Edition Fifty One — June 2016
Morgan Stanley's Oil Prices Forecast is Wrong; Oil is Heading to $50 Not a single FDP so far Returning To Market Balance: How High Must Prices Be To Save The Oil Industry?
#RGUTOPDOG OIL & GAS MANAGEMENT, LAW AND ACCOUNTING courses designed to take your career to the next level – Full time, Part time and online. Apply now for September 2016!
ABERDEEN BUSINESS SCHOOL www.RGU.ac.uk/TOPDOG
Morgan Stanley's Oil Prices Forecast is Wrong; Oil is Heading to $50 Written by Alahdal A. Hussein from Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) The Wall Street Journal has conducted a survey in April 2016 to get an overview of the oil prices direction in the next few quarters as seen by 13 investment banks. And despite the current rally in oil prices, the survey shows that analysts are doubting the rally and apparently many of them are still in the pessimism state. According to the survey, investment banks' forecasts for oil prices have not changed much from a similar survey conducted by The Wall Street Journal in March 2016. The survey shows that the banks see Brent crude and West Texas Intermediate averaging $41 and $39 a barrel this year respectively. That represents a change of only $1 up from March's survey for Brent crude and no-change from March's survey for West Texas Intermediate. While few investment banks' forecasts fall in a range close to the current direction of the oil prices, a notable forecast that points to a different direction is coming Morgan Stanley. The reputable investment bank along with other investment banks such as ING and BNP see oil prices falling in the third quarter of 2016. Although the analysts at Morgan Stanley have predicted the fall of oil prices to $20s earlier this year, they are now wrong in their forecast and here is why. 1- Morgan Stanley's forecast ignores the change in fundamentals Some analysts including those at Morgan Stanley believe that the current rally in oil prices could mimic last year's when Brent crude increased about $20 a barrel between January and May before falling later in the year. They are also worried about the current U.S. stockpiles and the potential for increased oil output from Iran. Although these threats are real, the analysts seem to be ignoring the fact that
circumstances have changed. Last year when oil prices jumped about $20 a barrel between January and May, the oil market downturn was just at its beginning. According to the EIA, the global oil over-supply (supply minus demand ) was growing at that time where it increased from about 2 million barrel per day in January 2015 to about 2.3 million barrel per day in May 2015 before reaching its highest level at 2.51 million barrel in August 2015. Crude oil supply was increasing dramatically while demand was lagging. U.S. crude oil production was also growing during that time where it increased from about 9.15 million barrel a day in January to about 9.4 million barrel a day in May before hitting its highest level at 9.6 million barrel a day in July 2015. It is obvious that during the January-to-May 2015 rally, all sentiments were pointing toward a further fall in oil prices and that is exactly what happened from May 2015 onward. But this year, things are totally different than they were in 2015, from fundamentals to oil market cycle emotions. First of all, unlike the January-to-May 2015 rally, U.S. crude oil output is dwindling at an accelerating decline rate. The U.S. crude oil production has fallen from 9.2 million barrel a day in January 2016 to 8.9 million barrel a day in April 2016. U.S. rig count is also experiencing a sharp and continuous decline since the beginning of 2016. According to Baker Hughes, U.S. Rig Count is down 485 rigs from last year at 905, and the decline in rig count is still intensifying. In addition to that, the global over-supply is easing with supply decreasing and demand increasing. According to IEA's Oil Market Report, global oil supplies fell from about 97.2 million barrel a day in the 4th quarter of 2015 to about 96.2 million barrel per day in the 1st quarter of 2016. Demand has also improved since last year where the global demand increased from 93.6 million barrel a day in the 1st quarter of 2015 to about 94.8 million barrel a day in the 1st quarter of 2016. Currently, the oil market fundamentals are totally different from those during the January-to-May 2015 rally, yet analysts chose to ignore these changes and focus on events such as the increase of Iran's oil output which time has proven it has little to no effect on the oil market. 2- Morgan Stanley's forecast is not consistent with the market cycle emotions Back in January 2016, when analysts at Morgan Stanley and other investment banks predicted oil prices to fall to $20 a barrel, they did it at the right time. Even though oil prices didn't fall to the level they have predicted, it fell below $30 a barrel. At that
time, the oil market was at its worst state, pessimism was ruling everything. And when the analysts predicted prices to fall to $20 a barrel and below, what they did was fueling the pessimism and pressuring oil prices to fall. Unfortunately, they succeeded in dragging oil prices down only because they played with the right emotion in the right direction at the right time. But that is not the case now with their current pessimistic forecast. They are playing with the wrong emotion in the wrong direction at the wrong time. Right now, the oil market cycle emotion is optimism and events that have taken place in the oil market during the last few weeks support this fact. For instance, despite the failure of Doha's meeting, and the fact that Iran is ramping up its oil output, oil prices were able to sustain their gains and continued increasing. In fact, just a few days after the failure of Doha's meeting, oil prices continued their gains, breaking out of a trading band. This shows the high level of optimism the oil market is in right now which some analysts underestimate its ability to drive prices up. It should be clear by now that the direction of the oil market at this moment is different from that predicted by Morgan Stanley's analysts and other investment banks which suggest that oil prices would fall again in the coming months. Judging by the improvement in oil market fundamentals and the current high level of optimism in the market, oil prices will continue its rally and it could reach to $50 a barrel in the coming weeks. It is expected that oil prices will remain in a range between $40 to $60 per barrel till the end of 2016. Oil traders at this moment are very optimistic and they are looking for a hope in anything whether it is the weakening U.S. dollar or the declining U.S. crude oil output and rig count. Hope and optimism is required to get the market out of this period and sustain oil prices at the current level or a little bit higher till market fundamentals improvement intensifies. Once the oil market fundamentals play its role completely, it will take charge of balancing the market and driving oil prices.
