Beyond the fragile state: Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies by Agence Française de Développement

Agence Française de Développement

working paper septembre november 2005 2005

Beyond the fragile state: Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies

Jean-Marc Châtaigner (chataignerjm@afd.fr) François Gaulme (gaulmef@afd.fr)

Département de la Recherche Agence Française de Développement 5 rue Roland Barthes Direction de la Stratégie 75012 Paris - France Département de la Recherche www.afd.fr

Contents

Summary

1. “Fragile states”: scope and limits of the concept

2. Contradictory modes of engagement

3. For a targeted approach to the situation of fragile states

4. Rebuilding social capital: donor actions should target all fragile actors and situations

Abbreviations and acronyms

References

Notes

Acknowledgements: The authors extend their particular thanks to Sandra Eugène, Karène Melloul and Jean-Bernard Véron for their contributions to the drafting of this paper. They also thank Georges d’Andlau, Béatrice Birot, Normand Lauzon, Olivier Charnoz, Philippe Chedanne, David Ambrosetti and Leslie Ouarzazi for their criticisms, suggestions and comments. The ideas expressed herein are nevertheless the authors’ sole responsibility.

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies

• november 2005 / 4

Summary

The concept of the “fragile state” came rapidly to the fore in

World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

2004 in the international policy debate about official

[CPIA] ranking2). Another approach to the same problem is

development assistance (ODA). The month of January 2005

to use the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the

saw not only an important international conference on the

point of reference, in order to underscore the fact that

topic, held in London, but also the simultaneous publication

“fragile states” are in fact those where the MDGs will not be

of two policy papers, one by the US Agency for International

achieved, or to highlight deficiencies in service delivery to

Development (USAID) and the other by the United

the population. The degree of “fragility” is defined according

Kingdom’s Department for International Development

to a few simple criteria (the rule of law, control over the

(DFID). Although the definition of the concept remains

country’s territory, respect for minorities, delivery of basic

ambiguous, there is now a clear trend towards assistance to

services), used exclusively within the national context. Such

“fragile” states, particularly among the OECD countries. The

definitions pay little attention to the country’s external

efforts in progress to formulate guidelines for good practice

vulnerability or the harmful consequences of certain policies

in this respect are aimed at counteracting the negative

of the developed countries or large private-sector firms. The

consequences of “performance-based aid”, a doctrine that in

“fragile states” approach does, however, allow for the

less than a decade has made “aid orphans” of the worst-

inclusion of the notion of preventive action, whereas

performing countries, i.e. those which have proved

previously the conceptual debate had been restricted to

incapable of turning the corner on “good governance”. The

countries emerging from crisis or in post-conflict situations.

Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Nepal are typical examples. Another aim for donors is to address the

Proposed actions to relieve the situation of fragile states are

risks that such countries represent both for their own

not all coherent and consistent with one another. Some

regions 1and for global security (Châtaigner, 2004). More

institutions (the DFID, OECD and World Bank) argue in

generally, the surge of interest in this concept may be

favour of technical and “apolitical” approaches to the

attributed to the ascendancy of security-related themes,

problems of fragile states, whereas others (USAID in

which now assign to ODA the task of contributing to the

particular) insist that priority should be given to their national

stability of the countries where it is provided, or even of

interests and to the primacy of geostrategic issues. For the

averting the risks of conflict in such countries. From this

United States, addressing the situation of fragile states is a

point of view, ODA has since 11 September 2001 regained

means of pursuing its fight “against regional insecurity, arms

the geostrategic importance it had during the Cold War.

proliferation, drug trafficking and terrorism” (Crocker, 2003). Though profoundly unilateral, the US position offers the

The situation of a “fragile state” is assessed in negative

advantages of flexibility and a solid (regardless of whether

terms, on the basis of two main criteria: (1) poor economic

one agrees with its premises) rationale based on

performance (the 46 fragile states listed in the DFID paper

geostrategic and security considerations. The approach of

are all low-income countries, and most of them are among

the DFID and the international financial organisations,

the less developed countries [LDCs]); (2) the effective

though apparently more consultative and consensus-

impotence of government (the DFID paper refers to the

oriented, still leads to value judgements, whose potential

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies

• november 2005 / 4

Summary

effects are all the more damaging because they remain

wide policies and approaches, can have negative

implicit (may not the consequences of donors rating a

consequences on the ground if they are applied

state as “fragile” become an additional factor of fragility?).

indiscriminately. At all events, the country-specific analysis should ultimately prevail and serve as the true

The question of whether to publish a list of fragile states

basis for action.

raises an unusual dilemma between, on the one hand, the desire to formulate as comprehensive and coherent an

None of these new lines of thought, however – and this is

approach as possible, and hence an approach based on

probably the point most worth pursuing – makes reference

measurable and comparable criteria, and on the other the

to a simple fact: if states are fragile, it is because their

political risk of placing countries on a “blacklist” of poor

societies are fragile as well. The breakdown of the social

governance, which has an immediate impact on private

bond is an aspect wholly ignored by current attempts to

investment.

define fragile states, except where this breakdown takes

Efforts to classify the various situations of fragile states

the extreme form of armed civil conflict. Yet the advocates

have thus far been rather limited. It would thus be helpful

of a more active and effective policy of assistance to

to pursue these efforts in order to improve the targeting of

fragile states generally stress the security aspect of

aid actions and to avoid approaches that are counter-

development, and to the extent possible from a preventive

productive in the specific situations considered, of which

standpoint. In this respect, social construction or

there have been many in recent years. Drawing on a

reconstruction becomes as important an aspect of

recent work on difficult partnerships (ODI, 2004), we

national or regional development as the fight against

propose here an approach to engagement based on a

poverty and income inequalities through economic

combination of two criteria: (i) the strength of the country’s

growth; moreover, these aspects may be partially

leadership; and (ii) the extent to which it accepts the

correlated, as when the perception of economic inequality

principles of international

law3.

This classification could be

as excessive becomes a source of tensions that weaken

used to better adapt the current recommendations

social ties. Through the integrated approach proposed in

concerning ODA – for example, those relating to the

this paper, it is suggested that, on this new social theme

achievement of the

MDGs4

or those put forward at the

as well and in a conception of development that is more

March 2005 Paris Forum on aid effectiveness – to the

social and microeconomic than strictly macroeconomic,

specific situation of each country. The fact is that good

France can make a contribution to refining international

general principles, such as the harmonisation of donor

thinking as a preliminary to concerted action to combat all

actions,

types of “fragility”, with a view to promoting stability,

systematic

widespread

reliance

intermediation by NGOs, and granting priority to sector-

conflict prevention and lasting peace.

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

1. “Fragile states”: scope and limits of the concept

The concept of the “fragile state” emerged from the debate

2001). The collapse of the traditional functions of states

over the recent dysfunctions of the international order:

(declining tax revenue and public spending, increased

although all member states of the United Nations remain

share of the informal sector, etc.) can encourage the

equal under the law, their performances as states have

criminalisation of economic activity and the emergence of

become very different, as witness the numerous “collapses”

further conflicts (Kaldor, 2000). The “privatisation of states”

of states in recent decades. From the narrowly political and

(Hibou et al., 1999), via the outsourcing of many functions

North American notion of a “collapsed state”, the first

to the private sector (some states have even relinquished

example of which was Somalia (Zartman, 1995), the

their “monopoly on legitimate violence” and relied on

theoretical debate shifted first to that of a “failed state”, a

private security firms to maintain or re-establish the

much broader and more complex concept (where the state

constitutional order 7), has de facto increased poverty,

has ceased to perform all of its basic functions, as in the

violence and ethnic and social antagonism.

cases of Liberia and Haiti), and then to that of a “fragile state”, which allows more analytical flexibility while making

Definitions of the “fragile state” are nonetheless highly

the implicit assumption that preventive action is a

diverse and inconclusive. The term is often used without in

possibility. For the international community, it is no longer a

fact specifying its meaning. The minimal definition used by

question of taking no action until a full-blown crisis exists,

DFID points to failure to achieve the MDGs as the main

when the threat to peace has become clear (pursuant, for

criterion for fragility, which is calculated on the basis of the

example, to Chapter VII of the UN Charter), but of

World Bank’s CPIA ranking and is estimated to affect 14%

strengthening the capacity of partner states to perform all of

of the world population (870 million people, mainly in sub-

their governmental functions. In international law, a state

Saharan Africa). The DFID’s proxy list of fragile states

cannot continue to exist unless it is genuinely capable of

includes countries as different as Angola, Cameroon,

exercising political authority (Satchivi,

2001) 5.

