The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries by Agence Française de Développement

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October 2012

The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries

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The emergence of new climate leaders warrants a study of the trends in their domestic policies and policymaking. This report evaluates the approaches of four significant developing and emerging economies to climate change governance, describing both the evolution of institution building and policymaking processes, and analysing the political and economic drivers of change : China and Brazil, as they account for a growing percentage of global GHG emissions, and the smaller, Ethiopia and Tuvalu, as examples of those most vulnerable to its effects while bearing little or no responsibility for the problem. While the future of climate governance remains uncertain, it can be seen that climate governance is increasingly defined by the actions of developing, or non-Annex 1 states.

AUTHORS David HELD Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science, LSE Co-Director, LSE Global Governance D.Held @ lse.ac.uk Eva-Maria NAG Senior Research Fellow, LSE Global Governance E.Nag1 @ lse.ac.uk Charles ROGER Research Officer, LSE Global Governance C.Roger @ lse.ac.uk

A SAVOIR

LSE-AFD Climate Governance Programme

The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries / D. HELD, E-M. NAG & C. ROGER / October 2012

Climate change has become the most important global issue of our time and now occupies a key place on the global governance agenda. Recent attempts to create a concrete framework for mitigation have fallen short. This failure has been explored in a number of studies. These have mostly focused on the pursuit of a global deal through international negotiations, or on the domestic mitigation policies of Annex 1 states. However, large developing countries, such as China and Brazil, are now widely considered to be the vanguard of climate change policymaking, taking actions that are comparable to anything being done by Annex 1 states.

The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries

A Report on International and Domestic Climate Change Politics in China, Brazil, Ethiopia and Tuvalu

David HELD, Eva-Maria NAG & Charles ROGER LSE Global Governance

A SAVOIR

The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries A Report on International and Domestic Climate Change Politics in China, Brazil, Ethiopia and Tuvalu David HELD Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science, LSE Co-Director, LSE Global Governance D.Held @ lse.ac.uk

Eva-Maria NAG Senior Research Fellow, LSE Global Governance E.Nag1 @ lse.ac.uk

Charles ROGER Research Officer, LSE Global Governance C.Roger @ lse.ac.uk CONTACT

Fabio GRAZI Research Department, AFD grazif @ afd.fr

À Savoir The A Savoir collection was created in 2010 by AFD’s Research Department and gathers either literature reviews or existing knowledge on issues that present an operational interest. Publications in this collection contain contributions based on research and feedback from researchers and field operators from AFD or its partners and are designed to be working tools. They target a public of professionals that are either specialists on the topic or the geographical area concerned.

All our publications are available at http://recherche.afd.fr Past issues in the collection (see page 155).

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Agence Française de Développement for supporting the research that took place between January 2011 and November 2011. They would also like to thank Daneille da Silva, Aida Kowalska and David Steinback for their invaluable research assistance, and Angus Hervey for his help in compiling the report.

[ Disclaimer ] The analyses and conclusions in this document are formulated under the sole responsibility of the authors.They do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of AFD or its partner institutions.

Director of Publications:

Dov ZERAH Editorial Director:

Alain HENRY

Design and production: Ferrari /Corporate – Telephone.: 00 33 (0)1 42 96 05 50 – J. Rouy / Coquelicot Published in France by: STIN

Contents

Introduction

1. China

1.1. The Evolution of Climate Change Governance in China: Policymaking, Policies and Global Governance 1.1.1. The evolution of policymaking for climate change and energy 1.1.2. Climate change, energy efficiency and renewable energy policy 1.1.3. China and the global governance of climate change 1.2. Interests, Institutions and Climate Change in China 1.2.1. Political, economic and environmental concerns 1.2.2. Deforestation and forest governance 1.2.3. Vulnerability 1.2.4. Foreign policy 1.3. Conclusion

21 21 24 29 35 35 38 39 41 43

2. Brazil

2.1. Energy, Deforestation and Climate Change Governance in Brazil 2.1.1. Hydropower 2.1.2. Biofuels 2.1.3. Deforestation and land-use change 2.1.4. Early approaches to international and domestic climate change governance 2.1.5. New approaches to climate change 2.2. Understanding the Evolution of Climate Change Governance in Brazil 2.2.1. Deforestation and forest governance 2.2.2. Electoral interests 2.3. Conclusion

49 50 52 54 58 59 64 66 67 70

3. Ethiopia

3.1. The Evolution of Climate Change Policymaking in Ethiopia 3.1.1. Early efforts 3.1.2. A new institutional environment for climate change governance 3.1.3. Global governance and climate change 3.1.4. New approaches to international engagement 3.2. An Analysis of Changes in Climate Change Policymaking in Ethiopia 3.2.1. The political economy of decision-making in Ethiopia 3.2.2. Vulnerability 3.2.3. Energy 3.2.4. Foreign policy 3.3. Conclusion

75 76 77 82 83 86 86 88 91 94 96

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4. Tuvalu

4.1. Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in Tuvalu 4.1.1. Multilateral governance and AOSIS 4.1 .2. Leveraging moral authority 4.1 .3. Tuvalu and post-Kyoto climate governance 4.1 .4. Adaptation and funding 4.1 .5. Tuvalu and the NAPA process 4.1 .6. The Pacific climate regime 4.1 .7. GEF-funded projects in Tuvalu

101 101 102 104 106 107 109 109

4.2. Ecological and Economic Vulnerability â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Explaining Climate Change Governance in Tuvalu 4.2.1. Ecological threats 4.2.2. Economic vulnerability 4.3. Conclusion

112 113 115 117

General Conclusion

119

Acronyms and Abbreviations

125

References

129

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Introduction Since negotiations for a global climate regime took off in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the assertion that it is now-developed countries that are responsible for climate change has been widely accepted. Rich countries account for the vast majority of cumulative, or historical, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in absolute and per capita terms, and despite their markedly greater energy efficiency continue to maintain average levels of emissions that are multiples of those in most developing states. It is therefore they who need to shoulder the burden of mitigation. Developing countries, by contrast, produce far fewer emissions in per capita terms, and argue that they should be allowed to emit more as their economies grow. The ‘survival’ emissions of the poor, necessary for improving basic livelihoods, have frequently been contrasted with the developed world’s luxury emissions, a result of its penchant for high consumption lifestyles (Aggarwal & Narain 1991; Giddens 2009). Mitigation commitments in poor countries have, in turn, been interpreted as a kind of ‘carbon colonialism’. From an early stage, this understanding of responsibility has played a great role in the climate change negotiations, becoming enshrined in the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities set out in Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the formal division between rich ‘Annex 1’ and poorer ‘non-Annex 1’ countries. A product of the 1992 ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro, the UNFCCC stated that only Annex 1 countries would be committed to the objective of limiting anthropogenic emissions of GHGs, with the original aim of returning to their 1990 levels of emissions, either individually or jointly, by 2000. Non-Annex 1 states only needed to meet a set of general commitments, such as reporting GHG emissions, sharing information and mitigation/adaptation technologies, and promising to take climate change considerations into account when formulating government policies. This understanding of the international division of labour on the issue provided an institutional basis for developing countries to resist binding obligations. However, the Earth’s future is increasingly being written by the non-Annex 1 states. As Figure 1 shows, the average national CO 2 emissions of those countries listed in Annex 1 have been relatively stable since 1990, while those of non-Annex 1 states have more than doubled, accounting for nearly all of the subsequent increase in global emissions. The argument that all non-Annex 1 countries are marginal emitters is

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becoming less true by the minute. China’s share of total annual GHG emissions rose from roughly 11 per cent in 1990 to nearly 22 per cent by 2006. It is now the world’s largest consumer of energy, the world’s largest emitter of CO 2, and has even exceeded the global per capita average. Brazil now produces more CO 2 per person than Germany, and almost three times as much in absolute terms. Figure 2 shows the IEA’s ‘business-as-usual’ projections for non-Annex 1 countries. It estimates that their emissions will grow by over 70 per cent by 2025, at which point they will collectively reach the same level of emissions as developed states. Yet according to a report by the OECD (2009), for a limiting of global temperatures to a 2-3°C rise to be technically feasible, emissions reductions will be required of nearly all the major emitters in the first half of the century, and by all developing regions in the second, with the possible exception of Africa.

Figure

1 World

National CO2 Emissions, Percentage Growth since 1990 Annex 1

Non-Annex 1

United State of America

China

180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Source: CAIT (2011).

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2006

Introduction

Figure

CO2 Emissions Projections, 2006–2025, Percentage Growth from 2006

IEA – Non-Annex 1

IEA – Annex 1

IEA – World

IEA – China

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

2024

Source: CAIT (2011).

The growing impact of non-Annex 1 countries has changed the dynamic of the global negotiations. As the end of the first Kyoto commitment period approaches, most industrialised countries have now tied their future commitments to more action by the more prosperous non-Annex 1 states. The US Senate’s Byrd-Hagel Resolution of 1997, for example, obliged the US to refrain from signing any treaty that did not include “new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for developing country parties” (US Senate Resolution 98, 25 June 1997). In 2001, President Bush erased the signature of the US from Kyoto, citing its failure to include commitments by the largest developing countries and its potential to harm the US economy. Although officially condemned by other states at the time, such sentiments now appear to be widely shared. In recent years, the European Union, Japan, and Canada (McCarthy 2010) have each stated that they will refuse to sign any further agreements that do not include commitments by major developing countries. No longer, it seems, is the developed world willing to give emerging economies a free ride – a position that makes the interests, politics, ideas and values of emerging economies more central to the international climate regime than ever before.

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After mounting pressure from the Annex 1 states, the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties in Bali, Indonesia, (COP13) saw developing countries finally agree – for the first time – to consider taking ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ mitigation actions, suitably supported by technology and finance from developed countries. Hotly debated within the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), the meaning of this promise has since become a key source of contention at subsequent COPs, especially COP15 in Copenhagen, where tension between delegates erupted into the halls of the Bella Center. Would developing countries accept some binding targets? What kind of targets would be acceptable? How would their emissions be monitored? These questions, and others like them, were the subjects of substantial disagreements. While developed countries placed considerable pressure on developing states to adopt more ambitious commitments, stressing their common responsibilities, non-Annex 1 states continued to voice opposition, emphasising their persistent differences and lower capabilities. Despite all the accusations of failure, the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Cancun Agreements of 2010 which formally embedded the Copenhagen Accord within the UNFCCC system, marked a small step in easing the gridlock that has become a hallmark of the climate negotiations. Above all, developing states agreed to undertake certain voluntary ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’, commonly referred to in UNFCCC jargon as ‘NAMAs’. Brazil and China, among other developing states, had, only a few years prior, voiced considerable resistance to even the possibility of incorporating voluntary commitments into the climate change regime. A previous proposal for voluntary commitments made by Argentina in Buenos Aires in 1998, for example, encountered significant hostility. However, by the end of 2011, 47 non-Annex 1 states had submitted NAMAs to the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn, in addition to 42 Annex 1 states. Together, the NAMA submissions cover more than 80 per cent of global emissions, and, if delivered, could reduce emissions from ‘business as usual’ by between 6.7 and 7.7 billion tonnes (Stern & Taylor 2010). Suitably strengthened and scaled-up, they could be a first step towards making the 2 degree Celsius goal a real possibility. Though they continue to reject the idea of binding mitigation commitments, the NAMA submissions reflect a new and arguably substantial commitment on the part of many developing countries to tackling climate change. While their foreign policies and approaches to global climate governance have remained broadly the same over time, contributing to the persistent stalemate in the UNFCCC negotiations, there has been a tremendous growth and strengthening of climate governance within their domestic political arenas. Indeed, a recent survey by the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) of voluntary mitigation pledges found that there was broad agreement

[8]

Introduction

that the developing countries’ proposed actions amounted to more mitigation than developed countries’ pledges (Kartha & Erickson 2011). Once considered laggards, some large developing countries, such as China and Brazil, are now widely considered to be the vanguard of climate change policymaking, taking actions that are comparable to anything being done by Annex 1 states. Although many of these actions are not necessarily new (Chandler et al. 2002), their scale, scope and ambition are. China, for example, has pledged in its 12th Five-Year Plan to reduce its energy intensity by 40-45 per cent from 2005 levels by 2020. It has also committed to increase the use of non-fossil fuel energy sources in its total final energy consumption to 15 per cent by 2020. Again, by 2020, the country aims to increase its installed wind capacity to 150 GW, nearly equivalent to the world’s entire capacity of 157 GW at present. Similar targets for solar energy, energy efficiency, building codes, and transportation and infrastructure policies have proliferated, and a host of programmes have been created for achieving China’s goals. Almost all have appeared within the last five years. Likewise, Brazil, in 2008, released its National Plan on Climate Change. Signed into law in 2010, it establishes considerable mandatory targets for shifting away from fossil fuel use, promoting the use of renewable energy and – most importantly – slowing the rate of deforestation in legal Amazonia. At the time of the Plan’s release, production and use of ethanol had already increased dramatically; over two-thirds of the country’s electricity came from hydroelectric plants; and almost half of its total energy production came from renewable sources. The targets, therefore, continue many of the positive policies Brazil was already undertaking. Moreover, Brazil has crucially committed itself to reducing Amazonian deforestation by 70 per cent by 2017 compared to 2006 levels, which would reduce emissions equal to more than two-thirds of current annual emissions in the US. Ethiopia, after playing a leading role representing Africa at Copenhagen, has since committed to an ambitious target of becoming a carbon neutral climate resilient economy by 2022, initiated numerous low-carbon energy generation projects, and set in motion the process of coordinating a national climate change strategy. The Maldives and Costa Rica have also committed themselves to becoming carbon neutral by 2020. Mexico, in 2008, announced that it intends to reduce emissions by 50 per cent below 2002 levels by 2050, and intends to reduce emissions by 20-30 per cent from its baseline scenario by 2020. Similarly, South Africa has set a goal of achieving peak, stabilisation and decline of its emissions by 2020-2025. Of course, the level of ambition differs between countries, and some plans are likely to be more successful than others. Estimates of the stringency of seemingly ambitious targets have also been questioned. Critics of China’s target argue, for example, that its

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Introduction A SAVOIR

commitment represents nothing more than the continuation of current energy efficiency and conservation policies and measures. What is undeniable, however, is that there appears to be a new sense of urgency about climate change in the developing world, a host of new voluntary commitments, and, in many places, ambitious domestic policies and programmes for meeting them. While the contexts within which developing countries are making these plans and commitments are different, as are their intentions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and abilities â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to fulfil them, there seems to be a new underlying political dynamic in the developing world that deserves careful scrutiny by scholars. What explains this new level of activity across such a diverse array of states, with very different political systems and economies, and facing very different challenges, across the developing world? Where ambition and commitments have been lacking in seemingly similar cases, what explains their absence? These are the questions this report seeks to address.

The state of existing research Why are some developing states becoming leaders and others remaining laggards? One possibility is that the new climate policies and policymaking in the developing world demonstrate that the traditional positive relationship that has been posited between good environmental governance and democracy, and the converse negative relationship associated with authoritarianism, may in fact be changing, and more complex than is commonly supposed. Within the group of non-Annex 1 states, for example, democracies appear to be only slightly more likely to have submitted NAMA pledges than non-democracies (see Table 1). While 32 per cent of all democracies in the non-Annex 1 grouping submitted a NAMA, 28 per cent of all the non-democracies did as well. Their pledges may also have been, on average, more proactive.

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Introduction

Table

NAMAs, Democracies and Non-Democracies [ 1 ] Total non-Annex 1

Submitted a NAMA

Democracy

Non-democracy

Has not submitted a NAMA

105

Total

152

30%

32%

28%

% of total that submitted a NAMA Source: Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000).

China has arguably adopted some of the world’s most stringent climate change policies. The Worldwatch Institute (2010) has remarked that its effort to increase energy efficiency and conservation ‘has few equals in other countries, developed or developing’. Similarly, one assessment of various NAMA commitments identified the Maldives, a non-democracy, as the most ambitious of all those countries – again, both developed and developing – that were surveyed, and as the survey’s ‘role model’ (Climate Action Tracker 2011). India’s NAMA pledge, by contrast, was among the least stringent, estimated to be 43 per cent above business as usual. Moldova, also a democracy, had the singular distinction of having submitted the least ambitious pledge among those surveyed, estimated to be 64 per cent above business as usual. Another idea that is being challenged by new efforts to tackle climate change in developing countries is the longstanding assumption that there is a connection between a country’s level of development and so-called ‘green values’, including concerns about climate change (Brechin & Kempton 1997 Inglehart 1995; Diekmann & Franzen 1999; Recchia 2001; Franzen 2003; Pugliese & Ray 2009). According to a version of this theory, citizens and governments only become willing to take action on environmental issues with the emergence of a set of ‘post-materialist’ beliefs that take hold when a country reaches a certain level of education and material satisfaction (Inglehart 1995). Poorly educated, and more worried about improving growth and reducing poverty, developing countries are likely, in other words, to be less concerned about taking action on climate change. But studies increasingly reveal a different picture. [ 2 ] [1 ] This table uses the PACL (2000) binary measure of democracy, with several of the authors’ own additions since there are no data for several states in the non-Annex 1 group. [2] The association between level of development and concern for the environment has, of course, been disputed by Dunlap et al. (1993), Brechin & Kempton (1997), and Dunlap & York (2008). Yet the relationship is still regularly assumed to hold in the literature on climate change in view of the problem’s newness, complexity and lack of immediate, discernable effects (Kempton et al. 1995; Bord et al. 1998; Tjernström & Tietenberg 2007).

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Concern about climate change, some have found, is negatively correlated with national wealth (Dunlap 1998; Sandvik 2008). A recent survey of attitudes towards climate change undertaken by the World Bank (2009 a ), for instance, found that the share who ‘agreed strongly’ or ‘agreed somewhat’ with the claim that the climate change should be a priority even if it causes slower economic growth and job loss was higher, on average, in lower and middle income countries (see Table 2). Similar results held when respondents were asked the question: “Do you think our country does or does not have a responsibility to take steps to deal with climate change?” In the developing states that were surveyed, a larger share of citizens than in developing countries believed their government did in fact have such a responsibility. More also believed that their responsibility remained the same whether or not a multilateral agreement was reached.

Table

Attitudes towards Climate Change

What do you think of the following statement? Dealing with the problem of climate change should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs

Egypt

Indonesia

India

Vietnam

Agree somewhat

Total Agree

Disagree strongly

Disagree somewhat

Total Disagree

Russia

Japan

Kenya

China

Mexico

France

USA

Agree strongly

Source: World Bank (2009 a).

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Lower Income Bangladesh

Lower-Middle Income

Iran

Upper-Middle Income

Turkey

High Income

Introduction

Unfortunately, many studies of climate change politics have tended to overlook the intriguing internal developments in a number of developing countries that suggest we should reconsider, refine or recontextualise some of these factors' traditional theoretical positions. The vast majority of the scholarly work on climate change politics in the developing world has been concerned with the role of developing countries in the UNFCCC negotiations. A host of studies have examined the foreign policies of developing countries (Johnson 2001; Harris 2003; Najam et al. 2003; Heggelund 2007; Zhang 2006; Roberts & Parks 2006; Depledge 2008; Korpoo et al. 2009; Rong 2010; Vihma 2011), their ability to work together as negotiating blocs (Dessai 2004; Chasek 2005; Kasa et al. 2008; Barnett 2008; Betzold 2010; Vihma 2010; Vihma et al. 2011), and how they have influenced or failed to influence the course and outcomes of the negotiations (Sell 1996; DeSombre 2000; Richards 2001; Williams 2005; Gupta & van Asselt 2006). A second, smaller literature has examined how the international climate regime has affected developing countries and the effectiveness of various multilateral mechanisms and engagement strategies. Such studies have analysed the impacts of regime design (Economy 2001; Victor 2008, 2011; Neuhoff 2009; Winkler 2010; Shrivastava & Goel 2010), global epistemic communities (Lahsen 2004; Lazrus 2005), global norms and activist networks (Schroeder 2009; Williams 2010 Wiener 2008), carbon finance (Maya & Gupta 1996; Halvorssen 2005; Fuhr & Lederer 2009), and foreign aid (Olsen 2006; Harmeling & Kaloga 2011). But the domestic climate change politics of developing countries as such – which appear to be increasingly disconnected or disjointed from their conservative foreign policies in the negotiations – have been relatively neglected.

Focus on developing countries Looking explicitly at developing countries is important because many assumptions often made about Annex 1 states do not hold in the developing world. Theories developed to explain climate change politics in the OECD cannot simply be extended to the developing world. First of all, the task of mitigating emissions in the developing world is different. Unlike developed states, the challenge in the developing world is not to mitigate emissions absolutely but to reduce emissions relative to GDP or to some ‘business-as-usual’ baseline. Second, given current trends in the multilateral negotiations, developing states are not likely to have an internationally set binding target but one that they have established themselves. Though they are likely to face tremendous international pressure to adopt and to some extent ‘internationalise’ stringent emissions targets, commitments will mostly be voluntary. The kinds of targets that can be chosen are, therefore, more flexible and subject to internal political

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Introduction A SAVOIR

wrangling. Third, the developing world faces the additional challenge – not as widely faced in developed countries – of adaptation. Developing countries, often highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture and pastoralism, are those most vulnerable to climate change. Indeed, it has been estimated that developing countries will bear 80 per cent of the burden of climate change (World Bank 2010). Therefore, we would expect developing states to be very active in developing and attracting projects and programmes for adaption, which frequently dovetail with their development priorities. The developing world also presents a valuable laboratory for exploring the effects of certain factors that are not as prevalent in the developed world. To varying extents, for instance, developing countries’ efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change are also being assisted by multilateral, bilateral and transnational mechanisms, which are less important in developed countries, if at all, and make the dynamics of their domestic climate politics quite different – inherently linking the domestic, regional and international political spheres. In some cases, the projects and programmes related to climate change taking place within the borders of developing states may even be entirely limited to the initiatives undertaken by multilateral and/or transnational actors, introducing international biases into the domestic context (Olsen 2006). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the most important conduits for such assistance in the developing world. Foreign aid via official development assistance (ODA) and/or from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is another. Of course, some countries, such as Brazil and China, are not likely to need foreign aid in order to make the changes that are needed, nor are they likely to receive much assistance, since they no longer qualify for certain kinds of multilateral funds. However, in these large emitters, foreign finance in the form of the CDM still plays a significant role, and will continue to do so if schemes such as UN-REDD+ are able to overcome the admittedly significant barriers to implementation. Poor governance and administrative capacity is another challenge that is more pervasive in the developing world. In the rich states where climate governance has been the most fully (though still inadequately) developed, it is, ultimately, the state that is held responsible, and its capacity, if not willingness, is usually without question. Moreover, the state is usually liberal and democratic in nature. Within the group of forty-two Annex 1 states only Russia and Belarus cannot be characterised as fullyfledged democracies. Among non-Annex 1 states, by contrast, the capacity and nature of the state cannot be taken for granted. Although good governance in both developed and developing states is always a matter of degree, ineffective policymaking and implementation, deficiencies in the rule of law, authoritarian government and state failure are maladies that tend to occur more frequently in those that are less well-off.

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Introduction

Therefore, in thinking about and comparing climate change governance in developing states, we must consider more carefully the impact of governance and administrative capacity, and the effectiveness and durability of institutions

Methodology This report seeks to overcome the limits of some initial studies of climate governance and offers some theories about climate politics in developing countries. We compare four countries: China, Brazil, Ethiopia and Tuvalu, each with very different characteristics. They differ in size (landmass, population, contribution to emissions and size of economy), in location (Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific â&#x20AC;&#x201C; major developing regions), in the structure of their economies (agriculture-based, industry-based, mixed, low-income, middle-income and levels of inequality), and in their types of political systems (authoritarian, democratic). All, however, are highly vulnerable to climate change. The cases that we have chosen to investigate, by necessity, comprise only a small portion of the total universe of developing and emerging economies. However, all are of interest because, by many accounts, they have become much more proactive on climate change in recent years, and all mainly within the past five years. They have nevertheless done so from very different positions within the global climate regime, and their national circumstances mean that their experiences have been unique to a great extent. Two are major middle-income emitters of GHGs (China and Brazil), but their emissions come from different sectors of the economy (industry and energyproduction in the case of China, and deforestation in the case of Brazil). They differ, also, in the nature of their political systems. Ethiopia and Tuvalu, by contrast, are both minor emitters of GHGs on a global scale, but the contexts within which new policies are arising are again quite different. One has a large population and is landlocked, the other is a set of small, isolated islands. Their political systems are different as well. The cases have, therefore, been selected in order to understand how these quite different circumstances and experiences have influenced the contemporaneous changes in national policies that have taken place. Each case began with an initial review of the political economy and mitigation and adaptation situation in each country using quantitative indicators to get a general idea of individual country circumstances, priorities, needs and abilities. A basic map of the climate change governance structure, i.e. major institutions, bureaucracies, agencies, executive, was produced using secondary and primary sources, including government websites and government documents. Foreign and domestic climate

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Introduction A SAVOIR

change policies were then reviewed via a desktop search, and review of secondary material. This review concentrated on understanding how the approach to climate change governance in each country has changed or has remained the same. Some initial hypotheses about the ways that politics and economics either facilitated changes or produced stasis were then developed.

Via an initial search of the Internet (government, civil society and university websites) as well as through personal and institutional contacts, a roster of possible interviewees was drawn up. These were limited to individuals involved in major government bureaucracies or interest groups, or prominent in advocacy/capacity building or related study. Meetings were arranged prior to fieldwork. In country, the initial hypotheses were confirmed and disconfirmed through semi-structured interviews, or entirely new points were raised by interviewees. Interviews focused on getting not only the intervieweesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; general impressions, but also specific information from interviewees with specialist knowledge. These meetings sometimes involved several people, especially when language was a barrier. Often, however, there was a bias in those who were interviewed. Civil society groups, interest groups, think tanks, and universities were usually much more likely to have agreed to the interview in the first place, and tended to be more candid, although there were exceptions. Many interviews were also unscheduled prior to the trip and involved interviewees that had been referred to us by others in situ. After fieldwork, the overall framework was then revised with new insights being incorporated where appropriate, and whenever points were supported by more than one interviewee. [ 3 ]

Preview of the case studies The first case study, China, occupies a critical position in the global governance of climate change. In international negotiations, China has insisted that, as a developing country, it should have few obligations for making binding commitments to reduce its emissions, particularly so long as developed countries refuse to do the same or fail to meet the targets they proclaim. The countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leaders are also reluctant to make emissions reduction commitments that might jeopardise their economic policymaking autonomy, as their political position and legitimacy ultimately rests on their ability to deliver high rates of economic growth and improve the living standards of average Chinese citizens. Domestically though, growing concerns about the environment have

[3] Face-to-face interviews could not be conducted for Tuvalu given the time and cost constraints and so the report findings for this case study remain more tentative.

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ÂŠ AFD / The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries / October 2012

Introduction

resulted in some shifts in policymaking, with some significant, albeit incomplete reforms of the institutions governing climate change and energy at home. These reforms have resulted in the implementation of a range of ambitious policies on reducing carbon intensity and increasing energy efficiency. China’s domestic and international approaches to the governance of climate change are, therefore, in a state of transition. While there have been some impressive achievements, the country continues to face immense challenges to its governance capacity as a result of deeply entrenched commercial, bureaucratic and political interests and the current structure of its economy, which will remain highly dependent on fossil fuels (especially coal) for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the developments mapped in this report suggest a more nuanced assessment than the dire picture found in the media and among foreign publics and practitioners. These developments must ultimately be set against the view of China as an obstinate climate laggard. Brazil’s approach to climate change has also changed quite dramatically in recent years. From an initial position in which the government regarded the issues as primarily a technical foreign policy issue, it now has some of the most comprehensive and binding domestic climate change legislation amongst all non-Annex 1 countries, and arguably, Annex 1 countries as well. Key to these changes have been the country’s unique emissions profile – despite a progressive energy profile dominated by heavy reliance on hydropower, its per capita emissions are relatively high for a developing country, due to emissions from high rates of deforestation in the Amazon. However, in the last few years, the government has transformed its approach to forest governance, strengthening its ability to set and meet deforestation targets in order to reduce its LUCF emissions. These changes have been accompanied by a series of ambitious sectoral plans and policies backed up by legislation that has made emissions reductions legally binding. Internationally though, Brazil continues to be something of a climate ‘laggard,’ refusing, along with a number of other developing countries, to sign up to compulsory emission reductions and insisting that developed countries take responsibility for their historical role in creating the problem. Nevertheless, despite some concerns about the future direction of energy policy and the government’s ability to continue tackling the problem of deforestation, the overall impression is that climate change governance in Brazil has improved considerably in the last few decades. In Ethiopia by contrast, the future is less clear. For many years, the country was a ‘laggard’ both domestically and internationally. Climate change failed to even warrant a mention in the government’s official poverty reduction strategies as late as 2003 and until recently, its participation in international negotiations was limited to attendance only. That approach has changed considerably since 2009, with some significant domestic

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policy commitments and institutional changes. In part, these changes have been motivated by the country’s growing awareness about its vulnerability to climate change. And at the international level, Ethiopia’s position in the UNFCCC negotiations and its overall approach to the governance of climate change has changed from one of indifference to leadership and high profile activism. Indeed, what this report makes clear is that in many respects, in fact, it has been Ethiopia’s growing international engagement that has paved the way for its domestic actions and in particular, the election of Ethiopia to the chair of the African negotiating group at the UNFCCC. However, there are a number of substantial political and administrative barriers to effective policy implementation in Ethiopia; to date, the policy commitments have yet to be translated into effective actions on the ground. Accordingly, while the country’s overall approach might certainly be said to be in a state of transformation, it is probably too early to say whether this is likely to prove permanent. For the final case study, Tuvalu, most of the analysis centres on the unique vulnerability of the island nation to the effects of climate change. As with the other three though, the government’s strategy has changed considerably in recent years, with an evolution of priorities away from internationally focused efforts at highlighting awareness in order to encourage mitigation by other countries to a greater prioritisation of adaptation at the national level. Preliminary analysis of the governance of adaptation in Tuvalu demonstrates that its government has been fairly successful in attracting funding to meet adaptation priorities. Tuvalu’s top adaptation priority, for example, is to increase the resilience of coastal areas and settlements and it has received more than three times the financing it originally requested. These developments give reason to be optimistic about the country’s ability to adapt to climate change in the years ahead, and suggest a more positive outlook particularly on the availability of international adaptation funding than has previously been the case. In the chapters that follow, climate governance in these countries is explored at some length. The report begins with China, followed by Brazil, Ethiopia and Tuvalu. It finishes with some concluding comments and comparative insights.