View more quality content from Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE)
A PERFECT FIT Seismic + Non-Seismic
NEOS Adds Seismic Imaging to Its Multi-Physics Toolkit Following our recent acquisition, some of the best and brightest minds in seismic imaging have joined the NEOS team. Continuing to do what they do best, the NEOS Seismic Imaging Group will deliver stand-alone processing and imaging services, including advanced onshore depth imaging in some of the most challenging regions in the world. But it doesn’t stop there. Our strengths in multi-physics imaging align perfectly and we will be teaming up to change the way the industry explores. Incorporating seismic attributes into our proprietary predictive analytics methods and undertaking multi-physics inversions is just the beginning. Together we offer a truly complete portfolio of subsurface imaging solutions to our clients.
Seismic + Non-Seismic. A powerful combination.
neosgeo.com
Returning To Market Balance: How High Must Prices Be To Save The Oil Industry? Written by Art Berman from The Petroleum Truth Report The global oil market is returning to balance based on the latest data from the EIA. That should mean higher oil prices but how high must prices be to save the industry? Data suggests that oil producers need prices in the $70-80 range to survive. That is unlikely in the next year or so. Without more timely price relief, the future looks grim for an industry on life support. EIA Revises Consumption Upward Major EIA revisions to world oil consumption* data provide a new perspective on oilmarket balance. The world was over-supplied by only 570 kbpd of liquids in April compared to EIA's earlier estimate for March of 1,450 kbpd; that March estimate has now been revised downward to 970 kbpd (Figure 1). February's over-supply has been revised downward from 1,180 to 240 kbpd. These revisions indicate that oil markets are much closer to balance than previously thought.
Figure 1. EIA world liquids market balance (supply minus consumption). Source: EIA and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc. EIA adjusted world consumption growth for 2016 upward to 1.4 mmbpd. Its estimate for 2017 is now a very strong 1.54 mmbpd (Figure 2).
Figure 2. EIA annual consumption growth and forecast. Source: EIA and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc. IEA's demand growth estimate for 2015 is 1.8 mmbpd but the agency maintains its 1.2 mmbpd estimate for 2016 based on concerns about global economic growth.It is easy to be skeptical about these new revelations but reports by both groups have been pointing toward improving market balance for some time. Oil Prices and Market Balance Oil markets are never in balance. Producers always misjudge demand and either over-shoot or under-shoot with supply. Balance is simply a zero-crossing from one state of disequilibrium to the next, from surplus to deficit and back again. Since 2003, the oil market has only been within 0.25 mmbpd of balance 16% of the time. The average price (2016 dollars) for that near-market balance rate was $82 per barrel (Figure 3).
Figure 3. World liquids market balance (supply minus consumption), 2003-2016. Source: EIA and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc. But that was essentially the average oil price of $78 per barrel for the entire period (Figure 4).
Figure 4. CPI-adjusted WTI prices, 2003-2016. Source: EIA and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc. In fact, market balance occurred in every monthly average oil-price bin in Figure 5 except $130 per barrel. Although prices above $90 per barrel represent 37% of nearmarket balance prices from 2003 to 2016, oil prices also averaged more than $90 per barrel 36% of the time during that 15-year period.
Figure 5. Brent oil price histogram at plus-or-minus 0.25 million barrels per day of world liquids production. Source: EIA & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
In other words, market balance merely reflects whatever price the market deems necessary to maintain supply at the time. There is no clear causal relationship between market balance and specific higher or lower oil prices. Balance merely represents the midpoint between prices on either side of the disequilibrium states that it demarcates. Our recent memory is of $90-100 per barrel prices so we think that was normal. When those prices prevailed in 2007-2008 and in 2010-2014, the disequilibrium state of the market was largely deficit. Moving toward market balance and being on the deficit side of market balance are hardly the same thing. The Price Producers Need Lower-cost oil producers of the world (Kuwait through Deepwater in Figure 6) need $50-80 per barrel and an average price of $65 per barrel to break even. Probably $70-80 is a minimum price range for near-term survival of more efficient producers allowing that some will still lose money at those prices.
Figure 6. Projected 2016 break-even oil prices for OPEC and unconventional plays. Source: IMF, Rystad Energy, Suncor, Cenovus, COS & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Existing Canadian oil sands projects, and Bakken and Eagle Ford Shale core areas are among the very lowest-cost major plays in the world. For all of the OPEC rhetoric about the high cost of unconventional oil, few OPEC countries are competitive with unconventional plays when OPEC fiscal budgetary costs are included.
Tight Oil Companies On Life Support Despite this relatively favorable rating, most unconventional producers are on life support at current oil prices. All of the tight oil-weighted companies that I follow had negative cash flow in the first quarter of 2016 except EP Energy and Occidental Petroleum (Figure 7). Nine companies increased their capex-to-cash flow ratios compared with full-year 2015 results and six increased that ratio by more than 2.5 times.
Figure 7. First quarter 2016 and full-year 2015 tight oil E&P company capital expenditure-to-cash flow ratios. Source: Google Finance and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc. On average in 2016, companies spent $1.90 more in capex than they earned while in 2015, they spent $0.60 more than they earned. The percent of negative cash flow
has increased more than three-fold so far in 2016 compared with 2015. The good news is that about half of the companies (Apache, EOG, Laredo, Continental, Statoil, and Diamondback) only increased negative cash flow slightly despite falling revenues. The bad news is that the rest (Marathon, Whiting, Pioneer, Murphy, ConocoPhillips and Newfield) did not. The debt side of first quarter earnings is far more disturbing. The average debt-tocash flow ratio for tight oil companies increased more than 3-fold to 10, up from 3 in 2015 (Figure 8).
