Research papers Authors Frédéric Le Manach Mialy Andriaahefazafy Nadège Legroux Laure Quentin Coordination Stéphanie Leyronas
FEBRUARY 2021 No. 203
Questioning Fishing Access Agreements towards Social and Ecological Health in the Global South
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1
Questioning Fishing Access
Abstract
level of transparency and data
Agreements towards Social
While marine ecosystems play
availability. This paper
and Ecological Health in the
a major role in the regulation of
examines and questions global
Global South
climate and our Planet's ability
fishing access agreements
to cope with climate change,
through the lens of the public
they are also critical for
agreements established
providing food, livelihood, and
between the European Union
income to billions of people
and African countries.
worldwide. Unfortunately, they
Specifically, we contextualize
Frédéric Le Manach
face increasing threats due to
the property and management
BLOOM
anthropic activities. In many
of marine resources at sea, and
regions, various types of
provide some of the most up-
Mialy Andriamahefazafy
agreements have historically
to-date information regarding
Université de Lausanne
organized and commodified
the state-of play of EU public
the access to the resources of
fishing access agreements. The
Nadège Legroux
the Exclusive Economic Zones
notion of “surplus”, which is at
AFD
of coastal States to distant-
the heart of many global fishing
water fishing nations. These
agreements, is also explored
Laure Quentin
longstanding commercial
and challenged. We conclude
AFD
mechanisms can take the form
our analysis with three avenues
of either private agreements
for researchers and policy
between a State and a fishing
makers: i) the development of
company, public agreements
more complex, multi-user
between two States, or joint
regional models as the
ventures between two
scientific basis for fishing
companies. They are used by a
access agreements, ii) the
Stéphanie Leyronas
variety of industrialized fishing
need to increase research
AFD
countries and blocs such as the
investments and transparency
European Union, the USA, Russia,
in order to develop such
Japan, and China to access
models, and iii) an
fisheries resources in the
improvement in monitoring,
waters of the Global South.
control and surveillance
In Europe, these fishing
necessary to drive practices in
agreements most often take
the Global South towards more
the form of “public access
sustainability and equity.
AUTEURS
COORDINATION
agreements”, i.e. agreements that are negotiated between a coastal State (e.g. Senegal or
Keywords
Madagascar) and the
Fisheries access agreements,
European Commission, on
surplus, commons,
behalf of the European fleets.
development
These public fishing access agreements have become an
JEL Classification
integral part of the Common
Q22, F18, 013
Fisheries Policy, granting EU vessels access to the bountiful
Original version
waters of Africa, and, to a much
English
lower extent, Oceania. Unlike for other fishing nations such as
Accepted
Russia, Turkey or China — whose
January 2021
severe impacts on local ecosystems and coastal communities are suspected but poorly documented — the analysis of European public fishing access agreements is facilitated by a relatively high 2
Résumé
ressources halieutiques.
Alors que les écosystèmes
Contrairement à d’autres pays
marins jouent un rôle majeur
disposant d’une flotte de pêche
dans la régulation du climat et
distante tels que la Russie, la
la capacité de notre planète à
Turquie ou la Chine – dont les
faire face aux changements
préjudices sur les écosystèmes
climatiques, ils sont également
locaux et les communautés
essentiels pour fournir de la
côtières sont suspectés mais
nourriture, des moyens de
peu documentés – l’analyse
subsistance et des revenus à
des accords de pêche
des milliards de personnes
européens est facilitée par une
dans le monde.
certaine transparence et
Malheureusement, ils font face
disponibilité des données. Ce
à des pressions croissantes
papier a pour objectif d’étudier
d’origine anthropique. Dans de
et d’interroger les principes des
nombreuses régions, différents
accords de pêche à travers le
types d’accords ont
prisme des accords publics
historiquement organisé et
établis entre l’Union
marchandisé l’accès aux
européenne et certains pays
ressources des Zones
africains.
économiques exclusives d’Etats
Après avoir brièvement rappelé
côtiers pour les pays pratiquant
le contexte des formes de
la pêche dans les eaux dites
propriété en mer et de gestion
« lointaines ». Ces mécanismes
des ressources marines, nous
commerciaux de longue date
proposons de présenter un état
peuvent prendre la forme
des lieux des accords de pêche
d’accords privés entre un Etat
de l’UE. Suite à ce panorama, la
et un armateur, d’accords
notion de « surplus », au cœur
publics entre deux États, ou
de nombreux accords de
encore de sociétés mixtes
pêche, est explorée et
(joint-ventures en anglais)
questionnée. Nous concluons
entre deux entités privées. Ils
avec trois pistes pour les
sont utilisés par un éventail de
chercheurs et les décideurs :
pays et unions de pays
i) le développement de
pratiquant la pêche industrielle
modèles holistiques régionaux
tels que l’Union européenne, les
et multi-usagers pour faire
Etats-Unis, la Russie, le Japon et
évoluer la base scientifique de
la Chine, afin d’accéder aux
ces accords, ii) la nécessité
ressources halieutiques des
d’augmenter les
pays « du Sud ».
investissements dans la
En Europe, ces accords de
recherche et la transparence
pêche prennent généralement
afin de développer de tels
la forme d’accords publics
modèles, et iii) l’amélioration du
négociés entre un État côtier
suivi, du contrôle et de la
(par exemple le Sénégal ou
surveillance indispensable pour
Madagascar) et la Commission
orienter les pratiques vers
européenne, pour le compte
davantage de durabilité et
des flottes européennes. Ces
d’équité.
accords de pêche sont devenus partie intégrante de la
Mots-clés
Politique commune de la
Accords de pêche, surplus,
pêche, permettant aux navires
communs, développement
de l’Union européenne (UE) d’accéder aux eaux du continent africain et, dans une moindre mesure, à celles de l’Océanie, abondantes en 3
Introduction Marine ecosystems in the waters of tropical countries face increasing threats due to human pressures at sea, especially from extractive activities (e.g. fisheries, oil and gas production, mining exploration), non-extractive activities (e.g. marine traffic, renewable energies, urbanization), and global changes (e.g. warming, acidification; IPCC, 2019). In parallel, these ecosystems are also critical for providing proteins, livelihood, and income for billions of humans worldwide, especially in the Global South (FAO, 2018; Hicks et al., 2019). Global ocean sustainability is therefore of paramount importance, as illustrated by different United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs) — SDG 2 “Zero hunger”, SDG 10 “Reduced Inequalities”, SDG 12 “Responsible Consumption and Production”, SDG 14 “Life below water” (United Nations, 2015) — as well as by ongoing negotiations on an international, legally-binding instrument on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (Ortuño Crespo et al., 2019).