Indonesia, the Kiribati Islands, Mali, Nigeria, Tonga and Yemen. The United States’ doctrine, in contrast, denies the

The “fragile state” concept is also associated with the

existence of a set of “fragile states” that, when their

debate in progress since the late 1990s on the overall role

economic aggregates are compared to governance

of the state in development (Fukuyama, 2004). In contrast

aggregates, would be basically identical to the group of

to the traditional approaches stemming from the

LDCs. This doctrine holds that each individual case of

Washington

consensus 6,

Fukuyama discusses the notions

“fragility” is absolutely unique, as impoverished but

of the “strength” and “scope” of the state’s activities and

relatively peaceful countries (the Sahel countries, for

stresses the need to strengthen its institutions. He

example) should not be treated in the same way as

considers that, “since 11 September 2001, the main

potentially rich states that are ravaged by civil war

problem is not how to whittle statism down, but how to

(Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan)

improve it”. Building strong institutions, including those

needed to improve the functioning of markets, has once

(Afghanistan).

again become a priority for donors (World Bank, 1997 and

The existing definitions of the “fragile state” are thus quite

regional

crossroads

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies

with

complex

• november 2005 / 4

histories

“Fragile states”: scope and limits of the concept

different from one another. That used in the DFID paper of

machinery of government (Châtaigner, 2003). The fragility of

January 2005 is allusive and very general: “[states] where

a state, which is always attributed to the internal breakdown

the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to

of its institutions, may just as well be due to the negative

the majority of its people, including the poor” (DFID, 2005:

impact of the interests of another state, or even of powerful

7). In 2004, USAID, which was already making efforts to

private networks. Many external actors, in some cases

define the notion fairly precisely, viewed this term as

having connections inside the country concerned, can find it

covering three categories of states: (1) “failing states”, which

in their interest to be faced with a weak state in order to

are unable to deliver basic services and ensure the security

ensure: (i) the conditions required for their own security,

of their people; (2) “failed states”, where a substantial

which otherwise could be compromised (what, for example,

proportion of the country’s territory is not subject to central

would Ethiopia’s position be if confronted with a strong

government control or administration; (3) “recovering

Somali state?); (ii) increased profitability of their own

states”, where governance and stability are weak but

economic activities (e.g. illegal international trafficking in

improving (internal documents presented to the DAC in

timber, diamonds and rare ores in many African countries,

2004). In its policy paper of January 2005, USAID put

as well as drug trafficking in South-East Asia and Latin

forward a new proposal, distinguishing between only two

America).

types of fragile states: those which are merely “vulnerable” and those already “in crisis”, where armed conflict is “a

Paul Collier (2003) has highlighted the cause-and-effect

reality or a great risk” (USAID, 2005: 1).

relationship that can exist between the risk of civil war in certain countries and their economic characteristics

The OECD/DAC, for its part, regards the expression “difficult partnerships” (introduced about 2002 through the

LAP8)

(particularly the presence of natural resources). Other

and

analysts (e.g. Galy, 2003) have examined the possibility that

the more recent term “fragile states” as equivalent. Although

there might be pre-existing patterns of conflict-prone

these terms are intellectually distinct, the DAC lumps them

behaviour, rooted in countries’ anthropological and social

together under the same definition: “countries where there is

history, that would largely outweigh the existence of a state.

a lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to

Ellis (1999), for example, identified a religious factor in the

develop and implement pro-poor policies” (DAC, Office of

case of Liberia. Conflicts in neighbouring countries have

the Chair, 2005). As for the World Bank, its LICUS initiative

also been recognised as one of the major causes of the

does not benefit all the states that the Bank regards as

collapse of a state (State Failure Task Force Report, 2000).

fragile, but only those deemed to display a “debilitating

The complex, intertwined nature of the forces involved thus

combination” of “deficiencies” in politics, governance and

becomes a matter of crucial importance, which cannot be

institutions (various internal Bank documents, 2004). Its list

encompassed merely by analysis of institutional strength

thus comprises fewer countries (thirty-odd) than the DFID

within a given territory (although the strength of institutions

list, even though the latter is based on the last two quintiles

does of course play a vital role in controlling the destabilising

(4 and 5) of the CPIA ranking. As can be seen, views on

influences entering this territory from the regional

these questions are far from consistent.

environment).

All of these approaches have the appreciable disadvantage

To illustrate the strong negative externalities that may affect

of being based exclusively on analyses at national level and

states, we present here (Figure 1) the mechanisms of a

not taking account of the weakening effects of wider regional

“new triangle trade” between Western countries (Europe,

situations. The spreading of the Liberian conflict in West

United States, Canada), the former Soviet bloc and a

Africa illustrates a process of “exportation of social relations

number of African states (Châtaigner, 2004). This illegal

based on violence and intimidation”, combining the

trade not only benefits from the fragility of these states, it is

instrumentalisation of unemployed youth, trafficking in arms

also an active cause of their continued poverty9, their

and natural resources, and Mafia-style capture of the

criminalisation and their destabilisation.

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

“Fragile states”: scope and limits of the concept

Figure 1 – Dynamics of the new triangle trade and the weakening of states

Western countries

Eastern European countries

Financial transfers

Illicit exports of raw materials

Corruption

Illegal arms sales Mercenaries

Southern countries

Engagement in fragile states would thus require that

global economic systems […], some leaders of weak

these international phenomena be addressed and that a

states have found that they could manipulate the terms of

concerted effort be made to control illegal trafficking.

international trade in their favour”10 . He also finds,

Reluctance to take such action remains strong, and donor

however, that “the weak states’ internal lack of capacity

activities rarely take such factors into account. Some may

gives a competitive advantage to firms having the

see in this the perpetuation of long-standing inequalities,

resources to cope with anarchy”. The question of what

as the fragility of the have-nots is the consequence of the

degree of responsibility certain international companies

power and domination of the haves: “The model becomes

bear in the decay of states is always handled with great

more secure and more refined, but the model doesn’t

care by the international community 11. Negotiated,

change. It corresponds typically to the unequal model of

voluntary solutions (of which the Kimberley process for

colonial trade” (Guigaz, 2002). It may also be true that the

diamonds is a perfect example) are preferred to more

aid community instinctively seeks to stay out of real

coercive approaches. Public accusations (such as those

conflicts (Véron, 2004) and that only grudgingly will it

made in the reports of the UN panels on Angola, Sierra

actually address problems in their entirety (many donors,

Leone, Liberia, the DRC, etc.) have rarely been followed

including the World Bank and the European Commission,

by legal proceedings. Setting aside the difficulties of legal

have engagement instruments focused exclusively on

co-operation in places where the rule of law is merely a

national frameworks and do not seem willing to bear the

hazy notion, it cannot be excluded that, for various

additional financial and political costs of regional

reasons (intelligence requirements, economic and

programmes), particularly when these problems are

business interests, etc.), the Northern countries prefer in

negatively perceived or difficult for public opinion to

some cases to close their eyes to ethically questionable

grasp.

behaviour on the part of their firms. Amazingly enough, a person like Victor Bout, a former KGB officer involved in

These dynamics do not, of course, work only in favour of

many arms-trafficking activities in Africa and the Balkans,

external actors. In this regard, Reno (1999) notes that

and even with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has

“located at the interface between local economies and

never been seriously bothered (Châtaigner, 2005).

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

2. Contradictory modes of engagement

Behind this theoretical fog and troubling lack of conceptual

beneficiaries – principles that continue to be strongly

rigour 12 ,

affirmed at the level of the OECD.

there are also two fundamentally opposed views

as to what stance to adopt in terms of action to assist “fragile states”.