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1. China China is one of the key countries in discussions on climate change. It is the world’s largest emitter of GHGs in absolute terms, producing over 6,000 megatonnes of CO 2 on a yearly basis, and accounting for nearly 22 per cent of total global emissions and just under half of all the emissions of the non-Annex 1 states. Its per capita emissions now surpass the global average, having grown by nearly 200 per cent between 1990 and 2007. Assuming its economy continues to expand at or near its historical rate, and with it China’s burgeoning appetite for mainly fossil fuel-based sources of energy, China’s business-as-usual emissions are expected to increase by between 57 and 75 per cent by 2025, depending on which projection is used.[ 4 ] The policies China adopts to govern climate change, its domestic capacity for effective governance of its emissions and energy use and any future international emissions reduction commitments that it makes are therefore of critical importance far beyond its own borders.

Figure

Global CO2 Emissions and Projections, Percentage Growth Rates: 1990-2025

Non-Annex 1 States

Annex 1 States

World

China

400

300

200

100

-100 1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

Source: CAIT (2011). Projections are from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook (2009).

[4 ] See the World Resource Institute’s CAIT database. http://cait.wri.org/

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Indeed, as multilateral negotiations have turned towards the design of a global climate regime to govern efforts beyond 2012, China’s actions have received growing attention. As a developing country (the world’s largest, with a population of over 1.3 billion), it has steadfastly resisted any suggestion in the UNFCCC negotiations that it should adopt binding commitments to reduce emissions. Motivated by a mix of political, economic and equity-based concerns, China’s policymakers have consistently argued that it is the industrialised countries that must take the lead on climate change and accept the main burden of mitigation. As a result, it has often been labelled a climate ‘laggard’ or ‘hard-liner’ by developed countries. Following Copenhagen, for example, Mark Lynas, negotiator for the Maldives, contended that China had “wrecked efforts to reach a global deal,” while Ed Miliband, the then UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, accused China and other developing countries of “holding the world ransom” (Lynas 2009; Vidal 2009a ). Yet as China’s impact upon global emissions has grown, so too have its own, internal concerns about the environment, energy security and vulnerability to climate change. As these concerns have achieved greater prominence, Chinese policymakers have undertaken substantial, if incomplete, institutional reforms in key sectors related to climate change, especially in the energy sector. As a result of this, the growing capacity of its domestic governance institutions has enhanced its ability to enact a number of ambitious policies and programmes for increasing energy efficiency and conservation, and for encouraging the use of renewable energy and reducing emissions. China has also adjusted its position on a number of key issues in the UNFCCC negotiations – on flexibility mechanisms, finance and technology transfer, and even the nature of its commitments. This chapter aims to map and explain China’s evolving institutions, activities and interests related to the governance of climate change. Part 1 provides an account of the shifts in China’s domestic policymaking and its approach to global governance. This includes changes in the institutional arrangements for climate and energy policymaking that have increased its capacity for climate change governance; domestic efforts to improve energy efficiency, restrain energy demand, increase renewable energy production and reduce emissions; and evolving participation in the UNFCCC. Part 2 provides a brief survey of the major Chinese interests and normative concerns related to climate change, in an attempt to explain the shifts outlined in Part 1. It suggests that while China’s overarching political, economic and foreign policy concerns have, to all appearances, remained consistent during the period in question, they have also had to incorporate growing domestic worries related to the environment, energy security, China’s vulnerability to climate change and its international image.

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1.1. The Evolution of Climate Change Governance in China: Policymaking, Policies and Global Governance New concerns related to climate change and energy in the Chinese government, the CCP, and among non-state or civil society actors have resulted in a number of remarkable changes in China. Domestically, China’s climate and energy policymaking structures have evolved from relatively powerless entities into more substantial bureaucratic machines influencing decision-making at many levels of government. The major institutional reforms that have taken place can be understood as attempts to increase the governance capacity necessary for implementing effective policies in these areas as the underlying issues have attained greater domestic and international prominence. These structures continue to face considerable challenges. However, the greater authority and capacity that they have achieved, although limited, have permitted them to set and enact a range of ambitious policies for reducing emissions, increasing energy efficiency and conservation and encouraging the use of renewable energy sources. Internationally, the picture is more nuanced. By comparison to the more significant shifts in its domestic policies and policymaking structures, China’s position in the UNFCCC has been less proactive. It has continued to resist any suggestion that it should accept binding emissions targets. However, as this section shows, there has been minor progress in other areas as the country’s negotiators have adjusted their position on flexibility mechanisms, leading to China’s embrace of the CDM, and on finance and technology transfer.

1.1.1. The evolution of policymaking for climate change and energy Coordination of Chinese climate policy began in 1990 with the creation of the National Climate Change Coordinating Leading Small Group (NCCCLSG), which was originally stationed in and chaired by the State Meteorological Association (SMA). The SMA was a key player in the coordination of China’s early climate change research and in its participation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other international scientific programmes, and was given responsibility for the implementation of China’s UNFCCC commitments after it was ratified in 1992. However, it was a low-ranking government body, and was increasingly sidelined by the more powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in the actual climate policymaking process, until it was eventually incorporated by the NDRC in 1998, signalling a significant change in policy (Bjørkum 2005). The NDRC is universally considered to be the most powerful comprehensive commission (the highest-ranking form of administrative

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unit in China) under the State Council, with overall responsibility for studying, developing and setting policies related to economic and social development, including the Five-Year Plans, and the coordination and regulation of energy prices and other areas related to the promotion of sustainable development. Officially shifting responsibility for climate change to the NDRC signalled that climate change was no longer being treated as a purely scientific question, but as a highly sensitive political and economic issue. After China’s approval of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, the NCCCLSG became known as the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC). Established under the auspices of the State Council in 2003, it continued to be stationed in and chaired by the NDRC. However, as a coordination group chaired by a vice-premier, its status and independent policymaking authority remained limited. With the increasing salience of the climate change issue both domestically and internationally and as the design of a post-2012 regime became the focus of the UNFCCC negotiations at COP13 in Bali, Indonesia, the governance of climate change in China received a significant boost as the NCCCC was replaced by the National Leading Committee on Climate Change (NLCCC). Headed by Premier Wen Jiabao, the mandate of the NLCCC, which coordinates twenty-seven different government agencies, is much like that of its predecessors: to make major decisions and to coordinate national actions on climate change. However, it has considerably strengthened capacity and decision-making power compared to its previous incarnations. The greater strength and authority of the NLCCC is largely due to the fact that its establishment was paralleled by the creation of similar leading groups and task forces designed to plan and coordinate action on climate change in local governments (Qi et al. 2008). Between June 2007 and March 2008, a number of provinces, provincial-level municipalities and autonomous regions established Leading Groups on Climate Change, Energy Saving and Pollution Reduction based on the central government’s model. These included the provinces of Fujian, Gansu, Hainan, Hubei, Ningxia, Qinghai, Sichuan and Zhejiang, as well as similar groups at the prefectural and county levels. Eighteen other provinces established Leading Groups on Energy Saving and Pollution Reduction that did not have ‘climate change’ in their titles, but nevertheless included clear mandates to generate strategies and policies and to organise action on climate change. Overall, such groups are often the most effective governance units in China, as they are ultimately responsible for implementing the central government’s decisions. Many of these, including Xinjiang, Hubei, Fujian, Beijing, Liaoning, Shandong and Jianxi, have developed their own mitigation and adaptation plans, while others have launched their own climate change research

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programmes (Tsang & Kolk 2010; Koehn 2008). Thus, within a short time, the entire structure of climate change governance in China changed. With the exception of several that were involved in the CDM, no local governments had previously been interested in or even aware of climate change issues. But, after the creation of the NLCCC signalled the importance of climate issues to the central government, and as pressure was placed on local governments, significant institutional developments followed that increased the central government’s capacity for implementing measures that can reduce emissions across China. A parallel, if less robust, trend can be seen in the structures governing energy policy. For a period of nearly ten years following the failure of the Ministry of Energy in 1993, there was no overarching governance structure in the energy sector. Coordination of planning and investment among the major ministries, such as the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, the Ministry of Coal Industry, the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, and the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power, along with the major national energy companies, was all but absent. However, as a result of a series of severe energy shortages and blackouts that began in 2002, coupled with the growing concerns about China’s oil and coal supply, the Chinese government was shocked into an effort to improve governance capacity. In 2003, the Energy Bureau was established under the NDRC and given a broad mandate to manage the energy sector. As with previous efforts though, centralisation of authority faced heavy resistance from the entrenched interests within the energy industry, and the outcome represented a compromise solution between two distinct groups. On the one hand were the proponents of a centralised energy authority, the NDRC, which wished to preserve its influence by preventing the emergence of an institution with a competing mandate. On the other hand, there were the national energy companies, who wished to prevent the creation of a body that had real authority over their actions (Downs 2006). As a result, the Energy Bureau suffered from a lack of manpower, financial resources, autonomy and authority, which compromised its ability to coordinate energy policy. Crucially, since its administrative rank was lower than the ministry or vice-ministry-level agencies and the national oil companies that it was supposed to coordinate, it was unable to reconcile the multiple conflicts among the most important stakeholders. China’s energy crisis of 2003-2004 again highlighted the need for further institutional reform. In a new effort to centralise energy policymaking, a National Energy Leading Group (NELG), headed by Premier Wen Jiabao, was created in 2005, along with a State Energy Office (SEO). The NELG, which would comprise many of the same officials as the NCCCC, acted as a high-level discussion and coordination body

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under the auspices of the State Council, while the SEO was subordinate to it, executed its decisions and managed its daily affairs. While the creation of the NELG and SEO improved governance of the energy section at the margin, many of the persistent problems that had hindered effective governance, including bureaucratic fragmentation and unclear or overlapping authorities, remained in place (Downs 2006). In most respects, the major administrative tasks continued to be managed by separate ministries, leading to poor coordination and resistance from influential constituencies. The most recent attempt, in 2008, to overcome the energy governance deficit by further centralising energy policymaking in China involved the creation of a National Energy Commission (NEC) to replace the NELG and a National Energy Administration (NEA), which absorbed the Energy Bureau, a number of offices in the NDRC, the SEO and the Nuclear Power Administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND). Acting on the behalf of the NEC, the NEA is tasked with managing the energy industry, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. Both the NEC and NEA continue to suffer from insufficient authority, autonomy and resources, which is problematic for any coordinated effort to moderate energy demand and to introduce energy efficiency policies (Downs 2006; Downs 2008; Tsang & Kolk 2010). Energy pricing policy, for example, remains the responsibility of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. However, while far from ideal, the NEC’s and NEA’s capabilities in each of the areas covered by their mandate are greater than those possessed by their predecessor, the Energy Bureau. The current energy governance structure, for example, benefits from the same proliferation of leading groups and task forces in provincial and local governments that assist climate policymaking, which reinforces its ability to set targets and implement policies and programmes for meeting them (Qi et al. 2008).

1.1.2. Climate change, energy efficiency and renewable energy policy While the structures of climate and energy governance in China continue to evolve, and remain troubled in a number of respects, the institutions that now exist nonetheless represent an improvement over previous incarnations. The increased authority and governance capacity they have achieved has permitted a number of new climate and energy-focused programmes, policies and targets to be established, which taken together amount to a nearly unparalleled effort to control GHG emissions, improve energy efficiency and conservation, and encourage the use of renewable energy.

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Of these, China’s pledge to reduce its carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45 per cent from 2005 levels by 2020 is probably the best known. Announced prior to Copenhagen and included as part of its Copenhagen Accord commitment, this carbon intensity target was recently reaffirmed in the 12 th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), with a commitment to reduce carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 17 per cent from 2010 levels by 2015. Meeting the target presents a substantial challenge to China, requiring a host of new energy efficiency and low-carbon technology policies and programmes at the national, provincial and local levels, and should result in a substantial limitation of emissions if implemented successfully. [ 5 ] At this stage an exact quantification of its likely effect is virtually impossible. Some, such as Fatih Birol, chief economist of the International Energy Agency (IEA), have estimated that China’s commitment may reduce projected emissions by as much as one gigatonne or 25 per cent of the total world reduction needed to stabilise average global temperatures at 2 degrees Celsius (Hood 2009). Critics counter it represents nothing more than the continuation of current energy efficiency and conservation policies and measures. Regardless of the outcome, it is clear that China’s current and already proposed efforts in these areas have been tremendous. China’s first major step on this path to a planned lower carbon economy was its target of reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20 per cent or 4 per cent annually, announced in the 11 th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). In order to meet this target, as well as others for the reduction of emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD) by 8 per cent, China launched a comprehensive economy-wide energy conservation programme. The 11th Five-Year Plan set energy conservation and emissions reduction targets for each region and sector, and for individual businesses noted for their high energy intensity levels and consumption. As part of this effort, a revised Energy Conservation Law was approved in 2007, which created a legal framework for promoting energy efficiency and conservation activities. Among other things, the law made local governments accountable for implementing their share of the national targets by including officials’ adherence to their target as a key criterion in their performance evaluations. And, as with commitments on carbon emissions per unit of GDP, the 12 th Five-Year Plan has continued where its predecessor left off, with a pledge to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 per cent from 2010 levels by 2015.

[5] For an introduction to China’s energy intensity target, see Seligsohn (2010). See Chandler & Wang (2009) and Cohen-Tanugi (2010) on the stringency of China’s commitment. For a more equivocal view see China Energy Group (2009). For more pessimistic views see Carraro & Tavoni (2010) and Levi (2009).

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Policies to achieve these goals include higher taxes on petroleum, coal and natural gas to encourage buyers to reduce consumption of, and diversify away from, such fuels; differentiated energy pricing, which raises the cost of energy on businesses that do not meet the government’s energy-efficiency standards; and financial rewards for businesses that make distinguished efforts to save energy (Worldwatch 2010). These polices have been accompanied by a number of energy conservation and efficiency initiatives focusing on public transport, alternative fuels, combined heat-and-power, surplus heat utilisation, green lighting, high-performance appliances and energy-saving buildings; energy efficiency benchmarking in key sectors, such as construction and transportation; and the Top-1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Programme, which encouraged key energy-consuming businesses to engage in energy auditing, to report their usage and to put forward energy conservation plans (Ibid). The effects of these policies are already being felt – in order to meet the stringent efficiency targets, some local authorities have initiated ruthless energy rationing programmes, cutting electricity to homes, factories and public buildings for much of the day on a regular basis (Li 2010). Chinese officials have also ordered the closure of more than 2,000 out-dated and inefficient steel mills, cement works and other energy-intensive factories as part of the efficiency and emissions reduction drive, with unknown effects upon employment (BBC 2010). These actions testify to both the improved capacity for energy governance in China and the determination with which the goal of energy efficiency is being pursued, although clearly substantial challenges persist. Renewable energy policies have seen a similar proliferation as China has attempted to diversify supplies away from the use of fossil fuels, particularly coal and oil. Sensing the major economic opportunities at hand in the production of renewable energy products, as well as the benefits to be had in terms of reduced pollution and lower emissions, it has in a short period of time also become both a major producer and market for renewable energy products. China has, since the early 1980s, designated renewable energy technology as an area of potential growth, investing large amounts of money in research and development over time. Though the production of renewable energy products began to take off in the 1990s, it was not until 2004 that China approved a Renewable Energy Law, which established a legal framework for enacting economy-wide renewable energy policies, and included regulations, targets, development plans, fiscal and subsidy policies and national standards. This was supplemented by the Medium and Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in 2007. Together, these aimed to increase the use of non-fossil fuel energy sources in China’s total energy consumption to 10 per cent by 2010 and 15 per cent by 2020, delegating responsibility to local authorities and making the achievement of each target legally

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mandatory. As Table 3 shows, specific targets were also set for each renewable energy source. By 2020, China aims to have a total of 300 GW of installed hydro capacity, 30 GW of wind capacity, 1.8 GW of solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity and 30 GW of biomass-based sources of energy production. Policies that were established by the Law and Plan to promote the development and use of renewables include rules requiring the operators of power grids to buy energy from renewable energy producers; feed-in tariffs, discounted lending and the creation of a national fund to foster renewable energy development; guidelines for renewable energy industries, setting technical standards for renewable energy electrical power, technology, and products; and rules designed to encourage the construction of renewable power generation facilities, efficient buildings, and rural electrification (Worldwatch 2010). This legislative effort has been supplemented by financial support from the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for R&D on key renewable energy technologies, and by a host of policies, regulations, targets, subsidies and plans formulated and set by local governments, many of whom have also created low-carbon development zones that focus on producing clean energy technology (Gordon et al. 2010; Worldwatch 2010). In 2009, a system of fixed tariffs and a special subsidy initiative, known as the ‘Golden Sun’ programme, was launched for encouraging solar PV installation, which has thus far lagged behind most other renewable technologies (Worldwatch 2010). And in the most recent Five-Year Plan, approved in March 2011, a number of priority ‘strategic emerging industries’ for industrial innovation and development were highlighted, such as energy efficiency technologies, recycling, and waste management; advanced nuclear energy, wind, solar, smart grids and biomass; and hybrid and pure electric vehicles.

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Table

Current and Targeted Renewable Energy Production in China 2006 (actual)

2009 (actual)

2020 (current target)

2020 (proposed target)

Hydro Power

130 GW

197 GW

300 GW

Wind Power

2.6 GW

25.8 GW

30 GW

150 GW

Biomass Power Solar Power Renewable Energy Share of Final Energy Consumption

2.6 GW

3.2 GW

30 GW

0.08 GW

0.4 GW

1.8 GW

20 GW

15%

Source: Martinot (2010); Wang et al. (2010); Martinot & Li (2007)

Efforts to promote the use and production of renewable energy have had significant results. Over the past decade years, hydro, wind, biomass and solar PV energy use has increased across the board, and China is now both a global market leader and the largest user of renewable energy (Gordon et al . 2010). Wind energy, thus far, has led the way. Boasting installed capacity of nearly 26 GW by the end of 2009, China’s wind energy capacity has doubled every year for the past five years (Fairley 2009). It is now the largest market for wind turbines, having surpassed the United States in 2009. And after nearly reaching its 2020 target (set in 2007) of 30 GW of installed capacity almost ten years ahead of schedule, the NDRC has recently proposed revised targets of 35 GW for 2011 and 150 GW for 2020 – the latter nearly equal to the world’s entire installed wind capacity of 157 GW at present. Solar PV capacity, by contrast, amounted to only 0.32 GW in 2009 – an amount less than Belgium – but is now being targeted to grow to 20 GW by 2020. Production of renewable energy technology has improved as well. Wind, solar PV, solar heating, biomass, geothermal and ocean energy technologies have all seen significant gains. China is now the third largest manufacturer of solar PV technology, for example, producing around 30 per cent of the world total, with around 98 per cent exported, mainly to Germany, Spain and California (Gordon et al. 2010). With respect to energy efficiency, there have also been some considerable achievements. China has made progress in industry – the largest consumer of energy – closing down obsolete power generation, iron production and steel production

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facilities, and gradually improving the efficiency of its most energy-intensive products; in buildings, where the deployment of energy-efficient technologies and materials has led to more efficient heating; and in transportation, where the fuel economy of cars has improved and massive investments in transit systems have taken place (Worldwatch 2010). Overall, while its GDP increased by over 10 per cent annually, as a result of its policies, targets and technological changes China’s energy intensity declined by nearly 18 per cent between 2005 and 2009. Indeed, almost all the country’s provinces, regions and municipalities have recorded improvements in the efficiency of energy use relative to GDP, which is reckoned to have saved 290 million tonnes coal equivalent (tce) of energy and to have reduced GHG emissions by 670-750 million tonnes (NDRC 2009; Zhenhua 2009). In sum, while China has accumulated a number of worrisome titles – becoming the world’s largest emitter of GHGs, the world’s largest consumer of coal and the world’s second largest producer and consumer of energy – these have been matched by a number of very positive ones: the world’s largest market for wind energy, the highest installed renewable electricity capacity, the third largest producer of solar PV. According to Worldwatch (2010: 11), its effort to increase energy efficiency and conservation “has few equals in other countries, developed or developing”. Despite these impressive accomplishments, though, China has struggled to burnish its image as a leader in the fight against climate change; its considerable domestic efforts to reduce its GHG emissions, increase energy efficiency and conservation and promote the use of renewable energy having frequently been overshadowed by its reputation as a ‘laggard’ or ‘hard-liner’ in the UNFCCC negotiations.

1.1.3. China and the global governance of climate change As both a developing country and the largest emitter of GHGs, China presents a considerable challenge to the global governance of climate change. Reducing its emissions is absolutely necessary for limiting global GHGs to sustainable levels, but it has so far refused to agree to a legally binding multilateral treaty. As a result, it is often viewed by the international community, particularly by developed countries, as inflexible and obstructive. The various concerns that inform its position in the international climate change negotiations have indeed led to a fairly consistent negotiation strategy. But it is unfair to say that there has been no change in China’s approach in the negotiations, nor, if we are to fully assess the role China has played in the governance of climate change, is it fair to only look at its behaviour in the UNFCCC, given its considerable domestic efforts.

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China’s position in the UNFCCC negotiations has naturally attracted widespread attention. With the greatest population and the second largest economy, China is widely considered to be an emerging ‘great power’ (Mearsheimer 2003; Shirk 2007; Lanteigne 2005 & 2009; Bergsten et al. 2006). However, as the world’s largest emitter of GHGs and second largest producer and consumer of energy, it can already arguably be considered an ‘environmental power’ (Rowlands 2001; Carter & Mol 2006). Possessing the potential to undermine any emissions reductions made by other countries, its cooperation is perceived to be essential to limiting global GHG emissions. Without strong action from China any efforts by others to control global warming would be futile, making China a lynchpin for achieving global cooperation. In many respects, China’s stance seems to have changed little since it first coordinated a negotiating strategy and became heavily involved in the climate talks of the early 1990s. At Copenhagen in 2009, its position may have appeared to many to be all but indistinguishable from its stance in Rio in 1992, or Berlin in 1995. China remained wedded to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities’, highlighted its low per capita and historic emissions and appeared to be hostile to any binding reductions. These have each been enduring features of China’s position in the UN negotiations. However, in reality, China’s approach has evolved and become more flexible over the course of time. Its position on so-called ‘flexibility mechanisms’, for example, has changed quite dramatically. On other issues, such as finance and technology transfer, China’s position has been more consistent, but its strategic approach to them has been transformed in important ways. Its general negotiation style, as several scholars have noted, has become more amicable and constructive (Heggelund 2007; Bjørkum 2005; Zhang 2006; Zhang 2003). Even China’s stance on the nature of its commitments, where its position appears least flexible, turns out to be less consistent than many suppose. China’s volte-face on the issue of flexibility mechanisms is one of the clearest ways in which its position has changed over the course of the negotiations. In the early talks leading to Rio joint implementation (JI) had been a particularly contentious issue for China, especially insofar as the concept was extended to include developing countries. JI would, in theory, allow developed countries to earn credits for emissionsreducing projects in other countries that could count towards their own emissions targets or could be sold to others. This would give them a degree of flexibility in how they would meet their emissions reduction limitation targets. However, at this early stage, China argued that JI was an unfair practice which would allow developed countries to shirk their responsibilities, and would involve a violation of sovereignty due to the invasive monitoring and verification measures that would be needed

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(Nielsen & McElroy 1998). Ultimately, against China’s initial objections, provisions for JI were included in the UNFCCC; but only as a pilot phase without the possibility of credits – what became known as Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). Again, in the subsequent negotiations leading to Kyoto, the so-called ‘Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms’ proved to be a key issue for China – the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in particular. The CDM was designed to allow emissions reduction projects in developing countries to earn Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) credits, which could be traded and sold, and used by industrialised countries to a meet a part of their emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast to its generally negative position on JI in earlier negotiations, however, key Chinese officials in the NDRC came to see the CDM as a potential conduit for technologies and investments that coincided with China’s evolving economic, energy and climate related concerns (Hatch 2003; Heggelund 2007, Heggelund et al. 2010). Participating in the CDM would also allow China to demonstrate its commitment to action on climate change, while remaining free of any binding obligations to specific emissions reduction targets. China still expressed significant reservations about the CDM’s institutions. It worried that the mechanism would primarily serve the interests of developed countries and would make it more difficult for developing countries to reduce emissions cheaply if and when they assumed some reduction commitments (Hatch 2003). China also objected to a US proposal suggesting that the resulting credits should be tradable in secondary markets, and preferred CDM projects to be arranged primarily through bilateral project-based institutional arrangements, rather than fund-based multilateral financing (Hatch 2003). But it became clear that China no longer objected to the CDM concept tout court as it had to JI. At COP6, China called the CDM a ‘win-win’ mechanism for both developed and developing countries, and, at COP7 in Marrakech, China bolstered efforts to accelerate its launch (Bjørkum 2005). Since its introduction, China has been a notable supporter of the CDM. As of November 2010, Chinese authorities have approved 2,785 projects (NDRC 2010). Of these, 1,079 are officially registered with the CDM executive board, amounting to just under 42 per cent of all registered projects (UNFCCC 2010). In total, China has issued about 250 million CER credits, amounting to 53 per cent of all CER credits, which are each equivalent to a reduction of one tonne of CO 2 , in theory (Ibid). According to research by Heggelund et al. (2010), projects focusing on renewables account for 46 per cent of all the CO 2 reductions resulting from CDM projects in China, followed by chemical pollutant reductions (especially of HFC-23) (16.72%), energy saving and efficiency improvement (16.44%) and methane recovery and

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utilisation (10.62%). The true value of the CERs issued by China in terms of reduced emissions has, of course, been subject to considerable criticism. David Victor and Michael Wara have argued that many CDM – supported projects would have happened anyway, violating the rule of ‘additionally’ and that between one – and two-thirds of the offsets do not represent real emissions reductions (Wara & Victor 2008; Wara 2007; Vidal 2008). Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that the CDM is now one of the key avenues through which China engages the world on the issue of climate change. Suitably reformed, the CDM offers a valuable conduit for supporting its domestic energy efficiency, conservation and renewable energy projects. China’s position on other issues, such as finance and technology transfer, has been more consistent over the years, but its approach or strategy has been transformed in important ways. China has, since the early 1990s, regarded finance and technology transfer as a crucial dimension of the governance of climate change (Economy 1997). At an early stage, on the issue of finance, it argued that developed countries should provide funds for implementing any agreements involving developing states and as compensation for damages and lost output that may result from climate change. Moreover, Chinese officials argued, these funds should be new and additional to existing development assistance. Developed countries, China also suggested, should find suitable mechanisms for providing technology to assist with adaptation and any voluntary mitigation efforts by developing countries. In particular, developed states should buy sustainable and environmentally friendly technologies from companies and sell it to developing states at below-market prices. With respect to both technology and finance, therefore, China’s emphasis in the UN negotiations was on the actions and obligations of developed countries. However, in recent years, China has changed its strategy and the way in which it has framed its demands on these issues. With respect to technology transfer, for example, it has come to emphasise a ‘win-win’ approach, proposing ‘reciprocal technology cooperation’ with industrialised countries that is both consistent with the ‘law of the market’ and ‘oriented towards climate change and sustainable development’ (Zhang 2006). China, of course, remains at the forefront of developing countries and as such continues to make strident demands for mechanisms to transfer funds and technology. At Copenhagen, it demanded that developed countries contribute between 0.5 and 1 per cent of their GDP to mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries. But, as a number of observers have noted, Chinese negotiators have taken a less aggressive, rhetorical approach and have been more willing to engage in constructive dialogue on these issues (Heggelund 2007; Bjørkum 2005; Zhang 2006; Zhang 2003).