1
This paper focuses on a European mechanism whose social, environmental and economic impacts at sea and for coastal communities are significant, namely the fishing access agreements that are negotiated between the European Commission and coastal States in Africa1. At the heart of both the European Common Fisheries Policy and the access and supply of fishery products in AfricanCaribbean-Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries — referred throughout as “the Global South” for readability — these fishing access agreements govern the access of European vessels to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)2 of numerous African countries in order to catch fish (Le Manach et al., 2013b; Panossian, 2014). The proportion of catches under fishing access agreements allegedly accounts for only 4% of the EU’s fish consumption according to industry representatives (Europêche, 2015)3 — a figure which does not represent the full breadth of the social and economic added-value of these agreements in Europe and Africa. The European (these latter agreements are reciprocal). See:
These fishing access agreements have taken
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/ag
several names over time. From the essentially “pay,
reements_en. Around the world, other agreements
fish, and go” initial “Fishing Agreements” (Failler et
between neighboring countries also exist, e.g.
al., 2005), they became “Fisheries Partnership
between Canada and the US, and between
Agreements” in 2004 with the second reform of the
Senegal and Mauritania.
Common Fisheries Policy (Gorez, 2009; Stilwell et al., 2
2010; Walmsley et al., 2007). The third reform of the
“Exclusive Economic Zones” typically extend to
Common Fisheries Policy, which entered into force
200 nautical miles (i.e. 370 km) from the coastline.
in 2014, led to a new name: “Sustainable Fisheries
The European Union possesses the largest EEZ in the
Partnership Agreements”, with the aim to reflect
world, with 22 million km2, chiefly thanks to France,
that
which has the largest EEZ in the world (almost
these
agreements
are
truly
becoming
sustainable partnerships and not just business
12 million km2).
agreements (Le Manach, 2014).
3
These agreements are what the European Union calls
“bilateral
agreements”.
Other
The European Commission reports that around 8% of the European catch is taken in the waters of non-
such
EU countries through fishing access agreements,
agreements exist but are out of this paper’s scope:
but those include the bilateral ones with Norway,
in Oceania (Cook Islands, Kiribati, Micronesia, and
Iceland,
Solomon Islands), as well as with “Northern
and
the
Commission, 2020).
countries”, i.e. Faroe Island, Greenland, and Norway 4
Faroe
Islands
(European
Commission reports that “the economic impact of European public fishing access agreements is clear and contributes largely to job creation: over 6,000 direct jobs (2,500 in the EU, 3,500 in partner countries), and about 9,000 indirect jobs (mostly in processing industries)” (European Commission, 2020).
(Guttierez et al., 2020)) or Russia. Other types of agreements also exist, e.g. private agreements directly negotiated between European fishing companies and coastal States where public agreements do not apply (e.g. in Kenya). Figure 1 compares the spatial extent of three wide networks of fishing access agreements: those established with i) the European Union (including agreements that are out-of-scope in the present paper, i.e. in Oceania), ii) China,4 and iii) the United States (using the example of the “Parties to the Nauru Agreement”)5
The network of EU fishing agreements is one of the largest in the world, but agreements with other distant-fishing nations such as China (by far the most important distant-fishing nation
Overall the network of EU fishing agreements is certainly the most transparent, given that all texts determining fishing possibilities as well as conditions associated with them are available online, at: http://www.eurlex.europa.eu. Furthermore, recent evaluations of their implementation are regularly commissioned by the Directorate General of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (DG MARE) of the European Commission and are available at: https://op.europa.eu
Figure 1. Map showing the spatial extent of current agreements (in orange) existing with the European Union (top), China (middle), and the USA (bottom; only “Parties to the Nauru Agreement”) Source: Authors (2020)
4
“Parties to the Nauru Agreement”, which allows
China has the largest fishing fleet in the world and
them to levy important fees on the tuna resources
currently fishes in most EEZs in the world — either le-
they sell to distant fleets, including those from the
gally (via agreements) or illegally — except in Euro-
United States. This network is often recognized as
pean and North American waters (Mallory, 2013;
the most beneficial to the coastal countries ceding
Pauly et al., 2014; Pauly et al., 2012). 5
their resources (Havice, 2010, 2013; Le Manach, 2014).
In the Pacific Ocean, Island States have organized themselves and are collectively referred to as the 6
or http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/docu mentation/studies 6.
Second, we propose an overview of the emergence and establishment of fishing agreements, especially in the European Union (EU), in an attempt to gather the most up-to-date information on their state-of-play. Last, by looking more specifically into these commercial tools, we challenge the notion of “surplus” and demonstrate how this central element in fishing access agreements lacks robustness and often results in losses for local fishers and harmful impacts for marine ecosystems. Based on this analysis, our conclusions present possible ways forward for researchers and policy makers involved in the design of future fishing access agreements.
These various types of agreements — European or not, public or not — have been a longstanding tool to bilaterally or multilaterally organize certain fisheries activities. However, one can question how they address many of a rapidly-evolving society’s concerns, in particular in the face of swift and extreme global changes and biodiversity erosion. Although this paper solely focuses on public European fishing agreements in Africa — given their level of transparency and data availability compared to other agreements — its conclusions are relevant to agreements elsewhere and/or with other distant-water fishing nations such as the USA in the waters of Pacific islands, or China in the waters of South American or African countries. This review is divided into three sections. First we provide some brief elements of context on debates regarding property and management of marine resources at sea. A short reference on the influence of the “Tragedy of the commons” model allows us to understand the origins of the State-led market in which fishing access agreements operate.
6
These assessments – which started in 2004 with the
Fisheries Arrangements), along with 20 environ-
Seychelles' (Anon, 2004a) and São Tome and
mental NGOs. Note that at that time, these assessments were published on Transparent Sea’s
Principe's agreements (Anon, 2004b) – used to be
website,
confidential, but the first sixteen of them were
(http://transparentsea.co;
no
longer
active), and that only recent evaluations are
made publicly available in 2011 following an access
available via the European Commission’s website.
request filed by “TransparentSea” (a platform created by the Brussels-based Coalition for Fair 6
I – Who Owns Wild Marine Resources? Society’s relation to the ocean has featured debates on property configurations at sea for millennia, and different, sometimes opposing, visions have (co)existed. The sea is recognized as a res communes (owned by no one, common to all) alongside shores, water and air in the Code of Justinian, which dates back to the Roman Empire (6th century; Chardeau, 2017). Thus, it is neither a res publicae (owned by the State), a res privatae (in the hands of private owners) nor a res nullius (freely available to the first who will take possession of it; Hallé, 1980). In the 17th century, a debate tagged as the “battle of the books” framed another set of opposing views expressed by European jurists about sovereignty at sea (Steinberg, 2001). Dutch intellectual Hugo Grotius defended the “freedom of the seas” principle (mare liberum), arguing that access and use of ocean space (including navigation, fishing) could not be appropriated under any kind of sovereignty. In his own words, the ocean “is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all” (Grotius, 1609). English jurist John Selden disagreed, claiming that marine waters could be enclosed by States (mare closum). These historical examples serve to remind that property at sea is an ongoing social construction, still under debate, as illustrated by current discussions on the legal status of marine genetic resources in the high seas.
1.1.
The extension of sovereign rights over marine resources
During the 20th century, several decades of negotiations on maritime jurisdiction and the growing need for management of marine resources led to some convergence regarding these issues. Culminating during the third round of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (December 1973), an international legal framework for the global ocean was agreed upon: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica, by a first country in 1982 (Fiji; United Nations, 2013), UNCLOS entered into force on November 16, 1994, one year after its ratification by the 60th country (Guyana on 16 November 1993; United Nations, 2012). UNCLOS partly institutionalized Grotius’ mare liberum by recognizing the “freedom of the high seas” (Article 78) in areas beyond national jurisdiction, set beyond 200 nautical miles (370 km) and covering a little over two thirds of the global ocean's surface. It also defined a gradient of legally distinct maritime jurisdictions that overall extended coastal States’ sovereignty at sea (Figure 2).
