Mapping the real routes of trade in fake goods

Page 1

Mapping the real routes of trade in fake goods


Contents

Preface

Preface 1 Executive summary 2 The key producers and transit points for fake goods 4 Main producers and transit points of fakes shipped to the EU, 2011-2013 6 Foodstuff 8 Pharmaceuticals 12 Perfumery and cosmetics 16 Leather articles and handbags 20 Clothing and fabrics 24 28 Footwear Jewellery 32 Electronics and electrical equipment 36 Optical, photographic and medical equipment 40 Toys, games and sports equipment 44

Globalisation, trade facilitation, and the rising economic importance of intellectual property are drivers of economic growth. However, they have also created new opportunities for criminal networks to expand the scope and scale of their operations, free-riding on intellectual property and polluting trade routes with counterfeit goods. The consequences for the economy are serious. Trade in counterfeit goods not only damages economic growth but also undermines good governance, the rule of law and citizens’ trust in government, and can ultimately threaten political stability. In some cases, the fakes can also have serious health, safety and environmental implications. Precise information about the routes of trade in counterfeit goods is essential for tailoring effective governance responses to this scourge. The complexity of the routes of trade in fakes can be a formidable obstacle for enforcement authorities.

We are very pleased that our two institutions were able to work together to analyse a unique set of global customs seizure data to chart the routes of trade in fake goods. We are also grateful to the World Customs Organization, the European Commission’s DirectorateGeneral for Taxation and Customs Union, and the United States Department of Homeland Security for providing excellent data on customs seizures of IP-infringing products. We are confident that this research will make a major contribution to the understanding of trade in counterfeit and pirated goods. We trust that it will help governments develop targeted policy responses and strengthen governance frameworks to tackle this phenomenon.

António Campinos Executive Director, EUIPO

Rolf Alter Director, OECD/GOV

PREFACE . 1


Executive summary Trade in counterfeit and pirated goods is a worldwide phenomenon that is growing in scope and magnitude. Globalisation, trade facilitation, and the rising economic importance of intellectual property have been fuelling economic growth on the one hand, while on the other opening up new opportunities for criminal networks to expand the scope and scale of their operations, with serious negative consequences for the economy and society. Trade in counterfeit pirated goods also undermines good governance, the rule of law and citizens’ trust in government, and can ultimately threaten political stability. Parties that engage in the trade of counterfeit and pirated products tend to ship infringing products via complex routes, with many intermediary points. The transit points are used to i) facilitate falsification of documents in ways that camouflage the original point of departure, ii) establish distribution centres for counterfeit and pirated goods, and iii) repackage or re-label goods. In addition, while imports of counterfeit goods are, in most cases, targeted by local enforcement authorities, goods in transit are often not within their scope, which means they are less likely to be intercepted.

2 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

This study assesses the complex routes associated with the global trade in counterfeit and pirated goods. It is important to note that higher reported shares of custom seizures, as well as higher reported estimates for being a source of counterfeited products (i.e. the GTRIC-e scores), do not necessarily suggest that an economy is a significant producer of counterfeits. The analysis in this study uses a set of statistical filters to go further in clarifying the role of important provenance countries. It identifies key producing economies and key transit points for ten main sectors that are particularly vulnerable to counterfeiting. These sectors span a wide range of IP-intense, tradable goods, including fast-moving-consumer goods such as foodstuff or cosmetics, to business-to-business products, such as spare parts and computer chips. The combined trade of fakes in these sectors account for USD 284 billion in 2013 (EUR 208 billion in 2013), more than half of total estimated trade in fake goods. In the analysis, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”) emerges as the top producer of counterfeit goods in nine out of ten analysed categories. In addition, several Asian economies, including India, Thailand, Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan and Viet Nam are important producers in many sectors, although their role is much less significant than China’s. Turkey appears to be an important producer in some

sectors – such as leather goods, foodstuff and cosmetics – which are sent by road to the EU.

fewer than ten items accounted for about 43% of all shipments, on average.

The data identifies several important transit points for trade in counterfeits, including Hong Kong (China), the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, which are handling trade in counterfeit goods in all the analysed product categories. Fake goods arrive in large quantities in containers and are sent further in small parcels by post or courier services.