Figure 8. First quarter 2016 and full-year 2015 tight oil company debt-to-cash flow ratios. Cash flow was annualized based on first quarter data. Source: Google Finance and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc. Debt-to-cash flow is a critical determinant of risk from a bank's perspective because it measures how many years it would take to pay off debt if 100% of cash from operations were used for this purpose. This means that it would take these companies an average of 10 years to pay down their total debt using all cash from operating activities. The energy industry average from 1992-2012 was 1.53 and 2.0 was a standard
threshold for banks to call loans based on debt-covenant agreements. That threshold increased in recent years to about 4 but 10 years to pay off debt is clearly beyond reasonable bank exposure risk. READ THE REST ON FORBES
View more quality content from The Petroleum Truth Report
What would happen to OPEC if it won the oil price war Written by Rudolf Huber from The Pitbull of LNG We are living in weird times. OPEC floods the market with crude oil in order to kill off shale as an industry and also to keep Iranians and Russians at bay. The cartel itself is under enormous strain as less wealthy members are in utter disarray and we might even see one of them blow up because of possible financial meltdown. And the only thing that happens is that shale producers in the US squeeze the bottle harder than anyone has dared to imagine just 2 years ago. However, this point was given plenty of coverage here. Anyone knowing me just a little bit will know that I believe in shale drillers entrepreneurial juices and that they will come back with a vengeance. Let's assume, just for a moment, that things play out very differently. Let's imagine that OPEC - after a protracted and bloody war with the rest of the world - finally prevails and shale meets an untimely end. The world goes back its pre-shale state where oil production is dominated by a cartel
and some other big producers producing oil from conventional reserves that take 5 years or more to develop. And North American energy independence just goes away like it had never been something that had disturbed our peaceful minds. I have already said in a post some years ago that easy oil is over and the shale revolution has not changed anything in this opinion of mine. I had also said that although the planet still sits on an awful lot of the black glibber, it's going to be much harder to produce. Super-deep Sea, Arctic, Sour Oil, Tar sands and Super Heavy crudes - shale would be in that group as well but this special kind is out for the sake of the argument right now. The problem is that as the world's energy needs are still massive and rising, we would pump the existing conventional reserves at even higher rates meaning that we will meet depletion of those easy fields much quicker which in turn forces us back onto the hard to find/extract/produce/process oil patch. This means rising prices which no doubt OPEC and its 'familiars' (that's a term I borrowed from the Blade trilogy) will massively enjoy. At least in the short run as it will patch over their current financial problems. But the current oil producer's problems are not shale or new extraction techniques. It's not even cheap oil and the oversupplied market. It's also not even faltering markets as we start to find out the scale of the cumulative financial worldwide Ponzi schemes and what their collapse is going to do to consumption of - anything. Their problem is their impossibly swollen state administrations, their reckless spending, their unreformed internal markets and their restive populations that have been bought off with largesse from the rulers for far too long. Loads of cash have stymied any hint of reform and reduced oil producing countries into fiefdoms of some strongman with a big wallet. Those countries had more than a decade to fall behind other nations in competitiveness, in entrepreneurialism and in social development. Those others, the consumers of oil suffered high oil prices as they bought the stuff. Oil producing nations competitiveness sucks, their nonoil products make anyone yawn, their economies are in a 'petrodollar hooked' shambles and their populations are coddled to the point where some real entrepreneurialism is always confounded with someone spending big money on big offices with no real business behind. If high oil prices come back because shale is beaten, those same countries, rulers and societies have it easy to return to their bad old ways and they will further deepen
the trench they are already sitting in. Rulers will choose the easy way and keep feeding the Crocodile that will eat them in the end and everyone will play along. There will even be plenty of economists which will restart praising the superiority of the petro-economy as opposed to the weaklings from the political west. Riches are just falling into their laps without them even trying and we consumer economies have to labor hard to get results. Clearly they are superior - we had that kind of hogwash multiple times during the high price tide. Remember the hype around the BRICS? Look again today. But even worse for them the consumer side of the oil business will redouble its efforts to find ways to wean themselves off oil as the cost (both financial and environmental) will be considered crippling which will ring in the true end of the petro-business-model as we know it in the longer run. Shale has given the oil business a shot in the arm and a new lease of life as it made oil affordable again and hence allows consuming nations to go easy on oil alternatives. That's maybe not great news for the Greenies out there but it's the best that could have happened to OPEC. They might not agree yet. And as for economic (and other) reform in producing countries - trust me, you will see the benefits of that too - in time. Rome was not built in one day and so will a new energy world take time to build. Your populations might not want to wait that long and they might even less be inclined to shoulder the pain that comes with it. Remember that they are used to the easy life the oil money has given them so far but this was a one-way road as has become clear by now. Any further down that alley will just make the crocodile bigger and it has already grown to monstrous proportions. Starting to tackle your fundamental problems now is still much easier than doing so later even if the current problems are already daunting. Imagine what it's going to be like after some more years of oil money induced standstill. It might even blow some countries up then. Shale oil is therefore maybe even the savior of your social fabric, of your continued existence as a country, of your way of life. As hard as it looks from the vantage point of an OPEC country you should thank those pesky shale drillers as they might have pulled you back from the abyss at the last moment.
Even the hardest-headed oil-aholics have come to understand by now that oils days are numbered. Shale has slowed the countdown down but nothing will stop it again.
