1998/1999 Yearbook of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media by OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media

REPRESENTATIVE O N FREEDO M O F THE MEDIA

Freedom and Responsibility YEARBO O K 1 9 9 8 / 9 9

Vienna 1999

The cover is a draw ing by the German author Günter Grass, “Des Schreibers Hand” (The w riteer´s hand),w ho kindly let our office use this as the label of the publications of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. The draw ing w as created in the context of his novel “Das Treffen in Telgte”, dealing w ith the literary authors of the time of the “thirty years w ar”.

Content Bronislaw Gerem ek - Preface, 5 Freim ut Duve - Introduction, 9

Culture and Media -Freedom to w rite, freedom to think, freedom to broadcast – Essays

Clifford G. Christians - Communication Ethics, 19 Mukhtar Shakanov - Z helton Square - M utiny to defend four mothers, 37 Dschingis Aitm atov - Z entral-Asien - Battelfield or O asis, 73 Michael Ignatieff - The M edia is the media ..., 81 Antonin Liehm - The role of culture, 97 Jim Hoagland - M edia Democracy in Jeopardy, 109 Freim ut Duve -The industrialisation of article 5 of Germany´s Constitution, 115

II. Where w e com e from , w hy w e do it – Essays Beate Maeder-Metcalf - Histories and some considerations, 123 Alexander Ivanko - Glasnost how it all started in Russia, 131 Stanley Schrager - Present at the creation - The American view, 141 Bei Hu - Censorship by Killing, 155

III. O verview Kaarle Nordenstreng - Self regulation , Press Councils in Europe, 169

IV. O ur Work , w hat w e have done – Reports The Mandate, 189 The Copenhagen opening speech, 193 The Reports to the perm anent Council, 195 Reports on the Media Republic of Y ugoslavia, 211 Republic of Croatia, 219 Republic of Kyrgyzstan, 227 Interventions, Contacts, Visits to the member states, 241

V. Where to find those w ho help the Media-NGO ´s in the O SCE-World Contributors, 286 3

Bronislaw Gerem ek Preface Addressing US Congress in January 1941, Presiden t Franklin Delano Roosevelt sketched the prospect of a secure future w orld based on four basic, cardinal values. He considered the first of them to be universal freedom of speech and expression w hich he regarded as the foundation of all social and political relation s. That approach to the values of the contem porary w orld did n ot arise solely from the democratic traditions rooted in the rise of the American republic. It also stem med from the conviction - know n also to European liberal an d democratic thinking since the tim es of the Fren ch revolution - that freedom of expression constitutes the basic determ inant of a m odern social system . That idea w as not obvious everyw here and to everyone and it did not alw ays becom e a political or ethical directive. For m any people in Central an d Eastern Europe, an evaluation of the resolutions of the Final Act of the Helsin ki Con ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe contained a difficult dilem m a. The Helsinki process launch ed in 1975 entrenched the division of the w orld imposed on Europe, consolidated th e sph eres of influence of the tw o then superpow ers and - especially to people lined w ith dem ocratic opposition groups - appeared to indefinitely preclude any changes in the states of the Soviet bloc. O n the other hand, it w as at Helsinki that a so-called ‘third basket’ w as created. It contained a sub-chapter dealing w ith the sphere of inform ation w hich becam e a veritable ‘w indow of opportunity’ for circles advocating at least a m inim um of openness in totalitarian systems. That minim um took on sufficient significance to becom e a battle-ground for freedom of speech, unfalsified information and free m edia, not subject to political censorship. The decline of the com munist system in Europe w as m arked by the collapse of the state’s inform ation m onopoly. Allow m e to recall Poland’s experience in this field: the victory of Solidarity in 1989 w as m ade possible to a large exten t by the gradual expansion of freedom of Bronislaw Geremek

speech and the building of independent m edia. It w as the fruit of con tributions m ade by journalists and intellectuals tow ards disman tlin g the political gag that had obstructed genuine public discourse. With regards to issues involving the freedom of speech and the m edia, the Helsinki process brought about unexpected results. They w ere unexpected by dem ocratic-opposition circles in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia as w ell as by the totalitarian structures w hich underestim ated their im portance. Neither w ere they expected by the countries of the West w ho insisted on the creation of a ‘third basket’ in 1975 at the price of consenting to the w orld’s bipartite division. The freedom to express one’s ow n view s is the sovereign and indivisible right of people, institutions and societies. And yet, even at the close of the 20th century, that unam bivalent statem ent continues to encounter resistance from political establishm ents in m ay different countries. Th e general public is aw are of incidents w hich include imperm issible pressure exerted by state structures on the content and relay of dissem inated inform ation. Instances of ‘final censorship’ and even of physical threats to the freedom and life of journalists also occur. I am happy that in the family of O SCE m ember-states such incidents are not as drastic as in other regions of the w orld. That stem s not so m uch from the specific nature of that region, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok and linking societies of various cultures and traditions, including different attitudes tow ards freedom of speech. That m ainly stem s from a conviction w hich has taken root throughout the O SCE area that there are certain com mon values and principles of conduct w hich are gradually becoming the norm . In today’s O SCE realities, freedom of speech is an integral com ponent of the concept of all-round security and international solidarity. Proposals first put forw ard by Germ any in 1996 to appoint a represen tative of an organisation dealing w ith the m ass m edia gained w idespread support and served as the basis of a decision taken during the O SCE Ministerial Council in Copenhagen in Decem ber 1997. The implem entation of those norms and constant reminders about their significance to freedom of expression is one of the tasks of the O SCE Rep6

PREFACE

resentative on Freedom of the Media. That activity has contributed to the building of stable, democratic societies, as w ell as playing a big role in the early-w arning process and conflict prevention. It is w ith great satisfaction that I can state that after its first year of activity the new O SCE organ has clearly and effectively defined its scope of com petence, presented m any interesting projects and specific solutions as w ell as doing a good job as a m ediator betw een governm ent institutions an d th e media com munity. Like security, freedom of speech is one and indivisible. The activities of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media revolved around that principle in 1998. I am convinced that w ith that principle in m ind he w ill also successfully tackle the challenges of 1999.

Bronislaw Geremek

Freim ut Duve Introduction I. The O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w as created in Decem ber 1997. We are today presenting our first Ye a rbook. The idea for this Yearbook grew out of discussions am ong the staff of our O ffice regarding the best w ay to present our annual public report. O ur intention is to contribute through the Yearbook to the discussion w ithin and am ong participating States and their representatives in the O SCE regarding freedom of the m edia, freedom of speech and the freedom of journalists. This is, after all, the com m on liberal com m itm ent to w hich the participating States of the O SCE have subscribed. The first year of our w ork has show n how very differently the historical legacy of our com mon tran satlantic and pan-European tradition s is understood. O ur w ork is m arked by the recognition of tw o historical facts. The development of modern democracies is unthinkable w ithout the hum anistic and political dimension of hum an and civil rights. Not only the tw o great revolutions w ith roots in the citizenry, the French and the Am erican, but also the measures taken to promote press freedom by many enlightened European m onarchies in the eighteenth century â&#x20AC;&#x201C; for example those adopted by the Kingdom of Denm ark in 1770 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; recognized the freedom to publish as a part of human and civil rights. So, too, solidarity w ith banned w riters durin g periods of dictatorship w as based on the hum an and civil right to the free expression of opin ion. It w as not until the end of the m onolithically-ruled com m unist States that a second, essential argum ent for the freedom to publish becam e evident in all its im portance. The role of the corrective, of the open debate, necessary for the major economic and technological decisions of the executive branch, not to mention those concerned w ith the cultural and social areas. A m odern State and a m odern econom y cannot survive w ithout this corrective public discussion â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a case in point Freimut Duve

can be seen in the absence of discussion regarding the safety of the Soviet n uclear industry. To d a y, therefore, freedom of the journalistic media represen ts, as w e m ove into the tw enty-first century, a global challenge to the community of States and to their internal and external peace. This challenge is at the sam e tim e m arked by the w orldw ide discussion regarding the responsibility of the old and new m edia vis-à-vis the fundam ental values and cultural convictions of very different nations. II. The Yearbook is designed to reflect only som e of these considerations. The O SCE h as com m itted itself to the great tradition of freedom of opinion and a free press. It is n ot surprising that, in this first year of our w ork, the focus should have been on specific even ts. Concern for th e developm ent of free media in certain participating States, along w ith our critical reaction s to violation s of that freedom , lay beh ind the visits paid to m any participating States, either by staff m em bers or by myselfe. Public relations and expressions of support for freedom in the form of lectures and public discussions, particularly in th e presence of journalism students and young diplom ats, are part of our w ork, w hich has also com e to include as a perm anent com ponent regular lectures to students from Eastern Europe at the Vienna Diplom atic Academ y. We are very grateful to the positiv respon se w e had received fro m the “Z eit- S tifung” in Ham burg to gran t our an nual interns from Princeton and from Eastern Europe th e “Bucerius - sholarship” and to the “open society” Budapest for supporting very gen erously our project to present schools on Cen tral Asia an d oth er O SCE- regions the founding of “school journals” run by the pupils themselves. The Bucerius program me started in 1998 th e “school- journals” program m e w ill start in 1999. In addition to providin g inform ation on our regular reports to the O SCE Perm anent Coun cil, the Yearbook contains individual country reports and discusses the m an y specific m easures that w e have un dertaken in th e first tw elve m onths of our existence. Naturally, the Ye a rbook also surveys the w ork of the n on-governmen tal organizations (NGO s) that are w orking for freedom of the media and w ithout w hose 10

I NTRO DUCTIO N

contributions it w ould often not h ave been possible to spark off any critical discussion outside the coun tries in question . A special part of the Yearbook is taken up by the very person al texts of m y advisors, in w hich they discuss their view of the objectives of our O ffice and their experience in pursuing them . These texts reflect the diversity of our convictions, all of w hich, how ever, com e together in one basic value – the freedom of the journalist to publish his opinions and w hat he know s to be true. O f particular relevance h ere is th e piece entitled “Censorship by killing” w hich deals w ith a special challenge – the m urder of critical journalists. The author, Bei Hu, a m ember of our staff, is a graduate of Princeton University w ho is w orking for one year in our O ffice under the Bucerius scholarsh ip established by the Germ an foundation “Die Z eit”. O ur diverse experiences during this first year also explain w hy w e have combined very different text genres in this Yearbook: a literary text by the Kazakh author Mukhtar Shakanov, a speech by the Chairm an of the Kyrgyz Writers’ Association, Dzhingis Aitm atov, on the selfaw areness of Central Asian cultures, and thoughts by Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post about the w orld’s greatest m edia event of the year 1998. In addition, Clifford G. Christians from the University of Illinois review s the developm ent of w hat has today com e to be cautiously called media ethics, w hile An tonin Liehm, the Czech w riter, traces the cultural process of the em ancipation of w riting from the constraints of socialist dictatorship in his journal Lettre Internationale. Liehm has tracked the literary and political developments, not only in Western Europe but indeed th roughout Europe, that led from Charta 77 and the em ergence of the Polish civil rights m ovem ent to today’s O SCE. III. Wh at tasks and experiences em erge from this first year of w ork? First of all, there is the constant reminder of the opportunities – but also of the challenges – in herent in this tran s-European and transatlantic organization that is the O SCE. The post-Soviet States in Central Asia are O SCE m em bers, as are Canada and the United States. If som eone w anted to w rite a cultural history of freedom of thought, freedom of Freimut Duve

the w ritten w ord and freedom of speech, the region s com prising t o d a y ’s O SCE area w ould p rovide excellent arch ival m aterial for such a chronicle. To the question w hat co nstitutes a source of legitimate pride for citizen s of the United States, m an y w ould answ er: th e first am en dm ent to the Am erican Constitution . The h istory of freedom in the United States is also the h istory of freedom from the feudal and institutional constraints of the Europe of th e eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a h istory of freedom that in Am erica – unlike Europe – h a s contin ued w ith out in terruption to the present day. As understood in Europe, freedom of the media is one successful outcom e of the struggle for dem ocratic national constitutions in the nineteenth and tw entieth centuries against initially successful efforts to use totalitarian m eans to defam e and destroy this history of freedom as a bourgeois aberration. To d a y, ten years after the fall of the Wall, Europe and the O SCE are united in their deep belief in the inalienability of this fundamen tal right. Still, there are many differences in basic perceptions. In the Caucasus and in Central Asia, w hile fundam ental rights are indeed officially recognized, at the same tim e w arnings are being raised against “too much journalistic freedom”. Western Europe has frequen tly been the scene of w idely differing notions regarding the lim its of this freedom in the light of the rights of other persons w ho m ay be affected by w hat is published. Indeed, historically and politically there have been some very interesting transatlan tic differen ces of opin ion betw een the Council of Europe and im portant institutions in the United States. Thanks to its diversified m em bership, the O SCE is, in political term s, the in ternational organization in w hich th ese h istorically determ ined differen ces and ethical questions on w h ich there is agreem ent can best be put on the table for discussion. Experience has taugh t Europeans that the essential issue is the freedom of in dividual journ alists an d w riters from persecution an d censorsh ip an d th e freedom of individual m edia en terprises, new spapers, radio stations and television programm e-m akers from harassm en t an d closure. Th is is w h y I have, again this year, visited im prison ed journalists and the fam ilies of journalists w ho have been m urdered. 12

I NTRO DUCTIO N

IV. N a t u ra lly, im plicit in the term “freedom of the media” is also the question of the ability to establish radio stations and new spapers free of State controls. O n this point there are transatlantic cultural differences, w hich have featured prom inently in the discussions in this O ffice. The rem arkable experience of the BBC as a public veh icle of free journalism th at is in no sense an instrument of the State – nor m ay it be – know s no parallel in the developm ent of American journalism. This has led to interesting arguments in our O ffice as to w hether the number of free private tran smitters is by itself a sufficient indicator of media freedom, and w hether quantitative com parisons are really useful at all in dem onstrating the existence of freedom or its absence. The European argum ent runs like this: If the critical question w ere sim ply the num ber of radio stations, Great Britain and Austria w ould head the list of countries to be criticized, w hile m any post-Soviet States w ould stand as paradigms of freedom , since sm all, private radio stations – as, for exam ple, in Georgia or Armenia – could be seen as proof of journ alistic freedom and diversity. We have h ad to learn and discuss things w ith one another. Th e matter is n ot as sim ple as it may seem. A free media enterprise as such may be the first sign of non-State-controlled journalism but it is by no m ean s proof that such journalism is firmly entrenched. In a num ber of th e privatized enterprises in the formerly State-controlled planned economies there is clear evidence of a definitive closeness to the State (an d in some cases of obedience to it as w ell). At the same time, there are other instruments that m ight at first sight seem surprising but th rough w h ich centralized State control can be brought to bear w ithout becoming im mediately obvious. For exam ple, censorship may be exercised through th e control of central distributors and printing firms that contin ue to be run by the State. The distribution of particular new spapers m ay be disrupted from time to tim e, or else certain papers m ay fail to receive their sales earn ings. O r the sole, State-run central printing establishment, possibly a relic from the com munist period, m ay often refuse to prin t an in dependent daily. As a result, that paper w ill be forced to rely on a far less modern print shop located w ell away from the capital city, w ith the result that its editions w ill hit the street w ith delays of up to 24 hours. Freimut Duve

V. Another equally important topic that w e have discussed has been the demand that journalists take responsibility for w hat they dissem inate. It is obviously true that, in the history of the struggle for freedom of speech, pow erful people w ho for one reason or another have no w ish to be criticized, either personally or in their official capacity, have constantly brought up this question of responsibility. O n this point, how ever, I w ould counter w ith the question w hether the subject of responsibility can sim ply be dismissed by others using the w ord to obstruct journalists in their w ork. Did the w ord “democracy” becom e unusable sim ply because in 1949 the comm unists in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany named their State the “Germ an Democratic Republic”? Is the w ord “freedom” no longer usable sim ply because it w as applied by people like Hitler and Stalin to either the German race or the Soviet w orking class? Are not today’s media called upon to exercise responsibility in the same w ay as all citizens and institutions that w ish to make use of the freedom that is theirs? Th rough our discussions of these issues w e have come to an agreed conclusion: Responsibility cannot be defined by the State; it is som ething naturally dem anded of journalists as professionals. VI. Th ese sam e consideration s w ill also have to apply in the future to m edia enterprises that are becom in g com parable in size to large in dustries an d that in econom ic terms are certainly not totally reliant on their role as w atch dogs vis-à-vis the pow erful. What, it m ay be asked, is the outlook in this area if the m edia have becom e an industry of the sam e im portance as that once enjoyed by the steel industry? Although this question is not a central concern in our w ork, w e shall have to deal w ith it again and again – for exam ple, in the case of the large, privatized m edia enterprises in m any of the postcom m unist countries, w here they are frequently the affiliates of m ajor industrial concerns. VII. An im portant question that has been put to our O ffice from the very outset in public discussions concerns its lack of pow er. How best to transform this lack of pow er into influence, w ithin the term s of our 14

INTRO DUCTIO N

m andate, is a question, and finding a good answ er to it is probably the m ost im portant strategic task facing our O ffice. The gratitude expressed by the new Foreign Minister of the Slovak Republic in the autum n of 1998 for our intervention on behalf of journalists w ho had been publicly branded as “traitors” for having criticized in their articles certain expectations, and also on behalf of independent m edia subjected to harassm ent. This personally expressed gratitude on the part of the democratically elected successor Government has show n us that w e are on the right path w hen w e publicly w arn participating States against using the tired old populist and nationalist “treason syndrom e” as a w eapon against journalists. Dem ocracies live on public debate. They live on divergent view s and they also live on a clash of political opinion as reflected in the m edia. In the long run, they cannot w ithstand political hostilities.

Freimut Duve

I. Media and Culture, Freedo m to think, Freedo m to w rite, Freedo m to bro adcast Essays

There shall be liberty of the Press. N o person m ay be punished for any w riting, w hatever its contents, w hich he has caused to be print ed or published, unless he w ilfully and m anifestly has either himself show n or incited others to disob ed ience to the law s, contem pt of religion, m orality or the constitutional p ow ers, or resistance to their orders, or has m ade false and defam atory accusations against anyone. Everyone shall be free to speak his mind frankly on the admin istration of the State and on any other subject w hatsoever. Article 100 of the N orwegian Constitution 17

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

Clifford G. Christians Communication ethics as the basis of genuine democracy Let me summ arize my argum ent in a paragraph . The Enlightenm ent w as besieged by a dichotom y that still needs resolution today for genuine dem ocracy to prosper. Im portant intellectual debates about the origins of m odernism centre that split on either the subject object, m aterial-spiritual, or fact-value dichotom ies. Contrary to those interpretations, I believe the Enlightenm ent m ind could not integrate freedom w ith the moral order, and th is perennial hum an dilem m a rem ain s to be solved. Com m unication studies can contribute to this integration by articulating a holistic view of truth in m oral rather than epistem ological term s. In this respect, Michael Traberâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s w ork is of historic value, because it overcom es the m odernist dichotom y betw een freedom and a m oral universum . Enlightenment dichotomies. The Enlightenm en t is the decisive m odern revolution.1 Nothing has been so form ative of the Western m ind. And to paraphrase O scar Wilde, w hoever does not know it w ell is con dem ned to repeat it. The intellectual revolutions of the previous tw o centuries - that is, the Age of Reason and the Age of Science - exploded into this audacious and entangled historical w atershed. Most of the w riters and thinkers w ere popularizers, journ alistic types cen tred largely in France and know n as philosopbes: Francois Marie Arouet (Vo lt a ire ), Jean Jacques Rousseau, Denis Diderot, Baron Holbach, and Antoine Caritat Marquis de Condorcet. Book publishing on the European continent underw ent an aston ishing transform ation. As the eighteenth century daw ned, nine out of ten books appeared in Latin an d w ere available only to the intelligentsia; a century later, eight out of ten w ere printed in the vernacular instead. Kn ow ledge w as dissem in ated on an unpreceden ted scale; literacy rates doubled and a learned class w as born. It w as the century of th e 1 For an elaboration of the Enlightenm entâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s im pact on the m ass m edia and public philosophy, see Christians, Fcrre and Fackler, (1993).

Clifford G. Christians

Germ an gen iuses in m usic — Johan n Sebastian Bach, George Frederic Handel, Franz Joseph Haydn, and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. The Am erican statesm en Benjam in Franklin and Thom as Jefferson w ere q u in t e ssential figures in the m ovem ent. Edw ard Gibbon penned his vitriolic Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire during this period. And befitting an age w hich extolled hum an centrality and historical progress, portraiture w as adopted by the w ealthy class as the preferred form of art. Given its magnitude, the collapse in our ow n day of the Enligh tenm en t w orldview certainly generates earthquake shocks everyw here. The Enlightenment mind clustered around an extraordinary dichotom y. Intellectual historians usually summarize this split in term s of subjectobject, fact-value, or material-spiritual dualism s. And all three are legitim ate interpretations of the cosmology inherited from Galileo, Descartes, and New ton. How ever, communication scholars addressing our crisis age must enter this scholarly debate w ith a revisionist purpose, recognizing the importance of these typical dualisms but identifying a fourth as m ore earth-shaking than the others for the prospects of genuine dem ocracy. The Enlightenm ent story actually begins in the sixteenth century w ith the Italian Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), a central figure in the tran sition from m edieval to m odern science. Galileo m apped reality in a new w ay, dividing nature into tw o fam ous com partm ents — prim ary: m atter, m otion, m ass, m athem atics; and secondary: the m etaphysical, supernatural, values, meaning. In The Assayer, Galileo w rites, ‘This great book, the Universe ... is w ritten in the language of m athem atics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and geom etric figures’ (Galilei, 1957 ed.: 238-9). Matter alone m attered to h im ; he considered all non -material im m aterial. He separated off the qualitative as incapable of quantitative certainty. In effect, he suggested tw o essences — values and m eaning on the one hand, m atter and quantity on the ocher. His fascin ation w ith the Copernican w orld-picture m otivated him to prom ote heliocentricity not as the calculation of astronomers only, but as a w ideranging truth about the structure of reality. Lew is Mum ford (1970) in his Pentagon of Power ridicules ‘the crim e of Galileo’, because his bifurcation allow ed the w orld of value and mean ing to start shrivelling aw ay. 20

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

Within a cen tury, the English m an Isaac New ton could describe the w orld in h is Principia M athematica (1687) as a lifeless m ach in e com posed of m athem atical law s an d built on un iform natural causes in a closed system . The upper story had been dissolved. Ph en om en a could be explained as th e outco m e of an em pirical order extending to every detail. M ystery w as defin ed aw ay. All but quan tity or num ber w ere called sophistry and illusion . Principles of m ass and gravity extended to th e extrem e lim its of the cosm os — explain in g th e m ovem en t of th e farth est plan ets w ith th e sam e m ath em atical law s as described an apple dropping from a tree. New ton provided m ature form ulation s, raising th e m ech an istic w orldview to an axiom atic, in dependen t existence. Ironically New ton w as com m itted to the upper story that his Prin cipia eroded. During his lifetim e, he w rote 1.3 m illion w ords on theology, m astered the w ritings of the early church fathers, and w as a generous supporter of Anglican church projects around London. Yet am ong his scientific colleagues, he banned any subject touching the sacred, insisting that ‘w e are not to introduce divine revelations into science, nor philosophical opinions into religion.’ New ton’s loyalties w ere firm ly anchored in both scientific m ethod and transcendent truth. His Enlightenment heirs, how ever, w ould abandon the upper story w ith the sam e zeal that New ton applied to founding new churches. Voltaire (1694-1778), for exam ple, pushed the m aterial spiritual split to its extrem e, at least in his prolific contributions to the French Encyclopedia if less so in Candide. With in that pattern from Galileo to the pervasive sch em e of New ton stands René D escartes (1596-1650), w h o cut the dich otom y firm ly into the being of homo sapiens. Although Galileo and New ton inspired the Enlighten m ent as m uch as anyone, the Frenchman René Descartes contradicted m ost vehem ently a h olistic view of reality and ensured that persons also w ould be sw ept into the new cosmology. Descartes insisted on the non-contingen cy of starting poin ts. He presum ed clear and distinct ideas, objective and n eutral, apart from an yth in g subjective. Clifford G. Christians

Consider the very conditions under w hich Descartes w rote M edi tations II in 1642. The Thirty Years War w as spreading social chaos throughout Europe. The Spanish w ere ravaging the French provinces and even threatening Paris. But D escartes w as in a room in Belgium on a respite, isolated in seclusion. For tw o years even his friends could not find him hidden aw ay studying m athem atics. Tranquillity for philosophical speculation m attered so m uch to him , that upon hearing that Galileo had been condemned by the Roman Catholic Church he retracted parallel argum ents of his ow n on natural science. His Discourse on M ethod (1637) elaborates this objectivism in m ore detail. Genuine know ledge is built linearly, w ith pure m athem atics the least touched by circumstances. Tw o plus tw o equals four w as lucid and testable, and all genuine know ledge in Descartes’ view should be as cognitively clean as arithm etic. In Rules for the Direction of the M ind, Descartes contended, in effect, that one could dem onstrate truth only by m easurem ent. Therefore, he lim ited his interest to precise, m echanistic, m ath ematical know ledge of physical reality. As E. F. Schum acher has com plained, no one sketched the m odern intellectual m ap m ore decisively than Descartes, and his philosophical m ap-m aking defined out of existence those vast regions w hich had engaged the intense efforts of earlier cultures and non -Western peoples. Neither the subject — object or m aterial — spiritual or fact-value split puts the Enlightenm ent into its sharpest focus, how ever. It´s deepest root w as a pervasive autonom y. What prevailed w as the cult of human personality in all its freedom. Human beings w ere declared a law unto themselves, set loose from every faith that claim ed their allegiance. Proudly self-conscious of human autonom y, the eighteenth century mind saw n ature as an expansive arena for exercising freedom, a field of lim itless possibilities in w hich the sovereignty of human personality w as demonstrated by its mastery of the n atural order. Release from nature spaw ned autonom ous individuals w ho considered themselves independent of any a u t h o r it y. The freedom motif — persons understood as ends in them selves — w as the deepest driving force, first released by the Renaissance and achievin g maturity during the Enligh ten ment. 22

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Jean-Jacques Rousseau w as the most outspoken advocate of this radical freedom . He gave intellectual substance to free self-determ in ation of the h uman person ality as the highest good. Rousseau contended that freedom em bodied in human beings justified itself as the final aim. ‘I long for a tim e’, he w rote, ‘w hen Freed from the fetters of the body, I shall be myself, at on e w ith myself . . . w hen I m yself shall suffice for my ow n happiness’ (Rousseau, 1961: 350). Although such unbridled liberty had taken root earlier w ith Pico de Mirandolla’s ‘O ration on the Dignity of Man’ in th e Renaissance, the Sw iss Rousseau provided its most m ature version. In Emile (1762), for instance, he contended that civilization’s artificial controls dem ean hum anity and make us vicious, w hereas free in a state of nature the ‘noble savage’ lives in harm ony and peace. As Joseph de Maistre observed, for Rousseau, asking w h y people born free w ere neverth eless everyw here in chains w as like asking w hy sheep born carnivorous everyw here nibbled grass. What w e observe em pirically does not invalidate our ow n true n ature. Liberty is th e inalienable in gredient that makes hum ans hum an , even though under so-called norm al conditions its sacred frontiers are desecrated. Rousseau is a com plicated figure. He refused to be co-opted by Descartes’ rationalism , New ton’s m echanistic cosm ology, or Locke’s egoistic selves. And he w as not m erely content to isolate and sacralize freedom either, at least not in his Discourse on Inequality or in the Social C ontract w here he answ ers Hobbes. His conclusion that a collective can be free if it enacts its ow n rules w hich are then obeyed voluntarily, is only a partial solution — though superior to m ore static contractarian theories and a cham pion of popular sovereignty. In distinguishing the general w ill from the em pirical w ill of all, Rousseau, of all the Enlightenm ent heavyw eights, recognized that freedom and the m oral order feed off one another, at least in principle. Rousseau represented the rom antic w ing of the Enlightenm ent, revolting against its ration alism . He w on a w ide follow ing w ell into the nineteenth century for advocating im m anent and em ergent values rather than transcendent and given ones. While adm itting humans w ere fin ite and lim ited, he nonetheless promoted a freedom of breathtaking Clifford G. Christians

scope — not just disengagem ent from God or the Church, but freedom from culture and from any authority. Even among those w ith a less pastoral vision, autonom y becam e the core of hum an being and the centre of the universe. Rousseau recognized the consequences more astutely than those com fortable w ith a shrunken negative freedom . But the only solution that he found tolerable w as a n oble hum an nature w hich enjoyed freedom beneficently and, therefore, one could presume, lived com patibly in som e vague sense w ith a m oral order. His understanding of equality, social system s, axiology, and language w ere not finally anchored in an adequate philosophical anthropology. O bviously one can reach autonom y by starting w ith the subject object dualism. In constructing the Enlightenment w orldview, the prestige of natural science — then typically called ‘natural philosophy’ — played a key role in setting people free. Achievements in m athem atics, physics, and astronomy allow ed h umans to dominate nature w hich form erly had dom inated them . In Cartesian term s, the scientific m ethod enabled the hum an race to be ‘m asters and possessors of nature’. Science provided unmistakable evidence th at by applying reason to nature and hum an beings in fairly obvious w ays, people could live progressively happier lives. Crim e and insanity, for exam ple, no longer needed repressive theological explanations, but w ere deem ed capable of m undane em pirical solutions. By characterizing the problem as primarily epistem ological, one ten ds to find the post-Enlighten ment alternative in epistem ology The burning issue then becom es how w e can know — and all kinds of subjectivity models or phenomenology or contem porary herm eneutics are directed precisely tow ards overcoming the scientistic notion of law like abstractions and operational definitions through fixed procedures. Likew ise one can get to the autonomous self by casting th e question in terms of a radical discontinuity betw een hard facts and subjective values. The Enligh tenm ent did push values to the fringe by its disjunction betw een know ledge of w hat is and w hat ought to be. And Enlightenm en t m aterialism in all its form s isolated reason from faith , know ledge from belief. As Robert Hooke insisted three centuries ago w hen he 24