This analysis can inform policy discussions among individual governments or on a regional or global level that aim to prevent, reduce or deter trade in counterfeit and pirated goods. It can help in designing more tailored policy responses to strengthen governance frameworks aiming to tackle this risk. The report calls for more indepth analysis for the development of efficient enforcement and governance frameworks in three areas:

In addition, there are some important regional transit points. For example several Middle Eastern economies (e.g. the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Yemen) are important transit points for sending fake goods to Africa. Four transit points – Albania, Egypt, Morocco and Ukraine – are of particular significance for redistributing fakes destined for the EU. Finally, Panama is an important transit point for fakes en route to the United States.

l

the role of free trade zones in transhipments

l

the detection problem posed by small shipments

l

the economic features of provenance economies, including the quantitative relationship between the intensities of counterfeiting and indices of free trade, quality of governance, and public sector integrity.

Finally, the data show that small shipments and parcels tend to dominate numerous trade routes, reflecting the shrinking costs of postal and courier shipments and the increasing importance of Internet and e-commerce in international trade. Shipments with EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 3


The key producers and transit points for fake goods

$461bn

total import value of counterfeit & pirated goods in 2013 Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan

Albania Tunisa Morocco

Mexico HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Belize Panama

Turkey Egypt

Nigeria

China

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

4 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

$121bn Electronics & electrical equipment $41bn Jewellery $13bn Footwear

Mongolia

$29bn Optical, photographic & medical equipment $12bn Foodstuff

$10bn Toys

$9bn Leather products

$28bn Clothing & textile fabrics

$16bn Pharma

$5bn Perfumery

Kuwait

Iran Hong Kong (China) Pakistan United Macau (China) Arab Bangladesh Emirates Philipines Yemen India Thailand Cambodia Malaysia Kenya Singapore

Saudi Arabia

Ethiopia

Indonesia Paraguay

Values of trade in fakes in ten of the top product categories

63%

of all seized fakes were shipped by postal & express services. Growing challenge for law enforcement!

Transportation modes by value of seizures 73% Sea

8% Postal & express service

1% Rail

11% Air

7% Road MAIN PRODUCERS AND TRANSIT POINTS FOR FAKE GOODS . 5


Main producers and transit points of fakes shipped to the EU, 2011-2013

Morocco

Tunisia Senegal

HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Mongolia

Turkey

Nigeria

Saudi Arabia

China United Arab Emirates

Pakistan India Thailand

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

Singapore

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

€21bn Electronics & electrical equipment

€2.6bn Toys

Armenia

Lebanon Iran Kuwait Egypt

total import value of counterfeit & pirated goods in 2013

Values of trade in fakes in ten of the top product categories

€6bn Optical, photographic & medical equipment

Ukraine Albania

€85bn

Hong Kong (China) Macau (China) Vietnam Malaysia

Philipines

67.5%

of all fakes seized in the EU were shipped by postal & express services. Growing challenge for law enforcement!

€2.3bn Foodstuff

€5bn Clothing & textile fabrics €2bn Leather products

€1.8bn Jewelery

€5bn Pharmaceuticals

€4bn Footwear

€0.6bn Perfumery

Transportation modes by value of seizures 61% Sea

18% Postal & express service

13% Air

8% Road

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

6 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

MAIN PRODUCERS AND TRANSIT POINTS OF FAKES SHIPPED TO THE EU, 2011-2013 . 7


Globally, China, India and several other smaller Asian economies (Pakistan, Indonesia, Viet Nam and Thailand) are the main producers of counterfeit foodstuff. They export directly to the US, the EU, Japan, Western Africa (Benin, Senegal, Nigeria), Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria) and Yemen; or indirectly, through Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Yemen, to other Gulf region economies.