Another unusual feature of the US stance concerning “fragile states” is that it does not hesitate to make

The first is that of the United Kingdom, or more precisely

judgements on their situation, using the criterion of

the DFID, which is increasingly influential in forums like the

“legitimacy”, that take an apparently legal form but have

World

Bank1 3

and which, seeking a revision of the

thoroughly political or even moral implications, in contrast to

“Washington consensus”, consistently argues for a holistic,

the

much

harmonised, technocratic and ostensibly non-partisan

approach14 .

conventional

and

neutral

British

approach to the problems of these states, regarded as a

political “willingness” as a yardstick for the “indicative

specific target group.

features” of these states, and notes that “tolerance of

In particular, USAID emphasises the notion of

diverse customs, cultures and beliefs” is one of the The second view, that of the United States, has been given

distinctive criteria for the “legitimacy” of a state, as viewed

vigorous expression in international meetings such as the

from a social standpoint. The thinking of the DFID, of

Senior Level Forum on fragile states held in London in

course, includes no such approach1 4. On these issues, the

January 2005, and the Paris forum on aid effectiveness the

only common ground between the two policy papers of

following March. As we have seen, the United States

January 2005 lies in the choice of the criterion of “effective

refuses to accept that idea that there exists an internally

service delivery”, which is presented in both evaluation

coherent group of fragile states comparable to the group of

grids as a factor influencing the fragility of states (USAID,

LDCs. It therefore insists on case-by-case treatment, with a

2005: 4, Table 1; DFID, 2005: 8, Box 1). Although

technical approach confined to the phase of situation

profoundly unilateral in nature, the US position offers two

analysis, as all development assistance activity properly

advantages: (i) flexibility and (ii) a manifestly solid

speaking is subject to political criteria (special relationship

(regardless of whether one agrees with its premises)

with Washington and a desire for democracy and/or combat

rationale

terrorism, according to the views repeated tirelessly, at all

considerations.

based

geostrategic

and

security

levels, by the spokespersons of the current administration). The recent division of the US bilateral ODA system between

The USAID approach in terms of values thus stands

the traditional field of activity of USAID and that of the MCA,

opposed to a more collegial and more international way of

which was established with a new objective of supporting

considering the question of what principles should govern

“winners” (and hence in theory is not concerned with fragile

action in favour of fragile states. The latter approach

states), has reinforced a tendency in Washington to adopt

consists first of all in setting aside political and moral

a cautious attitude towards the principles of aid

judgements on the situation of beneficiary countries (the

harmonisation and alignment of both donors and

“legitimacy” of a state is neither questioned nor examined

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies

• november 2005 / 4

Contradictory modes of engagement

from the standpoint of criteria of popular approval, as long

policy pillars defined by the United States’ National Security

as the state enjoys international recognition within the UN

Strategy of September 2002), the models for which are

framework). In addition, it makes no direct and explicit

presumably Iraq and Afghanistan, or even the current

reference to 11 September 2001, nor to the external policy

projects in Sudan (which have been frustrated by the

and military action of a given country, instead concentrating

situation in Darfur), in which the United States has placed

exclusively on developing principles of “good practice” for

itself deliberately at the head of a global coalition, stands

aid providers, a task that is progress at the

DAC1 5.

In this

opposed to a step-by-step British conception, which seeks

case, the aim is to formulate a new normative system

to be more persuasive and less direct in the attitude to

having a technical nature and adapting the prior rules of

adopt vis-à-vis fragile states. In this option, the concern for

ODA to a new situation and to the factors, other than

realism is expressed very differently from the former option:

political,

international

no allusion is made to “national” interests as such; to the

development assistance. This system is deliberately

that

block

the

workings

contrary, these interests are more or less explicitly rejected,

designed to be a restrictive, top-down affair; it is derived

in accordance with the principle of “ethical” diplomacy

more from theory than from practice, and more from the

adopted by the Labour Party as soon as it was returned to

consensus of donors than from observation on the ground.

power in 1997 in order to bring both political and civil

Its mechanism can lead to mistaken judgements

society to share the same global vision rather than a

concerning local situations that are much more complex

nationalist outlook (Gaulme, 2001 and 2003). In

than those described by donors in their endless case

accordance with this change of outlook, the DFID professes

studies.

to be acting in the interest of the countries to which it delivers aid. As regards the Commission for Africa

In contrast to this fundamentally multilateral option, the

established in 2004 by Tony Blair, its aim, through the

USAID policy paper suggests, in terms of aid to fragile

priority granted to Africa, is in fact merely to pursue, in the

states, an approach stemming initially from a bilateral

words of the title of its report, “our common interest”, thus

positioning, with a stance that is both independent and

compounding economic neo-liberalism with a “neo-

flexible, including as regards the establishment of the

utilitarian” stance which applies to the current process of

current criteria of “effectiveness” and “legitimacy” of

globalisation the practical moralism developed in the United

governance, which will be “refined based on pilot testing in

Kingdom in the past, from Bentham to John Stuart Mill,

the field” (USAID, 2005: 4, note to Table 1). Although

which has had little influence in France since the

USAID strongly reaffirms the United States’ participation in

Enlightenment.

donor thinking on how to improve strategies concerning fragile states (USAID, 2005: 10-11), the conclusion to its

Another noteworthy difference between the DFID position

policy paper defines the problem of fragile states primarily

and that of USAID, which ensues from the above principles,

as “a source of our nation’s most pressing security threats”

is that the DFID now argues for great caution as regards

(USAID, 2005: 11). The paper also recommends that

the desire to reform beneficiary countries, particularly in the

strategic choices be made among fragile states in need of

political sphere. Indeed, the deliberately unselective nature

external aid, in order to engage, as massively as possible,

of the British approach (the aim being to assist as many

only on the basis of two criteria that form a rather

fragile states as possible, without pre-selection) implies a

paradoxical combination: the country’s importance in US

much less ambitious attitude as regards both the resources

foreign policy and the availability of other donors to work

to be used by donors and the goals to be pursued in their

with the United States to bring about “constructive change”

support for reforms. Thus the DFID policy paper, although

(USAID, 2005: 5).

the theoretical dimension is otherwise held to a minimum, puts forward a new concept – that of “good enough

This far-reaching conception of full engagement (in terms of

governance” – that reflects its concern for pragmatism. This

diplomacy, defence and development – the three foreign

approach is not presented as an exclusively bilateral affair;

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

Contradictory modes of engagement

in its policy paper, DFID refers on this point to an earlier

being floated, in all their diversity, in the OECD countries

model of realism in the use of conditionality, namely that

undoubtedly constitute the beginnings of an international

proposed by the World Bank in 2004 through its LICUS initiative.

response by donors to the difficulties arising from two

The spirit of this new approach – relativistic as regards

distinct but equally troubling phenomena: (i) an overly

donors’ evaluation of the performance of beneficiary

mechanical – one might say naive – application of the

countries – may be summed up as follows: on condition

Washington consensus on ODA in development circles;

that the state actually fulfils certain basic governmental

(ii) the massive but also largely unforeseeable and

functions (protecting people from harm, providing an

potentially destructive effects of the dissemination of the

economic framework to enable them to support

Western political and economic model throughout the

themselves), donors may in fact be led to tolerate

world since the demise of the Soviet Union. As the

practices (corruption, lack of training and of capacity)

Development Co-operation Directorate of the DAC points

that, though unacceptable in an ideal state, may be

out (DCD/DAC, 2005), “the total amount of aid provided

temporarily acceptable if the higher-priority and more

to fragile states, apart from those emerging from violent

immediate goals are actually achieved. Fragile countries

conflict, seems exceptionally low, even considering the

receiving international aid would thus henceforth be

mediocre performance of these countries”.

required to undertake only limited reforms, with the aim of “achieving visible results in the short term, however

It is not the least of the paradoxes of these new ideas on

modest”, while “avoiding the most politically or socially

support to fragile states that they are rediscovering

controversial issues” and “ensuring that reform does not

several key ideas maintained for nearly half a century by

erode what capacity already exists” (DFID, 2005: 20).

French practice in development assistance. These longstanding ideas, which had fallen into obscurity amid the

The question of whether to engage in fragile states

far-reaching

intellectual

upheavals

resulting

from

ultimately leads to an issue that cannot be evaded: that of

globalisation and its liberating force, had mainly to do

the international community’s “right to interfere” to

with: (i) the need for state participation to control any

address observed deficiencies of governance, or even

process of economic and social development; (ii) the

what some call the “duty to interfere” when human rights

need for domestic and external security as a pre-requisite

violations reach a certain scale. For many US authors,

for development; (iii) the need for realism in the

“external powers, acting in the name of human rights and

application of principles and for adaptation to the specific

democratic legitimacy, have not simply the right but the

conditions of each country and region, particularly in the

moral obligation to intervene” (Fukuyama, 2004).

political and social spheres.

Moreover, this responsibility may be considered to fall first and foremost to the United States (Kagan, 2002).

At the same time, French development thinking and

Whenever such intervention involves the use of force,

practice have been obliged to adapt to the realities of the

however, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the

new century. What worked, for example, in the political

express authorisation of the United Nations Security

environment of the African independence period is no

Council is required, even if the aim is preventive. As

longer valid today. The problem of the fragility of states

Dejammet (2003) points out, “the Charter is simple and

must be addressed today in clear-headed fashion rather

flexible: it has never prevented the United Nations from

than through traditional diplomatic formalism, notably

becoming involved in the internal situation of a state

because of the new imperatives of conflict prevention. In

when that situation seemed likely to affect regional or

point of fact, when events escape the control of the

international peace and security”.

framework of the “nation-state” (which in many newly independent countries never really achieved this

Despite their limitations and the differences noted above,

objective), both at the top and at the bottom, this is

all of the new proposals concerning fragile states that are

reflected economically by the rise of the informal

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

Contradictory modes of engagement

economy, which has firmly established itself as such, for

group of states, because this concept does reflect current

lack of an adequate remedy and of an international task

concerns. This intellectual and practical progress needs

force capable of supplying one. Combating and

to be consolidated and taken further, however, since too

containing this multitude of disorders is an urgent

many of the recommendations contained in the policy

necessity.

papers

discussed

above,

whose

reasoning

insufficiently developed, are based on appeals to In a world where disorder is clearly one of the

principle instead of carefully argued analysis. One of the

fundamental features 16, these new concerns reflect a

main avenues for discussion could be a more detailed

badly needed awareness of contemporary reality. It would

classification of the situations of fragile states, in order to

thus be futile to reject the notion of fragile states out of

implement measures better adapted to the actual

hand, on the grounds that it does not refer to a coherent

conditions of governance in each country.