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

helped found London’s Royal Society: ‘This Society w ill eschew any discussion of religion , rhetoric, m orals, an d politics.’ With factuality gaining a stranglehold on the Enlightenm ent m ind, those regions of hum an interest w hich im plied oughts, constraints and im peratives sim ply ceased to appear. Certainly those w ho see the Enlightenm ent as separating facts and values have identified a cardinal difficulty. Likew ise, the realm of the spirit can easily dissolve into m ystery and intuition. If the spiritual w orld contains no binding force, it is surrendered to speculation by the divines, m any of w hom accepted the Enlightenm ent belief that their pursuit w as ephem eral. But the Enlightenment’s autonomy doctrine created the greatest m ischief. Individual autonom y stands as the centrepiece, bequeathing to us the universal problem of integrating hum an freedom w ith m oral o r d e r. Th is perennial question appears on the human agenda in various form s: determ inism and free w ill, constraint and em ancipation, order and anarchy, the liberty of conscience, dynam ic socialization and stultifying institutions, ideology and praxis, freedom and responsibility. But w hatever its specific form ulation, th e nexus of human freedom and moral order remains a classic concern for the philosophical m ind. And in struggling w ith the com plexities and conundrums of this relationship, the Enlightenment, in effect, refused to sacrifice personal freedom . Even though the problem h ad a particular urgency in th e eighteenth century, its response w as not resolution but categorically insisting on autonom y. Given the despotic political regimes and oppressive ecclesiastical systems of the period, such an un com promising stance for freedom at th is juncture is understandable. The Enlightenment began and ended w ith the assum ption th an hum an liberty ought to be cut aw ay from th e m oral o rd e r, never integrated meanin gfully w ith it. To be successfully counterEnlightenm ent, w e must take a radical stance precisely at this point; if this dichotom y remains unresolved a democratic life of eudaemonia and shalom is totally im possible. Alexis de To cq u e ville ’s monum ental Democracy in America re co gn iz e d the consequen ces of failing to integrate in dividual freedom w ith m oral n orm s. While democracy, in his view, operates w ith an egalitarian Clifford G. Christians

language in everyday affairs, it needs a deeper level â&#x20AC;&#x201D; that is, form s of m oral discourse w h ich an chor th e self and society, and provide a sense of calling for our jobs, leisure, and politics. These social integum ents Tocqueville saw as m oderating dem ocracyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s m ore destructive poten tialities. As a Catholic, he believed that liberty needed religion to m itigate those excesses that threatened its survival. He argued for m aking m oral sense of our lives rather than pursuing the unencum bered self. In this appeal, Tocqueville read the Enlightenmen t problematic correctly and reaffirm ed that unordered liberty becom es licence. He w ould not be surprised one century later that w e are overcome today by the banality of a social order exacted in the n ame of fulfilm ent. Life together has become not a struggle for social change but for self-realization. O ur current unseem ly self gratification, our narcissism, has ren dered public life virtually im possible and sim ultaneously hollow s out our personal sphere as w ell. When th e En lightenm en t gave birth to a reduction ist but distinctive freedom , pretending the self could be separated from nature and from culture, the very possibility of understanding basic hum an questions w as erased in prin ciple. Modernity is unable to negotiate moral criteria or understand the n ature o f com m un ity and m oral judgem ent because autonom y pervades its eth os. As Daniel Callahan concludes: Autonom y should be a m oral good, not a m oral obsession. It is a value, not the value. If ... it rests on the conviction that there can be no com m on understanding of m o ralit y, on ly private likely stories, then it has lost the saving tension it competitively needs w ith other m oral goods ... I am to ld that I have the right to fashion m y ow n m oral life and sh ape m y o w n m oral goals. But how d o I go abou t doing that? ... Auto nom y, I have disco vered, is an inarticulate bore, goo d as a bodyguard against m o ral bullies, but u seless and vapid as a friendly, w ise, and insightful com panion. (Callahan, 1984: 42)

Isolating freedom eclipses the integral substance of m orality at the starting point. O ur ethical discourse becom es gravely disordered â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the em otivist self, auton omism in m orality, and fictions like n atural rights. 26

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

Genuine dem ocratization of em pow ered citizens cannot occur unless freedom and the m oral order are reintegrated. Most philosophers of history recognize that the Enligh tenm ent age has now run its course. Eastern Europe and the USSR are forever changed. The West is finishing a historic period also; w e are only left to debate the appropriate nom enclature — postm odern, post-liberal, post-factual, post-colonial, post-structural, or post-patriarchal. To d a y ’s gratuitous hedonism , technocratic rationality, and debilitating secularism are the Enlightenm ent at its ragged edge. Its conceptual inconsistencies have finally been exposed and largely discredited. Underneath the shrill rhetoric and often overw rought claim s, the West recognizes th is age as a chairos, a strategic mom ent, a defining tim e in w orld affairs. The cancerous effect of the freedom/ m oral order dualism has been lon g-term and finely grained, but now inescapable. O n th e one side, the divines - th em selves relegated to the fringes — m aintain guardianship over m oral scraps. O n the other, th e few serious struggles have been transm ogrified in to epistem ological discourse. Early on the ethical question of how w e should live floundered on debates over w hether it w as cognitively m eaningful, w hich itself succum bed to philosophical relativity, until today un iversal norm s are largely alien to the Western m ind. Truth as master norm. How ever, as the curtain com es dow n on the Enlighten ment era and an oth er episode takes shape on the stage of history, the debate over freedom and the m oral order w ill not disappear. Were it not for Enlightenm ent hubris, it w ould have been recognized that th is is a perm an ent issue w hich n ever fades from the hum an agenda and can never be totally resolved on any occasion. Certainly the con nection betw een freedom and responsibility dem ands urgent attention by those of us com m itted to form s of com m unication that enable gen uine dem ocracy to prosper in the civic order. The history of m odernity rem inds us that eliminating the subject/object dualism, piously asserting value-centredn ess, and rejecting excessive m aterialism are all achievements in themselves, but of little consequence if freedom re m a in s isolated from any overarching standards. The press’s o b je ct iv is m , Clifford G. Christians

instrum entalism, and technicism are all rooted in an Enlightenment paradigm gone to seed. Exorcizing these dem ons is only a Pyrrhic victory if liberty and m orality are not conceived as one organic w hole. O ur efforts at genuine comm unity w ill be futile as long as democracy’s infrastructure is hoist by the Enlightenm ent’s petard. Richard Rorty scourges the Enligh ten ment w orldview as ‘the quest for certainty over th e quest for w isdom ’. Modernist ph ilosophers, have sought: ... to attain the rigor of the m athem atician or the physicist, or to explain the appearance of rigor in these fields, rather than to help people attain peace of m ind. Science, rather than living, becam e philosophy’s subject, and epistem ology its centre. (Rorty, 1979: 365-94 )

Rorty labels this epistem ological system ‘foundationalism ’, though ‘objectivism ’ is a m ore typical nam e for the am algam of practices and com m itm ents that have prevailed in Western thought as a w hole. Talcott Parsons has been Am erica’s m ost influential sociologist of this century. He insisted on the objectivist credo w hile helping sm uggle in Nazi collaborators as Soviet experts after the Second World Wa r.2 In the classroom , as head of the Am erican Sociological Association, w hile training the next generation’s leaders, this highly abstract functionalist pursued scientific status through value-free neutrality. Mean w hile, Parsons co-operated w ith the Russian m ilitary to bring Vladim ir Pozdniakov, Leo Dudin of` the University of Kiev, and Nicholas Poppe of Leningrad (w ar crim inals all) to Harvard’s Russian Research Center. It w as self-evident to him that Am erica’s Cold War frenzy and H a r v a r d ’s ow n George F. Kennan in the State Departmen t w ould guarantee unlim ited funding for the Center if its expertise w ere as close to the ground as these Russian exiles represented. Apparently their know ledge of ethnic groups in Soviet Asia, once vital to the Nazi pursuit of Jew ish com m unities, w ould now serve Am erican ideology. It w as the sum m er of 1948 as Parsons shuttled across the North Atlantic. Struc2

Cf. Jon Wiener (1989), ‘Talcott Parson’s Role: Bringing Nazi Sym pathizers to the US,’ pp. 1, 306-9

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

tural-functionalism purged of m oral quandaries in Massachusetts engaged in reprehensible social practice in Germ any. Scepticism and detachm ent — aloof from discourse th at sh apes the m oral landscape — disinterested pursuit of truth, in Parsons’ hands destroyed the very liberty it cherished for itself. The attacks on this m isguided view of hum an know ledge had already originated in Giam battista Vico ’s fantasia and Wilh e lm D ilt h e y ’s verstehen in the Counter Enlighten m ent; they continued w ith American pragm atism , critical th eory in th e Frankfurt School, herm eneutics; and Wittgenstein’s linguistic philosophy; until our ow n day w hen the phenom enal interest in Rorty, Thom as Kuhn, Michael a Polanyi, interpretive research, and deconstruction ism sym bolizes a crisis in correspondence view s of truth. Institutional structures rem ain Enlightenm ent driven, but in principle the tide has turned currently tow ard restricting objectivism to th e territory of math ematics, physics, and the natural sciences. In reporting, objectivity has becom e increasingly controversial as the w orking press’ professional standard, but it w ill rem ain entrenched in our ordinary practices of new s production and dissem ination until an alternative m ission for the press is convincingly form ulated. The press under Enlightenm ent tutelage m aintains representation al accuracy as its telos, w ith adjustm ents in detail but not in principle. Though w ithout the enthusiasm of earlier decades, w e still presum e that new s corresponds to reality and is ideally bound to neutral algorithm s. We counsel each other to m ake the best possible attem pt at value-free reporting, even though never perfectly attainable. By analogy, w e are told, a surgeon w ho cannot ensure an operating room free from bacteria, does n ot use a kitchen table and a butcher’s knife. O bjectivity is still the centrepiece of m ost journalism codes of ethics, and a m ajority of reporters continue to equate ethics w ith im partiality. But rather than m aintain a facade of objectivism — reporters as impersonal tran sm itters of facts — w e need to articulate a fulsom e concept of truth as communication’s m aster principle. As th e norm of healing is to medicine, critical thinking to education , craftsm anship to engiClifford G. Christians

n eering, justice to politics, and stew ardship to business, so truthtelling in its fulsom e sense becom es the new s profession’s occupational norm. I intend this as a n orm ative fram ew ork of a radically different sort, on e th at fundam entally reorders the new s media’s professional culture and enables it to serve dem ocratization. In stead of an inform ation en terprise trapped in the epistem ological dom ain, truth should be relocated in the moral sphere.3 D riving the m odern ist project is an objectivist w ay of kn ow ing, cen tred on hum an rationality and armed w ith the scien tific m ethod. In the Enlightenm ent w o r ld v ie w , facts m irror reality It aim s for ‘true, irrefragable [incontrovertible] accounts of an objective reality that is separate and different from h um an consciousness’ (McKin zie, 1994: 33). In Bertran d Ru s s e ll’s form ula, ‘truth consists in som e form of correspondence betw een belief an d fact’ (Russell, 1912: 121). 4 As Mark Johnson dem onstrates, this illusion of context-free rationality poses great obstacles for morality; m oral principles are allegedly derived from th e essen tial structure of a disembodied reason. Rath er than prizin g care, reciprocity and imaginative ideals, our m oral un derstanding becom es prescriptivist, rules orien ted, and absolutist. ‘What results is an extrem ely narrow definition of w hat coun ts as m orality; . . . it is only doing the right th ing; . . . it consists in discovering and applying m oral law s. This drastic n arrow ing of the scope of m orality has m on umental consequences’ (Johnson , 1993: 246). Truth, for exam ple, is conceived in elem entary epistem ological term s as accurate represen tation ; in th is trun cated form it m akes no robust, contextual, social contribution to our public ph ilosoph y. Rorty understands the significant stakes here, defining truth not as a ‘mirror of nature’ and ‘privileged contact w ith reality,’ but ‘w hat is better for us to believe’ (Rorty, 1979: 10). Since Walter Lippm ann distinguished new s and truth in the 1920s, the epistem ology of new s has

Research on the m oral concept of truth w as m ade possible through t he support of the Pew Evangelical Scholars Program .

For a sum m ary of correspondence view s, including both Russell’s and J. L. Austin’s versions, sec Kirkham (1992), ch. 4.

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

been critiqued and debated, but truthtelling still has not received its due. Truth is a problem of axiology rather than epistem ology. It belongs in the moral sph ere and therefore should becom e the province of ethicists, especially w hen the dom inant objectivist schem e has reached a historical crossroads. When truth is articulated in term s of the m oral order, w e can m ould its richly textured meaning around the Hebrew emeth (t ru st w o rt h y, genuine, dependable, authentic), the Greek aletheia (openness, disclosure), the Serbo-Croatian justified (as plum bline true in carpentry). Dietrich Bo n h o e ffe r ’s Ethics contends correctly that a truthful accoun t lays hold of the context, m otives, and presuppositions involved (Bonhoeffer, 1955: ch.5). Telling the truth depends on the quality of discernm ent so that penultim ates do not gain ultim acy. Truth m eans, in other w ords, to strike gold, to get at ‘the core, the essence, the nub, the heart of the m a t t e r’.5 In Anthony Giddens’ phrase, it en tails ‘discursive penetration’ (Giddens, 1979: 73). For Henry David Thoreau — though addressing a different issue — w hen w e are truthful, w e attem pt to ‘drive life into a corner and ... if it proves to be m ean, w hy then to get the genuine m eanness out of it and publish its m eanness to the w orld; or if it w ere sublim e, to know it by personal experience and be able to give a true account of the encounter’ (1975: 94). Augustine (AD 354-430), professor of rhetoric at Milan and later Bishop of Hippo, illustrates m y intentions here. His rhetorical theory represents a m ajor contribution to the philosophy of com m unication, contradicting the highly functionalized, secular and linear view bequeathed by the ancient Greeks. As w ith Aristotle, rhetoric entails reasoned judgem ent for Augustine; how ever, he ‘break[s] aw ay from Graeco-Rom an rh etoric, moving instead tow ard ... rhetoric as aletheiac act’.6 Rhetoric for him is not know ledge-producing or opinion-producing but truth-producing (aletheiac).7 In the Epistolae he chal5

Pippert (1989), An Ethics of N ews: A Reporter’s Search for Truth, p. l l, for an initial attem pt to defin e journalism in term s of truth.

Settle (1994), ‘Faith, Hope, and Charity: Rhetoric as Aletheiac Act in O n Christian Doctrine’, p. 49.

Clifford G. Christians

lenges us to speak truthfully rather than cunningly. De Doctrina Chris tiana scourges the value-neutral, technical language of ‘w ord merchants’ w ithout w isdom .8 Truth is not fundam entally a prescriptive statem ent. The aletheiac act in Augustine ‘ten ds to be m ore relational than propositional, a dialogically interpersonal, sacram entally charitable act rather than a statem ent ... , taking into account and being m otivated by [the cardinal virtues] faith, hope, and charity’ (Settle, 1994: 49, 57). The truth for him does not m erely becom e clear, bur m otivates. In truthful com m unication for Augustine, ‘it is not enough to seek to m ove m en’s m inds, m erely for the sake of pow er; instead, the pow er to m ove is to be used to lead m en to truth’ (Murphy, 1974: 62). Au gu s t in e ’s searing critique of autonom ous rationality w as so penetrating that Arthur Kroker and David Cook credit him w ith setting the stan dard for cultural analysis un til today. In contrast to postm ode r n is m ’s rupture and against nothingness as the ultim ate comm itm ent, this ‘Columbus of the modern experience’, fashioned a normative dom ain by reconceiving truth as reason radiated by love (caritas) (Kr oker and Cook, 1986: 37). ‘Not only is caritas the goal of interpretation, it is also the only reliable m eans of interpretation’ (O ’Donnell, 1985: 25). C aritas ‘inform s an d directs the rhetorical process’ (Settle, 1994: 56), or in St Paul’s term s, ‘love rejoices in the truth’ (I Corinth ian s 13: 6). Conversely, solidarity w ith our neigh bours is only possible over the long term w hen comm unicating virtuously, that is, w hen ‘speaking the truth in love’ (Ephesian s 4: 15). Augustine subverts contem porary discourse w hile retaining a constructive ambience th at links truth w ith m oral principles. Perhaps truth has languished so long in the epistem ological desert that our social com m unication cannot be em ancipated from facts and a ccu r a cy. Meanw hile, th e pow er and dom ination literature insists that no appropriate conception of truth is possible anyhow under prevail-

This term inology is from Sullivan (1992), pp. 317-32.

Marjorie Boyle’s ‘Augustine in the Garden of Zeus,’ (Harvard Theological Review, X, 1990, pp. 11739), and the mini-classic by Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970) provide a subst antial bibliography on Augustine and rhetoric.

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

in g con ditions of system atic distortion and repression.9 For Jacques Derrida, m odern discourse is an arbitrary system of differences, of oppositions and conventions; language is an unending series of signification s allow ing dogm a and official codes to govern hum an existence. Linguistic gam es are said to supercharge the contem porary age, fragm enting it tow ard oblivion. And how realistic are w e in dem anding m ulti-layered explanations from a public m edium such as television, constrained by its technology to visual im m ediacy? For William Jam es truth happens to an idea; and w ith Pilate scoffing at truth, Zen meditation seekin g it in everyday life, Hegel believing in the truth of the organic Gestalt, Brunner insisting on truth as encounter, and Nietzsche calling it a social product, the serpentine entanglem ents of this pregnant term m ay no longer perm it it to be a contem porary beacon. We have not even successfully identified as yet the distinctions that m ake a difference w ithin truth’s sem antic field, though interpretative studies and herm eneutics (Gadam er’s Truth and M ethod and Ricoeur’s History and Truth, for instance) help provide orientation and specificity. Furtherm ore, the idea of a m oral order in w hich to situate truth is only in an em bryonic stage. Bur one particular step forw ard is exceptional, M eaning and M oral O rder, by Princeton sociologist Robert Wu t hnow (1987). He argues that all cultures m aintain a com plex territory along the boundaries betw een the intentional and inevitable, actual behaviour and our aspirations, the conscience and socially constructed m ores (Wuthnow , 1987: 71-5). This value-centred dom ain — dram atized by ritual and m aking hum an life purposive — is a ‘relatively observable set of cultural codes’ (95).1 0 At epiphanal moments w e enter this arena suspended outside our persona, sym bols en abling us to reside sim ultan eously in the intern al an d external (Nagel, 1986). Th us Va cle v Havel and other politicians, parents w ith their children, educators w ork9

But refer to Anthony Giddens’ effort (The Constitution of Society: O utline of the Theory of Structuration, 1984) to reunite pow er and truth.

10 See Paul Ricoeur (1973), pp. 153-65, for a sim ilar argum ent.

Clifford G. Christians

ing w ith students on a philosophy of life, social activists w ith integrity such as Michael Traber — all appeal connotatively to a m oral order beyond them selves w hen they insist that the truth is non-negotiable. Language inflects truth statem ents in locis, yet at the sam e tim e sym bolization situates truth claim s outside our subjectivity. With first foundations no longer a credible anchor for our ethical principles, Robert Wu t h n o w, Paul Ricoeur, Thom as Nagel and their circle are attem pting to locate the latter as conditions of our hum anness. In other w ords, if absolutes over tim e are inconceivable on this side of New ton, can universals be establish ed across hum an space? The intellectual task of the post-Enlightenm ent is em bedding norm ative principles, such as truth, in history, rather than presum ing m odernist m etaphysics. Em m anuel Levinas is but one exam ple of how to proceed. In his classics, Totality and Infinity (1969) and Ethics and Infinity (1985), rhetorical ethics breaks free from tyranny and violence by inscribing itself in the inexhaustible O ther. Infinity exceeds its container in finite being. Infinity cannot be grasped by hum an reach or understood through human reason, though w e desire it totally. We are transfigured through the O ther as unfathom able difference; a third party arrives in our face-to-face encounters — the presence of the w hole of hum anity. In responding to the O ther’s need, a baseline for justice is established across the human race. Ethics is no longer a vassal of philosophical speculation, but is rooted in hum an existence. We seize our m oral obligation and existential condition sim ultaneously. 11 Ep ilogue.The nature of language w as one fascination of eighteenth-century intellectuals. Som e w ere preoccupied w ith the lingual per se, that is, w ith etymology, syntactics and ph onetics. But more im portantly for the issues in this volum e, th e Enlightenm ent as a w hole understood the centrality of language in hum an affairs. For tw o centuries the West has 11

Le vin a s’s w ork is elaborated in three papers presented at the Third National Conference on Ethics, Gull Lake, Michigan, May 1994: Wesley Avram , ‘Discourse and Ethics at the “End” of Philosophy: The Case for Levinas’; Kenneth R. Chase, ‘Rethinking Rhetoric in the Face of the O ther’; and Jeffrey Ediger, ‘The Ethics of Addressability in Em m anuel Levinas’.

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

benefited from and advanced the notion that language is the m atrix of com m unity, the catalytic agent in social form ation. Thus the vision of a m ore dem ocratic international order inevitably m eans revolutionizing our com m unications system s. When truth w ith m oral significance becomes com munication’s definin g feature, the global comm un ity has at least the basic resources for peace, solidarity, m utual respect, and equality. In Jew ish w isdom , truth is tied together w ith m ercy (Genesis 32: 10), w ith m ercy and justice (Isaiah 16: 5), and w ith peace (Zechariah 8: 16). In Psalm 85: 10, ‘Mercy and truth w ill m eet, justice and peace w ill kiss each other.’ Within these linkages, truth is foundational: ‘Justice is turned back, and righteousness stands afar off; for truth has fallen in the public squares, and righteousness cannot enter’ (Isaiah 59: 1415).12 Michael Traber’s books, editorials, and addresses bring this prophetic legacy into its ow n. We face w hat Jürgen Haberm as calls a crisis of legitim ation. What counts as validity after post-structuralism? It is far from settled w hether a credible version of norm ative values in general, and in truthtelling in p a r t icu la r, can be established w ithout assum ing an Enligh tenm ent cosm ology. But this I consider to be a w orthw hile challenge for reflective ethicists, w ho believe that genuine democracy rests on moral principles. For students and practitioners of com m unication, recovering truth as a master norm is preferable to allow ing the public m edia to lurch along through a post-factual m odernity w ith an em pty centre, w hile w e put our scholarly energies into their short-term predicam ents.

12 Sum m arized from Pippert (1989), p. 12.

Clifford G. Christians

References: Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1955). Ethics, trans. N. H. Sm ith. New York: Macm illan. Callahan, Daniel (1984). ‘Autonom y: A m oral good, not a m oral obsession’, The Hastings Center Report, O ctober. Christians, Clifford G., John R Ferr( and P. Mark Fackler (1993). Good N ews: Social Ethics and the Press. New York: O xford University Press. Galilei, Galileo. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, trans. Stillm an Drake (1957). New York: Doubleday. Giddens, Anthony (1979). Central Problems in Social Theory. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. Giddens, Anthony (1984). The C onstitution of Soci ety: O utline of tht Theory of Structuration. Cam bridge: Polity Press.

Pippert, Wesley (199). An Ethics of N ews: A Reporter’s Search for Truth. Washington DC: Georgetow n University Press. Ricoeur, Paul (1973). ‘Ethics and culture: Haberm as and Gadam er in dialogue’, Philosophy Today, 17, 2/4 (Sum m er 1973). Ro rt y, Richard (1979). Philosophy and the M irror of N ature. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Russell, Bertrand (1912). ‘Truth and falsehood’, Problems of Philosophy. London: O xfo rd University Press. Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1961). Emile. London: Dent. Settle, Glenn (1994). ‘Faith, hope and charity: rhetoric as aletheiac act in O n Christian Doctrine’, Journal of Communication and Religion, 17:2 (Septem ber 1994).

Johnson, Mark (1993). M oral Imagination: Impli cations of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sullivan, Dale L. (1992). ‘Kairos and the rhetoric of belief’, Q uarterly Journal of Speech, 78.

Kirkham , Richard L. (1992). T heories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cam bridge, MA: MIT Press.

T ho reau, Henry David (1975). ‘March 31, 1837’, in Early Essays and M iscellanies. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kro k e r, Arthur and David Cook (1986). T he Post modern Scene: Excremental Culture and HyperAesthetics. New York: St Martin’s Press.

Wie n e r, Jon (1989). ‘Talcott Parson ’s role: Bringing Nazi sym pathizers to the US’, The N ation, 6 March 1989.

Levinas, Em m anuel (1969). Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

Wuthnow , Robert (1987). M eaning and M oral O rder. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Levinas, Em m anuel (1985). Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Pbilippe N emo, tran s. Richard A: Co hen. Pittsbu rgh PA: Duquesne University Press. McKinzie, Bruce W. (1994). O bjectivity, Commu nication, and the Foundation of Understanding. Lanham MD: University Press of Am erica. Murphy, Jam es J. (1974). Rhetoric in tht M iddle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. M umford, Lew is (1970). Pentagon of Power. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Nagel, Thom as (1986). View from N owhere. New York: O xford University Press.

O ’Donnell, Jam es J. (1985). Augustine. Boston MA: Tw ayne Publishers.

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Mukhtar Shakanov Zhelto ksan Square o r Mutiny to D efend Fo ur Mo thers

A m ost sensitive, learned m an, A genius of w idest span, Inventor of hydrogen bom bs, Andrei Sakharov, belongs As a true m em ber, one finds, To the guardians of our tim es. O n XXth century lines. In the course of m any years, All fundam ental tears O f this old w orld, for their part, Have passed right through his heart. In 1980 A.D. When he once again, you see, Protested against w hat began Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan The Governm entâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s patience ran dry They cancelled his honours, forby, And all high aw ards did deny. Having baiting scandals then, At the w ord of som e Party m en, To Gorky they packed him aw ay, Where he rem ained, I m ust say, Seven years under house-arrest, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Neath the keen eye of S.S.C 1 Acceding, w hen they thought best, 1

S.S.C. State Security Com m ittee

M ukhtar Shakanov

To a w orld-w ide protest. They set him free from their tricks O n Decem ber 16th, 86. The next m orn, in Alm a-Ata, O n Brezhnev Square, there you are, O ut stepped our bold Kazakh youth. That w as the first splash, in truth, O n a scale not know n in those days, ‘Gainst totalitarian w ays O f the land of Soviet m en, In the spirit of Sakharov then. In the Krem lin Met quickly then The Party superior m en, And all w ere confused as could be. The leader of S.S.C. A m an in his closing years, In his heart then felt, it appears, That soon he w ould be replaced, But a chance cam e to save his face, And to keep him safe in his place. Tw o years before, it appears, His Bureau, And Internal Affairs, Fearing then, am ong other cares, Many “dem ocratic ‘flu’” flares, Had secretly w orked out the form O f operations “Snow -storm ” For repressing a m utinous track. But in testing they w ere held back, Since experim ents, indeed, 38

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

Living people w ould certainly need. But here a success cam e to hand O ne could teach those “dare-devils” grand, So that in republics elsew here They rem em bered the head-chopping there. Yes, he m ust certainly show That his Bureau m ust not go ... And then the Gen. Sec. Would say: “The old m an is not in our w ay Let him go on w orking, and stay!” Supported by inner belief, The State Security Chief, With approval of Politburo, Let experim ent “Blizzard” flow . For the first tim e in their land, At a peaceful m eeting grand, Half m en, And half m aidens there, No truncheons, but spades filled the air. And police dogs w ere set on them then ... They pitied nobody, it’s true! Even w ounded m aidens they drew Along by their hair in the snow, And like logs Into lorries they hurled. In addition, at his ow n w ord, Party boss of all Kazakhstan, Gennady Kolbin, bad m an, Having seized the governing place, O f his countrym an, of the sam e race, Dinm uham ed Kunayev, off he chased To som e factories in Alm a-Ata, Stopped production at night, there you are M ukhtar Shakanov

And secretly then produced Steel staves, and clubs to be used As arm s against any caprice, By sixteen thousand police Though m any of them , all the sam e, Did not w ish to dishonour their nam e... No Procurator’s sanction had they. No judgem ent ‘gainst them , anyw ay. Dem onstrators arrested they threw Into prison, all pitiless too. With those w ho found no room , In the deep nocturnal gloom , They fifty kilom etres race, O ut of tow n, in deep frost apace, And taking off clothes and boots so, Having beaten them senseless below, Just left them , half dead in the snow . ‘Gainst dem onstrators they flew, That special brigade, not a few, Young lads w ith sadistic m inds, Enlisted in earlier tim es, From orphans w ho lived in despair, Having filled m ass-hom es, anyw here. They passed a rough training as w ell, O n a program m e no one w ill tell. A pack of w ild w olves w ere they. I think they w ere fiercer, say, Than the Fascists w ere in their day. More than tw o thousand people they m aim ed, Then m ore, unlaw fully, detained. About ten thousand, not less, Dem onstrating under stress, Were slain, and w ithout redress. 40

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

The Result o f Silent Actio ns Supplem ent to the poem . (Monologue of Kairat Riskulbekov in the deathcham ber of Sem ipalatinsk prison) I dreamed, almost since birth, To live free on this sacred earth, In my own homeland here, W here two clever leaders stand clear Abai, and Auezov, both grand But instead, O God, here I stand In handcuffs, lock and chain, Under guard, and deep in pain, And suffering when me they flog, In a muzzle, like a dog! Itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s stifling in my cell. I get no sleep, as well. From dusk until dawning day; Canâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t close my eyes, anyway. I think, and think, And think. N ow here I stand up, and blink: Those events seem of no import, But in secret, as if in sport, An important role have played In my unpleasant fate... In my carefree childhood years, Very often I went, it appears, To those relatives of mine, Living beyond the far line. There I made social friends with one lad, W hat games in his courtyard then we had! M ukhtar Shakanov

Forgetting all else on this earth, Played football, for all we were worth! He kicked the big football hard Broke a window in the yard. His father, ready to grouse, Came running out of the house, And angrily shaking his head: “N ow, who has done that?” he said. The lad just trembled with fear, Kept silent - no word could you hear. Then father his question re-said; His son, with a low-bent head, N o single word still said... “1 see!” said his dad in the end; “That means it must be your friend! W hat need to get friends like that, With a hooligan, though still young, W ho nonetheless holds his tongue?” I was deeply offended that day, To the depths of my soul, I must say. Then suddenly, up came a maid, W hite bow, on her hair displayed She’d seen what took place, on the side, And went up to father, and cried: “In vain you accuse your son’s guest! The guilty one can’t stand the test. It was not he, but your son!” M y tears then began to come, And I turned round, made a run... After several years had passed by, We met again, 42

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

He and I. We both were young student-men. Well, we met, And what happened then?! As her birthday was drawing near, That sharp-eyed maid did appear, With big white bows, and a smile, But having matured meanwhile, A real beauty now, not mute She studied in our Institute, And succeeded In waking in me Those feelings, as bright as can be!.. M y previous friend, at that, Then right beside her sat, And was happy, so I trust, To enjoy, as a close friend must, Her fullest belief and trust... ... Upon our frosty way, O n that December day, I barely persuaded him then To go with us other young men. We found ourselves, I must own, With demonstrators unknown, W ho marched with their slogan ahead: “W e demand free speech!” they said “All nations are equal in right!” “Democratic reform is in sight!” We went toward Central Square, But in order to get there, Three kilometres lay ahead, And then l suddenly said: M ukhtar Shakanov

“D’ you remember you broke the glass, But let the blame on me pass?” “So that’s how it stays with you? For that football I kicked through, I’m cut off from your friendship too? Let’s forget that infant offence, And let’s again be friends!” I trustfully shook his hand, We went on together, and... At one certain moment then, We both, at the same time As punctual men, Took a look at our watches, see, Took a look at each other did we, Then a smile broke through, All smirky Exactly 11.30.! O nly afterwards I knew W hat a tragic coincidence too! At that very moment there, O n the western side of the Square, A young guardsman then was slain. The killer escaped unseen, And none in the crowd could name, But somebody noted, it’s true, That he wore a jacket of blue... After ten days or so had passed, Kolbin gave a stern order at last As the Public O rder head: “If in three days”, he said, “The murderer is not found, 44

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Then officials all around Would be dismissed from their place.” This, under-dogs could not face, And each of those tracker-men Wished to gain approval then, In the eyes of that great Chief, O r else they would come to grief. So three men came to my cell, Among them my tracker as well. By force they dressed me too, In a jacket all coloured blue. Then took me outside in the street, And photographed me, head to feet, Against a background of trees, And various buildings to please. And then those photos were sent, With accusative document, And as a result, you see, I became the owner free O f that cursed jacket of blue, W hich means - the murderer too! A lying witness serene. W ho from his window had “seen” M e there in my jacket of blue, And had recognized me too, And knew me as “killer” at last, Even after two weeks had passed! Then they started to judge in Court, W here witnesses, all of one sort, O ne after the other came out, And my name began to shout, And brought my shame about. M ukhtar Shakanov

