Migration from México, Latin America and the Caribbean to de United States by Observatorio Diasporas

ROOM DOCUMENT N° 6

JOINT OAS/OECD TECHNICAL SEMINAR ON: OAS CONTINUOUS REPORTING SYSTEM ON LABOUR MIGRATION FOR THE AMERICAS (SICREMI) Tuesday 17 March 2009 Venue: 1889 “F” Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Padhila Vidal Room

MIGRATION FROM MEXICO, LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TO THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES Shirley J. Smith, Ph.D.

This room document has been prepared by Shirley J. Smith (OECD Consultant). The views expressed are those of the author and do not commit either the OECD, the OAS or the national authorities concerned.

MIGRATION FROM MEXICO, LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TO THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

INTRODUCTION 1. The adage â&#x20AC;&#x2022;Geography is Destinyâ&#x20AC;&#x2013; is nowhere more true than in the Western Hemisphere. Until th the 20 Century, the movement of southern populations toward North America was constrained by land formations and the distances involved. Land, sea and air travel have lessened these obstacles. Yet migrant access to the United States is still strongly correlated with proximity, and this relationship is only growing stronger due to the effects of global climate change. 2. Until relatively recently, migrants from the Caribbean and South America played a very minor role in overall migration to the United States. The people, crops and technologies of temperate South America would have been equally suited to life in North America. Yet for centuries the two continents remained isolated from one another due to the challenges of passage through the equatorial region. 1 Prior to completion of the Panama Canal in 1914, the 82 km (50 mile) wide strip of land linking North and South America was nearly impassible. Likewise, would-be Caribbean migrants were cut off from the mainland by hundreds of miles of sea. The only southern neighbor with which the United States had much early interaction was Mexico, and that interaction explicitly discouraged northerly movement. During the period of Spanish colonization portions of the southwestern United States were actually part of colonial Mexico. Those areas became part of independent Mexico in 1821 but were lost again, to the United States, in 1836. Today a 3141 km (1951 mile) international boundary, much of it through difficult terrain, separates Mexicans from what many regard as their ancestral homeland. 3. As U.S. immigration policies became written into law between 1890 and 1950, they consistently favored countries with which Americans shared a European heritage. Although physical obstacles to migration were overcome by oceanic and later air travel, Mexican, Latin American and Caribbean populations had little chance to develop the cultural bonds on which U.S. immigration policies had come to rest. 4. Only in the 1950s did Mexican, Latin American and Caribbean migrants collectively constitute as much as 20 percent of total lawful permanent U.S. admissions (Figure 1). Their entries were spurred by the Bracero program that, beginning in 1942, admitted millions of Mexican workers for temporary employment in the agricultural sector. Many simply remained in the United States. In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) established country-based quotas that made permanent admissions proportional to the ethnic makeup of the existing U.S. population. New family preference categories reinforced ethnic patterns by favoring relatives of citizens and U.S. permanent residents. In 1965, the restrictive national-origin quotas were abolished in favor of broader annual limits for permanent admissions from the Eastern (170,000) and Western (120,000) Hemispheres. For the first time U.S. law authorized substantial permanent mobility from Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean, albeit at lower levels than from other regions. By 1976 when the Western Hemispheric quota was eliminated, 41 percent 2

of each yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s new lawful permanent admissions were from Mexico, Latin America or the Caribbean. With a growing population base in the United States, Mexican, Central American, Caribbean, and to a lesser extent South American, nationals could finally share in the benefits of statutory family preferences. Figure 1. Proportion of Legal Permanent Resident Admissions to the United States Originating in Each World Region: 1820-2007 100%

90%

80%

70%

Other Africa Asia

60%

Europe Other N. America

50%

Mexico Caribbean

40%

C. America S. America

30%

20%

10%

0% 1820s 1830s 1840s 1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-07*

* The figures for 2000-â&#x20AC;&#x2122;07 are partial decade data; note the disproportionate decline from Mexico. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2007, Immigrants, Table 2.

MIGRATION TRENDS 5. During the many decades that U.S. laws restricted migration from Mexico, the Caribbean and Latin America, it simply occurred outside of legal channels. A 2,000-mile land border made it impossible to prevent all unauthorized entries. The agricultural sector continued to hire Mexican farm laborers long after the Bracero program was abolished in 1964. Over subsequent decades, millions of Mexican, Central American and Caribbean migrants have crossed the border to take jobs throughout the U.S. economy, with or without authorization. Networks of unauthorized migration are now highly developed, often arranging passage across the border and connecting workers to specific U.S. employers. Relatively few South American migrants have entered without authorization. 6. In an effort to draw unauthorized workers into the formal economy, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1987 (IRCA) regularized the status of nearly 2.9 million unauthorized migrants. Soon thereafter the U.S. Congress established the H-1A agricultural worker visa. Employers wishing to hire H1A foreign workers are required to provide housing for all of their farm workers and pay any transportation costs their H-1A workers may incur to and from the United States. This latter stipulation gives workers from Mexico, Jamaica, and other parts of the Caribbean an advantage over workers coming from greater distances. The H-1A program now admits nearly 90,000 seasonal agricultural workers each year. 7. U.S. immigration law strongly favors skilled over unskilled workers, and most skilled worker visas are issued to nationals of India, China and Europe. The family preference system is therefore the principal mechanism through which natives of most Western Hemisphere countries can obtain legal 3