ÂŠ AFD Document de travail - Beyond the fragile state -

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societiesâ&#x20AC;˘

november 2005 / 4

3. For a targeted approach to the situation of fragile states

At the request of the LAP group of the DAC, in the context

partnerships into the “fragile states” context and

of preparations for the London Forum of January 2005, the

appreciably modifying one of the criteria suggested by the

Overseas Development Institute outlined a classification of

ODI, we can plot the situations of fragile states on a

four types of “difficult partnerships” (ODI, 2004). This

dynamic co-ordinate system (Figure 2), with the x-axis

classification has the merit of showing that different types of

indicating their acceptance of the principles of international

situations do exist. The four categories of difficult

law and the y-axis the strength of their leadership 18. This

partnerships identified by the Institute are as follows: (i)

criterion of acceptance of the principles of international law

situations in which strong leadership is provided by the

is not used here as a value judgement, but as an indication

beneficiary government (the ODI cites Afghanistan, East

of whether a country actually fulfils its international

Timor and Sudan as examples); (ii) situations in which

commitments. We suggest that this evaluation should be

strong leadership is provided by a single donor or small

conducted in the light of two criteria: (1) compliance with

group of donors (as in the case of Sierra Leone); (iii)

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter19,

situations in which the beneficiary government provides

which calls on states to abstain from the use or the threat of

weak leadership and there is a lack of donor cohesion (the

force in international relations; and (2) internal observance

ODI’s examples are Tajikistan and the Democratic Republic

of international conventions on human rights and

of Congo); (iv) the most difficult partnerships ( “isolationist”

humanitarian law (particularly, in conflict situations, the

states such as North Korea,

Burma/Myanmar 17

and

Zimbabwe).

Geneva conventions and their 1977 protocols). These principles are obviously not applicable to fragile states alone – and many “strong states” try to get round them20,

From this perspective, the distinctive feature of countries in

particularly when they themselves have pockets of fragility

the last group mentioned (and to a lesser extent Kenya)

to manage21 – but failure to observe them entails strong

would thus be not so much the internal collapse of the state

internal and external potential for destabilisation. This

or the inadequacies of governance as the development of

approach seems to us, among other things, to have the

tension between the authorities of these countries and the

merit of not basing the fragile states question solely on

main donors and/or the international community. According

criteria of economic and social performance: for example,

to the DAC, this is sufficient reason to include such cases

neither Senegal nor Mali, despite their poor economic and

under the “fragile states” heading. The conceptual haziness

social indicators, can be considered fragile states according

of this notion is necessarily conducive to confusion,

to these two criteria (they are certainly less “fragile” than

because it identifies as a factor of fragility the fact that a

Côte d’Ivoire, though the latter is much wealthier, and

state, without necessarily constituting a threat to global

Chad). Similarly, this grid does away with ideological

peace and security, does not follow a policy conforming to

assessments of the actions of a given state based on its

the international liturgy of the moment or to the requests of

international

the donor community.

politically to the United States, appears as a weaker state

allegiances:

Colombia,

though

closer

than Venezuela; Kenya, which has been strongly criticised By transposing this set of issues concerning difficult

by some donors for its failure to root out corruption 22, is

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies

• november 2005 / 4

For a targeted approach to the situation of fragile states

probably less fragile than the “good pupil” Uganda

countries considered using this grid, in order to consider

(which has been deeply involved in the successive

in particular whether strategies can be developed to help

conflicts in Rwanda and the DRC and in raw materials

them emerge from fragile or difficult situations. By way of

trafficking in the Great Lakes region).

example, we have plotted a few states on a graph (Figure 2) representing the four main situations

It may thus be of interest to analyse trends in the

encountered.

Figure 2 – The fragility of states: strength of leadership and degree of openness

Strong North Korea East Timor

Leadership

Burma

Sudan Sierra Leone Central African Republic DRC

Somalia

Weak Openness

High

The actions taken by the international community should of

country. In the case of Haiti from 1997 to 2000 (see Box 1),

course vary with the situation of the countries considered.

donors relied heavily on civil society, providing funds to

The advantage of this classification is that it clearly shows

many NGOs, which had the negative effect of dispersing

that there can be no single formula of engagement.

the aid effort. Their support to private stakeholders, in

Clumsily implemented strategies can have effects contrary

particular for education and health projects, was not always

to those desired: for example, external pressure exerted on

safe from misappropriation and in any event had no

authoritarian regimes rarely leads to democratisation and in

catalytic effect (enrolment rates declined despite the

most cases tends rather to strengthen their autarkic and

proliferation of private elementary schools).

repressive tendencies (e.g. Zimbabwe and Burma). On the other hand, without efforts directed specifically to rebuilding

The most complex situation is clearly that of the countries

the state, development actions conducted in countries with

in the first quadrant, which display strong leadership and

weak leadership and a low level of openness will

low acceptance of the values of international law. The

necessarily be limited, and will have little chance of being

strategy most often adopted will be that of a complete break

shaped and taken up by local stakeholders. Emerging from

(including the suspension of all development assistance

a situation of fragility requires both increased influence of

and the application of international sanctions), leading in

international standards and strengthening the capacity of

most cases to increased isolationism and authoritarianism

local authorities. Without such support to local government,

on the part of the regimes concerned, and sometimes to

the action undertaken will be similar to placing the country

open conflict (Iraq). The regime change in Liberia in 2003,

in a situation of complete dependency, whose sustainability

in contrast, illustrates the value of an alternative and two-

cannot be guaranteed when the external partners leave the

sided approach, offering the current leadership the

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

For a targeted approach to the situation of fragile states

prospect of a negotiated departure. In this view, sanctions

causes of the US operation Restore Hope in Somalia in

or an embargo should not be applied for more than a limited

1992) but rather outright re-establishment of governmental

time, and should be targeted as precisely as possible on

and administrative authority. The approach should be as

political leaders (through travel restrictions and financial

fully integrated as possible and requires considerable

sanctions), with a detailed agenda for negotiations. In this

outlays to restore the operation of the sovereign ministries

respect, a good political model for negotiation is that

and neutralise the forces hostile to the revival of the state,

defined by the European Union in Article 96 of the Cotonou

including if necessary the implementation of disarmament,

Agreement, which, in the words of the European

demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. It

Commission, creates an area for “dialogue upstream of

also requires a special effort in favour of the more

conditionality”. ODA, though all too often left hanging in this

vulnerable and/or marginalised actors, who suffer the most

type of situation, does have a role to play in continuing to

from the disappearance of state authority and are subjected

assist people and show them that the international

to the diktat of militias and armed bands. In this context, any

community has not left them to their fate, or to the mercy of

international presence, including its traditional forms of

their leaders. To avoid the suspicion of collusion with the

project aid and technical assistance, will be welcome as

regimes in power, bilateral donors will do well to route their

long as it takes account of the security concerns (even

funds, without reducing them, via the United Nations

where states have disappeared, there are always pockets

system or NGOs.

of relative stability) and inequalities that may have given rise to the crisis (for example, by taking action in the areas

The issues will be different for countries in the second

that were the least developed in the country before the

quadrant (weak leadership and low acceptance of the

conflict). It is also important in such situations to maintain

principles of international law). Through the outbreak of civil

the presence of humanitarian aid organisations (an overly

war, usually due to internal causes (the mismanagement

rapid disengagement of these organisations can have

and corruption of former leaders and their monopolisation

disastrous results if not offset by the inflow of development

of power along ethnic lines are often pointed to), this

aid resources) and to provide for their security (the

situation can lead to the virtual disappearance of the state

traditional function of UN peace-keeping operations).

and all forms of public services, the uncontested power of warlords (Liberia in the early 1990s), the emergence of