FOODSTUFF

8 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

Regionally, Turkey is a relatively significant producer of counterfeit food products, and exports them to the EU countries and to Serbia, Yemen, or (indirectly) to Saudi Arabia. Ethiopia and Kenya are also identified as producers of fake food products for export to Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Most counterfeit foodstuff is shipped in large quantity shipments, either in containers by sea or by air. FOODSTUFF . 9


The key trade routes for fake foodstuff

1.2%

the total share of fakes in global trade in food products

Transportation methods for counterfeit foodstuff (as a percentage of total seizures) 56% Air

2% Rail

37% Sea

Turkey Iran

Egypt

United Arab Emirates

Saudi Arabia

HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Ethiopia

Pakistan

China

Thailand Indonesia

Size of shipments

Some of the most common seizures of food products Cookies & Sweets

Bananas

Drinks

Sweets

Tea & Coffee

6-10 items 0.4%

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

>10 items 99%

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

1% Mail

Vietnam

Yemen Kenya

4% Road

India

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

10 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

$12bn

the global trade value of fake foodstuff

2-5 items 1% 1 item 0.2% FOODSTUFF . 11


PHARMACEUTICALS

12 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

India and China are the largest identified producers of counterfeit pharmaceuticals. They are shipped all around the globe, with a special focus on African economies, Europe and the US. In addition, Singapore is also indicated as a potential producer of fake pharmaceuticals. Hong Kong (China) is one of the most important transit points for counterfeit pharmaceuticals, mainly exporting them by post to the US, Europe, Japan and some South American economies in small parcels. Other relevant transit points for fake pharmaceuticals include Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. From these countries, fake pharmaceuticals are reshipped either to African economies such as Egypt or Ethiopia by air and sea, or to Europe and the US by mail. PHARMACEUTICALS . 13


The key trade routes for fake pharmaceuticals

Albania Lebanon Belize HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

3.3%

the total share of fakes in global trade in pharmaceuticals

13% Air

China

United Arab Emirates Yemen

India

1% Road

Hong Kong (China) Singapore

Size of shipments

Some of the most common seizures of pharmaceuticals HIV and Aids drugs

Cancer drugs

Medical supplies

Medical equipment

6-10 items 7%

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

82% Mail

4% Sea

Iran

>10 items 85%

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Transportation methods for counterfeit pharmaceuticals (as a percentage of total seizures)

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

14 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

$16.2bn

the global trade value of fake pharmaceuticals

2-5 items 6% 1 item 2% PHARMACEUTICALS . 15


Generally, China is the key producer of counterfeit perfumes and cosmetics preparations that are shipped throughout the globe. Counterfeit perfumes and cosmetics produced in Malaysia, Thailand, India and Singapore are generally exported to the EU, the US, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Finally, Turkey is a regional producer exporting counterfeit perfumery and cosmetics almost exclusively to the EU.

PERFUMERY AND COSMETICS

16 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

Trade routes for counterfeit perfumery and cosmetics are very complex. Hong Kong (China) is the key transit hub for the fakes produced in China, which are then exported throughout the world. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait receive counterfeit pharmaceuticals mainly from China, and re-export them notably to the EU and to Africa. Regionally, Albania is an important transit point for fake perfumes and cosmetics on the way from Turkey to the EU. Fake perfumes and cosmetics produced in China, Malaysia, Thailand, India, and Singapore are shipped to the OECD countries mostly by postal parcels. Shipments to the Middle East and African economies are carried mostly by sea or air. Lastly, counterfeit perfumery and cosmetics exported from Turkey to the EU are transported by road. PERFUMERY AND COSMETICS . 17


The key trade routes for fake perfumery and cosmetics

4.7%

the total share of fakes in global trade in perfumery and cosmetics

Transportation methods for counterfeit perfumery and cosmetics (as a percentage of total seizures) 51% Mail

28% Road

15% Sea

Belarus Albania

Ukraine China

Turkey Kuwait

HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Panama

India United Arab Emirates Thailand

6% Air

Hong Kong (China) Malaysia Singapore

Size of shipments

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

>10 items 8%

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

18 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

$5.3bn

the global trade value of fake perfumery and cosmetics

Some of the most common seizures of perfumery and cosmetics Perfumes

Cosmetics

Make up

Creams

Nail sets

6-10 items 13% 2-5 items 17% 1 item 62% PERFUMERY AND COSMETICS . 19


LEATHER ARTICLES AND HANDBAGS

20 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

China is the main producer of counterfeit leather articles and handbags. Fakes are exported across the globe either directly, or using several large trade hubs, such as Hong Kong (China) and Macau (China) and Kuwait. Other regional producers of counterfeit leather articles and handbags include Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. They export fakes directly to the EU and the US. Finally, Turkey and Tunisia are also indicated as important producers that particularly target the EU. Postal parcels were the main conveyance method for fake leather goods used by counterfeiters in producing economies and transit points to ship goods to the US and the EU. Air and sea transport were used for sending counterfeit leather articles and handbags from producing economies to transit points. LEATHER ARTICLES AND HANDBAGS . 21