7
Figure 2. Maritime zones according to UNCLOS
Source: Jouffray et al., 2020.
Under UNCLOS and following previous customary law, coastal States possess full sovereign rights within their territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles; this sovereignty covers the water column, seabed and air space) while allowing for “innocent passage” (UNCLOS Section 3). In the contiguous zone situated between 12 and 24 nautical miles, they retain rights to prevent infringement of some of the laws within their territory. Up to 200 nautical miles, UNCLOS recognizes a new jurisdictional form: Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). In this area, a number of freedoms are granted to all (navigation, overflight, cable and pipeline-laying), but coastal States maintain sovereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of resources within the water column and seabed. This specific new jurisdictional regime led to significant legal changes: marine resources within EEZ became the property of the citizens of coastal nations, managed by governments, and thus can be considered as State property (Charles, 2005). Following the adoption of UNCLOS, coastal States suddenly captured 36% of the global ocean’s surface and 90% of its fisheries resources (Seto and Campbell, 2019). The “Tragedy of the Commons” was among the influential ideas that supported this extension of sovereign rights. Clarifying this model and the limits highlighted by commons scholars provides a better understanding of the context in which fishing access agreements were set up.
8
1.2.
The “Tragedy of the Commons” in support to State-property regimes
The extension of coastal sovereign rights at sea reflects one of the solutions offered by an influential theory formulated at the end of the 1960s: the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). Writing during the Cold War and heavily inspired by Malthusian thinking, American biologist Garrett Hardin offered a grim view on the management of natural resources. He predicted the overexploitation of what he described as “commons” if such resources were not captured either by private property or by State property. Hardin based his theory on a conceptual model in which a common pasture open to all is inevitably destroyed as each herder, animated by individual economic self-interest, increases his stock. His metaphor became increasingly cited in fisheries management as its fears were echoed by the decline of fish stocks monitored in the North Atlantic (i.e. Eurasian continental shelf hake, North Sea herring, British Isles’ haddock), the collapse of certain fisheries (Northwest Atlantic cod, Peruvian anchovy) and the threat of further collapses (Locher, 2019). In addition, bioeconomic fisheries models developed in the 1950s (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1957) drew similar conclusions to Hardin’s theory, encouraging the transfer of property rights on shared resources to States (Feeny et al., 1996). Despite the “Tragedy of the Commons’” influence to date (van Laerhoven and Ostrom, 2007), it was quickly nuanced by an array of scholars, including the neo-institutionalists led by political scientist Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues from the Bloomington School (Locher, 2013). They shed light on a number of empirical examples in which common-pool resources had been, for a long time, sustainably managed by communities under common-property regimes (Ostrom, 1990). Many such examples were found in inshore or local fisheries (Bambridge et al., 2019), where resource users organized themselves, often under unwritten regulation and customary law, in order to establish common rules with regard to their fisheries’ access and management (Berkes, 1985, 2006). These illustrations strongly contrast with Hardin’s reasoning, which separated fishers from policy solutions, considering them unable to sustainably manage marine resources (Locher, 2019). The works of these social scientists clarify the fact that the “Tragedy of the Commons” is a regime among others: an open-access, unregulated regime, to which one may archetypically oppose private property, State property and common propreté (Berkes et al., 1989) (Table 1). Table 1. Taxonomy of the four archetypal property-rights regimes
Open access: absence of well-defined property rights; access is free and open to all, as with ocean fisheries of the past century
Communal property: resource is held by an identifiable community of users who can exclude others and regulate use; some shellfish beds, range lands, forests, irrigation and ground water have been managed as communal property
Private property: an individual or corporation has the right to exclude others from using the
State property: rights to the resource are vested exclusively in government, which
resource and to regulate its use
controls access and level of exploitation; examples include crown lands and resources such as fish and wildlife held in public trust
Source: Berkes et al. (1989).
9
1.3.
Looking beyond property: the allocation of usage rights
While the common-property arrangements revealed by Ostrom and labelled “commons” are far from a panacea (Ostrom et al., 1999), they represent a paradigm shift in the way governance of natural resources is understood (Leyronas and Bambridge, 2018). Through an institutional lens, what makes a “common” is not the nature of a resource, but the governance regime set up to collectively manage this resource. Studying these institutional arrangements reveals key insights on the notion of property. In a number of empirical settings, property is far from being binary, either fully exclusive or fully absent. Rather, it tends to be organized as a “bundle of rights”, where different usage rights may be granted to different users (Orsi, 2014). For example, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) distinguish five types of rights that may be distributed differentially: the right to accede, withdraw, manage, exclude and/or alienate from a common-pool resource. The analysis of these usage rights shows that their distinct allocation is not limited to common-property regimes but can be found in all property settings. For example, in the high seas, where marine resources tend to be treated as res nullius and assimilated to an open access regime, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and regulations set up by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations may prescribe specific usage rights to pelagic fish and other wild resources (Charles, 2005). These considerations encourage us to reformulate our initial question: rather than who owns shared resources (e.g. the State, citizens, a specific community), the fundamental question is rather how the different rights to access, withdraw, manage the resources are allocated over time, and especially redistributed when a change of property regime occurs. In light of the above, one better understands how the extension of State-property regimes over marine resources aimed to counter the institutional failures of open-access regimes fueled by the fear of the “Tragedy of the Commons”. While replacing open access situations in many settings, State-property also sometimes replaced other forms of regimes, including communal (St Martin, 2007). A change in property regime draws attention to the (re)distribution of usage rights: is it socially and environmentally fair? These questions contribute to framing the analysis of fishing access agreements, as such agreements illustrate the commodification of a specific right (right to withdraw marine resources) in a State-property regime. Keeping them in mind, the following section offers to delve into a historical and geographical review of these contracts between the EU and ACP countries.
10
II – A Review of EU Fishing Access Agreements 2.1.
The inception of fishing access agreements
"[…] Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements […], give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch" — Article 62, United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS; 1982). Fishing access agreements emerged in the late 1970s following the Law of the Sea negotiations and adoption of UNCLOS. This international convention allowed the formalization of a number of customary laws and rights that already existed in less formal or specific ways7. These included the concepts of “territorial seas” and “continental shelves”, defined as part of the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1956) and resulting Geneva Conventions dating back to 1964. As transcribed above, Article 62 of UNCLOS stipulates that coastal States may give access to any "surplus"8 of allowable fisheries catches to other States. The establishment of UNCLOS as a novel, internationally-recognized legal instrument containing this article, key to our study, paved the way towards the widespread emergence of fishing access agreements. The formalization of EEZs resulted in notable changes: as fishing efforts expanded in the northern hemisphere, fishing fleets increasingly moved southward following negotiations of fishing access agreements with tropical coastal countries (Bonfil et al., 1998)9. Although UNCLOS did also include various provisions allowing countries to keep their surplus rather than cede it10, scholars have argued that countries in the Global South were not opposed to incoming foreign vessels, as these allowed them to generate income from locallyunderexploited stocks (Andriamahefazafy et al., 2019b; Carroz and Savini, 1983). As a result, the EU developed a wide network of fishing access agreements (Figure 1 for entire network; Figure 3 for a more detailed focus on Africa )11.