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China’s position on emissions reduction commitments for itself and for developing countries as a group has, by contrast, been the most consistent dimension of its climate change foreign policy over the years. Despite quite remarkable changes in China’s domestic policies, Chinese negotiators have regularly argued that developing countries have made a negligible contribution to global emissions in per capita and historic terms, should be allowed to increase their emissions as they develop, and have no obligation to make any commitments, voluntary or otherwise. Their unswerving dedication to this position can be attributed to the strength of the political, economic and international equity-based concerns that inform it. Having staked their legitimacy on the ability to grow the Chinese economy by 7 to 8 per cent annually, China’s political leaders are wary of binding the country into any agreement that may undermine their control over domestic economic policymaking. China’s historic experience with unequal treaties, which contributed to domestic unrest during the Qing Dynasty, also contributes to a general suspicion of such international agreements. But, even with respect to China’s approach to international commitments, it is unfair to say that its position has seen no change. In 1998, China’s stance was characterised by Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the US House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations, as a policy of “ ‘Three No’s’: no obligations on China, no voluntary commitments by China and no future negotiations to bind China” (Zhang 2006; US House Committee on International Relations, 1998). And, in the early negotiations, Gilman’s characterisation could be said to have offered a reasonable appraisal of China’s position. Holding fast, China, along with the G77, successfully influenced the structure of the UNFCCC in a number of ways. Most importantly, they were able to include the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, according to which developed countries assumed the primary responsibility for reducing emissions. However, while China has continued to avoid any binding obligations, two of Gilman’s ‘Three No’s’ – ‘no negotiations on future commitments’ and ‘no voluntary commitments’ – no longer reflect its stance. The first of these was decisively altered at COP13 in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007. The most significant issue discussed at Bali was the question of post-2012 actions, including the structure of the negotiation process moving forward. China could easily have been expected to continue its long-time refusal to take part in any negotiations that might lead to specific actions by developing countries. But in a remarkable departure, China supported the establishment of an ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action (AWG-LCA), which would explicitly consider ‘Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by tech-

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nology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner’ (ENB 2007: 15). For the first time, China and the G77 appeared to have accepted the idea that they should discuss taking measurable steps toward mitigation. Of course, China has continued to resist any binding commitments in AWG-LCA negotiations. However, simply agreeing to such negotiations represented a considerable shift in the positions of China, the G77 and other developing countries. The second ‘no’ – no voluntary commitments – was decisively altered at COP15 in Copenhagen, 2009. Throughout the Copenhagen negotiations, China seemed to hold to its long-time position, underlining the historical responsibility of developed countries, the rights of developing countries and their lower capabilities for reducing emissions. It supported the G77’s rejection of attempts to shift responsibility onto developing countries, and emphasised that binding mitigation commitments in the AWG-LCA negotiations should only apply to developed countries that were not parties to Kyoto (meaning the US). However, in the end, China signed the Copenhagen Accord, making its specific, voluntary public commitment to reduce its carbon emissions intensity by 40-45 per cent from 2005 levels by 2020. Although this was not a legally binding commitment and had been proposed prior to Copenhagen, it still represented a step away from its own ‘no commitment’ or ‘no voluntary commitment’ position, as expressed in earlier negotiations, towards a ‘minimal commitment’ position (Bjørkum 2005). In sum, China has, to be sure, displayed continuing resistance to put forward binding targets. Moreover, as a developing country with a large population, China does not think it has any moral obligation to take the lead in reducing emissions and to make any commitments beyond what it is willing to do voluntarily. According to China, since developed countries are the primary contributors to the problem and have already had over one hundred and fifty years to develop economically, the main responsibility for mitigation should fall on them. However, as the next part of this report goes on to explain, China’s growing sense of vulnerability, its desire to bolster its international image as an upholder of multilateralism, and its desire to attain international support for its substantial domestic energy and climate change programmes have resulted in changes, albeit hesitant ones, in its position on specific issues, its negotiation strategy and, in some respects, its approach to international commitments in the UNFCCC negotiations.

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1.2. Interests, Institutions and Climate Change in China The governance of climate change in China has been powerfully shaped by a number of critical considerations. First, Chinese policymakers are motivated by political and economic issues. Concerned about maintaining legitimacy and cohesiveness in Chinese society, China’s leaders are determined to improve the standard of living of the average Chinese citizen. Second, they are concerned about China’s energy security, including its access to adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy and the efficiency of the economy more generally. Third, policymakers, businesses and the mass public are increasingly concerned about China’s vulnerability to the negative effects of climate change, especially insofar as these may adversely affect its economy and society. Finally, they are motivated by concerns about sovereignty, equity and China’s international image among both developed and developing countries. Each of these considerations pulls policy in different directions, but together, they have resulted in some significant changes in policymaking, policies and governance in a number of areas over time.

1.2.1. Political, economic and environmental concerns Above all, Chinese policymakers are motivated by political and economic considerations. At each level of government, from the municipal and prefectural to the provincial and national, maintaining social stability and the position of the CCP at the apex of Chinese society are the overarching priorities guiding policymaking. Politically, China is governed by a single party whose legitimacy and authority rests on the consent of several key constituencies, the bureaucracies, the military and the mass public. Having abandoned many traditional elements of communist ideology by embracing market forces, the CCP derives its legitimacy primarily by successfully addressing China’s key political, economic and social challenges. Mainly, this has been achieved by maintaining domestic security and an economic growth rate above 7 to 8 per cent per year, improving living standards and reducing poverty.

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Chinese Population and Income (per cent growth) and Poverty Headcounts (millions), 1980-2006

Population

GDP PPP/Person

GDP PPP

Poverty Headcount

1.500.00%

700

1.125.00%

525

750.00%

350

375.00%

175

0% 1980

Millions

Figure

0 1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

Source: Income and population figures from CAIT (2011). Poverty figures from Chen and Ravallion (2008).

Since 1980, China’s economic output has grown by nearly 1,1 00 per cent in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, recently overtaking Japan’s position as the second largest economy in the world. Due to slow population growth, its PPP per capita has increased by roughly 800 per cent; and the number living in extreme poverty has been reduced by as much as 500 million (See Figure 4). Barring any major disruption, these improvements are expected to continue, and China has the potential to become the main engine of the world economy in the decades ahead.

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Figure

China Energy Use, 1990-2006, Percentage Growth since 1990

CO2 Intensity of Economy CO2 Intensity of Economy Use

Energy Use/Person

Energy Use

300.00

225.00

150.00

75.00

-75.00 1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

Source: CAIT (2011).

Figure

China, Sectoral Energy Consumption

5% 3%

Manufacturing Electric Power, Gas and Water Production and Supply Construction

10%

59%

4% 2% 8%

Transport, Storage and Post Wholesale and Retail Trades, Hotels and Catering Other

2% 7%

Household Consumption Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry, Fishing Mining

Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009).

However, while the tremendous growth of China’s economy has brought great material benefits, it has come at considerable cost to the environment. Demand for water, energy and land has skyrocketed; forests have been depleted, resulting in desertification and flooding; water pollution has increased dramatically; and air quality has diminished as emissions from dirty fossil fuels have risen, increasing particulates in the local atmosphere. As the economic costs – estimated by the World Bank to be 8-12 per

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cent of annual GDP – of environmental degradation and resource depletion have become more apparent, and as their effects on public health have resulted in growing unease, China’s leaders have become more concerned (Economy 2004; Murray & Cook 2002; Elliot 2002; Aden & Sinton 2006; World Bank l997). As a result, protection of the environment and the sustainable use of resources have slowly moved up the government’s list of priorities

1.2.2. Energy China’s rapid growth since 1980 has been highly dependent on energy. As its economy has expanded, energy use has increased by over 200 per cent and by nearly 150 per cent per capita , with over half of this growth occurring in the years since 2001 (see Figure 5). China is now the world’s second largest producer and consumer of energy, behind only the United States, with manufactures – China’s primary export and a major component of its GDP – accounting for nearly 60 per cent of total energy consumption (see Figure 6). This tight connection between growing energy use and economic development means that energy policy is a central concern of the government. China’s large domestic reserves of coal traditionally allowed it to meet most of its energy needs using domestic sources. However, since 1993, China has become increasingly dependent upon foreign sources of oil, and now imports roughly half of all the oil it uses (see Figure 7). This state of affairs has resulted in rising concerns amongst Chinese policymakers about the country’s ability to acquire adequate, affordable and reliable supplies (Downs 2006). China’s leaders are particularly concerned about securing the oil requirements needed to meet the CCP’s core objectives and about adverse effects on China’s economy as a result of the volatility of international prices. Dependence upon the Strait of Malacca for around 80 per cent of China’s oil imports and reliance upon the United States Navy for ensuring the safety of the major sea-lanes of communication have also resulted in significant strategic discomfort. But the domestic determinants of China’s energy security have been a growing worry as well. Most of China’s coal supplies are located far from the coastal areas where energy demand from the rapidly expanding manufacturing industry has been rising fastest, making these areas highly vulnerable to China’s weak energy infrastructure and more reliant upon foreign sources of coal and oil (Lewis 2009). A number of severe energy shortages, bottlenecks and blackouts (in 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2005 and 2008) have resulted from massive geographic imbalances in supply and demand.

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Figure

Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Oil Imports, Exports and Output (units 10,000 tonnes)

Imports

Exports (-)

Domestic Output

30.000

22.500

15.000

7.500

0 1990

1995

2000

2005

2007

Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009).

Chinese anxiety about energy security has pulled state policy in opposing directions. On the one hand, in order to expand energy supplies to meet demand, efforts have been made to help its national oil companies to secure trade and investment opportunities abroad and to acquire equity in foreign oil exploration and production (Downs 2006; Elliott 2002). Expanding electrical generation capacity by bringing more and more coal-fired power plants online, as well as more renewable energy capacity, is another dimension of this drive. On the other hand, in order to moderate demand, significant emphasis has been placed on energy conservation and efficiency. As a result of its prodigal economic growth, its heavy reliance on low quality coal and fossil fuels, and its inadequate management of energy resources and infrastructure, Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s intensity of energy use is extremely high. Per unit of GDP it consumes roughly four times as much energy as the United States; seven times as much as Japan, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy; and one and a half times as much as India (Worldwatch 2010). These are the underlying concerns that have driven China to undertake the ambitious efforts to improve energy efficiency and conservation discussed earlier in this report.

1.2.3. Vulnerability Until the late 1980s, China had almost no history of research on climate change and therefore no domestic capacity for assessing the potential dangers it may pose. According to one prominent academic, when policymakers first asked scientists

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about the potential effects of rising average temperatures and sea-level on China, they responded by saying that there was no existing data or analysis with which to provide an answer. [ 6 ] However, soon after the adoption of UN Resolution 43/53 in 1988, China started to coordinate a serious research undertaking, establishing an interagency group of officials from the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), the SMA and the MOFA to prepare for the UN-sponsored scientific discussions on climate change under the IPCC. As scientific research on climate change in China has developed in the years since, providing ever more reliable estimates of its probable effects upon a range of issue areas, from agriculture and health to forestry and the economy, policymakers have become progressively more concerned about China’s vulnerability. The first comprehensive and authoritative review of climate change in China, the National Assessment Report on Climate Change, published in 2006 by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST, formerly the State Science and Technology Commission, or SSTC), the China Meteorological Administration (CMA, formerly the State Meteorological Agency, or SMA) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), forecast a range of negative trends, and received considerable attention from policymakers (NCCCC 2009). This was followed, in 2008, by the State Council’s White Paper on China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change , which also outlined a number of negative effects, and stated that China is “one of the countries most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (State Council 2008: 7). The sheer complexity of China’s climate and ecological systems – in a territory comprising 9.6 million km 2, 18,000 kilometres of coastline and stretching over both temperate and tropical/subtropical zones – means that the dangers it faces as a result of climate change are many and varied. According to the State Council, China’s agriculture and livestock, forests and natural ecological systems, water resources, and coastal zones have all already been adversely affected, or are expected to be in the near future, with dire consequences for the economy and society (State Council 2008: 7-10; NDRC 2007: 16-19). Indeed, the Council anticipates that climate change will ‘cause huge losses to the national economy’, increase ‘chances of disease occurrence and spread, endangering human health’, raise ‘possibilities of geological and meteorological disasters and consequent threats to the security of major projects’, and augment ‘threats to the safety of life and property, and to the normal order and

[6] Confidential interview in Beijing, November 2010.

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stability of social life.’ (State Council 2008:10). These concerns are amplified by the fact that the main geographical hubs of economic activity in China are located in areas along the coast that are considered to be especially vulnerable to potential rise in sea-level (Lewis 2009). However, elevated climate change awareness in China is not confined to policymakers alone. Many businesses as well as the mass (particularly urban) public have become more alert as a result of significant awareness-raising campaigns by the Chinese government and media; by local and international NGOs, such as the Climate Group, the World Resources Institute, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund; and by public intellectuals, such as Hu Angang, a prominent economist at Tsinghua University who has been a vocal advocate of the ‘green revolution’ (World Bank 2009a ; Angang 2009; confidential interviews in Beijing, November 2010). According to a survey conducted by the World Bank in 2009, 71 per cent of Chinese respondents believe that climate change has already seriously harmed people in China; 78 per cent agree strongly or agree somewhat with the claim that the climate change should be a priority even if it causes slower economic growth and job loss; and 65 per cent believe it will be necessary to increase the costs of energy in order to encourage firms and individuals to conserve more (World Bank 2009a ). In general, there has also been much less scepticism about the science of climate change among the mass public, policymakers and academics than has been the case in the West (World Bank 2009 a ; confidential interviews in Beijing, November 2010).

1.2.4. Foreign policy Many of the international concerns that inform China’s foreign policy are the result of longstanding political or historically rooted factors as well as normative values that influence China’s behaviour across a range of issue areas. Three international concerns – sovereignty, equity and image – have shaped China’s policies on trade, finance, nuclear non-proliferation and international institutions more broadly, in addition to climate change (Economy 2001). As with other motivating factors, China’s interests in the international political sphere often pull policy in opposite directions. First of all, Chinese negotiators have expressed an enduring concern for the preservation of sovereignty (Zhang 2003; Economy 2001). Defined in terms of territorial integrity, foreign and domestic policymaking autonomy, and especially the maintenance of the CCP’s hegemony and privileged position in Chinese society, sovereignty is a value deeply rooted in China’s modern history (Economy 1998; 2001). Observing the destabilising effects of imperialism and repeated foreign interventions in China’s domestic and

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external affairs, which ultimately contributed to the downfall of the Qing dynasty in the early twentieth century, the CCP is wary of any external influences on its policymaking that might be interpreted as a lack of authority. China’s historical experience with so-called ‘unequal treaties’ – widely understood to be hallmarks of the Qing dynasty’s weakness – has given rise, for example, to substantial distrust of multilateral treaties more generally. In the years after the Second World War, this suspicion was reaffirmed as a result of China’s exclusion from many multilateral regimes, particularly the United Nations, where its seat and membership in the Security Council were occupied by the Republic of China (Taiwan) until 1971. Since then, this suspicion has been somewhat tempered as China has become enmeshed in a growing number of multilateral regimes and international agreements (Lanteigne 2009). However, sovereignty remains a special foreign policy value that has been repeatedly emphasised by China in international negotiations on a range of issues. Above all, China does not want to be seen to be giving in to bullying by the dominant global powers. China also voices concerns about equity in the international sphere, consistently arguing in favour of differentiated responsibilities among developed and developing countries in recognition of their substantially different contributions to climate change and varying capabilities for reducing emissions. From a historical perspective, its negotiators have regularly argued that China has been a small contributor (the 89 th largest) when one takes into account its large population. And though its yearly absolute emissions are the largest in the world, China remains a minor contributor in per capita terms, producing 4.7 metric tonnes per person each year, and ranking only 67 th worldwide. By contrast, the average European produces 8.7 metric tonnes per person, and the average North American more than 19 metric tonnes. Moreover, Chinese officials claim that over 30 per cent of China’s emissions arise from the production of goods exported to developed states and that many of the developed world’s most environmentally harmful industrial processes have been ‘outsourced’ to China (Brahic 2008). [ 7 ] On the basis of equity, therefore, it is not clear why China should be obliged to reduce its emissions. As now-developed countries were able to produce emissions during their period of industrialisation, China should have an equal right to produce emissions in pursuit of its development. Its unequal capacity for reducing emissions reinforces this conclusion. China’s current emissions are, it is argued, ‘survival’ emissions – necessary for economic development and the reduction of poverty – while those of developed countries are ‘luxury’ emissions – a result of long showers and large, gas-guzzling off-road vehicles (Kobayashi 2003).

[7] We would also like to thank Kate Meagher for raising this point.

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China also has a comparatively diminished domestic capability for developing and adopting technologies for mitigating its impact on the climate. The country claims it is therefore not only unfair for it to accept stringent obligations, but unrealistic as well. That said, China has also been concerned about its image among foreign publics and policymakers. On the one hand, it wants to allay the worries of the many Westerners who believe that China is a threat to a stable international order and the effective governance of transnational issues. Confronted with massive domestic challenges, China’s leaders also want to avoid any foreign entanglements that may handicap their ability to continuously improve living standards. To reassure foreign publics that China intends to maintain its ‘peaceful rise’ policy it has embedded itself within an ever-widening array of international institutions, hoping to be seen as a cooperative partner and responsible upholder of multilateralism. On the other hand, China remains wary of agreeing to any binding commitments that it does not believe it can meet, risking potentially damaging economic or diplomatic retaliation from other countries in response. [ 8 ] It also wants to be seen as a leader of the G77 and of the developing world more generally to boost its prestige and bolster its stance in the UNFCCC negotiations. To this end, it has used its power to mobilise a common position amongst developing countries through the G77/China, positioning itself as a supporter of the developing world’s cause, even in certain cases when this puts it in the awkward position of supporting policies that are not directly in its own interests (Kasa et al. 2008; Conrad 2010)

1.3. Conclusion Among foreign publics and policymakers, China’s position in international climate negotiations has been a natural focal point. International governance constitutes one of the most important dimensions of the governance of climate change. But it is not at the international level where the most important policies are implemented. In its attempt to map China’s approach to the governance of climate change, this chapter has made a special effort to look not only at China’s position in the UNFCCC but to consider its domestic governance initiatives as well. Cumulatively, the mapping produces a more nuanced account of China’s role in the governance of climate change than its international reputation as a climate ‘laggard’ suggests. Indeed, it reveals a notable disjuncture between China’s ‘voluntary’ efforts to govern climate change and energy use and its ongoing obstinacy in the UNFCCC negotiations.

[8] Confidential interview in Beijing, November 2010.

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As the second largest producer and consumer of energy and the greatest emitter of GHGs in absolute terms, China occupies a critical position in the global governance of climate change. Significant efforts to limit its rising emissions over the upcoming years are essential for limiting GHG concentrations to sustainable levels, but as a developing country China has been hesitant to embrace any binding emissions targets in UNFCCC negotiations. This hesitance is ultimately a result of powerful political, economic and international equity-based interests and normative concerns that have fundamentally shaped the decisions of Chinese policymakers at all levels of government. Above all, the privileged political position and legitimacy of the CCP rests on its ability to deliver high rates of economic growth and improve the living standards of average Chinese citizens, making stringent emissions reductions commitments that could seriously circumscribe the economic policymaking autonomy of the CCP politically unpalatable. China also does not wish to appear weak in international negotiations, is often ambivalent about making serious international commitments due to concerns about its international image and potential foreign entanglements, and makes strong equity-based arguments against obligations for mitigating emissions among developing countries. However, as the costly side effects of China’s growth have reached its economy and society, compromising the health and living standards of ordinary Chinese citizens, China has also come to view the environment as an important concern. Its vulnerability to the effects of climate change, which threaten economically crucial population centres, has become an especially worrisome source of weakness, as has China’s growing energy use and dependence on foreign sources of petroleum. As a result, China’s approach to climate change and energy, two policy areas which are closely connected, has shifted in important respects over the past two decades. The Chinese government has made a significant, if incomplete, effort to reform the institutions governing these issue areas, increasing the power of central decisionmaking structures and establishing similar leading groups at all levels of government. These new governance structures have enhanced China’s capacity to implement a range of ambitious policies for taking action on climate change and energy security; most notably, its carbon intensity, energy efficiency and renewable energy targets for 2020, and the wide range of specific policies and operational programmes for reaching them. Crucially, the government has made fulfilling its countrywide environmental and energy targets legally mandatory and an important dimension of the performance evaluations of local government officials. This revolution in China’s domestic governance structures and climate policies has been paralleled by several changes in its approach to international governance.

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Although less comprehensive than the changes that have taken place domestically as a result of the considerable constraints facing Chinese negotiators, these reflect China’s growing desire to gain the support of foreign actors on climate and energy issues. Within the UNFCCC negotiations, the transformation of its position on flexibility mechanisms has been the most dramatic, with China becoming the most significant user of the CDM in the years since its launch. Participation in the CDM has offered a low-cost opportunity to demonstrate China’s commitment to multilateral climate governance while also receiving substantial foreign support for its domestic reform effort. By contrast, China’s resistance to binding commitments at the international level has persisted, contributing to the breakdown of negotiations and the negative image of China among foreign publics. China’s domestic and international approach to the governance of climate change is, therefore, in a state of transition. Domestically, Chinese policymakers have shown great determination in their efforts to tackle climate change and burgeoning energy use, reforming institutions at an impressive rate and enacting new policies and programmes on a scale that is unparalleled anywhere else in the world. Of course, many of these have yet to prove their mettle. And the country continues to face immense challenges to its governance capacity as a result of both deeply entrenched commercial, bureaucratic and political interests and the current structure of its economy, which will remain highly dependent on fossil fuels (especially coal) for the foreseeable future. Whether China’s policymakers are able to match their goals with adequate political, economic and technological capabilities remains to be seen, and will for some time remain a key question in considerations of China’s potential contribution to global emissions reductions. The track record so far is uneven, marked by both successes and setbacks. Internationally, Chinese policymakers have also shown that they are keen to engage positively with other major GHG emitters through a number of innovative channels. But this engagement has so far been limited to initiatives that can contribute to China’s major domestic goals, a trend which may be expected to continue. China still regards itself as a developing country with few obligations for making binding commitments to reduce its emissions, particularly so long as comparably stringent actions on the part of developed countries, especially the US, are not forthcoming. With its economy growing at an unprecedented rate, the rising affluence of its population and its burgeoning demand for energy, China is bound to see its GHG emissions increase, creating an immense challenge for both itself and the world. However, the significant, if uneven, developments in China that are described here suggest a more subtly optimistic assessment than the dire picture found in the

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media and among foreign publics and practitioners. Effective intergovernmental cooperation has indeed faced obstacles as a result of deeply ingrained domestic concerns in China, as elsewhere. But, domestically, China sees itself as a leader in the fight against climate change. It has demonstrated considerable initiative for taking action on its own and a willingness to engage actors beyond its borders through a number of alternative channels in the absence of a multilateral treaty. These positive developments must ultimately be set against the view of China as an obstinate climate laggard.

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2. Brazil Brazil is a unique country in the global climate change regime. Thanks to its large size and impressive economic growth in recent years, it is regarded as one of the major emerging economies that will play an increasingly influential role in global politics in upcoming decades. It is one of the members of the BASIC group (with China, India and South Africa), which made its mark on the global climate change negotiations at Copenhagen in 2009. But unlike the other BASIC countries, Brazil is not a major producer of fossil fuel-based emissions. Due to the large share of renewable energy sources in its energy mix, its fossil fuel-based emissions amounted to only 1.9 tonnes of CO 2 per capita in 2005. By comparison, China, with a much larger population, produced 5.1 tonnes of CO 2 per capita , and neighbouring Argentina, with a nearly equivalent level of GDP per capita , emitted more than twice as much (4 tonnes of CO2 per capita). In many respects, therefore, Brazil already has a low-carbon economy, this being the result of important decisions and investments in hydropower and biofuels in previous decades. Without these, the World Bank has said, ‘Brazil’s current energy matrix would be far more carbon intensive’ (2009 b : xv). Yet despite its impressive use of renewable energy and low fossil fuel-based emissions, Brazil is one of the major net producers of GHGs amongst both developing and developed countries. This is because the country’s tremendous rate of deforestation in the Amazon more than outweighs its low fossil fuel emissions, and contributes significantly to overall global GHG levels. In 1990, shortly after the Amazon first began to attract global attention, the World Resources Institute estimated that the GHGs produced by deforestation in Brazil were greater than those stemming from the annual use of fossil fuels in the United States (CAIT 2011: 346). This may have been an exaggeration – a subsequent report by the World Resources Institute more than halved its previous estimate (CAIT 2011). Nevertheless, according to the most recent figures available, when land-use change and forestry (LUCF) are taken into account, Brazil emits more CO 2 per person than Germany, Europe’s largest economy, and nearly three times as much in absolute terms (CAIT 2011). Unfortunately, for many years, the Amazon has been a sensitive topic for Brazilian policymakers, who have historically regarded the forest as a major economic and strategic asset. Efforts to control deforestation have frequently been frustrated by deeply entrenched interests, both legal and illicit, which have historically benefited

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from Amazonian deforestation and poorly enforced institutions. As a result, the country has taken a broadly conservative position in response to climate change, especially at the international level. In multilateral negotiations Brazil has been deeply opposed to binding emissions commitments for developing countries. The Brazilian Proposal of 1997, for example, which sought to allocate responsibility for carbon reductions according to historical emissions, served to emphasise the country’s minimal responsibility despite its large contribution to GHGs at present. The Proposal argued that Brazil (and other developing countries) should not, therefore, be required to make significant sacrifices in order to resolve the problems of climate change. In 1998, at COP4 in Buenos Aires, the country’s negotiators even steadfastly resisted an Argentinean Proposal for voluntary emissions commitments. However, in recent years there have been some dramatic changes in Brazil’s domestic approach to climate change governance, and its efforts at home have become much more ambitious. In 2008, the Interministerial Committee on Climate Change released its National Plan on Climate Change, announcing the country’s intention to take action domestically, regardless of developments in the international arena. Calling climate change a ‘strategic issue for both the present and the future of national development’, the Plan outlined the actions that Brazil would undertake to curb emissions in its territory (2008: 7). These included improving energy efficiency, maintaining the country’s high share of renewable energy sources in its energy mix, further encouraging the sustainable use of biofuels and – most significantly – reducing deforestation rates and eliminating net loss of forest coverage by 2015. Signalling Brazil’s determination to meet its goals, the targets set out in the Plan were subsequently offered as a voluntary commitment as part of the Copenhagen Accord and signed into law after Copenhagen in 2009. While this new, ambitious approach to climate change governance in Brazil reflects a number of new domestic political dynamics at work, it also rests on a number of critical decisions and investments that Brazil has made over the past century – particularly its investments in hydropower and support for biofuels. These form the background upon which new political and economic decisions are now playing out, and are discussed in the first part of this chapter. Yet, despite Brazil’s substantial advantages in its energy profile, this chapter argues that LUCF problems have held it back from a more integrated, robust approach to climate change governance, a fact that has clearly been reflected in the government’s position in international negotiations, which are discussed in the second half of Part 1. That said, changes have begun to occur domestically as a result of Brazil’s increased success in controlling deforestation in the last decade and have been bolstered by greater public

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concern and attention to the issue, by the influence of prominent actors that shaped public dialogue on climate change and by growing support from the Brazilian business community. These changes and the reasons behind them are explored in greater detail in Part 2. The overall conclusion is that climate change governance in Brazil has come a long way since the early 1990s, particularly with regard to governance of its major source of emissions via LUCF, and that there are a number of reasons for qualified optimism for the near to mid-term future.

2.1. Energy, Deforestation and Climate Change Governance in Brazil Brazil’s is an anomaly amongst the major developing countries – in China, India and South Africa, energy use accounts for over 90 per cent of all GHG emissions yet is responsible for only 15 per cent in Brazil. The relatively small contribution of Brazil’s energy sector to its yearly emissions is because its economy is not carbon-intensive by world standards. In 2007, the country produced only 1.59 tonnes of CO 2 per tonne of oil equivalent, thanks to the dominance of renewable energy sources in its energy matrix. As Figure 8 shows, while fossil fuels (coal, natural gas and petroleum) account for 54 per cent of Brazil’s total primary energy supply, 45 per cent consists of renewable energy, with biomass and hydropower constituting 30 per cent and 15 per cent of the total, respectively.

Figure

Total Energy Supply in Brazil, 2006 Petroleum

39%

Hydropower Nuclear

30%

Coal Natural gas Biomass

15% 9%

6% 1%

Source: MME (2006).

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This unique energy mix is primarily a result of a number of key public and private decisions, reaching as far back as the end of the nineteenth century, to invest heavily in renewable energy sources. Without this history of investments, the World Bank (2009 b ) has estimated that Brazil’s energy sector emissions would be twice as high and that its total national emissions would be at least 17 per cent higher, assuming that its energy matrix reflected the worldwide average. The political decisions and policy frameworks that influenced the evolution of Brazil’s energy sector – the majority of which were made before climate change became an important international and domestic issue – have, as a result, been an important influence on Brazil’s present approach to climate governance. In order to properly understand the evolution of the country’s polices on climate change, it is essential therefore to first clarify how and why the Brazilian energy sector has evolved the way it has, and to outline the factors shaping Brazil’s ability to maintain and even reduce the sector’s already low contribution to national emissions in the future.