The third quadrant (weak leadership and greater

local mini-states, as in Somalia (Somaliland). The US

acceptance of international law) comprises two types of

intervention in Iraq pushed this country abruptly into this

states: (i) those where, following a crisis, the international

second quadrant. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime

community has taken over the functions of a failed state

alone would probably not have sufficed to do so, had not

(e.g. through a peace-keeping or peace-building operation);

the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul

and (ii) states which, though willing to meet their

Bremer, decided for ideological reasons (combating

international commitments, lack the economic and social

Ba’athism) to dismantle the existing security forces.

resources needed to assert their authority. In the first case, the importance granted by the international community to

The threat that these “dismembered states” represent for

the involvement of representative prominent figures who

the international community lies precisely in the lack of

are among the local “winners” in the process of change can

authority and the anarchy prevailing on their territories. This

be the determining factor in whether the reconstruction of

threat was clearly under-estimated in a country such as

the state succeeds: one of the best examples of this in

Afghanistan before 11 September 2001. In this situation,

recent years is the successful operation conducted by

the only possibility for action lies in massive intervention by

Sergio Vieira de Melo, the special representative of the UN

the international community, which must replace the failed

Secretary-General to East Timor, who from the outset

state and assume its functions, with the aim not simply of

sought to involve all the political forces in Timor in the

providing humanitarian relief (this was one of the major

reconstruction process. In the second case, it will also be

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

For a targeted approach to the situation of fragile states

important for donors to give their full support to the national

dismantling of the “Caistab” (the state-controlled marketing

authorities to help them assert their legitimacy: efforts should

board for cocoa and coffee, the country’s main commodities),

be made to integrate donor projects and programmes into

in the name of liberalisation and fighting corruption (the

domestic frameworks, and the use of budgetary aid should

“Caistab” was regarded as one of the “privy purses” of

not be rejected, despite the reluctance that might be

President Houphouët-Boigny), the World Bank and European

engendered by an overly strict analysis of the fiduciary risk

Union actively contributed to weakening the local social

and the risk of misappropriation of funds. Indeed, it is

model, which had previously been based on central

precisely in this type of situation that the positive dynamics of

government control over the redistribution of the rent derived

trust and ownership will have their full effect. The lesson of

from coffee and cocoa exports. Market opening can also

Mozambique’s emergence from civil war is particularly

entail redistribution of resources in ways that are apt to stir up

enlightening: such countries, starting from scratch and well

conflict (Severino and Charnoz, 2005).

supported by the international community, have every chance of obtaining positive outcomes, first through a catching-up

Figure 3 represents the undesired effects of the positions

effect, and subsequently through the establishment of a

taken by the international community with respect to three

virtuous circle of trust and reconstruction.

states. It is evident that the social realities of these countries were under-estimated, which had the effect of triggering

States in the fourth quadrant (combining strong leadership

processes that were not desired initially. International

and a high degree of openness to international values) may

pressure may either weaken the local leadership, sometimes

seem to be good examples of escape from situations of

very suddenly (with a concomitant rise in political and ethnic

fragility and hence to require less attention on the part of the

antagonism), for the sake of an uncertain political opening

international community. It will nonetheless be worthwhile to

(Iraq), or increase the resistance of countries’ leaders, but in

pay close attention to volatility and to the impact of external

the form of isolationist stances and domestic repression

shocks, which can still adversely affect such countries’ social

(Zimbabwe). The case of Guinea-Bissau clearly illustrates the

equilibrium. Moreover, internal breakdowns due to a gradual

limitations of non-intervention: for lack of an appropriate

weakening of the country’s leadership may be misevaluated

international reaction to General Mane’s coup d’état of June

and underestimated, as in Guinea-Bissau until June 1998 and

1998 and the delivery of aid resources in accordance with a

Côte d’Ivoire in 1999. The latter case, in fact, is one of the

prior analysis of this country’s fragility2 3, the country sank into

most significant examples of donors contributing to the

a situation of perpetual crisis that has not been resolved by

weakening of a state: by arguing incessantly for the

the various elections held since.

Figure 3 – Undesired developments in fragile states and inappropriate actions by the international community

Strong

Iraq (2003)

Zimbabwe (2005)

Leadership

Zimbabwe (1990) Guinea-Bissau (2005)

Guinea-Bissau (1998)

Iraq (2005) Weak

Openness

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

High

november 2005 / 4

For a targeted approach to the situation of fragile states

Provided it is not applied too broadly or used mechanically to

initiating analysis of individual situations. At all events, specific

deduce rules of conduct for the international community, this

analysis of each individual case should ultimately prevail and

attempt at classification might, in our view, be helpful for

serve as the real basis for international engagement.

Box 1. Haiti: the dilemmas of engagement in fragile states24 The crisis of February 2004 revealed the structural and multi-dimensional (political, economic, social and environmental) nature of the crisis in Haiti, as well as the failure of past aid efforts. This has led some development actors to examine the shortcomings of their earlier actions, particularly during the 1994-2000 period, which saw strong mobilisation on the part of the international community (US$2.5 billion in aid has been granted to Haiti in the last ten years). The country’s internal instability and weak governance were further obstacles to the implementation of a sustainable development strategy. Donors’ lack of co-ordination helped to weaken the state. Paradoxically, institutions such as the World Bank (World Bank, 2004) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA, 2004) have noted after the fact that their overly zealous engagement may have produced an effect opposite to that intended. The proliferation of project committees weakened Haiti’s governmental institutions and impeded domestic ownership of the reforms. Moreover, the state’s withdrawal from responsibility also weakened donors’ ability to control governance. This effect was amplified by their mistrust of the state. Donors’ tendency to prefer private aid channels, via local or foreign NGOs, also had contradictory effects. Privatising aid in this way helped to build Haitian civil society and stimulated local initiative, but unfortunately it also heightened the erosion of public services by dispersing aid efforts. Another risk arises from the volatility of aid and the discontinuity of aid flows to the recipient country. In Haiti’s case, the unpredictability of aid flows compromised the coherence of the programme to re-establish peace and rebuild the state, as well as the economic development programme. This is not to say that international aid is responsible for all of the country’s ills. Haiti’s chronic instability and lack of security are primarily the result of internal factors. Yet the Haitian case illustrates the dilemmas facing donors in countries with bad or weak governance: strengthening state capacity versus support to civil society, national versus local action, public versus private beneficiaries. The balance and mix of these different types of engagement nevertheless would seem to be the keys to the success of actions in fragile states, which are generally more dependent on and sensitive to the conditions and fluctuations of external aid. The new Interim Co-operation Framework (ICF) set up under the joint lead of the UNDP, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Commission in July 2004 is designed to address these difficulties. Security is still lacking in Haiti, however, and both the population and donors are still threatened with instability. As in other fragile states, priority has been given to the organisation of the municipal, legislative and presidential elections scheduled for the autumn of 2005. The future of the development programme in Haiti will depend on whether these elections go smoothly and on their results.

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

4. Rebuilding social capital: donor actions should target all fragile actors and situations

These observations point up the narrowness of the

receive international funds without respecting the

international approach to fragile states as currently

fundamental rights of their fellow citizens (whence the

formulated. Although the notion of “fragility” does emerge

importance, as pointed out in the preceding section, of not

as an undeniable reality of today’s world, why would the

taking a solely economic approach to fragility but of taking

international community want to confine it – to compress it,

account of their acceptance of the internal and external

so to speak – in the straitjacket of a nation-state framework

values of international law).

that in many ways proves to be rather artificial? In terms of international agreements, the ODA system has historically

“Strong” states may also have particular situations of

always preferred the framework of the state and traditional

fragility to manage26, owing to inegalitarian regional

partnerships between governments25 . But apart from the

contexts;

use of legal instruments, which is unavoidable, why limit

differences of identity exploited by extremist elements of all

oneself to a viewpoint that profoundly distorts the observed

persuasions to neutralise the central government’s room

facts? Why, for example, should donors feel obliged to

for manoeuvre. Such regional or local “pockets of fragility”

negotiate with states that are in effect “privatised”, in the

are characterised by social resistance to development and

worst sense of the word, and in some cases entirely

strong potential for engendering conflict (the conflict in the

dominated by anarchical, corrupt, violent and authoritarian

Casamance region, for example, was one of the factors

groups?

that triggered the crisis in Guinea-Bissau). Management of

social,

ethnic

religious

antagonism;

these local crises will require long-term actions and Moreover, the approach exclusively based on the concept

investment, and in most cases active support from the

of “fragile states”, rather than on “fragility” in all its aspects,

international community. In this specific case, the latter

in fact increases the risk that ODA will be instrumentalised

cannot take the form solely of budgetary aid or aid

for political and geostrategic ends – the worst possible

harmonised within the framework of the poverty reduction

response to problems of sustainable development. Given

policies established by PRSPs, since the latter, which are

the persistent conceptual fuzziness of the “fragile state”

inherently national in scope, will not necessarily take local

concept, what could be easier than to seize on this formula

needs into account. Development projects do not merely

to disguise subjective support for a given beneficiary

have an economic impact, but can also serve the purpose

country as an apparently objective decision? Governments

of social mediation between groups with conflicting

with a poor international image could thus find themselves

interests (for example, the traditional opposition between

ostracised by a label used in a deliberately pejorative way,

herders and crop farmers, which played a role in the recent

in which the all-embracing notion of the fragile state

outbreak of the Darfur conflict). One of the international

obscures some of their occasional successes; while

community’s rather successful actions in this respect

others, though unyielding in their capacity for repression

(Châtaigner, 2004) is the support provided to Niger and

and not at all fragile in this respect, could benefit from

Mali by the UNDP and France (with, in the case of the

adroit window dressing of their overall record, allowing

latter country, a discreet mediation process conducted by

them, on the strength of their designation as “fragile”, to

Edgar Pisani) to address the Tuareg issue in the early 1990s.