Then some were sorry for me... The times were mixed up, you see, In Kazakhstan, Year ‘37. And therefore I understood even All there, excepting one, W ho sat in the back row alone, W ith timidly downcast eyes. M y “childhood friend” - what surprise W ho did not dare to explain: At that fatal moment we twain At 11.30 that day W ere not on the Square, anyway, But at the end of the town... Just one word by him set down, O ne word of truth then would win, And they would liberate ine, From false accusations set free. At Court they gave me Last word. And when I explained, and all heard The false accusation absurd, Then my mother, Tormented by fears, Broke out into unbidden tears, And suffered unbearable pain... I wanted to cheer her again. But otherwise it turned out. Her words, full of woe and doubt, Engraved themselves in my mind, Like titles on stones you find: “I beg you believe his word He speaks so true! - Its absurd 46

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

To doubt him, and think he lies. To be a real poet he tries... Someone else to deprive of life God save us! He’d never survive! He couldn’t offend a flea! Believe him, And then believe me, Good people, set this man free, And best results you will see...” I shouted, the pain to relieve: “O mama,I beg you, Don’t grieve!” W hen the jury their sentence gave, Condemning me to the grave, M y mother fell into a fit. I tore away from my guard, W ith all my strength tugged hard, And tried to get to her side But my guard this action denied, Thrust me back, my will defied... The jury arose to go, And people divided also, Then something occurred unforeseen A delicate maiden serene, W ith slightly slanting eyes, University student likewise, A future jurist was she, W hom only once did I see At our W riters’ Club, at a loss Tulen Abdikov’s day, it was And right angrily she cried: M ukhtar Shakanov

“Y ou set justice quite aside! You cheekily sweep on your way, And falsify facts, I say, W hile your victim, tried by you, Stood up for the truth he knew, And his head he did not bend, But manfully did defend N ot only himself to the end, But all our Kazakh young men, W ho were on the Square yesterday then. Common interests did he protect, And tomorrow you may expect, A N ational Hero he’ll be! Then people on you will spit Excuse me for saying it, Here, in your shameless pit!” Two youths (From the S.S.C.) Then led her away, from me... And one more thing I recall, From far days, when I was small: M y father had a friend. All our family, in the end, Just loved this friend as well, Especially I, let me tell! Then suddenly - no more he came. I almost forgot his name. Then later I heard from mama, That at a big meeting, papa Was openly accused, And his right to reply refused. His friend then held his tongue. 48

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

At that moment W het this was done, Although he very well knew That father was innocent too, And he himself said so He would not come to woe. After that had come to an end, M y father broke off from his friend. I was sorry to see him go, And therefore I told him so: “Dear Papa,” I said at the end, “W eren’t you too severe with your friend, And did not trust him as well?” But my father had this to tell: “Remember, my son, at least, The one who’s a coward in peace, Will betray you all the more In decisive moments at war!” And here is Fate’s irony; W hat my father had said to me Changed then To a great tragedy. Such an outcome M y foes I don’t wish Even accusers, that is, And even those judges amiss, W ho pushed me in the abyss... The art of the “Blizzard” m ove Lay not bad crim e to prove, But to beat Dem onstrators dow n, And then that all to crow n By artfully changing round M ukhtar Shakanov

All the evidence they found, Im portant papers destroy, And m uddled-up facts em ploy, So that Sherlock Holm es, no doubt, Despite his desire so stout, Just could not sort them out! Well, here is one event Which before the Com m ission w ent, For judgem ent of w hat had occurred; A m aiden - take m y w ord With the fam ily nam e Bakit, Which translated m eans “happiness” Was killed w hen she w as hit By a sapper’ s spade on the head, O n Decem ber 17th. Dead. And hidden from people’s view In Militia cellars too... Tw o w eeks later, at dead of night, Thus secretly, out of sight, Laid her bleak corpse in her bed In the students’ hostel instead. They straightw ay called First Aid, To establish the death of that m aid, From cardiac failure, you see, The Procurator, ah m e, Show ed envied activity The dem anded list received O f all w ho had seen and believed, Those students and teachers as w ell Who affirm ed w hat First Aid tell, That they had also seen, Yes, altogether, I m ean, Each w ith his ow n pair of eyes, 50

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Her end in the bed w here she lies. The Com m ission could then nohow Prove the of violent action now, And thus they gave their vow. This beginning of w ilful w oe, Which as “Blizzard” people know, Got settled in Alm a-Ata, Then in places, near end afar, In Tbilisi, and in Baku, The Kazakhstan dw ellers too Were alm ost choked by fear. To w rite or speak, it’s clear, Was then allow ed alone In a very darkened tone, And nobody took the risk, To break that directive brisk, Which w as given, sure enough To low er ones, from above.

The Price o f Co w ardly Fo retho ught Supplem ent to the poem . (From a 1987 album ) In W aterloo, for a start, In Brussels southern part, In a wonderful, picturesque spot, Bonaparte, the Emperor hot, Led a cruel, furious fray ‘Gainst Duke W ellington’s men, in his way. And Gerard von Blucher, that day. He became the victim there O f one with a far-sighted air A cowardly General, I swear. M ukhtar Shakanov

... M arshal Grouchy sat dumb, By a sleepy camp-fire numb. The rain then slowly poured. N ot far off, the cannons roared... And General Gerard, who knew The M arshal’s hesitance too, Piped up: “W ould it please your ear An Eastern parable here?” Grouchy slowly nodded his head, And Gerard hastened and said: “There was once a ruler,I wist, W ho squeezed a bird in his fist, And then asked his Vizier; ‘Is it living or dead, tell me clear?’ The Vizier caught on straightway: If ‘The bird is dead!’ I say, The leader will let fingers fly, And the bird will soar up in the sky! If ‘The bird is alive!’ I say, He will squeeze still harder that way, And the bird will be crushed stone-dead!” And therefore the Vizier replied: “O master, who reigns far and wide, The fate of that poor little bird Depends on your hand, and your word! ... Understand me, M arshal now, The fate of France, somehow, Like the fate of that small bird, Depends on your hand, And your word. O ur Emperor’s starting to fade Let us go at once to his aid!” The M arshal Then turned from the fire 52

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

His gloomy glance, and looked higher: “I can’t, my dear fellow, do so. I am ordered to follow, you know, The retreating hostile foe!” The officers started their speech, And each broke in upon each: “W e pray and beg of you, Turn round your army, do!” “W hat orders now can I give, W hen our Emperor scarce wants to live?” “W ell, think, and think clearly do The victory rests just with us! That is clear to a child even thus, So think, and don’t drive us wild!” The M arshal thought, indeed, For fifteen seconds complete, W hile everyone held their breath In the deafening silence of death! W hat moments there are in life! O n the seeming-wide brow, during strife O f that medium-minded man, O f that indecisive pan, O f that weak-willed M arshal here, W hich fell into wrinkles clear, There trembled the fate of France, And all Europe in war-time dance. How tormentingly slow at last Those fifteen seconds passed! To break orders he did not dare, That eminent M arshal there: «N o, I cannot - all the same!» With a sigh the answer came. And France, at that moment therefore M ukhtar Shakanov

Completely lost the war! It’s everywhere understood O ne tree does not make a wood, And one soldier’s no army, forby! But can one really deny The role of the man at the wheel, And those all around him who feel The effect O f various means W hich influence him, it seems... Along the mountain road Went a ‘bus with its children’s load. O f a sudden, the brakes gave way. The driver, without delay, Jumped out, and no child did save He felt too near the grave... In Court, someone rightly said; “The driver bears guilt; for those dead!” ... Another one added then: “W e are guilty too, we men, And parents, and teachers too!” And the TV he had in view In short - society all through!... How much in this world does depend O n taking a risk, near the end. O n the spirit of one brave man, W ho tomorow, who knows, then can Be sitting behind the wheel! God grant that he may feel, W hen he comes to the cross-road quirk, In that second he cannot shirk, W hen the brakes refuse to work, That he must not tremble within, 54

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

N or seek to save his skin, And give up control of the wheel, For such cowardice, he must feel, W hen society gets to hear, Will certainly cost him dear! There exists a secret tie ‘Tween the well, and the ocean, forby. So the driver, and that M arshal too, In the ‘bus, and the Government, knew N ot all are base, who don’t risk. But if there’s no risk to fear Then character will disappear... At the crossing Z ailisk-Alatau, O ne more autobus is seen now, But the driver Lacks moral support, Does not trust himself, as he ought. His hands are both trembling - and why Somebody who sits nearby Holds the door-handle, on the sly, And he’ll save the driver thus, N ot the people in the ‘bus. - ?... When these verses I read to them , To Gennady Kolbin then, In Central Com m ittee cabinet, With his fellow -thinkers yet, He exploded: “Who have you in view ? If it’s us, M ukhtar Shakanov

You ought to-know, Every loud voice Echoes so... But that later on com es about. Meanw hile seething new s got out Through w orld-w ide regions, no doubt. A large group O f Kirghizian youth, Having heard of reprisals uncouth, Against their brother-Kazakhs, Tried to break into Alm a-Ata, Crossing over the Kordaisk pass, And supporting them , if they found pow er, In that sad and difficult hour. But the iron hand of the Pow er Stopped that, at the half w ay gate... O n the streets of Istanbul, With m utineers’ cavalry full, Were dem onstrating, like m ad, Fam ous activists anew, Czechoslovaks and Englishm en too. Ronald Regan, from USA, Nobel Prize-w inner Lex Valenca, From Bonn, Helm uth Shaver, George Conrad, from Budapest there, Though new spapers and TV, And “Freedom ” Radio, see, All branded them w ith sham e With tyrannous pow er they cam e Upon Kazakhs’ ow n land!.. And our suppressed land couldn’t stand Against that bitter truth, Kept deadly silence, forooth! 56

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

Ro cks in the Land o f Info rmers Supplem ent to the poem . Intelligentsia reign high Without them I am not I. Like smoke, without a flame, Without it you’re not the same. Like a bird without its wings, Poor helpless, hopeless things, Like a harlot who no longer swings, Without them, the folk is no folk, Just a shapeless mass, no joke! And therefore We must protect From the hatred of despots select, From blows aimed at the spine, From nameless informers in time, Intellectuals having no shield, M oral base of the national field But tomorrow will be too late, For tomorrow we cannot wait! ...W hy in 1937 Was the Land of Soviets riven, And became an informers’ land? W hy on maps of history, to hand, Appeared GULAG Government Camps...2 And why did they specially invent Certain «groupings» of Various “foes”; And “Three Judges” Punishing those, W hose sentences 2

Governm ent lagers or prison-cam ps w here folk w ere beaten, and killed...

M ukhtar Shakanov

N o one could change? W hy did treachery so widely range, And betrayal, and scornful lies, And why did they idealize That Pavlik M orozov, likewise? The one who betrayed his own sire!? And why, in the fatherland then, O f Stalin’s and Beria’s men, Accusing by anonymous notes, Did they choke 1 in 8 Georgian throats? As in the proverb, they say: “If the storm makes a camel sway, Then look for small goats in the sky!” And if without any end, All round and about there stands The split-toothed Kremlin grand, From the ruler’s native land Then what can you demand In “provinces” not at hand? In Kazakhstan, let’s say, In whose regions not far away, Solzhenitsin they later throw As an obvious “Ardent foe”, O f totalitarians all. And one Chief Gave a threatening law: “Every guard of Internal Affairs, In the course of a week must declare N ot less than Three ‘people’s foes’, O r otherwise we shall count those 58

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

Also as people’s foes”. So in all our land round about, Triumphantly broke out An ideological hate Search everyone, in full spate, And mate betrayed his mate. Like milk in foment did run, W hen standing in the hot sun, And mutual relations were spoiled, Folk’s minds and characters soiled! If in some circle small, Somebody said ought at all, Straight out, or on the side, O r the common line denied, Some other opinion took O f the leader, And things around - look All those who then stood by, Had to inform straightway The Secret Police on that day. The first to give friends away Saves his Home-land and Chief in the fray, Proves his faithfulness, they say. And then he has some hope O f escaping The hang man’s rope. But he who with words was late, O r thought the need was not great, And paid no attention to this, Fell at once Upon the black-list, From which a straight road led To GULAG, or being shot dead, M ukhtar Shakanov

Because he did not denounce, N or upon “folk-enemies” pounce, N or different-minded ones trounce. A learned poet of fame, Akhmet Baitursinov by name, W ho was thus given away By a circle of “friends”, so to say, Kept silence, deep in his cell. His sly questioner, truth to tell, Was a sadist of highest type, W hose knowledge of torture was ripe, And he put into practice there M ore than twenty torments bare, O ut of over a hundred known, Worked out by the headsmen alone, In old times by people shown. He wanted to test the best, With a stubborn heart In their breast, Some forty or so, in their stall, And to his life’s end recall, With blissful feeling aflare, Like favourite music there, Their howls, Their groans, Their tears... Upon his breast he wears The Red Banner O rder award, W hich shows valour in its lord, Presented then personally, By Kalinin, W hose goat-beard you see! 60

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

That fanatic inspector then For months A-tormenting men, Baitursinov tortured too, Using methods ever new, Inhuman torture gave he, But as a result, you see, Gained nothing materially. Before victimâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s faith in flower, Before his spiritual power, Before his intelligence too His own self belief Fell through. He had to confess, at the end: â&#x20AC;&#x153;All those whom I questioned, my friend W ell, I simply made them dance To my flute I made them prance! But are you, my dear old chap, An exception here, mayhap? How can I allow it to be, That through your obstinacy A shadow falls upon me, O n my firm reputation, see, W hen only two years remain Before my pension I gain?! Come, let us on this agree, As man to man let it be Just give the name to me O f one person at least, still free, Let it be your rival, maybe, O r even your worst enemy, So long as someone you betray, M ukhtar Shakanov

Then I shall be quiet that day, And I shall get you free way. Go off, wherever you will, Any quarter your needs will fill, And I promise, if you agree, To keep it known only by me!..” Baitursinov, to answer disgrace, Just spat in the sadist’s face... ... He was shot at the dawning hour, With his spiritual power In full flower... Those false intellectuals then, Those rogues, and careerist men, With mercenary morals too They all survived and came through. So with “activists” such as these, In our cultural sphere, if you please, There happened, just as things went, An anecdotal event... A lad there was, fate decrees, Looked much like a Japanese. They arrested him, by-the bye, As a Japanese agent-spy. Poor lad - like a child he cried: “How is that? I have never lied N o Japanese have I seen!” “But you have! Come, confess where you’ve been” They beat him, to his distress, Until he lost consciousness. Then he later howled all night, 62

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

Fellow-captives put in a plight; Then his capturer whispered clear, To him, right close, in his ear: “There are two ways you can go Either stand out manly so, Through all the testing of fate, And die with dignity great, And keep in that way your face O r confess, put aside disgrace, That you did really lie, And are a Japanese spy, And as their agent you came To tell your tale, play your game. And we can believe what you tell, And in your confession as well. But then you’ll be bound to betray Somebody you know, anyway, A near acquaintance or friend In one moment you then will be A political hero, you see, O f international rank! Your inspector then will thank, W ill receive a higher charge, For exposing this ‘espionage’”! Important enemies, though, We could not treat just so And could not silently shoot. They’ll be sent to Siberian waste, For twenty-five years’ disgrace! O ur land cannot thus contrive, And living on needles survive! All will change in time, maybe O ur leader grows older, you see... M ukhtar Shakanov

But he may last Twenty years yet... A new ruler then you’ll get, And you will return from afar... And he to Alma-Ata, Then returned and drew fresh breath, N ineteen years After Stalin’s death! W hat a price, though, he had to pay! He gave eleven away, All innocent people too, Including his cell mate true, W ho “advised” him what to do! Under such a thought-up hell, And false accusations as well, In the previous Soviet land, Were repressed, all out of hand, Amass of women and men, O f fifteen million then. All that was methodically done ‘Gainst each intellectual one, W ho refused to be standardized, And believed in his own eyes; ‘M id the mass of flatterers there And sometimes kept silence bare, N o applauding hands in the air! Intellectuals are a great force. W hen fools took the opposite course Beimbet M ailin, named as foe O f the folk, they his wife also, Sent off to the Camp ALZ HIR,3 3

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Akm olinsk Prisoners’ Cam p for w om en traitors

And their children threw out of the gate To suffer the tricks of Fate. All friends their writer denied, And shielding themselves tried to hide. And then Gabit M usrepov, In Committee his steam let off: “O ur nation’s great son,” said he, “Beimbet M ailin, must be free! To count him a foe of the folk Is a stupid, blasphemous joke. If he’s a foe, I am too, His fellow-thinker, it’s true! And I do not wish to remain, And be called a betrayer again. In the Party ranks, anyway, W hich name him a traitor today That most trustworthy man, O f honest men in the van!” He then on the table threw His red Party Ticket too, And thus he quitted the hall, With proud head, straight and tall... That was a challenge thrown To a heartless regime, well-known, And that whiskered dictator-boss. That evening, a colleague, at loss, W ho called himself clever too, And intellectual all through, Phoned M usrepov, and said his word: “W e are sorry that this has occurred! Well, twice times two makes four M ukhtar Shakanov

You won’t need your flat any more, So you might as well leave it to us, And we’ll be glad of it thus, And from time to time we too Will put up a prayer for you!” W hen that history of old To Andrei Sakharov I told, He thought for a little while, Then said, with a sad, slow smile: “If I ever get so far, And visit Alma-Ata, Upon his grave I shall lay Red roses in a bouquet...” But Fate’s word is always the last: W hen a mere three months had passed, Sakharov was already dead... O n M usrepov’s birthday instead, I took a red rose bouquet To the writer’s grave on that day, In the Kensaisk graveyard grey. O n the ticket I wrote this way: “To intellectual M usrepov, From intellectual Sakharov.” For long on the bench I sat, Remembering both, at that, In which they were both alike — In ability to strike, In deeds of their intellect, In fearful times acting correct, Those two great spirits, Grand souls, 66

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Like cliffs, W here the sea of life rolls M y teachers of highest goals. Repressive acts are alike, Whenever, w herever they strike. Whatever the m ethod used, With m uch the sam e Feelings infused. That Hitler-thought-up idea O f deadening people’s ear With m usical pow ers untold, In Safety Com m ittees of old, Developed this new -found «art» In their buildings, right from the start. Such “Musical Room s” w ere found, With equipm ent all around, The last w ord in technical sound. In those “room s” it w as com fy too, As in luxury suites, m ark you, O r apartm ents in a hotel. There m ad m usic resounded as w ell, From the w alls, The ceiling, the floor, From the furniture, w hat’s m ore, Many-toned, and rem inding us, say, O f the flood of m usic today, O f m ass “culture”, to w hich folks sw ay, Which surrounds this w orld of ours, In the course of several hours. That young m aid Raushan, I sw ear, Beaten dow n by brutes on the Square, M ukhtar Shakanov

And throw n then into a van, Found herself by a blood-stained young m an, Who’d been killed by a blow from a spade, With his tongue hanging out of his head. She did not know , that naive m aid That from a deadly Blow on the nape, The tongue falls out of the m outh agape For the first tim e in her life Raushan Saw w ith horror The tongue of a m an, So long, and so red... And she started to shake For pity’s sake The m urdered lad, To m ake him aw ake - but no luck she had “You fool, he’s long been lying dead!” Grinding his teeth, The driver said: “And w e’ll soon be finished w ith you And you’ll keep him com pany too!” When she w rote A note about that, I, w ho as High Com m isioner sat, O n exam ining her affair Stinking things that happened there Gave her perm ission the Court to quit But in cam e Kegebeshnik’s m en With a special task from Moscow then, And caught the girl, and brought her here O n the experim ental track In the w ell-equipped “Music Room ”... After seances Which took m any hours, 68

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

They let her out... Q uite robbed of her pow ers, She sat on a bench Near the auto-bus stop Hands over ears, And ready to flop. Her head w as buzzing, And long she cried. And w hen she w anted To go hom e and hide O God above! She just couldn’t think O f her hom e address And that m ade her blink, And filled her w ith fear, So back then she w ent Full of fury, w ith spiteful intent With both her fists she beat on the door. O f that Grey House, And began to roar: “Torturers! What you did, just see! You robbed m e of m y m em ory. Say, tell m e now Just w here do I live?” So you see How creative m usic does change Into m usic of a destructive range! When the Suprem e Soviet w as set, They decided Sakharov should get His old title “Thrice Hero” back, And his other aw ards, lying slack. But he quietly answ ered them so: M ukhtar Shakanov

“I have not the right now , you know , To accept them again in a row, While other’s rights are not restored, All the captives of conscience, now floored, Arrested, im prisoned, and ignored.” At their first session so far, People’s Deputees, USSR, Transm itted for all to see, O n international TV With set-backs, m y w ord I gained, And I at once proclaim ed, How Alm a-Ata w as sham ed By its w ild abuse of pow er, And dem anded Justice, that hour! The effect w as just like a bom b, Exploding all Evil and Wrong. Then Andrei Sakharov arose, Cam e up to m e, stood close, And pressed m y hand in a vice, And said, in a quiet voice: “O ur thanks to you, dear m ate!” He, a Russian, at any rate, O God! He thanked m e, no doubt, Because I w as first to shout For our offended youth, And because I told the truth, O f hum iliation, and scorn. Then som e of m y people, w ell-born, But false intellectuals, see, Who feared they m ight be dism issed, Just turned from m e With a tw ist... 70

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

In that difficult tim e O f m y life, With all State structures at strife, When they tried by every w ay My activities to stay, And thus to hinder cares tense O f inspecting Decem brist events, With Sakharov aiding m e, So fatherly m oral w as he, In supporting m e w here m y path led, Introduced Boris Yeltsin, And said: “An im portant act he’s achieved That act w as a w ord w e believed, And now w e m ust help him too, To see that his w ord goes through. Yes, that is a dangerous path. Can he Stand firm to the last? Yes, he him self m ust hold fast!” For Sakharov No w oes could ignore, He felt our tragedy m ore, Not less sharp, I’m bound to say, Than any Kazakh on that day. Therein his greatness you see, And his high hum anity. O ur courage w e m ust not forget, If today’s young States are set Having been M ukhtar Shakanov

In the Soviet line In sovereign liberty fine, They proudly raised ahead The banner of freedom instead. Then in that there surely does rest A certain m ite, Sm all, of the best. Although a tiny, Sad gift, For those bold youngsters, a lift, As they w ent out O n the Square, In Alm a-Ata, in the bare And frosty Decem ber days there, With firm dem ands, you see, For freedom , dem ocracy... (Translated into English by W alter M ay)

We thank both the translator Friedrich Hitzer (Germ any) and the editor Ernst Piper of the Pendo Verlag, Zürich, for having made available this political Poem - w ich w ill appear in its Germ an version in Zürich by Septem ber 1999: “Irrw ege der Zivilisation - ein kasachischer Gesang”.

Chingis Aitm atov Battlefield o r O asis The Issyk Kul Forum seeks answers to urgent questions In a certain sense everybody is a â&#x20AC;&#x153;nationalistâ&#x20AC;? - this is m y sincere opinion, since the ethnic affiliation of any hum an being and the resultant bond linking him or her to the fate of a nation is alw ays historically predeterm ined. Wherever w e go in the w orld, w e continue to feel the bonds of our national affiliation, coloured by everthing from our original tribal instincts to the cosm opolitan philosophies of universal hum anism . It is w ithin these boundaries that the spirit of national culture is nourished. But from these origins the spirit of internationalism , dialogue and interaction betw een peoples also develops. A national culture accordin gly h as a double nature. O n the one hand it is som ething earthy and origin al, som ething separate from and stran ge to others, but on the other han d it is also destin ed to rem ain part of a com m on origin: it is on e of the supports for the spiritual roof w hich covers the heads of all peoples. To the exten t th at a n ational culture defines its ow n pristine character as its m ost im portan t priority, som ething w hich has given rise to its ow n un ique an d self-sufficient quality in the w orld roun d about, it contributes actively to shaping the national self-consciousness of a people, enabling it to m aintain its ethnic tradition s an d to express a national w ay of thinking an d of view in g the w orld. The self-portrait of an ethnic group necessarily includes m ythological m aterials underlying the genesis of its national aw areness as w ell as real facts marking its ch ronological developm ent. Each nation looks first and forem ost into its ow n m irror in assessing the history, culture and religion it has inherited. Each nation is perceived by others prim arily through the prism of its national characteristics and its capacity to coexist w ith others. In th e overall pan oram a of the w orldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s peoples th ere is, h ow eve r, also a global and supranation al task w h ich is just as vital for th e Chingis Aitmatov

w hole of th e h um an race, n am ely the developm en t an d syn thesis of com m on h um an an d spiritual values, th e grow th and prosperous developm en t of eth nic an d cultural variety on com m on ground, w hich im plies h arm ony am on g th e civilizations th at enrich and fertilise each other through their com m on efforts. This does not exclude the possibility of dram atic collisions. Experience of th e tragic is part of the endless path w e follow in our ceaseless efforts to perfect m an kin d an d society. History and the present alike bear clear testim ony to the fact that these paths are subject to colossal historic trials w hich affect the existence and the fate of w h ole generations as w ell as th e relations betw een nations and States. They unleash w ars and lead to bloodshed of regional and universal dim ensions. Here, too, history and present experience reveal to us the origins of such trials. The source of conflicts and w ars, of incitement to ethnic confrontation, lies usually in political passions, im perial am bitions, a disposition tow ards separatism and in dependence, an d in national and religious prejudices and conflicts. All this is accom panied by dogged fanaticism and violence, and it ends in perm anent disaster, in privation and catastrophe – in the ruin of w hole peoples. In the shadow of such events, the forces interested in pushin g history in this direction rem ain h id d e n – forces w hich reap huge profits from the events in question, prim arily through arm am ents deals. In this respect the tw en tieth century seems to be heading, as it ends, tow ards a period of global upheaval. In this connection, w e should bear in m ind particularly the events associated w ith tensions betw een ethnic groups w hich, in politics as in daily life, divide hum an beings into their ow n people and foreigners, “ours” and “theirs”. These events are caused not only by the struggle for independen ce, the quest for national dignity and recognition by others w hich is carried forw ard through the dynam ic im petus of the national spirit, but also by nationalistic claim s, tribalism and fanaticism - by the fact that the search for a w ay out of the crises of national ideology that are being fought out on the ground of populistic excesses and pseudopatriotism has got stuck in a 74

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

dead end. All this is correspondingly reflected, one w ay or another, in the developm ent and m utation of national cultures. In this w ay the national factor is becom ing the biggest problem of ethnic and geopolitical life at the end of the tw entieth century. It is precisely here that circumstances are becom ing tangled in a knot of extremely serious dangers for m odern civilization. Th e dialectic of th e struggle that is goin g on in the w orld h as chan ged. The confron tation betw een different social and econ om ic system s - socialism versus capitalism - has now becom e less im portant than the critical evolution of national con flicts, w h ich are som etim es fateful, im placable and lastin g; th ey are tragic and represen t a difficult challenge. In various parts of the w orld th e n ation al factor is leading to ever greater chauvinism . This chauvin ism , in turn, is boun d up w ith convictions born of arrogance, the arrogance of believing oneself to belong to an elect group; it arouses the forces in a society w hich are m arked by a pseudo-national con sciousn ess and can m ake their w ay only in h ostility and aggression tow ards oth ers. Such ch auvin ism bears a placard reading “patriotism ” at the head of th e parade but is in fact a deadly enem y of th e un iversal values represen ted by dem ocracy an d tolerance. In this connection the role and task of national cultures that incorporate national modes of thinking are acquiring enormous significance. A national culture m ust cherish and preserve ethical standards in relationships w ith other peoples. Such ethical standards should be imparted to children w ith their m other’s m ilk. We m ust proceed from the assum ption that conflicts betw een ethnic groups arise and m ature above all in the heads of individuals, in the “Weltanschauung” of m en and their understanding of the w orld. And yet our common life together, mutual understan ding amon g the peoples of the w orld, sh ould be approached in a realistic and unbiased w a y. Let us, for heaven’s sake, view the history of th e w orld’s peoples in a m anner free of all fanatical and egoistic thinkin g! Whoever revives the historic claim s of a nationalistic system is bringing the past in to th e present in a m ost dangerous w ay. Chingis Aitmatov

Neo-nationalistic thinkers are endeavouring to revive such tendencies of national revanchism and to use them for their ow n purposes. And religious revivals, w hich often have a fanatical and violent char acter, only serve to m ake this picture even m ore com plicated. In our ow n tim e the tragic events that h ave taken place in the form er Yugoslavia an d m an y other sim ilar situations in the post-Soviet w orld provide vivid exam ples of w h at I m ean . Ethn ic, national and religious feelings w hich had long been suppressed un der the pressure of a pow erful totalitarian regim e rose sudden ly to th e surface. O nce these feelin gs h ad burst forth explosively, th e situation required an im mediate national and political solution - in som e cases involving th e creation of tiny States. In the course of th is process som e groups, in asserting th eir ow n national and religious beliefs, not infrequen tly attacked the righ ts of others - usually n eighbourin g peoples - thereby escalating already present conflicts and paving th e w ay to uncom prom ising con fron tation. In som e instances century-old problems, now barely smouldering, w ere fanned anew and hostile passions separating nations w ere kindled. Representatives of the national intelligensia - above all historians, w riters an d journ alists - sent their ow n sparks flying as ultim atum s , w hether w illingly or unw illingly, further inflam ed the nationalistic and chauvin istic mood of th eir peoples. Patriotism can be a n oble sentim ent, but it harbours dangers w hen the source of its inspiration is devoid of all w isdom and all balanced sense of reality. O n the threshold of the new m illennium the w orld is experiencing a catastrophic phase of its history. As so often in the past, the w orld is doing its best to com plicate the problem s of existence on earth. This being so, it w ould perhaps be appropriate to quote a few lines from a paper I read to the Issyk Kul Forum in 1986. At that intern ational m eeting of a group of intellectuals I said, am ong other things: â&#x20AC;&#x153;We should not assum e th at the life of m ankin d is n ecessarily going to becom e easier in th e future, even if w e succeed in m aintain in g peace on earth un der th e m ost favourable con dition s. If this endeavour sh ould succeed, it w ill be on ly at th e price of a violent 76