7
This approach is similar to the Common Law in the United States or Canada, which eventually recognizes a nonwritten law based on previous decisions made by judges in similar cases (Anon., 2014a).
8
Refer to the glossary for the definitions of 'surplus' and 'maximum sustainable yield', which will then be addressed in detail in part III.
9
However, this southward expansion was not only the result of the EEZs' formalization. Most notably, it was also the result of intense overfishing in coastal areas, which demanded that new fishing grounds, deeper and further offshore, be found and exploited (Anon., 2002; Le Bail, 1994; Swartz et al., 2010). This fishing expansion also occurred species-wise, for example with the industrialization of tuna fisheries worldwide (Coulter et al., 2019).
10
This is supported, for example, by Article 297, which grants coastal nations full sovereignty over the living marine resources in their EEZ (Burke, 1994).
11
It is important to note, however, that these publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements only represent a fragment of European policies that control access and supply of fishery products in the Global South and guarantee jobs for a substantial part of EU fleets (Gorez and O'Riordan, 2004). Indeed, numerous formal economic links between EU and ACP countries date back to the colonial era, for example through the establishment of preferential trade and aid provisions as part of the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Anon., 1957; Nunn and Price, 2004), followed by the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions (Anon., 1963, 1975, 1979, 1984, 1989). A new brand of economic ties has emerged in recent years: the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are the latest 11
Figure 3. Map of Africa showing the historical network of European public fishing access agreements (EEZs are shown in partial transparency; color-coding indicates corresponding target species; dates indicate the year of the first signed agreement). Struck-through names indicate agreements that no longer exist or that have been denounced. Stars (*) indicate agreements with protocols that have recently expired but which are being negotiated, i.e. Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar; see Table 2 for details). Western Sahara and its EEZ — disputed (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2018) — are indicated in hatched.
Source: Authors (2020).
As part of these agreements — which can be grouped into three categories depending on the target species (Figure 3 — “host countries” have always received (except in rare instances) a financial package composed of three types of items, two of which are EU public money: i) a fee for the access to their EEZ, which is borne by the EU; ii) a sectorial support aiming to develop local fisheries and to improve monitoring, control and surveillance (also borne by the EU); and iii) a fee paid by the private sector, proportional to the fishing opportunity (e.g. annual catch volume, number of vessels), which depends on the target species and/or on the type of fishing vessel. Note that the annual financial amounts associated with these three components can either be the same throughout the duration of the agreement or evolve on a yearly basis. However, fluctuations in actual market prices do not imply changes in the financial package. Table 2summarizes the target species, annual catch, and annual EU financial contribution of the current fishing agreements established between Europe and countries in Africa. Until the mid-2010s, the fees paid by the private sector accounted for approximately 25% of the total
commercial tools that must be established to comply with the World Trade Organization (WTO) with regards to free-trade requirements (Borrmann et al., 2006). 12
value of the agreements (i.e. the two components corresponding to EU public money accounted for 75%)12, which in turn consistently represented around 2% of its gross revenue generated by the fishing activities under the agreement (Le Manach et al., 2013b). There is no global update for these figures yet. Table 2 provides a condensed overview of the current (or recently expired but not denounced) fishing opportunities that are offered to EU fishing fleets, as well as the financial compensation borne by the EU. Table 2. Target species, annual catch, and annual EU financial contribution (i.e. EEZ access fee + sectorial aid) of the current fishing agreements established between Europe and countries in Africa)a
Host country
Historical coverage
Target species
Catch (t/year)
EU financial contribution (million EUR/year)b
Cabo Verde
1990 onward
Large pelagics
5 000b
0.5
Côte d'Ivoire
1991 onward
Large pelagics
b
5 500
0.7
Gambia
1987-1993 & 2019 Demersal species onward Large pelagics
750b 3 300b
0.5
Guinea-Bissau
1980-2017c
Demersal species
16 500d
Large pelagics
2 200d
9.2
Liberia
2015 onward
Large pelagics
6 500b
0.6–0.7
Madagascar
1986-2019
Large pelagics
15 750
1.5
Mauritania
1988 onward
Demersal species Large pelagics Small pelagics
20 000b 20 000b 240 000b
62 0.6
c
b
Mauritius
1990 onward
Large pelagics
4 000b
Morocco
1988-2002, 2007-2012, 2014-2018 & 2019 onward
Demersal species Large pelagics Small pelagics
6 800d 235d 85–100 000b
São Tomé & Principe
1984 onward
Large pelagics
8 000b
0.8
Senegal
1979-2006 & 2014 onward
Demersal species Large pelagics
2 000b 14 000b
1.7–1.8
Seychelles
1985 onward
Large pelagics
50 000b
5–5.5
Former agreements Angola Comoros Eq. Guinea Gabon Guinea Mozambique
1987-2004 1988-2016 1983-2001 1998-2016 1983-2012 1987-2015
-
-
37–42
-
Source: a Agreements in Oceania – i.e. with Cook Islands (the only one currently active), Kiribati, Micronesia, and Solomon Islands – are not included in this table ; b Data from https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements_en ; c Negotiations are underway ; d Data from latest ex-post evaluation.
Based on the information provided above and the figures presented in Table 2, it appears that: i) EU public fishing agreements remain largely commercial agreements and ii) that most of the financial package received by partner countries correspond to public subsidies, 12
A 75-25 breakdown is also reported by the European Commission (European Commission, 2020). 13
whose amount is not determined by objective criteria such as sectorial needs or even market value. Therefore, the rationale behind the calculation of this public counterpart can be questioned, as well as the balance of power between the countries involved in the agreements. 2.2.