View more quality content from The Pitbull of LNG
Saudi Arabia is planning for the postoil era, why not the United States? Written by Kurt Cobb from Resource Insights The world's largest exporter of crude oil, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, recently announced a plan for its post-oil future. If a country almost synonymous with the oil economy can see the need for such a plan, how can the rest of the world, particularly the United States, the world's largest consumer of petroleum, not see the necessity of such foresight? The kingdom's plan includes sale of part of Saudi Aramco, the world largest oil company and currently wholly-owned by the Saudi government. The company controls all oil development in Saudi Arabia. That the Saudis want to sell part of the most valuable company in the world means they have a different view about the future of oil than those who will be buying. Commentators often report that markets rise because investors are optimistic or fall because they are pessimistic. But this is complete nonsense because for every buyer there is always a seller. Each side of a trade believes in a different future for the investment being traded.
Certainly, there are many reasons for selling a minority stake in Saudi Aramco. But one of them can't be that the rulers of the kingdom have an unalloyed bullishness about Saudi capabilities and oil resources. As recently as 2007 the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) believed Saudi Arabia would be supplying the world with 16.4 million barrels per day (mbpd) of oil by 2030. (And, that was down from 23.8 mbpd projected for 2025 in a 2003 report.) In 2008 theSaudi king appeared to embrace a policy of 12.5 mbpd and no more. Since then long-term projections for Saudi production have come down with a range of 10.2 mbpd to 15.5 mbpd for 2040 (in a 2013 EIA report) depending on which of three scenarios you choose. No explicit range has been included in subsequent EIA reports. With the release of a new independent report on world oil reserves by a former BP insider, a report that suggests that conventional reserves are half what is being claimed, the issue of limits on oil production has resurfaced. (The report implies that Saudi reserves have been inflated as well.) By including Canadian tar sands and Venezuelan heavy oil, world oil reserves increase back to about 75 percent of what is typically reported. But that number makes no adjustment for the much greater difficulty and expense of getting these unconventional resources out of the ground and then turning them into something we call oil. The financial debacle taking place in the tar sands under the current lowprice regime is clear evidence that those resources cannot be sustained without high prices. The temporary glut we are experiencing now, however, does not disprove limits. It only shows that we can still have market cycles in oil just as we did in 2008 when oil fell from $147 per barrel to around $35 in six months. By 2011 oil was back above $100, where it stayed with only brief forays under that price, until the end of 2014. This period has so far given us the highest inflated-adjusted average daily prices for oil ever. For those who believe the United States does seem to have energy policies relevant to a post-oil world, I would answer that this is not the result of some grand design, but rather due to a hodge-podge of programs, many of which are conflicting. Even as the U.S. tax code continues to provide substantial subsidies for oil and natural gas production, it also provides substantial subsidies for renewable energy such as solar
and wind. But these renewables subsidies are really about producing electricity. Subsidies for liquid fuels, the kind that replace fuels from oil, have been reduced. The federal subsidy for ethanol ended in 2012. Subsidies for biodiesel and other biofuels continue. While ethanol was always really an energy carrier and not an energy source--it takes about as much energy to produce corn ethanol as it yields--biodiesel is believed to have a positive energy balance. Even so, converting the U.S. vehicle fleet to biodiesel isn't in the cards, and doing so would require so much farmland to grow the necessary oil crops that we might be able to drive, but probably not eat--an absurdity of the first order. Now granted, a post-oil society doesn't necessarily mean a no-oil society. Oil supplies may decline gradually after a future peak in production. We won't, as the critics say, 'run out.' That's just a canard meant to prevent people from understanding the serious implications, not of running out, but of having less each year. There is the option of moving to electrified transportation which I support. But most people think of this as a move toward electric cars. The entire car fleet in the United States currently takes about 14 years to turn over. But, of course, we'd only get replacement of all vehicles with electrics over this period if we started selling 100 percent electric-only vehicles now. Moreover, certain types of transport--emergency services, farm equipment and rural transport--will likely require liquid fuels for a long time to come. Because we are only very gradually increasing the number of electric-only cars available for purchase, it would likely take two to three decades for a complete transition away from oil-fueled vehicles. It would be much wiser to electrify and vastly expand public transportation, something that isn't on the policy radar in the United States. There are certainly local efforts to expand bicycle lanes and pedestrian areas to reduce dependency on motorized transportation. But those efforts can hardly be called coordinated and rapid. If we had absolute clarity on future oil supplies, we'd know how quickly we must make the transition away from oil. But we don't have anything approaching that. Instead, we have competing estimates and timelines, and--here's the important part--
we Americans have chosen to embrace the optimistic forecasts without understanding the risks because doing so takes the pressure off of us to make the necessary changes. (And, we do this in spite of the fact that supposedly ample U.S. production is now once again in decline.) The Saudi move toward a post-oil economy ought to be one of the strongest messages ever that the world is moving closer to a peak and decline in world oil production. The kingdom's actions are telling us that the world's largest crude oil exporter feels it must start today to plan and implement a post-oil economy. Will we Americans (and others who haven't yet) take the hint seriously?