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

struggle of hum an beings w ith th em selves and their ow n nature, w ith their natural conservatism and th eir age-old ten dency tow ards national and region al egoism , egoism based on States and blocs of States. In the w hirl of the w orld’s affairs hum an beings m aintain their balan ce like storm -tossed chips of w ood on the sea. It w ill be all th e m ore significant, then, w h en w e ach ieve victory over ourselves, over the deep-rooted in stincts an d prejudices, th e m istrust an d m utual h o s t ilit y, th at w e h ave felt in th e past. We can see, after all, how difficult this is for people, not on ly in in ter-State relation s but also in com m on everyday m atters of life, w hen the paths of dem ocracy and c a n d o u r, civilized, hum ane trust, are con stan tly bein g sabotaged by vicious acts of terror - sen seless an d brutal attacks w h ich reduce th e value of hum an lives to sm all change. These horrors are of con cern to us all, w herever w e live; in this sense there is n o such thing as th e grief of oth ers.” More than ten years have passed since then. Even so, I have the im pression that practically nothing - or better, nothing at all - has changed in our lives. As w e continue the Issyk Kul Forum , w e should devote ourselves to a discussion of social and political trends in the postSoviet era and concentrate on the them e: “National and global aspects of cultures in present-day conflicts”. Here it w ill be particularly appropriate to m ention the venue of our m eetin g. The Issyk Kul Forum has found the region of Cen tral Asia to be the m ost suitable site for discussion of the th eme I h ave referred to. Th ose w ho know and appreciate the present situation feel that Central Asia is by nature an ideal region because h ere w e can grasp, better than an yw here else, th e new paradigm of history and of the spiritual evolution of society. Central Asia borders on Russia and China as w ell as on Iran and Afgh anistan; here w e have all the interw oven elem en ts of ethnic and religious tension, here w e w itness the process of transform ation of national cultures under the assault of m ass-culture in the inform ation age. And all th is is happen ing at a tim e of dem ocratic tran sformation, at a tim e w hen w e are searching for a w ay out of successive econom ic crises. Chingis Aitmatov

O ne further circum stance should be m entioned w hich underlines the significance and the present im portance of the issues confronting us. In our opinion the problem s of m odern national cultures seem all the more drastic if w e view them in the context of the rapidly w orsening m ulti-layered conflicts confronting us at the end of the tw entieth century and of the collisions betw een civilizations that seem likely to threaten us in the future. All this is happening in the circumstances prevailing since the end of the cold w ar, circumstances in w hich w orld culture is em erging as a force w hich can both separate and unite peoples. This culture is becom ing m ore and m ore im portant in the life of our planet and in one w ay or another is bound to affect the fate of national cultures and of the w orldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s religions. To this extent, national cultures, their transform ations and their ethnic and religious conflicts - accom panied by im portant social and political processes - are bound to take first place in the social life of our tim e. If w e consider the future of th e peoples and cultures of Cen tral Asia in the light of th e general tendencies observable at the present tim e, w e find ourselves confronted by a num ber of question s. What should the future m odel be for the political and cultural development of Central Asia at the end of the tw entieth and the begin ning of the tw entyfirst century? An d how can th e tragic upheavals of the past be avoided - even ts that un leash ed consequences lastin g for d ecades and even c e n t u r ie s ? Given its unusual and special position, Central Asia has alw ays been close to the interface betw een centres of pow er and has accordingly felt the destructive consequences of conflicts of varying severity at various times. From antiquity through the early Middle Ages the most varied civilizations have collided here in battle: the civilization of ancien t Rom e and the civilization of th e Steppes, the Turkish and Iranian civilizations as w ell as th e Arabic and th e Chinese. From the geopolitical standpoint this region has alw ays been a territory m arked for conquest; it w as a region of transit, and also a buffer or interm ediate zone w hose inhabitants w ere thus som etim es protected against imm ediate contact w ith the enem y. 78

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

To d a y, too it seem s to us that Central Asia h as reached a decisive historical stage in its development. O ne possibility, of course, is that it w ill slip into the pacifist role th at geopolitical destin y seem s to hold ready for it. Interaction betw een the fam iliar centres of pow er - China, Russia, the Middle East, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and also the land of Tajikistan, w hich is in the grip of civil w ar - determ ines the basic options. Do w e w ish once again to be a battlefield w here the special interests of external and internal foes collide? O r do w e w ish to be an oasis of prosperity m arking the beginning of an oriental “neo-hellenic and humanistic” synthesis of peoples and cultures each w ith an original and unique character of its ow n? We h ave a unique h istoric opportun ity before us - a situation w h ich enables us, indeed requires us, to find w ays and m ean s of establish ing the m ost effective possible organ ization for a political com m onw ealth in w hich every State belon ging to th e w orld order n ow takin g shape receives its appropriate place, so that it does not lapse from the secure h eights of n ation al aw aren ess an d succum b to the allurem en ts of nationalistic propaganda, pursuing national exclusivity w ith an un quench able thirst for pow er. We n eed to th ink an d reflect and talk about all these th in gs. The sm all circle of intellectuals w h o m eet here in the Issyk Kul Forum an d are in effect spiritual brothers should speak to the public th roughout our region in loud an d un m istakable term s. Then it w ould be desirable to seek broad resonance in the m ass m edia, to pass on the results of our efforts and to offer practical proposals beneficial to the developm ent of w orld culture. There is a proposal to sum m arize the different positions in a declaration of the Issyk Kul Forum and to form ulate an appeal to contem porary intellectuals to participate in this social m ovem ent under the m otto: “Cultures of all Nations in the Service of Peace.” This new social m ovem ent could help to con solidate our present spiritual evolution and to advance dem ocracy, pluralism of opinion and tolerance by supporting the ethnic and spiritual values of national cultures. O ur initiative Chingis Aitmatov

could also draw the attention of society to its w ork, further the developm ent of creative forces in national cultures and support them in attempting to influence th e th inking of contem poraries by m akin g cultural circles m indful of their responsibility tow ards their ow n peoples. (This English version is based on the German translation from Russian by Friedrich Hitzer)

We thank the translator Friedrich Hitzer (Germany) to have proposed this text of a speech by the President of the Writers Union of Kyrgyzstan, Chingis Aitm atov, for publication in this yearbook. In gives som e insight into the view s on culture by one if the outstanding Central Asian literary fighters for the freedom of w riting and publishing in the Soviet and post-Soviet tim es. The speech w as given at the Issyk Kul Forum initiated by Aitm atov in Bishkek. 1997 80

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Michael Ignatieff Televisio n and Humanitarian Aid There are strict lim its to hum an em pathy. We m ake som e peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s troubles our business w hile w e ignore the troubles of others. We are m ore likely to care about kin than about strangers, to feel closest to those connected to us by bonds of history, tradition, creed, ethnicity and race. Indeed, sin ce moral im pingem ent is alw ays a burden, w e may use these differences as an excuse to avoid or evade obligation. It is disagreeable to adm it that instincts play a relatively sm all role in our m oral reactions. We w ould prefer to suppose that the m ere sight of suffering victim s on television w ould be enough to rouse us to pity. In fact, there is nothing instinctive about the em otions stirred in us by television pictures of atrocity or suffering. O ur pity is structured by history and culture. The idea, for exam ple, that w e ow e an obligation to all hum an beings by sim ple virtue of the fact that they are hum an is a m odern conception. We still encounter tribal cultures in the w orld w here such an idea seem s n onsensical. Universality com es late in the m oral history of m ankind: once Judeo-Christian monotheism and natural law have done their w ork. Even w hen these traditions have established them selves, people go on finding ingenious w ays to evade their im plications. When w e do m ake the m isfortunes, m iseries or injustices suffered by others into our business, som e narrative is telling us w hy these strangers and their problem s m atter to us. These narratives-political, historical, ethical-turn strangers into neighbours, aliens into kin. They also suggest som e idea of reciprocal obligation: if w e donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t help them , these stories im ply, they w onâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t help us, w hen our turn w ith adversity com es around. Story-telling gives us pleasure, and the pleasures of m oral stories are just as suspect as or at least as com plex as the pleasures of, say, a dirty joke. O ur m oral stories usually tell us w hat w e w ant to hear: that w e are decent folk trying to do our best; and that w e can m ake good the M ichael Ignatieff

harm s of the w orld. We’d hardly tell these stories if they didn’t m ake us feel better, and they make us feel better even w hen they make us feel guilty, because guilt endow s us w ith capacity; it suggests that w e have the pow er to m ake a difference and are failing to do so. The truth m ight be grim mer, after all: that w e have less pow er than w e suppose; far from being able to save others, w e m ay be barely able to save ourselves. Thus if m oral activity alw ays involves the imagination, it is as much about imagining “us” as it is about im agining “them ”; the stories w e create alw ays place us as their chief subject, and to the degree that this is so, our im agination is alw ays susceptible to m oral narcissism . The stories w e tell lead us to think better of ourselves than w e deserve. Beside moral stories linking us and them , there are meta-stories governing the larger relationship betw een zones of safety and zones of danger. In the 19th century there w ere the stories of em pire: the nexus of interest, econ omic, geo-political, religious and ideological, w hich bound the m etropolis to the periphery . The im perial narrative-bringing civilisation to the w orld of savagery— gave the m edia a m eta narrative, a grand story into w hich each local event could be fitted and given its m eaning.1 With the passage of the 19th century em pires, and the creation of the post-w ar Soviet and Am erican hegem ony, the story w hich linked the tw o zones w as the super pow er rivalry for pow er and influence. What brought television to the w ar zones of these areas w as the prospect of w itnessing the proxy w ars in w hich the w orld balance of pow er w ould be sh ifted. Now the super-pow er rivalry is over; “w e” are no longer there, because “they” are no longer there either. The proxy w ars are no longer fed from Washington and Moscow , and w hile they continue-as in Angola-their salience and interest to the developed w orld has dim inished. As for the parallel narrative of de-colonisation, som e ex-colonies have m ade a successful transition to genuine independen ce and som e degree of econom ic developm ent, w hile others have foundered into tribalism , oligarchy or civil w ar. Either w ay, there is no 1

See m y Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (1998), Ch. 4

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

sim ple narrative to tell an ym ore. Instead, the narrative that has becom e most pervasive and persuasive has been the “chaos narrative”, the w idely held belief, only reinforced by the end of direct colonialism , that large sections of the globe, especially in cen tral Africa and the fiery southern edges of the former Soviet empire have collapsed into a m eaningless disorder, upon w hich no coherent pattern can be discerned. 2 The “chaos narrative” de-m otivates: it is an anti-narrative, a story w hich claim s there is no story to tell and therefore no reason to get involved. Since the end of the Cold War, television has sim ply reproduced the chaos narrative. As it does so, it underm ines even its ow n lim ited en gagemen t in zones of danger. These de-motivating elements are reinforced by the collapse of tw o other narratives. In the first of these, liberals w ere interested in Africa and Asia because the narrative of colonial nations achieving freedom and independence after years of struggle seem ed to confirm the liberal story of progress. Now that a generation or tw o has passed an d m any of these societies have either achieved independence or throw n aw ay its advantages, the story has lost its m oral gleam . There are few partisans of African and Asian independen ce left, an d m ore than a few w ho are overtly nostalgic for the return of colonial rule. Another m eta-narrative w hich sustain ed in terest in the Third Wo rld after World War II w as socialist internationalism , the faith that new ly independent states w ere a test-bed for the possibilities of a socialist econom y and w ay of life. Generations of Western leftists w ere lured to Cuba, Vietnam and other places in the hopes of finding their dream s confirm ed. The collapse of the Marxist and socialist project has ended this m eta-narrative of hope, and as it does, disillusioned and dem otivated socialists turn aw ay from developing societies altogether. No new sinew s of econom ic interdepen dence h ave been created to link zones of safety and zones of danger together. In the heyday of em pire, there w as at least ivory and copper, gold and tim ber. As the developed w orld entered the phase of perm anent post-industrial rev2

See Robert D. Kaplan The Ends of the Earth, (1996)

M ichael Ignatieff

olution, based in know ledge and com puters, it appears to stand in less need of the raw materials of the developing w orld. Large sectors of the w o rld ’s population are not being draw n into globalized comm erce, but banished backw ards into sustain ed underdevelopm ent. The developed w orld is tied in ever tighter linkage-Internet, 24 h our global trading, jet travel, global hotels, resorts, credit card netw orks and so on-w hile sections of central Africa, Asia, Latin America, since they no longer even supply vital raw m aterials, cease to be of either economic or strategic concern. This leaves only one m eta-narrative draw ing zones of safety and zones of danger together: the hum anitarian narrative. We are in one w orld; w e m ust shoulder each other’s fate; the value of life is indivisible. What happens to the starving in Africa and the hom eless in Asia m ust concern us all because w e belong to one species. This narrative, w ith its charter document-the Un iversal Declaration of Hum an Rightsand its agencies of diffusion, the non-governmental h umanitarian agencies and the UN system , puts a strong priority on m oral linkages over econom ic and strategic ones. The question is how television m ediates this m oral linkage. We should consider the possibility, first of all, th at th e m edia chan ge little at all. O ur best stories - from King Lear to Peter Pan - seem to survive any num ber of re-tellings. Why should the technology of storytelling change the story? We should bew are of technological determ inism in thinking about the m oral im pact of m edia. The claim that global m edia globalizes the conscience m ight be an exam ple of technological determ inism at w ork. It is certainly true that modern real-tim e television new s gath ering tech nology has shortened both th e tim e an d the distance separating zones of safety-the small num ber of liberal capitalist dem ocracies w hich possess pow er, influence and w ealth; from the zones of danger-the sm all num ber of collapsing states in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin Am erica-w here refugees and w ar victim s stand in need of aid and assistance. But it does not follow that media tech nology has reduced the “m oral distance” betw een these zones. Real and m oral distance are not the sam e. Real distance is abolished by technology; m oral distance is only 84

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

abolished by a persuasive story. Technology enables us to tell stories differently; but it doesn’t necessary change the story w e w ant to tell. Indeed, one could say that the m edia follow s w here the m oral story leads. To the extent that television takes any notice w hatever of zones of danger, it does so in terms of a moral narrative of concern w hich antedates the arrival of television by several centuries. This narrative: that w e are our brothers’ keeper, that hum an beings belong to one species, that if w e “can” help, w e “m ust” help-all of this em erges out of the Judeo-Christian idea of hum an universality secularised in European natural law beginning in the 16th cen tury. At best television m erely allow s us to tell this old m oral story m ore efficiently. The m edium is just a m edium. The m odern conscience had w ritten its moral charter-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights-before television had even entered m ost of our living room s. Television w ould not be in Kosovo or Kabul at all, if it w ere not for these antecedent m oral narratives. It m ay be the case that television cannot create any m oral relationship betw een audience and victim w here none exists already. If tele vision’s m oral gaze is partial and prom iscuous, it is because ours is no less so. The TV crew s go w here w e w ere already looking. We intervene m orally w here w e already can tell a story about a place. To care about one place is necessarily to cast another into shadow. There is no m orally adequate reply to the charge that Europeans and North Am ericans, to the degree that they cared at all, cared m ore about Bosnia than Rw anda. The sources of our partiality w ere only too obvious. O ne w as in Europe, the other in Africa; one w as a frequent holiday destination; the oth er w as off m ost people’s map. For most w hite European s and North Am ericans this partiality w as transparently a function of race, history and tradition. But how can it be otherw ise? O ur know ledge is partial and incom plete, our narratives of engagem ent are bound to be incon sistent and biased. To lam ent this is understandable, except w hen it is supposed that w e should be capable of m oral om niscience. We cannot be. It is sim ply unrealistic to expect that each of us should feel con nection to every place in the w orld w here victims are in danger. We are bound to care m ore about places and people w e already know som eM ichael Ignatieff

thing about. It is certainly invidious to believe that w hite victim s m atter m ore than black ones, that co-religionists are m ore naturally a m atter of our concern than non-believers and so, and w e can counter-act these biases w here w e can, but at th e end of the day, w e w ill care m ore about w hat w e know som ething about, and if this is Bosnia, so be it. The m edia w ill sim ply reflect the biases intrinsic to its ow n audience: its coverage m ay in deed exacerbate th em, but in itself, it is not respon sible for them . Indeed, television coverage can do relatively little to counter-act the inherent m oral biases of its view ers. It follow s w here they, and other m edia lead. What is m ore to the point is that m edia ow nership concentrates m edia pow er in m ostly w hite European and North Am erican hands, and their angle of vision determ ines the focus of w orld m edia coverage. For these reasons, natural partiality is grossly magnified, and the w orld’s m ajority — non-w hite, n on-North American, non-European — is forced to take the m inority’s moral priorities. This bias can not be corrected by w ell-m eaning gestures. It w ill only change as the m ajority takes econom ic pow er into its ow n hands and creates m edia institutions w hich reflect its ow n m oral priorities. This is already occurring across southeast Asia, an d there is no reason to suppose that it cannot happen eventually in Africa and Latin Am erica. The fact that television reflects, but does not create m oral relationships does not exclude the possibility that it may also distort these relationships. Three possible distortion s are evident. First, television turns m oral narratives into entertainm ent; second, television turns political narratives into hum anitarian dram a; third, television individualises: it takes the part for the w hole. All three form s of bias are inter-related, yet distinct. Television new s is an en tertain ment m edium . It derives its revenue and its in fluence from its capacity to make the delivery of inform ation pleasurable. Pleasurable story lines are generally sim ple, gripping and easy to un derstand. Now all moral life requires simplification, and all form s of m oral identification proceeds by w ay of fictions. In fram ing up our m oral w orld, w e all seek for good guys and bad guys, innocent victim s and evil perpetrators. There is nothing intrinsically 86

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

w rong about this resort to fictions and sim plifications. It is also puritanical to suppose that m oral problem s should never be m ixed w ith entertainment values. Moral dram a is alw ays com pelling and television can be easily forgiven for seeking to build revenue and ratings on the production of m oral dram a out of new s. Dram atisation only becom es problem atic w hen the actors in our m oral dram as stop playing the roles on w hich our identification w ith them depends. For moral roles frequently reverse: innocent victim s turn perpetrators; perpetrators turn victim s. In such circum stances, it m ay becom e difficult to alter the story line in the public m ind. Serbs w ho w ere perpetrators of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1993, turned out to be victim s of ethnic cleansing in Croatia in 1995. But their dem onization in 1993 foreclosed the possibility of em pathy â&#x20AC;&#x201D; an d the assistance that rightly follow s em pathy â&#x20AC;&#x201D; in 1995. The distorting bias here is sentimentalization: since sentim ental art, by definition, sacrifices n uance, ambivalence and com plexity in favour of strong em otion. Hence it is art w hich prefers identification over truth. To the degree that television is an art-form w hose revenue stream depends on creating strong identifications, it is axiom atic that it w ill occasionally sacrifice m oral truth. O ccasionally, but not alw ays: there are times w hen the sentim ental is true, w hen w e identify strongly w ith a story w hich happens to have got its facts straight. Th e second distortion flow s from the visual bias of th e m edium . Television is better at focusing upon th e con sequen ces of political decisions than upon the rationale for the decision s th em selves: hence upon the th un der of the gun s rather than upon th e battle-plans; th e corpses in the ditch, rather th an th e strategic goals of the ethnic cleansers. Th e visual bias of television h as certain obvious advan tages: it en ables an y view er to m easure the gulf w hich separates in ten tions from con sequen ces; it allow s a view er to m ove, sh ot by shot, from the prevarications of politicians to the grim y realities these prevarications attem pt to conceal. But the very in tensity of th e visual im pact of television pictures obscure its lim itation s as a m edium for telling stories. Every picture is n ot w orth a th ousan d w ords. PicM ichael Ignatieff

tures w ithout w ords are m eaningless. Even w hen pictures are accom pan ied by w ords, th ey can only tell certain stories. Television is relatively in coherent w hen it com es to establishing th e political an d diplom atic con text in w h ich hum anitarian disaster, w ar crim e or fam ine take shape. It has a ten dency to turn these in to exam ples of m a n â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inh um an ity to m an ; it turn s them from political into n atural disasters, an d in doing so, actively obscure th e con text w h ich is respon sible for their occurren ce. Its n atural bias, th erefore, is to create sentim ental stories w h ich by m akin g view ers feel pity also, and not accidentally, feel better about th em selves. Thus, television pictures from the Eth iopian fam in e in 1984 focused naturally on the pathos of the victim s, not on the m achinations of the elites w h o m anufactured famine as an instrum ent of eth nic oppression; or on other long-term failures of th e African economy or ecology. It did so sim ply because it chooses identification over insight, and it did so because television depends for revenue and influence on the heightened dram a of this visual m im esis of one-to-one contact betw een the w atching spectator and the suffering victim . The third related difficulty is that television, like all form s of journalism , m akes up its stories by m eans of synecdoche, by taking the part for the w hole. Journalism is closer to fiction than to social science: its stories focus on exemplary individuals and makes large and usually tacit assum ptions about their typicality. This is synecdoche: the starving w idow and her suffering children w ho stand for the w hole fam ished com m unity of Som alia; the m ute victim behind the barbed w ire at Trnopole w ho stands for the suffering of the Bosnian people as a w hole. Given th at victims are num berless, it is natural that identification should proceed by m eans by focusing on single individuals. Synecdoche has the virtues of making the abstractions of exile, expulsion, starvation and other forms of suffering into an experience sufficiently concrete and real to m ake em pathy possible. But there are evident dangers. First, is the individual typical? Notoriously, television chooses exem plary victim s, ones w hose sufferings are spectacular and w hose articulacy rem ains undiminished. View ers trust experienced reporters to make these exem88

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

plary choices but w hen view ers begin to question the typicality of the w itness, they also begin to question the term s of their identification. When they feel that hum an suffering has been turned into entertain ment cliche, they begin to feel manipulated: the w ard full of abandoned orphans; the star crossed Rom eos and Juliets w ho loved each other across the ethnic divide and w hose love show s up the folly of ethnic hatred; the plucky journalists w ho keep on publishing right through the shelling; and the w ar-torn child w hom the journalist adopts and spirits back to safety and endless interview s.3 These form s of synecdoche forfeit any kind of com plex identification w ith the w hole panoram a they are supposed to evoke. The identification w hich synecdoche creates is intense but shallow. We feel for a particular victim , w ithout understanding w hy or how he or she has com e to be a victim ; and em pathy w ithout understanding is bound to fritter aw ay w h en the next plausible victim makes its appearan ce on our screen, or w hen w e learn something w hich apparently contradicts the im age of sim ple innocence w hich the structure of synecdoche invited us to expect. It m ay be therefore that television itself has som ething to do w ith the shallow ness of forms of identification betw een victim s and donors in zones of safety. Television personalises, hum an ises, but also depoliticizes m oral relations, and in so doing, w eakens the understanding on w hich sustained empathy — and m oral comm itment depend. The visual biases of television, therefore, deserve som e place in our explan ation of “com passion fatigue” and “donor fatigue” — grow ing reluctance by rich and w ell fed publics to give to hum anitarian charities or support governm en tal foreign aid. Real distance has been drastically shortened by visual technology, but m oral distance rem ains undim inished. If w e are fatigued it is because w e feel assailed by heterodox and prom iscuous visual claim s and appeals for help com ing from all corners of the w orld. Moral narratives have been banalized by repetition, and in repetition, have lost their im pact and force. 3

Gilbert Holleufer “Im ages of Hum anitarian Crises: Ethical Im plication s”, in International Review of the Red Cross, Nov.-Dec. 1996, no. 315, 609-613.

M ichael Ignatieff

Aid agencies, like the International Com m ittee of the Red Cross, are w aking up to the erosion of the narratives of m oral engagem ent w hich they depend upon both to sustain the m orale of their field staff and to sustain the political support of don or governments. For aid agencies are moral story tellers: they tell stories to m ediate and to m otivate, and they typically use television to get these stories and m essages to pass from the zones of danger back to the zones of safety. Typically the stories aid agencies tell are different from the ones w hich television journalists tell, and these differences illustrate the m oral dilem mas aid agencies characteristically en counter. Unlike journalists, aid agencies cannot point the finger of blam e. They can nam e victim s, but they cannot identify perpetrators, or if they do so, they m ust be careful not to do so in such a w ay as to jeopardise their access to victim s. This limitation is especially the case for the ICRC, w hich has m ade moral n eutrality its touch-stone; but even groups, like M SF, w ho have explicitly con tested m oral neutrality, have learned that that if they do engage in blam e, they m ay gain credibility am ong victim s, but they lose it am ong perpetrators and consequently lose the capacity to w ork in the field. If tables are turned, and victim s becom e perpetrators and perpetrators victim s, aid agencies w ho have told a blam e heavy story m ay find it im possible to change their line of response to the disaster. Yet if aid agencies refuse to tell a political story-on e w hich attributes causation and consequen ces for the disaster they are helping to relievethey risk falling back upon a narrative of sim ple victimhood, em pty of context and m eaning. This disempow ers the agencies w hen they appeal to governm ents an d ordinary people for support. For purely sentimental, purely humanitarian stories create shallow identifications in the audiences they are intended to sway; such stories deny the audience the deeper un derstanding â&#x20AC;&#x201D; bitter, con tradictory, political, complex â&#x20AC;&#x201D; on w hich a durable comm itm ent depends. In the recourse to the pure humanitarian narrative of support for innocent victims, the aid agencies actively contribute to the com passion fatigue they purport to deplore. Getting out of this contradiction is not easy. The pure hum anitarian narrative preserves neutrality, and w ith it the agenciesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; autonom y 90

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

and capacity to act. A political narrative com mits the agency to a point of view w hich com promises its credibility w ith the group it has accused. Aid agencies like th e ICRC have responded to this dilem ma, in effect, by telling tw o m oral stories, one in public, the other in private. The on e reserved for public consum ption preserves the neutrality of the organisation and avoids attributing political responsibility for the disaster, w ar or conflict in w hich it is intervening. The private m essage is m ore political it is directed to governm entâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, donors, sym pathetic journalists and does point the finger of blam e. In the form er Yugoslavia, the ICRCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s public story offered emotionally charged but ethically neutral descriptions of human itarian tragedy; w hile the private back-ch annel story, told by its delegates an d its high officials, did not hesitate to attribute blame an d responsibility and recommend political action. Its public statements about th e Serbian camps in central Bosnia in 1992 preserved ethical neutrality; the private messages of its delegates on the ground did not mince w ords.4 O rganisations w ho split their m essage in this w ay risk appearing duplicitous and hypocritical. The objective m ay be laudable: to preserve sufficient credit w ith perpetrators that access to victim s can be preserved. But inevitably, a certain credit is lost w ith victims and w ith those w ho side w ith victim s, notably journalists. Faced w ith these challenges to their m oral integrity, som e agencies have tried to h armon ise both public an d private story-telling. Medecins sans Frontieres has been m ost explicit: refusing to be evenhanded as betw een perpetrator and victim ; refusing to offer hum anitarian assistance w hen the political conditions are unacceptable; denoun cing both perpetrators and outside pow ers w hen they obstruct hum anitarian efforts. In Afghanistan, likew ise, O xfam and UMCEF have refused to split their messages about Taliban treatm ent of w om en, publicly denouncing Taliban attitudes tow ards w om en. There are risks in this outspokenness: not m erely that the Taliban may shut these agencies out, but that these agencies them selves becom e m ore enam oured of the politics of m oral gesture than of reach in g and assisting fem ale 4

See Roy Gutm an Witness to Genocide, (1993)

M ichael Ignatieff

victim s them selves. So if the ICRC runs the m oral risk of duplicity and h ypocrisy by sharply distinguishin g betw een w hat it says in public and w hat it says in private, agencies w hich refuse this distinction run the risk of m oral narcissism : doing w hat feels right in preference to w hat m akes a genuine difference. 5 But these are not the only dilemmas w hich occur w hen aid agencies try to tell m oral stories. Their hum anitarian action is frequently exploited as a m oral alibi. Aid agen cies becom e victim of a certain moral synecdoche of their ow n. Thus, the fact that the ICRC has been doing humanitarian w ork in Afghanistan for a decade is taken, by the w atching w orld, as a sign that “at least” “w e” are doing som ething about the h uman m isery there. The “w e” in question is the moral audience of the civilised w orld, and this “w e” has proven adept at taking m oral credit for hum anitarian interventions in w hich it has strictly no right to take credit at all. For there is no “w e”: the so-called civilised w orld has no such m oral unity, no such concentrated vision, and if politicians w ho represent its concerns claim credit for the hum anitarian w ork of agencies in the field, they do so illegitim ately. Anyone engaged in hum anitarian action in the field is indignantly aw are of the extent to w hich their individual efforts are incorporated by the w atching m oral audience on television as a proof of the West’s unfailing moral benevolence. For television does not like to depict misery w ithout also show ing that som eone is doing something about it. We cannot have m isery w ithout aid w orkers. They conjure aw ay the horror by suggesting that help is at hand. This is synecdoche at its m ost deceiving for if help is getting through in this in stance it may not be getting through in others, and som etim es help m ay actually m ake a bad situation w orse, for exam ple, if food assistance falls into the hands of com batants and enables them to continue a civil w ar. Television coverage of hum anitarian assistance allow s the West the illusion that it is doing som eth ing; in this w ay coverage becom es an alternative to more serious political engagem ent. The Afghan civil w ar cannot be stopped 5

Michael Keating “The Reality Gap” in Geographical Magazine, Septem ber 1996, 23-4; also M Keating, “Painting it black, w ho’s to blam e ?” in Crosslines, 18-19, Dec.1995, 21-22.

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

by humanitarian assistance; in many w ays humanitarian assistance prolongs the w ar by sustaining the populations w h o subm it to its horrors; only active political intervention by th e great pow ers forcing th e regional pow ers bordering Afghanistan to shut off their assistance to the factions is likely to bring the w ar to an end. Aid w orkers in the region indignantly believe — and w ith reason — that their hum anitarian presence allow s the West the m oral alibi to abstain from serious political engagem ent w ith the problem . Thus w h en humanitarian agencies bring television to a conflict site, they may not get w hat they bargained for. They m ay have w anted to generate stories w hich w ould focus the attention of policy-m akers on the need for substantive diplomatic or political intervention; w hat they get instead is the production of m oral drama: sentimental tales of suffering, using a poor country as a back-drop, w hich, by stimulating exercises in generosit y, simply reinforce donors in their sensation of moral superiority. Th is certainly goes against the received w isdom about the impact of television on foreign policy and humanitarian intervention. It has been generally supposed that television coverage drives policy an d intervention alike, the pictures creating a demand that “something must be done.” Alre a d y, w e have questioned the technological determ inism implicit in these assumptions, by arguing that it is not the pictures w hich have the im pact, but the particular story — m oral or otherw ise — w hich w e happen to tell about these pictures. Where stories are wanting, television cannot supply them. Those w ho have examined the impact of television coverage on the propen sity of government’s to intervene in zones of danger w ould take this argument still further. After closely studying cases like the Somalia, Haiti and Bosnian interventions, most analysts com e aw ay w ith a m arked degree of scepticism about the efficacy of the so called “CNN effect.”6 Policy-m akers insist that they decide w hether to comm it th eir countries to action, n ot according to w hat they see on the screen , but according to w hether it is in the stable, long-term national interest of their countries. Accordin g to these studies, three years of drastic and som etim es ghastly television footage did little to m ove European policym akers aw ay from their reluctance to comm it troops and planes to bring M ichael Ignatieff

the Bosnian w ar to an end. At most the television images stim ulated a humanitarian respon se: aid agencies moved in , donation s flow ed and som e of the m isery on the screen w as alleviated. But television did little or nothing to drive the Bosnia policy of Whitehall or the White House. Here the determinant factor against intervention w as Vietnam -bred caution about sinkin g into a quagm ire. No amount of sentimental coverage of humanitarian disaster w as able to shift the policy-maker’s and m ilitary a n a ly st ’s basic perception th at this w as a “lose-lose” situation. Both the victim s them selves and the hum anitarian agencies in Bosnia supposed that getting the cam eras there w ould help to trigger decisive m ilitary and political action. Both w ere angrily disillusioned w hen this action w as not forthcom ing. It w as as if both believed that m isery tells its ow n story; that pictures inevitably suggest the moral conclusions to be draw n from them. But as w e have argued, pictures do not tell their ow n story; and m isery does not m otivate, on its ow n. Yet sceptics go too far w hen they claim that television pictures had no im pact on the foreign policy of states or the conscience of a w atch ing public. Policy-m akers and m ilitary planners have an institutional stake in denying that they are at the mercy of television im ages and public pressure. It is essential to their amour propre and to professional detachm ent to believe that they m ake policy on grounds of rational interest rather than on the basis of inflamm atory and sen tim ental television reports. Yet their disclaim ers on this score are not entirely to be believed. What the pictures from Bosnia undoubtedly did create w as a small, but vocal constituency of people w h o felt disgust and shame and w ere roused to put pressure on the politicians w ho stood by and did nothing. It w as not the pictures them selves that m ade the difference, but the small political constituency in favour of intervention w hich they 6

Nik Gow ing “Real-tim e Television Coverage of Arm ed Conflicts and Diplom atic Crises: Does It Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions?” Joan Shorenstein Center, Kennedy School of Govern m ent, Harvard University, occasional paper, June 1994; see also Steven Livingston “Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Exam ination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention”, Joan Shorenstein Centre, Harvard University, occasional paper, Jun e 1997; see also Nik Gow ing “Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention ?” report for the Carnegie Com m ission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, 1997.