Criticisms and transformation of European public fishing access agreements
Since the early 2000s, agreements and their protocols of application contained data on the agreed allocation of fishing licenses among EU countries, but — with the exception of a key but restricted external review (Anon., 2008) — accurate data on the number, name/matriculation, and fishing zone of EU fishing vessels were not readily available13. However, over the last decade, open data accessibility has significantly improved notably thanks to the release of the “Who Fishes Far” platform (www.whofishesfar.org) in 2015, driven by a group of environmental NGOs. Trends of EU vessels operating in third-party EEZs through fishing access agreements are now publicly accessible. Globally, public EU fishing agreements established throughout Africa are widely considered now as the most transparent and “least inequitable”, compared to those developed by other nations. Critiques have however been formulated, including regarding the lack of civil society participation during negotiations between the EU and host countries as well as the availability of social and economic data pertaining to these agreements (Anon., 2019a; Gorez, 2012). Their crosscutting weaknesses, as well as some positive aspects of their evolution, are developed below. 2.2.1. Impacts on marine resources and local communities Public EU fishing agreements have been widely criticized for their impact on local ecosystems, as well as for their consequences on food security and political/economic stability, in particular for those that included a demersal component, using destructive fishing gears such as bottom trawls and leading to an intense competition with local fishers (Le Manach, 2014). For instance, when the first agreement with Senegal was concluded, “its justification was mainly based on the fact that Senegal had abundant resources that its national fleets were unable to exploit in an optimal way - however, this is no longer the case” (Le Roux and Noël, 2007). In 2006, the agreement between the European Union and Senegal was suspended due to a significant decrease in marine resources (Brown, 2018), and was subsequently amended. From a multi-species, “mixed” agreement, it became a tuna agreement so as to limit the extent of catches made by European vessels (although it still includes a small fishing opportunity for demersal species; 2,000 tonnes of hake for two trawlers). The same situation happened with other agreements, e.g. with Morocco, that expressed its disagreement with the European Union’s intention to renew its fishing agreement as early as 2001. A new text was eventually signed, but with several species (such as octopus) removed from its scope and/or spatial exclusions (d'Aboville, 2010). The latest agreement with
13
Ex-post and ex-ante evaluations usually do include such data, but not in an exhaustive nor homogeneous manner. 14
Morocco, which entered into force in July 2019, still includes fishing opportunities for demersal species, and large and small pelagics. However, the large-scale vessels targeting the latter – by far the most important in terms of overall catch – are now excluded from the 12–15 nm coastal zone and must not engage in “reduction fisheries”, i.e. the process of grinding fish into fishmeal and fish oil. This practice is increasingly criticized for its impact on marine ecosystems and food security, as most reduced fish are, in fact, edible and oftentimes a staple food for local communities (Cashion et al., 2017; Changing Markets Foundation, 2019; Green, 2018; Greenpeace, 2019; Standing, 2019a). This is even more problematic due to the fact that most stocks of small pelagics in the region are already largely overfished (Ba et al., 2017; Braham and Corten, 2015; FAO, 2019). The development of these small pelagics fisheries was mostly driven by the growth of the aquaculture sector, which relies on fishmeal and fish oil (Le Manach et al., 2017). Although European fleets are an important actor of this sector — with, for example, 22–41% of industrial catches in the Mauritanian EEZ (the other European agreement that targets these species) between 2007 and 2012 (Anon., 2014a) — other countries such as China and Turkey are under more scrutiny and operate in a much more opaque way (Standing, 2019b)14. Overall, exports of small pelagics-based fishmeal from the West African region have skyrocketed in recent years, increasing from around 10,000 tonnes in 2010 to over 120,000 tonnes by 2018 for Mauritania alone (Fernandez Peralta et al., 2019). The currently dominating large pelagic agreements are not free from environmental criticisms either, most notably due to the increasing and intense use of drifting fishing aggregating devices (d-FADs)15. According to the latest available data16, the proportion of dFAD-associated catch in the Spanish and French fleets of purse seiners has increased from less that 50% in the early 1990s to around 70% in 2018 in the Atlantic Ocean, and from less than 60% to 97% in the Indian Ocean over the same time-period. 2.2.2. Impacts on marine resources and local communities Despite these critiques, EU fishing agreements are surely evolving towards a better inclusion of social and environmental clauses, away from their historical “pay, fish and go” basis. Many of their key characteristics have improved over time. For example, current requirements regarding the monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) of fishing activities now include the use of electronic logbooks, satellite monitoring, and possible onboard observers and/or at-sea/land inspections. Unlike for agreements with other fishing countries (e.g. China; Pauly et al., 2014), catches are also generally constrained (quotas or “limits of reference”). Finally,
14
Also see, e.g. https://www.cffacape.org/news-blog/senegalese-civil-society-protests-against-its-governmentintention-to-issue-fishing-licenses-to-54-chinese-and-turkish-vessels.
15
Manmade drifting Fishing Aggregating Devices (d-FADs) were developed in the 1980s and their use truly expanded to reach an industrial scale in the early 1990s (Campling, 2012; Miyake et al., 2010; Scott and Lopez, 2014). These d-FADs are floating objects that are released at the surface of the ocean and whose structure and surrounding dynamics attract tuna and other species. As such, they greatly increase the fishing efficiency of purse seiners (Fonteneau et al., 2015, 2013). Scholars have expressed concerns about the detrimental impacts of d-FADs with regards to i) tuna behavior (Hallier and Gaertner, 2008; Marsac et al., 2017), ii) the high level of bycatch, including sensitive species and tuna juveniles (Dagorn et al., 2013; Filmalter et al., 2013; Hall and Roman, 2013; Scott and Lopez, 2014), and iii) the impacts on coastal habitats and fragile ecosystems, as around 10% of dFADs trajectories end with beaching (Maufroy et al., 2015).
16
Data
available
at:
https://www.iccat.int/Data/t2ce_PS91-18_bySchool.7z
(Atlantic
Ocean),
https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/09/IOTC-2019-DATASETS-CESurface.zip (Indian Ocean). 15
and
from a financial perspective, some of the European agreements are of key economic importance to national budgets (e.g. the Seychelles), fund fisheries departments' projects (e.g. Madagascar), or support key fisheries research programs (e.g. in Morocco). The use of these public funds is also increasingly scrutinized so as to ensure that they are indeed used to build and increase MCS capacity in host countries, as well as to implement sustainable fisheries programs for local communities. Although it was highlighted on several occasions in the past that it was difficult to trace the actual use of public money, e.g. in Mozambique (Anon., 2006), the situation seems to have improved in recent years despite recurrent delays and the fact that not all objectives have been fulfilled, e.g. in Côte d'Ivoire (Defaux et al., 2017) or Liberia (Caillart et al., 2020). For example, in Madagascar, where the use of European funds linked to fishing agreements has also been criticized (CFFA, 2020), it is important to mention that a number of specific areas are clearly identified in agreements' texts. Over time, the European sectoral support has evolved in three steps, from only two areas covered between 1986 and 1998, to up to five areas covered between 1998 and 2006 and a multiannual program with two to five priorities since 2007 (Table 3). The use of this sectoral support has been deemed satisfactory by both parties (e.g. Caillart et al., 2018). Table 3. Evolution of the use of the EU sectoral support in Madagascar Source: Agreements and associated protocols, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html
1986-1998 ✓
1998-2006 ✓
✓
✓
1,860,000
Funding for the Enseignement Maritime de Majunga (ENEM)
✓
175,000
Management of observers
✓
20,000
Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
✓
Knowledge improvement by funding attendance of international meetings Grants to study/train abroad in field
2007-2014 2015-2018
1986-2018 2,038,000
linked to fisheries
✓
✓
4,109,834
✓
✓
2,366,400
✓
434,534
Institutional and Private sector Capacity building
✓
111,949
Activities of the economic observatory
✓
101,262
Activities of the Fisheries and aquaculture development Unit
✓
189,106
Activities of the Unité Statistique Thonière d’Antsiranana (USTA)
✓