View more quality content from Resource Insights
PICK A WINNER FOR THESE CHALLENGING TIMES With the industry’s current focus on cost control, it is remarkable that more and more forward-thinking oil & gas companies are stepping up to invest in Ikon Science’s revolutionary RokDoc Ji-Fi®, a new tool to build reliable seismically-driven geological models. Ji-Fi breaks the mold of traditional workflows and opens up a whole new realm of possibilities. The cost/benefit of Ji-Fi is so compelling it redefines how customers leverage data and knowledge to drive success in their exploration, development and production activities. Stay ahead of the game, and don’t wait for partners to show you the value in your assets! Find out more at
ikonscience.com/jifi
The Present And Future Of GeoPrediction
info@ikonscience.com
ikonscience.com
Cyclical Oil Prices - Is it a Necessary Condition to Balance Global Oil Supply/Demand? Written by Dr Salman Ghouri and Dr Amjad Ansari from Energy and the Economy During the past 50 years global oil demand increased from 30.8 million barrels per day (MMBD) in 1965 to 92.03 MMBD in 2014 - an increase of 61.28 MMBD. In contrast, global oil production increased by 56.87 MMBD during the same period (BP-Statistical Energy Review June 2015). That is on an average annual growth in demand and supply of 1.22 and 1.15 MMBD respectively. Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicts global oil demand to increase to 113.1 MMBD in 2035. Likewise global natural gas demand is projected to increase to 4547 BCM in 2035 as compared to 3394 BCM in 20143. In order to meet the projected demand for global oil, natural gas and other sources of energy, International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that during 2012-2035 the world would be needing cumulative investment of $48 trillion during now and 2035, consisting of around $40 trillion in energy supply and the remainder in energy efficiency. The main components of energy supply investment are the $23 trillion in fossil fuel extraction, transport and oil refining; almost $10 trillion in power generation, of which low-carbon technologies - renewables ($6 trillion) and nuclear ($1 trillion)1 - account for almost three-quarters, and a further $7 trillion in transmission and distribution. Less than half of the $40 trillion investment in energy supply goes to meet growth in demand, the larger share is required to offset declining production from existing oil and gas fields and to replace power plants and other assets that reach the end of their productive life. Compensating for output declines absorbs more than 80% of upstream oil and gas spending. The fundamental question is how and from where the oil and gas industry will generate
this level of investment year after year especially during the regime of lower oil prices? Market Fundamentals History has taught us that sustained higher oil prices negatively affect the demand, but encourages supply side (assuming other factors remain constant). The most important determinant of the level of exploration activity by international oil companies (IOCs) is the current and most recent past oil prices. The initial response of the industry to increase in oil prices may not immediately lead to an upsurge in exploration activity, but possibly a reappraisal of discoveries made in mature regions deemed uneconomic under lower price scenarios. Therefore, exploration activities in new acreage especially high-risk-high-cost basins are expected to increase after a year or two in response to higher oil prices especially if IOC's strongly view that pattern of high oil price will continue in the future. Higher oil prices improves profitability of oil and gas industry and therefore they are willing to invest in high cost unexplored basins (new frontier - deep offshore) in search of sizeable oil fields. In addition high oil prices also induces investments in energy efficiency, conservation, backstop fuel supplies from unconventional crude oil from tar/tight sands, oil shale, gas to liquid (GTL), coal to liquid (CTL)4, and other renewable sources of energy - thus reducing the pressure on oil demand in the long run. For example, recently, the sustained higher oil prices substantially encouraged shale oil/gas development, particularly in the USA, which is complemented by innovative technological advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Likewise, the world has also witnessed rapid growth in renewable sources of energy; however, it is not a threat to fossil fuels due to its marginal share in total energy mix. Persistent higher oil prices also adversely affected the global economy - slowing down oil demand. Therefore, eventually market fundamentals push the oil prices downward. The recent memories of 2007/2008 and later during 2011-2014 a period of higher oil prices followed by plunging oil prices during 2nd half of 2008 and 2014/2015 are still afresh. In contrast to higher oil price regime, lower oil price environment reduces the oil and gas industry profitability and therefore, they immediately take cost cutting measures including cutting back exploration activities. Recently, we have witnessed that it is difficult for most of the OPEC members to balance their budget given the low oil prices, and are forced to deplete sovereign funds (or foreign exchange reserves). That is, in the regime of softer oil price environment it will be even difficult for the industry to sustain current level of oil production that requires continuous investment
in work over, side-tracking, recompletion of wells in different formation, secondary recovery, and EOR and what to speak of new investment in finding and developing new reserves. A sustained lower oil price environment reduce profitability, cutting back in exploration activities, however, increases oil demand, depleting oil inventories and therefore eventually market fundamental will push the oil prices and converge to its long-term equilibrium. Implications of sustained higher or lower oil prices The sustained higher oil prices always encourage exploration activities with some lags. Figure-1 & 2 illustrate the historical relationship between US rig counts onshore/offshore against oil prices. The visual inspection clearly demonstrates that there is indeed a positive correlation between drilling activities and oil prices though drilling activities increases/decreases with some lags. To test this relationship, we have used January 1974 to March 2015 monthly data. Number of rig count onshore and offshore are separately run against the oil prices. The models were suffering from serious autocorrelation and therefore we have used autoregressive moving average (ARMA) of order one. The onshore rig count is more responsive to changes in oil prices than the offshore. As expected the initial response to changes in oil prices was marginal, however with the passage of each month the response got stronger and stronger. It took 24 months for onshore when a full impact is realized with 0.86 percent increase/decrease in exploration activities in response to one percent increase/decrease in oil prices. For offshore, the response to changes in oil prices for the first five months were negative and statistically insignificant. Thereafter the response was positive but remain statistically insignificant. It took 17 months before we got statistically significant response to changes in oil prices. However, after passage of 24 months the full impact was less than half that of onshore 0.41 percent increase/decrease in drilling activities as a result of one percent increase/decrease in oil prices. The difference between the responses to onshore and offshore drilling is due to magnitude of investment, difficulty, and time required to mobilization/demobilization of drilling rigs. Offshore requires huge capital investment as compared to onshore and therefore more time is required for planning and analyzing before making final investment decision. In case of US shale oil drilling, the response to changes in oil prices is shorter duration of about 5-6 months. The lag for example could be due to initially revisiting resources that were deem uneconomic during the regime of lower oil prices or a lag is involved in acquiring new lease/concessions, carrying out seismic surveys etc. Higher anticipated prices will
encourage exploration activities, however, it is not like turning the switch on or off rather it requires a number of years before the full impact is fully realized. In a similar manner when oil prices plunge exploration activities did not die off instantaneously due to contractual commitments, or in the middle of drilling, drilling rig is hired for a number of year(s) etc. Therefore, the trends depict a lag before the impact of increase/decrease in oil prices is fully realized. A similar trend could be witnessed when relationship between oil prices and oil production are analyzed (Figures-3 & 4). The response of oil production to changes in oil prices took longer adjustment times than the drilling rig count.