The key trade routes for fake leather articles and handbags

11.5%

the total share of fakes in global trade in leather articles and handbags

Transportation methods for counterfeit leather articles and handbags (as a percentage of total seizures) 51% Mail

28% Road

15% Sea

Belarus Ukraine Morocco

Albania

Kuwait

Tunisia Egypt

HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

China

Turkey United Arab Emirates

Macau (China) Thailand Malaysia

6% Air

Hong Kong (China) Cambodia Philippines Singapore

Size of shipments

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

>10 items 33%

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

22 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

$8.6bn

the global trade value of fake leather articles and handbags

Some of the most common seizures of leather articles and handbags Handbags

Wallets

Gloves

Luggage

Belts

6-10 items 7% 2-5 items 21% 1 item 39% LEATHER ARTICLES AND HANDBAGS . 23


China is the main producer of counterfeit clothes and textile fabrics. In addition, Viet Nam, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia also appear as important producers, exporting them across the globe, either directly, or via Hong Kong (China) and Singapore. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are also important producers of counterfeit textile articles, which they ship to the EU, the US, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Finally, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco are also

CLOTHING AND FABRICS

24 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

indicated as important producing economies, mostly destined for the EU. The main transit hubs for the trade in fake clothes and fabrics include Hong Kong (China), Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Fake clothes and fabrics enter the EU and the US from producing economies and transit hubs mostly in the post. Air and sea transport are used for exporting fake clothes and fabrics from producing economies to transit points. Finally, road transport is used for trafficking fake clothes and fabrics from Middle Eastern transit economies to the EU. CLOTHING AND FABRICS . 25


The key trade routes for fake clothing and fabrics

11%

the total share of fakes in global trade in clothing and fabrics

Transportation methods for counterfeit clothing and fabrics (as a percentage of total seizures) 46% Mail

33% Air

15% Road

Ukraine China

Azerbaijan Morocco

HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Honduras Panama

Turkey

United Arab Emirates

India

6% Sea

Hong Kong (China) Vietnam

Thailand Singapore

Peru

Size of shipments

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

>10 items 30%

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

26 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

$27.7bn

the global trade value of fake clothing and fabrics

Some of the most common seizures of clothing and fabrics Shirts

Suits

Coats

Blouses

Fabric

6-10 items 12% 2-5 items 27% 1 item 31% CLOTHING AND FABRICS . 27


China is the main producer of counterfeit footwear, followed by the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam and Malaysia. Fake footwear is shipped from these economies directly to the EU, the US, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Australia, Japan, Korea and numerous economies located throughout the African and the South American continents. They are also shipped to some trade hubs, such as Hong Kong (China) and Singapore. In addition India and Pakistan also appear to be important producers of counterfeit footwear, which is shipped directly to the EU, the US, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Finally, Turkey and Morocco are also indicated as important producers of fake footwear, targeting the EU. Hong Kong (China), Singapore and the United Arab Emirates are the main global transit points. Regionally, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Morocco are

FOOTWEAR

28 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

important transit points for counterfeit footwear shipped to the EU, while Panama is an important transit point for fake footwear en route to the US. Most counterfeit footwear is shipped by mail in small consignments of up to five items. FOOTWEAR . 29


The key trade routes for fake footwear

10.5%

the total share of fakes in global trade in footwear

Armenia Morocco Honduras HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Senegal

United Arab Emirates

Panama

Hong Kong (China) Thailand Vietnam Malaysia Philippines Singapore

10% Air

2% Sea

Size of shipments

Some of the most common seizures of footwear Trainers

Dress shoes

Boots

Flat shoes

Sandals

6-10 items 4%

Undetermined

Transits

85% Mail

China

>10 items 8% Producers

3% Road

Azerbaijan Iran Turkey

Peru

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Transportation methods for counterfeit footwear (as a percentage of total seizures)

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

30 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

$13.3bn

the global trade value of fake footwear

2-5 items 24% 1 item 64% FOOTWEAR . 31


China is the main producer of fake jewellery, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam. Counterfeit jewellery is shipped from these economies directly to Europe, the US, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and to large trade hubs: Hong Kong (China), Macau (China) and Singapore. The destination economies for the fake jewellery exported from China include Australia, Japan, Korea and numerous economies located throughout the African and the South American continents.