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

helped to call into being. Television itself did not create this con stituency; it w as rather that the im ages helped the constituency to w iden its basis of support; it could point to these im ages and draw in others w ho felt the same outrage an d disgust as they did. The numbers w ho care about foreign issues w ill alw ays be m uch sm aller than for dom estic ones, but their influence is out of all proportion to their num bers . Most of them -in the press, the hum anitarian agencies, th e th inktanks-have the pow er to create and m ould public opinion. 7 For three years, a sm all constituency pounded aw ay at the sham e of Bosnia, and in th e end, their campaign w orked. Not, I hasten to add, because political leaders them selves felt any great sham e, but because in tim e, they w ere made to feel th at th ey w ere failing to exercise â&#x20AC;&#x153;leadership.â&#x20AC;? O nce a political leader feels his legitim acy and authority are put under sustained m oral question , he is bound to act sooner or later. Added to this, in the Bosnian case, w as the undoubted fact that prolonged inaction w as beginning to erode the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance and open up im portant splits betw een Europe and Am erica. In th e end, the Clinton adm inistration intervened and set th e D ayton process in train, not because it had been sham ed by television but because it felt, w ith good reason, that there w as at last an over-riding political interest at stake in Bosnia: the coherence of the alliance structure and the continued hegem ony of Am erica in European affairs. In other w ords, humanitarian pressure, in the form of outraged editorials and gruesom e television footage, set up a train of consequences w hich only three years la t e r, eventually generated a national interest basis for intervention. This national interest drove policy, but it does not follow that the interven tion w as m otivated solely by national interest considerations. The hum anitarian, m oral pressure w as integral to the process by w hich a reason for intervention w as eventually discerned and acted upon. All of this suggests that the m oral stories w e tell through television are less in fluential than their visual im pact w ould suggest; but they are not as unim portant as sceptics w ould im ply; and that they do play a 7

Larry Minear, Colin Scott, Thom as G. Weiss The New s Media. Civil War and Hum anitarian Actions, (1996)

M ichael Ignatieff

continuing role in structuring the in terventions, h umanitarian and otherw ise, th rough w hich the zones of safety attempt to regulate and assist the zones of danger. As hum anitarian agencies confront the question of how to use television m ore effectively to sustain engagem ent, by donors and governm ents and to counter â&#x20AC;&#x153;donor fatigueâ&#x20AC;?, they need to address the general break-dow n of m eta-narratives, linking the developed and developing w orlds. We have tw o meta-narratives on offer: globalization and the chaos narrative; econom ic integration an d collapsing time and distance constraints for the w ealthy few in the northern w orld; state fragm entation , eth nic w ar an d econom ic disintegration for the unfortunate citizens of as m any as 25 nations in Africa, Asia and Latin Am erica. The rhetoric of globalization-and especially the globalization of m edia-altogether conceals the fact that its prom ise is w ithheld from the m ajority of the w orldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population. Indeed, as the developed w orld integrates still fu rt h e r, it is reducing, not extending, its contacts w ith the w orlds of danger. Highly m ediatized relief operations, like Som alia, Gom a and Afghanistan, conceal the shrinking percentages of national incom e devoted to foreign aid, just as highly m ediatized charitable cam paigns like Live Aid conceal th e shrinkage of private donations to international h umanitarian charities. The m eta-n arrative-the big story- is one of disengagem ent, w hile the m oral lullaby w e allow our hum anitarian consciences to sing is that w e are com ing closer and closer. Published in Jonathan M oore (ed.) Hard Choices: M oral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, (O xford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, ps. 287-302)

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

Antonin Liehm The ro le o f culture under co mmunism and in the po st co mmunist w o rld

A great Hungarian poet, Gyula Illyés, once w rote: “Whenever politics is banished from our lands, culture is w hat should take its place.” What does this statem ent m ean in the Central European context? O ften w e find it difficult to understand how com m unism , w hich established itself and ruled in Central Europe under the banner of collectivism , could have ultim ately led to a com plete breakdow n of society and to the program m ed destruction of all autonom ous social relationships. The com m unist regim e succeeded in driving all m em bers of society into a sm all private corner of their ow n w here every individual ultimately took refuge and tried to survive as best he or she could. What is altogether paradoxical is that the non-com m unist population – the large m ajority – w ere just as m uch affected as the m em bers of the com m unist party, including the nomenklatura. Culture as a substitute for politics. Wh at best characterized the state of the individual in com m unist society w as isolation. This situation helped to create an enorm ous social need to restore at least a m inimum of com m unication, and it explains w hy people endeavoured to establish links am ong them selves outside the public sphere (politics), to rebuild “horizontal” relations (the ruling com m unist party recognized only “vertical” relationships) – in short, to recreate the constituent elem ents of civil society. It w as at this level that culture, a privileged area in social com m unications, w as fated to com e into play. It w as precisely through culture that people succeeded in constructing new social bonds and that authentic social com m unication am ong individuals, independent of the official structures of the system, gradually took hold. The com m unist system w as never entirely m onolithic. With tim e, especially after 1956, w e w itnessed a progressive but steady w eaken ing of the totalitarian character of the com mun ist regim es in Central and Antonin Liehm

Eastern Europe. The com m unists in pow er becam e less and less capable of directing and controlling all spheres of social life effectively and com pletely (as had been the case during the Stalinist era). This m ovem ent began after the death of Stalin, first of all in Hungary w here the film s that came out in the years from 1953 to 1956 w ere already cinem a of quite a different kind from the classical Stalinist pattern. At that tim e the Hungarians took as their m odel the neo-realism of the Italians. This movem ent w as later to extend into other countries, first Poland and the USSR – to say nothing of Yugoslavia w hich, since the break betw een Tito and Stalin in 1948, had been living a quite different life from that of other com m unist countries. The m ovem ent tow ards autonom y and upgrading of culture w as also in keeping w ith pow erful historical traditions. In fact, culture had often played a decisive role in these countries in the past. In nineteenthcentury Poland, partitioned since the end of the eighteenth century am ong three pow ers (Russia, Prussia and Austria), it w as notably through culture that the national independence m ovem ent had m anifested itself. In Bohem ia, during this sam e period, it w as the national cultural elite w hich for historic reasons took the place of a non-existen t aristocracy in the political life of the country. The increasingly autonom ous position of culture vis-à-vis the aesthetics of socialist realism , and in due course also vis-à-vis official ideology, w as ultim ately to bring about a certain political liberalization of the existing com m unist regim es. The m ovem ent tow ards cultural autonomy vis-à-vis the system of official ideology w as a m ovem ent that preceded and anticipated actual political liberalization. We should rem em ber that the founders of the Soviet-style com m unist regim es had thought that culture could becom e an effective w eapon and an im portant tool that w ould facilitate the establishm ent of a future com m unist society. This is w hy they decided, right from th e start, to finance the w hole of cultural life very generously. The first years of com m unism brought not only forced and som etim es spectacular industrial developm ent but also a very substantial developm ent of the w hole cultural infrastructure (houses of culture, universities, theatres 98

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

and cinem as, studios, publishing houses and so on). During this initial period, m any intellectuals and artists w ere happy to accept the role of enthusiastic and sincere builders of the new com m unist society. The regim e, in return, guaranteed them substantial practical advantages, at least by com parison w ith the rest of society: relatively generous rem uneration, rest hom es, and a system of prom otion and rew ards for the creative artists m ost devoted to the com m unist cause. Very soon , how ever, there occurred splits and differences of opinion betw een th e artists and the political authorities w hich gave rise to the first con flicts. These w ere not, at least at the start, political con flicts. For the com m unist leaders, the Stalinist pyram id of pow er w as to rem ain absolutely monolith ic; it could not tolerate the slightest fissure. It w as th ought that any cracks that m ight appear in the fabric w ould allow foreign elements to enter, and the system w an ted to avoid such a developm ent at all cost. In the cultural dom ain , th e com m unist leaders w ere determined to im pose on all creative artists not only a specific political an d ideological policy but also a prescribed aesthetic. And so it w as precisely in the aesthetic domain that the first con flicts w ere to arise. It is interesting to note that at the origin of these conflicts w e often find artists w h o w ere totally devoted to the comm un ist cause – w hether mem bers of the party or not – such as Vladimir Mayakovsky and Sergei Eisenstein. Sooner or later, h ow ever, their ow n aesthetic ideas inevitably came into conflict w ith the theory and practice of social realism . These aesthetic divergences w ould soon involve m ore and m ore artists. O ften these w ere people w ho did not necessarily w ant to contest the legitim acy of the com m unist regim e as such but m erely w anted it to let them live and create according to their ow n lights. For a regim e of the Stalinist kind this position w as unacceptable. Every departure from the aesthetic norm w as regarded as potentially dangerous and as such had to be put dow n. Since every departure from the regim e’s standards produced cracks in the system ’s m onolithic structure, con flicts in the aesthetic sphere necessarily acquired an explicit political dim ension quite independently of the political sym pathies that the artists them selves m ight have. Antonin Liehm

This sam e phenom enon occurred in the USSR and in all the countries that becam e com m unist after the Second World War. Naturally, these aesthetic controversies quickly w ent beyond the lim ited fram ew ork of culture. Moreover, they gave rise to serious internal debates and to the establishm ent of n ew form s of solidarity among th e artists them selves. In this w ay, they fostered the establishm ent of new social bonds. Then, progressively, they em braced the consum ers of culture as w ell, and ultim ately the w hole of society. The history of all the com m unist countries exhibits num erous exam ples of this kind of evolution. Culture, w hich w as in any case already a favoured area for social com m unication, w as to becom e for that very reason a logical ground for questioning the system as a w hole. The pyram id of Stalinist pow er relied on the principle of levers and controls. O rders and directives reflecting the official party line w ere w orked out at the h ighest level and subsequently transm itted from the sum mit to th e base by a com plex system em bracing a multitude of organizations: professional organizations, the youth union, the trade unions, but also the parliament and the various region al assem blies. Every realm of social activity w as entitled to its ow n organization, the principle function of w hich w as to ensure that the system for transm itting directives from above w as efficiently controlled and functioned sm oothly. The comm unist auth orities had fostered the creation of w riters’ unions, film producers’ unions and associations of artists and painters – but also other organizations such as philatelists’ associations, local and regional cultural associations and indeed even a union of rabbit breeders. Every social and professional group w as thus placed w ithin an organization structured on the sam e principle as the com m unist party itself (w ith a presidium , central com m ittee, etc.). These organizations w ere directed by m ilitant com m unists appointed by party officials, but their m em bers w ere not necessarily all com m unists. Control of the highest State authorities by com m unist functionaries w as thus designed simply to ensure effective transm ission of their directives. H o w e ve r, after the death of Stalin comm unist pow er becam e far m ore uncertain w ith regard to the doctrine and directives to be transmitted to 100

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

the base. Little by little, the w h ole transmission system w ent into crisis. In the absence of specific directives, the different elements of the system show ed a tendency to become m ore and more auton omous. This phenomenon affected, in particular, cultural organizations and the professional organizations grouping artists togeth er. To be sure, artists continued to be subject to party directives, but since the party itself w as becom ing less and less m onolithic, comm unist officials belonging to the “cultural front” them selves becam e m ore independent and above all less and less docile. Still later, in an attempt to take due account of the public notoriety of artists, the upper echelons of all these organizations w ould be open ed more and m ore to non-com munists. Thus, organizations w hich in theory w ere supposed to guarantee effective control over the cultural dom ain and ensure transm ission of party directives w ould becom e, w ith tim e, organizations w hich openly contested State pow er. This phenom enon could be observed in all the com m unist countries and it affected notably the associations of w riters, journalists and film -m akers. O n the occasion of each m ajor political crisis w ithin the com munist w orld (1956 in Poland and Hungary, 1968 in Poland and Czechoslovakia, 1980 in Poland), most of these organizations w ere to play a high ly decisive role. They becam e in effect a useful vector for the civil societies that w ere now being reconstructed, a natural breeding ground for all the various currents of political opposition. O nce the crisis w as over, the com m unist leaders w ere forced to introduce a policy of “norm alization ”. But this led to serious problem s. Thus, after the declaration of m artial law in Poland in 1981, the com m unist authorities found them selves obliged to dissolve most of the country’s official cultural and artistic associations, because the old leaders of those organizations had becom e all too independent. Culture, and cultural organizations, thus played an increasingly central role in the life of the commun ist societies. Thanks to them, larger and larger segm ents of the population found their w ay out of isolation. Individuals and num erous groups attempted to build new identities and to establish horizontal comm unication: they were rediscovering, through Antonin Liehm

101

culture precisely, a basis for independent thinking. In som e cases the categories characteristic of culture w ere substituted for political categories properly speaking. The idiom of culture replaced that of politics. In 1963 an international sym posium on the w orks of Franz Kafka w as held in Prague. The initial objective of the organizers w as to put an end to a situation w here Kafka’s entire oeuvre w as banned. This symposium in fact became a real battlefield betw een “orthodox” marxists and “liberal” m arxists. The w eekly m agazine of the Czechoslovak Writers’ Union (print run: 130.000 copies in a country of 15 m illion) published the proceedings in their entirety, w hich enabled a broad public to discover an author they did not know and also the fact that his w orks offered a virtually perfect description of their ow n situation under com m unism . “That’s Kafkaesque”, people w ould often say thereafter, w ithout actually having read a single page of his books. Given this m ovem ent tow ards steadily increasing autonom y, on the one hand, and the m ain tenance of public subsidies, w hich th e com m unist leaders did not w ant to touch, on the other, culture w as soon able to blossom to a degree th at seem ed som etimes unbelievable to foreign observers. “How is it possible that the greatest anti-Com munist film s have been produced in all th ese countries not on ly w ith the backing but actually w ith the m oney of th e com m unist State?” they often asked. It is absolutely necessary to recall these peculiarities of the role played by culture, and of the w ay cultural m echanism s functioned under the com munist system , if w e w ish to understand w hat happened subsequently in all these countries after the collapse of com m unism . How ever, contrary to w hat a lot of people think, there w ere actually m any m ore differences betw een tw o com m unist countries than betw een tw o capitalist countries. This is w hy everything I have endeavoured to describe above should be seen in the particular historical and political context of each country. Cultural contradictions of the post-communist period. I am alw ays intrigued by the fact that not only the politicians them selves but also the political scientists, sociologists and econom ists in the West have consistently failed to focus on one particular aspect of the com m unist 102

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

system ’s failure. For those w ho w ish to analyse the dynam ics of the post-com munist era, it is not on ly the ideological or econom ic fiasco of com m unism that m atters but also the m oral aspects of the system ’s defeat. The disruption of society, the isolation of individuals, the demoralization of the population, the trium ph of egoism and cynicism - phenom ena w hich had often been observed in the com m unist societies them selves - did not disappear autom atically (in fact could not disappear) after the collapse of the com m unist regim es. Q uite th e contrary, the post-com m unist societies inherited m uch of this baggage. To be sure, the end of com m unism cam e as a surprise to m any people. But the societies w hich today are trying to get rid of their com munist legacy found them selves unable to consider carefully w hat “getting out of com munism ” really m ean t. This lack of profound reflection is particularly obvious on the plane of social m orals w here possible sources of social cohesion - the conditions required for the building of a new civil society - need to be considered. O b v io u s ly, w e m ust recognize that in all these countries there have been enorm ous changes since 1989. How ever, I shall not be speaking of dem ocracy here, but rather of a situation involving liberty. The old constraints of the com m unist State vanished all at once. What had up till then been forbidden or just barely tolerated by the system (tolerated provided the in dividual did not m eddle in matters affecting the functioning of society) w as suddenly allow ed. But this suddenly rediscovered liberty opened the w ay to free expression of num erous form s of social behaviour hitherto repressed. For exam ple, in com m unist tim es there had been a popular saying: “He w ho does not steal is stealing from his ow n fam ily”. After the fall of com m unism the practice of theft did not disappear. O n the contrary it becam e even m ore flagrant and m ore com m on in the absence of a new and coherent system of legal constraints such as exists in Western societies. O n the other hand, the post-com m unist period saw the em ergence of a new social m orality peculiar to a society w hich is now free, to be sure, but at the sam e tim e rem ains entirely disrupted. In the absence of either horizontal or vertical social bon ds, th is new society finds itself Antonin Liehm

103

in an ethical void - and to a certain extent in a political and legal void as w ell. The politicians w ho assum ed pow er after 1989 underestim ated this problem for the m ost part. Culture has an absolutely fundam ental role to play in providing a m inim um of social cohesion. How ever, it w as not at this level that the politician s now in ch arge tried to find sources of cohesion for the future post-comm unist society. Let us quickly review the procedures they preferred to rely on and attem pt to understand w hy the transform ations characteristic of the post-com m unist period ultim ately led to a m arginalization of culture. It w as first and forem ost through a return to nationalism that leaders attem pted to provide social cohesion in societies undergoing rapid, unexpected and radical transform ations. We know the results only too w ell. In som e countries, notably in Poland, w here national feeling rem ains closely bound up w ith religious belief, it w as by prom oting moral standards of a religious kin d that th ey hoped to bring about social cohesion - but w ith disappointing results, one m ust confess. And all appealed to an ti-comm unism. But anti-communism as an “ideology” of these new States is not an idea for a society. Moreover, since there w as no further risk of a return to comm unism, this “moral” appeal very soon proved to be devoid of any positive influence on social m orals. Fin a lly, there w ere m an y w ho believed that th e m arket w ould autom atically ensure a reorganization of society on new foundations. H o w e v e r, people quickly realized, particularly in the C zech Republic, th at th e m arket could do all sorts of things but that it could n ot by itself guarantee social cohesion. The m arket can do nothing to regulate civilized and dem ocratic behaviour in individual hum an bein gs. It cannot, alone, create a civil society. The new Czech leaders, believin g as th ey did in the om nipoten ce of the m arket, even w ent so far as to proclaim that civil society w as in th e final analysis a “creation of the devil” and th at they w an ted n othing to do w ith it. As far as th ey could see, individual h um an beings an d electoral procedures w ere all a coun try had. Social com m unication had, in prin ciple, to take place through the m arket. 104

M EDIA

AND

C ULTURE

This explains w hy the post-com m unist societies, and especially th e new leaders, have n eglected the importance of culture - a neglect w hich has led in the end to its margin alization . At the beginning of the 1990s, the Czech Minister of Culture declared that his governm ent had no cultural policy (cultural policy, he explained, w as a com m unist invention ) and did not w ant any. In a country w here culture had alw ays played a central political role, this w as an extrem ely grave statem ent - especially if w e consider the role culture m ight have played in establishing social cohesion in the post-com munist societies, in the reconstruction of civil society generally, and in the tam ing of nationalism . To say that culture should be subordinated to the m arket, that it should survive by itself, w as equivalent to signing a death w arrant for cultural activities. And this is exactly w hat happen ed in Central Europe after 1989. We m ust not forget the overall situation of the post-com m unist countries of Central Europe: these are sm all countries, linguistically lim ited, w ith a cultural m arket as yet w eakly developed. This is not the Anglo-Saxon w orld, w hich has w hat w e m ight call a naturally large language m arket. In the liberal and anti-State euphoria that follow ed the collapse of co mm un ism , th e â&#x20AC;&#x153;Am erican m odelâ&#x20AC;? becam e an inevitable and unavoidable point of reference. And yet, this Am erican m odel is not applicable to the countries w ith w hich w e are concerned â&#x20AC;&#x201C; even in other areas, and m ost certainly not in the cultural sphere. The United States has nearly 300 m illion people w ho speak the sam e language and, w ith a dynam ic econom y, can take advantage of a long tradition of support for cultural activities. Am erican culture can also rely on the Anglo-Saxon language m arket, w hich em braces nearly a billion people throughout the w orld. How could one possibly im agine that sm all countries like Bulgaria or the Czech Republic w ould be able to apply the Am erican m odel in the cultural sphere ? How could one possibly think that they w ould be able to establish the sam e conditions for the developm ent and functioning of their cultural life? This w as a vast illusion of the first postcom m unist leaders, w ho w ere fascinated by the Am erican m odel. O n e Antonin Liehm

105

can easily understand their attitude. What they really w anted w as to put an end to cultural life subject to State and party control as quickly as possible. This w as w hy they com pletely disregarded the experience of other non-com m unist European countries in this area. Nor did they understand the fundam ental difference betw een culture in Europe and in the United States. From tim e out of m ind European culture (art in particular) had been th e preserve of an elite, an elite w hich in fact also generated it. It required decades (and still does), even centuries, for w orks of culture to reach a larger public; they crossed frontiers w ith difficulty and rem ained stubbornly stuck in local and even national particularism . North Am erican culture has a com pletely different history. From the start it w as aim ed principally at a broad public composed of imm igrants w ho had com e from all over the w orld and becom e American by adoptin g a com m on dialect, a language that they shared. The privileged classes of Am erican society w ere in fact m uch closer to the m asses of imm igrants than to their counterparts in Europe. And it w as from th is starting point that the Un ited States evolved a tradition of m ass culture quite unique in the w orld, a culture w hich is addressed to all and understood by all, w hich is accessible today to the general public throughout the w orld. The situation of culture in th e post-com m un ist countries is n ot heartenin g. It varies to be sure from one coun try to another, but everyw here the influence of the Am erican m odel h as been very strong an d has done a lot of dam age. When the Czech Prim e Minister m akes a public statem ent to the effect th at his country should have done w ith the im age of Boh em ia as a coun try of art an d culture, he did n ot m ean th at culture should be eradicated altogether but that this particular im age, w hich earlier h ad been respon sible for Bohem iaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s visibility in the w orld, should be replaced by a n ew im age, that of a country in w hich free en terprise, industry an d com m erce flourish. How e v e r, the on e th in g does not exclude the other. Culture also serves to m ake a coun try visib le. Culture is not in itself fundam entalist, but it does m ake the cultural integration of different form s of fundam entalism easier. How ever, if 106

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

one does not support culture, if one does not actively concern oneself w ith it, these fundam entalism s w ill no longer have anything to secure their acculturation. Finally, w e should say that in the m odern w orld of technology cultural production has becom e very expensive. A poet and a w riter need only a pencil, but audiovisual artists often require very substantial backing. In the sm all countries there w ill be no sponsors to provide such backin g, and it is a dangerous illusion to think there m ight be. The requisite support m ust com e from society as a w hole, a society that understands the im portance of culture for its ow n survival in civilized and dem ocratic conditions. The leaders of th e form er com munist countries have still not understood this, and their failure to understand is all the m ore serious on the threshold of an audiovisual century. Whereas in other European countries the com m itm ent of public w ealth to culture rem ains both obligatory and substantial, the leaders of the post-com m unist countries, im prisoned as they are in a strongly ideological attitude, have tried to reduce such com m itm ents to a m inim um . The Polish film producer Andrzej Wajda neatly sum m arized this situation in a simple sentence: â&#x20AC;&#x153;We spent man y years fighting for freedom in the cin em a, and now w e have freedom but no m ore cinem a.â&#x20AC;? To return to the rem ark of Gyula IllyĂŠs cited at the start, w e m ight say that the post-com m unist w orld has not driven politics out of public life but that it has banished culture. But politics can hardly do otherw ise, and in any case it cannot take the place of culture.

Antonin Liehm

107

108

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Jim Hoagland Media: D emo cracy in Jeo pardy? The im plication of that question m ark is that Am erican dem ocracy is in jeopardy from the Am erican m edia. The im age that question con jures up - in my m ind at least - is one of an unbridled, arrogant and profit-driven m ass comm unications system that is either out of control - and I subm it to you that is not the case - or one that serves as a conveyor belt along w hich pow er, respect, and legitim acy flow aw ay from the peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s elected representatives to our ow n version of the oligarchs big media conglomerates-, w hose business interests w ill gain from this or, alternatively, if not to them , to the m ob clam oring at the gate and to the demagogues w h o stoke those appetites, exploiting the salacious and sensational details provided by the Media, this conveyor belt. I w ould be less than honest if I did not admit that I recognize bits of that description in the current situation in America today. But I feel, overall, th at this experience, as Watergate did, w ill ultim ately strengthen American democracy and w ill certainly strengthen the role and credibility of the American press, although both the Am erican democracy and most of all the American press are in for some rough tim es ahead in the short term. Three points of particular significance emerge from the eight month ordeal that threatens to be remem bered as â&#x20AC;&#x153;Monicagateâ&#x20AC;?. My first point of concern - and ultim ately m ost im portant thought about the jeopardy the m edia finds itself in - is the extent to w hich our low ering of standards and refocusing of reporting is being sublim inally, subtly dictated by m arket con cerns in a rapidly and at times violently changing global econom y. The New Media - particularly the Internet and the cable netw orks that program w hat I call pseudo-new s - are redefining the m arket, dow nw ard. Much of w hat they sell as new s is in fact gossip, journalistic pop-corn. They low er recognized journalists into lending credibility to these enterprises, w hich are in need of m ore content than they can evaluate or edit. These netw orks need to fill up the tim e that th ey have Jim Hoagland

109

created, in a circular process. I w ould of course at this point like to exem pt the PBSâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s New sHour, w hich has resisted these tren ds. You w ill hear from Michael Mosettig about the problems they face, but how they have continued to be very good gatekeepers. They have in fact established a m edia unit recently that I think w ill be an im portant part of w hat is going to be a broad - and I hope constructive - national investigation of the m ediaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role in all of this. I realize that particularly to m y Russian colleagues I m ust sound something like a cry-baby. Here I am , sounding like an ungrateful child, complaining of the problem of too much mon ey, of an endangered independence, w hile they strive to find enough resources and m oral support w ithin their ow n society to establish and pursue independent reporting and editing. If they are successful, perhaps years from now they w ill get to the point of having the problem s I have com plained about today. I think it is importan t at th is point to underscore the subtle changes to dem ocracy of golden chains how ever, the problem s of success that w e experience in the Am erican m edia and the dangers of answ ered prayers. We have an incredible concentration of m edia ow n ership in the United States today. Few er than one hundred new spapers are ow ned by individuals or families, the rest are ow ned by corporation s w ho ow n other new spapers and broadcast stations nationally. The Washington Post, for example, ow ns N ew sw eek m agazine. I th in k th e m ost difficult, subtle and increasingly im portant function of top editors in the new sroom is to insulate new s coverage from com m ercial interests of the new spaper and of the com m unity it serves. Just as w e m ust m aintain our credibility from pressures of political authorities, so w e m ust m aintain that credibility in the face of pressure from advertisers and even at tim es in the face of the econom ic interest of the ow ners. O ne incident com es to m ind here: In 1969 I w as w orking w ith another reporter on a Washington city story concerning savings and loans. We published the first series of articles that really high lighted the problem s that Savings and Loans Institutions, w hich in the United States are ban king institutions, w ere running in to as the result of spec110

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

ulative investments that they w ere m aking in real estate, and the impact that that had on ghettos and the availability of housing in the city of Washington. As w e proceeded reporting and w riting a ten-part series that took up the better part of six m onths, the Savings & Loans executives cam e to see the executive editor of the Washington Post, Ben Bradlee, and told him the series had to be stopped, that if he did not stop it they w ould w ithdraw one m illion dollars in advertising - and these w ere the days w hen a m illion dollars w as real m oney. The m ost interesting thing about this incident is that I did not know about it until a year later, w hen Bradlee told m e about it. They did w ithdraw their advertising, w e did publish the series, som e of the Savings & Loans executives w ent to jail, and years later the w hole Savings & Loans industry in the United States produced a huge problem that cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars. Bradlee did a characteristic thing, for him and I w ould hope for new spaper editors everyw here, by protecting his reporters, protecting his staff. Where is the point w here a journalist w ill have to decide for him or herself w hether or not to resign a job rather than to do things the w ay the editor or publisher w ants? That is obviously true - w e w ill all face that sort of situation at sometime in our careers probably. But I thought that it m ight be useful to add to that the Am erican journalistâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sense of such a m om ent, in w hich, I believe, m ost Am erican journalists w ould not see themselves faced w ith an easy choice. I think the average American journalist sees him or herself as representing the public in such a conflict w ith the publisher, it is in all likelihood the publisher w ho the journalists w ould say should leave. An Am erican journalist w ill see him or herself as having as m uch an autom atic right to stayin g in that place, to publish those stories, to bring the truth to the public, as the publisher has, even though the publisher m ight ow n the paper. This is, I think, fundam ental to understanding w hy the Am erican m edia continues to be such a strong force for dem ocracy. It has a lot to do w ith the individual tem peram ents, personalities, form ations of journalists. My second concern, is the w ay in w hich the gatekeeper function w as dismantled or diminished at the leading American new spapers, new s Jim Hoagland

111

m agazines and TV netw orks under the competitive pressures of new m edia, that is of th e new 24-hour new s cable netw orks, the Internet and supermarket tabloid sheets that devote the sam e resources and en ergy to chasing and actually creating sleaze as the New York Tim es and Wa shington Post devote to covering national security and diplomacy. By the gatekeeper function I refer to the editor, or group of editors, w ho sets the standards of w hat is published or broadcast - the standards of new sw orthiness, of taste, of decency, and of relevance. The most frequent decision made in any new sroom at a new spaper like m ine is w hat not to publish - w hat falls below the threshold of our standards. The gatekeeper is as important for w hat he or sh e does not publish, does not allow in as for w hat he or she does allow in. At least this has been the case till now . It is this function of taste, of verification, of setting and observing standards, that has been severely dam aged by the last eight m onths of breathless and often tasteless reporting on the Lew insky scandal. Too often establishment n ew spapers, including my ow n, have allow ed them selves to becom e the authenticating agent for the m ore reckless, m ore partisan new s m edia outlets that have flourished in recent years. That authenticating role is a role w e have played for som e tim e in relationship to broadcast television new s and particularly the Sunday discussion and interview programs like M eet the Press. Those program s strive to be authenticated not so m uch by their ratings - too low to be significant in the eyes of th e netw ork leadership - but in h ow much ink they create on Monday m orning in the m etropolitan dailies or on the new s agency w ires. Until now , w hat a politician said on Sunday w as not verified new s until it appeared in the N ew York Times or the Wash ington Post on Monday m orning. But that has ceased to be true as tens of m illions of Am ericans have learned to consum e their new s instantly, from the Internet, from television and radio, w ithout th e filtration and judgment of editors - of gatekeepers - that those gatekeepers can provide over a 12- or 24-hour new s cycle. These instant-new s consum ers frequently mistake the urgent for the im portant, and develop new s indigestion as a result. 112

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

The com petitive pressures that established Am erican new spapers now face have pushed them in the space of tw o years from being a reluctan t an d em barrassed authen ticator of stories about the O .J. Sim pson case that originally appeared in the tabloids. That is, once a story appeared in the Star, for exam ple, it w as deem ed to be ‘out there’, to be the subject of discussion and therefore w e could not, in good conscience, not report it and thereby authenticate it. We’ve m oved from that em barrassed state, then, to being an avid pursuer and original publisher of lurid details about the president and Ms. Lew insky. So m y con cern is that in rushin g to adapt to the real-time, or instan tan eous, availability of un digested and often unverified new s, w e in the mainstream press are w eakening, or abandoning, our gatekeepers, or at least the gatekeeping function of journalism , w ith out acknow ledging w hat w e are doing or adjusting intern ally for that. This does have a devastating effect on the political leaders, w ho are our natural adversaries, and our political institutions. But it has an even more devastatin g effect on our ow n credibility. We are becom ing a threat not so much to democr a cy, as the question im plies, as to ourselves. Readers and view ers w ho are not going to be h appy w ith w hat is about to be divulged in the Starr report w ill rightly hold the m edia respon sible for low ering its standards; they w ill add this grievance to others, to less justified and m ore personal resentm ents about the intrusiveness and pow er of the m odern media. That brings m e to m y last point of concern, w hich is the nature of the reporting in the Lew insky saga, rather than the nature of the editing. I think m any of us are uneasy w ith the unacknow ledged collaboration of the m edia w ith the special prosecutor’s office in th is case. Bob Woodw ard and Carl Bernstein, w ho exposed Watergate, have pointed out that their reporting w as focused on finding and interview ing w itnesses that the Nixon Justice Departm ent had either ignored or w ere actively trying to intim idate into not testifying, into not bringing facts forw ard. Woodw ard and Bernstein published a story that the law m en of the day did not w ant to com e out and w ere in fact covering up. But in “Monica m eets the w orld”, reporters h ave been guided to and inform ed about inform ation the prosecutors did w ant out, to force the Jim Hoagland

113

h ands of the President or other w itnesses or targets of investigation. We becam e force m ultipliers for an already pow erful institution, w ith alm ost no public discussion or acknow ledgm ent on our part of w hat w e w ere doing. I w ould think, in a group like this, that I do not have to add the obvious - I have frequently reflected on the fact that Journalism is the art of the obvious - that I do not have to add the disclaim er that w hat I say in no w ay constitutes approval of w hat the President is said to have done or w hat he has in fact adm itted doing. I w ould not voice such approval. I do understand the irony of a president w ho played the m edia so w ell being underm ined by the sam e tactics w hen em ployed by Ken Starr: live by the spin, die by the spin. Som ehow in the crunch, Clinton’s talents have failed him . In January, w hen he denied having an ything to do w ith “that Lew insky w om an”, he spoke to Am erica w ith the sam e em otional intensity he brought to public issues: he used the sam e approach on that that he did on health care and on many other th ings. Th en, in August, he told us that w as n ot true. The August reversal doom ed him . To quote Robert Reich, “He w ill never again be believed.” When Clinton tried to tell the truth about Lew insky in August, or at least some sm all part of it, he w as unconvincing. He appeared to be better at lying in January than at truthtelling in August. And that is a fatal flaw.