In order to have a better understanding of the relationship between oil prices and rig count and oil prices and oil production please see the Figures-5-8.
Figures-9 & 10 depicts the best fitted graph for both onshore and offshore based on best estimated model. Onshore drilling is more responsive and requires less number of months to increase/decrease in drilling activities in response to changes in oil prices. Whilst offshore drilling activities is less sensitive, erratic and requires more time to respond to changes in oil prices. Both the models fit quite well as more than 97% of the variation are explained by the given explanatory variables. The higher sustained oil prices results in acceleration of exploration activities leading to more oil and gas discoveries and enhanced production. Whilst lower oil prices over extended period of time not only constrained industry profitability but also hampered the required investment in exploration and development activities. What we have learned from history is that neither higher nor lower oil prices are sustainable over an extended period of time and world would continue to live in cyclical uncertain environment. That is, lower oil prices over extended period of time will choke the supply side but continue encouraging oil demand that in turn will gradually push the oil prices - another episode of higher oil price will be followed. Though some episodes are short lived while others could hold back for a number of months depending on global economic situation and inventories level. The cyclical movement in oil prices will ensure that neither high nor low oil prices will continue to stay forever - giving a hope of oil and gas industry to continuously progress and also allows to develop new-state-of-the-art-technology. It appears that such episodic oil
price regime is necessary condition in balancing the global supply/demand.
View more quality content from Energy and the Economy
$50 Oil Doesn't Work Written by Gail Tverberg from Our Finite World $50 per barrel oil is clearly less impossible to live with than $30 per barrel oil, because most businesses cannot make a profit with $30 per barrel oil. But is $50 per barrel oil helpful? I would argue that it really is not.
When oil was over $100 per barrel, human beings in many countries were getting the benefit of most of that high oil price:
Some of the $100 per barrel goes as wages to the employees of the oil company who extracted the oil. Often, the oil company contracts with another company to do part of the oil extraction. Part of the $100 per barrel is paid as wages to employees of the subcontracting companies. An oil company buys many goods, such as steel pipe, which are made by others. Part of the $100 per barrel goes to employees of the companies making the goods that the oil company buys. An oil company pays taxes. These taxes are used to fund many programs, including new roads, schools, and transfer payments to the elderly and unemployed. Again, these funds go to actual people, as wages, or as transfer payments to people who cannot work. An oil company pays dividends to stockholders. Some of the stockholders are individuals; others are pension funds, insurance companies, and other companies. Pension funds use the dividends to make pension payments to individuals. Insurance companies use the dividends to make insurance premiums affordable. One way or another, these dividends act to create benefits for individuals. Interest payments on debt go to bondholders or to the bank making the loan. Pension plans and insurance companies often own the bonds. These interest payments go to pay pension payments of individuals or to help make insurance premiums more affordable. A company may have accumulated profits that are not paid out in dividends and taxes. Typically, they are reinvested in the company, allowing more people to have jobs. In some cases, the value of the stock may rise as well.
When the price falls from $100 per barrel to $50 per barrel, the incomes of many people are adversely affected. This is a huge negative with respect to world economic growth. If the price of oil drops from $100 per barrel to $50 per barrel, this change adversely affects the income of a large share of people who formerly benefited from the high price. Thus, the drop in oil prices affects the incomes of many of the people listed in the previous section. Furthermore, this drop in income tends to radiate outward to the rest of the economy because each worker who is laid off is forced to purchase fewer discretionary items. These workers are also less able to take on new debt, such as to buy a new car or
house. In some cases, they may even default on existing debt. A drop in oil prices from $100+ per barrel to $50 per barrel leads to job layoffs by oil companies and their subcontractors. Oil companies and their subcontractors may even reduce dividends to shareholders. While oil prices have recently been as low as $30 per barrel, the subsequent rise in prices to $50 per barrel is not enough to start adding new production. Prices are still far too low to encourage new development. In 2016, other commodities besides oil have a problem with price below the cost of production. Many commodities, including coal and natural gas, are currently affected by low prices. So are many kinds of metals, and some kinds of food commodities. Thus, there is pressure in a wide range of industries to lay off workers. There are many parts of the world now feeling recessionary forces. As prices fall, the pressure is for high-cost producers to drop out. As this happens, the world's ability to make goods and services falls. The size of the world economy tends to shrink. This shrinkage is clearly not good for a world economy that needs to grow in order for investors to earn a profit, and in order for debtors to repay debt with interest. Growing demand comes from a combination of increasing wages and increasing debt. The recent drop in oil prices from the $100+ level seems to come from inadequatedemand for oil. This is equivalent to saying that oil at such a high price has not been affordable for a significant share of buyers. We can understand what might have gone wrong, by thinking about how demand for oil might be increased. Clearly, one way of increasing demand is through increased productivity of workers. If this increased productivity allows wages to rise, this increased productivity can cycle back through the economy as increased demand for goods and services. We can think of the process as an 'economic growth pump' that allows continued economic growth. Generally, increased productivity of workers reflects the use of more capital goods, such as machines, vehicles, and buildings. These capital goods are made using
energy products, and operate using energy products. Thus, energy consumption is an important part of the economic growth pump. These capital goods are frequently financed using debt, so debt is another important part of the economic growth pump. Even apart from the debt necessary for financing capital goods, another way of increasing demand is by adding more debt. If a company adds more debt, it can often hire more workers and can add to its holdings of property. These also help raise the output of the company. As long as the output that is added is sufficiently productive that it can repay the added debt with interest, adding more debt tends to enhance the workings of the economic growth pump. The way governments have attempted to encourage the use of increased debt in recent years is by decreasing interest rates. The reason this approach is used is because with a lower interest rate, a broader range of investments can seem to be profitable, after repaying debt with interest. Even very 'iffy' investments, such as extraction of tight oil from the Bakken, can appear to be profitable. The extent of the decrease in interest rates since 1981 has been amazingly large.