permanent admission to the United States. But this family reunification process is swiftest for relatives of U.S. citizens, and here too, Mexicans are at a disadvantage because of low rates of naturalization. Because demand for unskilled foreign labor significantly outpaces the corresponding visa allotment, the development of legal channels for such migration has not stemmed unauthorized entries. 8. The principal reason is wage disparities. The collapse of oil prices, drop in wages, and rise in inflation in Ecuador during the 1970s prompted thousands to emigrate to the United States. Likewise during the 1980s, a decade of high inflation and low economic growth in Brazil, thousands left for the United States because even low-skilled jobs paid more than the higher-skilled positions they were vacating. In 2009, the most a minimum wage worker in Mexico can earn is the equivalent of $3.86 U.S. per day.2 In El Salvador, the highest paid minimum wage worker earns about $8 U.S. per day.3 By comparison, those working at minimum wage jobs in the United States earn at least $6.55 per hour.4 Despite higher costs of living and the stigma of being among the ―working poor,‖ migrants who are able to enter and find employment in the United States, even without authorization, earn more than they could hope for at home. The disparity also benefits U.S. employers, since the wage expectations of their foreign employees can be satisfied much more cheaply than those of comparable U.S. natives. 9. Thus the number of unauthorized migrants in the United States rose from about 3.3 million in 19905 to an estimated 8.5 million in 2000 and 11.9 million in 2008.6 Today more than 70 percent of unauthorized migrants are believed to be from Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean. Fully 59 percent are from Mexico alone (Figure 2). During the current decade, a growing number of Central American and Caribbean workers have crossed through Mexican territory on their way to the United States. The Mexican government now faces its own problems with unauthorized foreign migrants. 10. The increase in hemispheric migration has been spurred not only by economic factors but by political repression, civil wars and natural disasters. There have been 14 civil wars in the Western Hemisphere since 1945. Although the U.S. Congress has crafted immigration provisions to help certain displaced migrants, others have simply arrived without legal authorization. For example, the unauthorized Colombian population of the United States grew from 51 to 141 thousand during the 1990s as a result of the Colombian civil war. 11. In selected situations, U.S. immigration authorities may offer ―temporary protected status‖ (TPS) to persons at risk of being deported if their countries are beset by civil war, natural disaster, or other unsafe conditions. The duration of temporary protective status is defined but can be extended due to circumstances in the home country. Deferred deportation offers sanctuary but does not guarantee a path to lawful permanent residence.

Figure 2. Unauthorized Migrants in the United States by Place of Origin, 1990 to 2007

100%

90%

80% Other countries Ecuador

70%

China Brazil

60%

Korea India

50%

Honduras Philippines

40%

Guatemala El Salvador Mexico

30%

20%

10%

0% 1990

2000

2007

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.

12. TPS has been of particular benefit to thousands of unauthorized Central American migrants who have fled to the United States during decades of civil war and political violence at home. The U.S. Congress finally passed the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) in 1997 to prevent the deportation of certain El Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, Guatemalans and Cubans and give them a possible path to lawful permanent residence. Subsequently in 2001, a series of devastating earthquakes displaced more than a fifth of El Salvador’s remaining population. The U.S. government responded by granting TPS to an additional 260,000 Salvadorans then in the United States. Most still remain in TPS status. About 20,000 Salvadorans and a similar number of Guatemalans now obtain lawful permanent residence in the United States each year, becoming eligible to sponsor relatives for family reunification. 13. In recent decades, political repression and economic hardship have also caused hundreds of thousands of Haitians and Cubans to seek refuge in the United States. In the effort, many lives have been lost at sea. The Mariel boatlift brought 120,000 unauthorized Cuban migrants and about 25,000 Haitians to southern Florida in a short period of time in 1980. Such flotillas cause humanitarian crises and critically stretch the economic, social and political resources of receiving communities. Although subsequent mass migrations from the region have been smaller, they too have been highly disruptive. To avert further spontaneous boatlifts, in 1994 the governments of the United States and Cuba entered into an agreement. The United States would admit at least 20,000 Cubans per year for ―safe, legal and orderly migration‖ while the Cuban government would take steps to prevent further mass departures by raft or boat. The agreement has been only partially successful in stopping flotillas, but the United States admitted more than 45,000 Cubans into lawful permanent U.S. residence in 2006. 14. Although both Cuba and Haiti have experienced political repression and human rights violations, U.S. immigration policy has been more generous toward unauthorized Cuban migrants than toward similarly situated Haitians. Admission of unauthorized Cuban migrants is governed by a ―wet foot/dry