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies

• november 2005 / 4

Rebuilding social capital: donor actions should target all fragile actors and situations

Under these circumstances, without abandoning the

To conduct a thorough-going revision of the very

“fragile states” concept, it is certainly necessary to put it

conception of development assistance to countries in

into clearer intellectual and practical perspective by

crisis, and in so doing to leave nobody behind (or rather, to

deliberately broadening the scope of the concept of

leave behind no group or type of actors), we recommend

“fragility”, with a view to addressing such issues holistically.

an analytical and practical approach to fragile situations

This could be mainly be done by:

that is not restricted to the frontiers of the state but also considers those of societies (because no aspect of such

concentrating efforts on examining and addressing factors

crises will stop automatically at the limits of state activity

of fragility at the level of the various actors involved,

properly speaking). Such an approach could be applied at

regardless of their political or social status, and of specific

three levels.

situations; broadening the theoretical and operational scope of ODA

A central and explicit objective of this approach would be

towards the structuring of societies, either within or outside

to rebuild the social bond where this bond has been

the framework of the state, systematically pursuing the

destroyed or severely damaged. This would not be

two-fold objective of consolidating the social bond and

opposed to the broader goals of combating poverty and

strengthening the microeconomic fabric;

inequality, but would become a complementary element,

working on the question of identity-building and recognition

whose purpose is to tackle the heart of the problem of bad

of the cultural diversity of the societies and sub-groups

governance and lack of insecurity, because this problem is

making up a state.

driven by a process of general social disintegration, requiring an equally comprehensive response going

In simple terms, development actions must be adapted as

beyond

immediate

results

(economic

and

social

closely as possible to local realities, which is particularly

performance) and the question of forms and practices

difficult in fragile countries or areas at risk because the

(governance in all its aspects) to address that of values

information available to donors is scanty, often unreliable

(the nature of the social bond in its specific cultural

and often sensitive, and because donors’ knowledge of

context). This shift in focus thus involves the deployment of

what is happening on the ground is often derived entirely

a humanistic conception of development. This conception

from intermediaries, who have their own agendas. The

remains closely tied to the French intellectual and political

challenge, then, seems to be to develop an easy-to-use

tradition, but has a good deal in common with the notion of

analytical tool that can provide a rapid assessment of local

“human security” that emerged in the 1990s (Commission

social realities, in order to identify the causes of fragility as

for Human Security, 2003) and has been pursued by some

well as the levers available for adapting donors’ actions. A

bilateral donors, including Japan and Canada. It would

social analysis need not examine all sectors of society

highlight the importance of the relationships between

(which would be unrealistic in terms of both costs and the

citizens and their institutions.

time required), but must focus on areas that are directly linked to the stability and/or fragility of the region

From this perspective, the first level of response to a

concerned. Prior analysis of the stakeholders having

situation of fragility would be that of local realities, specific

power, influence and capacity (including the ability to do

to a community and a territory2 7, and viewed from two

harm) can help to identify these areas (e.g. mining in

standpoints: that of citizenship and the political bond, and

Central Africa and, in a less well-known example, electrical

that of civil society. These two aspects are complementary,

power in Haiti). The determining role played by illegal

especially since, in the crisis of traditional values and

actors in many fragile countries obviously makes this type

hierarchies that remains a central cause of the difficulties

of analysis extremely sensitive and can raise security

encountered by “fragile states”, it is often difficult to

problems for the development experts responsible for

distinguish in practice between “political” society and “civil”

conducting it.

society as defined by criteria which are generally not those

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

november 2005 / 4

Rebuilding social capital: donor actions should target all fragile actors and situations

contemporary

Western

countries.

“Grassroots”

the fact that federal entities inherited from the colonial

democratisation and empowerment will also necessarily go

period have sometimes survived the independence of the

hand in hand with an economic approach conducted along

constituent countries (e.g. the Franc Zone). Beyond this, it

the same lines, i.e. not at all limited to national aspects

also involves the less visible issue of the more diffuse – but

evaluated quantitatively in terms of broad economic

no less important – complementarities and oppositions that

aggregates. To address the problem of violence in fragile

may exist within a group of states. These complementarities

countries, one must address individual models of

and oppositions are the constantly changing expression of

misconduct, the entrenchment of violent and delinquent

the deep, long-standing social relations, having both

behaviours in daily life (which in turn provokes responses

political and economic dimensions, that characterise a

that are equally disturbing, such as massive reliance on

given area. They generally relate to maintaining specialised

private security firms) and the collapse of social bonds

groups with a common identity living within a single

(when the bases for trust and reciprocity are broken).

transnational area, as is often the case for herders, fishermen and “cross-border” ethnic groups.

The second level of approach to a non-statist concept of fragility would involve strengthening or rebuilding networks

Fragile situations, once they are properly diagnosed,

of microeconomic relationships (if necessary extending

require considerable adaptation on the part of both the

across borders), with the organisational modes that may be

governments concerned and donors in order to avoid the

associated

organisations,

application of the usual ODA recipes. Such situations, if

organisations representing a given generation, trade unions

their root causes are really to be addressed, call for periods

and various regulatory systems). This effort must not

of consultation (which are essential, though they can be

neglect the informal sector, which may be very broadly

long and their results are uncertain), mediation, recognition

defined, comprising many instances of more or less

of the diversity of situations and paces of development –

traditional organisational and regulatory modes that are

none of which are really consonant with the massive

simply expressed in a different cultural vocabulary from that

engagement doctrines in fashion in some international

of the “modern” sector of developing economies. The

circles (a trend that reached its climax with the report on

priority given by donors to social issues, narrowly defined

how to achieve the MDGs produced under the editorship of

(education and health), for the achievement of the MDGs

Jeffrey Sachs). ODA should also avoid becoming an

has often relegated to the background the whole set of

additional and unneeded factor in the acculturation of

issues relating to the development of trade, the marketing

fragile societies; rather, it should contribute to the rebuilding

of local output and provision of services in the most isolated

of their identities from the inside, following the principles of

areas (including the urban fringes inhabited by the poor).

local ownership, which are now recognised where states

The point is that in some cases strengthening the social

are concerned; this requires that donors take account of

fabric requires increased trade, or simply the monetisation

diversity in their strategy for reducing inequalities, and no

of trade. Moreover, certain socio-professional categories

longer seek refuge exclusively, using many abstruse and

such as hauliers and large retailers can play an important

technical terms, in what Normand Lauzon, director of the

role in setting up early warning mechanisms for fragile

Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, calls “sector-wide

situations (security indicators) and even in mediating

restrictive approaches” .

with

them

(professional

between groups with conflicting interests. To take just one example, it seems obvious that the current A third level of approach would be that of the region and

crisis in Côte d’Ivoire will not be resolved simply by holding

sub-region (e.g. West Africa or South-East Asia). This

national

requires, first and foremost, the political and economic

government in areas currently controlled by rebel forces.

integration of developing countries in the most widely used

Structural treatment of this crisis will require, at the earliest

sense of the term – a reality made all the more tangible by

possible moment, actions to reintegrate, within a pacified

elections 28

and

Taking action to assist fragile actors and societies•

the

re-establishment

november 2005 / 4

Rebuilding social capital: donor actions should target all fragile actors and situations

social model, the urban and rural youth who today are still

- economic organisations, which play widely different roles

the force driving all existing and potential forms of

from one state or region to the next, but which are an

destabilisation; consideration of the land issue in a context

essential contact point for the involvement of civil society

that cannot be limited solely to the question of ownership in

and the establishment of proper regulation of economic

the Western sense of the term (Galy, 2004); the resumption

activity. Chambers of commerce, guilds and trade unions in

of import and export flows within the regional frameworks of

particular should receive attention, funding and training, or

UEMOA and ECOWAS; the reorganisation of security

even institutional support and access to the outside world

forces (police, gendarmerie, army) based on strong

(since they are confronted with local politicians’ grip on the

principles of neutrality and ethnic balance (a solution that

economy), which they still cruelly lack, particularly in

seems to be bringing results in Burundi), etc. Many of these

French-speaking Africa;

actions can and should rely on social actors having an interest in peace, including an economic interest (such as

- municipalities and local power structures that can play an

business owners and Abidjan’s small middle class).

important role in containing conflicts and ensuring at local level a better balance of power and effective redistribution

An initial list of the focal points of action to contain the

of resources to the people;

manifestations of fragility might include the following: - where difficult partnerships are concerned, an approach - ethnic minorities, which, when discontented, have been

basically aimed at continuing with planning of future

shown by experience to be highly destabilising for most

development programmes and with forecasting, even in the

states, particularly when these minorities were denied any

event of a breakdown in the dialogue between donors and

political responsibility and/or straddled an international

the recipient state, owing for example to an armed conflict

border;

in progress.