2.1.1. Hydropower Brazil’s unique low-carbon energy matrix has been influenced, first and foremost, by the fact that hydroelectricity serves as the cornerstone of the country’s electric power system. Brazil is the third largest producer of hydroelectricity in the world behind China and Canada, and ranks fourth in terms of installed capacity after America, China and Canada. Domestically, hydropower’s share of total energy generation is considerable, accounting for approximately 85 per cent of all power generation and over 77 per cent of total installed capacity. Investment in hydropower began at the end of the nineteenth century, driven by the favourable Brazilian landscape and climate and the scarcity of adequate, high-quality coal reserves. Nearly all investment at this early stage was undertaken by small private companies who were granted licences by, and signed service contracts with, state and municipal governments. The most significant of these early energy providers was Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company, known as ‘Light’, a Toronto-based company established in 1899 that would serve Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo and would eventually become responsible for some of the world’s largest hydroelectric projects. Other players, such as the American firm AMFORP also became important investors in Brazil, obtaining several large concessions. By 1910, 86 per cent of all electricity was being generated from hydroelectric sources. No overall federal regulations existed until the implementation of the Water Code by the Vargas government in 1934, which clarified property rights related to water resources and established a national concession system, as well as creating corres-

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ponding regulations to be overseen by the National Council for Water and Power, established in 1939. Following the Water Code, the creation of a governmentcontrolled company to construct the Furnas Project and the construction of the first transmission lines to connect the Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro electricity grids, Brazil began to move towards a system wherein nearly all new plants and electricity transmission infrastructure would be publicly owned (de Oliveira 2007; Leite 2009). Electrobras was created in 1961 in order to act as a holding company for all the regional supply companies and the federal government’s energy investments, and oversaw development of the power system along with the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), created in 1960. The growing participation of the government, which deepened as the military took power in 1964, did not lessen the predominance of hydropower in the country’s energy matrix; in fact, between 1965 and the mid-1990s, when the Brazilian power sector was partially reformed, hydropower’s share of total energy generation increased from around 73 per cent to nearly 90 per cent. Previously, hydropower projects had been built without any effort to coordinate investments by the different power companies. But in the 1960s, the government developed, with the assistance of CANAMBRA, a Canadian and American engineering consultancy, a coordinated long-term power sector development strategy that gave a prominent role to hydropower. The plan produced by CANAMBRA emphasised that thermal power plants continued to be costly in Brazil and that their use should be limited to an ancillary role. Hydropower should continue to serve as a basis for industrial development, a view which was subsequently reinforced among policymakers as a result of the oil shocks, which made hydropower even more competitive compared to thermal sources. Coordinated planning of the system, therefore, encouraged massive expansion of hydroelectric capacity, highlighted above all by the construction of the Itaipu dam on the Paraná River’s Sete Quedros waterfall on the border with Paraguay. The dam, which would become jointly managed by Paraguay and Brazil but was wholly financed by Brazilian funds, began operation in 1983 and remains the largest hydroelectric power plant in the world in terms of annual generating capacity. Originally, it was designed to be even bigger, with the goal of meeting nearly 20 per cent of Brazil’s energy consumption. However, problems began to occur in the centralised planning system in the 1980s as a result of the country’s macroeconomic crisis and the related financial difficulties encountered by the federal government and a number of the larger states. The crisis culminated in a partial privatisation of the power sector in the mid- to late 1990s. The reform was ‘partial’ primarily because privatisation was limited to the major distribution companies. Prominent interests linked to the hydropower

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construction industry, which aimed to avoid any risk of a major shift towards thermal energy, resisted further efforts to privatise energy generation. So, while fossil fuels did become a more important part of the energy mix after the reforms, increasing their share of generation capacity to just under 23 per cent by 2005, the actions of the pro-hydropower interests crucially shaped the reform process and ensured Brazilian dependence on hydropower for the foreseeable future (de Oliveira 2005). Indeed, the emphasis on hydropower would persist despite a severe energy crisis in 2001, as a major drought took a hold. The crisis, induced largely by underinvestment in thermal power and high dependence on hydroelectricity, contributed in 2002 to the presidential election victory of da Silva – who then promised to end the liberalisation efforts and return to centralised energy planning. However, hydropower, the new government emphasised, would remain the cornerstone of the Brazilian electricity sector, and as of 2011 at least 146 major dams have been planned in the Amazon Basin alone, including the Belo Monte dam on the Xingu River, which is expected to be the third largest dam in the world once completed. The government’s support for large-scale hydroelectric projects has also, thus far, persisted despite heavy resistance from environmental and indigenous groups, as well as the resignations of several prestigious environmentalists – Marina Silva, Minister of the Environment (in 2008), and Abelardo Azevedo, head of the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) in 2011 – who left important government positions due wholly or in part to pressure from MME and to various vested interests in the government determined to obtain licenses for dam projects in the Amazon.

2.1.2. Biofuels In addition to hydropower, biofuels, especially ethanol, have played an important role in Brazil’s energy matrix, particularly in the transport sector and have helped to lower its fossil fuel-based emissions. Ethanol in Brazil is made primarily out of sugarcane, which is considered to be more energy-efficient and economical than other bioethanol feedstocks such as corn or rapeseed. It also, as many studies have found, produces fewer GHGs than petroleum substitutes. According to the IEA (2007), for example, the well-to-wheel CO 2 emissions from ethanol can be as much as 90 per cent lower than conventional gasoline. Its widespread use has therefore arguably had a significant impact on the country’s emissions. Indeed, while disagreements remain, at least one study estimates that Brazil’s ethanol programme resulted in the avoidance of as much as 110 Mt of CO 2 emissions each year between 1975 and 2000, making it ‘probably one of the most efficient GHG mitigation efforts ever executed’ (Roman 2007: 78).

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Brazil’s efforts to regulate the domestic sugar industry and promote ethanol date back as far as the 1930s. The year 1931 saw the creation of the Institute for Sugar and Alcohol, which aimed to regulate the industry, set prices and support growers at a time when prices had collapsed as a result of the Great Depression. The poor balance of payments due to heavy dependence on imported oil had also motivated the Vargas government to encourage the use of ethanol. But this early effort was, generally, unsuccessful at reducing oil imports and promoting the use of ethanol in gasoline (Nass et al. 2007). Efforts to promote ethanol production and use were renewed in the 1970s when the international price of oil reached record highs and the price of sugar collapsed, creating a crisis in Brazil. At the time, Brazil was importing 80 per cent of its petroleum and the jump in prices doubled the cost of meeting national demand. Sugar, on the other hand, was a key industry and source of foreign exchange for the country; its growers and processors were a powerful political coalition. Worried about dissipating valuable foreign exchange on oil imports, the economic impacts of high cost petroleum and the extremely harmful effects of price volatility on the sugar industry, the military government of Ernesto Geisel responded by creating the National Alcohol Programme (PROALCOOL) in 1975. Originally intended as a temporary expedient, PROALCOOL rapidly grew with the support of the President Geisel, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the powerful sugar interests (Hira & de Oliveira 2009). Together, they overcame considerable opposition from a coalition comprising the MME, Petrobras, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the Banco do Brasil. The supporters’ efforts were, crucially, reinforced by the second oil shock in 1979 and technological advances that allowed for the development of engines running entirely on alcohol. After an early period of fragmentation, the alcohol industry consolidated and expanded, with production and consumption both increasing significantly. Supported by PROALCOOL’s regime of tax incentives and subsidies, sales of alcohol-fuelled cars reached 645,551 in 1985, compared to gasoline-fuelled car sales of 26,675, and production of ethanol rose to nearly 12 billion litres (Dias de Moraes 2007; Hira & de Oliveira 2009). After 1985, however, the programme encountered significant problems as the price of oil declined to historic lows and the price of sugar increased, making ethanol relatively more expensive. Faced also with a burdensome fiscal and macroeconomic crisis, the government slowly began to remove the system of tax incentives, subsidies and price supports that made the ethanol industry work. As these were removed, the production of ethanol dropped from its peak in 1985 and sales of alcohol-fuelled cars saw a marked decline, reaching as low as 40,707 vehicles in 1995, while gasolinefuelled car sales climbed to 1,234,254 (Dias de Moraes 2007; Hira & de Oliveira 2009).

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Along with the privatisation of many Brazilian industries, which was underway at the time, PROALCOOL was officially ended in 1991, and for most of the remainder of the decade the ethanol industry stagnated. Although an attempt was made to support ethanol production by mandating that all gasoline needed to be blended with 20-25 per cent ethanol, sales of alcohol-fuelled cars reached a low of 1,1 20 by 1997. Only in 2003, with the introduction of flex-fuel vehicles that could run on varying mixtures of gas or alcohol, was the industry re-energised. With flex-fuel vehicles, consumers could easily switch fuels and would be able to quickly respond to price signals in both the ethanol and gasoline markets. Again, the government also assisted with the adoption of flex-fuel vehicles by making them eligible for tax breaks, as it had for entirely alcohol-based cars. As flex-fuel vehicles became popular with consumers, dominating new car sales, production grew to nearly 18,000 litres per year, buoyed by the high cost of oil. Foreign and domestic investment likewise increased, as the industry proved that it was viable without government support in the new economic climate of high oil prices. At present, 20 per cent of all automotive fuel substitutes ethanol for petroleum, and 80 per cent of all cars now use a flexible mixture of gasoline and ethanol. Given their already large share, there is thus little room for substantial further gains for existing renewables in Brazil. The main task for the future is rather to maintain and perhaps marginally increase their share in the energy mix. It is also arguable that other renewable energy sources should be deployed. Wind energy, for example, has been very slow to grow in Brazil; in part, as a result of political resistance to creating an effective wind energy programme. However, the strength of the interests supporting renewable energy in the country – especially sugarcane producers, auto-fuel consumers, and prominent hydroenergy interests – suggests that the position of renewables in the energy matrix is secure for the foreseeable future.

2.1.3. Deforestation and land-use change Deforestation and land-use change has been deeply entwined with indigenous struggles and the landless workers movement. It is a leading cause of biodiversity loss. Moreover, with respect to climate change, LUCF accounted for 1,830 Mt of CO2 emissions in 2005, or 84 per cent of Brazil’s total emissions of CO2 for the entire year, roughly equivalent to the total annual CO 2 emissions of Indonesia, greater than the total emissions of India, more than twice as great as the annual emissions produced by Germany and nearly three times the annual emissions produced by Canada. As Figure 9 shows, between 1988 and 2004 just over 18,000 km2 were deforested each

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year in Legal Amazonia, an area nearly equivalent in size to Slovenia or Kuwait, with the trend line sloping upwards from just under 15,000 km 2 in 1988 to around 23,000 km 2 in 2004. However, deforestation of the Amazon dates back much further than 1988,[ 9 ] with origins in policies and actions first undertaken by the military government in the 1960s and 1970s. Motivated by geopolitical concerns about the security of the Amazon borders and the need to ensure control of its vast natural resources, the military set about populating the empty, unguarded region and integrating it into the national economy (Foresta 1992). The Superintendency for the Development of Amazonia was created in 1966 in order to manage the government’s operations and implement policies, and the National Integration Programme (PIN) was launched in 1970. The government’s goal of settling the Amazonian frontier was pursued through major highway construction projects, large agricultural settlement schemes and the provision of diverse fiscal incentives to attract investment into industry and agriculture (Binswanger 1991). Deforestation continued even though the government’s strategy in the Amazon shifted in the later 1970s away from settlement of the frontier and the building of major highways. In response to the rise in oil prices and the greater need for foreign exchange, the government’s policies placed more emphasis on export-oriented projects in a number of critical development zones through its POLAMAZONIA programme. Started in 1974, POLAMAZONIA sought to encourage, in particular, projects related to livestock, forestry and mining in the Amazon by constructing critical infrastructure and encouraging exports and investment through fiscal incentives and subsidies. By comparison to PIN, POLAMAZONIA focused less on populating the Amazon, but contributed to deforestation as it facilitated large-scale capital-intensive agriculture and forestry.

[9] 1988 is the earliest date for which there is satellite-based data from the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), which tracks deforestation rates in Brazil.

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Figure

Amazon Deforestation Rates, 1988-2004

Acre Amazonas Pará Rondônia Legal Amazonia Average

Amapá Maranhão Mato Grosso Roraima Tocantins Legal Amazonia Linear Trendline (Legal Amazonia)

35.000 30.000

Km2 per Year

25.000 20.000 15.000 10.000 5.000 0 1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Source: INPE PRODES (2010).

Yet, legislation to control deforestation did exist; for example, the Forest Code of 1965 required that rural properties maintain 50 per cent of the native forest on the property, as well as all forests in environmentally strategic areas alongside bodies of water, on steep terrain and on the tops of hills and mountains. However, the state’s capacity to enforce these rules was generally unable to match the immense incentives for clearing land. By the 1980s and 1990s, deforestation rates seemed to be out of control, fluctuating between lows of 10,000 km 2 per year and highs of nearly 30,000 km 2. Markets, farmers and loggers, both legal and illegal, appeared to be governing the Amazon, not the federal government, and in 1995 Brazil recorded its highest ever rate of deforestation with clearance of over 29,000 km2. Now, in place of the earlier government-controlled factors such as the infrastructure projects and settlement schemes that had initiated the deforestation process, the dominant drivers appeared to be market forces largely beyond the control of the federal government (Anderson 1996; Margulis 2004). Greater market access, growing demand and market size, together with the rising price of land, all contributed to making land clearing increasingly profitable.

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Figure 10 Brazil GDP and Rates of Deforestation (1988-2004)

03 20

02 20

199

199 7

6 199

199

-2

199

15.000 3

0 4

20.000

199

25.000

199

30.000

199

Km2 per Year

Rate of Deforestation 35.000

198 8 198 9 199 0

GDP Growth Rate

GDP Growth Rate (1988 as base year) 8

10.000

-4

5.000

-6

Source: GDP data from World Bank (2011). Deforestation data from INPE PRODES (2010).

Figure 10 shows Brazilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s GDP growth rate and the rate of deforestation from 1988 to 2004 and roughly indicates that the rate of deforestation tracked changes in GDP following a boom-bust cycle. More detailed econometric studies reveal a similar, if more detailed and complex pattern. According to Anderson (1996), population pressures, the level of economic activity and credit access were leading determinants in the 1980s and 1990s. Margulis (2004) likewise found that deforestation was caused by prevailing financial conditions and by the profitability of medium and large-scale cattle ranching, although soy bean farming has also become an increasingly important factor (Hecht 2005). Da Silva and Kis-Katos (2010), for example, identify both meat and soy bean prices as well as rural credit availability as the key drivers of land-use change. Other important contributing factors that fed into many of those just mentioned included the prioritisation of economic development and the exploitation of natural resources by local elites and businesses. There was a profound absence of political willingness on their part to implement existing policies and, occasionally, outright opposition to more stringent policies emanating from the National Congress and backed by federal arrangements that give a good deal of political weight per person to Amazonian states (Viola 2004; Hochstetler & Keck 2007). As such, Brazilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest source of emissions was, for many years, beyond the control of the federal government.

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2.1.4. Early approaches to international and domestic climate change governance Given the importance of renewables in Brazil’s energy sector, we might reasonably expect the country to have also displayed a progressive approach to environmental issues such as climate change. This is certainly the modern understanding of the problem – that energy diversification goes hand in hand with a country’s attempts to limit GHG emissions. However, Brazil’s energy mix owes more to historical factors and to changes in the political economy of the energy sector than to environmental priorities. Indeed, environmental issues have not traditionally played a great role in politics in Brazil (Kasa 1997; Hochstetler & Keck 2007). Compared to the issues of economic crisis and political reform, climate change and the environment have usually occupied a much lower position on the government’s agenda. Environmentalists as well as the environmental bureaucracy did make some progress towards the end of the 1990s, which strengthened legislation for preserving the Amazon, but the gains made were largely overshadowed by the first Cordoso administration’s imperative of expanding exports and increasing investment (Viola 2004). Moreover, compared to more visible environmental challenges such as deforestation, climate change has until recently been a marginal feature of national politics, [ 10 ] and regarded by the government as a technical, scientific and foreign policy concern rather than a political or environmental issue. Policymaking has therefore traditionally been the preserve of the highly regarded Ministry of External Relations, known as Itamaraty, and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT). This has been evident in Brazil’s active participation in international climate change negotiations. Of course, it famously hosted the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, or ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, a defining moment for the international environmental movement and for all climate change negotiations since. This initiative on the part of the Sarney government was partially an attempt to ameliorate the mounting international criticism from both INGOs and governments, which had grown as a result of Brazil’s poor environmental record at that stage; this was especially the case regarding the Amazon, which Sarney’s administration had connected to its broader policy of economic reform (Kasa 1997). In the wake of this initiative, Brazil has continued to have a substantial impact on the multilateral governance of climate change, playing a significant role in shaping the course and outcomes of the UNFCCC negotiations. However, its positions during [10] In addition to health concerns, global warming appears to have been increasingly used to justify urban pollution policies, especially in Sao Paulo towards the end of the 1990s (see Hochstetler & Keck 2007).

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the early years of the UNFCCC largely reflected domestic ambivalence about making stringent commitments at the international level. This was due to the predominance of Itamaraty and the MCT in climate change foreign policymaking in Brazil, as well as to the various domestic interests in the National Congress that were arrayed against any ambitious stance on deforestation and climate change. This stance was most clearly reflected in the Brazilian Proposal of 1997, which represented one of the most important and influential articulations of a developing country’s position at the time (Cole 2010). At the most basic level, the proposal stated that responsibility for mitigating emissions in the international climate change regime should be tied to historical or cumulative rather than present-day per capita emissions (which are quite high in Brazil), and that therefore the country should have few responsibilities. The proposal also argued in favour of a Clean Development Fund (CDF) designed to channel the fines levied on Annex 1 countries that exceeded their emissions targets to larger developing country emitters. Notably, the proposal for a CDF laid the basis for what eventually emerged as the Clean Development Mechanism, one of the most feted (although not necessarily effective) features of the current climate change regime. But the position taken in the proposal was essentially a conservative one and served to bolster Itamaraty’s argument – consistent with its overall foreign policy – that Brazil had no responsibility to take actions domestically, leaving it free to pursue a resource-intensive development trajectory. Brazil’s position on LUCF was another area in which its domestic interests clearly shaped foreign policy. Because of the Amazon, Brazil has always had a considerable stake in how forests are treated in the climate change regime, and was thus from an early stage deeply involved in the negotiations attempting to develop a common methodology to assess the impact of LUCF. Two issues – the treatment of forests as carbon sinks and the use of forest preservation projects for gaining certified emissions reduction credits under Kyoto – were especially important (Johnson 1999). On the treatment of forest sinks, Brazil’s position was that the Amazon acts as an enormous carbon sink, sequestering a substantial amount of the world’s CO2 on an annual basis, for which Brazil should receive credit when its emissions are calculated. Reforestation and afforestation projects should, in turn, be eligible for emissions reduction credits under the CDM.

2.1.5. New approaches to climate change Brazil’s approach to climate governance during Cardosa’s second term underwent some notable changes. Political investment in the creation of the CDM ensured that the country would push for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol under Cardoso,

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especially after the United States withdrew its support in 2001. Brazil, therefore, played an important part in helping to bring together the coalition of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 states that made the subsequent agreements at Marrakesh and thereafter possible, eventually resulting in the Kyoto Protocol, which came into force in 2005. Domestically, efforts were made to improve Brazil’s position in the negotiations by creating the Interministerial Commission on Climate Change (CIMGC) in July 1999. Composed of representatives from nine different ministries as well as the Office of the President and jointly chaired by the MCT and Ministry of the Environment (MMA), the CIMGC was designed to coordinate the government’s actions on the issue of climate change across the ministries involved and to provide inputs into the government’s position in the UNFCCC. At this stage, the inclusion of a variety of other government offices into the process shifted the locus of climate policymaking and diluted the control of Itamaraty over Brazil’s foreign policy, although the latter remained the official UNFCCC Focal Point. But, crucially, the creation of the CIMGC served to institutionalise the issue of climate change within the Brazilian government, establishing an integrated, crosscutting governance body charged with formulating national policies and positions in the UNFCCC. The following year, this effort at institutionalisation was supplemented by the creation of the Brazilian Climate Change Forum. Designed to enhance the articulation and exchange of ideas about climate change policies, the Forum comprised federal, state and municipal government officials, as well as NGOs, academics and businesses, with President Cardoso as its chairman. Although it was not intended to have any official power or direct influence upon government policymaking, it provided an arena for members of civil society and the business community to engage openly with government officials, allowing them to make their voice heard within the climate policymaking apparatus through an established channel. Around the same time, a number of important developments led to the establishment of a more effective system of domestic and international incentives for forest management, forest preservation and institutional capacity-building. Changes began in 1996 with a modification of the 1965 Forest Code to increase the percentage of area that had to remain forested from 50 to 80 per cent. In 2000, the National Forest Program (PNF) was created as a result of the 1997 Positive Agenda for the Forestry Sector supported by the FAO/World Bank in response to the high levels of deforestation that had prevailed in the Amazon in 1995 and 1996. The PNF was designed to increase Brazil’s share of international timber markets and to support the sustainable management of forest resources. It aimed to increase the area of sustainably managed private forest land by 200,000 km 2 and the area on public lands by 500,000 km 2, while stepping up timber exports from natural forests from 5 to 30 per cent by

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2010. In the same year, the National Congress passed the creation of a National Conservation Area System (SNUC), establishing a framework for the creation and management of national conservation areas. As a result, the number of protected areas began to grow substantially, increasing the number of protected areas from just over 20 in 1984 to over 100 in 2002 and 150 by 2009. At the same time, the total area protected rose from around 100,000 km 2 in 1984 to nearly 700,000 km 2 by the end of 2009, equivalent to over 8 per cent of Brazil’s total land area. The PNF and SNUC, which initiated the transition towards the sustainable management of forests in Brazil, were topped in 2006 by the creation of the Public Forest Management Law (PFML). The PFML amended the 1965 Forest Code and provided a mechanism for regulating the management of forests on public lands, something which had until then been missing. Created in order to maintain long-term capacity for sustainable resource-based development and establish an integrated policy approach to deforestation involving all the key ministries, the PFML set rules for the sustainable use and conservation of public forests and created the Brazilian Forestry Service and the National Fund for Forest Development. The Fund was also an example of increasing provision of national and international incentives for sustainable forestry management that began during this period. After some initial and largely unsuccessful efforts such as the Northeastern Financing Fund and the Central-West Financing Fund, which coincided with the creation of the PNF and were supposed to provide resources to promote sustainable forestry, the successful Amazonian Fund was created in 2008 in order to channel international donations for forest preservation and management. These examples of institution building in the areas of climate change and LUCF developed in the context of Brazil’s efforts to support ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and created the governance apparatus through which nearly all subsequent policymaking at the national level has taken place. However, with the election of da Silva in 2003, climate change was moved to the backburner of the national agenda and attention was focused once more on the overriding goal of economic growth. Engagement with climate change continued, but mainly in terms of developing Brazil’s scientific understanding of the issue and how it affected the national economy, health and environment. A significant effort was undertaken, for example, to develop Brazil’s Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC, which was released in 2004 and provided an assessment of the current state of affairs and decisive issues for Brazil in the area of climate change. The main governance initiative during this period was limited to the creation of Brazil’s CDM framework, with the MCT as the Designated National Authority (see Friberg 2009).

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Not until 2007, as climate change gained in worldwide political significance, did policymaking again begin to change shape, this time in a significantly different manner. In April 2007, after four years of relatively inaction, da Silva called for the elaboration of a national plan to restructure the government activities and policies related to climate change, putting it on the government’s agenda. In November 2007, the Interministerial Committee for Climate Change (CIM) was created under the Office of the Presidency to replace the CIMGC. The CIM was mandated to prepare a National Policy on Climate Change and National Climate Change Plan through a Presidential Decree. After an extended consultation process among the ministries and regulatory agencies involved, the CIM released the National Plan on Climate Change in December 2008, outlining an ambitious strategy for lower emissions and marking a significant departure from the government’s previous approach to climate change. The plan identified seven major targets: 1. stimulate energy efficiency in the economy; 2. keep Brazil’s high share of renewable energy in its electric matrix; 3. encourage the sustainable increase in the share of biofuels in the national transport matrix and work towards the structuring of an international market of sustainable biofuels; 4. seek a sustained reduction in deforestation rates, in all Brazilian biomass, in order to reach zero illegal deforestation; 5. eliminate the net loss of forest coverage in Brazil by 2015; 6. strengthen inter-sector actions concerned with the reduction of the vulnerabilities of populations; 7. identify environmental impacts resulting from climate change and stimulate scientific research able to trace out a strategy that can minimise the socio-economic costs of the country’s adaptation. Several of these merely signalled the government’s intention to continue or expand policies that were already prominent in national policymaking, although the Plan recast them specifically as climate mitigation actions, much as the government and media had done in a more informal way in the late 1990s. However, under each target, a number of individual actions were elaborated, calling not only for the implementation of already existing policies and laws but, frequently, for the establishment of altogether new ones as well. Targets 4 and 5 were the most ambitious, and marked the first occasion on which the Brazilian government outlined specific macro-goals to tackle LUCF in connection to climate change. Again, the Plan specified the objectives of

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each target. Target 4, for instance, called for a reduction of 40 per cent in the average deforestation rates for 2006-2009 compared to the average rate of just under 20,000 km2 per year from 1996-2005, as well as for 30 per cent reductions (in relation to the preceding period) for the following two-to-four year periods. This, the government estimated, was expected to result in avoided emissions of 4.8 billion tonnes of CO 2 between 2006 and 2017. The Plan was not altogether free of criticism. In late 2008, a group of prominent national and international civil society organisations expressed their dissatisfaction with the government’s consultation process, the Plan’s incompleteness and its lack of overall targets for reducing GHG emissions. A ‘manifesto’ coordinated by the Climate Observatory was presented to Carlos Minc, the Minister of the Environment. It contained a number of important criticisms of the Brazilian Plan and called for a comprehensive climate legal framework to be established before its final adoption and presentation in Poznan. Accordingly, in 2009, the government took two actions that partially addressed several of the concerns expressed in the manifesto. First, the government submitted its targets as a voluntary commitment to Copenhagen, each with specific amounts of estimated reductions, announcing that they should result in an overall reduction in national emissions of 36-39 per cent below its baseline emissions scenario by 2020. Second, the government announced that the National Policy on Climate Change (the Política Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima, or PNMC), which now included the overall emissions reduction estimate as a target presented to the world at Copenhagen, became legally binding with the passing of Federal Law No. 12.1 87. Granted, this law still leaves much of the legal framework and mechanism for reaching the Plan’s goals to be established. Targets were to be adopted according to a voluntary approach and would require another federal decree detailing the specific actions that needed to be taken in order to meet them (Crawford et al. 2010). However, it established the requirement that all government policies and programmes take account of the PNMC in their elaboration and implementation. Furthermore, the National Fund for Climate Change was also created. This established a mechanism for implementing the PNMC and providing resources to support and finance projects and studies aimed at emissions mitigation and climatic change adaptation. As this section has shown, there is something of a disconnect between Brazil’s approach at the international level and its approach at the domestic level. At the international level, Brazil continues to be something of a climate ‘laggard,’ refusing, along with a number of other developing countries, to sign up to compulsory emissions reductions and insisting that developed countries take responsibility for their historical role in creating the problem. This position has been highly influential and continues to inform

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the negotiating tactics of a large segment of the non-Annex 1 countries. However, the stalling progress at the UNFCCC has not caused Brazil to stand still on climate change policy at home. The passing of Federal Law 12.1 87 in 2009 signalled a considerable shift in Brazil’s climate change policymaking compared to its starting position in the 1990s, and represented the culmination of several underlying transformations that had been underway since the start of the new millennium. Most noticeably, Brazil has, in recent years, shown a greater ability and willingness to govern deforestation in the Amazon. The cumulative effect of new forestry policies, backed up by legislation, has profoundly altered the state of Brazil’s climate change governance (Banerjee et al. 2009). The following part of this chapter explores the reasons behind these changes in greater detail, focusing in particular on drivers of change in the forest sector and the effect of electoral politics on the government’s growing attention to climate change.

2.2. Understanding the Evolution of Climate Change Governance in Brazil Brazil is by far the largest emitter of GHGs in South America and the fourth largest emitter in the world, producing around 2,1 79 Mt of CO 2e per year. Only China, the United States and the European Union are responsible for producing more emissions. India, the eighth largest emitter in world with a population more than five times its size, produces just 1,1 26 Mt CO 2e each year, almost half as much. As this comparison suggests, Brazil’s per capita emissions are very high, amounting to 13.6 Mt of CO 2 e, the 19 th highest level of per capita emissions in the world. Indeed, Brazil is unique in that its annual per capita emissions are much higher than those in many other major emerging economies. Its BASIC counterparts – South Africa, China and India – produce, respectively, 7.2, 4.3 and 1.1 tonnes of CO 2 per person per year. This is not, however, because of energy usage. Certainly, energy use in Brazil has grown considerably, by nearly 70 per cent since 1990 and by around 239 per cent since 1970. In 2007, Brazil used around 235,000 tonnes of oil equivalent, ranking as the world’s 10 th largest energy consumer. Energy use per capita has also increased, albeit less quickly, as Brazil’s population has also grown, by 75 per cent since 1970 and by 33 per cent since 1990. However, thanks to the dominance of renewables in its energy matrix, explored in detail in the previous section, this growing energy usage has only translated into net emissions of around 1.59 tonnes of CO 2 per capita . Brazil’s emissions profile is thus unique among emerging economies in that the vast majority of its emissions come from LUCF. In China, by comparison, LUCF acts as a net sink, absorbing a net total of 47.4 Mt of CO 2 emissions on an annual

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basis. Similarly, in India and South Africa, LUCF makes little to no net contribution to their yearly emissions profiles. The main challenge for these countries is to make their power sectors and manufacturing processes more sustainable. Brazil, on the other hand, mainly needs to reduce the emissions caused by the deforestation of the Amazon, which accounts for most of its LUCF emissions. The politics of climate change in Brazil is therefore very much connected to the politics of the Amazon.

Figure

11 National GHG Emissions by Sector Brazil

China

India

South Africa

6.000

CO2 Emissions (Mt)per Year

5.000 4.000 3.000 2.000 1.000 0

al To t

Ind

tri

W a st

res

try

ur e ric Ag

ult

es Pr oc

iss

ion

on Em git Fu

lC ue rF he

i ve

t at

st i

ion

on sp

-U

tru

cti Tra n

rin

Ele

ctr

ici

e rg

-1.000

Source: CAIT (2011).

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Figure

12 Brazil’s Sectoral Emissions in 2005

1% 2% 6% 4%

Land-Use Change & Forestry

84%

Electricity & Heat Manufacturing & Construction

Transportation Other Fuel Combustion Industrial Processes

Source: CAIT (2011).