footâ&#x20AC;&#x2013; policy. Those who flee in boats and reach dry land before being apprehended may remain in the United States but those apprehended at sea are interdicted and may be returned to Cuba. 15. Haitian undocumented migrants are seldom treated as political migrants, but are instead viewed as unauthorized economic migrants.7 The U.S. government has employed its Coast Guard resources to interdict Haitian boats at sea so that migrants could be returned to Haiti or some other country within the region. The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 allowed certain Haitians in the United States at the end of 1995 to adjust to legal permanent residence. But all spontaneous migration by sea is now very actively discouraged. Since 2002, mass sea migrations have been considered a threat to U.S. national security because they divert the Coast Guard from its national security functions. Despite having had limited legal access to the United States, there are now nearly one million Haitians residing in the country. 16. Natural disasters have also propelled mass migrations within and from the Caribbean basin. Increasingly intense hurricanes, cyclones and earthquakes have exacerbated the pace of emigration. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch tore through Honduras, Nicaragua and the Caribbean, killing over 11,000 residents and displacing many thousands more. Because the region was ill-equipped to deal with returning deported aliens, the United States gave temporary protective status to about 100,000 Hondurans and about 6,000 Nicaraguans who were at risk of deportation at the time. Since 2000, their TPS status has been extended seven times and today over 80,000 Hondurans and Nicaraguans remain in the United States under TPS. The near flattening of the city of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 brought home to U.S. citizens how swiftly natural forces can compel populations to scatter. 17. The various pressures facing Latin America and the Caribbean between 1995 and 2000 were so disruptive that the United Nations estimates one out of every 1,000 residents of the region emigrated each year, giving it the highest net emigration rate of any region in the world.8 As a result, hundreds of thousands of Central American and Caribbean nationals have been living in the United States under temporary protective status for a decade or more. Despite improving conditions in the sending countries, with the passage of time it becomes less and less likely that these migrants will ever be deported 18. From the mid-1990s through 2005, unauthorized migrants entering the United States actually outnumbered persons being legally admitted for permanent residence. The unauthorized population appears to have grown very little since 2005, and since 2007 authorized admissions appear to have outnumbered illegal entries. Jeffery Passel and Dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Vera Cohn of the Pew Hispanic Center estimate that during the first half of the decade the U.S. unauthorized population grew by about 800,000 per year. 9 Since 2005 net growth has averaged just 500,000 per year and the figure still appears to be trending downward. Passel and Cohn estimate that 11.9 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in March 2008. There are some indications, as yet inconclusive, that the unauthorized population may actually have declined since 2007. Pew researchers estimate that in 2008 about four percent of the U.S. population, five percent of the U.S. labor force, and one-third of the foreign-born labor force were illegally resident in the country. 19. The foreign-born population of the United States grew by more than 20 percent between 2000 and 2006. Nearly two thirds of this net growth originated in Mexico, Central and South America and the Caribbean (Table 1). The Central American component of U.S. population grew more rapidly than that of any other region of origin, but in absolute terms Mexico contributed far more net migrants, i.e., nearly 2.4 million in just six years. Pew estimates that during the same period the unauthorized Mexican population grew by about 1.8 million.

Table 1. Change in Foreign-Born Population in the United States by Region of Birth: 2000 and 2006 Country Or Region Of Birth Total Regional Subtotal Mexico Central America Caribbean South America South and East Asia Middle East Other

Population 2000

2006

31,133,481 16,067,673 9,163,463 2,029,383 2,954,820 1,920,007

37,469,387 20,058,546 11,534,972 2,669,558 3,354,549 2,499,467

7,195,764 1,137,898 6,732,146

8,860,407 1,279,161 7,271,273

Change 2000Percent 2006 Change 2000-2006 6,335,906 20.4 3,990,873 24.8 2,371,509 25.9 640,175 31.5 399,729 13.5 579,460 12.4 1,664,643 141,263 539,127

Percent of Total Change 2000-2006 100.0 63.0 37.4 10.1 6.3 9.1

23.1 12.4 8.0

26.3 2.2 8.5

Source: â&#x20AC;&#x2022;Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2006,â&#x20AC;&#x2013; The Pew Hispanic Center, 2008 at pewhispanic.org.

20. Rakesh Kochhar, also of the Pew Hispanic Center, has taken a first look at the effects of recession on Hispanic immigrant workers.10 He finds that by the middle of the current decade Hispanic immigrants no longer contributed disproportionately to the size of the U.S. working-age population. Between the third quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2008, there was an actual 234,000 drop in the count of working-age adults who had arrived from Latin America during the 1990s. The overall workingage population of Hispanic migrants continued to grow but the corresponding number in the labor force did not. Consequently, during the early months of the current recession the labor force participation rate of Hispanic migrants declined from 72.4 to 71.3 percent, a small but statistically significant drop. The decline was twice as sharp among Mexican immigrants and those arriving since 2000. 21. Hispanic immigrant workers bore the brunt of the 2007 construction slump. An additional 239,000 became unemployed during this interval. Their overall unemployment rate rose from 4.5 to 6.4 percent and would have reached 7.8, had it not been for the simultaneous withdrawal of thousands of foreign-born Hispanics from the U.S. labor force. The sharpest unemployment rate increase was registered by Central Americans (Table 2). But South American migrants lost a much larger number of jobs, and the number of migrant workers entering unemployment was largest from Mexico.

Table 2. Employment Status of Foreign-Born Hispanics, by Origin, Third Quarter 2008 to Third Quarter 2008 (nonseasonally adjusted, numbers in thousands)

Year and Quarter 2007 – 3 2008 – 3 Mexico Employment Employment rate (%) Unemployment Unemployment rate (%) Central America Employment Employment rate (%) Unemployment Unemployment rate (%) South America Employment Employment rate (%) Unemployment Unemployment rate (%) Source: Rakesh Kochhar: December 2008.

Change 2007-3 to 2008-3

7,316 69.6 326 4.3

7,370 66.3 498 6.3

54 -3.3 171 2.1

1,759 76.6 83 4.5

1,823 73.9 130 7.0

-36 -2.8 47 2.5

1,225 69.3 64 4.9

1,126 69.7 75 6.2

-100 0.3 11 1.3

Latino Workers in the Ongoing Recession:

2007 to 2008, Pew Hispanic Center,

22. Paradoxically, the median wages of foreign-born Hispanics appeared to have increased during this period. Kochhar surmises that the increase resulted from disproportionate job losses at the lowest rungs of the earnings ladder. 23. It is unclear how many Mexican, Latin American and Caribbean migrants will actually leave the United States as a result of what is shaping up to be a prolonged economic crisis. However, the forces compelling south-to-north migration will outlast the current downturn, and the challenges facing the Western Hemisphere will only accelerate population redistribution in the coming decades. CHALLENGES Demographic forces 24. Population growth rates. As the Baby Boom generation enters retirement, the United States is faced with the economic consequences a rapidly aging population. Existing institutions risk being undermined by the slowing growth of workforce in the face of an expanding elderly population. By contrast, the jobs being generated in Mexico and many parts of the Caribbean, Central and South America are insufficient to fully utilize the available labor supply. In many countries emigration has become the preferred ―safety valve‖ to offset population growth, while in the United States immigration is often seen as the remedy for population aging. The historic movement of millions of working-age adults into the United States each year has helped to slow, although by no means stop, the aging of the U.S. population. Migrants from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean both expand the U.S. workforce and significantly increase the nation’s birth rates. 8