- marginalised people and social groups denied the benefits

It should not be forgotten (see above) that ODA in itself

of growth, particularly young people and ostracised social

does not necessarily strengthen a fragile society: it can also

categories, who are often denied access to capital and land

weaken such a society and contribute to a mistaken

owing to deeply rooted local practices;

apprehension of its real problems. Mireille Guigaz points out that, “for countries affected by instability, crises and

- migration, which can be

destabilising 29

both locally and

armed conflict, the verdict [on the action of ODA] is

internationally, not to mention migration within a state

damning:

inappropriately

designed

responses,

(people “displaced” by conflict and migrating in search of

inappropriate pace of deployment on the ground,

economic opportunity);

inappropriate instruments for policy dialogue and cooperation, failure to seek synergies between institutional

- the land issue, whose destabilising nature is particularly

and civil stakeholders” (Guigaz, 2001). Donors’ interests

evident in sub-Saharan Africa (especially Zimbabwe and

are often more sensitive to conceptual fads than to the

Côte d’Ivoire). Experience has also shown that this issue is

needs expressed by partner populations. Many sectors that

growing potentially more explosive, owing to three global

are essential to economic growth and social cohesion have

phenomena that sometimes intersect: population pressure,

been abandoned one after the other, such as rural

the drive for economic competitiveness on the part of agro-

development (agriculture and herding), local infrastructure

industrial land consortia (to the detriment of smallholders),

(rural and urban roads, town markets, etc., which reduce

and the conceptual frameworks of globalisation, which

the cost of basic commodities), and secondary and higher

encourage access to individual ownership in the modern

education. Sometimes, in their eagerness to take action at

sense, to the detriment of traditional, more communal

any price, donors also initiate processes of change that do

modes of ownership;

not correspond to societies’ real needs. They participate in

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Rebuilding social capital: donor actions should target all fragile actors and situations

the destruction of previous control mechanisms without

scarce resources can exacerbate predatory behaviour and

making sure that new mechanisms to preserve the social

power struggles, thus paving the way for the emergence of

and/or economic balance are established. Even more than

future conflicts.

in other situations, the engagement of ODA in a situation of fragility (or “pre-fragility”) needs to be fully integrated into a

Far from arguing in favour of all-powerful interventionism,

comprehensive process that gives due consideration to

our proposals for actions to help fragile societies claim only

diplomatic and security issues.

to reflect a process of debate and consultation: the complexity of the factors and the interweaving of all the

There is no evading the fact that ODA bears direct

causes of fragility preclude any single recipe, regardless of

responsibility for the emergence of conflict in some

donors’ analytical and engagement capacity with respect to

situations: how is it possible not to question the

beneficiary states. This is indeed the entire point of an

effectiveness of the policies recommended by donors when

economically

it is well known that half of all current conflicts are the result

development, as applied to a given geographical area with

of failed transitions and reconstruction processes? A

a view to the long-term maintenance or restoration of

country emerging from conflict has a fifty-fifty chance of

assets that are indispensable to growth and development

falling back into conflict within five years, which tends to

(human, financial, environmental, etc.), with no hierarchy of

prove that action to address the root causes of the crisis is

forms and stages (which marks a difference between this

neglected in most cases (for lack of time or

money30,

and

socially

balanced

approach

but

point of view and a Jacobinical sovereignist view). The

also because it is much easier for a donor simply to rely on

follow-up to this approach could thus consist in working on

existing structures and rebuild along identical lines).

more suitable operating methods and instruments and on

Another important linkage is the risk of conflict engendered

analysis of the comparative advantages of the various

by the arrival of fresh resources in a fragile context: the very

actors (multilateral, bilateral, private sector, civil society,

presence of aid projects and programmes in a context of

etc.) involved in crisis management and development

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Abbreviations and acronyms

CIDA:

Canadian International Development Agency

DAC:

Development Assistance Committee (OECD)

DDR:

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (the programme traditionally supported by donors after a conflict to disarm the belligerents, with priority to rebel and/or informal groups)

ECOWAS:

Economic Community of West African States

IMF:

International Monetary Fund

LAP:

Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships (group established by the DAC)

LDC:

less developed country

LIC:

low-income country

LICUS:

Low Income Countries Under Stress (internal initiative of the World Bank involving a grant programme specifically for poor countries, used primarily for studies)

MCA:

Millennium Challenge Account (fund established by the Bush administration, in the wake of the 2002 Monterrey

conference on development financing, to manage the additional aid promised by the United States) MDGs:

Millennium Development Goals

NGO:

non-governmental organisation

ODA:

official development assistance

ODI:

Overseas Development Institute

OECD:

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PRSP:

Poverty reduction strategy paper

UEMOA:

Union monétaire et économique ouest-africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union)

UN:

United Nations

UNDP:

United Nations Development Programme

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Bibliographical references

Châtaigner, J.-M. (2003), “Le modèle de l’effondrement libérien ou la tentation de la déconstruction en Afrique de l’Ouest”, Afrique contemporaine, No. 206, pp. 205-222 . Châtaigner, J.-M. (2004), “Aide publique au développement et réformes des systèmes de sécurité : l’improbable rencontre du Dr Jekyll et de Mr Hyde”, Afrique contemporaine, No. 209, pp. 39-49. Châtaigner, J.-M. (2005), L’ONU dans la crise en Sierra Leone. Les méandres d’une négociation, Paris, CEAN-Karthala. CIDA (2004), Canadian Cooperation with Haiti: Reflecting on a Decade of “Difficult Partnership”, December, 22 pp. Collier, P. (2003), Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, Washington, World Bank. Commission for Africa (2005), Our Common Interest. Report of the Commission for Africa, produced under the chairmanship of Tony Blair, available on the website www.commissionforafrica.org, London, March. Commission for Human Security (2003), Human Security Now, report produced under the co-chairmanship of Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, Geneva/Paris, Presses de Sciences po. Crocker, C. (2003), “Engaging Failing States”, Foreign Affairs, September/October. DAC (Office of the Chair) (2005), “Chair’s Summary: Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States. London, 13-14 January 2005”, Paris, OECD, 1 February 2005, 7 pp. DCD/DAC (2005), “Development, Peace and Security: Issues Relating to Fragile States and the Implementation of Security Sector Reform”, OECD, 17 February 2005, 5 pp. Dejammet, A. (2003), Supplément au voyage en Onusie, Paris, Fayard. DFID (2005), Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States, London, January, 28 pp. Ellis, S. (1999), The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, London, C. Hurts & Co. Fukuyama, F. (2004), State-Building, Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century, London, Profile Books.