2.2.1. Deforestation and forest governance As outlined in Part 1, forest governance in Brazil underwent a drastic transformation between 1996 and 2006. Several causes underlie this shift (see Banerjee et al. 2009 for a more detailed discussion). First among them were the deforestation crises (in 1995 and 2004), which had a galvanising effect on Brazil’s National Congress and created a greater desire amongst politicians to tackle illegal logging and clearing on public lands. Escalating violence related to Amazonian deforestation, particularly the murder of an American missionary, Dorothy Stang, created a political window for this initiative and directly contributed to the expansion of conservation areas as well as the PFML, resulting from the constitutional emergency this violence engendered. Growing international attention to the issue of deforestation and violence in the Amazon placed further pressure on the government to take action. The greater institutional capacity of the MMA and IBAMA also played a significant role in strengthening the government’s resolve. Under the decisive leadership of Marina Silva, a globally respected socio-environmentalist and disciple of the late Chico Mendes, the MMA stepped up enforcement of forest regulations. The number of fines levied for violation of forestry regulations increased substantially, while a record number of law enforcement operations were undertaken in order to interdict illegal logging. The cumulative success of these actions became especially clear towards the end of the decade. Following the high rates of deforestation experienced in 2004, deforestation of the Amazon declined across all states, reaching the lowest recorded levels by 2010 – just over 5,000 km 2 per year (see Figure 13). This was all the more significant as it occurred over a period during which Brazil had been experiencing high GDP growth rates. As da Silva and Kis-Katos (2010) have shown, while cattle and soy prices still

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determined fluctuations, fines and the number of preserved areas had a significant effect on the rate of deforestation. Overall, the success achieved made it increasingly clear that Amazon could be governed – and that LUCF emissions could be reduced or managed.

Figure 13 Amazon Deforestation Rates: 2004-2010 Acre Pará

Amazonas Rondônia

Amapá Roraima

Maranhão Tocantins

Mato Grosso Legal Amazonia

30.000

Km2 per Year

25.000 20.000 15.000 10.000 5.000 0 2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010 (d)

Source: INPE PRODES (2010).

2.2.2. Electoral interests Alongside the set of factors that have pushed Brazil towards greater confidence and success in its ability to limit deforestation, the government’s new initiative on climate change and its willingness to set legally binding targets have been connected to changing electoral interests. Politicians in Brazil have faced new incentives to alter their approach to climate change due to greater pressure from both Brazilian voters and businesses, which have now joined civil society groups advocating immediate action. In cross-national polls gauging concern about the environment, Brazilians are consistently among those respondents who have been most worried for some time. For example, Gallup’s ‘Health of the Planet’ Survey of 24 low, middle and high income countries conducted in 1992 found that Brazilians were among those most personally concerned about environmental issues and among those most likely to choose environmental protection over economic growth. With Portugal and Germany, Brazil had among the highest share of people most likely to say that global warming and

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the greenhouse gas effect were ‘very serious’ (Dunlap et al. 1993, Dunlap 1994). Brazil has also had an extremely vibrant environmental movement for some time (Hochstetler & Keck 2007). Yet, public attention to climate change was often overshadowed in the 1990s and early 2000s by the problems of economic crisis and reform, as well as other environmental challenges such as deforestation, pollution and biodiversity loss. And, in the early years of da Silva’s government, climate change had clearly been pushed into the backseat as emphasis was placed more on the country’s social and economic development. Today, however, the Brazilian public’s concern about the environment and climate change is at an all-time high – coinciding with a time when many economic issues have receded with the successful implementation of economic and social policies. According to Pew Global Attitude Surveys, for example, the number of Brazilian respondents expressing concern about environmental problems grew from 20 to 49 per cent between 2002 and 2007 – the largest rise among the 47-country sample over the period. With respect to climate change, a report by Pew (2009) found that 90 per cent of Brazilians surveyed reported that global warming was a very serious problem – the highest percentage among the countries surveyed. This was up from 88 per cent in 2007. By comparison, in Argentina, with the second highest share in 2009, only 69 per cent thought it a very serious problem. Other polls have shown similar results. According to a poll conducted by Gallup in 2007 and 2008, 76 per cent of Brazilians consider climate change to be a very serious threat, while 63 per cent thought that less wealthy countries should be expected to limit their emissions (Pugliese & Ray 2009). This growing concern amongst Brazilians can be attributed to a number of factors. First, there have been extreme weather events, such as a 2004 hurricane that formed in the South Atlantic for the first time since records had been kept causing significant damage to the state of Santa Catarina. This raised worries about the impacts of climate change on Brazil and created a window for prominent climate scientists to make their voices heard in the media (Rohter 2007). Similarly, the subsequent drought of 2005 in the Amazon, which resulted in substantial losses of crops and forest fires and caused considerable economic damage, was an important catalyst of public awareness, as were several reports, such as those by the IPCC, which highlighted impacts on the Amazon and on agriculture. At the same time, coverage of climate change in the media increased considerably during this period, contributing to the growing prominence of climate change on public agenda. One study by ANDI (2009) documented climate change reportage across fifty national and regional newspapers between 2005 and 2008 and found that there was a considerable

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increase in the number of articles, commentaries and editorials on global warming. During the first half of 2007, they found that the number rose by nearly 200 per cent, due to a substantial increase in newspaper coverage of the Stern Review, Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth and the IPCC’s AR4. Moreover, they found that in 80 per cent of the publications the veracity of the greenhouse gas effect was taken for granted. Only 9.5 per cent offered contrarian perspectives on global warming. Greater emphasis on developing country actions after Bali also raised the stakes for Brazil in international negotiations. This was accompanied by a growing public perception of Brazil as one of the leaders of the BASIC group, as a formulator of global policy and as having a growing influence on world affairs under da Silva. These factors increased public support for a strong leadership position in climate change negotiations in the run-up to Copenhagen, and bolstered the arguments of those pushing for strong domestic action on climate change as well. As a result of these shifts in electoral interests, climate change became an important feature of the political agenda – events, the media and international developments drew greater attention to the issue, against a backcloth of growing domestic prosperity and a stronger perception of Brazil as global leader. But the issue’s prominence can also be attributed to the support and advocacy of many important public figures. This occurred, most notably, when the former Minister of the Environment, Marina Silva, who, as mentioned above, had resigned as a result of policies pursued by da Silva’s government, renounced her membership of da Silva’s Workers’ Party (PT) and joined the 2010 presidential race as a candidate for the Green Party. Her candidacy had a strong effect on the trajectory of the elections for several reasons: her strong appeal to middle-income Brazilians given her firm positions on corruption, social and environmental issues; the support she received from low-income Brazilians on account of her personal history in the Amazonian state of Acre, her strong Christian faith and position on abortion; and her association with the rubber-tapper movement of Chico Mendes. More specifically, her campaign managed to shift the debate in Brazil towards topics such as climate change, deforestation and sustainable development, and forced her opponents, Dilma Rouseff and Jose Serra, to place greater emphasis on these issues in their own campaigns. Although Silva would ultimately lose in the first round of voting, her performance demonstrated the appeal these issues had with voters. After garnering 19 per cent of the votes, she managed to force a second round of voting after drawing votes from Rousseff, which meant he failed to obtain a clear majority (Lyons and Prada 2010). Alongside these factors, which have led Brazilian voters – and politicians – to pay more attention to climate change and demand action, a good cross-section of businesses have also become recent advocates of activist climate change policy. This was clearly

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evidenced by the strong support Silva’s candidacy received from many businesses, including agro-business. That said, support from the business community had been growing for some time, initially as a result of its dissatisfaction with the government’s international position on LUCF in the UNFCCC, which many argued had deterred possible avenues for international investment in Amazonian states. Their criticism became especially fierce after the establishment of the CDM, whose design was far from amenable to many of the agro-forestry projects that had the greatest potential in Brazil, a fact that became increasingly evident with Brazil’s poor performance in attracting CDM projects (see Friberg 2009). As Viola & Hochstetler (2010) have noted, three broad business coalitions – from a range of high-carbon-emitting/energyintensive sectors such as agro-business and the mining industry – became public advocates of robust climate policies, making strong public statements in favour of leadership in 2009. Led by Vale, one group of 22 large national corporations released an ‘Open Letter to Brazil about Climate Change’, calling for reductions in deforestation and in emissions from energy and cattle-ranching. A second advocacy group, The Brazilian Climate Alliance, consisted mainly of agro-business industry associations and also called for strong policy and control of deforestation. Finally, a third group, The Coalition of Corporations for the Climate, demanded policies that set mandatory emissions reductions and a peaking of emissions between 2015 and 2020. Such broad support from business served to bolster more principled support of environmental advocacy groups as well as of the general public.

2.3. Conclusion Brazil’s approach to climate change has altered quite dramatically in recent years. From an initial position in which the government regarded the issues as primarily technical foreign policy issues, it now has some of the most comprehensive and binding domestic climate change legislation of all non-Annex 1 countries, and arguably, Annex 1 countries as well. While Brazil started out from a strong position with respect to its energy emissions, making it a unique case among the other emerging economies in the BASIC group, its inability to govern Amazonian deforestation has made it one of the most notable contributors to global emissions. Deforestation reached new historical heights in the 1980s and 1990s, and bringing it under control was hindered by the absence of the rule of law : poor monitoring and enforcement capacity due to the Amazon’s size and the poorly resourced, understaffed, undertrained and sometimes corrupt enforcement agencies; inadequate cooperation among federal-level agencies; and inadequate cooperation between federal, state and municipal agencies.

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Domestically, it was not feasible for the government to set targets on emissions if it could not effectively control the market forces at the origin of the huge cycles of deforestation. However, between 1996 and 2006, the Brazilian government was able to reverse that trend, motivated by a series of deforestation crises, a greater desire amongst politicians and voters alike to tackle the problem, greater institutional capacity and political leadership in other areas of environmental governance, and growing international pressure. This resulted in a newfound ability to govern forests and land-use change, and strengthened the government’s confidence in its ability to set and meet deforestation targets that could reduce its LUCF emissions. Internationally, Brazil continues to be something of a climate ‘laggard,’ refusing, along with a number of other developing countries, to sign up to compulsory emission reductions and insisting that developed countries take responsibility for their historical role in creating the problem. However, at the domestic level, changes in its approach to LUCF have been accompanied by a growing ambition in overall sectoral approaches to climate change, as demonstrated by the release of the National Plan on Climate Change in 2008, the National Policy on Climate Change in 2009, and the passing of Federal Law No. 12.1 87 in 2009, which made emissions reductions legally binding. These have been closely tied to growing support for strong actions as a result of greater public concern, led by key public actors and businesses. Despite encouraging progress in recent years, there are a number of potential problems on the horizon. Brazil is pushing to expand $120 billion worth of public and private sector investment in the Amazon by 2020, including dams, high-speed rail, roads, electricity transmission systems, mines and industrial farms, and it also aims to more than double the Amazon's share of power generation to 23 per cent of national output, up from 10 per cent today (Wiziack & Brito 2011). The target represents 45 per cent of planned energy expansion during the period. There are also some concerns about the contradictions in Brazil’s energy policy. Encouraging biofuels may have adverse impacts on attempts to discourage deforestation, and the ongoing emphasis on waterpower and large dams is also likely to have significant effect on LUCF emissions. For example, the planned flooding of large swathes of the Amazon to accommodate the new Belo Monte dam has been heavily criticised for greatly underestimating its potential impact. Massive oil discoveries are also likely to fundamentally alter energy policies, with fossil fuels looking set to play a more important role in the future. Most worryingly perhaps, 2011 has seen a sharp increase in the deforestation rate, suggesting that Brazil’s ability to control market forces is not secure. It remains to be seen whether successes in forest governance in the first decade of the century can be replicated during the second. While concerns over

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continued progress persist, the overall impression is that climate change governance in Brazil has improved considerably over the last few decades, particularly with regard to governance of its major source of emissions through LUCF, and that there are a number of reasons for qualified optimism for the near to mid-term future.

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3. Ethiopia Over the past few years, climate change has become a more significant issue on the Ethiopian government’s official agenda. It once used to warrant little or no mention by officials outside the country’s main UNFCCC focal point; today it is commonly identified as a critical issue by officials from all ministries and levels of government. The Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, has become an international spokesperson on the impacts of climate change in Africa and on the need for fair, effective and accountable local and global governance. At Copenhagen in 2009, he headed the group of African negotiators and played a significant role in publicising an African ‘common position’. Domestically, he has been pivotal in promoting a new awareness and sense of urgency about climate change. The newest economic development framework, Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), reflects this growing concern about climate change within the country, recognising it as a crosscutting development issue that risks compromising the considerable developmental gains the country has achieved since the end of its civil war in 1991. It boldly states that the formulation and implementation of an effective programme of adaptation is a ‘dictate of Ethiopia’s survival’ (MOFED 2010 a : 77). Ethiopia has, of course, made only a marginal contribution to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 2000, the country produced 0.2 per cent of all GHGs, ranking as the 63 rd largest emitter in absolute terms and the 171 st in per capita terms. [ 11 ] The average Ethiopian produces around one metric tonne of CO 2 per year. According to the World Resources Institute CAIT database, there are only 15 countries that produce fewer emissions per capita . At the same time, a growing number of studies show that Ethiopia is likely to be one of the most afflicted countries in the world. Heavily dependent upon rain-fed agriculture and already suffering from difficult climatic conditions, with droughts and flooding occurring on a regular basis, the economy and the livelihoods of ordinary Ethiopians are particularly vulnerable to rising temperatures and the changes in rainfall patterns expected to occur as a result of global warming. Since COP15 at Copehagen, Ethiopia has set a number of bold targets and policies related to climate change, and has initiated a policymaking process to elaborate and implement a strategy for meeting and defending them. Proactive behaviour by the

[11] 2000 is the only year for which there is comprehensive data on Ethiopian emissions.

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government has also been accompanied by the articulation of a more nuanced and constructive position in the UNFCCC negotiations. The greater priority given to the task of mounting an effective response at both the domestic and international level is widely regarded as a positive development by both global civil society groups and international donor agencies, as well as journalists, academics and local nongovernmental organisations within Ethiopia who have long been concerned about the country’s vulnerability. The country is now considered by all of these groups to be more engaged, and the policymaking bodies that have been created to coordinate actions by government ministries now constitute a substantial emerging climate governance structure within the country. [ 12 ] But, it should be noted at the outset, many of the features of this structure have yet to take a definite form, and most of the country’s domestic and international policies and programmes related to climate change have yet to be firmly established. The country’s overall approach to climate governance is, therefore, in a state of transformation.

Figure 14 Ethiopia Population, GDP and Emissions, Per Cent Growth since 1980 Population PPP PPP/Person National CO2 Emissions (excludes land use change) Per Capita CO2 Emissions (excludes land use change) 400.000 350.000 300.000 250.000 200.000 150.000 100.000 50.000 0 -50.000 1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

Source: CAIT (2011).

[12] The inclusion of climate change considerations in the government’s economic development framework (EDF) is in itself considered a major, albeit largely symbolic achievement; the previous equivalent, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty, (PASDEP), failed to incorporate any climate change concerns at all.

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The evolution of Ethiopia’s climate change policy is described in detail in the following section (3.1 .). Until 2009, the country’s approach might have best been described as indifferent; since then, the changes have been dramatic as the Ethiopian government has created institutions, implemented policies, passed legislation to back them and established a combative and influential stance at the UNFCCC. We then go on to explore (3.2.) the underlying political, economic and foreign policy-related concerns that have resulted in these shifts – not just in climate change policies but, ultimately, in the country’s domestic and foreign policies as a whole. Admittedly, Ethiopia has begun to develop ambitious plans and programmes, but these are also likely to be hampered by the political and administrative barriers that perpetually make policy implementation difficult. Together, these two sections (3.1 ./3.2.) show how and why, in response to several new domestic and international dynamics, the country is trying to take serious actions on climate change after nearly two decades of being laggard.

3.1. The Evolution of Climate Change Policymaking in Ethiopia Ethiopia’s coordination of climate change policy was relatively limited until recent years. Although the Council of Ministers recognised the need for an effective response to global warming as far back as 1997, with inclusion of policy recommendations for climate change responses in the Environmental Policy of Ethiopia adopted that same year, the issue nonetheless failed to become a high priority concern. Climate change policymaking, such as it was, remained confined to a few sectoral agencies and ministries that were expressly concerned with environmental or climate-related issues. According to most observers, the efforts made by these bodies were generally disappointing, as the government’s response was left to chronically under-resourced bodies with relatively little capacity for national implementation, regulation or interministerial coordination. However, as climate change has become of greater concern both in Ethiopia and throughout Africa more generally, and as a number of economic and political ‘co-benefits’ became apparent, the Ethiopian government has begun to develop a more orchestrated response. This began haltingly after the launch of the Bali Plan of Action in 2007, but took off after COP15 in Copenhagen. To be sure, Ethiopia has yet to formally move away from the weak governance structure that has existed until now. However, through its ongoing efforts to develop a cross-sectoral plan of action, a more substantial governance structure has started to emerge.

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3.1.1. Early efforts The foundations of environmental policymaking in Ethiopia, including climate change policymaking, can be traced back to the development of the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE), which began in 1989. Initially an undertaking of the Office of the National Committee for Central Planning (known as the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development after 1991, the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation after 1995, and eventually the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development [MOFED] after merging with the Ministry of Finance in 2001), the CSE was a major initiative intended to develop an overarching policy framework that would establish environmental and sustainability policies across all sectors and levels of government. The CSE policymaking process emerged in three stages. The first, from 1989 to 1990, involved developing the CSE process itself and identifying the key environmental issues in Ethiopia. The second, between 1990 and 1994, focused on elaborating an overarching environmental policy, establishing an institutional framework and developing an investment platform that would facilitate the implementation of Ethiopia’s sustainable development programmes. The third stage then focused on drawing up Regional Conservation Strategies and institutions to guide environmental governance in each part of Ethiopia. Responsibility for developing Ethiopia’s environmental policies and coordination of its environmental programmes was given first to the newly established but short-lived Ministry of Natural Resources Development and Environmental Protection in 1992 and then, in 1995, to an independent institutional arm of the Ethiopian government, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) operating under the aegis of the Council of Ministers. This gradual shift away from the Ministry of Planning, a central crosssectoral policymaking and regulatory body, to institutions exclusively dedicated to natural resource management and environmental protection occurred partially in response to recommendations from the CSE itself and the growing international recognition of the importance of the environment following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, or the ‘Earth Summit,’ in 1992. Among other things, the Earth Summit established a precedent for creating separate institutions entirely dedicated to increasing sustainability and protection of the environment. But, within Ethiopia, this shift in responsibility was also related to the sidelining of the CSE process itself, which was slowly being divorced from the main concerns and policymaking processes of the central economic planning ministries. And since responsibility for the environment was delegated to lower-ranking sectoral institutions, it became more and more difficult for them to make environmental concerns felt in other ministries and levels of government.

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The Environmental Policy of Ethiopia, one of the critical outputs of the CSE process, was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1997. While this formally established, among others, the goal of creating a climate-monitoring programme and taking action on climate change, relatively few steps were actually taken. Almost no specific policies or strategies were elaborated, and few programmes or projects were implemented beyond those directly supported and promoted by international public and private donor agencies or domestic civil society organisations. Instead, the government’s response to climate change was limited to conducting research on climate change and assessments of the country’s adaptation and technological needs in cooperation with several external organisations. Moreover, it was the National Meteorological Agency (NMA) rather than the EPA that was given the responsibility for undertaking this research. It was the NMA that took the lead in coordinating the studies that led to Ethiopia’s National Communication, its NAPA and the climate change Technological Needs Assessment (TNA). Tellingly, the NMA was also designated as the UNFCCC focal point and, as such, was tasked with the responsibility of representing Ethiopia in the UNFCCC negotiations, although it had almost no ability to table constructive proposals or capacity for interministerial coordination. The failure of Ethiopia’s climate policymaking process became especially apparent when climate change concerns were not included in any substantial way in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), which was adopted as the national development framework for Ethiopia in 2005/2006. The PASDEP was widely criticised by both global and local civil society organisations for omitting climate change considerations and for failing to ‘mainstream’ climate change into Ethiopia’s major development plans (PANE, 2009).

3.1.2. A new institutional environment for climate change governance In the lead-up to the Copenhagen negotiations in 2009, there was a substantial change in the government’s approach to climate change, and a number of new initiatives were launched. Among these, one of the first and most visible was the designation of the EPA as the new UNFCCC focal point. The NMA, as a research and servicefocused institution with little coordinating capacity or authority, was no longer seen to be the appropriate platform for interactions at the global level. And the EPA, whose staff proved to be among the most capable members of the Ethiopian negotiating team at Copenhagen, was mandated to coordinate a national response. One of the first actions taken by the EPA under its new mandate was to put together Ethiopia’s NAMAs submission. With backing from the Prime Minister, the EPA initiated a consultation process with the major ministries to discern what kinds of actions,

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already in the pipeline or under study, could count as NAMAs and demonstrate Ethiopia’s response to climate change. A list of 75 mitigation projects and plans categorised into seven broad groups was compiled and eventually submitted to the UNFCCC in January 2010. Building on the NAMA process and the newfound prominence of climate change in Ethiopia, climate change considerations also began to be included in the GTP discussion documents that started to emerge from an inter-ministerial, multi-level consultative process orchestrated by MOFED shortly thereafter. The final GTP replaced the PASDEP in 2010, and outlined Ethiopia’s major economic, social and institutional objectives, as well as a range of others for individual crosscutting issues, including climate change. Together, the GTP and the NAMA submission establish Ethiopia’s short-term and long-term goals for climate change. Their overall goals are highly ambitious. Identifying poverty as the central problem facing Ethiopia, the GTP explains that the overarching development objective of the government is broad-based, accelerated and sustainable economic growth that can reduce poverty in the country. For the period 2010/11 to 2014/15, the GTP sets a target growth rate of 11 per cent per year and aims to meet the Millennium Development Goals. In the long term, it states, Ethiopia’s vision is to reach middle-income status by 2020-2023. Adaptation to the impacts of climate change is highlighted as the most important objective related to climate change, especially in the short term. Indeed, the GTP asserts that climate change is already resulting in yearly GDP losses of between 2 and 6 per cent, and that immediate action is necessary. It makes clear that the main climate change-related goal is to build capacity to reduce the country’s vulnerability by avoiding the harmful impacts of climate change or at least reducing them to an acceptable level. However, mitigation is also recognised as an essential dimension of Ethiopia’s approach, deemed to be ‘very important from the point of view of the country’s economic interests, its capacity to develop renewable energy sources and prospects for its future energy consumption’ (MOFED 2010b: 121). The GTP sets out 22 specific targets related to the environment and climate change. These include increasing the amount of energy produced by renewable energy resources by 8,000 MW, raising sales of ethanol and biodiesel by 35M litres, and expanding the area covered by forests by 2,000 km 2. Notably, it also establishes a long-term target of making the Ethiopian economy carbon-free by 2025. In order to achieve these, the GTP calls for plans, strategies and action plans to address climate change mitigation, the identification of key infrastructure that is highly vulnerable to climate change, and for appropriate adaptive measures to be put in place. It also identifies a need to strengthen the capacity of all levels of government

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to implement these measures, to develop and implement regional climate change plans and laws, as well as national systems for facilitating the work of NGOs, shifting businesses and the economy towards a low-carbon pathway, and enhancing access to global finances. The GTP thus sets a number of significant objectives to respond to climate change. However, it left many of the strategies to reach these to be further developed in a more ambitious plan focused specifically on climate change, which would sit alongside the GTP and flesh out Ethiopia’s overall approach. Following the NAMA consultation process, the EPA therefore began to draw up the corresponding climate change strategy. In partnership with several donor agencies, it produced an early concept note for transitioning towards a carbon-neutral and climate-resilient economy, outlining the activities and institutional reforms required to strengthen Ethiopia’s short- and long-term response. This process has yet to be completed; only a draft mission statement has been circulated at this point. The mission statement is intended to guide the process of producing Ethiopia’s official ‘Climate Resilient Green Economy’ (CRGE) strategy, which is expected to be completed by the end of 2012. Nevertheless, a review of the draft CRGE mission statement gives some indication of Ethiopia’s approach to domestic climate governance. The mission statement affirms that building a climateresilient green economy by 2025 is one of Ethiopia’s key strategic ambitions, and sets out a common vision and roadmap for doing so. In keeping with the GTP, it identifies two pillars for Ethiopia’s approach: creating climate resilience through an Ethiopian Programme of Adaptation to Climate Change (EPA-CC) and moving towards green growth by way of nationally appropriate mitigation actions. The EPA-CC updates and replaces Ethiopia’s NAPA, and sets over twenty-nine goals and guidelines for attaining resilience. Having been submitted to the UNFCCC as the country’s official plan for adaptation, it seeks to establish a programmatic approach to adaptation in the place of the NAPA project-based approach. Following the blueprint set out in the EPA-CC, each region and sector is obliged to develop its own adaptation plans and programmes in collaboration with the EPA, key stakeholders and a range of donors. This first three-year phase of the EPA-CC has received funding from the Government of Japan through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UNDP itself, and the European Union via its Global Climate Change Alliance fast-start finance facility. Four regions (Afar, Oromia, the Somali region, and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region) have already drawn up adaptation strategies, which set priorities and identify technical and financial needs for guiding investments tailored to their individual climate concerns.

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Around the same time as the release of the GTP, a parallel initiative was launched by the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), a think tank with ministerial status whose executive director, Newai Gebre-Ab, serves as the Prime Minister’s Chief Economic Advisor. Shortly after Copenhagen, at the request of the Prime Minister, EDRI began to investigate what could be done to seriously include adaptation and mitigation concerns in Ethiopia’s major development plans, setting Ethiopia on a lowcarbon trajectory while reducing its vulnerability. With little experience in dealing with climate change, EDRI approached the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), a Korean non-profit organisation that partners with governments in order to assist with the development of low-carbon growth strategies and projects (as well as implementation and capacity building). With GGGI, EDRI also started a round of consultations with key public and private stakeholders in order to elaborate a green growth strategy for Ethiopia that would effectively complement the research and planning being undertaken at the EPA. Several consultants from McKinsey & Company were also invited by EDRI and GGGI to support the research and strategy development process in cooperation with various donors and ministries. In late 2010, the work being done at EDRI was merged with the CRGE work being done at the EPA, and a Ministerial Steering Committee was created under the authority of the Council of Ministers in order to oversee the development and implementation of Ethiopia’s climate change strategy. With Newai Gebre-Ab as the chair, the Ministerial Committee comprised the heads of the EPA and NMA and ministers from MOFED, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD), the Ministry of Water and Energy (MOWE), the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) and the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MOTC). A Technical Committee, chaired by the EPA deputy director and itself divided into several working groups focusing on particular concerns and sectors, were to assist the Ministerial Committee. Together, these two groups were made responsible for elaborating and coordinating Ethiopia’s climate change strategy and designing the policies and institutional arrangements necessary for mounting a realistic and effective approach to both adaptation and mitigation. Each of the ministries involved would help to design the overall strategy for the country and create their own sectoral strategies to implement it. The final output of the group has yet to be released, and only a few discussion papers and concept notes have been circulated that indicate the kind of governance arrangements envisioned. But it is the first time that a major cross-sectoral policymaking body has been convened in Ethiopia with the explicit purpose of developing a response to climate change, establishing responsibilities across all sectors, and creating the overall administrative structure necessary for their implementation. By

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all accounts, coordination among ministries still remains fragmented, and many implementation problems are likely to arise as established goals begin to conflict with the interests of individual bureaucracies. Furthermore, many ministries do not yet have the expertise and administrative capacity required to identify their needs and effectively incorporate climate change considerations into their sectoral strategies without substantial external assistance, thus raising worries about the sustainability of their initiative. The effort has also been criticised for excluding the input of local civil society organisations. However, as an initiative that originated from within the Prime Minister’s office, the creation of the Ministerial Steering Committee is notable for its high political status and its already quite substantial ability to stimulate climate change awareness, thinking and planning in all the major ministries. The second pillar of Ethiopia’s approach to climate change – NAMAs – are similarly built around a central green growth strategy being developed by the Ministerial Committee in collaboration with GGGI and McKinsey & Company, with each major sector, region and even three municipal governments (Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Harar) developing their own comprehensive climate action plans (CAPs). As with the EPA-CC, the CAPs (which will also eventually incorporate the adaptation strategies being developed through the EPA-CC) are to be created through a consultative process with major stakeholders, while the EPA, the Ministerial Committee and the Technical Committee will ensure that these align with the overall CRGE strategy and are harmonised across regions and sectors. The development of sectoral, regional and municipal CAPs currently being overseen by the Ministerial Steering Committee, with the support of the EPA and the Technical Committee, is intended to form the basis of a CRGE Investment Package. The Investment Package, which the government hoped to present at COP17 in Durban at the end of 2011, is intended to be an overall blueprint for Ethiopia’s response to climate change. It outlines a detailed plan with clear costs and spending priorities to attract funding to help achieve the country’s ambition of attaining a climate resilient green economy by 2025. In order to implement the package and the overall CRGE strategy, a CRGE Facility has also been proposed – a national institution linked to the EPA, MOFED and the Prime Minister’s Office. Due to be established by the end of 2011, the CRGE is the key governance structure that has been envisioned to oversee Ethiopia’s response to climate change, with responsibility for climate policy, monitoring and evaluation, and the management of climate finances. While the Climate Facility has yet to be established, the UNDP has already agreed to provide support to Ethiopia in order to ensure that it is launched before COP17.