25. Moreover, chain migration ensures a continuous flow of workers. Most U.S. visas permit immediate family members to accompany the principal migrant. Given a sufficient period of stay, families often put down roots, buying property and/or bearing and raising children in the United States. Temporary migration often becomes more permanent. Those able to obtain a green card may eventually sponsor relatives of their spouse, expanding the chain. By contrast, migrants who enter the United States illegally typically leave their families at home. However, tightening border security has complicated cross-border visits to the point that many such families now appear to be reuniting north of the border. Family and chain migration are almost impossible to curtail. 26. In the long run, however, international mobility cannot rectify demographic imbalances and high rates of mobility may actually create new imbalances for the countries involved. Passel and Cohn have modeled the future demographic impacts of various levels of immigration to the United States. 11 A continuation of current migration trends from 2005 to 2050 would gradually increase annual immigration from 1.4 million to 2.1 million persons per year, for an average net increase of 1.7 million per year. The total U.S. population would grow by about 142 million persons. Fully 82 percent of this increase and the entire increase in the U.S. working age and youth populations would be attributable to immigrants arriving during that period and their U.S.-born children. Even so, as the current U.S. workforce aged into retirement the dependency ratio, i.e., persons of non-working age per 100 working-age adults, would climb from 59 to 72. Assuming an average of 2.6 million net immigrants per year—50 percent higher than the current trend---after 45 years there would still be 69 dependents per 100 working age adults in the United States. The dynamic of population aging is inescapable. 27. Moreover, immigration of this magnitude will significantly challenge the U.S. urban infrastructure, housing, transportation, the workforce, environment, and a wide range of other resources. Already immigrants and their children present serious challenges to U.S. educational institutions and attempts to raise national educational standards. Hispanic enrollments nearly doubled between 1990 and 2006, accounting for 60 percent of the rise in total public school enrollment. Foreign-born Hispanic students drop out of high school at rates that are four times the national average and six times those of other foreign-born students.12 In 2006, fully half of all U.S. adults that had never attended high school were foreign born. Just four percent of natives are similarly classified; most of them are elderly. 28. Immigration is also on target to revamp the ethnic makeup of the U.S. population over the next half century. At current trends, Passel and Cohn estimate that the traditional ―majority‖ status of nonHispanic whites (67 percent of total population in 2005) will become a plurality (47 percent) by 2050. The Hispanic population will triple in size, accounting for 60 percent of overall U.S. growth. Most of this growth will be due to births among U.S.-born Hispanics. The Hispanic share of total U.S. population will climb from 14 to 31 percent. This sea change will undoubtedly have social and cultural ramifications. 29. Emigration can be equally unsettling to the countries of origin. Prachi Mishra of the International Monetary Fund finds the highest emigration rates in the world are in the Caribbean, where about 12 percent of the regional labor force migrated to OECD countries between 1970 and 2000. 13 The Central American region ranks second, with a seven percent overall loss. More than 10 percent of all workers in Mexico, El Salvador and Jamaica emigrated to the United States between 1970 and 2000. Mishra notes that ―The aggregate emigration rates, however, understate the loss of the educated population.‖ … ―A majority of Caribbean countries have lost more than 50 percent of the labor force in the tertiary education segment‖ (post-high school) ―and more than 30 percent in the secondary education segment (9-12 years of schooling).‖ Table 3 illustrates this point. At least three out of four graduates of high schools in Grenada, Jamaica, Haiti and Guyana have settled in the United States. Grenada has also lost six out of 10 graduates of its secondary schools to the United States. The scarce resources these countries have spent to educate their most promising residents have been lost to the local economy. Given the selective nature of

emigration, brain drain is likely to increase apace with out-migration. The best hope for such countries is that migrant networks will promote trade and investment and bring in substantial remittances. Table 3. Percent of Labor Force That Has Migrated to the United States, 1965-2000 (By Level of Schooling) Country of Origin

Primary Secondary Tertiary (grades 1-8) (grades 9-12) (post HS)

Caribbean Average

Dominican Republic Barbados Dominica St. Lucia Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas, The Belize St. Kitts and Nevis Trinidad and Tobago St. Vincent and the Grenadines Grenada Jamaica Haiti Guyana

5 4 6 2 3 2 4 8 3 4 7 5 2 7

28 20 56 13 57 10 54 31 17 23 61 29 27 35

18 46 49 53 56 58 62 65 68 71 75 78 79 80

Source: Prachi Mishra: Emigration and Brain Drain: Evidence From the Caribbean, IMF Working Paper WP/06/25, January 2006.