114

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

Freim ut Duve The “Industrializatio n” o f article 5 o f Germany’s Co nstitutio n

The new Prim e Minister of the Germ an Land (province) of North Rhine-Westphalia has quite rightly declared the m edia to be a “m atter for the boss to deal w ith”. The m edia have probably been the m ost im portant factor in converting Germ any’s largest province during the past 20 years from a mining an d steel-m aking region into a modern service econom y - perhaps the m ost successful structural transform ation in the industrial history of the w orld. Here, the dram atic crises inherited from the 19th cen tury by other industrial regions (in Great Britain , for exam ple) w ere avoided - or have been largely overcom e. The m edia industry is now an econom ic and structural reality. O r let us take southern California: the region al econom ic crisis of the early 1990s, w hich lasted longer there than in other parts of the United States, has been overcome com pletely. The media and culture industry is to be thanked for that: in 1997 alone, alm ost 200,000 jobs w ere created in that sector. In 1990 there w ere 143,000 people w orking in film s and television in Los Angeles; by 1997 the num ber had risen to 262,000. The dem ands for cultural and journalistic freedom raised during the 18th and 19th centuries have, at the end of the 20th century, becom e a central factor of m odern econom ic life. I have not done any calculations of scale, but the general argum ent is un doubtedly correct: the m edia industry is now playing a role w hich is at least as im portant as that played a hundred years ago by the steel industry and the railw ays, on w hose investm ent decisions the hopes or disappointm ents - of entire regions depended. The expectations of cities and the innovation policies of provinces are linked to the decisions of the m edia industry. As w e know , the steel industry and the railw ays of the 19th century brought about great transformations in the w orld in w hich they operFreimut Duve

115

ated: not only did they produce steel and provide transport, they also changed m uch of our culture (our arch itecture, for example), th e speed w ith w hich things are delivered, and th e w ays in w hich investment and innovation take place. Entire branches of science em erged w ith them , and it w as through them that the m achinery of w arfare acquired true technological substan ce - including that w hich sustained the tw o Wo rld Wars. They produced possibilities, prospects and fears, but never direct opinions or live pictures. The m edia are now an industry w hich is increasingly global rather than national: the basis of this success is the freedom of the m edia, the lifting of censorship restrictions and the grow ing desire for education and culture in industrial societies. A vivid illustration of w hat has happened is provided by the Bertelsmann group, w hich burgeoned in the 19th century w ith th e risin g general interest in books and culture and expanded further in the 20th ce n t u ry - especially after the Second World Wa r - w it h the revolutionary changes in printing and m arketing, and w hich is now one of the w orld’s largest m edia corporations. Th e still larger Tim e Warner group developed along different lin es (it ow es its size far m ore to films and m agazines than to books), but it too is now a w orld-w ide industrial group w hose investm ent decisions fuel the dreams - or nightm a r e s - of com m unities an d cities, even of entire countries. This “industrialization” of Article 5 of our Constitution (or of the Am erican First Am endm ent) has presented the m odern dem ocracies and m any firm s w ith a problem for w hich w e do not yet have either a precise nam e or a solution. The “Article 5” share in the turnover of the great m edia corporations - th at is to say, journalism in the narrow sense - is now sm all, and it is even sm aller if w e consider, as the central elem ent of a free democracy, the narrow er definition of freedom of speech and of the press underlying the revolution of 1848. Although its eco nomic significance is slight, how ever, its political significance for the free dem ocracies is great: it is indispensable! We now know that the ideological dictatorships of the 20th century opposed not only the democratic, hum anist dem ands - derivin g from the Enlighten m ent - for freedom of opin ion and of speech, but also th e 116

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

increasingly im portant second role of journalism - that of a perm anent corrective of all m ajor decisions through critical public debate. In an open dem ocracy, the critical gaze of journalism m ust em brace not only politics, the governm ent and parliament, but also industry an d the decisions taken by it. In the Soviet Union, no industrial decisions w ere criticized publicly by free m edia, and that w as the m ain factor leading to the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s econom ic m isery. The Chernobyl accident w ould not have been possible if there had been public debate about the radiological hazards due to a nuclear industry w ith low safety standards. The m ajor decisions taken in the service age also need to be debated critically. Cartel law s and m arket com petition are not enough. What does critical journalism look like, how ever, if it is itself part of this so im portant industry central to econom ic policy? How do the big m edia corporations defend the critical independence of th eir journ alistic offspring (including their independence vis-Ă -vis the m edia industry itself)? That may not yet be a problem for firm s w ith a journalistic tradition of their ow n and thus a com m itm ent to critical reporting. But it is already a problem for big m edia corporations w hich did not originate in journalism or w hose younger managers feel responsible only for th e business side and not for the journalistic m ission. O f course, it is difficult to rectify m atters through legislation, either national or supranational - w ithin the EU fram ew ork, for exam ple. The firm s are too large and important for governm ents to try restricting by legal m eans their entrepreneurial independence in favour of th eir journalistic mission. In Tu rk e y, tw o big new spaper groups are currently pressing the Governm ent to repeal a law of 1994 w hich forbids the participation of m edia corporations in public ten dering in, for exam ple, the energy, civil engineering and electricity sectors. The tw o corporations have succeeded in alm ost com pletely preventing journalistic criticism of this dangerous initiative so that, despite the resistance of the vast m ajority of parliam entarians and even som e Governm ent m em bers, there is a strong probability that their business interests w ill prevail in Parliam ent. When public discussion is controlled by interested parties Freimut Duve

117

and thus hardly takes place, as in this admittedly very extrem e case, serious dangers arise for the econom y and for society. For exam ple, if criticism in connection w ith the aw arding of public contracts no longer got out, even fear of the discovery of possible corruption in road and dam construction w ould hardly play a role any m ore; increasing costs and declining quality m ight becom e autom atic. That w as a radical example, but it indicates h ow w ise it w as to prohibit cross-ow nership and how im portant it w ill be to prom ulgate and enforce rules restricting m edia corporations’ entrepreneurial involvem ent outside the m edia industry. In addition, how ever, firm s and the journalists w orking for them w ill together have to form ulate codes of conduct w hich ensure respect for Article 5 and journalistic professionalism even in the pow er environm ent of the big corporations just as the standards of freedom in States based on the rule of law and parliam entary dem ocracy do. First published in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Z eitung” 8. September 1998.

118

M EDIA AND C ULTURE

119

120

II. Where w e co me fro m, w hy w e do it. Reflections and a report by the advisors

Are w e allow ed to say ou r opinion in public? It should be possible alw ays. Because opinion is ready for debate and argum ents open to changes. O pinion alw ays needs the cor rective, because opinion is not just simply the truth, it calls for the corrective, because opinion never is absolute conviction. Where opinion is public, the change for the corrective is the greatest. Hans Saner, Swiss author, 1986 The m ore dangerous id eas are, the m ore one m ust circulate them in order to dem onstrate their faults. Any idea w hich refuses to be contested digs a grave for freedom . Stephane Hessel, French diplomat and writer, 1998 121

122

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

Beate Maeder - Metcalf Tales o f the Vienna Wo o ds ? Some personal reflections after a year of work

Whilst thinking back over the past year of w ork in the O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media – quelle histoire – tw o old tales cam e into m y m ind… The first is that of the scandal surroun ding the publication of a book th at h ad resulted from a journey of m any m on ths in a n eighbourin g co u n t r y. The author, in the event a society lady, the daughter of a m inis t e r, the w ife of an am bassador, and a one-time friend of a terrorist, w as confronted not only by th e official cen sor, but by the Minister of Police in person. In an elegant but arrogant note, he m ade quite plain to her w h y th e regime did not favour publication of her book: it w as according to him quite unnecessary to seek inspiration from foreigners. The author w as ban ish ed and the printer’s plates of her book officially destroyed. A few m onth s later, a friend m an aged to get a few prin ted copies to safety in Vien na. At last, the author succeeded in publishing h er w ork abroad w hen, th ree years later, the m ilitary and political situation in Europe began to ch ange. The book w as a success and becam e, in th e cultural history of tw o nation s, a classic, even though it remained controversial. The second tale is that of a penniless, little-know n author w ho obtained a judgem ent from the High Court that forced the publication of his book, the second volum e of a m ajor w ork. The renow ned publisher, w ith w hom the author had a contract to publish, w as reluctant to print the book: this tim e not for political reasons, the first volum e had sim ply been a clear com m ercial failure. Here, the rule of law favoured the w eaker party and, three years after the judges’ decision, the second volum e w as published, ten years after the first. The lengthy judicial w rangling left the author exhausted and bitter, even if it did lead to som e publicity for the book w hich deserved attention. Beate M aeder - M etcalf

123

These tw o true episodes both end w ith a victory for the freedom of the w ritten w ord, and so happily. A third tale began optim istically in 1998 w ith the setting up of the new O SCE office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media. Its spiritual foundation lay in the Helsinki process and the im portance attached to human rights for dem ocracy, peace and stability. The “Third Basket”, Principle 7 of the 1975 Helsinki catalogue, included the basic hum an right to freedom of expression. Indeed, since the fall of com mun ism, the O SCE m embers have agreed in this decade that free, independent and pluralistic m edia are a fundam ental compon ent of an open society, and an indispensable instrum ent in w atching over a dem ocratic governm ent. A com mitment to this effect w as undertaken by O SCE m em ber states in 1994 and it is a major feature of this third tale, deserving close study: “The participating States reaffirm that freedom of expression is a funda mental human right and a basic component of a democratic society. In this respect, independent and pluralistic media are essential to a free and open soci ety and accountable systems of government. They take as their guiding prin ciple that they will safeguard this right. — They condemn all attacks on and harassment of journalists and will endeavour to hold those directly responsi ble for such attacks and harassment accountable. — They further note that fomenting hatred and ethnic tension through the media, especially by govern ments, can serve as an early warning of conflict”. Freedom and diversity of the m edia are thus not, in the eyes of the O SCE, ideals sim ply in their ow n right, but rather a basic necessity on account of their fundam ental social and political fun ctions. Media that are free, independent of governm ents and diverse in nature are intrin sic players and critics of the governm ent w ithin a dem ocratic process. Th ey should also establish a sen se of openness in public life and ensure open debate in the res publica. How ever, this undisputed definition of the role of the free m edia as a w hole involves their assum ption of responsibility for its realisation, something that they alone must undertake. This should in no w ay be con fused w ith th e influence of the state on w hat is reported in individual publications. 124

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M ,

WHY WE DO IT

In the context of the O SCE, governm ents have not developed further com m on criteria as to how diverse m edia free of state control are to be organized. How ever, the m em ber states are required to establish the necessary fram ew ork w ithin w hich freedom of the m edia can be fostered. Therefore, the fundam ental political and social role of free media, as a vital condition for openn ess and w atchfulness over dem ocratic governments, is essential to the w ork of the O ffice of the Representative. From this point of view, it is even surprising that the O SCE member states un dertook th e establishm ent of an office concerned w ith freedom of th e media â&#x20AC;&#x201C; governments undertake to defend the freedom of their supervisors and potential opponents in an institutional w ay? Thus seen, w e have a paradoxical project! But let us interpret this act of creation as m eaning that the O SCE member states at least w ish to recognise the principle of m edia freedom and the basic hum an right to freedom of expression. It com es as no surprise, how ever, that reality and the day-to-day actions of governm ents often tell other tales, ones concerning vested interests rather than grand principles. The w ork of the Representative on Freedom of th e Media is thus, unavoidably, akin to a tightrope w alk. The first year show ed up contrasts. Th e actual situation w ith respect to the m edia in the O SCE m em ber states can hardly be sum m ed up in a single w ord, even under the broad m otto of independent and pluralistic media. The state of affairs ranges from one of oppression and intimidation of journalists and official obstruction of freedom of the m edia in the young dem ocracies, w here often only a few independent m edia have m anaged to get establish ed, to the risks that can arise through the creation of lucrative electron ic and print m edia m onopolies in w estern industrial nations, and on to the challenges presented by new m edia technologies and global netw orks. Whereas financial difficulties threaten the continued existence of independent m edia in the Eastern and south-eastern O SCE mem ber states, new form s of inform ation and publicity are being generated by the globally and directly applicable individual right to freedom of expression via the Internet. To that extent, it w as both correct and forw ard looking to combine the O ffice w ith the Beate M aeder - M etcalf

125

concept of “freedom of the m edia” as, unlike the m ore traditional expression “freedom of the press”, new m edia are included. What w as there to be done in the first year of our tightrope w alk ? The O SCE currently concentrates its operational efforts, as a European security organization, on the co-operative prevention of conflict (“early w arn in g”), on crisis m anagem ent and, w herever necessary, on the prom otion of dem ocracy, rule of law and hum an rights. This form ulation determ ines also the w ork of the new O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media. The O ffice concerns itself operationally in the m ain w ith the cases of individual journalists w ho are being obstructed or persecuted in th eir w ork, and w ith a variety of structural w ays and m eans used by governm ents to restrict freedom of the m edia. There is certainly n o lack of w ork! In addition, journalists, politicians and academ ics ask us m any questions about the use of new technologies and about the econom ic significance of the m edia: Is anti-trust legislation sufficient to ensure effective freedom of the m edia? What does freedom of expression on the Internet really m ean, and how do the new m edia affect the quality of new s and journalism ? Will this give rise to possible new form s of international conflict? Despite the O SCE´s focus on crisis prevention and m anagem ent, som ething that determ ines also the daily agenda of the O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, w e cannot ignore either the w ider political context or the ch allenge of n ew media forms. Even if the restricted resources and possibilities of the O SCE and of this new O ffice m ean th at not everything can be tackled : ignoring th e future in a European security organization is rather a recipe for disaster than a dem onstration of strategic thinking. O n the other hand, the daily w ork of the O ffice of the Representative cannot do w ithout a historical perspective either. Wh at do w e n eed these old tales for? The m agic num ber for the year 2000 is giving rise to m any historical perspectives and com parisons. Whether in books, new spapers, radio or television, the notion of freedom of the m edia – as a freedom of com126

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

munication that allow s free exchange of view s in society and a m easure of control of government – is now here counted, even in w estern O SCE states, am ong the achievem ents of the m illennium . We thus need to m aintain a degree of realism and patience w hen energetically defending the O SCE principle of freedom of the m edia - som ething w hich O SCE m em bers have undertaken w ith the nom ination of the Representative on Freedom of the Media. So it is that the first of the tales related at the beginning dates from the year 1810, w hen Germ aine de Stael w as throw n out of Napoleonic France on account of her report of her journey through German y. The enlightening basic concept of “De l’Allem agne” is the defence of freedom of though t and w riting, the rejection of prejudices and prohibition on thought. The book described contem porary German art an d culture, adm ired openly the Germ ans’ “enthousiasm e”, and w as intended to hold up a mirror to the artistic an d cultural stagnation in France, w hich de Stael often lam ented. At a tim e in w hich the Germ an principalities had just been occupied and subjugated by French revolutionary arm ies, her message w as, for Napoleon, an irritating attack on the high cultural self-esteem of the French and a politically undesirable re-evaluation of the defeated Germ ans. When Napoleonic rule cam e to an end, this rejection of her w ork ceased. Th e book could appear, at first in London in 1813, and the actual controversy about it begin. Like m any others that could be quoted here just from the past tw o centuries of European history, this exam ple illustrates the precarious relationship betw een the principle of freedom of the m edia and the interests of the prevailing pow ers. Even though, since the invention of m odern mass media, governm ents have sough t to m aintain them selves by lim iting, or even suppressing, press and m edia freedom , w e learn from these old tales that, sooner or later, all pow er crumbles. This observation also indicates the possibility that, in the end, freedom of the m edia w ins. The Representative on Freedom of the Media defends this principle in full but not exclusive co-operation w ith governm ents. After all, contacts w ith the m edia, w hose freedom is being defended, is a necessary Beate M aeder - M etcalf

127

com ponent of his task. What happens, how ever, w hen governm ents refuse to co-operate? Then public attention has to be draw n to this for the sake of the principle and of the credibility of the O SCE, even at the tem porary expense of diplomatic harm ony. During its first year of existence, the O ffice has already had exam ples of how im portant it is to advocate its principles openly and even in the face of opposition from the governm ent concerned. In one case, the protests of a governm ent turned rapidly to later praise and approval for the O SCE’s support of dem ocratic values, follow ing a change of that governm ent. A second historical consideration is w orthy of note: w e should rem em ber that freedom of the press and of the m edia in its m odern form is not unconditional, is not absolute freedom . Press freedom , in a dem ocracy, im plies the freedom of m arket and depends on the m arket’s m echanism s. This condition has been illustrated in the second of our opening tales, concerning a dispute over the delayed publication of the second volum e of “Notizen / Von der unvoreiligen Versöhnung”, the m ajor w ork of the Sw iss author Ludw ig Hohl. The w ell-respected Artem is Verlag did not w ish to assum e the cost of m arketing this outstanding philosophical and literary text, despite its contractual obligation to do so. The first volum e, published in Sw itzerland in 1944, had not fitted into the intellectual landscape of the tim e, w as poorly circulated also due to the circum stances of the ongoin g Second World War and became certainly n ot a comm ercial success. Nevertheless, the apparently pow erless author challenged the publisher’s refusal before the highest Sw iss Federal Court in 1951 w ith success: the second volum e of “Notizen” w as finally published in 1954. The “Notizen” have sin ce then remained a book w hich is still appreciated rather in intellectual circles then by a large public. It w ould have been lost, if th e law of the market, dem andand-supply, had been the only one prevailing in this affair. Experience in the first year of the O ffice of the Representative has, in fact, con firm ed that the rule of law protects th e principle of freedom of the m edia against purely com m ercial interests of m arket econom y as w ell against repressive state intervention. 128

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

In those places w here no such rule of law and functioning courts do exist, individuals, including authors, journalists or media ow ners, are in danger. Thus w e see that, in several O SCE m em ber states, journalists’ criticism of public figures results in libel suits, in prison sentences or in large fines. In m any of such “legal” proceedings, the protection of th e person criticised or of his office is given greater w eight than the righ t to free speech and freedom of the m edia. There is now a significant body of evidence pointing to the consequences: intim idation, an d a tendency tow ards self-censorship on the part of journalists. The Representative has already taken up num erous individual cases. How ever, the rule of law cannot be established overn ight, and the contribution of the current O SCE in this respect is and w ill be rather lim ited, in com parison to the activities of the Council of Europe and to other international organizations. So, a lot of w ork in the first year and certainly no less in the second. The third tale, that began w ith the setting-up of the O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, w ill last a w hile… To that end, w e require a sense of history and an outlook on the future. But, for now, in the w ords of a fictional optim ist: Il faut cultiver notre jardin.

Beate M aeder - M etcalf

129

130

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M ,

WHY WE DO IT

Alexander Ivanko Glasno st: Ho w it All Started in Russia A N on-Historical Essay by a Rank-and-File Participant in the Fight for Freedom of Expression

During the m id-eighties, the only people in the Soviet Union advocating freedom of expression, as any other basic h uman right, w ere either in jail, on trial or outside the borders of th e country. Those still sought after by the secret police w ere frantically putting out underground samiz dat publications that even few er people read than published. Moscow ’s journalistic com munity, w ell educated, cosm opolitan an d imm ensely cyn ical, w as going about its busin ess, polishing th eir literary styles for num erous new spapers and magazines and drinking aw ay their evenings at the semi-posh and exclusive restaurant belonging to the Union of Journalists. Mikh ail Gorbachev’s selection as the General-Secretary of the Com munist Party of the Soviet Union, a de-facto dictator w ith lim itless pow ers, w as view ed by many in age rather than political terms. Finally w e h ad a leader w h o w ill not die on us in the next year or so. Tell anybody back then that in six years the Soviet Union w ill cease to exist and they w ould have thought that you just fled from an asylum , or even w orse, that you w ere an agent provocateur w orking for th e CIA. Few young journalists w ill probably rem em ber the nam es of those w ho w ere the first pioneers of Glasnost. Gorbachev only started opening the floodgates w hen there w as an immediate rush outside and it w as almost literary outside. The air w as so stale in the Soviet Union that one really needed a breath of fresh air. The tw o m ain sprinters w ere Vitali Korotich and Yegor Ya k o vle v. To d a y, Korotich lives in the United States and Yakovlev is still a Moscow editor, how ever, overshadow ed by his son, Vladim ir, one of Russia’s m ost influential and rich m edia m oguls. But back then Korotich and Yakovlev changed a w hole generation of journalists and readers. The tw o publications they headed becam e the epitom e of freedom of expression in the Soviet Union. Alexander Ivanko

131

Back in the m id-eighties, Korotich w as a reasonably w ell-know n Ukrainian w riter and essayist, w ho received th e Soviet Union’s top literary prize for an anti-American pamphlet ‘The Face of Hatred’. He w as then suddenly nam ed editor of O gony ok, a dull Moscow m agazin e read only by pensioners. Under Korotich O gonyok started discussing such taboo topics as Stalin’s legacy, the true history of comm unism , free market and m any others. O gonyok becam e the bible for those advocating dem ocracy and the devil’s w riting for defenders of the Soviet past. Its circulation w ent through the roof and it w as alm ost im possible to get w ith people queuing outside new stands at six o’clock in the m orning hoping, often in vain, to purchase one copy. O gonyok w as passed from person to person as a cherished icon. Yegor Yakovlev w as nam ed editor of an even m ore bizarre publication, M oscow N ews, w hich at that tim e w as a propaganda outfit targeted at Moscow ’s foreign com m unity and published by the N ovosti Press Agency, the Soviet Union’s m outhpiece to the w orld. Yakovlev’s past w as also interesting: a career journalist, he lost his first senior job as editor of Journalist, a Moscow m agazine, for publishing a collage depicting a half-naked w om an. He then w orked in Prague for Problems of Peace and Socialism, the theoretical magazine of the in ternational com m unist m ovem ent, and later as the Prague correspondent for Izvestia, the Soviet Union’s governm ent new spaper. He also w rote historical essays on Lenin’s life and w orks. Under Yakovlev, M oscow N ews basically smash ed all political taboos getting its editor in to deep w ater w ith Soviet bureaucracy. Yakovlev w as on the verge of losing his job for publishing an obituary of Victor Nekrasov, a form er Soviet w riter and W.W.II veteran w ho w as forced out of the country for his anti-Soviet view s and died in France. A sim ilar non-event today w ould not even catch the com m un ists in the Russian Duma paying any attention. Back in 1987 this obituary almost led to the closure of one of the biggest proponents of Glasnost. Yakovlev got into even bigger trouble for a report filed from a train going from Moscow to Vladivostok in 1988. The article titled “What People Talk About in Russia”, Dialogues and Monologues in the Longest 132

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

Travelling Train’, had Gorbachev fum ing personally and dem anding Yakovlev’s head on a platter. A know ledgeable observer of that scan dal remembers th at Alexander Ya k o v le v, Gorbachev’s num ber tw o an d the theoretician behind Glasnost (currently a leading liberal politician in Moscow ) dem anded the sacking of his nam esake. Valentin Falin, w ho ran N ovosti, M oscow N ews official publish er, told his superior Alexander Yakovlev that the only w ay to get rid of Yegor Yakovlev w as to “kick him upstairs”. At that point Yegor Yakovlev w as already a figure big enough in the country that even the all-pow erful Com mun ist party had problem s taking h im dow n. How ever, w hat w as M oscow N ews’ offence, w hat did the reporter w rite that w as so horrible that the almighty apparatchiks w ere going for the kill? The journalist on the train conducted a poll asking the passengers did they see any concrete results from the policies of Perestroika? 36 percent said they did, 64 percent said they did not. An other question: Do you support Perestroika? 16 percent supported it enthusiastically, 13 percent did not support it at all and 71 percent did not actively participate in the changes and took a ‘w ait and see’ approach. Getting into trouble becam e the modus operandi of m any editors. Vladyslav Starkov edited the most popular w eekly in the country A rgu menti i Facti (Arguments and Facts) w ith a circulation in the late 80s over 30 m illion. In 1999 he still edits the sam e w eekly although on a num ber of occasions in the 80s Gorbachev personally dem anded his dism issal. But the tim es, th ey w ere a-changing, sang Bob Dylan. Editors, used to quoting previous Gen eral-Secretaries, tried to do the sam e w ith Gorbachev until the editor of Pravda, the country’s m ost influential new spaper, received a phone call: “Do you have a volum e of Lenin’s w orks in your office...You do...Next tim e, quote him .” The caller w as Gorbachev. By the end of the eighties, Izvestia, then a leading sem i-liberal daily, w anted to start publishing foreign advertising. How ever, its editor, Ivan La p t e v, w as runnin g into w alls in the Comm unist Party’s Central Com mittee, w hose officials still controlled all the m edia. Frustrated, he corAlexander Ivanko

133

nered Gorbachev at an official function and told him that he has this great idea how to bring in foreign capital into the new spaper business: through advertising. Gorbachev agreed. When a senior Com m unist party official saw the first foreign ad in Izvestia he w as livid and called Laptev demanding to know w ho gave h im the go-ahead. “General Secretary Gorbachev”, answ ered Laptev. The official did not have the nerve to ask Gorbach ev if that w as th e case. By Soviet standards, Iz vestia w a s able to get aw ay w ith practically m urder, becom ing the first Soviet new spaper to earn foreign currency through advertising. The debates of those days in the n ew sroom w ould astonish an yon e from the West. Why are these serious-looking and seemingly w ell-educated people discussing, for exam ple, should an article in defence of Salm an Rushdie be published today, tom orrow or not at all, or w hy is the editor so nervous regarding a report on the Chinese crackdow n in Tiananm en square? What is the big deal, it is only new s. It w as not in the Soviet Union. New s w ere divided into useful and not useful, or harm ful. The last w ere to be ignored, as the then editor of Izvetia, Nikolai Efim ov, put it in 1990. Each step pushing the lim its of Glasnost demanded personal courage and could have ended m any careers. If only w e knew that just around the corner w e w ould see the Soviet Union disintegrate into 15 independent states and the Com m unist party banned and put on trial. But w e did not and the debates in the new sroom continued, often turning into shouting m atches betw een the younger an d m ore liberal reporters and th e older seasoned editors w hose careers w ere on the line. And w ho could blam e them for being cautious? In the eighties and early nin eties I w orked for Iz vestia’s foreign desk. O n a num ber of occasions, like the oth er youn g reporters, I tried to publish an article o r in terview that pushed the boun daries just a little bit. O ften I failed. An interview w ith Stephen Coh en, an Am erican auth or specialising in the history of Bolshevism , w as canned for being too risky. When I w orked as a correspon dent in Afghanistan in 1989 an yth in g that w as critical of Soviet policy in th e region never made it to the pages of Iz vestia. Even uncritical articles that in the view of the 134

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

censors gave aw ay too m uch ‘sensitive’ inform ation ended up gathering dust in the archives. Wh en fin ally in the early nineties I end ed up publishin g a piece highly critical of the Soviet puppet regim e in Afgh anistan, TASS, th e Soviet Union’s official n ew s agency, issued a com mentary blasting m y article. The m essage w as clear: som e issues w ere still ‘untouchable’. How ever, every day brought a sm all victory for dem ocracy. For printing w hat w as once unimaginable, editors w ere being dressed dow n on Staraya Ploshad’ (the Moscow headquarters of the Commun ist party) but they kept their jobs and avoided long-term ‘vacations’ in Siberia, a very realistic prospect som e years ago. Nam es of authors banned from print for decades w ere being reincarnated on the pages of Soviet new spapers and m agazines. People w ere finally able to read w hat Alexander Solzhenitsyn actually w rote and not just official Soviet condem nations of his books. His w orks w ere brought to the readers by Novi M ir, an extrem ely popular Moscow literary m agazine. N ovi M ir also pub lished Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Z hivago and im m ediately w as targeted by Pravda. For the first tim e in Soviet history there w as a public debate in the m edia on the vices and virtues of com m unist ideology and practice. Czar Nikolai, Russia’s last royal ruler, stopped being a scarecrow pointedly insulted by everybody as a m atter of principle. Even the Soviet U n io n ’s sacred cow, the legacy of its founder Vladim ir Lenin, w as being cautiously questioned. The changes seem ed so im m ense and overw helm ing to m any journalists that the m edia started getting divided into those supporting dem ocratic reform s and those advocating a m ore cautious approach. M oscow N ews and O gonyok w ere no longer alone, they had ideological com rades often m ore pow erful then the tw o lonely editors of the late eighties. Ivan Laptev, w ho w as extrem ely close to Gorbachev, w as on e of them . But the anti-reform movement w as also actively recruiting support. Its pow er-base w as m uch stronger and w as led by Gorbachev’s chief ideologist Yegor Ligachev, a dedicated com munist w ho in the late 90s preaches the sam e values. Alexander Ivanko