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3.1.3. Global governance and climate change In parallel to increasingly addressing the problem of climate change domestically, Ethiopia has considerably stepped up its engagement at the regional and international level in recent years. Having been largely on the sidelines of global public policymaking in the domain of climate change, the country now occupies a central leadership position. The country has, of course, participated in the climate change negotiations since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and its negotiators have been present at nearly all of the major COPs. It was a signatory to the UNFCCC on 10 June 1992 and ratified the agreement on 5 April 1994. Likewise, it ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 14 April 2005, shortly after it came into force on 16 February 2005. But, at least until COP13, Ethiopia’s participation and contribution to global negotiations was not commensurate with its size, vulnerability and important geopolitical position in Africa. In the main, Ethiopia contributed to the negotiations as a member of the G77 and the African Group, their focus being to ensure that developing countries (and Africa) had few obligations, that they were given special access to funds and technologies, and that developed countries fulfilled their obligation to take the lead in mitigating their emissions to safe and sustainable levels. But rather than serving as a key coordinator or formulator of G77 policy or African common positions, its contribution was mainly to add its weight and stature to these groupings. Indeed, Ethiopia dedicated few resources to the negotiations. During the period from COP1 to COP14, the country rarely sent more than two negotiators to represent its interests, and occasionally only one, or even none as happened during COP9 in 2003. While its representatives may have been experienced diplomats, they typically did not have the mandate to coordinate a robust position that adequately reflected the country’s main interests and concerns, nor did they have a strong base of support or the resources to facilitate their contribution to the technical negotiations. As Gray and Gupta (2003) have noted, this combination of factors led its negotiators to take up a ‘defensive’ position. The African Group, which represented all African countries in the climate negotiations after the 1992 Earth Summit, did advance several positions on behalf of Ethiopia (as a member of the African Group), particularly regarding the issues of Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), but it too generally lacked a constructive position. It was only COP12, in Nairobi in 2006, which saw a deepening and intensification of African participation. Yet, even at this point, Ethiopia’s role in both the COP and the regional preparatory process was minimal. Combined, these factors meant that Ethiopia had no great impact upon the negotiations. It did not play a large role in either the UNFCCC or in regional climate change diplomacy.

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Instead, Ethiopia’s main form of participation in the UNFCCC process was through the preparation of its national communications and other official documentation for the UNFCCC. Produced with financial and technical assistance from Global Environment Facility (GEF) and UNDP, Ethiopia released its Initial National Communication on Climate Change in June 2001. Its NAPA and its Climate Change Technology Needs Assessment Report were both released in June 2007. It was only after the potential for receiving finances through the CDM had become apparent in 2005-6, that Ethiopia began to modestly increase its level of engagement in the UNFCCC process. However, attempts to actually make use of the CDM in Ethiopia encountered difficulties owing to insufficient institutional and technical capacity, low awareness and knowledge of CDM processes, poor financial services and uncertain/ unfavourable policy frameworks (GTZ 2007). Effective use of the CDM was also hindered by the extremely onerous requirements for registering many of the kinds of projects that were most relevant for Ethiopia, namely land-use and forestry projects, as well as by their exclusion from the burgeoning European Emissions Trading System. Thus far, only one CDM project has been successfully registered in Ethiopia: the Humbo Community-Based Natural Regeneration Project, a large-scale reforestation project aimed at restoring 2,728 hectares of forest, providing economic and social benefits to the local community and sequestering over 880,000 tonnes of CO 2 over a period of thirty years (Dettman et al. 2008). The Humbo Project was the product of collaboration between the NGO, World Vision, the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund, the EPA and local governments. It has served as a blueprint for future CDM projects and stood as a significant capacity building enterprise, but it has also highlighted the acute and pressing challenges that CDM projects have faced in Ethiopia (see the discussion in Dettman et al. 2008).

3.1.4. New approaches to international engagement Ethiopia’s engagement with the international climate regime changed substantially in the lead-up to COP15. Across Africa, participation in the global negotiations had grown steadily after COP12 in Nairobi, which launched two initiatives that attended to deep-seated concerns in both Africa and the wider developing world: the Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change, the objective of which was to help developing countries understand and assess their vulnerability to climate change and make informed decisions on practical adaptation measures; and the Nairobi Framework, which aimed to help developing countries, especially those in sub-Sahara Africa, to improve their level of participation in the CDM. The UNFCCC negotiations began to climb up the diplomatic agenda especially after

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COP13, which initiated the Bali Plan of Action and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), beginning negotiations on ‘nationally appropriate’ mitigation actions by non-Annex 1 states. The higher stakes now involved in the discussions for a post-2012 regime meant that there was a much greater need for high-level participation. In its twelfth session held in Johannesburg in June 2008, the African Ministerial Conference for the Environment (AMCEN) underscored the need for Africa to participate strategically in the negotiations in order to ensure that its interests were adequately reflected in any agreement at COP15 (ENB 2008). Ministers stressed the need for Africa to elaborate a common position on the commitments that it wanted from the international community, particularly Annex 1 countries, and on the character, scale and scope of actions that African countries would themselves be willing to take. In November 2008, during the lead-up to COP14 in Poznan, Poland, such a position was finalised at a preparatory meeting for the African Group of negotiators and ministers of the environment. Known as the African Climate Platform to Copenhagen (or Algiers Platform), this established a basic negotiating framework and principles for the African Group in the Kyoto and AWG-LCA negotiations and would be significantly updated and elaborated at subsequent meetings of the African Group as Copenhagen approached. Following an update at the third special session of AMCEN in May 2009, the revised Platform was formally endorsed as the common position of Africa at the 13th Ordinary African Union (AU) Summit in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009. It was the first time that the AU had clearly endorsed a common position ahead of a COP, and signalled the extent to which climate change and the UNFCCC negotiations had risen on the agendas of Africa’s leaders. At the same time, the AU also decided to accede to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. More importantly, the AU Summit in Libya established the Conference of African Heads of States and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC). Officially representing the highest level of African political leadership in the global negotiations, the eight states included Algeria, the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria and Uganda. The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, who had lobbied assiduously for the position, was chosen as the official chair. The move transformed Ethiopia’s position from marginal participant to key player at the UNFCCC almost overnight. The size of its delegation, for example, increased from three persons in 2006 at COP12 in next-door Nairobi, to forty-seven persons at Copenhagen three years later. This level of participation was also roughly maintained at the subsequent COP16 in 2010 in Cancun, where Ethiopia’s delegation reached a total of thirty-four persons. At COP16, Ethiopia’s

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official delegation also included members of non-governmental organisations. Beyond sheer numbers, however, Ethiopian negotiators were more fully engaged in the preparations for developing an African common position and contributed in a more substantive manner to the UNFCCC negotiations. Reflecting Ethiopia’s (as well as Africa’s) profound interest in securing a steady flow of funds and technology, Zenawi played a considerable role in the negotiation of finances for developing countries at Copenhagen. He proposed, for instance, that $50 billion be provided for developing countries by 2015, with $10 billion in ‘fast-start’ financing, and at least $100 billion by 2020, with 50 per cent of these funds earmarked for especially vulnerable countries, such as African states and small-island developing states. He also proposed that developing countries be given significant control over how the funds would be allocated and called for a panel to be established in order to monitor the delivery of the financial pledges made by the developed world. Zenawi’s leadership of CAHOSCC has not been without controversy. According to many observers, while his proposals were pragmatic and accorded with offers made by the United Kingdom and the European Union, they departed significantly from the levels of funds requested by the G77 and even the African Group of technical negotiators in the AWG-LCA, who had earlier called for at least $400 billion of fast-start financing and financial transfers of at least 5 per cent of GNP thereafter. Several African ministers, negotiators and NGOs roundly dismissed Zenawi’s proposals, although they were publicly lauded by others such as Nicholas Stern and French Prime Minister Nicholas Sarkozy. Following COP15, Zenawi’s term as the chair of CAHOSCC was nevertheless renewed by the African Union until COP17 in Durban, South Africa. And, at the request of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, he also became the chair of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, which was to study various alternatives for monitoring and delivering the financial pledges made by developed states at Copenhagen. The group’s report was delivered on 5 November 2010. In sum then, Ethiopia’s approach to climate change governance at both the domestic and international level has undergone some dramatic changes in recent years. In 2006, the issue failed to warrant a mention in the country’s overall development plans, and until COP15 at Copenhagen in 2009, its diplomats were little more than observers at international climate change negotiations. A few years later, the country has implemented a raft of new initiatives, has established a substantial new institutional structure for climate change governance, and has taken an active leadership role in international negotiations. How can these changes be accounted for? The next section attempts to answer this question by exploring the political dynamics and economic characteristics unique to the country in more detail.

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3.2. An Analysis of Changes in Climate Change Policymaking in Ethiopia Changes in Ethiopia’s climate change governance structures and policies have been forged within the context of a distinct bureaucratic and authoritarian political framework. They have been driven by the goals of economic development and poverty reduction, by growing perceptions of Ethiopia’s high vulnerability to climate change, by its need to expand access to secure energy resources, by the emergence of new opportunities for gaining access to foreign finances and by a desire to increase Ethiopia’s influence at the international level. While individually some of these factors have been important in Ethiopia for some time, it is only recently that they have all combined in such a way as to create a distinct incentive for moving the country towards a more resilient, low-carbon trajectory.

3.2.1. The political economy of decision-making in Ethiopia Officially, since the adoption of the transitional charter in 1991 and the Ethiopian constitution of 1995, political decisions in Ethiopia have been made through a decentralised democratic process. Both the charter and the constitution were elaborated by the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the current ruling party, after its victory in the civil war over the Mengitsu regime, and in theory heralded a radical departure from the country’s history of highly centralised authoritarian government. The constitution formally delegated separate legislative, judicial and executive powers to central, regional and local governments, according local and regional governments a high degree of autonomy in certain domains (Gebre-Egziabher & Berhanu 2007). The central government, on the one hand, was made formally responsible for all tasks of a ‘national’ character, including national social and economic development plans and programmes, defence, foreign affairs, monetary policy and so on. Regional and local governments, on the other hand, were given the authority to enact their own constitutions, to develop their own local social and economic development plans and programmes, and to establish their own administrative structures. In accordance with the Constitution, elections are held at each level of government on a regular basis, the first national election under the Constitution being held in 2000. While this officially decentralised system of government has been praised by some as ‘one of today’s most dramatic experiments in governance’ (Henze 1998: 41), in practice, decisions have been made according to a highly centralised, clientelistic (Chanie 2007) or bureaucratic-authoritarian (Harbeson 1998) logic. Indeed, despite

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a brief period during the 2005 elections, which were widely believed to have been conducted in a relatively free and fair manner (Harbeson 2005; Lyons 2006; Abbink 2006), the government has been ruled almost exclusively by the EPRDF. This party has wielded power by controlling the distribution of economic resources within the country, the access to positions of authority and power inside both the party and government, and by maintaining coercive controls on civil society and political opposition (Lefort 2010; Chanie 2007; Vaughan & Tranvoll 2003; Harbeson 1998). Through complex patronage networks, the party’s elites have given access to material benefits, status and authority in return for obedience and loyalty to the party and the Prime Minister from those in key constituencies and ethnic groups. Ethiopia’s economic, social and environmental policies and programmes are therefore planned and implemented largely according to this bureaucratic authoritarian logic rather than a strictly evidence-based or results-based rationale, which frequently results in a disjuncture between the policies and plans that are elaborated and the way in which these are actually executed. In terms of economic policy, Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF have been deeply influenced by the developmental experiences of Taiwan and Korea, and have generally attempted to follow an agriculture-led industrialisation strategy with a focus on exports and labour-intensive industries (Altenburg 2010). Certainly, much of this strategy has been successful. Between 1996 and 2008, average annual income per capita grew by 4.1 per cent, resulting in a cumulative increase in average real incomes of 65 per cent (World Bank 2011b). Importantly, this growth has benefited a large portion of the population as a result of the low and declining level of income inequality in the country. The number of people living below the World Bank’s $1.25 poverty line fell from 66 per cent of the population at the start of the 1980s to 39 per cent in 2005 (World Bank 2011b ). Life expectancy, access to water, literacy and primary school enrolment have all improved dramatically (World Bank 2011 a ). All this has occurred despite significant population growth – which has turned Ethiopia into the second most populous country in Africa, behind only Nigeria – as well as several major civil and international conflicts. However, effective policy formulation and implementation in all domains remains troubled by issues stemming from Ethiopia’s current governance structure and administrative apparatus, such as an often debilitating lack of coordination and cooperation between government ministries, authorities and agencies; poor communication and collaboration across different levels of government; a general lack of transparency in decision-making; low human capacity; and weak civil society participation. Each of these issues has been identified as a key constraint in shifting Ethiopia onto a sustainable development trajectory.

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3.2.2. Vulnerability One area in which the Ethiopian government and various subnational governing units have performed relatively well is in acknowledging the country’s high vulnerability to climate change, especially in recent years. Research to establish evidence for this and awareness-raising have primarily been conducted with the help of donor agencies such as the World Bank, the UNDP and the GEF, major bilateral donors and several consultancy firms and global civil society organisations. Major studies include Ethiopia’s initial national communication to the UNFCCC (supported by the GEF), research on the impacts on agro-ecological systems in Africa (sponsored by GEF/World Bank), Ethiopia’s UNFCCC technology needs assessment (supported by the GEF), and Ethiopia’s National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) (supported by the GEF), among others (HoA-REC & GTZ 2011; Oxfam 2010; Yusef et al. 2008). A number of Ethiopian scholars have also independently done their own assessments and reviews of the literature (Amsalu & Gebremichael 2010; Amsalu & Adem 2009; Kassahun 2008). The consensus that has gradually emerged from these studies – and caused growing alarm within the government and civil society – is that Ethiopia is one of the countries that will be worst affected by future changes in temperatures and weather patterns. Ethiopia’s high vulnerability derives from the fact that its economy and the livelihoods of all Ethiopians are extremely dependent on agriculture. While the service sector has grown considerably in recent years, agriculture continues to account for nearly half of the country’s GDP, representing over 80 per cent of its export revenues and roughly 85 per cent of employment. Coffee, pulses, oilseeds and cereals, particularly teff, are the principal crops, while many regions also continue to depend on pastoralist farming. Although there is a growing trend towards modernised commercial farming, the majority of Ethiopia’s agricultural production is still based on human and animal power, using traditional tools and methods and relying heavily on natural rainfall to feed crops. Indeed, irrigated agriculture accounts for less than 1 per cent of the country’s total cultivated land (Yusef et al. 2008). Changes in temperature and the timing , distribution and intensity of rainfall can thus deeply affect the mainstay of Ethiopia’s economy.

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Figure

15 Ethiopia GHG Emissions by Sector, 2000

Agriculture Waste Energy Industrial Processes

Source: CAIT (2011).

Historically, Ethiopia has suffered from extreme weather events, especially droughts and floods, with harmful effects on the country’s economy and food security (World Bank 2008: xvi-xxvi). Droughts of varying intensity affect the country almost every year, with significant impact on agricultural production. For example, drought-induced crop and livestock losses in north-eastern Ethiopia between 1999 and 2000 were estimated at $266 per household, an amount greater than the annual average income of more than three-quarters of the households in the region (Carter et al. 2004). Since the early 1980s, there have been at least seven serious droughts, five of which resulted in widespread famine. Flooding has also affected Ethiopia on a regular basis, with at least six major floods in different parts of the country since 1980 causing significant damage to communications, roads and other public and privately owned infrastructure (World Bank 2010). Other significant environmental problems in Ethiopia include land degradation, soil erosion, deforestation, biodiversity loss and water and air pollution (NMA 2007 a ). A large part of the country is also especially prone to desertification, primarily due to poor water distribution and irrigation infrastructure, and the country has fragile highland ecosystems that are currently under stress due to population pressure and associated socio-economic practices. According to the UNDP, average temperatures in Ethiopia have already increased by about 1.3°C since 1960, an approximate rate of 0.3°C every ten years on average (UNDP 2008). Over roughly the same period, the average number of ‘hot days’ experienced each year increased by 73, while the number of ‘hot nights’ increased by 137. Similarly, the average number of ‘cold days’ and ‘cold nights’ occurring each year decreased by 21 and 41, respectively. The most recent estimates suggest that this upward trend will continue. The mid-range emissions scenario of the IPCC model, for instance, tells us that temperatures in Ethiopia are expected to increase by 0.9-1.1°C by 2030, 1.7-2.1°C

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by 2050 and 2.7-3.4°C by 2080, accompanied by a small increase in average annual precipitation as well as a sharp decline in rainfall during the Ethiopia’s summer period (June to September), especially in the South-Western and Central parts of the country (NMA 2007 a ). As a result, droughts are expected to become more frequent and intense with corresponding negative impacts upon agriculture, incomes and food security. In its list of the twelve countries most at risk from drought due to climate change, the World Bank placed Ethiopia in second place, behind only Malawi (World Bank 2009c). The Bank also expects Ethiopia’s agricultural sector to be seriously affected by the impacts of climate change. It anticipates that changes in rainfall and temperatures will shorten the maturity periods of crops and decrease crop yields. Greater food deficits are expected across the country. The IPCC also predicts that rising temperatures could lead to a steady expansion of malaria to the previously malaria-free highland areas, where the majority of the Ethiopian population resides (IPCC 2007). The incidence of a number of other diseases, including livestock diseases, is also anticipated to increase (Aklilu 2010). Finally, in addition to these serious impacts on livelihoods, agriculture and health, Ethiopia’s NAPA predicts that climate change will increase desertification, contract pastoral zones, affect forest growth patterns and result in major changes in wildlife patterns. Already, the Ethiopian government estimates that climate change leads to economic losses equivalent to between 2 and 6 per cent of GDP each year (MOFED 2010b). But the cumulative economy-wide impact of future changes is predicted to be especially severe. By reducing agricultural output and output in sectors linked to the agricultural sector, for instance, one study estimates that climate change will reduce Ethiopia’s GDP in future decades by about 10 per cent from a benchmark level (Mideska 2009). The same study forecasts that climate change will heighten inequality by about 20 per cent, based on the Gini-coefficient. In short, the effects of climate change are expected to reduce the size of the economic pie compared to its annual potential and redistribute it more unevenly. Similarly, the World Bank has concluded that the economy-wide GDP losses in Ethiopia resulting from climate change are likely to be sizeable (World Bank 2010). It estimates that GDP may well be at least 2 per cent below its baseline level in each decade up to 2050, with possible deviations of up to 10 per cent or more in the last three decades. The Stern Review, which had a major effect upon perceptions of climate change in Ethiopia’s government and civil society, stated that rainfall variability alone may reduce average annual GDP growth rates in Ethiopia by up to 38 per cent and increase poverty rates by 25 per cent (Stern 2007). The IPCC’s fourth assessment report, released in 2007, made similar pronouncements about African and Ethiopian vulnerability (IPCC 2007).

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Combined with severe drought conditions and drought-induced famine in the Horn of Africa in 2006, research on vulnerability has dramatically increased policymakers’ perceptions of the dangers of climate change and has led to growing concern among the elites within the EPRDF, as well as among civil society groups. The EPRDF, whose power rests on securing, providing and distributing resources to key groups within the country, has become worried by mounting evidence showing that economic growth in sectors that are critical to political stability is highly dependent upon the climate in both the long and short term. This concern is magnified by the fact that the domestic instability that led to the overthrow of both of the previous regimes in Ethiopia (the Selassie monarchy and the Mengitsu regime) stemmed at least partly from their unresponsiveness to the human costs of massive droughts in the country. For some time after its rise to power, the EPRDF asserted that the cycle of droughtinduced famines had been broken thanks to its prudent administration, and staked a share of its legitimacy on this claim (Gills 2011). However, with the return of drought and famine in 2006, as well as political instability following the 2005 election, several members of government and insiders now acknowledge that the current regime is similarly dependent. Although the government has so far been more successful in managing these disasters than its predecessors, climate change threatens to exacerbate Ethiopia’s already existing vulnerabilities and therefore constitutes a potentially significant threat to the EPRDF regime itself.

3.2.3. Energy Along with deepening perceptions of the country’s vulnerability, Ethiopia’s changing approach to climate change governance has been precipitated by a number of pressing concerns about energy supply. At present, the majority of the Ethiopian population has little or no access to modern sources of energy, which largely reflects the country’s level of development as only around 16-22 per cent of the population lives in areas with access to the national grid or one of the separate energy grids. For the most part, these electrified areas are urban; the share of the population with access to energy in rural areas is estimated to be as low as 2 per cent. However, these energy access figures, which are calculated by measuring the share of the population that lives within ostensibly electrified areas, likely overstate the real number of people who have access to modern sources of energy. Even in areas with good electrical access, many continue to go without electricity because of the high cost of the distribution lines needed to link their houses and businesses into one of the major energy systems. The real access rate, the study estimates, may be as low as 5 to 6 per cent. The remaining bulk of the population relies on alternative sources of energy,

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mainly primitive biomass energy sources such as peat, wood fuel and dung, which are the principal sources of energy for the domestic sector and cottage industries. Households alone account for nearly 91 per cent of all biomass fuel consumption (IEA 2012 a ). Expanding access to energy is a critical component of the Ethiopian government’s economic development plans. Among other goals such as energy efficiency and the removal of bottlenecks, the 1994 Energy Policy of Ethiopia calls for ensuring an adequate, affordable and reliable supply of energy to support the country’s agricultural and industrial development strategies, as well as a gradual shift from traditional to modern sources of energy. Real plans to meet these goals were initially set out in the first Five-Year Power Sector Development Plan (2000-2005), which inaugurated the country’s first major expansion of its energy sector since the late 1980s. Subsequent plans were then elaborated in the PASDEP, which included a number of targets and policies focused on energy. The PASDEP, for instance, set a target to increase energy access to 50 per cent by 2010 by increasing electrical energy generation to 2,218 MW, called for an expansion of the national grid, and promoted off-grid rural electrification. Having expanded installed capacity to around 2,000 MW and enhanced access considerably, Ethiopia’s most recent economic development framework (EDF), the GTP, set a target of expanding installed capacity to 8,000-10,000 MW and raising coverage to include 75 per cent of the country over the next five years. However, Ethiopia is heavily reliant on hydropower for both current and future power generation. Currently, 88 per cent of electricity in Ethiopia is generated using hydropower plants. The largest of these hydroelectric plants (Beles) came online in May 2010 with a capacity of around 460 MW, but since 2001 five similar-sized hydroelectric dams as well as a number of smaller dams have been brought into service with a combined capacity of over 1,400 MW (EEPCO 2010). And if Ethiopia carries out its current energy development plans, it has been estimated that the country will soon be more than 95 per cent dependent on hydropower for electricity generation (Moges et al. 2010; Karekezi et al. 2009 a ). At least nine hydropower projects are under construction with a combined projected capacity of roughly 5,600 MW, while plans for at least eleven more dams are being studied. Furthermore, in March 2011, the government announced a controversial plan to construct a 5,000 MW ‘Millennium Dam’ at an estimated cost of nearly 3.3 billion euros on the Blue Nile with a capacity to hold 62 billion cubic meters of water. This kind of dependence however, leaves Ethiopia’s power sector vulnerable to drought and floods. Droughts tend to reduce the level of water in catchment areas, curtailing hydroelectric generation capacity and resulting in massive losses to the

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economy as customers are left without power (Ibid). Overreliance has, in fact, already resulted in energy shortages in Ethiopia during dry periods. A drought in 2002-03 caused power interruptions for nearly four months, with at least one complete power disruption each week. Again, from 2006 to 2008, customers experienced more than six months of power interruptions and blackouts due to low water levels, with as many as 15 hours of interruptions twice a week. The economic impact of such disturbances is considerable. According to the World Bank (2008), a one-day power disruption can result in a 10 to 15 per cent loss of GDP for that particular day. Like droughts, flooding can also result in power disruptions, as excessive flooding can contribute to a rapid build-up of silt, which affects the volume of water available for electricity generation and can result in significant damage to turbines (Moges et al. 2010). As one study concludes, there is ‘a direct relationship between climate change and energy security’ (Karekezi et al. 2009b: 1), which makes the long-term prospects of shifts in rainfall patterns and, especially, more frequent droughts and flooding due to climate change particularly worrisome. Indeed, this dependence is compelling the government to investigate other sources of energy, including wind and geothermal energy. Finally, Ethiopia relies heavily upon imported petroleum. Petroleum-based fuels constitute only around 7 per cent of the energy consumed in Ethiopia (IEA 2012b) but, largely as a result of Ethiopia’s fast-paced economic growth, their use has increased considerably. Since 2000, the consumption of petroleum products has more than doubled, growing from around 1,000,000 tonnes in 1999 to more than 2,500,000 tonnes in 2009 (IEA 2012c). And, with little to no domestic oil production or refining capacity, Ethiopia has to import all of its petroleum. In 2008, for example, Ethiopia imported about 2,1 22 thousand tonnes or $800 million worth of oil, an amount greater than the country’s foreign trade earnings (Lakew 2010). This means that the country has had to engage in economically unsustainable and politically dangerous borrowing simply to ensure supply (Lakew 2008). Moreover, as a landlocked country, Ethiopia must import all of its oil via its neighbours, several of whom have been involved in international conflicts with Ethiopia (such as Eritrea) or have been sources of regional instability (Sudan/Southern Sudan and Somalia) in recent years. Accordingly, Ethiopia now sees a clear need for safer and cheaper energy. Fluctuating oil prices have also contributed to this realisation, and the search for renewable energy products and technologies that can reduce the country’s dependence on imported oil has grown in importance.

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Figure 16 Ethiopia Carbon Intensity and Energy Use, Per Cent Growth since 1980 CO2 Intensity of Economy Energy Use Energy Use/Person Carbon Intensity of Energy Use 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 1980

1982

Source: CAIT (2011).

3.2.4. Foreign policy As a developing country that has contributed little to global GHG levels and is likely to be severely afflicted by the impact of global warming, Ethiopia is of course concerned about the fairness of any system of global climate governance. It is determined to curtail any binding obligations on itself and wishes to bolster international efforts to limit emissions to sustainable levels, particularly through strong commitments by Annex 1 countries. Ethiopia thus supports negotiating blocs such as the G77 and the African Group, as well as others like the Least Developed Countries Group that seek to maximise the commitments of developed countries and minimise the restrictions that might be set on the developing world, fully embracing the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. But a number of additional international factors â&#x20AC;&#x201C; both threats and opportunities â&#x20AC;&#x201C; have deeply shaped foreign and domestic climate policy in Ethiopia. For a start, climate change is considered a threat to regional security in the Horn of Africa due to its alleged potential to multiply threats and increase conflicts. Given the long and complicated history of conflict in the Horn of Africa as well as the presence of a failed state, (namely Somalia), regional security is a central pillar of Ethiopian foreign

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policy (Clapham 1999). Nationalist struggles, violent liberation movements, geopolitical contests over land, water, natural resources and infrastructure, as well as ideological, ethnic and socio-political rivalries, have made the Horn one of the most turbulent regions over the last half century (Woodward 2002). Inasmuch as climate change is likely to influence underlying variables that shape the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn, such as domestic and inter-regional migrations and competition over water, it can thus be considered as a serious foreign policy concern. Indeed, the Horn has been identified by several studies as a region that is likely to be deeply affected by changes in regional security dynamics as a result of climate change impacts (see, for instance, Stern 2007). Although climate considerations have not affected security practices and strategy in any significant way, a growing appreciation of a security dimension to climate change within the Ethiopian government, especially following the release of the Stern Review, has been an important factor in shaping perceptions of the country’s vulnerability to climate change. Still, it is the economic effects rather than the security implications of climate change that are most commonly highlighted by the Ethiopian policymakers. In recent years, greater opportunities for attaining access to finances and technology via the Clean Development Mechanism and the wide variety of adaptation and mitigation funds have raised the status of the international negotiations on Ethiopia’s foreign policy agenda. Foreign aid is a crucial dimension of domestic politics and control in Ethiopia; the country is already the largest African recipient of development assistance (Human Rights Watch 2010), and manipulating and controlling the dispensation of foreign finances is one of the EPRDF’s key tools for maintaining its hegemony over Ethiopian society. The growing opportunities for gaining access to finances through the climate regime and bilateral donors, which are ‘additional’ to the foreign assistance that the country already receives, are therefore being pursued assiduously by the government. Sensing the real opportunities at hand, the country has thus used its size, vulnerability and status to effectively lobby for a system of global governance with robust mechanisms for compensating developing , particularly African, countries. This is reflected in its emphasis in the UNFCCC negotiations on building fair, effective and accountable conduits for transfers of money and technology for mitigation and adaptation. Ethiopia has, for instance, recently tabled proposals for an Adaptation Committee with substantial powers to facilitate adaptation project financing and heavily controlled by vulnerable regions. By increasing the amount of international funds available for financing renewable energy projects, the Ethiopian government hopes to overcome some of the official obstacles that have hindered international

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public support for projects, such as hydroelectric dams, which have encountered many financial difficulties in recent years. A number of individual government agencies have begun to consider the ways in which they too might access funds through the CDM. Around 2006, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, the main parastatal energy provider, began to conduct studies to determine the feasibility of obtaining funding for renewable energy projects, especially wind farms, which could reduce reliance upon petroleum-based thermal power in order to ameliorate the occasional energy deficits associated with the country’s dependence upon hydropower. Other departments, such as MOARD, have considered how the CDM might facilitate finances for land-use projects. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as a result of the country’s deteriorating image in the international community following the post-election violence in 2005 and the political repression during the 2008 and 2010 elections, which led to the almost complete removal of all EPRDF opposition from the parliament, the opportunities for regional and international climate leadership have offered an avenue for improving the country’s reputation and raising its global stature. Key to this has been the election of Miles Zenawi as the chair of CAHOSCC, which formally represents all the African heads of state in the UNFCCC negotiations. The bloc was created by the African Union in July 2009 following the COP13 in Bali, as developing countries began to consider NAMAs, thus raising their stakes in the UNFCCC negotiations even further. The formation of CAHOSCC granted Africa a significant presence at Copenhagen, and was instrumental in promoting an African common position sanctioned by the African Union.