30. While brain drain is diminishing the productivity of sending economies, it may also be reaping disappointing benefits for the emigrants themselves. Obtaining recognition of foreign credentials is often a problem, and college-educated Latin American migrants seem to have more difficulty marketing their skills than most other comparably situated migrants. A recent study by the Migration Policy Institute looked at the occupational progress of college-educated immigrants in the United States.14 It found that four out of 10 Latin American college graduates who have been in the United States for a decade or less work in unskilled occupations (Table 4). Even after 10 or more years, over one third still work in unskilled occupations. Moreover, obtaining a college degree in the United States does not appreciably improve their ability to land a skilled job. College-educated Mexican migrants appear to be positioned worst of all. Economic forces 31. Labor market conditions. The enormity of regional wage disparities has already been noted. U.S. free trade agreements with Mexico and certain countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean have shifted a great deal of U.S. capital into their lower-wage economies. But the resulting job opportunities have not matched potential earnings or job openings in the United States. 32. The American Community Survey (ACS) data indicate that in 2006, prior to the current economic downturn, the employed labor force of the United States included 8.4 million persons born in Mexico, 2.4 million from the Caribbean, 2.1 million from Central America, and 1.9 million persons born in South America.15 Additionally, the U.S. unemployed included 81 thousand Mexicans, 22 thousand workers from the Caribbean, 21 thousand from Central America and nearly 13 thousand from South 10

America. At that time, roughly 10 percent of the U.S. labor force originated in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean. Table 4. Share of College-Graduate Immigrants to the United States Working in Unskilled Occupations by Length of Stay and Region of Origin, 2005-2006 Region of Origin

Latin America Mexico Rest of Latin America Africa Asia China India Japan/Asian Tigers Philippines Rest of Asia Europe W. Europe/Canada/Oceania E. Europe

Percent in Unskilled Occupations Recent Long-term US-educated Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants (last 10 years) (11+ years) 43.5 34.6 25.4 46.5 41.7 33.7 42.5 33.2 22.6 32.9 20.3 10.0 12.5 17.9 34.6 31.9 18.9 10.3 33.1

22.3 23.4 12.7 19.3 21.6 31.8 24.6 16.8 13.0 21.6

18.2 14.4 11.8 10.3 13.7 19.4 16.5 16.4 15.6 18.5

Source: Jeanne Batalova and Michael Fix: Uneven Progress: The Employment Pathways of Skilled Immigrant in the United States, Migration Policy Institute, October 2008.

33. These migrants tend to be younger, less educated and skilled, and less proficient in English than their native counterparts. Most find jobs in household construction, leisure and hospitality, personal and support services, or light manufacturing. With little access to social safety nets, they have had a strong incentive to remain employed. Hence proportionately fewer foreign-born workers than natives were unemployed in 2007. However, the employment situation of foreign workers began to deteriorate more rapidly due to their heavier concentration in vulnerable industries. Between 2006 and 2007, as the median household income of natives rose by 1.3 percent, that of all Mexican-headed households fell by 6.2 percent, and that of Caribbean, Central and South American-headed households plummeted by 9.6 percent.16 Households of non-citizens suffered the greatest average loss: 7.3 percent as compared with just 1.5 percent among households headed by naturalized migrants. 34. It is understandable, therefore, that the foreign-born population in the United States has grown very slowly since 2007 and the unauthorized population has grown minimally if at all since 2005. Unusually large numbers of authorized migrants, especially those from Mexico, may even be returning to their homelands. Researchers have also noted a falling off of migration from other parts of Latin America since 2007. While this reversal is largely due to the current prolonged recession, other factors may be contributing as well. Important among these are the stepped up enforcement of U.S. immigration laws at all levels of government17 and, until quite recently, the improving social and economic conditions in certain countries of origin. For whatever reason, in the last three to four years the magnetic pull of U.S. employment appears to have weakened considerably. 35. Remittances. Remittances are a sending countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most tangible compensation for its loss of educated, working-age adults. The funds that are remitted help to alleviate poverty, support the unemployed, and generate demand which can have multiplier effects in the home economy. Manuel 11

Orozco of the Inter-American Dialogue points out that in countries like Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua the impact of remittances is particularly strong in rural areas, where there are few institutional sources of credit.18 Numerous rural infrastructure projects have been funded largely through emigration. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) found that in 2006, Latin American and Caribbean countries received five times as much through remittances as they did through official development assistance from governmental and international development groups.19 Caribbean countries receive a higher share of their GDP from remittances than do most other countries worldwide.20 Nonetheless, most have found that the gains from remittances are outweighed by total losses associated with skilled emigration, including loss of personnel, the costs of their public education, taxes foregone, etc. 36. Moreover, in periods of economic instability remittances can be an unreliable foundation for economic development. Remittances to Mexico and Central America increased rapidly from 2000 to 2006, but central bank reports indicate that this growth tapered off beginning in 2007. According to the InterAmerican Development Bank, remittances during 2007 were essentially flat.21 Moreover, a recent Pew survey finds that seven out of 10 of the Hispanic immigrants who remitted funds in the last two years sent less in 2008 than in 2007.22 The IDB expects that after adjusting final 2008 remittance figures for inflation and exchange rate variations, their contribution to household incomes in Latin America and the Caribbean will have dropped by 1.7 percent over the previous year. Their eroding impact is thought to be due to significant increases in the cost of food and fuel, both to those sending and those receiving funds; migrantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; inability to find well-paying jobs during the U.S. economic downturn; and the decline in purchasing power of home currencies relative to the U.S. dollar. As households and communities throughout Latin America and the Caribbean have become dependent on remitted funds, their vulnerability to external economic forces has also grown. Governmental and Political forces 37. The U.S. perspective. Intergovernmental relationships encourage the migration of some nationalities while effectively shutting off others. Through NAFTA and the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, the United States actually promotes the temporary migration of certain Mexican and Chilean professionals to and from the United States.23 Conversely, over the many decades that Fidel Castro was in power, the United States imposed strict limits on the movement of persons between the Cuba and the United States. If the U.S.-Cuban relationship were to thaw following Castroâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s death, there would likely be a flood of migrants between the two countries as relatives reunited after decades of separation. 38. The United States is currently forging new legal migratory networks through its Diversity Visa Lottery. Each year this lottery reaches out to nationals of countries that have relatively few migrants living in the United States. Lottery winners obtain a visa that gives them a permanent foothold in the United States from which to eventually sponsor additional countrymen. The diversity lottery is only open to those born in countries from which less than 50,000 people have migrated to the United States in the past five years. All countries of South and Central America and the Caribbean have had few enough migrants to the United States to qualify except for the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala. As this list illustrates, even today the largest migratory streams to the United States are from the countries in closest proximity to its borders. In 2007, the Diversity Visa program admitted 2,615 persons from qualifying countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 39. IRCA, the U.S. legalization program of 1987, has also influenced recent permanent migratory flows. Of the 2.9 million unauthorized residents who obtained lawful permanent residence under IRCA, nine out of ten were from the Western Hemisphere. Fully 69 percent were Mexican, 15 percent Central American, and 7 percent from South America or the Caribbean. As they became eligible to naturalize,