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Bibliographical references

Galy, M. (2004), “Côte d’Ivoire : la violence juste avant la guerre”, Afrique contemporaine, No. 209, pp. 117-139. Gaulme, F. (2001), Intervenir en Afrique : le dilemme franco-britannique, Notes de l’IFRI 34, October. Gaulme, F. (2003), “Le sursaut africain du New Labour : principes, promesses et résultats”, Afrique contemporaine, No. 207, pp. 71-97. Guigaz, M. (2002), Afrique au Sud du Sahara : le conflit en partage. Les mots pour le dire, Sion, Institut Universitaire Kurt Bösch, January. Kagan, R. (2002), “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review, No. 113, June/July. Kaldor, M. (2000), “Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence”, Presentation to the conference “Conceiving Cosmopolitanism”, Warwick, 2729 April. ODI (2004), Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States, Paris, OECD, DCD (2005) 3, 17 December. Presidency of the United States (2002), National Security Strategy of the United States of America , available on the website www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss, Washington, September. Reno, W. (1999), “La privatisation de la souveraineté et la survie des Etats faibles”, in B. Hibou (ed.), La privatisation des Etats, Paris, Karthala. Sachs, J. (ed.) (2005), Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, UN Millennium Project, New York, January. Satchivi, F. A. (2001), Le déclin de l’Etat en droit international public, Paris, L’Harmattan. Severino, J.-M. and O. Charnoz (2005), “Les mutations impromptues : Etat des lieux de l’aide publique au développement”, Afrique contemporaine, No. 213, pp. 13-131. State Failure Task Force [now known as the Political Instability Task Force] (2000), State Failure Task Force Report – Phase III Findings, 2000, a collective academic project financed by the CIA and headed by Monty G. Marshall, available on the website www.cidcm.umd.edu, 30 September. Teixera, P. (2002), “Le Conseil de sécurité à l’aube du XXIème siècle : Quelle volonté et quelle capacité a-t-il de maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales ?”, Geneva, UNIDIR/IFRI. USAID (2005), Fragile States Strategy, Washington, USAID, January, 28 pp. Véron, J.-B. (2004), “La délicate mais indispensable implication de l’aide dans les conflits”, Afrique contemporaine, No. 209, pp. 51-64. World Bank (1997), The State in a Changing World. World Development Report, New York, Oxford University Press. World Bank (2001), Building Institutions for Markets. World Development Report 2002, New York, Oxford University Press. World Bank (2004), Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Haiti, December, 62 pp. © AFD Document de travail - Beyond the fragile state -

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Bibliographical references

World Bank (2005), Empowering People by Transforming Institutions: Social Development in World Bank Operations, January, 61 pp. World Bank (2005), Engaging Civil Society Organizations in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States: Three African Country Case Studies , 28 June, 48 pp. Zartman, I. W. (1995), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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Notes

1. A note for the DAC (DCD/DAC, 2005: 4), for example, states that “recent research indicates fragile states have an estimated negative impact of 1.6% on economic growth for neighbours”. 2. The CPIA ranking is an aggregate quantitative indicator of the quality of macroeconomic management, of the government and public sector, and of structural and poverty-reduction policies. It is criticised, however, for its static nature, its failure to take structural handicaps into account and its connection with the Washington consensus (Severino and Charnoz, 2005). 3. Such acceptance is in turn evaluated on the basis of two criteria: (1) compliance with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, which calls on states to abstain from the use of force in international relations unless so authorised; and (2) domestic application of international agreements on human rights and humanitarian law. 4. One of the main steps in the reaffirmation of the importance of ODA in the international arena was the adoption, at the Millennium Summit organised by the United Nations in New York in September 2000, of an unprecedented declaration of solidarity in favour of the poorest countries and populations. This declaration sets forth eight specific, quantitative goals for sustainable development, known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The first seven goals constitute the foundation for the entire debate on human development, while the eighth rounds out the system by calling for the establishment of a global partnership for development. The eight goals laid down in the Millennium Declaration are in turn broken down into eighteen targets and fortyeight indicators. 5. Satchivi cites among other things the opinion handed down by the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia (Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1992, p. 264): “The state is commonly defined as a community consisting of a territory and a population subject to an organized government [emphasis added] and characterised by sovereignty”. 6. A response to the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Washington consensus is a set of free-market recommendations aimed at making South American economies more efficient. This “consensus”, formulated in particular by John Williamson in Latin America: How Much Has Happened? (1990), is at the root of structural adjustment policies: trade liberalisation and elimination of protectionist systems, deregulation and privatisation, reduction of public spending, etc. 7. One of the most striking examples of this in recent years occurred in 1995, when the government of Sierra Leone hired a private South African security firm called Executive Outcomes to try to dislodge the rebel movement RUF from the mining areas it was occupying. 8. On 22 June 2005, the DAC decided to change the name of its Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships (LAP) to the Fragile States Group (FSG), with the possibility of its becoming a full-fledged subsidiary body of the DAC in November 2005. 9. This is illustrated in Hubert Sauper’s film Darwin’s Nightmare (2004), which purports to demonstrate the linkages between exports of Nile perch and the supply of arms to the protagonists in the Great Lakes conflict. 10. Examples here include certain rare mineral resources such as diamonds and cobalt, as well as the paradoxical increase in domestic resources enjoyed since 2002 by President Gbagbo of Côte d’Ivoire; this increase was due to the rise in international cocoa prices, which itself was connected with the crisis affecting this country.

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Notes

11. The report of the Blair Commission for Africa (Commission for Africa, 2005), however, argues that “OECD countries should promote the development and full implementation of clear and comprehensive guidelines for companies operating in areas at risk of violent conflict”. 12. The consequences of labelling states as “fragile” may also be related to a certain stigmatisation of such states, which discourages private investment and the arrival of external assistance all the more strongly, and paradoxically increases their vulnerability (see also below). 13. In this regard, Paul Wolfowitz’s appointment as head of the World Bank in June 2005 may help to stabilise or reduce its influence. 14. In the case of USAID, the notion of “legitimacy”, defined in the policy paper by a four-element grid covering security, political, economic and social aspects, refers to the “perception by important segments of society that the government is exercising state power in ways that are reasonably fair and in the interest of the country as a whole”. Note 4 states that this term as used in the policy paper should not be considered to have any bearing on official recognition of a government by the United States (USAID, 2005: 3). It should be emphasised, however, that this notion of “legitimacy” runs counter to that of “legality”, which is supposed to be used within the UN system and which is based on respect for electoral processes, constitutional rules, international law, and basic rights and freedoms. The US notion of legitimacy is based on a political, social and moral assessment of the partner government. 15. On 22 June 2005, the DAC approved the initiation of the pilot phase of the “Paris Principles” (Bercy Senior Level Forum, 28 February-2 March 2005) on aid effectiveness in fragile states in ten pilot countries, as well as the production of a watch list on ODA flows to fragile states, with a view to the Senior Level Meeting (SLM) of the DAC in December 2005. 16. At a 2004 seminar on European development policy, a Pakistani academic took pleasure in comparing the world to his country: “The world is just a huge Pakistan, with its islets of rich people, its oceans of poverty, its violence, its ethnic and religious conflicts, the unbridled exercise of power by the strongest at the expense of the weakest …”. 17. The name Myanmar, now used officially instead of Burma, refers to the official terminology of the UN, which was adopted at the country’s request, but is not completely devoid of social and ethnic connotations. 18. It is a common but mistaken idea that a fragile state is necessarily a state where government power seems weak. States with strong leadership, such as Serbia under President Milosevic in the 1990s, can also be sources of both domestic and international tension. 19. The exact wording of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter is as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. 20. Only within certain limits, however: even in the extreme case of the 2003 war in Iraq, the United States tried to secure the agreement of the Security Council, and its first concern after the victory of the coalition was in fact to obtain implicit approval of its intervention by the United Nations. 21. Which can also de facto weaken their institutions, or even push them into spirals of weakness (e.g. the Fourth Republic in France, entangled in its colonial wars, and Russia’s handling of the Chechen question). 22. Although corruption is very often pointed to as a brake on development, particularly in Africa, it can in fact have quite contradictory effects, depending on how the fruits of corruption are redistributed and/or redirected to the financing of domestic investment. 23. Arms trafficking with Gambia and the Casamance region, the structural problem of reintegrating former freedom fighters into a non-existent economic fabric, etc. 24. This text box is primarily the work of Sandra Eugène. 25. The recent Paris declaration of March 2005 on the principles of countries’ ownership of their own development policies, of donor alignment on the priorities and procedures of recipient countries and the harmonisation of donor actions still adheres to this model.

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Notes

26. Raising issues that can be found even in the most industrialised countries: those of New Caledonia for France, Ulster for the United Kingdom and the Basque country for Spain. 27. This approach has been developed among others by the World Bank under the label of community-driven development (World Bank, 2005), the idea being to enable local authorities and communities to define their needs and to manage their own development processes, while observing a certain number of managerial principles (transparency, participation, accountability, etc.). 28. Holding national elections in situations of fragility often engenders tensions that the existing authorities are not equipped to manage. Apart from their cost, elections tend, particularly in Africa, to catalyse ethnic divisions and to stimulate the manipulation of group identities. The formation of governments of national unity during a transitional period (e.g. the DRC) can be a viable alternative, but the question then becomes how to move beyond the transitional period to institute a constitutional state based on democratic principles, given that elections may plunge the country back into violence by breaking the previous, hard-won political balance. 29. Migration per se is not necessarily destabilising; it has been a factor of development for centuries, through the financial flows it engenders. Free circulation of people can be just as importance for international development as that of goods. 30. It is regrettable, in particular, that United Nations peace-keeping operations are not more often provided with resources that are more appropriate and more in proportion to the mandate assigned to them by the Security Council (Teixeira, 2002), and that their budgets do not include any development spending for peace-building purposes.

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