3.2. Conclusion The current state of climate change governance in Ethiopia remains in flux, and it is unclear whether the current raft of new initiatives will make a significant impact on the ground, where it really matters. Many of the goals laid out in official documents are laudable, but as the first part of this report made clear, the strategies to achieve those goals are still being formulated. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the country has made significant progress in recent years; since 2009, it has released its NAMAs, established a potentially powerful interministerial committee, released the GTS, and incorporated a number of climate change priorities within its overall development strategy. In part, the country’s newfound enthusiasm has been driven by growing awareness of its vulnerability to climate change, given the importance of agriculture, the economic costs of more frequent droughts, and its current and planned future

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reliance on hydropower. At the international level, Ethiopia’s position in the UNFCCC negotiations and its overall approach to the governance of climate change has changed from one of indifference to leadership and high profile activism. Ethiopia has a keen interest in establishing a fair, effective and accountable system of governance at the global level, with considerable compensation for climate impacts and assistance for pursuing a low-carbon, ‘green growth’ pathway. As such, it has been firmly committed to the UN process and the UNFCCC’s principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. What this report makes clear is that the scale and character of the country’s engagement and contribution at the international level has largely followed a pattern similar to the one visible at the domestic level; in many respects, in fact, it has been Ethiopia’s growing international engagement that has paved the way for its domestic actions. The creation of a robust system of domestic climate governance became a high priority and received a greater share of resources and attention only in the years leading up to and following COP15, when Ethiopia’s involvement at the international level increased dramatically. This has been possible thanks to the highly centralised nature of decision-making at the domestic policy level. At the same time, climate change negotiations have given the EPRDF, and Meles Zenawi in particular, the opportunity to raise the country’s stature at the UNFCCC while deflecting growing domestic and international criticisms about legitimacy at home. However, while the country’s overall approach might certainly be said to be in a state of transformation, it is probably too early to say whether this is likely to prove permanent. Thanks to several new domestic and international dynamics, the country is certainly trying to take serious action on climate change after decades as a laggard, particularly at the international level. However, at the domestic level, substantial political and administrative barriers cast doubts on whether policy implementation will follow formulation – as yet, there is not much actually happening on the ground.

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4. Tuvalu Tuvalu is a country on the frontline of climate change. As a group of low-lying islands in the Pacific Ocean with a maximum elevation of five metres above sea level, the country is particularly vulnerable to the negative effects associated with a rise in global temperatures and the corresponding changes in the Earth’s natural systems that have already begun to occur. These changes include rising sea levels, extreme weather events, coral bleaching , coastal erosion and contamination of freshwater sources. Yet, since Tuvalu is a least-developed country (LDC) with an extremely small economy, it has few resources to safeguard itself from the patterns that threaten the livelihoods of its citizens and, ultimately, possibly the existence of the country itself. The effectiveness of international efforts to govern climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is therefore considered a top national priority for the Tuvaluan government. Historically, Tuvalu’s efforts to tackle the problem of climate change have involved lobbying at the international level for comprehensive and legally binding emissions reductions targets to limit global temperature rise below 1.5ºC. However, given the almost complete lack of economic and political leverage that this tiny country of just over 10,000 citizens can apply at the negotiations, its efforts have been largely limited to raising awareness and leveraging its moral authority to encourage an international agreement. Tuvalu’s efforts in this regard have, of course, not been successful. Rather, since COP15 in Copenhagen in December 2009 an ongoing stalemate has occurred within the UNFCCC, centred on the degree of responsibility that major emerging economies must take for mitigation in a post-Kyoto agreement. This impasse has led the Government of Tuvalu (GoT) to diversify its strategy for governing climate change in recent years by prioritising adaptation at the national level as a key response to this issue. Not only have Tuvalu’s interactions with the UNFCCC been more successful under the governance of adaptation than that of mitigation, but this approach has also had more far-reaching impacts on the ability of ordinary Tuvaluans to secure a future safe from the adverse effects of climate change. Yet for the most part, this result has been overlooked by analysts, who tend to view Tuvalu as singularly focused on advocating for global emissions reductions. In fact, although the ongoing disagreements over the historical responsibilities of various countries to atone for their emissions records at

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the UNFCCC have tended to dominate headlines, a quiet revolution has been taking place with the gradual emergence of Western-funded adaptation programmes. Countries such as Tuvalu have been at the vanguard of newly successful efforts to attract international funding for their national adaptation priorities. This chapter undertakes a detailed overview and analysis of the governance of climate change in Tuvalu. Part 1 begins by outlining the evolution of the two main strategies Tuvalu has used at the international level in an attempt to mitigate emissions from the largest producers of GHGs. The first of these is participation in multilateral governance initiatives such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which creates a unified voice among vulnerable coastal and island nations that can together press for more rigorous emissions targets. The second is its attempt (in conjunction with its AOSIS partners) to try and leverage its moral authority as a country that has made a negligible contribution to the historic causes of climate change, yet faces the greatest threats from its effects (Fisher 2008). However, these two strategies have been unsuccessful in breaking the impasse at the UNFCCC. The first section therefore also documents the recent evolution of climate policy in Tuvalu towards a focus on adaptation as a more pragmatic response for its immediate survival. Specifically, these programmes include improving coastal resilience to erosion, developing salt-resilient crops that can tolerate the encroachment of seawater into agricultural lands as ocean levels rise, and increasing the islands’ capacity for rainwater collection and storage. Tuvalu’s adaptation priorities are then compared to the national programmes that have received funding from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), in order to highlight the early successes of the GoT’s efforts to ensure a sustained response to climate change through an adaptation focus. Part 2 provides an analysis of these changes in Tuvalu’s approach to the governance of climate change. It argues that the country’s attempts to limit mitigation at the international level have been defined by perceptions about Tuvalu’s physical vulnerability to the effects of climate change. However, this has gradually given way to a more focused approach on adaptation at the domestic level in conjunction with growing awareness about the more immediate concerns of economic vulnerability. The analysis of these changes suggests that Tuvalu is not only a key country to consider within the global climate regime since its vulnerability demonstrates the need for more earnest mitigation efforts, but more importantly, that the country offers a clear example of the ability of vulnerable states to adapt to the consequences of living with climate change. In this latter respect, Tuvalu can be seen as a barometer for the robustness of the international climate change adaptation funding architecture.

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4.1. Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in Tuvalu Over the two decades since the inception of the UNFCCC, Tuvalu’s approach to governing mitigation has been remarkably consistent. As a country with high vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, Tuvalu has been an active lobbyist for setting firm global mitigation targets, advocating particularly strongly in recent years for the creation of a post-Kyoto climate agreement. To overcome its lack of voice, Tuvalu has used two main governance strategies – building coalitions with other disempowered, vulnerable countries and using media-grabbing activism to highlight its moral authority as the ‘canary in the coalmine’ of climate change. Ultimately, these tactics have proven unsuccessful as ongoing disputes at COP15 and COP16 over the responsibility that emerging economies like the BASICs should take in a future commitment period have stalled progress at the UNFCCC.

4.1.1. Multilateral governance and AOSIS Tuvalu’s governance of mitigation efforts within the international climate regime is defined by its participation in multilateral advocacy to create a unified voice for the plight of those nations most vulnerable to climate change. This engagement dates back to 1990, when, prior to the founding of the UNFCCC, a coalition of low-lying and coastal nations formed the AOSIS. The unifying force of this organisation is the perception that the countries facing the most serious impacts of climate change, including coastal flooding, loss of agricultural productivity, unpredictable weather patterns and greater risk of water-borne diseases, are also the countries that have contributed least to the problem. Taken as a whole, the entire coalition of thirtyeight member and four observer states is responsible for just 0.003 per cent of annual greenhouse gas emissions and only 0.06 per cent of net historical emissions since the beginning of the industrial revolution (Betzold 2010: 3-4; Fisher 2008: 5; Lazrus 2005: 6). These small countries realised that they would not be able govern a global response to climate change due to a lack of critical leverage within the international community unless they used their power as a multilateral bloc to gain a platform for their negotiating position. Over the years, AOSIS – which comprises nearly 20 per cent of UN member states – has emerged as the most vocal bloc within the UNFCCC for robust and legally binding reductions in carbon emissions, with Tuvalu as one of the driving forces. In 1994, AOSIS tabled the first draft proposal in UNFCCC negotiations to include a mandatory emissions reduction target for a future climate mitigation protocol, advocating for a 20 per cent emissions cut (Betzold 2010). This proposal was certainly influential in

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directing negotiations towards what was ultimately to become the Kyoto Protocol. However, by the time the Protocol was signed in December 1997, AOSIS’s proposals had been significantly watered down, with Annex I nations pledging to cut emissions by just 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels. This attempt to lead a multilateral response to mitigation within the UNFCCC demonstrates that even small and seemingly powerless countries can influence the proceedings of global climate governance. Yet it also shows that the main power of groups like AOSIS is exercised through their ability to set and shape the agenda rather than their ability to lobby powerful actors within the regime to adopt such proposals. This lesson remains poignant more than a decade later as AOSIS is pushing for a legally binding climate agreement with much stricter emissions reduction targets to enter into force following the end of the Kyoto commitment period. Once again, despite impassioned pleas by AOSIS members like Tuvalu that the future of low-lying countries are in jeopardy without firm action on climate change, it appears that its members can do little to sway those with the real bargaining power. Unfortunately for Tuvalu and its partners, ‘this means their greatest influence, however, may have now passed, as the discussion moves from the agenda-building phase towards the policy formation and implementation steps’ (Shibuya 1997: 552).

4.1.2. Leveraging moral authority To make up for its lack of voice in the international climate mitigation regime, Tuvalu has also attempted to attract media exposure to its plight, and to use its moral authority to argue that it deserves to be at the forefront of considerations of climate change. This strategy has often resulted in Tuvalu using confrontational tactics in an effort to get its message across and to not be ignored by more powerful actors within the UNFCCC. For example, in 2002, following the announcement by President George W. Bush that the United States was not going to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, Koloa Talake, the then Prime Minister of Tuvalu, coordinated an effort (together with the leaders of two other small island nations, Kiribati and the Maldives) to sue the Bush Administration at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). They claimed that the US’s lack of leadership on climate governance, despite being the world’s largest emitter in per capita and absolute terms at the time, posed a direct threat to Tuvalu’s security (Jacobs 2005) In reality, it was unlikely that such a case would ever be tried at the ICJ. However the headline-grabbing potential of the move was enough to ensure that Tuvalu’s agenda was given more attention, and that the country attained a platform from which it could potentially influence the negotiations further.

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A second example of this activist approach occurred at the COP15 in 2009 when Tuvalu led a walkout of a key panel that was negotiating the future of the Kyoto Protocol. The breakdown in negotiations occurred when major emerging economies like China, India and Saudi Arabia attempted to block Tuvalu’s proposal for a new Protocol that called for significant emissions reductions by both Annex I Parties and developing countries like the BRICS (Vidal 2009a ; ENB 2009 a ). In the end, the obstruction of the entire COP negotiation track did little to secure Tuvalu’s desired outcome of a legally binding agreement in Copenhagen. It did, however, attract widespread attention for Tuvalu’s cause at the Conference. The move garnered Tuvalu its highest amount of media coverage in the history of the UNFCCC, and earned it an international reputation as one of the champions of robust climate governance. In addition to such public examples of international climate activism, Tuvalu has adopted more indirect means of positioning itself as a country with the moral authority to direct the appropriate response to climate change within the UNFCCC. The first example of this is its focus on migration as a necessary policy to deal with climate change. Indeed, few portrayals of Tuvalu in popular media are complete without the conclusion that the country faces an imminent crisis that will ultimately lead to the permanent displacement of its citizens. This crisis narrative views international migration as the only long-term adaptation strategy that the GoT has at its disposal to govern a response to climate change. [ 13 ] Yet while these analyses are full of doomsday predictions, they rarely consult Tuvaluans to determine whether migration from the effects of climate change is occurring on a wide scale, nor do they rely on reports from the GoT beyond the usual vulnerability rhetoric that its officials use in UNFCCC summits. In fact, no official government policy on climate-related migration has ever been properly identified. The only migration policy that does exist is a bilateral partnership with New Zealand that grants work and student visas to 75 Tuvaluans each year. However, this programme is explicitly de-linked from considerations of climate change and cannot be considered part of Tuvalu’s governance of adaptation (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2011a). Furthermore, a preliminary microstudy of migration behaviour in Funafuti by Mortreux and Barnett (2009) concludes that climate change is not a major factor of concern among residents of the capital, let alone a reason to leave the islands. If this ‘adaptive strategy’ is based less on fact than fiction, how can the persistence of this narrative be explained, and what does

[13] For a detailed explanation of the various ways which climate change migration is perpetuated see Lazrus (2009).

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that say about the governance of climate change in Tuvalu? One way to answer this question is to consider that the GoT has never explicitly stated that migration is not a national adaptation strategy. In other words, the government has no reason to refute these claims because it continues to give Tuvalu media exposure and therefore more ability to govern their response within the UNFCCC, even if migration is not currently a major component of this governance. Bearing this in mind, the perpetuation of the migration narrative can actually be considered a subtle way in which Tuvalu uses moral authority as part of its wider attempt to create a more robust mitigation regime in the COP negotiations. The second example of Tuvalu’s approach to earning international moral authority is its ‘2020 Renewable Strategy’, initiated by the GoT in 2009, which aims for the country to generate 100 per cent of its energy from renewable sources by 2020. This programme began with the launch of two solar projects funded by the Japanese and Italian governments and generate 5 per cent of the energy needs on each of Tuvalu’s two main islands of Funafuti and Vaituipu. It also includes two GEF-funded partnerships among Pacific Island countries known as the Pacific Islands Greenhouse Gas Abatement through Renewable Energy Project (PIGGAREP) and the Low CarbonEnergy Islands project. Together all four of these projects contribute $4.7 million to a programme that the GoT estimates will cost $20 million to complete (see Table 5, further in this chapter). In one respect, the 2020 Renewable Strategy can be viewed as a pragmatic economic decision to diversify Tuvalu’s energy security away from imported diesel fuel, which needs to be shipped to Tuvalu’s remote islands at an extremely high cost. However, there is no doubt that the Strategy also gives Tuvalu the moral authority within the UNFCCC to prove to climate change laggards that it is leading the way on mitigation efforts despite being a low-income country. It can, therefore, be considered as part of Tuvalu’s wider governance strategy of using moral authority as a tool to influence the global climate change regime.

4.1.3. Tuvalu and post-Kyoto climate governance Tuvalu’s twin efforts to gain a voice in the global climate regime through coalitionbuilding and publicity-seeking are both aimed at furthering the country’s main goal of creating an international climate treaty that has comprehensive and legally binding emissions reductions at its core. This central component of its climate governance strategy has remained consistent over the past two decades, only evolving as scientific forecasting has become more precise and as experts have warned that deeper emissions cuts will be necessary to limit the direst consequences of global warming. Yet, while Tuvalu has continued to be a vocal advocate for a strong mitigation regime

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within the UNFCCC, the past two years have been characterised by the entrenchment of differences between Annex 1 countries who refuse to commit to further emissions reductions without the participation of major developing country emitters, and the middle-income nations who believe that the present state of global warming is a result of the historical emissions from Western countries. This impasse is particularly worrying to vulnerable countries like Tuvalu, as they fear the time needed to find a compromise is running out. It is thus important to understand the current negotiating position for Tuvalu as it attempts to play a key role in resolving this protracted dispute. Tuvalu has been increasingly frustrated with the inability of the UNFCCC to reach a consensus on strong emissions reduction targets. Following a disappointing outcome at COP15, Tuvalu was one of the most vocal critics of the Copenhagen Accord, calling the document a ‘hollow agreement to meet short-term political needs’ and certainly a ‘document for the demise of nations like Tuvalu’. (Sopoaga, 2010: 2). In fact, while other AOSIS members endorsed the Accord as a necessary compromise that could lead to future progress, Tuvalu remains one of the few small island developing states (SIDS) (along with some partners like Nauru and Grenada) that continues to disassociate itself with the Accord. Rather, Tuvalu believes that much greater sacrifices must be made if the UNFCCC is to successfully negotiate a post-2012 climate regime. According to Tuvalu, this future agreement must be aimed at limiting global temperature rise to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels, with a global peak of emissions in 2015. The cuts to reach this target must be legally binding and inclusive of all countries worldwide: both developed and developing (it is here that Tuvalu uses its aforementioned moral authority as an LDC that has already undertaken such a programme). Furthermore, in order to overcome the dispute over the future of the Kyoto Protocol – a dispute that has partially contributed to the stalemate between developed and developing countries – Tuvalu tabled a motion at COP16 in Cancun for a ‘two-track’ proposal that would pave the way for a new mitigation treaty to be adopted at COP17 in December 2011. This two-track approach would renew the mandate for the Kyoto Protocol with a new commitment period of emissions reductions, and establish a second mandate through the proposed ‘Durban Protocol’, which would set targets for non-Annex I countries that are currently excluded from emissions commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AOSIS 2011; Sopoaga 2010; Stephen 2010). Despite all its attempts to influence the negotiations and put forward creative solutions for the impasse that is currently ensnaring the UNFCCC, Tuvalu may not be able to sway the proceedings of COP17. If the past is any indication, Tuvalu’s ability to set the

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agenda in Durban will likely be its only major influence on the UNFCCC negotiations. Ultimately, it will be up to the world’s largest emitters and the emerging BASIC bloc to show the initiative if a deal on mitigation is to be reached. While this asymmetry of power clearly disadvantages vulnerable SIDS and LDCs like Tuvalu, it does not necessarily mean that all is lost for small island states. Tuvalu’s current negotiating position within the global climate regime also includes a strong role for adaptation in a future UNFCCC agreement. Specifically, Tuvalu and its partners argue that new and additional funding for adaptation and green technology transfer must be earmarked for LDCs if they are to cope with climate change in the coming decades. Furthermore, as extreme weather events increase in frequency and strength, AOSIS has begun to lobby for a ‘comprehensive insurance and risk management facility’ that guarantees funds for the protection and revitalisation of infrastructure damaged by cyclones and tropical storms (AOSIS 2011). As Tuvalu continues to be stymied in its efforts to influence the mitigation dimension of UNFCCC negotiations, and as its own national policies towards adaptation begin to take immediate precedence over long-term mitigation, the way forward for Tuvalu’s climate governance may thus be to hold out for promises of comprehensive adaptation assistance if it – and its critical bloc of 38 vote-wielding UNFCCC members – is to support a more watered down mitigation treaty.

4.1.4. Adaptation and funding Adaptation funding has been on the agenda of the UNFCCC for over a decade. The Marrakesh Accords, signed at COP7 in 2001, established three main funding bodies for adaptation – the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF). Since then, the GEF Trust Fund has also introduced a Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) as part of its climate change funding architecture. However, these funding bodies have been notoriously slow in fast-tracking adaptation financing in developing countries, and financial disbursements to LDCs have only begun in recent years. As this funding has become more accessible, and given that a global deal on the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions at the UNFCCC has looked unlikely in recent years, Tuvalu has begun to prioritise national adaptation as its chief strategy in the governance of climate change. In doing so, the GoT risks becoming totally reliant on the effective functioning of these largely untested funding mechanisms for its survival. At first glimpse, the prospect of relying on externally financed adaptation does not look very hopeful. The GEF, which administers the SPA, SCCF and LDCF, has been heavily criticised for prioritising

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capacity-building exercises, while restricting access to more substantial funding for national adaptation projects in climate-vulnerable LDCs that desperately need millions of dollars in co-financing.[ 14 ] Furthermore, international donors continue to hamper the effective implementation of adaptation programmes in developing countries by failing to live up to their commitments to provide adequate financial resources to these funds. To date, the three GEF bodies responsible for adaptation have only received $133.4 million of the $283.3 million that donors have pledged to meet adaptation needs in developing countries. Put in perspective, however, even these pledges are insignificant compared to the $28-$67 billion that the UNFCCC estimates will be necessary to adequately respond to adaptation in LDCs in the coming decades (Flam & Skjaerseth 2009: 110). Yet these criticisms, which focus on overall funding, have not been corroborated by an assessment of the implementation of national adaptation programmes in many LDCs or SIDS in order to determine whether the UNFCCC-sponsored funding mechanisms are improving the governance of climate adaptation on the ground. Tuvalu is an appropriate country to use as a barometer for such an analysis, because if Tuvalu cannot attract adequate funding for climate change adaptation as one of the world’s most vulnerable countries, then it could reasonably be claimed that the UNFCCC and the GEF were failing their mandate on adaptation. In fact, an analysis of Tuvalu suggests that GEF funding is becoming increasingly accessible to developing countries, and that a switch in emphasis from mitigation to adaptation has been a pragmatic and successful strategy for climate change governance in this tiny island nation.

4.1.5. Tuvalu and the NAPA process As an LDC, Tuvalu qualifies for international assistance to implement its adaptation programmes. The funding priorities for adaptation in LDCs are determined by a UNFCCC-sponsored consultative process and drawn up into a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), much like the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) which qualify LDCs for debt-relief assistance. Tuvalu’s NAPA was finalised in May 2007. The document dovetails with Tuvalu’s overall national sustainable development strategy, Te Kakeega II, which identifies the country’s susceptibility to environmental risks such as sea level rise, population pressure in Funafuti and a decline in traditional resource management, as well as its need to adapt to these challenges. The Tuvaluan

[14] For a detailed criticism of GEF adaptation bodies, see Mace (2005).

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NAPA prioritises seven key adaptation projects in six focal areas, which the GoT hopes to address over the coming five years (see Table 4). Unsurprisingly, given the main vulnerabilities facing the country (described in Part 1), Tuvalu’s top three NAPA priorities are to increase coastal resilience, introduce salt-tolerant pulaka species to promote food security and improve rainwater storage capacity to increase access to safe drinking water for the country’s citizens (GoT 2007).

Table

Funding for Tuvalu’s NAPA Priorities

Priority No.

Project Title

Coastal: Increasing resilience of coastal areas and settlements to climate change

$1,906,500

$6,200,000

Agricultural: Increasing subsistence pit-grown pulaka productivity through introduction of a salt-tolerant pulaka species

$2,220,000

Water: Adaptation to frequent water shortages through increasing household water capacity, water collection accessories and water conservation techniques

$2,675,300

$2,510,000

Cost

Secured

Health: Protecting community health through control of vector borne/climate sensitive diseases and promotion of community access to quality potable water

$381,500

Fisheries: Strengthening of community-based conservation programmes on highly vulnerable near-shore marine ecosystems

$636,500

Fisheries: Adaptation to near-shore coastal shellfish fisheries resources and coral reef ecosystem productivity

$388,000

Disaster: Strengthening community disaster preparedness and response potential

$462,000

$8,669,800

$9,635,150

Total

$925,150

Sources: GoT (2007); Global Environmental Facility (2008a, 2008b, 2009c).

The total project cost for Tuvalu’s seven NAPA pilot projects is estimated to be $8,669,800. Given the severity of Tuvalu’s climate vulnerability, this does not seem an excessive level of funding to secure such a critical outcome as the enhanced security of an entire nation. But Tuvalu already relies on ODA to meet much of its annual budget expenditure and is, therefore, potentially subject to aid fatigue from

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its major external financers as it attempts to acquire new and additional climate adaptation funding (OECD 2011). [ 15 ] The effectiveness of GEF financing is therefore essential to enable the GoT to govern climate change at a national level, and ultimately to ensure the very survival of the country.

4.1.6. The Pacific climate regime In order to maximise its engagement with the GEF funding boards, Tuvalu has adopted the same approach as the one it uses to create a voice for itself within the UNFCCC, forging partnerships with other Pacific SIDS to undertake multilateral adaptation projects with pooled funding. The focal point for this engagement is around the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), which hosts the South Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP), a coalition that mainstreams climate adaptation and mitigation projects into national policies among member states. SPREP works in partnership with the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), an autonomous organisation that monitors geothermal activity, environmental vulnerability and natural disaster risk assessment, oceanography, energy policy, water and sanitation issues, and information and communication technology development, all with the aim of advising national policy responses by governments in the Pacific region (Lazrus 2009: 62-63). In recent years, the SPC and SPREP have become increasingly unsatisfied with GEF engagement with Pacific SIDS, arguing that the region is underrepresented by GEF projects compared to every other region in the world, and that funding for Pacific SIDS has been significantly lower despite the fact these countries suffer the most imminent threats from climate change. To this end, the SPC has developed the Pacific Alliance of Sustainability (PAS), in which Tuvalu participates, as a regional programmatic hub for fast-tracked funding for mitigation and adaptation projects.

4.1.7. GEF-funded projects in Tuvalu With the help of GEF-PAS, Tuvalu’s government has been able to attract significant amounts of funding in the four years since the Bali Plan of Action endorsed the mainstreaming of adaptation financing into the UNFCCC. As Table 5 outlines, there are currently six GEF-funded programmes under various stages of implementation in Tuvalu, four of which are adaptation projects. Remarkably, these four projects

[15] For more information on current levels of funding by Tuvalu’s top three donors – Japan, Australia and New Zealand – see Government of Japan (2011), AusAID (2011) and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2011b).

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total $13,275,1 50, surpassing Tuvalu’s NAPA priority target by $4.6 million and giving Tuvalu renewed hope that the country will be able to manage the worst effects of climate change in the coming years. However, a quick glimpse at how these four projects match Tuvalu’s NAPA priorities (see Table 4) reveals a need for some caution regarding claims that they will be a panacea for sustainable development and long-term adaptation. For example, the existing GEF funding does not cover either Tuvalu’s second NAPA priority of increasing the distribution of salt-resistant pulaka species to ensure that domestic food security is not compromised by climate-induced saltwater intrusion, or its sixth NAPA priority to strengthen community disaster preparedness. Furthermore, Tuvalu’s targeted funding for projects on safe drinking water and fisheries management fall short of their funding targets by $546,800 and $99,350 respectively. Critical steps for ensuring that crosscutting adaptation programmes are mainstreamed into the country’s national development remain as a key governance challenge for Tuvalu. Nevertheless, the fact that Tuvalu has gained such significant funding for adaptation in just the past two years justifies a cautiously optimistic assessment of Tuvalu’s evolving climate governance strategies. Further, it highlights that early efforts to fast-track adaptation financing into the UNFCCC regime and its subsidiary funding boards are paying off with tangible benefits to the most at-risk LDCs. While much work remains to be done within COP negotiations to ensure that this funding is scaled up to the billions of dollars necessary for adaptation in developing countries, the current performance of the GEF in funding adaptation needs in Tuvalu provides hopes that the global climate regime can rise to this critical challenge.

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Table

Project Name

Externally Financed Adaptation and Mitigation Programmes in Tuvalu Project Description

Project Type

Project GEF GEF Dates Agency Grant Total

Tuvalu CoFinancing

Multilateral Total CoProject Financing Funds for Tuvalu

Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project (PACC)

Climateresilient water management demonstration project at the community level.

Adaptation

20092014

SCCF

$1,010,000 $1,500,000

–

$2,510,000

Increased Resilience of Coastal Areas and Community Settlements to Climate Change

Communitybased resource management demonstration projects on each of Tuvalu's nine islands. Information sharing and streamlining best practices into a national strategy.

Adaptation

20092013

LDCF

$3,060,000 $3,140,000

–

$6,200,000

PAS Sustainable Integrated Water Resource and Wastewater Management

Integrated sustainable wastewater management demonstration project.

Adaptation

20092014

Trust Fund

$564,000

$967,000

$2,109,000

$3,640,000

PAS Island Biodiversity Programme

Creating Conservation/ protected areas. Adaptation Ensuring conservation of threatened species.

20112013

Trust Fund

$435,150

–

$490,000

$925,150

20072013

Trust Fund

$522,500 $1,800,000

–

$2,322,500

Pacific Islands Reduce Greenhouse greenhouse gas Gas emissions Abatement through through the diffusion Renewable of renewable Energy Project energy (PIGGAREP) technology.

Mitigation

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Project Name

PAS Low CarbonEnergy Islands

Project Description

Project Type

Project GEF GEF Dates Agency Grant Total

Building government capacity to implement energy demand management/ energy efficiency strategies.

Capacity Building/ Mitigation

2011-

Trust 2014

Tuvalu Solar Increase solar Power capacity by 3% Project of annual energy demand

Mitigation

Completed

TPVENI Solar Project

Mitigation

Completed

Total

Solar energy storage for Vaitupu island.

Tuvalu CoFinancing

Multilateral Total CoProject Financing Funds for Tuvalu

$432,878 Fund

–

$688,000

$1,120,878

–

$1,300,000

–

$700,000

$6,024,528 $7,407,000

$5,287,000

$18,718,528

Sources: Global Environmental Facility (2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c); e8 (2009); IUCN (2009).