overall naturalizations shot up from a few hundred thousand per year to one million or more each year between 1995 and 1998. The newly legalized citizens entered the pool of those eligible to sponsor relatives for permanent U.S. residence, widening the door for other Mexican and Latin American migrants. Although this program has not been repeated, Congress periodically weighs the benefits of doing so again. 40. The implications of existing immigration laws are a frequent topic of political debate. As the migrants legalized under IRCA neared eligibility for several major Federal assistance programs in 1996, the impending costs led Congress to pass legislation that denied non-citizens access to many of these programs. Some of those prohibitions remain in force today. In February of this year, the Congress nearly failed to expand the State Child Health Insurance Program because it would now cover legally resident immigrant children. The education budgets of many urban areas have been stretched thin by the need for language training and other remedial services for children of immigrants. Some communities have defied Federal law by attempting to deny educational benefits to unauthorized migrant children. And while most immigrants pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits,24 public perceptions to the contrary keep the issue of immigration and taxation alive in political discourse. 41. Moreover, local governments bear many of the direct costs of immigration, including law enforcement. The spread of drug traffic and highly visible criminal networks from Mexico and El Salvador, e.g., MS13, has particularly challenged local authorities and their law enforcement resources. Since 2000, a growing number of communities have passed local ordinances targeting undocumented migrants and those who house or employ them. The costs of enforcing these ordinances have likewise strained public budgets. Concerns about rising crime, diminishing resources, and social and cultural frictions can lead to xenophobia, particularly during economic crises. 42. At the same time, U.S. citizens of Latin American origin have become a powerful voting block in U.S. elections. In several â&#x20AC;&#x2022;battleground statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2013; a much larger share of the 2008 electorate was Hispanic than had been the case in 2004. Candidates of both parties courted the Hispanic vote, which in the end went more heavily for Democratic candidates than in the previous national election. By a 2-to-1 margin, Hispanic voters favored President Obama over candidate McCain, helping to win several critical states and thereby the national election. Their prominence as a political force is now fully recognized by both political parties. 43. Political issues in sending countries. There are also political challenges for countries of high emigration. To retain a connection with their emigrant population, many countries have legalized dual citizenship. Among them are Mexico, El Salvador, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Uruguay, Panama and Peru. U.S. law does not mention dual nationality or require a person to choose one citizenship over another, but the U.S. Government recognizes the existence of this phenomenon.25 It is unclear how election outcomes might be affected by a growing electorate with dual nationalities and pressing concerns on both sides of the border. 44. The difficulties associated with brain drain have already been noted. Credential recognition is another challenge for sending countries. When emigrants cannot find jobs commensurate with their education, they become underemployed and their home communities receive fewer remittances than might otherwise be the case. Finding ways to standardize educational credentials and improve their transferability is a significant challenge for countries with high rates of emigration. 45. The need for official identification documents has also been a pressing issue for migrants to the United States. In response to the US Patriot Act of 2001, many institutions now require identification documents for all transactions. It has become difficult for unauthorized migrants to open a bank account, obtain a driverâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s license, or rent an apartment without official identification. For many years the Mexican government has provided its nationals living abroad with a document that identifies them to Mexican