JEWELLERY

32 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

The main transit points for trade in counterfeit jewellery are Hong Kong (China), Macau (China) and Singapore. Other important transit points for this type of product include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Lastly, Morocco is an important transit point for fake jewellery transported to the EU. JEWELLERY . 33


The key trade routes for fake jewellery

4.8%

the total share of fakes in global trade in jewellery

Transportation methods for counterfeit jewellery (as a percentage of total seizures) 61% Mail

6% Sea 28% Air

Ukraine China Morocco

Turkey Saudi Arabia

HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Armenia United Arab Emirates

Panama

Macau (China)

5%

Hong Kong (China) Vietnam

Thailand Malaysia

Singapore Indonesia

Size of shipments

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Precious stones

Precious metal

Gold

Pearls

Fashion jewellery

6-10 items 9%

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

>10 items 48%

Some of the most common seizures of jewellery

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

34 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

$40.9bn

the global trade value of fake jewellery

2-5 items 23% 1 item 20% JEWELLERY . 35


China is the main producer of counterfeit electronics and electrical equipment, which it exports throughout the globe. Other minor producers include Thailand, Korea, India and Singapore. Mexico is a regional producer of

ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

36 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

fake electronic equipment targeting the US market. Hong Kong (China) is the largest transit point for counterfeit electronics and electrical equipment produced in China and Thailand and re-exported throughout the globe. The United Arab Emirates is also a central transit point for re-exports to Africa through large containers by sea, but also by road to other Middle East economies and by mail and air to the EU. Regionally, Egypt and Turkey are transit points for fake electronics being shipped to the EU. Belize, Guatemala and Panama are key transit points for counterfeit electronic and electrical goods targeting the US. Parcels were mostly used by counterfeiters located in producing economies and in Hong Kong (China) to reach OECD countries. Air and sea transport were used for trade flows of counterfeit electronics and electrical products transported from producing economies to transit points, or from some transit points to the EU. ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT . 37


The key trade routes for fake electronics and electrical equipment

China

Azerbaijan

Mexico HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Egypt

Belize Panama

Nigeria

United Arab Emirates

India Thailand

5.3%

the total share of fakes in global trade in electronics and electrical equipment

Transits

Producers

Undetermined

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

38 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

25% Air

3% Road

Hong Kong (China) Cambodia

Size of shipments >10 items 48%

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

66% Mail

6% Sea

Korea

Singapore

$121bn

Transportation methods for counterfeit electronics and electrical equipment (as a percentage of total seizures)

the global trade value of fake electronics and electrical equipment

Some of the most common seizures of electronics and electrical equipment Mobile phones

Headphones

Batteries

Speakers

Microphones

6-10 items 7% 2-5 items 15% 1 item 30% ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT . 39


OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

40 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

China is the key producer of fake optical, photographic and medical equipment. Several East Asian economies – Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand and Viet Nam – also appear to be significant producers. Turkey produces counterfeit optical and photographic equipment targeted exclusively at the EU and Saudi Arabia. Large Asian trade hubs – Hong Kong (China) and Singapore – are the main transit points for exporting counterfeit optical, photographic and medical equipment worldwide, while Morocco, Algeria, Albania and Mongolia are identified as transit points for fake sunglasses, optical products and medical equipment en route to the EU. Uruguay and the Dominican Republic appear to be important transit points for counterfeiters located in China and Hong Kong (China) to the US. The lion’s share of shipments of counterfeit sunglasses, photographic apparatus, and medical equipment is sent by mail and express services. OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT . 41


The key trade routes for fake optical, photographic and medical equipment

5.2%

the total share of fakes in global trade in optical, photographic and medical equipment

Transportation methods for counterfeit optical, photographic and medical equipment (as a percentage of total seizures) 77% Mail

4% Road

16% Air

Mongolia China

Turkey Morocco Dominican Republic

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

Pakistan

Bangladesh

Singapore

42 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

Size of shipments >10 items 37%

Uruguay

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

3% Sea

Hong Kong (China) Cambodia Thailand

HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Kuwait

$29.2bn

the global trade value of fake optical, photographic and medical equipment

Some of the most common seizures of optical, photographic and medical equipment Glasses