36,625
Control of sanitary standards of products ✓
Development and formalisation of traditional fishing
Total (in EUR)
11,705,710
16
From Table 3, three observations can be made (Andriamahefazafy, in prep.):
Over the past twenty years, sectoral support has largely been used to invest in monitoring, control and surveillance, and to build the capacity of the authority in charge of sanitary standards (Autorité Sanitaire Halieutique; ASH). These investments have made Madagascar an operational actor in the surveillance of the Southwest Indian Ocean and have improved the quality of exported products (mainly to Europe). However, these priorities have mainly focused on distant water fleets, chiefly those from Europe;
There has only been limited and sporadic funding, over the 32 years of existence of European agreements, to develop the national fisheries sector, including tuna fisheries. The development and capacity-building of traditional fishing is however advertised by Europe as a major goal of these agreements17;
Finally, a considerable amount of public funds has also been invested in areas so as to build national capacity with regards to scientific knowledge on offshore pelagic species. This is however not reflected in the current state of knowledge at the national level, where such data and knowledge depend on catch data. 2.2.3. Weaknesses in implementing monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS)
The improvements on paper often remain hindered by important structural weaknesses in MCS by both the EU and host countries. For example, it was reported that despite the requirements set in fishing agreements and their protocols, partner countries in Africa often do not possess the financial and logistical capacity to use electronic monitoring (e.g. in Côte d'Ivoire; Anon., 2012) or to send observers (e.g. in Cape Verde; Amador et al., 2018) or inspectors (e.g. in Gambia; MacFadyen et al., 2018) onboard. Data related to European fishing activities also appear not to be communicated in certain cases (e.g. in Cape Verde; Amador et al., 2018). Taking advantage of this situation, some European vessels remain somehow engaged in illegal fishing activities (i.e. fishing in an area, or targeting a species/using a gear they are not legally permitted) in both West and East Africa (Amador et al., 2018; Caillart et al., 2018; Gorez, 2019; Vulperhorst et al., 2017), and still actively participate in overfishing18, along with vessels from other distant-water fishing fleets (Holmes, 2019; Standing, 2019a). 2.2.4. Potential future tensions around large pelagic fisheries As highlighted in Figure 3 and Table 2, there are still a few European agreements that catch species also targeted (or caught as bycatch) by local fishers and which are often of crucial importance for local food security and coastal economies. This is the case for all agreements targeting demersal species and small pelagics, but also to a certain extent, for agreements exclusively targeting large pelagics. An increasing number of coastal countries seem to be looking forward to expanding their fishing activities offshore in order to relieve the pressure from coastal species and increase the sector's importance, although the execution of such an endeavour might prove difficult, at best, for many coastal countries. In addition, this spatial expansion of local fleets might be unavoidable in the near future given 17
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/2015-sfpa_en.pdf
18
See ongoing case of Spanish fleets overfishing yellowfin tuna in the Indian Ocean (Holmes, 2019). 17
the impacts of climate change. In particular, it was shown by scholars that increasing ocean temperatures in the inter-tropical belt will result in fish catch in these waters to be reduced by 40%, while those in higher latitudes, e.g. in Europe, could increase by 30–70% (Cheung et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 2013). Such migrations further strengthen the point made above (Section 1.3.), i.e. the poor value of the question “who owns the resource (e.g. the State, citizens, a specific community)”, compared to “how rights are allocated and redistributed over time”, at a regional or international scale. Velleities of offshore expansion have been reported, e.g. for Comoros (Doherty et al., 2015), Kenya (Le Manach et al., 2015a), Madagascar (Le Manach et al., 2013a), and the Seychelles (Anon., 2014b; Le Manach et al., 2015b). Should it occur, this spatial expansion of local fleets would eventually result in the same competition as for demersal species, and in turn in the denunciation of fishing agreements even for these species that were historically not targeted by local fishers. Premises of this competition are also already visible in the Indian Ocean, where the future allocation of tuna quotas among fishing countries is currently being discussed. While coastal countries in the region consider that what was historically caught, by anyone, in their EEZ should be considered as their historical catch, distant-water fishing nations such as the European Union consider that past catches by their fleets — in the high seas or in the waters of coastal countries — should be attributed to them (IOTC, 2019)19. Pressure is mounting and the gap between these two extreme positions threatens to jeopardize a fair allocation of natural resources to the detriment of both fish populations and coastal countries (Andriamahefazafy et al., 2019b; Sinan and Bailey, 2020). As was concluded by Section I, the issue however lies not so much in these resources’ property regime but rather in the allocation of different rights to access, withdraw and/or manage them. Promoting this position is particularly relevant in the case of migratory species that move between different State EEZs and into the high seas. The key point to be addressed is not who owns these resources but how and to whom the rights to fish for them are allocated at the regional level and sometimes beyond. Such discussions must not only be held but evolve as the scopes of local fleets’ activities change. As seen in this section, numerous fishing fleets — including from the European Union — target a wide array of species in the waters of Africa through an extensive network of access agreements. Although the trends for the agreements established with the European Union are positive, criticisms are still frequent and challenge some of these ongoing agreements. Beyond these points, the theoretical basis of many agreements, European or not, chiefly those targeting demersal species, also raises questions. In the next section, we offer to explore the theoretical implications of a notion that holds a central position in fishing access agreements: the surplus.
19
The European Union however proposes to concede that 10% of its catches made in the EEZs of African countries, through access agreements, be considered as belonging to these countries (the other 90% being European; IOTC, 2019). 18
III – The Ineffective Notion of “Surplus” in Fishing Access Agreements As highlighted above, the concept of “surplus” is central in UNCLOS’s Article 62. A “surplus” corresponds to the fraction of the “entire allowable catch” or “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY)20 that is not caught and thus remains in the water (Figure 4). Figure 4. Conceptual diagram of the notion of “surplus”, i.e. the difference between the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) of a given species and its actual catch Source: Le Manach (2014)
3.1.
A model of the past?
Before looking more closely at the notion of surplus, one must highlight that the MSY model was developed at a time when biodiversity conservation and management was less of a concern than it is today. In turn, its conceptual framework makes it obsolete in the face of current challenges, especially biodiversity collapse. It was deemed the “worst idea in fisheries management” by one of the founding fathers of this field of research, Dr. Sidney Holt (Holt, 2011). According to Holt, "[MSY] is inadequate and its pursuit increases the likely unprofitability, and even collapse, of fisheries" when used "as a target for management of fisheries, or even as the anchor for so-called “reference points”". Its emergence and wide acceptance appears to have been mostly rooted in political considerations rather than in ecological ones (Finley, 2009). As a result, its use as a basis for fisheries management is increasingly challenged by scientists and NGOs, including at the European level21. However, it seems unlikely that the concept of MSY will quickly be substituted by a more rigorous, upto-date model (e.g. fleet-by-fleet management based on social, economic and
20
MSY is defined as "the weight of fish the population will produce, annually on a sustainable basis when that is at its maximum level" (Chapman, 1970). After several decades of hesitation (Le Manach, 2014), the first model that was able to determine MSY was the surplus-production model developed by Schaefer (1954). Garrod (1969) and Fox (1970) later developed the 'exponential surplus-production model', and Pella and Tomlinson (1969) produced a 'generalized surplus-production model'. All of these models have the same implications with regard to the matter discussed here. Consequently, the simpler model developed by Schaefer (1954) will be used throughout for convenience.