consular officials if their assistance is needed.26 In response to tightening U.S. security, the Mexican government has recently redesigned this ―matricula consular.‖ It is now bilingual and includes a local U.S. address as well as counterfeit-proof features. Mexico has successfully marketed this document to various U.S. entities not involved in immigration law. The matricula is now recognized by many U.S. banking institutions and several States, some of which also accept the Mexican Individual Taxpayer Identification Number in lieu of a U.S. Social Security number. However, the matricula consular does not meet the documentation standards set out in U.S. law and Federal authorities could well crack down on its use at some future date. For the time being however, the redesigned document is helping unauthorized Mexican nationals to get by in a tightening legal environment. 46. The eventual return of emigrants to their homeland could also present Latin American countries with a new set of challenges. Social Security is a case in point. Only persons authorized to work in the United States can obtain a valid U.S. Social Security Number (SSN). Because employers cannot hire anyone without an SSN, unauthorized workers typically invent an account into which their taxes (deducted from each paycheck) will be paid. Migrants whose taxes have been deposited into a valid account for the requisite number of years can eventually collect U.S. Social Security benefits even if they leave the country. But the taxes collected on behalf of unauthorized migrants cannot be recovered in the form of benefits because the accounts in question are invalid. 47. A second problem confronts properly documented migrants who have split their working lives between two countries, paying in to two separate social security programs. Unless they can pool credits earned in the two separate programs, they may not qualify for benefits from either system. The United States has entered in to Totalization Agreements with numerous countries to make this pooling possible. However, Chile is the only Latin American country with which the United States currently has such an agreement. A draft agreement with Mexico has never been ratified. When today’s highly mobile migrants can no longer work, it remains to be seen how they will support themselves if they do not qualify for either country’s pension system. Faced with the high costs of living in the United States, however, many may opt to return to the country from which they came. Social and Cultural forces 48. In periods of economic prosperity, even unauthorized migrants may have little difficulty finding U.S. jobs and the U.S. public may be tacitly in support of their employment. Day laborers have been welcomed by many employers, although some communities object to the pick-up sites at which they gather in local shopping centers. Local ordinances have been crafted to move these gatherings to less visible locations. 49. When resources are strained, however, attitudes toward immigrants tend to harden. Tightening budgets for education, health, law enforcement, and various public benefits bring focus to the issue of rapid immigration. Massive layoffs raise questions about whether U.S. citizens are losing their jobs while visaholders retain theirs. Underlying this xenophobia are several longstanding social and cultural anxieties. 50. The U.S. health care system rests on private health insurance, something a large share of all Latin American migrants and other low-wage workers lack. Uninsured health care costs are largely paid with tax dollars. Disease transmission is also a threat. U.S. efforts to eradicate diseases such as tuberculosis have been complicated by large-scale population movements from other regions of the world.27 51. By 2006, nearly six percent of all students in U.S. elementary and secondary schools were foreign born. Nearly five million children lacked English proficiency, and over one million required English language instruction. These special needs add to concerns about the future of public schools. Moreover, Latin American children have retained their linguistic identity more persistently than many

previous cohorts of immigrants, contributing to the mainstream perception of cultural separation. Migrants from many parts of the hemisphere are able to communicate in a single language, Spanish. Because of the large number present in many localities, it is possible for many adult migrants to live and work in a Spanish-speaking environment. Whole work crews are often supervised in Spanish, minimizing their interaction with English-speaking co-workers. 52. Social and Cultural challenges for sending communities in Latin American and the Caribbean. Emigration seriously challenges family bonds. It separates adult emigrants from their spouses and/or children. It leaves many children to be raised by other relatives while their parents support them via telephone and remittances. Even when ―family reunification‖ restores one family unit, it breaks up others. Within emigrant families it is common for siblings to have different countries of birth and citizenship, and different legal rights. Those born in the United States are by law U.S. citizens, regardless of their parents’ immigration status. Their foreign-born siblings may have a green card, a temporary visa, or no documentation whatsoever. Many foreign-born children have lived in the United States since early childhood but are at risk of deportation to a country they do not know because their parents brought them in illegally or overstayed their visas. Years of living abroad, even for those fully authorized to do so, can leave migrants with a bi-national identity, dual citizenship, and a permanent sense of being an outsider. The Challenge of Global Climate Change 53. Although it is seldom discussed in the context of migration, climate change is the most inexorable challenge facing the Western Hemisphere. In as little as 40 years, living conditions may change so radically in certain regions that their populations have no choice but to relocate. According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), by mid-century Latin America will experience: 1) increases in temperature and decreases in soil moisture that will convert Amazonian tropical forests to savanna and replace semi-arid vegetation with arid-land vegetation; 2) significant loss of biodiversity thoroughly much of tropical Latin America; 3) a drop in crop and livestock productivity leading to greater risk of human hunger, and 4) changes in precipitation that will alter the availability of water for consumption, agriculture and energy generation.28 54. Argentina is already experiencing the most intense, prolonged and expensive drought in the past 50 years. Since October 2008 it has lost an estimated 1.5 million head of cattle, mostly due to starvation. This represents 11 percent of the previous year’s total animal slaughter. The affected regions are home to 40 percent of that country’s renowned cattle stock. Animals being slaughtered are now significantly below normal body weight. In just three years Argentina has fallen from the world’s third largest beef exporter to seventh place. Agricultural harvests are also severely depressed. Grain exporters have lost an estimated $5 billion due to weather.29 The potential for lost jobs and displaced rural populations is clearly evident. However past experience suggests that mass emigration of Argentines to the Northern Hemisphere is unlikely. 55. Today small island states like those of the Caribbean, with 16 percent of their land area classified as low-elevation coastal zones, are at tremendous risk of climatic events.30 The IPCC projects that by midcentury these small islands will see: a) rising sea levels that exacerbate storm surges, erosion and other coastal hazards and threaten settlements, facilities and vital infrastructure, b) erosion of beaches and coral bleaching, c) potable water supplies dropping to inadequate levels during periods of low-rainfall, d) more invasions of non-native species, and e) changing frequency and intensity of extreme weather with adverse impacts on humans and other species. Hurricane Mitch forced many thousands of migrants to flee the Caribbean basin for refuge in 1998; many of them are still the United States. If environmental devastation ruins the tropical tourist industry, Caribbean and Central American countries will have lost one of their principal sources of employment, revenue and investment. Increased emigration is likely to follow.