Figure 1. Ten year treasury interest rates, based on St. Louis Fed data.
Since 2008, additional steps have been taken to decrease interest rates even further. One of these is the use of Quantitative Easing. Another is the recent use of negative interest rates in Europe and Japan. Falling demand would seem to suggest that the world's economic growth pump is no longer working properly. This is happening, even with all of the post-1981 manipulations of interest rates to reduce the cost of borrowed capital, and thus reduce the required threshold for profitability of new investments. What could cause the economic growth pump to stop working? One possibility is that accumulated debt reaches too high a level, based on historical parameters. This seems to be happening now in many parts of the world. Another thing that could go wrong is that the price of oil rises so high that capital goods based on oil are no longer cost effective for leveraging human labor. If this happens, manufacturing is likely to move to countries that use a cheaper mix of fuels, typically including more coal. The shift of manufacturing to China seems to reflect such a change. A third thing that could go wrong is that pollution becomes too great a problem, forcing a country to slow down economic growth. This seems to be at least part of China's current problem. If oil prices drop from $100 to $50 per barrel, this has an adverse impact on debt levels. With lower oil prices, workers are laid off, both from oil companies and from companies that provide goods and services to oil companies. These workers, in turn, are less able to take on new debt. In some cases, they may also default on their debt. Oil companies with reduced cash flow are also less able to repay their debt. In some cases, companies may file for bankruptcy. The result is generally that existing debt is 'written down.' Even if an oil company does not file for bankruptcy, it is likely to have difficulty adding new debt. The trend in the amount of debt outstanding is likely to change fromincreasing to decreasing. As the amount of debt shifts from increasing to decreasing, the economy tends to shift from increasing to shrinking. Instead of adding more employees, companies
tend to reduce the number of employees. If many commodities are affected, the impact can be very large. We need oil prices to rise to $120 per barrel or more. The current price of $50 per barrel is still way too low. A post I published in February 2014 was called Beginning of the End? Oil Companies Cut Back on Spending. In it, I talked about an analysis by Steve Kopits of Douglas-Westwood. In this analysis, Kopits points out that even at that time-which was before oil prices began dropping in mid-2014-major oil companies were beginning to cut back on spending for new production. Their cost of production was at that time typically at least $120 or $130 per barrel, if prices were to be high enough so that companies could fund new development without adding huge amounts of new debt. Oil prices could perhaps be lower if oil companies could fund their operations using large increases in debt. Company management recognized that such a funding approach would not be prudent-it could lead to unmanageable debt levels. Today's cost of oil production is likely to be even higher than it was when Kopits' analysis was performed in early 2014. If we expect oil production to continue to rise, we probably need oil prices in the $120 to $150 per barrel range for several years. Prices at such a level are likely to be way too high for consumers, because wages do not rise at the same time as oil prices. Consumers find that they need to cut back on discretionary expenditures. These spending cutbacks tend to lead to recession and falling oil prices. We can think of our economy as being like a big ball, which can be pumped up to greater and greater size with either rising productivity or rising debt. This process can continue to work, only as long as the debt added is sufficiently productive that it is possible to repay the debt with interest. We seem to be reaching the end of the line on this process. Returns keep falling lower and lower, necessitating ever-lower interest rates. To some extent, the pumping up of oil prices that occurs in this process represents a lie, because the energy content of a barrel of oil remains unchanged, regardless of price. In fact, the energy of coal and of natural gas per unit of production remains unchanged as well. The value of energy products to society is determined by their physical ability to leverage human labor-for example, how far diesel oil can move a truck. This ability is unchanged, regardless of how expensive that oil is to produce. This is why, at some point, we find that high-priced energy products simply don't
work in the economy. If we spend the huge amount of resources required for the production of energy products, we don't have enough resources left over for the rest of the economy to grow. Low oil prices, plus low commodity prices of other kinds, seem to indicate that we are reaching the end of the line in the 'pump up the economy with debt' approach. We have been using this approach since 1981. At this point, we have no idea what economy growth would look like, without the stimulus of falling interest rates. The drop in oil prices and other commodity prices since mid-2014 seems to represent a 'shrinking back' of our ability to use debt to raise prices to a level sufficient to cover the cost of extraction, plus associated overhead costs, including taxes. This drop in prices should be an alarm bell that something is seriously wrong. Without continuously rising prices, to keep up with ever-rising extraction costs, fossil fuel production will at some point come to a halt. Renewables will not work well either, because prices will not be high enough for them to be competitive. Of course, once the economy stops growing, the huge amount of debt we have amassed becomes un-payable. The whole system we have built will begin to look more and more like a Ponzi Scheme. We are blind to the possibility that oil prices of $50 per barrel may indicate that we are reaching 'the end of the line.' The popular belief is that everything will work out fine. Oil prices will rise a bit, and somehow the economy will get along with less fossil fuel. Somehow, we will make it through this bottleneck. If we would study history, we would discover that there have been many situations of overshoot and collapse. In fact, those situations tend to look quite a bit like the situation we are seeing today:   
Falling resources per capita, because of rising population or exhaustion of resources Falling wages of non-elite workers; greater wage disparity Governments finding it increasingly difficult to fund needed programs
There is a popular belief that oil prices will rise, if there is a shortage of energy products. In prior collapses, it is not at all clear that prices have risen. We know that when ancient Babylon collapsed, demand for all products, even slaves, fell. If we are reaching collapse now, we should not be surprised if the prices of commodities,