21
E.g. with debates at the Parliament such as “Beyond Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)? Ambitions for the future of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)”. See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/PECH/OJ/2020/01-20/1196005EN.pdf. 19
environmental indicators) due to existing hurdles in monitoring fisheries and collecting (and analyzing) sufficient data. Unlike what the name suggests, “surpluses” are not some useless biomass of fish in the sea (Gascuel, 2019). They play a crucial role in marine ecosystems, which means that not exploiting them can be beneficial from an environmental standpoint. Among other issues, the concepts of MSY and surplus solely focus on targeted species, without taking into account that fishing practices can be destructive (e.g. bottom trawls; Watling and Norse, 1998) and also usually catch a fair amount of non-targeted species (the so-called "bycatch"; Alverson et al., 1994; Kelleher, 2005). Other limitations include the inability of MSY estimates to account for the age, size, and maturity of the fish, the fact that optimal catches may vary over time (Botsford et al., 1997; Larkin, 1977), and, especially, that MSY varies with the sizeselectivity of the gear (Beverton and Holt, 1957; Froese et al., 2008). Another key point is in that multi-species fisheries — such as those operating bottom trawls or catching a diverse range of bycatch, e.g. d-FAD-associated tuna fisheries — the exploitation of one species at MSY can lead to the collapse of another. This happened in the Gulf of Thailand for demersal species (Pauly, 1979), and also likely occurred in the multi-species fisheries of West Africa. Despite these criticisms and shortcomings, the concept of “surplus” has been widely used to justify fishing access agreements ever since, and is still referred to as the basis of fishing access agreements by the European Union (European Commission, 2020). In theory, foreign fishers could thus access such a surplus without causing detrimental impacts. In this section, we will however demonstrate that the concept of “surplus” is inappropriate to ensure that fishing access agreements are ecologically and socially legitimate, given that its use mechanically results in detrimental social and environmental impacts as soon as new fishers (foreign in this case) enter the fishery.
3.2.
“Surpluses” remain largely unestimated 3.2.1. MSYs are poorly assessed worldwide
As seen above, one needs to estimate an MSY before determining if any surplus exists. However, to date, MSYs remain poorly assessed worldwide, even in highly developed regions. For instance, the French institute for the exploitation of the sea (Ifremer) reported in January 2020 that among the >330 species landed22 by metropolitan French fishers, only 74 were assessed (accounting for 83% of landings) for one or more stocks (164 overall), and that many of these “assessed stocks” were not understood well-enough (lack of data, etc.), resulting in their status being “unknown” (Biseau, 2020)23. The situation is much worse in less developed regions such as Africa, where MSYs are generally not estimated for demersal
22
These, by and large, do not cover the full range of biodiversity impacted by fishing activities in European waters. They only represent the individuals that have a commercial value.
23
An older study had shown in 2016 that only 42 stocks (accounting for around 90% of the catch in the Northeast Atlantic) were properly assessed at that time, out of the 167 inventoried by the International Council for the Exploration of the sea (ICES; AFH, 2016). 20
species. In most (if not all)24 instances, MSY estimates were (and still are) weak (STECF, 2012), e.g. in Gabon (Anon., 2015) or Côte d’Ivoire (Anon., 2012). Note that the situation for the two main groups of species currently targeted by European vessels — i.e. small and large pelagics — is different in the sense that their status is assessed at the regional level due to their migratory nature and high commercial value25. In line with these observations, the European Commission reported in 2011 that "in spite of several improvements, substantial shortcomings continue to affect the functioning of [fishing agreements]: -
The scientific knowledge on certain stocks in foreign waters is insufficient to establish the overall size of the surplus;
-
The terms and conditions [i.e. fishing effort, catch, etc.] of fishing agreements concluded by partner countries with other (non-EU) countries are usually not known to the EU;
-
Consequently it is often impossible to assess the overall fishing effort targeted at the stocks, and to determine the share of the surplus to be sustainably fished by the EU fleet” (European Commission, 2011). 3.2.2. Total catches are poorly known
On top of estimating a value of MSY, one also needs to know the actual catch before determining if any surplus exists. However, a global effort of catch reconstructions led by the Sea Around Us has recently shown severe issues of underreporting in countless cases (Pauly and Zeller, 2016). This study showed that total catch estimates are generally poor, if they exist at all. In fact, the fishery sector is rarely considered as a priority by governments in the Global South, except in Senegal or in the Seychelles, for example. Consequently, worldwide fisheries statistics often only reflect industrial, large-scale fisheries (Pauly, 1997). While these operations are “easy” to monitor26, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU)27 catches are often overlooked, and this inadequacy is widely recognized as a major barrier towards sustainable fisheries management (Agnew et al., 2009; Sumaila et al., 2006).
24
As summarized during a hearing at the French Parliament in January 2020: “there has never been any surplus estimated, anywhere, for any of the European fishing agreements” (Gascuel, 2020).
25
Small pelagics are assessed by working groups operating under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; large pelagics are assessed by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs), namely the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) for West Africa, and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) for East Africa. Although assessed on a regular basis, this does not guarantee that these species are free from overfishing. In particular, evidence suggests that most populations of small pelagics in West Africa have been (and still are) severely overfished (Ba et al., 2017; Braham and Corten, 2015; FAO, 2019). Species of large pelagics such as yellowfin tuna in the Indian Ocean are also currently experiencing overfishing (Andriamahefazafy et al., 2019a), and despite regular alarms regarding this species, fishing effort is still building up, most notably through the expanding use of d-FADs.
26
Although even for industrial segments, logbooks are not always transmitted, further exacerbating the difficult task undertaken by statistical units with limited human and technical means. As a result, not all activities are covered, including as part of fishing access agreements, e.g. in Mauritania (Anon., 2019b), Côte d’Ivoire (Defaux et al., 2017), Liberia (Caillart et al., 2020), etc.
27
Typically, IUU catches include a wide variety of missed information such as industrial discards and small-scale fisheries landings for subsistence or recreational purposes. 21
In contrast, small-scale fisheries, which are of critical importance in most coastal states in the Global South (Kent, 1997), are poorly accounted for and marginalized by policy makers (Pauly, 1997)28. In the case of fishing access agreements, this marginalization of small-scale fisheries can result in a biased view of the catch (and thus of the surplus available) for a given fishery, which ultimately has a detrimental effect on both the ecosystem and the coastal communities that rely upon these stock(s) for their livelihoods.
3.3. Foreign access to surpluses is socially and environmentally detrimental Furthermore, even if surpluses could be estimated properly, allocating them to new entrant fishers would result in a negative outcome for historical local fishers and/or marine ecosystems. This can be explained in four steps (Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). Figure 5. The impact of surplus exploitation by foreign fishers in four steps Source: Authors (2020)
Authorizing new entrant fishers to exploit an underfished stock that is already targeted by local fishers always results in negative impacts locally (Figure 5). Therefore, one can only question the legitimacy of fishing access agreements for the shared exploitation of a stock (Garcia et al., 1986), especially in regions where fish-based diets are essential for domestic food security29. While this concept easily applies to fishing access agreements that still target demersal and small pelagic species — including a few European ones (see Table 2) — it is more difficult to 28
States also tend to favor the development of the industrial sector, perceived as bringing more revenue. In turn, the socio-economic and environmental impacts or benefits of small-scale fisheries remain largely unknown (Cohen et al., 2019).