56. According to the IPCC, over the next half century colder regions will experience higher agricultural and forestry yields but warmer environments will see these yields decrease due to drought, heat stress and wildfires. Insect outbreaks will be widespread. There will be less demand for heating but greater demand for cooling. Air quality in cities will decline and heat-related deaths may increase, especially among vulnerable populations with inadequate housing – conditions most prevalent in tropical areas. By mid-century many areas will experience heavy, increased precipitation that damages crops. Soils will become waterlogged and eroded to the point that they are no longer cultivable. Flooding will cause loss of property and disrupt settlements, commerce, transportation and urban and rural infrastructures. Contamination of ground water is likely to cause water scarcity. Those in the weakest economic position, especially in low-latitude, less developed areas, will be most vulnerable. In such regions, emigration may be the only rational response. 57. A second study recently published by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 31 (NOAA) assesses the longer term impacts of increased carbon dioxide emissions on world ecosystems. The international panel of scientists authoring this report finds that the increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide during the 21st century will irreversibly alter regional patterns of rainfall and ―lock in‖ the course of rising sea levels worldwide for the next thousand years. Well before 2035, subtropical areas (including southern regions of South America and the United States) are expected to experience Dust Bowl-like conditions due to dramatic drops in precipitation. 58. Sea levels will continue to rise, irrespective of melting polar and glacial ice. The risks are sobering, given that human populations tend to concentrate in and around coastal zones. In Latin America more than 28 million residents, i.e., six percent of the region’s population and nearly seven percent of its urban population, currently reside in low-elevation coastal zones. So too do 25 million residents of North America. Fully 55 percent of those living in Guyana and 88 percent of all Bahamians now live in lowelevation coastal zones. These populations will experience massive weather events, even if their land remains above sea level. As nature forces residents of the Caribbean basin and coastal Latin America to settle elsewhere, the United States will be coping with its own problems of population displacement. Under such circumstances, increased immigration could well exacerbate the challenges outlined previously.

Jared Diamond: Guns, Germs, and Steel, 1999.

Three separate rates pertain in different zones, ranging from 51.95 pesos to 54.80 pesos per day. At February 2009 exchange rates this is the equivalent of U.S. $3.65 to $3.86 per day.

This is the minimum wage for the highest paid sector, business and services, as agreed by El Salvador’s Minimum Wage National Council, effective January 1st, 2009.

The Federal minimum of $6.55 per hour will increase to $7.25 in July 2009. Twenty-six States and the District of Colombia have higher minimums than the U.S. rate, some in excess of $8.00 per hour.

Edward W. Fernandez & J. Gregory Robinson: Illustrative Ranges of the Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants by State, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division, October 1994. Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker: Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2007, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, September 2008 and

Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Trends in Unauthorized Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now Legal Inflow, Pew Hispanic Center, October 2, 2008.

Trails

Ruth Ellen Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, Congressional Research Service, 2005.

UN Population Division, International Migration Report: 2002.

Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Trends in Unauthorized Immigration, October 2, 2008.

Rakesh Kochhar: Latino Workers in the Ongoing Recession: 2007 to 2008, Pew Hispanic Center, December 15, 2008..

Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn: U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050, Pew Research Center, February 11, 2008.

Rick Fry: One in Five and Growing Fast: A Profile of Hispanic Public School Students, Pew Research Center Publications, August 6, 2008.

Prachi Mishra: Emigration and Brain Drain: Evidence from the Caribbean, International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 2006.

Jeanne Batalova and Michael Fix: Uneven Progress: The Employment Pathways of Skilled Immigrant in the United States, October 2008.

Pew Hispanic Center, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born in the United States, 2006, table 24. These figures include those naturalized as well as both legal and unauthorized migrants.

Rakesh Kochhar: Sharp Decline in Income for Non-Citizen Immigrant Households, 2006-2007,Pew Hispanic Center, October 2, 2008.

Mark Hugo Lopez and Michael T Light: A Rising Share: Hispanics and Federal Crime Pew Hispanic Center, February 18, 2009.

Manuel Orozco: Remittances, the Rural Sector, and Policy Options in Latin America, Migration Policy Institute, June 1, 2003.

Inter-American Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund: Development Impact of Remittances, 2007.

Inter-American Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund: The Changing Pattern of Remittances: 2008 Survey of Remittances from the United States to Latin America, April, 2008.

Inter-American Development Bank: Estimates of 2008 Remittance Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean, at: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1662094

Mark Hugo Lopez, Gretchen Livingston, and Rakesh Kochhar,: Hispanics and the Economic Downturn: Housing Woes an Remittance Cuts, Pew Hispanic Center, January 8, 2009.

Due to Congressional opposition, subsequently free trade agreements have not included temporary entry provisions for professional mobility.

Sending Money Home:

Leveraging the

Michael E. Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel: Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight, the Urban Institute May 1994. 25 Dual citizenship is not encouraged as a matter of U.S. policy because of the problems it may cause. 26

Marti Dinerstein, Fellow, Center for Immigration Studies: ―The Issuance, Acceptance and Reliability of Consular Identification Cards,‖ Testimony prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, June 19, 2003.

According to the Journal of the American Medical Association, ―Trends in Tuberculosis Incidence—United States, 2006,‖ :―In 2006, the TB rate among foreign-born persons in the United States was 9.5 times that of U.S.born persons. … The slowing of the decline in the overall national TB rate and the inability to effectively address persistent disparities in TB rates between U.S.-born and foreign-born persons …threaten progress toward the goal of eliminating TB in the United States.‖ JAMA 2007.

International Panel on Climate Change: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policy Makers, November 2007.

Joshua Partlow: ―Pride of Argentina Falls on Hard Times: Washington Post, Feb. 9, 2009.

Drought Kills off Cattle by Thousands,‖ The

Gordon McGranahan, Deborah Balk and Bridget Anderson: ―Low Coastal Zone Settlements,‖ Tiempo, August 2006. ―Low-elevation coastal zones‖ are defined as contiguous land areas up to 100 kilometers from the coast that have elevations of ten meters or less .

Susan Solomon, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Reto Knutti, and Pierre Friedlingstein: ―Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions,‖ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, January 2009.