135

O n 13 March 1988, Ligachev finally got a chance to ghost-publish his view s on the transformation of the Soviet Union . Sovetskaya Rossiya, a leading Moscow com m unist new spaper, printed an article by an obscure college professor Nina Andreeva “I Cannot Give Up My Principles”, its chilly resonance scaring every liberal in dividual in the country. Nina Andreeva advocated a return to “past values” of com m unist ideology and questioned the m otives of those pursuing dem ocratic reform s. In the journalistic com m unity the article w as seen as an obituary for Glasnost. There w as one catch - it w as published at a tim e w hen both Mikhail Gorbachev and Alexander Yakovlev w ere travelling abroad. O n their return the frightened pro-reform editors show ed the tw o leaders w hat one of their m inions w as up to during their absence. As a result of a num ber of follow ing discussions, Pravda, Gorb a ch e v ’s (and officially the Comm unist party’s) mouthpiece, printed an editorial blasting the article by Nina Andreeva. It looked like Glasnost had w on. But for m any in the nom enklatura the fight had only started. They w ere preparing offensive, after offensive, after offensive. They w ere also recruiting support am ong dissidents that had fled or w ere forced out of the country in th e 70s. Th e logic w as simple; at th at poin t the liberal intelligentsia had a sym pathetic view of the ém igré com m unity and if m em bers of that group started questioning the reform process, m aybe it w as the w rong path for the Soviet Union. O ne of the m ost loud mem bers of th is comm unity w ho decided to return to the Soviet Union w as Eduard Limonov, a talented w riter until recently living in New York and Paris. Because of his cult status among the cosmopolitan intellectuals (he w rote a highly naturalistic, in parts pornographic, autobiographical novel, This is M e, Edichka, that became an underground classic in Moscow in the mid-eigh ties), Limon ov w as initially in vited to alm ost every liberal-lean ing TV talk show and w idely published by major Moscow n ew spapers and magazines. Th e message from the form er Paris and New York recluse: the Soviet Union’s stature as an em pire should not diminish an d th at th e count r y ’s ideology should be based on Slavic nationalism . Lim onov saw th e w riting on the w all: sensing the population’s distrust tow ards com 136

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

munist ideology, he, basically preaching similar values, em braced Russian chauvinism . He w as joined by many prom inent and imm ensely popular w riters living in the country. A nationalistic opposition to the reform process started form ing that w ould later encom pass the com m unists. Their battle cry: the Soviet Union is synonym ous w ith Russian em pire and as such should be defended. A num ber of literary m agazines provided a theoretical base for this philosophy. N ash Sovremennik, edited by a prom inent Russian poet Stanyslav Kuny e v, started publishing w orks by a leading Russian m athematician , ph ilosopher and mem ber of th e Academ y of Sciences Igor Shafarevich that brought back m emories of early century czarist pogroms. In his articles Shafarevitch put the blame for all of Russia’s troubles on the Jew s. He advocated a theory that is still popular w ith man y Russian nationalists: that the nightm ares of Lenin ’s and Stalin’s rule w ere propagated by their Jew ish lieutenants. The famous Russian cry “Save Russia - Beat Up All the Jew s” w as entering the lexicon of serious publications. Glasnost brought into the open not only liberal ideas but also those suppressed for m any years by the state but very much alive among certain groups - ideas of a strong pan-Slavic state based on the domination of all other nations. These views w ere especially prevalent among the literary community that articulated them through journals published by the Union of Writers. Go rb ach ev’s policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, initially promoted as fine-tuning mechanisms for the ‘Soviet way of life’, where turning into vehicles for reforms not condoned or even envisaged by the communist nomenklatura. Glasnost w as becoming the target of attacks at Communist party functions, government meetings, parliament debates. O n several occasions, Gorbachev himself, under pressure from the almighty conservatives in his entourage, had to side w ith the forces that undermined his own policies. The debates from the pages of new spapers spilled into the streets of Moscow, Leningrad and other major Soviet cities w here your political affiliations w ere synonymous w ith the new spapers and magazines you read. Know ing that they had the public’s support, liberal publications started getting bolder and more involved not as outside observers but as active participants in the turbulent developments of the late eighties and early nineties. Alexander Ivanko

137

When in early 1991 the Soviet Arm y cracked dow n on pro-independent dem onstrators in Vilnius and Riga resulting in a dozen civilians killed, the liberal m edia broke all rules pointing the finger at the Com m unist party as the culprit. A num ber of senior editors published an open letter in M oscow N ews firm ly putting the blam e at its door. Am ong the letter’s signatories w as Igor Golembiovsky, First Deputy Editor of Izvestia. Nikolai Efim ov, Izvestia’s Editor, relying on instructions from Staraya Ploshad’, called a meeting of the editorial staff to try to get all of us to rubber-stam p Golem biovsky’s dism issal. To his am azem ent, th e editorial m eeting turned into a unified front against Efim ov and the policies of the Com m unist party forcing the editor to leave the m eeting - a m in uscule event in h istorical terms but a grand victory for us th e journalists of Izvestia as w e w ere able to stand behind Golem biovsky, our favourite senior editor and a dedicated defender of Glasnost, and defy the w ill of the Krem lin. The m edia landscape w as not only chan ging politically but also econom ically. Editors started realising that w hat they w ere printing w as a product and a very popular one that could be sold in larger quantities for a hefty profit once you got the Com munist party off your back. This w as another catalyst to attack the party and dem and m ore freedom , political as w ell as econom ic. There w as a catch: all of us w ere not trained as free-m arket econom ists and had no clue how the m arket w orked. We thought that as soon as w e had econom ic freedom w e w ould becom e instant m illionaires, and in the next few years som e actually did, but most Russian journalists today barely make ends meet. After its success w ith advertising, Iz vestia editors decided to try som ething new and form a joint venture w ith an Am erican m edia compan y that w ould start publishing the first Russian-American new spaper in both countries in tw o languages. This project w as started in 1990 and after alm ost tw o years of negotiations w ith the Hearst Corporation in early 1992 We newspaper was founded; a unique experiment that only lasted for tw o years. How ever, the road w as cleared and other publications follow ed Iz vestia establishing joint magazines and new spapers, franchises and even public relations companies w ith m edia giants from the We st . 138

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

In the early nineties most new spapers started changin g publishers, moving from either governm ent or Com munist party or some other public organisation to ‘editorial staff’. Iz vestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, m any other publications h ad officially named their editorial staffs as publish ers. This w as initially m ore a political m essage rather than econom ic realit y. It underlined th e m edia’s independence from govern ment. How eve r, as before, n ew sprint w as subsidised, distribution w as mostly done through the governm ent monopoly S oy z p echat’ and salaries w ere paid in w orthless roubles. Everybody’s political rights expanded beyond belief but th e econom ic righ ts w ere still the same - non-existent. O ne had the right to preach w hatever view s one deem ed appropriate but on e could not privately ow n his or her ow n apartm ent except as part of a co-operative scheme. And these schem es w ere pretty rare. O n ly after the com plete collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 did econom ic reform start leading to privatisation of m any new spapers by their editorial staffs. We the journalists form ed closed shareholding com pan ies an d becam e ow n ers of our ow n product. No one outside the w alls of Iz vestia, for exam ple, could ow n its stocks. It took an oth er few years an d in 1995 Iz vestia m anagem ent allow ed the staff to sell stocks so that individ uals and compan ies outside Iz vestia co u ld buy its shares on the m arket. But th e m edia scene in the m id-90s w as very different from five years ago. Fo r starters, th e founders of Glasnost, its first pioneers w ere squeezed out by the m ore energetic and young reporters-entrepren eurs, som e of them directly related to leading M oscow editors. Yegor Ya k o v le v ’s son, Vladim ir, foun ded th e new spaper K om m er sant th at today is one of Russia’s leading an d m ost influen tial business publications. He also publishes a num ber of m agazines. Vladim ir Yakovlev is on e of M oscow ’s richest and im portant m edia gian ts of the 90s. Artem Borovik, the son of Gen rih Borovik, a top Russian foreign affairs colum n ist, edits Sovershenno S ekretno, a m on thly specialisin g in crim e stories an d in vestigative reports. This m agazine is on e of the h ottest sellers in the coun try. Borovik junior also runs a num ber of side businesses. Alexander Ivanko

139

But w here are the pion eers of freedom of expression , th ose bold ‘the buck stops here’ individuals? Sadly, m ainly out of business or out of co u n t ry. These courageous men w ho stood up against a totalitarian system and w on failed the m arket test. They could not com prehend how the market actually w orked and instead of leading th eir publications to finan cial glory often brought them to the verge of bankruptcy and then sold them to different banks and conglom erates that needed pocket m edia. The m arket, neutral as ever, did not care about their previous accom plishm ents. In the free-for-all capitalism of the 90s in Russia n obody really gave a dime about how you fought for democracy in the 80s. New values w ere taking over an d this tim e th e journalists w ere not in the lead but trailing w ay behind. O nce popular literary m agazines w ith circulation in the m illions w ere barely afloat publishing, if lucky, a few thousand copies a m onth. Their form er readers w ere actually becom ing norm al people, going about their business, trying to m ake a living instead of reading about other people’s lives and histories in num erous publications w hich w as the fad of the eighties. Glasnost paved the w ay to freedom of expression unseen in Russia except for a short tim e in 1917 betw een the tw o revolutions. Debates often turned ugly and involved a lot of name-calling but these w ere nevertheless debates, lively, new and unpredictable. A once boring to death m edia landscape becam e as diverse as in any other dem ocracy w ith publications of all colours and creeds present: from far right to far left. Even the m ost bizarre w eeklies and m onthlies found a niche. As a policy Glasnost w as Gorbachev’s m ajor and som e w ould say only success. He could not bring him self to introduce m arket reform , he changed little in how the Com m unist party operated but by being its General-Secretary he forced on it a concept alien to the very core of com m unist ideology, that of freedom of expression. And there w ere people in Russia, w ell-educated and liberal, just w aiting to flesh out this policy and m ake it reality. To them Russians of today ow e their freedom . To them Russians of tom orrow w ill build m onum ents.

140

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

Stanley N. Schrager Present at the creatio n: An American’s perspective O f all the things that Am ericans are inclined to take for granted, chief am ong them is perhaps the First Am endm ent, that neat little phrase w hich guarantees Am ericans free speech, free press, and the general idea that governm ent cannot, should not, w ill not, interfere w ith these inalienable rights. “That First Am endm ent stuff again!.” — as a frustrated diplom at (non-Am erican obviously) referred to a U.S. diplom at’s assertion that the m edia sh ould be free — seems like a rem arkably idyllic and non-attainable elem ent in the O SCE fam ily of states. Even our European allies, w ho subscribe w ith varying degrees of enthusiasm to a European Con vention on Human Rights drafted fifty years ago, have problem s w ith this liberal Am erican idea. Am erican diplom ats at the O SCE have occasionally stated publicly, “The best m edia law is no media law,” but realizing at the same time the inevitability of some kind of legislation that brings the governm ent into the affairs of m edia. But how far, and under w hat circumstances? How much is enough? Too m uch? The Am ericans have historically grappled w ith this question. It is easy to cham pion speech w e agree w ith; it is much harder, in the w ords of Suprem e Court Justice O liver Wendell Holm es’ w ords, to protect speech that “w e loathe and believe to be fraught w ith death.” Nevertheless, for most Am erican s, this is exactly w hat a comm itm ent to freedom of speech requires us to do — and w ith good reason. Unpopular speech can not be subject to suppression m erely because it is unpopular. Am ericans are not insensitive, or should not be, to legislatures in the O SCE region w h ich attempt to restrict speech. Legislatures in the Un ited States have also frequen tly attempted to restrict speech because they believed it to be dangerous. Just before the Civil War, m any Southern states put abolitionists in prison for publishing their view s. During World War I, the governmen t jailed Bolshevist sym path izers — includStanley N . Schrager

141

ing leading American socialist and presidential candidate Eugene Debs — because they urged m en to resist the draft. The McCarthy era saw nationw ide crackdow n s on anyone w ith leftist beliefs; people lost their jobs, their reputations and their freedom . And during the w ar in Vietnam, of course, the government tried to prevent publication of the infam ous Pentagon Papers. The justification for these limits on speech is alw ays the same — and w e hear reverberations of this theory in the occasional O SCE governm ent w hich attem pts to restrict freedom of the m edia or speech; especially in tim es of crisis, w e cannot allow speech that w ill incite law lessness or endanger lives. It w as not until th e 1960s in the United States that the courts began to reject that justification. Recognizing that all speech is an incitem ent designed to persuade the listen ers to action, the Suprem e Court, in 1969, specified very narrow circum stances under w hich a speaker can be liable for the harm that results from his speech ; only w hen the speech is intended to produce, and is likely to produce, im m inent law less action. In the United States w e have learned that once w e low er the barriers against restricting speech, it becom es easy to justify alm ost any restriction on speech. Those staking a position at th e far end of this thesis subscribe to w hat I like to call the “Theory of the Slippery Slope” — once you begin the descent into even a few areas w here the governm ent can even legitim ately con cern itself w ith lim itin g th e freedom of th e m edia, w hat is to prevent the governm ent from going a bit further along th is road th e next day? This is only one of the issues that this particular Am erican diplom at has had to deal w ith the past year. “Present at the Creation” of this unprecedented O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, this particular diplom at, w ho, by anyone’s standard, w ould qualify as a “liberal” in Am erica (and as a radical by som e in the O SCE fam ily), now begins his second year of service. “Never have so few tried to do so m uch w ith so little” m ight have been the m otto of this office a year ago. The “few ” speaks to the restrictions on the num ber of staff — “the little” is the relatively paucity of 142

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

resources — and the “so much” is th e product of the w ide-ranging in tellect and com m itm ent of the first O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Freim ut Duve. It is good to have around som eone w ho resists the urge to be beaten dow n by the vicissitudes of life, and w ho still, after m ore than six decades, believes that one can still, hyperbolic as it sounds, “m ake a difference.” Don Q uixote and Sisyphus com e to m ind; they w ould have approved of this office, and w ould have been bem used by those w ho, overtaken by the reality syn drome, keep clam oring for “results.” Don Q uixote de la Mancha pursued his im possible dream , and Sisyphus refused to be defeated and continued to roll his rock again up to the top of the hill, and Duve refuses to take no for an answ er from the m ost repressive governm ents in the region. Institutions have personalities because they are com posed of people. Wh ile I often disparage th e somew hat preten tious idea that an office w hich has existed for only a year can qualify as an “institution ,” this office, nonetheless, has a “personality” all its ow n, and a distinctive w ay of view in g the w orld. Yes, w e have a “Mandate,” one that took months of negotiations to agree upon, and, like all good bureaucrats, w e rely on this m andate. But w e are more than just the provisions outlin ed. Those are w ords on paper, good w ords, appropriate w ords, but they guide, they do n ot lim it. They show us possibilities, they do not restrict. I rem em ber one year ago sitting w ith Duve and our Germ an advisor in a room w ithout furniture. Now that w e had been “created,” w e w ere faced w ith the overw helm ing question — “What do w e do now ?” And the subsets of questions w hich follow ed; how and w here do w e get our information? What do w e do w ith it? Who do w e com m unicate w ith? Who and w hat are our constituencies, our clients? What is our relationship w ith the O SCE bureaucracy? What influen ce can w e bring to bear on governm ents? How many divisions does this particular Pope have and how should they be utilized? Most important of all, we are engaged in a process, and the process suggests an evolution tow ard a freer media environment in the O SCE region. I have to adm it to a bit of bem usement when we are asked, as we occasionally are, “What are your priorities and can you submit a Work Plan?” Stanley N . Schrager

143

“Freedom and Responsibility:” Where to draw the Line? The nam e of this publication, not coincidentally, and a m ajor them e of this office during the past year is “Freedom and Responsibility.” For som e Am erican liberals, the w ord “responsibility” is a code w ord (as one Am erican media NGO contends) for “restrictions.” Indeed, w hen some O SCE governm ents speak about “responsibility” of the m edia, they are suggesting that in cases of “irresponsibility,” governm ents should be able to take som e action to restrict th e m edia. Am erican liberals (including, again, several NGO s) continue to express concern about Article Ten, Section Tw o of the European Convention on Hum an Rights (ECHR) w hich, w hile affirm ing clearly in a preceding paragraph O ne, the concept of freedom of speech and expression — “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”— then, in the succeeding paragraph Tw o, notes that “The exercise of these freedom s, since it carries w ith it duties and responsibilities, m ay be subject to such form alities, con ditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a dem ocratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the preven tion of disorder or crim e, for the protection of health or m orals, for th e protection of th e reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of in form ation received in confidence, or for m aintaining the authority and im partiality of the judiciary.” This issue, in fact, w as a m ajor difference of opinion betw een the United States and the Council of Europe countries during the negotiations on the m andate for this office in 1997. While this is past history, the potential or im agined conflict betw een Am ericans’ strong com m itment to the First Amendment, and the ECHR, to w hich all the Council of Europe countries subscribe, is a potential source of concern. Under w hat circum stances should a governm ent intervene to restrict the m edia? It is clear, it should be noted, that the case law of The European Court on Hum an Rights in Strasbourg has consistently supported the concept of the idea of free expression and has rarely found in favor of governm ents w hich have attem pted to use Article 10 Section 2 to restrict the m edia. To som e Am ericans, how ever (and Am erican NGO s), this is not sufficient solace for having the restriction s en shrined 144

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

for the past fifty years in a docum ent to w hich som e 40 O SCE countries subscribe. The concern, as it is understood, and as som e m edia NGO s have highlighted, is that a country could use restrictions as outlined in Article Ten Paragraph Tw o to restrict its m edia and claim that such restrictions are enum erated in the European Convention on Hum an Rights. Indeed, m any of the new dem ocracies in the O SCE are engaged in legislating new m edia law s w hich are im portant because they spell out the relationship betw een governm ent and m edia. Nearly all the draft law s have enum erated specific exam ples of under w hat circum stances the governm ent can take action against the m edia. Some of these exam ples use precisely, or nearly precisely, the exact language of Article Ten Paragraph Tw o of the European Convention on Hum an Rights w hen discussing w hen governm ents can intervene w ith the m edia. O ne m edia NGO has even published a study of how govern m ents around the w orld have used ECHR language to repress the media. What the report does not do, how ever, is demonstrate any con nection betw een the ECHR language and the actions of the particular governm ents involved. Every country brings its ow n history an d culture to the relation ship betw een freedom and responsibility. It is this intersection of freedom and responsibility that continues to define the nature of the problem s w h ich confront this office and th ose in the O SCE w h o continue to prom ote and encourage m edia freedom in the pan-European area. This is not an apologia for the responsibility or lack thereof of the Am erican media; th e Americans can come to grips w ith th at issue, and, in fact, continually do so. By the sam e token, each country can do the same. But if each country, indeed, determines by itself w hat is or is not “responsible” m edia, w hy have this office in the first place? “Cultural relativism ” can be carried too far, but so also can an absolutist doctrine that determ ines w hat is or is not “responsible” for the m edia in another country. Unfortunately, w e see, in certain countries in the O SCE area, ram pant exam ples of “irresponsibility,“ often a by-product of a young and inexperienced m edia. O ccasionally, these “irresponsible” allega tions are products of inexperience, occasionally of political m alice, but Stanley N . Schrager

145

perhaps the m otive is not as im portant as the product — the libelling of someon e else’s reputation in an “irrespon sible” m anner. What, then , can the aggrieved, or libelled, party do about these allegations, and, to make it even more complex, w hat if the aggrieved party is a governm ent official in a country w hich has defam ation law s m aking it a crim inal offense to “slander” or “defame” the President or other high governm ent officials? And if governm ents take action against the m edia to reduce or correct the ill-effects of “libellous” allegations, to w hat degree do these governm ents, by doing this, inhibit m edia freedom ? The stan dard line of this office is th at freedom is the product of n onrestrictive government policies w hich prom ote and encourage m edia freedom w hile “respon sibility” is up to the media them selves to determine. That may w ork in principle, but in a region w here one of the products of an em erging dem ocracy is lack of professional and trained media, the practical results of this imbalance is a situation w here governm ent officials and prominent persons may indeed have actionable grievan ces. You then get to the question of the “burden of proof”; is it up to the m edia or to the allegedly libelled persons to dem onstrate the truth or falsity of the claim s? We are here rem inded of a prom inent politician in one of the em erging dem ocracies in the O SCE region w ho has been said by a leading new spaper to be a hom osexual and w hose grandm other w as labeled a prostitute. There is a certain laughability to these allegations, particularly the latter one, but the politician had a good point; in his country, the “burden of proof” rests w ith the aggrieved p a rt y, not the m edia, and it w as up to him, legally, to “demon strate” that he w as not a hom osexual, and, theoretically, if carried to the extrem e, that his grandm other w as not a prostitute. Libel and the burden of proof; yet another exam ple of the kind of issues that confronts this office. In the best of all possible w orlds, the m edia w ould be “responsible,” and governm ents and individuals w ould not need to resort to defam ation or libel suits. But the O SCE region today, w hile far superior to other areas of the w orld in term s of m edia freedom , is not the best of all possible w orlds. It represents an entire spectrum of m edia freedom , and the farther east you go, the farther 146

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

from “Western Europe” tradition, the more complex the issue becom es, becom ing enm eshed in new dem ocracies w ith no tradition of free media. In fact, another w ay of dividing the issue, in order to perceive a greater definition, is betw een those countries w ith a “dem ocratic tradition” and those countries to w hich dem ocratic traditions are new or not fundam entally cem ented, either in the present, except for w ords, or in the past history of that particular country. I am not an apologist for governm ents, but in the past year I have seen clear examples of unfounded allegations against governm en t officials; w hat to do about them . A person’s reputation is a valuable com m odity, som etim es all that one has, and unfounded allegations should not be throw n around lightly — I think everyone agrees w ith that. At the same tim e, libel law s should not be used by a govern ment to intim idate the m edia from engaging in a serious discussion of corruption. O ne official called it a “m aturation process,” that it took tim e for both sides, governm ent and m edia, to com e to grips w ith this new pheneom enon of media freedom . Wh ile it may be true that it w ill take tim e for both sides to “m ature,” w e deal w ith the present as w ell, and for struggling governments and journalists to be told that time w ill take care of these issues is sm all solace. And here is, perhaps, the appropriate role for international organizations like O SCE and offices like this one; to bridge that distance betw een the parties and m oderate the polar extrem es. The form ation of a m iddle class is a vital com ponent of the grow th of a democracy, so too is the grow th of a responsible m edia, the parallel of the econom ic m iddle class. But som e of these countries need som e urging, som eone to play a m oderating role as they engage in this “m aturation process.” “How can w e speed it along?” one diplom at asked. I am m ore con vinced than ever th at this office and internation al organizations like th e O SCE can play this “m aturation” role in bringing both sides together. Values, traditions, dem ocracy, norm s and obligations — all these issues are intertw ined as this new Institution seeks to m ark a path. The NGO s, of course, have their ow n view s, and w e often declare, “We are not an NGO .” Well, that is true, as far as it goes, but w e often Stanley N . Schrager

147

strongly support NGO appeals to a particular governm ent to lift restrictions on the m edia on a particular issue. In fact, the relationship of this office to the NGO s is a prim ary source of strength, from our view point. The NGO s approached the creation of this office w ith a certain understandable apprehension; after all, much of w h at th ey do is done against governm ents. Their initial skepticism about this office, as w e understand it, w as based on an inherent potential conflict of interest and their belief that this office m ight indeed side w ith governm ents against m edia. After all, w e w ork for the participating States of the O SCE, are paid by them, and destined to w ork closely w ith these governmen ts to bring about positive changes in the m edia environm ent of these very sam e countries. The initial misgivings of the NGO s, h ow ever, have not, in our opinion, been borne out. This office has been adam ant in its denunciation of those governm ents w hich have arbitrarily and unjustly restricted their m edia. This is all the more rem arkable w hen one realizes that NGO s do not have to deal w ith conflicting concerns or national, or regional, or organizational “interests.” National governm ents have to continually balance values and interests in their policies tow ard a particular govern m ent; NGO s need not deal w ith this com plexity. And neither, in fact, does this office. We are quite aw are of the concept of con flictin g interests, be they econom ic, com m ercial, or strategic that often dictate policy. But if w e w ere to put too m uch em phasis on interest, rather than the “value” of a free and independent m edia as a benefit to em erging dem ocracies, then, perhaps, the NGO s w ould have a reason for their initial distrust. That has not been the case. While w e are not ignorant of the pervasive nature of national interests in our w orld today, w ere w e to overem phasize the idea of national interests, or comprom ise the im portance of the value of an independent m edia in the prom otion of dem ocracy, w e w ould not be either true to our m andate or true to the principles w hich led to the founding of this office. Most im portantly, w e w ould not be true to the ideals w hich m otivate us. So any conflict w hich m ight have arisen betw een values and interests has not m aterialized, at least not in the first year, at any rate. It is 148

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

entirely likely that some O SCE delegations w ill, if they have not already, accuse us of being too “values-oriented,” of not taking into consideration other overriding, or at least im portant, issues. It is im portant, vitally so, not to com prom ise the integrity of this issue, for once one goes dow n that slippery slope, w here does it end? We are cognizant of the panoply of issues w ith w hich O SCE deals, and w e know that freedom of the m edia is but one of them . But those other issues con cern us on ly to the extent that they affect the principle of a free, independent and pluralistic m edia. It is not that w e are unsym pathetic; far from it. This Am erican has spent the better part of tw o decades in the Diplom atic Service dealing w ith fragile governm ents in som e kind of transition to dem ocracy, or som ething resem bling dem ocracy. As these governm ents, by nature som ew hat insecure, m ove tow ard dem ocracy, they clearly grasp the im portance of public opinion, and the potential uses of the m edia to influence that public opinion and support. We do not begrudge any O SCE governm ent the righ t to prom ote a governm ent-sponsored television or new spaper; w e understand the need to have a public avenue to explain governm ent policy. It is also understandable that only a farsighted and secure governm ent w ould encourage, alongside that government-controlled media, an indepen dent media, or opposition media, w hich w ould engage in criticism of that governm ent, how ever w ellintended. This w ould just, as one official told us, “confuse the public.” This sam e official w en t on to explain that if the governm ent w anted to con tin ue w ith dem ocratic reforms, it needed the support of the people w hich could only be garnered through the m edia, and indepen dent and opposition media w hich might oppose governm ent reforms, w ould lead to fissures in the public, thus decreasing the ability of the governm ent to m ove ahead w ith dem ocratic reform s. This is an interesting conundrum , but it assum es, first, that the governm ent is w ell-m eaning and, indeed, interested in prom oting dem ocratic reform s, but m ore importantly, it m isreads the value and function of a free m edia in strengthening dem ocracy. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media likes to speak of the “corrective function” Stanley N . Schrager

149

of the m edia, th e ability of th e m edia to redirect policy concerns, to foster an open debate on critical issues. It w ould be naive to assum e that sim ply airing and engaging in a public and free debate in the m edia w ill solve or even am eliorate som e of these issues, but w ithout such a debate lies the path to rigid and arbitrary decision-m aking. Som e governm ents prefer to put the issue of freedom of the m edia on the diplom atic “back burner,” som ething they w ill “get around to” in the near future. Until the advent of this office, the only resistance they had to this policy w as the outcry of NGO s and the occasional dem arche of an interested governm ent. Now, w ith th e creation of this office, O SCE has institutionalized its concern w ith and support for, a free and independent m edia. But how can this office resist being institutionalized? How can it retain its uniqueness, and its ow n nature? Despite the trappings of an existential query, the question needs to be answ ered, and one year of experience can only provide guidelines. We return to the question of results. Som e OSCE m embers ask w hat w e have “accom plished” in this sh ort year, w hat w e can point to as victories in the fight against govern ment repression of the media. It w ould be nice if it w ere as easy as all that. What is unarguable, how ever, is our belief that the m ere presence of this new office has m ade govern m ents m ore aw are of how they deal w ith the m edia in their country, for w e are w atching. The elevation of the concept of freedom of the m edia into the third of the O SCE “Institutions,” by its very existence, testifies to the im portance the organization attaches to this idea. It is difficult to prove a negative — w hat action certain governm ents migh t h ave taken against the m edia in their country if this office did n ot exist — but as an article of faith it seem s a certainty that, as the existentialists used to like to say, “existence precedes essence.” But now th at w e exist, an d have don e so for a year, w h at n ow. What kind of a second year can the O SCE expect from this office; ho w can w e build upon the first year to extend th e reach an d im pact of the concept of freedom of th e m edia th roughout the O SCE region? What new areas can w e becom e involved in an d is th ere a risk of “o v e r r e a c h in g ? ” 150

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M ,

WHY WE DO IT

Travel has been an im portant part of w hat w e do. It soon becam e obvious that the battles that needed to be fought could not be fought primarily from here in Vienn a, that it w as important to be on the scene, to speak w ith the journalist w ho had been harassed, w hose new spaper had been closed, w ho had been recently called in by the Minister of Justice for a little chat. But these visits are not easy to put together. Where w e have an O SCE M ission in th e country to w hich w e are traveling, then it becomes easier to plan a useful schedule. Without an O SCE Mission, w e need to construct a program w hich, w hile taking into consideration the legitimate view s of the government visited, also provides us access to the other three of our core constituencies — Parliam en tarians, NGOs, and, of course, the journalists themselves. Balancing this kind of program is no sm all feat, but w e are learning as w e go along to fine tune the visits, to calibrate them to gain exposure to the w idest possible am algam of officials and journalists to provide an accurate picture of the m edia environm ent in that country. The year has made the issues m ore clear; harassm ent of journ alists through unreasonably high libel judgm ents; inviting media to a Min ister for a little talk about a recent article or broadcast; government control of the distribution system ; un w illingness of a governm ent to license independent electronic m edia; action against media based on “personal insult” law s still on the books in a num ber of O SCE countries; criminal defamation law s w hich threaten journalists w ith imprisonment; and, finally, perhaps the m ost in sidious restriction of all, that of “self-censorship.” “Self-censorship” is w hat goes on in the m ind of a journalist w hich causes him to hesitate before publishing or broadcasting som ething w hich others, in this case governm ents, m ight find distasteful. It is im possible to m easure w hat has not been published or broadcast throughout th e years because of self-censorship; the desire to avoid h assles — better, in the end, not to do it. It is the hardest violation of all to m easure because it is, in the end, unsaid, never havin g seen the light of day. It is a w ay of censoring truth as surely as putting a journalist in prison, and it is a result of law s and statutes that result, in the end, in stifling freedom of, the m edia and in the end, of suffocating truth. The Stanley N . Schrager

151

only w ay to combat self-censorship is to repeal all statutes w hich m ight lead a journalist to hesitate in publishing som ething because he or she m ight run afoul of the law . Even then there m ay be som e hesitation. Because of the subjective nature of the thinking of the journalist, this violation of freedom of the m edia is difficult to m easure. How prevalent is self-censorship in the OSCE region? We have taken to asking this question of journ alists w h en w e travel, and, invariably, w ithout giving specific exam ples, m any of the journalists adm it that there are boundaries beyond w hich they w ill not traverse because of the possibility of governm ent reaction. But how can one get a handle on self-censorship? The governm ent in question can plausibly deny any responsibility. Ye t the threat to freedom of expression clearly exists. An other area w orth exploring is the use of the m edia in conflict resolution. There tends to be a negative slant to the actions of this office to the degree w e exercise w atchdog or om budsm an functions, searching for violations on the part of governm ents of O SCE norm s and com m itm ents regarding m edia freedom . But there are positive w ays to utilize the media, and one is in con flict resolution; “Unfriendly Neighbors” as som e have called it. The idea here is to take journalists from tw o “unfriendly neighbors” and explore w ith them the nature of their coverage of the “other side.” As m any as six or eight journalists w ould com e from each country to a n eutral site for tw o or three days of in ten sive interaction . This w ould include show ing video clips an d articles of h ow each side has covered a particular event, perhaps, and discussions w ith a skilled facilitator about how to m ove beyond the prejudices of the past, to, as the poet Robert Burns put it, “see ourselves as others see us.” O bviously, funding is an issue since w e are, unlike our colleagues at O DIHR, not a “program or sem inar office, and intentionally so. But the “Unfriendly Neighbors” project w ould have a m ultiplier effect, as, one hopes, the m edia from each country w ould return hom e w ith a more incisive view of w here each side is coming from . They could also, as a follow -up, exchange visits to their respective capitals in the future as w ell. The results could be tracked as w ell through an alysis of media coverage of the issue in the future. 152

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

We w ill w an t to look, too, at the role of minority media in the O SCE countries, their relationship w ith the government and w ith other media in the m ajority language. We may w ant to draw on th e expertise of th e O ffice of the High Com missioner on National Minorities for assistance in fram ing our program .. Th e in crease in O SCE Missions w ill significantly alter the w ay w e do busin ess as w ell. All the Central Asian states now have O SCE Missions, and as this is bein g w ritten, plans are underw ay to open O SCE Missions in Azerbaijan and Arm enia, thus providin g total coverage of Cen tral Asia and the Caucuses, areas in w h ich w e deal. Th e O SCE Missions in the Balkans continue to play a significant role in providing information w h ich w e need, an d the O SCE Missions in Belarus and Ukraine have proved invaluable in providing assistance under difficult circum stan ces. The most im portant aspect of this increase in resident missions w ill be the change in the nature of our visits â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the key element in the quiver of arrow s w e possess. We have learned in this first year that there is a w orld of difference in developing a visit to a country w here w e have a m ission on the ground and w here w e do not have such a m ission. Where w e have a m ission, w e w ork closely w ith them in developing a useful program ; w here w e do not have such a m ission, w e are obliged to look for other sources and interlocutors w hich can, on the ground, supplem ent the governm ent-provided part of the program . While w e usually find an NGO or em bassy officials w ho can assist, this is not as certain as w orking w ith a like-m inded O SCE entity. What, then does the future hold? O r at least the next year. We w ill continue and deepen our continuin g dialogue w ith those governmen ts w hose actions are not yet consistent w ith O SCE norm s and standards concerning the prom otion of a free, independent and pluralistic m edia environm ent. We w ill continue to travel extensively, returning a secon d and third time to countries w here w e have issues of concern to pursue. We w ill look at w ays to m ake the activities of this office better know n to the publics in the O SCE region. But the second year w ill not, should not, be m erely a reiteration of the first. We w ill w ant to go Stanley N . Schrager

153

beyond w here w e have been before, refining our approaches to particular countries, dealing w ith specific issues as m ay be appropriate and asking governm ents to m ake decisions that dem onstrate their com m itm ent to the principles of a free m edia. We w ill have to be realistic as w ell, tem per our idealism w ith pragm atism . For the prototypical im patient Am erican , this w ill occasionally not be easy. We exist in real tim e, and one searches alw ays for positive results. But w e do have a lodestar to show the w ay, and a foundation to build upon..