29
Note that the same conclusion would be reached with new local entrant fishers. 22
apply it to migratory species that straddle different EEZs in larger areas, such as tunas and other large pelagics. Note, however, that i) the aforementioned goals of offshore expansion might result in similar conclusions being reached in the future, even for these large pelagic species, and ii) that interactions between offshore and inshore stocks are poorly studied and understood. To conclude, the legal basis of fishing access agreements was forged decades ago based on concepts that have proven to be limited, when our knowledge of marine ecosystems was significantly lower and when our societal vision was radically different, given that UNCLOS was largely negotiated during the colonial era. On top of these “historical changes”, other important changes such as climate change — and resulting shifts in fish distribution and abundance (Cheung et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 2013; Lam et al., 2016) — demand that policies avoid the notion of surplus, especially with regard to fishing agreements with countries in the Global South.
23
IV – Ways Forward Fishing access agreements in the Global South have been historically problematic and often imbalanced for the aforementioned reasons. From these observations, the three following issues appear crucial to guide these agreements towards sustainability and equity. First, there is a need to improve the scientific models on which these political and commercial agreements are based. Going beyond single-resource assessments would be better adapted to ocean connectivity and the sensitivity of trophic webs. Ideally, following the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF), other species along these webs should be encoded into models. Socioeconomic components should also be considered in order to build more robust and holistic management tools. The current design of fishing access agreements and calculations of the surplus neglect this holistic approach, especially as they are bilateral and information on other agreements are strongly lacking. Following the development of more complex, multi-user models, resources could be regionally allocated and not on a single-country basis for highly-migratory pelagic species. Such a regional distribution has already been initiated in the Pacific with the vessel day scheme (Havice, 2010; Shanks, 2010; WCPFC, 2012), and is under discussion in the Indian Ocean with the regional allocation of quotas (similarly to the allocation in the Atlantic and Southern Oceans; Allen et al., 2010; IOTC, 2013; Noye and Mfodwo, 2012). Although Europe should be a driving force in constructing and promoting such a regionally allocated multi-user surplus model, this might eventually prove difficult given the European interests at stake. Furthermore, one must also keep in mind that a quota fully allocated for a given region does not ensure that it is equitably nor sustainably allocated. The development of more complex surplus models is highly challenging, especially in a context where funding needs for research are strong and data is lacking. For this reason, increasing data transparency and research investments is a second avenue that would help address the improvement of scientific modelling raised above. These investments could contribute to expanding data collection and developing local research capabilities, both of which are necessary to refine our understanding of ecosystem and socioeconomic dynamics associated with activities under fishing access agreements. Such investments could be activated through various channels, including increased national funding for research, which could benefit from an additional part of Official Development Aid and the promotion of scientific cooperation. Sectoral aid generated from fishing access agreements could also be strengthened; as highlighted in the report, the financial package linked to EU public fishing agreements does not reflect such sectorial needs. Furthermore, the generation of more data and knowledge related to fishing access agreements would gain from “open” policies relating to data access and sharing. As noted previously, there is also an important lack of transparency on a number of aspects relating to fishing access agreements, which is not only true of the EU but also and especially of many distant fleets from Asia, Russia, etc. This is widely illustrated by the absence of knowledge on non-EU fishing agreements and joint ventures that exist in the Global South’s EEZs. A major step towards transparency would therefore consist in publicizing reliable information on licenses (joint 24
ventures, chartering, fishing agreements, private licenses, etc.) allocated to all vessels, as well as their catch. In addition to transparency on other resource users and agreements, monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) constitutes a third area of concern where improvements would strongly benefit partner countries. MCS is required for the effective application of rules and can contribute to the knowledge on resource status. The European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) offers opportunity for improvements on the issue of cooperation on MCS, as wished by the European Commission in the “Green Paper” published ahead of the 2013 CFP reform (European Commission, 2009). But even if the EU shows good faith, there is still a need to go beyond the current state-of-play so as to ensure that everyone plays by the rules and that distant-water fleets’ fishing activities are sustainable. Although still imperfect, new technological tools such as satellite surveillance (e.g. Global Fishing Watch) could be instrumental in MCS, contributing to good and fair management of resources such as tuna populations in the Indian Ocean. To conclude, we would like to emphasize again the current alarming trends in biodiversity erosion, degradation of ecosystems and climate change highlighted in the introduction, all of which directly threaten coastal communities in the Global South. In the case of fishing access agreements, countries or blocs of countries such as the EU must guarantee the environmental and social harmlessness of their public subsidized distant fleets. This report advocates for the EU to be a leading force in this area and demands more investment in the sustainability and transparency of these agreements. Otherwise, the precautionary principle should apply and public subsidies to long-distant fishing activities be reconsidered.
25
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33
Appendix - 1 Glossary African-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries: resulting from the Georgetown Agreement in 1975, this organization is composed of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states. All of them except Cuba are signatories to the Cotonou Agreement, which binds them to the European Union. Bycatch: part of the catch that is composed of unwanted individuals (wrong species, size, or sex). Common Fishery Policy (CFP): set of rules that govern the management of European fishing fleets. The first CFP was implemented in 1983 and has since then been reformed three times, every ten years. Distant-Water Fishing Nation (DWFN): describes those countries whose fishing grounds extend far beyond their Exclusive Economic Zones (see below). Drifting Fish Aggregating Devices (d-FADs): floating objects that are released by purse seiners at the surface of the ocean and whose structure and surrounding dynamics attract tuna and other species. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): coastal band extending from the limits of the territorial sea (12 nautical miles from the coast) to 200 nautical miles, in which the coastal state has sovereign rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources in the seabed and the water column above it. Fishing effort: amount of capacity put in place to catch marine animals, over a given unit of time. There is no universal unit of fishing effort as the most sensible one widely varies from one fishing gear to the other. Fishing effort is often provided in terms of kilowatt, number of hooks, kilometers of nets, trawling hours etc. per day/month/year, etc. Global South: loosely used as a synonymous of “African-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries” in this report. Joint venture: business arrangement where two or more parties, generally from two different countries (e.g. China and Senegal) pool their resources together to set up a fishing company in one of the partner’s country. Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY): highest possible annual catch that can be sustained over time. Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS): set of rules and tools used for the purpose of fisheries management, e.g. satellite monitoring, data collection, at-sea/port inspections, etc.
Private agreement: business arrangement that allows the access by one fishing company to the waters of a coastal country. Negotiations are conducted between the coastal country and the fishing company. Public agreement: in contrast with private agreements, public agreements are negotiated between a coastal country and another country, often a distant-water fishing one, but not always. Many agreements exist between two neighboring, coastal countries (e.g. Mauritania-Senegal, Canada-USA, etc.) Surplus: fraction of the MSY that is not caught and thus remains in the water. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): international agreement from 1983 that lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order governing all uses of the ocean and its resources.
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