including oil, stay low. Alternatively, they might spike, but only briefly—not enough to really fix our current situation. Too many wrong theories Part of our problem is too much confidence that the 'magic hand' of supply and demand will fix the economy. We don't really understand how demand is tied into affordability, and how affordability is tied into wages and debt. We don't realize that the view that oil prices can rise endlessly is more or less equivalent to the view that economic growth can continue indefinitely in a finite world. Another part of our problem is failure to understand how the economic pump that keeps the economy operating works. Once debt rises too high, or the cost of energy extraction rises too high, we can no longer keep the system going. Price tends to fall below the cost of energy extraction. The quantity of energy products consumed cannot rise fast enough to keep the economic growth pump operating. Clearly neoclassical economics doesn't properly model how the economy really works. But the Energy Returned on Energy Invested (EROEI) theory of Biophysical Economics does not model the current situation well, either. EROEI theory is generally focused on the ratio of Energy Returned by some alternative energy device to Fossil Fuel Energy Used by the same alternative energy device. This focus misses several important points: 1. The quantity of energy consumed by the economy needs to keep rising, if human productivity is to keep growing, and thus allow the economy to avoid collapsing. EROEI calculations normally have little to say about the quantity of energy products. 2. The quantity of debt required to produce a given amount of energy by an alternative energy device is very important. The more debt that is added, the worse the alternative energy device is for the economy. 3. In order for the economic growth pump to keep working, the return on human labor needs to keep rising. This is equivalent to a need for the wages of nonelite workers to keep rising. This is a requirement relating to a different kind of EROEI—energy return on human labor, leveraged with various types of supplemental energy. Today's EROEI theorists tend to overlook this type of EROEI. EROEI theory is a simplification that misses several important parts of the story. While a high fossil fuel EROEI is necessary for an alternative to substitute for fossil fuels, it is not sufficient. Thus, EROEI analysis tends to produce 'false favorable'
results. Lining up resources in order by their EROEIs seems to be a useful exercise, but, in fact, the cut-off likely needs to be higher than most have supposed, in order to keep total costs low enough so that the economy can really afford a given energy source. In addition, resources that add heavily to debt requirements are probably unhelpful, regardless of their calculated EROEIs. Conclusion We are certainly at a worrying point in history. Our networked economy is more complex than most researchers have considered possible. We seem to be headed for collapse because of low prices, rather than high. The base scenario of the 1972 book 'The Limits to Growth,' by Donella Meadows and others, seems to indicate that the world will likely reach limits about the current decade. The modeling done in 1972 laid out the basic situation, but could not be expected to explain precisely how collapse would occur. Now that we are reaching the expected timeframe, we can see more clearly what seems to be happening. We need to be examining what is really happening, rather than tying ourselves to outdated ideas of how the economic system works, and thus, what symptoms we should expect as we approach limits. It may be that $50 per barrel oil is one of the signs that collapse is not far away.
View more quality content from Our Finite World
Cartographic Drafting & Design Services
We’ve got it covered‌ Serving the E&P industry for over 25 years
At blue asterisk, we specialise in providing on-demand cartography and graphic design services at highly competitive rates. We work within your deadlines to provide accurate, high quality end products, from maps and montages to presentations and reports. Find out how we can make your business stand out from the rest...
Contact us for more details or visit our website
blueasterisk.co.uk | info@blueasterisk.co.uk | +44 (0)1883 340341
Not a single FDP so far Written by Steve Brown from The Steam Oil Production Company Ltd Crikey, we are half way through May, that's half way through the second quarter of 2016, and so far this year there hasn't been a single new field development plan approved by the OGA. In fact there hasn't been an FDP approved since Scolty & Crathes in October last year, over six months ago. Don't blame the OGA, they can't approve what hasn't been submitted. It is all of us, in the oil and gas industry, who haven't managed to get a project ready enough to make that formal FDP submission. That's not to say that there aren't projects worth doing and technically ready to be submitted, but the people holding the purse strings are putting the brakes on. The bankers, the boards, the brokers, the bond holders or any of the other bleeders that actually decide when and where money can be made available, that's where the problem lies. And of course the reason the purse strings are being held so tightly is the oil price. There isn't an oil company around that was built for oil prices in the $40's, let alone a spell in the $30's. When the oil price was $110/bbl, a $60/bbl downside test seemed pretty extreme. Now $60/bbl is just wishful thinking. So with virtually every company desperately trying to shore up their balance sheet, or prioritising dividends now, over prosperity in the future, no one, but no one, is splashing the cash on a brand new field development. Even last year things weren't so bad. We had come off a surge of new projects with a huge boost to capital spending in the UKCS. Time was £1 or £2 billion worth of projects were approved every year, but when the oil price started to climb more and more projects looked profitable and got over the hurdles. I have taken liberties with the OGA chart that shows the capital committed in the various FDP's approved since 2001, it is rotated 90º and I have added most of the names of the fields approved in each of the years.
From 2010 to 2015 ÂŁ7 to ÂŁ8 billion a year was being committed to new projects. Even in 2015 more than ÂŁ4 billion worth of field development plans were approved. But now, it is nothing, nada, zilch, not a single new FDP for the last six months. So, which field is going to prove that the North Sea is not a wasteland. Truth is I don't know, but I am guessing my audience does. So stick your neck out, vote on the poll just here and let us know which project you think will get over the line first. I'm bound to have missed the front runner, so if that is the case, email me or tweet at me and I'll add in your favourite.
View more quality content from The Steam Oil Production Company Ltd