Microscopes

Contact lenses

Telescopes

Bulbs

6-10 items 10% 2-5 items 24% 1 item 29% OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT . 43


China is the main producing economy of fake toys, games and sports equipment.It produces and exports them throughout the world, using a significant number of transit points, such as Hong Kong (China), Singapore and Macau (China). Other producing economies include India and Pakistan. Regionally, Turkey and Morocco are producers shipping to the EU; Mexico is

TOYS, GAMES AND SPORTS EQUIPMENT

44 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

also identified as a potential producer targeting the US. Apart from Hong Kong (China), Singapore and Macau (China), there are several other transit points for trade in fake toys, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. They receive the fakes direct from China, India, and Pakistan, and indirectly from Hong Kong (China), and re-export them to the EU, the US, and North and Central Africa. On a regional scale, Morocco, Lebanon, and Armenia also appear as important transit points for the fake toys, games and sports equipment en route from China, Hong Kong (China) and Turkey to Europe. Finally, Uruguay and Paraguay are transit points for products made in China and Hong Kong (China) targeted to the US market. TOYS, GAMES AND SPORTS EQUIPMENT . 45


The key trade routes for fake toys, games and sports equipment

11%

the total share of fakes in global trade in toys, games and sports equipment

Turkey Morocco Saudi Arabia

Mexico HIGH INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

Armenia Bahrain United Arab Emirates

Ecuador

India

Macau (China)

Undetermined

Transits

Producers

Uruguay

The probability for producing fakes is based on the average GTRIC scores for the analysed economy. For more details on the GTRIC index see the OECD/EUIPO report.

46 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

30% Sea

16% Air

12% Road

0.5% Rail

Hong Kong (China)

Paraguay

LOW INTENSITY of producing or transiting fakes

42% Mail

China

Singapore

Size of shipments >10 items 41%

$9.7bn

Transportation methods for counterfeit toys, games and sports equipment (as a percentage of total seizures)

the global trade value of fake toys, games and sports equipment

Some of the most common seizures of toys, games and sports equipment Balls

Games consoles

Robots and dolls

Skateboards

Plastic toys

6-10 items 7% 2-5 items 15% 1 item 37% TOYS, GAMES AND SPORTS EQUIPMENT . 47


Further reading THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods MAPPING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

2017 Situation Report on Counterfeiting and Piracy in the European Union A joint project between Europol and the European Union Intellectual Property Office

The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 35 democracies work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.

Managed by the EUIPO, THE EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON INFRINGEMENTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS is a network of experts and specialist stakeholders. The Observatory’s objectives are to: l

Provide evidence-based contributions and data to enable EU policymakers to shape effective IP enforcement policies and to support innovation and creativity;

l

Provide data, tools and databases to support the fight against IP infringement;

l

Provide knowledge and learning programmes for IP and enforcement authorities as well as for businesses and IP practitioners;

l

Develop initiatives to help innovators, creators and businesses (especially SMEs) protect their IP rights;

l

Design campaigns to raise awareness of the value of IP and the negative consequences of IP infringement.

www.oecd.org

June 2017

Mapping the Real Routes of Trade in Fake Goods

48 . MAPPING THE REAL ROUTES OF TRADE IN FAKE GOODS

Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact

2017 Situation Report on Counterfeiting and Piracy in the European Union

The OECD Task Force on Countering Illicit Trade (TF-CIT) convenes governments and a wide range of stakeholders to map and analyse the underlying dynamics of illicit trade. Its evidence-based research and advanced analytics draw attention to the convergence of criminal networks that operate illicit trade, from counterfeits to narcotics, from excise goods to the trafficking of persons and wildlife. The goal of the TFCIT is to foster public policies, international cooperation and public private partnerships that deter and reduce illicit markets. http://oe.cd/tfcit

http://euipo.europa.eu For other reports: http://euipo.europa.eu


http://oe.cd/routes


Turn static files into dynamic content formats.

Create a flipbook
Issuu converts static files into: digital portfolios, online yearbooks, online catalogs, digital photo albums and more. Sign up and create your flipbook.