4.2. Ecological and Economic Vulnerability – Explaining Climate Change Governance in Tuvalu As previously noted, Tuvalu’s approach to the governance of climate change at the international level has involved concerted efforts to limit global emissions, and at the domestic level, attempts to leverage as much funding for adaptation as possible. Both of these approaches have originated, and have been made possible, by its perceived status as an extremely vulnerable country whose very existence is threatened by the potential of rising sea levels. While this image has certainly been cultivated by the GoT to serve the political purpose of shaming laggards within the UNFCCC regime, it is also rooted in the reality of severe geographic and economic vulnerabilities as a result of climate change. Perceptions of these vulnerabilities and the country’s actual experience of living with climate change are therefore crucial in explaining the way in which policymakers in Tuvalu address national and international responses to this issue. What must be noted from a serious analysis of vulnerability in Tuvalu, however, is that the most immediate risks facing the country are threats to its food and water supplies rather than the commonly articulated claim that its very existence is jeopardised by

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the imminent flooding of the entire country. This fact does not take away from the seriousness of the impacts of climate change in Tuvalu, nor from the potential that rising sea levels may inundate the country over the next century or two. However, it does go some way towards explaining Tuvalu’s shifting approach to climate change governance, given that its mitigation strategies continue to fail within the UNFCCC and adaptation to livelihood insecurity is becoming an increasingly important national priority.

4.2.1. Ecological threats The Fourth Assessment of climate change science by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007 conservatively predicts that during the twentyfirst century, sea levels will rise between 0.1 8m and 0.59m as a result of the warming of the Earth’s atmosphere and the subsequent melting of the polar ice caps. Given that Tuvalu’s average elevation is less than one metre above sea level, this projection indicates that there is a very real threat that Tuvalu could be partially submerged, or at the very least made entirely uninhabitable, due to increasing sea level rises over the next two centuries (Dasgupta & Meisener 2009; Lazrus 2007). In fact, changes in sea levels are already having an impact in Tuvalu. According to one analyst, sea levels have risen approximately 2mm per year in the Tuvaluan archipelago during the second half of the twentieth century, which roughly corresponds with the global average over the same period (Church et al. 2006: 155-168 quoted in Lazrus 2009: 53). The GoT challenges this, however, arguing that sea levels are rising significantly faster there than elsewhere in the world. In fact, they claim that sea levels on the coasts of Tuvalu increased by an average of 22mm per year in the 1990s (GoT 1999: 3). Clearly sea level rise is a long-term threat to Tuvalu, which is already beginning to impact the coastal security of the country. Yet a sole focus on the fate of Tuvalu’s territorial integrity comes at the risk of ignoring more immediate risks facing Tuvaluan citizens as regards their livelihoods as a result of sea level rise. In particular, two phenomena stand out as major threats. First, rising sea levels increase rates of coastal erosion. The primary impact of coastal erosion is that it lowers the islands’ natural barriers to the sea and makes them more vulnerable to extreme weather events. Consequently, during cyclones and storms, large waves have a more direct impact as they crash into the islands, damaging homes and ruining scarce farmland (Connell, 2003: 91; Tompkins et al. 2005: 23). This risk is exacerbated by Tuvalu’s tiny geography – the entire area of Tuvalu’s nine islands covers just 26 km 2 – and high population density in the capital, Funafuti, where nearly half the country’s population lives. As extreme weather events displace people, their livelihoods are threatened by an inability to relocate their farms to land with

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productive soil and pick up the pieces of their destroyed existence. Furthermore, this erosion leaves lasting impacts for the island community as a whole, since the silt runoff is often deposited in lagoons and coastal reefs, which disrupts the local fisheries that Tuvaluans rely on as their main source of economic and nutritional wellbeing (GoT 2007: 29). The second main threat posed by rising sea levels in Tuvalu is to the security of its natural systems as a result of freshwater contamination. Small islands like Tuvalu contain a freshwater lens below ground that is vital for sustaining life in an otherwise remote and inhospitable environment. This freshwater has amassed over time as rainwater has seeped through the ground and collected on top of the heavier saltwater lying beneath the rocky terrain of the islands (Ralston et al. 2004). Rising sea levels, however, gradually diminish this source of fresh water as saltwater pushes into these reserves from below. In Tuvalu, this encroachment of saltwater into freshwater sources has had two critical effects for health and livelihood security. First, it has polluted the groundwater to the point where it is unfit for human consumption, leaving the inhabitants of the islands without their main source of drinking water (GoT 2007: 19). This problem is compounded by the fact that one of the main impacts of climate change is increasingly unreliable weather patterns. Since Tuvaluans must now rely entirely on rainwater collection as the main source of drinking water, future unanticipated fluctuations in precipitation levels are likely to exacerbate an already delicate situation. Second, it has seriously crippled the county’s agricultural productivity. Eighty per cent of Tuvalu’s inhabitants rely on a combination of subsistence farming and fishing for the main source of their livelihood (GoT 1999). The main crop in Tuvalu is pulaka, a giant taro plant, which is cultivated in pits dug deep into the coral in order to reach the freshwater lens, ensuring a reliable source of water for the crops. As the groundwater has become more saline, however, 60 per cent of the pulaka crops in Tuvalu have been destroyed, thereby threatening the lifeline of thousands of people in the country (GoT 2007: 27) Rising sea levels are not the only ecological threat to the livelihoods of Tuvaluans. As saltwater encroachment into agricultural land threatens pulaka crops, global temperature increases threaten coastal fisheries, which make up the second critical component of subsistence food production in Tuvalu. According to the GoT, the average ocean temperature around Tuvalu is 29ºC. This is already at the upper limit of the 25ºC-29ºC temperature range tolerated by most species found in Tuvalu’s coral fisheries. Thus, as the Earth’s temperature continues to rise over the coming decades, Tuvalu’s marine ecosystems are likely to face a serious crisis, with possible coral bleaching , the loss of suitable breeding grounds for fish stocks to replenish, and

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perhaps even localised species extinction (GoT 2007: 29; Tompkins et al., 2005: 23; Davis, 1996: 17-18). When combined with ocean acidification and increasing population pressure through the high levels of urbanisation in Funafuti, this threat to the islands marine biodiversity has the potential to cripple the country’s food supply entirely.

4.2.2. Economic vulnerability Tuvalu’s vulnerability to environmental threats is exacerbated by an extremely weak economy, which makes it more difficult for the GoT to govern responses to climate change at a national level. In PPP terms, Tuvalu’s GDP is approximately $36 million, making it one of the smallest economies in the world (IMF 2011). As has already been mentioned, 80 per cent of Tuvalu’s population relies on subsistence agriculture and fishing for its livelihood. The rest of the economy is based on external sources of capital, meaning that Tuvalu’s economic security is vulnerable to fluctuations in the generosity of foreign governments and overseas workers. For example, Tuvalu received $18 million in official development assistance (ODA) in 2008-2009, primarily from Japan, Australia and New Zealand, to fund the daily operating costs of government and various development programmes. This funding is vital, because 30 per cent of Tuvalu’s workforce is employed in the public bureaucracy, a sector that contributes over two-thirds of all wage-based employment to the economy. Furthermore, there are approximately 3,000-4,000 Tuvaluans living abroad or working as seafarers aboard merchant ships operating in the Pacific. These overseas workers and economic migrants contribute between 17 per cent and 20 per cent to Tuvalu’s national income through the remittances they send home to their relatives (Mortreux & Barnett 2009: 107; Connell 2003: 92). This figure may have dropped in recent years due to the collapse of phosphate mining in Nauru, where hundreds of Tuvaluans worked, but nevertheless still remains an important source of financing for the country. Given this reliance on foreign sources of funding, the GoT has searched for innovative ways to diversify its economy and raise money to meet its annual expenditure. One way it has done so is through the creation of the Tuvalu Trust Fund. This Fund was established in 1987 through contributions by Tuvalu, New Zealand, Australia and the UK. An amount of $27.1 million was set aside for investment on the international stock market so that the country could become more financially independent in the future. In 2007, twenty years after its inception, this Fund had grown in market value to $106.6 million, giving Tuvalu the flexibility it needs to meet budget shortfalls and potentially invest in national climate adaptation projects in the future (Tuvalu Trust Fund 2007: 3). Secondly, perhaps Tuvalu’s most unique method of economic governance aimed at diversifying the national economy has been the leasing of their

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national internet domain name, the coveted ‘.tv’, to international internet service providers. This strategy earns the country approximately $2 million per year and could be an even greater asset in the future as demand for online video streaming increases and the technology becomes cheaper and more accessible (CIA 2011). Finally, Tuvalu raises money by selling fishing licenses within its 900,000 km2 of territorial waters to international shipping companies. This is an extremely important source of income for Tuvalu, which at one point earned the country up to half of its annual revenue at nearly $12 million. [ 16 ] Yet despite all of these efforts to diversify its economy, Tuvalu is still a poor country that faces extreme economic vulnerability. This is particularly important to understand because it limits Tuvalu’s ability to effectively respond to the external shocks brought on by climate change, and thereby shapes the way that Tuvalu governs its national adaptation response within COP negotiations at the UNFCCC. For example, while the Tuvalu Trust Fund has been a welcome alleviation to the government’s budget shortfalls over the past decade, it has also faced four years of market instability since the financial crisis in 2008, precisely at the same time that the GoT has attempted to rigorously pursue high-cost national adaptation projects as a key component of its climate governance strategy. This inability to directly fund its own adaptation (along with the moral claim that it has not historically contributed to the causes of climate change, examined in greater depth in Part 1I) has led Tuvalu to join the chorus of LDCs and SIDS within the UNFCCC to claim that developed countries must finance adaptation with new and additional funding sources. However, the historical record of Western nations increasing ODA in any capacity, whether it be to raise national disbursement targets of 0.7 per cent of GDP or to combat the spread of HIV, has been less than successful. Tuvalu’s perception, therefore, is that it risks finding itself in a situation where it receives external financing for the adaptation programmes critical to the survival of its citizens but is unable to meet regular government expenditure for social services like healthcare or education due to funding shortfalls. For the GoT, it is thus imperative to pursue adaptation at the UNFCCC that is sensitive to both its ecological and economic vulnerability. In sum, Tuvalu’s perception of its own vulnerability is what defines its strategy to meet the twin goals of setting firm mitigation targets and attracting GEF finances for adaptation within the global climate regime. On the one hand, Tuvalu’s geographic [16] The government notes, however, that this is a volatile source of income, which has diminished in recent years to $1.5 million per year from a high of $11.8 million in 2001. It should therefore not be considered guaranteed income, which thereby further contributes to the country’s economic vulnerability (GoT 2007: 30).

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vulnerability to rising sea levels and changing weather patterns shapes its perception that climate change is a serious global threat that must be met with a firm response by the international community. On the other hand, its economic vulnerability leads Tuvalu to claim that it should be the largest emitters that support LDCs such as itself in financing their adaptation to climate change.

4.3. Conclusion Most analysis of climate governance in Tuvalu to date has centred on the unique vulnerability of the island nation to the effects of climate change. These works often ignore the agency of Tuvaluan policymakers in influencing the global climate regime in such a way as to secure for the country a future free of such risks. Instead, they predict that the citizens of Tuvalu will likely have to migrate from the islands as rising sea levels render their homeland uninhabitable. In an attempt to question such catastrophic narratives, this report has undertaken a more nuanced study of Tuvalu’s governance of climate change. Specifically, it has documented an evolution of the GoT’s priorities, mapping how its strategy has moved away from internationally focused efforts to create a more robust mitigation regime within the UNFCCC towards a greater priority on adaptation at the national level. Of course, the threat of sea level rise remains a very real risk to the future territorial integrity of Tuvalu. Yet an analysis of domestic adaptation strategies in Tuvalu documents the vital role played by the GoT in view of effectively managing the most immediate effects of climate change. Such an analysis is critical, not simply in order to assess how the successes and failures of this governance strategy will impact the future of Tuvalu, but also to set an example for other SIDS and LDCs that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Tuvalu’s governance of adaptation is thus crucial for a wider understanding of the role of adaptation in the global climate regime. Preliminary analysis of the governance of adaptation in Tuvalu demonstrates that the GoT has been fairly successful in attracting funding to meet the adaptation priorities outlined in its NAPA document. While funding for certain projects, including its second NAPA priority, has not been forthcoming, Tuvalu’s top adaptation priority of increasing the resilience of coastal areas and settlements has received more than three times the financing it originally requested. This means that the government can significantly scale up the project and ultimately provide a more secure environment for the citizens of Tuvalu. Nevertheless, two caveats to Tuvalu’s preliminary engagements with the GEF adaptation boards should be noted. First, the assessment of Tuvalu’s successful engagement with the GEF is based on the projects that have already been approved

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for Tuvalu. They do not include funding requests that may have been rejected by the GEF since those decisions are not made public, which means that this chapter cannot make an authoritative claim that Tuvalu is meeting all of its goals in this regard. Secondly, this chapter’s findings were not supplemented by interviews with government officials who would be able to give valuable insight on the perception of success of Tuvalu’s adaptation programmes, and opinions on the ease or frustration with which Tuvalu was able to acquire GEF funding. Given that the adaptation boards have taken such a long time to reach operational capacity,[ 17 ] and given Tuvalu’s continued insistence within the UNFCCC that more funds be made available for adaptation in LDCs and SIDS, it is impossible to claim with certainty that the GoT is satisfied with its current relationship with the GEF. On the surface, however, it appears that Tuvalu’s governance of adaptation in the past two years gives reason to be optimistic about the country’s ability to adapt to climate change in the years ahead. This is an impressive accomplishment for Tuvalu, and is certainly one that has been overlooked by most analyses of the way in which Tuvalu has managed climate governance over the past decade. Moreover, it is also evident that after years of ineffectiveness and foot-dragging by laggards on the GEF governance boards, the SPA, LDCF and SCCF have finally made significant progress in directing resources to adaptation in low-income countries. Further evaluation will need to be undertaken in the coming years to document whether the adaptation projects funded by these bodies in Tuvalu have been successful in responding to the livelihood security concerns of Tuvaluans. Moreover, further study of adaptation in other Pacific SIDS is needed to assess whether the early positive results of Tuvalu’s engagement with the GEF are being replicated elsewhere by other climate-vulnerable countries. Only through a confirmation that this trend can be effectively implemented on a wider scale can it be claimed that Tuvalu’s adaptation strategy represents a successful new paradigm of climate governance in small-island developing states.

[17 ] For a study of the long-delayed Adaptation Fund, for example, see Harmeling and Kaloga (2011).

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General Conclusion Climate change now occupies a key place on the global governance agenda, having finally ‘come of age’ in the last decade as the leading global environmental issue of our time. Only large-scale policy can fix it. Until now, most of the attention has been focused either on attempts to reach a global deal via a series of negotiations at the global level, or on the domestic policies of Annex 1 states in their attempts to mitigate emissions. To date, a sound and effective framework for global climate governance has not been generated, due to deep fissures in climate politics, and in Annex 1 states solutions have been weak and have struggled to transcend the push and pull of partisan politics. What this report has attempted to show, however, is that the future of climate change governance is increasingly coming to be defined by the actions of developing, or non-Annex 1 states. Large developing states, such as China and Brazil, account for a significant and growing percentage of global GHG emissions, and smaller states, such as Ethiopia and Tuvalu, are on the ‘frontlines’, likely to feel its most deleterious effects while bearing little or no responsibility for the problem. As noted in the Introduction to this report, while there have been several studies of domestic climate change politics in recent years, these have mainly focused on comparing Annex 1 states and specific regions, or looked at individual non-Annex 1 countries in isolation of each other. The value of this project is that it has sought to map and explain the approaches of a few significant developing and emerging economies to climate change governance, describing both the evolution of institution building and policymaking processes and analysing the political and economic drivers of change. Given their differences in population (China and Tuvalu are the largest and smallest countries in the world respectively), size, location, economic power, economic structure and political systems and political culture, it should come as no surprise that each country has approached the issue in different ways, and with varying degrees of success. In each case, the approach often seems to be determined primarily by the nature of their different emissions profile and by perceptions about their level of vulnerability. In China, the country’s leaders have continued to insist on as few obligations as possible with respect to binding international commitments, arguing that their historical and per capita contribution is negligible compared to developed countries. Beyond notions of fairness, that position has been motivated by worries about economic policymaking autonomy and the CCP’s desire to maintain high rates of economic growth. Those

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same worries, however, have resulted in some noticeable changes domestically, as the country has implemented a range of policies designed to reduce carbon intensity and increase energy efficiency. These have been motivated by a desire to improve energy security as well as by a growing perception by the country’s leading policymakers that current patterns of growth are causing irreversible environmental damage. Brazil’s approach, by contrast, has been determined largely by the country’s unique emissions profile, which is dominated by its emissions from high rates of deforestation. Despite a progressive energy make-up dominated by hydropower, its per capita emissions are therefore relatively high for a developing country. Thanks to the government’s improved ability to set and meet deforestation targets in recent years, policymakers have been able to enact a series of ambitious sectoral plans and policies backed up by legislation that has made emissions reductions legally binding. Pressures from civil society and businesses have also played an important role. In Ethiopia, action on climate change has been limited to policy commitments and some minor institutional changes. While there is evidently a growing awareness about Ethiopia’s vulnerability given the importance of agriculture and its reliance on hydropower, a number of substantial political and administrative barriers stand in the way of effective policy implementation. The country, therefore, stands at something of a crossroads, and it is still too early to see whether policy commitments will translate into on-the-ground changes. The same cannot be said for Tuvalu, for whom vulnerability is a far more important issue and has already prompted some noticeable actions. Internationally, the government’s strategy has changed in recent years, moving away from efforts to raise awareness to a prioritisation of adaptation, and a number of adaptation programmes have already started thanks to the new sources of international funding. Yet these four developing/emerging country cases also reveal a number of common characteristics in their approaches to climate change governance. For a start, there has been a remarkable consistency in their behaviour at the international level, where negotiators for all four have regularly argued that developing countries that have made a negligible contribution to global emissions in per capita and historic terms, should be allowed to increase their emissions as they develop, and have no obligation to make any commitments, voluntary or otherwise. A few qualifications should be added to this. Ethiopia has only developed a strong negotiating position in recent years, thanks to its election to the head of the African negotiating bloc at the UNFCCC, while China’s position has not remained completely static, most noticeably, in its embrace of flexibility mechanisms such as the CDM. Brazil, by contrast, initially lobbied assiduously for the creation of the CDM, only to criticise it for its failure to give more room to reforestation and afforestation projects, while Tuvalu’s strategy has undergone a noticeable

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shift, from awareness-raising to securing funds for adaptation. However, all of these changes have been either strategic or technical in nature. On the central issue of GHG emissions, their stance has remained the same; refusing to sign up to compulsory emission reductions and insisting that developed countries take responsibility for their historical role in creating the problem. This stance, evident in all four countries, has been highly influential, and continues to inform the negotiating tactics of a large segment of other non-Annex 1 countries. That said, it seems that the stalling of progress at the UNFCCC has not caused any of the four countries to stand still on climate change policy at home. A few common themes emerge from the analysis of the domestic policymaking processes. Energy security, for example, features prominently. Domestic demand for energy is expanding rapidly, particularly in China and Brazil, where usage has rocketed in tandem with economic growth and development. The energy mixes of all four countries are quite different – China is heavily reliant on coal, while Ethiopia and Brazil generate most of their electricity from hydropower, and Tuvalu from imported diesel and solar power. China imports roughly half the oil it uses, while Ethiopia and Tuvalu rely on imports for all their petroleum. However, this state of affairs has resulted in rising concerns among policymakers in all four governments about their ability to acquire adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of oil, and in motivating their search for renewable energy products and technologies. The ways in which each country has responded to energy security concerns differs though, depending on their respective energy mixes and, increasingly, on perceptions of their ecological and economic vulnerability. In China, the emphasis has been on expanding renewable energy capacity and improving energy conservation and efficiency. In Brazil and Ethiopia, energy security has focused on the expansion of domestic biofuels and hydropower capacity respectively. In both cases, their efforts have run up against obstacles – in the case of Brazil, there has been a trade-off in the shape of deforestation, while in Ethiopia increasing dependence leaves its power sector vulnerable to drought and floods. For Ethiopia, in particular, the prospects of shifts in rainfall patterns and especially more frequent droughts and flooding are directly linked to climate change in the form of increased vulnerability, thereby compelling the government to also investigate alternative sources of energy. Meanwhile, in Tuvalu, efforts at diversification into alternative sources such as solar and wind power have already begun, made possible by the growing availability of global adaptation funding. Another consistent feature in all four countries is the growing centrality of so-called ‘green growth strategies.’ China’s latest Five-Year Plan identifies a number of priorities for ‘strategic emerging industries’ for industrial innovation and development, such

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as energy efficiency technologies, recycling and waste management; advanced nuclear energy, wind, solar, smart grids and biomass; and hybrid and pure electric vehicles. Ethiopia’s most recent growth plan, the GTP, has established a long-term target of making the Ethiopian economy carbon-free by 2025, calling for mitigation strategies, the identification of vulnerable infrastructure for adaptation, and the capacity strengthening at all levels of government in order to implement these measures. This sits alongside its pending CRGE strategy, designed to flesh out the actual approach and which affirms that building a climate-resilient green economy by 2025 is one of Ethiopia’s key strategic ambitions. In Brazil, targets set out under the National Policy on Climate Change have been passed into law, committing the government to significant emissions reductions by 2020. And in Tuvalu, most of the adaptation priorities identified in its overall national sustainable development strategy, Te Kakeega II, have already begun to receive funding. Yet, while the plans and policies outlined in this report are encouraging, they are a long way, of course, from providing an adequate response to climate change in general. Macro trends for non-Annex 1 countries as a whole are still depressing. Even for the countries analysed here, there are real concerns about their ability to fully implement their plans. In Brazil, the impact of planned infrastructure development and energy policy is unclear, and it remains to be seen whether its recent successes in limiting deforestation can continue. In recent years there has been an uptick in deforestation rate, for example, and new energy projects in Amazon have created conflicting policy goals. In China, there is some doubt as to whether the country can meet its ambitious targets, as well as a debate about whether its plans for improving energy efficiency will have a marked impact on the country’s overall emissions levels. In Ethiopia, most of the policymaking thus far has been devoted to institution building and developing strategy. Actual results on the ground are still few and far between, and it is not yet clear whether the government is prepared to meet its commitments in full with real action. Of course, that problem is not limited to Ethiopia – one only needs to look at most Annex 1 states to see a similar gulf between policymaking and policy implementation. And in Tuvalu, adaptation is completely reliant on financial and technical assistance from abroad, raising concerns about the long-run viability of its strategy. As always, more research is required. It would be interesting to conduct a similar analysis for a number of other significant non-Annex 1 countries such as India, South Africa, Mexico and South Korea, to name but a few. That said, the evidence and analysis presented here suggests a more subtly optimistic assessment than the conventional narrative of non-Annex 1 states as climate “laggards.” As the report shows,

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this view, popular in the media and with foreign publics and practitioners, overplays the obstacles encountered in intergovernmental forms of climate change governance, and ignores the significant (if uneven) domestic development in each country. In a number of areas such as energy efficiency, solar power, hydropower, LUCF and in the increasingly important area of adaptation, China, Brazil, Ethiopia and Tuvalu are very much on the frontline of the fight against climate change, and have been among the most ambitious climate leaders. It is our belief that this new level of activism and ambition reflects a new political dynamic that increasingly warrants the serious attention of scholars and policymakers alike.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations AF

Adaptation Fund

AIJ

Activities Implemented Jointly

AMCEN

African Ministerial Conference for the Environment

AOSIS

Alliance of Small Island States

AWG-LCA Ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action BASIC

Brazil, South Africa, India, China

BRICS

Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa

CAP

Climate Action Plan

CAS

Chinese Academy of Sciences

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

CDF

Clean Development Fund

CDM

Clean Development Mechanism

CER

Certified Emission Reduction

CIM

Interministerial Committee for Climate Change

CIMGC

Interministerial Commission on Climate Change

CMA

China Meteorological Administration

CO 2

Carbon Dioxide

CO 2 e

Carbon Dioxide Equivalent

COP

Conference of the Parties

CRGE

Climate Resilient Green Economy

CSE

Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia

EDF

Economic Development Framework

EDRI

Ethiopian Development Research Institute

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Acronyms and Abbreviations A SAVOIR

EPA

Environmental Protection Authority

EPA-CC

Ethiopian Programme of Adaptation to Climate Change

EPRDF

Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front

G77

Group of 77

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GEF

Global Environment Facility

GGGI

Global Green Growth Institute

GHG

Greenhouse Gas

GoT

Government of Tuvalu

GTP

Growth and Transformation Plan

Gigawatt

IBAMA

Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources

ICJ

International Court of Justice

IEA

International Energy Agency

INGO

International Non-Governmental Organisation

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

Itamaraty Ministry of External Relations (Brazil)

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Joint Implementation

LDC

Least Developed Country

LDCF

Least Developed Country Fund

LUCF

Land-Use Change and Forestry

MCT

Ministry of Science and Technology

MMA

Ministry of the Environment

MME

Ministry of Mines and Energy

MOARD

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Acronyms and Abbreviations

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFED

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

MOST

Ministry of Science and Technology

MOTC

Ministry of Transport and Communication

MOTI

Ministry of Trade and Industry

MOWE

Ministry of Water and Energy

NAPA

National Adaptation Programme of Action

NCCCC

National Coordination Committee on Climate Change

NCCCLSG National Climate Change Coordinating Leading Small Group NDRC

National Development and Reform Commission

NEA

National Energy Administration

NEC

National Energy Commission

NELG

National Energy Leading Group

NEPA

National Environmental Protection Agency

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

NLCCC

National Leading Committee on Climate Change

NMA

National Meteorological Agency

ODA

Official Development Assistance

PACC

Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project

PACL

Przeworski-Alvarez-Cheibub-Limongi (measure of democracy)

PANE

Poverty Action Network of civil society organizations in Ethiopia

PFML

Public Forest Management Law

PIGGAREP Pacific Islands Greenhouse Gas Abatement through Renewable Energy Project PIN

National Integration Programme

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Acronyms and Abbreviations A SAVOIR

PNF

National Forest Program

PNMC

National Policy on Climate Change

PPP

Purchasing Power Parity

PROALCOOL National Alcohol Programme

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PRSP

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Workers’ Party

Photovoltaic

R&D

Research and Development

SCCF

Special Climate Change Fund

SEO

State Energy Office

SIDS

Small Island Developing States

SMA

State Meteorological Administration

SNUC

National Conservation Area System

SOPAC

South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission

SPA

Strategic Priority on Adaptation

SPC

Secretariat of the Pacific Community

SPREP

South Pacific Regional Environmental Program

SSTC

State Science and Technology Commission

TCE

Total Carbon Equivalent

TNA

Technological Needs Assessment

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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Earlier publications in the collection À SAVOIR NO. 1 : La régulation des services d’eau et d’assainissement dans les PED The Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services in DCs À SAVOIR NO. 2 : Gestion des dépenses publiques dans les pays en développement Management of public expenditure in developing countries À SAVOIR NO. 3 : Vers une gestion concertée des systèmes aquifères transfrontaliers Towards concerted management of cross-border aquifer systems À SAVOIR NO. 4 : Les enjeux du développement en Amérique latine Development issues in Latin America À SAVOIR NO. 5 : Transition démographique et emploi en Afrique subsaharienne Demographic transition and employment in Sub-Saharan Africa À SAVOIR NO. 6 : Les cultures vivrières pluviales en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre Rain-fed food crops in West and Central Africa À SAVOIR NO. 7: Les paiements pour services environnementaux Payments For Ecosystem Services À SAVOIR NO. 8 : Les accords de libre-échange impliquant des pays en développement ou des pays moins avancés À SAVOIR NO. 9 : Comment bénéficier du dividende démographique ? La démographie au centre des trajectoires de développement How Can We Capitalize on the Demographic Dividend? Demographics at the Heart of Development Pathways À SAVOIR NO. 10 : Le risque prix sur les produits alimentaires importés – Outils de couverture pour l’Afrique À SAVOIR NO. 11 : La situation foncière en Afrique à l’horizon 2050 À SAVOIR NO. 12: Contract Farming in Developing Countries – A Review À SAVOIR NO. 13 : Méthodologies d'évaluation économique du patrimoine urbain : une approche par la soutenabilité À SAVOIR NO. 14 : Creating Access to Agricultural Finance – Based on a horizontal study of Cambodia, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, Thailand and Tunisia

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What is AFD? Agence Française de Développement (AFD) is a public development finance institution that has been working to fight poverty and support economic growth in developing countries and the French Overseas Communities for seventy years. It executes the policy defined by the French Government. AFD is present on four continents where it has an international network of 70 agencies and representation offices, including 9 in the French Overseas Communities and 1 in Brussels. It finances and supports projects that improve people’s living conditions, promote economic growth and protect the planet: schooling for children, maternal health, support for farmers and small businesses, water supply, tropical forest preservation, fight against climate change, among other concerns. In 2011, AFD approved nearly €6.9 billion to finance activities in developing countries and the French Overseas Communities. The funds will help get 4 million children into primary school and 2 million into secondary school; they will also improve drinking water supply for 1.53 million people. Energy efficiency projects financed by AFD in 2011 will save nearly 3,8 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually.

www.afd.fr

Agence Française de Développement 5, rue Roland Barthes – 75598 Paris cedex 12 Tel. : 33 (1) 53 44 31 31 – www.afd.fr Legal deposit: 3rd quarter 2012 ISSN: 2105-553X

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The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries

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LSE-AFD Climate Governance Programme

The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries / D. HELD, E-M. NAG & C. ROGER / October 2012

The Governance of Climate Change in Developing Countries

A Report on International and Domestic Climate Change Politics in China, Brazil, Ethiopia and Tuvalu

David HELD, Eva-Maria NAG & Charles ROGER LSE Global Governance

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