154

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

Bei Hu Censo rship by Killing

“A few days ago in Ireland, a journalist w as m urdered by the Mafia w hose crim es she w anted to expose. We mourn the death of Veronica Guerin from Dublin. She died also for the h uman dimension of the O SCE, shared by us all.” Freimut Duve, upon the presentation of the OSCE Prize for Jour nalism and Democracy in 1996 We define censorship by killing broadly to include all cases in w hich journalists h ave been killed to silence their voices. That w ould encom pass not only th ose w ho have paid the dearest price for th eir exposé of official corruption, but also those w hose lives have been cut short by other perpetuators of injustice w hose greed they had tried to reveal. NGO s tracking the killings of journalists m ay h ave used different criteria for inclusion into their lists. Reporters sans Frontières publishes an annual report on journalists killed and jailed during the year. They counted 19 journalists killed around the w orld last year. That w as at variance w ith the International Federation of Journalists - International Press Institute tally, w hich put that num ber at 50. The IFJ-IPI list included “journalists killed w hile w orking or because of their w ork.” “We m ake n o distinction betw een a correspondent caught in the crossfire w hile covering a w ar and the violent death of other journalists killed as a result of their w ork,” the IFJ-IPI report says. The RSF list, by contrast, “only counts those cases w here it has been established beyond doubt that the journalists w ere killed in the course of their w ork, or sim ply because of their profession.” O ur list m ore or less represents a com prom ise betw een those tw o. For w ell-grounded reasons, neither of the above-m entioned NGO reports has attem pted to separate narrow ly defined censorship by Bei Hu

155

killing, w hich em phasises the m alicious intent to silence negative coverage, from other types of violent incidents that have resulted in the death of journalists. O ur list, how ever, highlights the form er, although w e understand that it is often hard to identify this intent and attribute responsibilities. We recognise, at the sam e tim e, the practical difficulties in m ain taining law and order as w ell as ensuring m edia freedom in fledgling dem ocracies and the urgency of better protection for journalists. We have excluded those journalists w ho have been killed in tragic accidents, although w e deeply m ourn their prem ature death. Also excluded are murders w hose con nection to the journalists’ professional activities are open to question. O ur focus is therefore on w hat can and should be done to create a safe w orkin g environ ment for journalists, be it stronger law enforcem ent or agreem en ts betw een w arring parties to guarantee hum anitarian treatm ent of w ar correspondents. O ur definition for censorship by killing, w hile appearing sim ple on paper, finds no easy application in actual case analysis. In countries w here killings of journalists have been m ore com m onplace, investigation s in to th ose m urders often drag on for years, sometim es arriving at controversial conclusions. As activists at the International Federation of Journalists w rote in the introduction to its 1997 killed (journalists) list, “Many journalists are the victim s of tragic accidents, som e are the targets of violence and others are brutally assassinated. It is not possible to m ake sim ple distinctions in draw ing up this list. In som e cases, especially Latin Am erica and the countries of the form er Soviet Union, it is difficult even to find the specific m otive for the killing.” Thus, in com piling such a list, sole reliance on either official inform ation or private speculations can be inadequate. A certain am ount of guessw ork is required in m ost cases, particularly w hen one is rem oved from the ground, and thus the raw m aterial facts. Borrow in g heavily from the NGO reports, our list looks back on the m ajor cases since 1996. As researchers at IFJ and IPI have observed, a major trend has been the decrease of journalists killed in arm ed conflicts as tensions abate in Bosnia, Croatia and Chechnya. O n a less positive note, how ever, killings linked to the victim s’ investigative w ork have 156

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

been gaining w eight in the list over the years. Geographically, the focus has gradually shifted aw ay from the w arring zones to countries w ith fledgling legal system s and unstable m edia environm ents. 1996 Arm ed conflicts raged on in Chechnya, claim ing the lives of four journalists. It is w orth pointing out that they did not die in accidents, but in the hands of hostile forces. It rem ains unclear w hether their killings had anything to do w ith the content of their coverage. In a w ay, this is not the key issue, though w e have alw ays stressed that journalists should maintain high professional standards. Here w e w ould like to call attention to the necessity of guaranteeing journalists’ personal safety and right to w ork regardless of their eth nic or nation al origin s and professional affiliations. Russian Viktor Pim enov, a cam eram an for Vaynakh — the proMoscow national Chechen television station — w as gunned dow n by a sniper in Grozny on March 11, 1996. He w as film ing the afterm ath of the Chechen rebels’ raid on Grozny and w as shot in the back. (IFJ) The body of Nadezhda Chaikova, a correspondent for the Russian w eekly O bshchaya Gazeta, w as foun d buried in the Chechen village of Greikhi on April 11, 1996, about seven m onths after her death. Photos taken before her burial by the villagers show ed that she had been brutally beaten, blindfolded and shot in the neck. Chaikova w as form erly a Tass correspondent. She had travelled extensively in Chechnya and w as know n for her hard-hitting coverage of the w ar. (IFJ) Russian journalist Anatoly Yagodin w as ambushed by Chechen m ilitants near th e settlement of Assinovskaya on April 18, 1996. He had been a senior Lieutenant in the special forces and w as reporting for the military m agazine Na Boevon Postu before his death. (IFJ) Ethnic Chechen journalist Ram zan Khadzhiyev w as killed crossing a Russian checkpoint w ith his family on August 13, 1996. He w as the North Caucasus corresponden t for Russian Public Television Bei Hu

157

(O RT). He w as fleeing the besieged city of Grozny. He had show n his press identification and had been w aved th rough by the Russian guards before tw o Russian arm oured personnel carriers suddenly opened fire on his car, according to an unidentified male passenger in his car. In its initial report, O RT said that Chechen guerrillas had killed Kh adzhiyev. Khadzhiyev w as a know n supporter of the Moscow -installed governm ent in Ch echn ya. (IFJ) O f far greater concern to us is th e m urder of journalists in peacetim e in retaliation for their professional w ork. In all three years, journalists w orking on crim e stories or investigating official corruption w ere m ost vulnerable to this kin d of m urder. Th e form er Soviet Un ion states have seen m any of these cases. Even though the governm ents m ay not be directly responsible for a majority of them, they nevertheless underline the w eakness of law enforcem ent — a situation that these governm ents are in the best position to im prove. Metin Goktepe, correspondent of the left-w ing daily Evrensel, w as found dead on January 8, 1996 near the Eyup Gym nasium in Istanbul w here he w as detained by the police along w ith m any others w ho had attended the funeral of tw o leftist m ilitants killed in a prison clash. An autopsy report released on January 10, 1996 revealed that he had died in the gym nasium — a fact that the police had denied — and that he had died from brain haem orrhage as a result of strikes to the head. The Interior Ministry ordered an investigation. The Parliamen tary Comm ission, on the basis of the investigation, concluded that Goktepe had been beaten to death in police detention. Eleven police officers w ere subsequently charged directly w ith beating Goktepe to death, and another 37 charged w ith abusing other detainees in the sam e case. The trial has been tw ice transferred, w hich m edia and NGO s have claimed to have rem oved the trial out of public attention an d hindered attendance by Goktepe’s law yers, the accused an d oth er groups. They also believe the changes h ave resulted in delays in the judicial process. (IFJ) 158

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

Nina Yefimova, Grozny correspondent for the Russian-language new spaper Voz roz hdeniye, w as found dead from a pistol shot in the back of her neck on May 9, 1996. She and her mother had been kidnapped from their apartment the previous night. Their bodies w ere found in tw o different locations. A police official claimed that the murders had been com mitted for private reasons. But journalists linked them to Ye fim o va ’s coverage of crim e in Chechnya. (IFJ) Igor Grouchetsky, a Ukrainian freelance journalist know n for his coverage of crime and corruption, w as found dead from a severe headw ound near his hom e in Tcherkassy, southw est of Kiev on May 10, 1996. He h ad been the Tcherkassy correspondent for the Kiev new spaper U k raine- C entre. Shortly before his death, he had reportedly testified in a crim inal case involving, am ong others, the son of a high-ran kin g police official. Police found tw o files in the journalist’s home containing criminal information belon ging to the police. (IFJ) O n May 11, 1996, Viktor Mikhailov, a crim e reporter for the leading Serbian daily Z abaikalsky Rabochy, w as killed in broad daylight by unknow n assailants. (IFJ) French national Xavier Bernard Gautier, w ho w orked for the daily Le Figaro, w as found hanging in a house on the Spanish island Menorca on May 19, 1996. While official sources said he had committed suicide, his friends and fam ily suspected m urder. They said Gautier had been found w ith his hands tied and a blue cross painted on his shirt. The w ords “traitor” and “red devil” w ere scraw led on the w alls. According to the Spanish daily El Pais, Gautier had been w orking on a story about the w ar in Bosnia and illegal arms sales. (IFJ) Irish investigative reporter Veronica Guerin w as gunned dow n on June 26, 1996 by tw o m en on a m otorcycle w hile w aiting out side a hotel in Dublin. Guerin, w ho w orked for the Irish daily T he Independent, had specialised in coverage of Mafia and drug trafficking in the few years leading up to her death. Not long before her m urder, she had obtained an exclusive interview w ith the local Mafia boss nick-nam ed “Mad Dog.” (RSF-IFEX) Bei Hu

159

Tw o journalists w ith the private Russian television Otechestvo (Father land), Marina Gorelova and Yuri Sh makov, w ere am ong 14 people killed by an explosion in Kotlyakov cem etery in Moscow on November 10, 1996. They w ere covering a m em orial service for Michael Likhodei, President of the Afghan War Invalids Fund. (IFJ) 1997 At first glan ce, there w ere few er vicious, censorship-m otivated killings of journalists in O SCE m ember-states in 1997. How ever, w e have to add a w ord of caution. Each year, on top of high-profile cases enum erated here, m any other journalists and m edia w orkers die in the line of duty. Som etim es, because of lack of data, the causes of death are not quickly identified. The IFJ list cited 11 such cases in 1997. Am ong the m ost w ritten about cases in 1997 are: On March 13, 1997, the body of Pyotr Sh evchenko, Lugansk regional correspondent for the Ukrain ian daily Kievskiye Vedomosti, w as found hanging in an abandoned building in Kiev. Not long before his death, he had co-authored a series of articles on the disputes betw een the m ayor of Lugansk and the local branch of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), successor to the KGB. The SBU had held a press conference in Lugansk during w hich they had accused the new spaper of bias in its coverage. In early March, Shevchenko had expressed h is fear for SBU reprisal to the daily’s editorial offices. The police found no apparent signs of struggle. Cash and other valuables w ere found on the body. According to Ukrainian reporters, the prosecutor’s office looking into the case had reportedly found a suicide n ote from Shevchenko indicating he had been pressured by SBU. But his colleagues had not been allow ed access to that note. (IFJ) The killing of Boris Derevyanko, editor-in-chief of Vechernyaya O dessa, w as described by Governor of the O dessa Region Vasily Ivanov as “an act of political terror.” Derevyanko w as gunned dow n near his office on his w ay to w ork on August 11, 1997. He died of gun shots in the heart and stomach, fired from point blank 160

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

range. His colleagues h ave linked the murder to the new spaper’s critical coverage of the city council, particularly the m ayor of O dessa Eduard Gurvits. Derevyanko him self w as deputy to the city council. The Chief Regional Prosecutor has opened an official investigation into the possibility of a contract killing. Several other journalists at th e n ew spaper had com e under assaults in the past. Sergei Lebedev survived three gun shots. His attacker received only 18 m onths of jail time for attempted murder. Vit a liy Chechik w as assaulted in 1996 and 1997 by attackers w ho w arned him to stop w riting articles about the m ayor. (IFJ) Milorad O stojic, w ho reported for the Alternative Informativna M reza (AIM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, suffered a brain haem orrhage on O ctober 28, 1997. He slipped into a coma and died 11 days later. The In ternational Police Trainin g Force suspected “ possible violent death” in a subsequent statem ent. O stojic had w ritten articles critical of the local authorities in Teslic, for w hich he had been threatened and harassed in the Septem ber m unicipal election. Several of his colleagues at AIM claim ed to have received threats from local officials that if they continued their critical coverage, they w ould face a sim ilar fate as O stojic did. (IFJ) 1998 Tw o journalists died in regional conflicts in Abkhazia. But the m ainstream w as killings as a form of intim idation. These m ore recent cases illustrate that a lot rem ain to be done in O SCE m em ber-states to guarantee correspondents’ personal w ell-being and press freedom . Ivan Fedyunin, politics editor of the Russian new spaper Bryanskie Iz vestiya, died of m ultiple stab w ounds in his apartm ent on March 31, 1998. He had published critical reports on the activities of a num ber of local com panies and had reportedly received threatening phone calls a few days before his death. (IFJ) Igor Lykov, a Russian journalist and police m ajor, w as shot tw ice point-blank in his apartm ent on May 2, 1998. He had repeatedly w ritten in the local and Moscow press on corruption and Bei Hu

161

breaches of law in the law -enforcem ent system s, for w hich he had been regularly punished. Nine crim inal suits had been brought against him and he had been tw ice dism issed from th e police service. There w as an attem pt to brin g charges against him for divulgin g state secrets w hen h e published a num ber of articles in the local press on problem atic practices in police recruitm ent. (IFJ) Georgy Chanya, an ethnic Georgian journalist w ith the independent Georgian daily Rez onants, w as killed on May 27, 1998 w h ile covering fighting betw een the Abkhaz rebels and Georgian guerrillas in the separatist region of Abkhazia. He had follow ed a band of Georgian guerrillas to file front-line reports about ethnic cleansing by the Abkhaz rebels. He died in a raid on the guerrillas’ cam p. His body w as m utilated beyond recognition and identified only through personal docum ents found on his body and photos taken by the Abkhazian m ilitary personnel. (IFJ) O n June 8, 1998, Russian journ alist Larisa Yudin a w as m urdered on th e outskirts of the Kalm yk capital Elista. She had been h arassed and threatened for her coverage of local corruption and the rule by the republic’s m illionaire president Kirsan Ilyum zhinov. The day of her murder, she w as to m eet a source for evidence of financial im proprieties by local firm s setting up an offshore tax shelt e r. The Federal prosecutor has taken over the case and three suspects have been subsequently arrested in connection w ith the m urder. (CPJ) Anatoly Levin-Utkin, deputy editor-in-chief of Yuridichesky Petersburg Segodnya, died in August 1998 from head injuries as a result of an attack by tw o unknow n assailants on the porch of his house in St. Petersburg. His briefcase, containing m aterial for the next day’s paper as w ell as photo equipm ent and exposed film , w ere reportedly m issing. The paper had published articles on corruption in the city’s banking circles. A story about the leadership of the city’s ban kin g industry w as to be published the day after th e assault. Leading bankers had dem anded the new spaper to nam e its sources. (IFJ) 162

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

Tara Singh Hayer, publisher of the ethnic Indo-Canadian Times, w as shot to death in the garage of his suburban Vancouver hom e on Novem ber 18, 1998. An outspoken critic of violent Sikh fundam entalists, he had been left paralysed by a previous assassination attem pt at his new spaper office in 1988. His son believed that Hayer had been killed to deter people from voting for the m oderates in the upcom ing Sikh tem ple elections in Vancouver. (IFJ) Afrim Maliqi, a journalist for the Albanian-language daily Bujku in Pristina, w as am bushed by m asked gunm en and shot to death w ith tw o others in his car in the centre of Pristina on Decem ber 2, 1998. He had expressed fear to colleagues that he w as being follow ed and w ould lose his life. He had w ritten a cultural colum n for the paper critical of the Serbian policy tow ards the Albanian language com m unity. The Serb auth orities h ad threatened to close dow n the new spaper. The new spaper has been unable to publish since police stopped journalists from entering its offices on the w eekend of Decem ber 19. (IFJ) In conclusion, w e eulogise journalists w ho have braved intim idation and devoted their lives to m aterialising people’s righ t to know. But th is list is m ore than a eulogy. The m urderers have done m ore than silencing a few voices. Their vicious acts have m ajor chilling effects on the m edia in those countries. We understand that better protection of journalists’ safety and professional rights w ill m ost likely have to go hand in hand w ith perfection of the country’s political and legal system s. This is going to be a long process. But w ork has to start today. The governm ent has a m ajor role to play in this process, no m atter w hat pattern the killings of journalists m ay follow in that country. Alm ost as im portant are the voices of NGO s and a w ide spectrum of citizen groups. Som e organisations have taken concrete initiatives, such as the IFJ’s Safety Fund, w hich gives financial assistance to journalists under threats of censorship. In light of this, w e urge the establishm ent of an effective netw ork that is to track cases in w hich journalists h ave been killed in the course Bei Hu

163

of w ork or because of their profession. Unlike previous tracking system s, this one should concentrate on follow ing the progress or lack th ereof in the in vestigations into these cases. A sim ilar netw ork sh ould be set up to receive and act upon com plaints of threats, either in the form of personal safety or right to w ork, filed by journalists. We w ould also urge all kinds of groups to share experience on how best to im prove the situation. Topics m ay include how to protect journalists in a difficult legal system and how to accelerate the developm ent of an independent and effective legal system in a new dem ocracy. Last but not least im portant, w e call on the governm ents to speed up investigation, be m ore responsive to NGO concerns and introduce greater transparency in crim e investigations.

164

W HERE WE CO ME FRO M , WHY WE DO

165

166

III.

Respo nsibility European Landscape of M edia Self-Regulation

The freedom of the press guaranteed in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germ any em braces independence and freedom of inform ation, expression of opinion and criticism . Publishers, editors and journalists pursuing their profession m ust rem ain con stantly aw are of their responsibility tow ards the general pu blic and th eir duties to the best of their ability and b elief and m ust not allow their w ork to be influenced by personal interests or extraneous m otives. The journalistic principles em body the professional ethics of the press. These ethics encom pass the duty, w ithin the framew ork of the con stitutio n and the con stitutional law s, to m aintain t he standing of th e press and to be com mitted to the freedom of t he press. These professional ethics grant everyone affected the right to complain about the press. Complaints are justified if professional ethics w ere infringed. The Preamble of the Press Code as presented to the Federal President Dr. Gustav W . Heinemann by the German Press Council on 12 December, 1973 in Bonn. 167

168

RESPO NSIBILITY

Kaarle Nordenstreng Euro pean Landscape o f Media Self-regulatio n Self-regulation is the most obvious answ er to the question, how to ensure the freedom and resp onsib ility of mass media in so ciety. Claude-Jean Bert rand (1998a) refers to it by media accountability systems M AS and list s over thirty different w ays to up hold the quality and responsibility of the free m edia (see Bert rand 1998b). These include m edia criticism and m onitoring, public access to the m ed ia and even training – the education of both professionals and consum ers. How ever, the most im portant and internationally recognised m echanisms of self-regulation are independent press councils and professional codes of ethics. Table 1 on the follow ing page lists the European countries w here m edia selfregulation operates through councils and codes. The m ain basis for this inform ation are surveys made at the University of Tampere, Department of Journalism and Mass Com munication, under m y direction and published in 1995 as Reports on M edia Ethics in Europe (see References at t he end of this chapter, listed as Nordenstreng 1995a). O ne of the surveys is particularly on press councils, prepared for the first regional conference of press councils in Europe w hich w as organised by the World Association of Press Councils (WAPC) in Helsinki in June 1995. The survey w as carried out and reported by tw o of my graduate students, Päivi Sonninen and Tiina Laitila (see pp. 3-22 in Nordenstreng 1995a). The sit uatio n today (early 1999) has naturally brought some changes to w hat w as discovered in the survey four years ago, and thus the information reported m ay be outdated. Moreover, the definition of a press council is far from clear, and o ur survey included some institutions w hich do not strictly speaking qualify for a truly independent self-regulatory body. For exam ple, Claude-Jean Bertrand lists few er countries w ith a press council than done in the Sonninen & Laitila report (Betrand’s list is published in the Institut francais de presse’s Website: w w w.u-paris2.fr/ifp). O bviously there is a need to update our survey and at the same time clarify the concept of a press council. This m ay be done still during 1999 w ith the support of two forthcoming conferences: the seminar on ‘Self-regulation in the Media Sector at the European Level’, convened by Germany as part of its EU Council Presidency in Saarbrücken (April 19-21), and a meeting of European self-regulatory bodies, convened by the British Press Com plaints Com mission in London (June 10). Also the Council of Europe, w hich organised the ‘Information Seminar on Selfregulation of the Media’ in Starsbourg in 1998 (O ctober 7-8), serves as a helpful partner – in addition to the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. Table 1 show s graphically that codes are mo re frequ ent than councils. Every one of the 34 count ries listed has a docum ent of p rinciples and p ractices typiKaarle N ordenstreng

169

Table 1. European countries which have a press council and/or a professional code of ethics (Sources: N ordenstreng 1995a; www.uta.fi/ethicnet; www.u-paris 2.fr/ifp… Deontologie/ethic) Co untry

Co uncil

Arm enia Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Cyprus Denm ark Estonia Finland France Germ any Greece Hungary Iceland Italy Latvia

+ (+) (+) + + + + (+) + + -

Co de + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Co untry

Co uncil

Lithuania Luxem bourg Malta Netherlands Norw ay Poland Portugal Rom ania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sw eden Sw itzerland Turkey United Kingdom

+ (+) (+) + + (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) + + + + +

Co de + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

cally called ‘code of ethics’, ad opt ed by an independent m edia organisat ion (UK has two codes). Meanw hile, only 25 countries have a body to functio n as a court of honour m ost ly called ‘press council’. Considering the nature of these m eans of self-regulation this is u nderstandab le: a code is relatively easy to adopt by a single professional association, whereas a council requires an agreement betw een several parties (jou rnalists and publishers often in conflict w ith each ot her) and an institu tional com m itm ent far beyond a single reso lutio n. Som e of t he councils are no longer or not yet in o peration, or t heir status as an indep endent body is und er disp ute, w hich is m arked by brackets in Table 1 (altogether 10 cases). Press C ouncils. For a council to be an agency of self-regulation, it m ust be independent from the political and judiciary system . Thus an official body in co rp orated in t he stat e apparatu s d oes no t qualify as a self-regulat ory m edia co uncil. Yet th ere are tw o countries, Den m ark and Lith uan ia, w h ere a m edia co uncil has b een estab lished b y law p assed b y th e Parliam en t, an d t hu s fo rm ally sp eaking it has an official character, but in reality it operates as any independent self-regulatory body. Most broadcast ing cou ncils are official st ate bodies in th is respect , and therefo re t hey are exclud ed h ere, alt ho ugh such radio and/or television councils m ay in som e cases have quite a professio nal and pluralist orientatio n. Sin ce th e co un cils are first an d forem ost estab lish ed for and b y th e print m edia – althou gh m ost of t hem t oday cover also t he electronic m edia – t hey are usually called ‘press coun cils’. 170

RESPO NSIBILITY

Founding. Table 2 below show s how the first press councils em erged in the beginning of the century, at around the sam e tim e as did the first ethical co des of journalist s. The real bo om of the councils started, how ever, only after the Seco nd World War and had it s p eak in t he 1960s, w hen also several already existing councils began t o be rem od eled or revised. The most im portant exam ple for the later councils has been the now defunct British â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;General Council of the Pressâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, founded in 1953. For instance the German Presserat is copy of the form er British body. Even if serving as a m odel for other councils especially in Europ e, the Brit ish Press Council w as not the first of its kind. The Scandinavian journalists w ere years ahead of their British colleagues, the Sw edish Court of Honour being founded as early as in 1916, the Finnish in the early 1920s and the Norw egian in 1928. Table 2. Founding and revision of the councils Decade

Original

1910s

Sw eden 1916

1920s

Finland 1927 Norw ay 1928

Revision

1930s 1940s

Slovenia 1944 Netherlands 1948

1950s

United Kingdom 1953 Germ any 1956

1960s

Austria 1961 Denm ark 1964 Iceland 1965

Netherlands 1960 Austria 1963 Finland 1968

1970s

Sw itzerland 1972

Norw ay 1972 Sw itzerland 1976

1980s

Luxem bourg 1980 Poland 1984 Belgium 1985 Turkey 1988 Greece 1989 Malta 1989

Germ any 1986

1990s

Cyprus 1990 Portugal 1990 Rom ania 1990 Estonia 1991 Italy 1995 Lithuania 1996 Russia 1998

United Kingdom 1991 Denm ark 1992 Finland 1997

Kaarle N ordenstreng

171

After the opening move by the Scandinavian journalists, the councils spread around the w orld. At the end of the 1970s there w ere around 50 media councils or sim ilar organisations throughout the w orld, as docum ented in a survey conducted for Unesco by Clement J. Jones (1980). And as show n in Table 2, further councils w ere established in Euro pe in the 1980s and 1990s — am ong these the councils in Greece and Portugal sponsored by the state (the latter not recognised by the Syndicate of Jo urnalists). The British body w ent through a crisis and w as reborn in 1991 as the Press Complaints Comm ission (without participation of the National Union of Journalists). Russia is a case in its ow n scale, w ith the ‘Chamber for the Abjudication of Information Disputes’ under the President of the Russian Federation established in the m id-1990s and an independent ‘Grand Jury of the Media’ set up by the Union of Journalists in 1998. Although there are considerable differences betw een the various press cou ncils, they also have much in common. Their main task everyw here is tw ofold. First, the councils protect the rights of the public (audience, sources and referents of the content) in relation to the mass media. By giving the public the opportunity to complain about bad or unethical journalism , the press councils give the public at least some empathy if no t direct vo ice in the m edia performance. The council investigates the complaints by the public on certain cases and makes a statement that the medium in question, if found to have violated good journalistic practice (as defined in the code of ethics), is asked to publish in a given period w ith due prominence. Seco n d ly, the press councils protect the mass media themselves. Here the quarter to be protected against is mainly the state and other pow ers in the public as w ell as private sector, but also various interest groups among the general public. Thus selfregulation is also a w ay for the journalists and publishers to demonstrate that the media are responsible, w ith no further official regulation needed. Many councils, including the first in Sw eden, w ere in fact founded under public interest pressure. As pointed out by Denis McQ uail (1992), media regulation as w ell as self-regulatio n is typically introdu ced at a m oment of crisis or at turning points of history. Thus the Scandinavian councils w ere established after the First World Wa r, and the council of the Net herlands after the Second World Wa r. Several councils w ere founded after the introduction of television in the 1950s. In the late 1980s and 1990s the increasing economic concentration of the m edia and also the new inform ation technologies have made the councils topical again. Composition and financing. Most independent press councils have been established by journalists and/or publishers, and their composition is typically made up of representatives of these professionals and proprietors, appointed by the respective national associations of journalists and publishers. Ethics com mittees of journalists’ associations o nly may not be taken as proper councils, but nevertheless som e such cases are included in this presentation (among those bracketed in Ta b le 1). In addition, more often than not a media council has also ‘lay m em bers’ – peo172

RESPO NSIBILITY

ple representing the general public. To be true, the selection of these lay m embers remains a problem , because in this case one obviously does not w ant to resort to the Parliam ent as a representative sample of the population. In reality, how ever, the m em bers of the general public have proved to be an important asset to the councils, adding their credibility. Table 3 on the follow ing p age show s the composition of the councils according to inform ation of our 1995 survey. The m o st com m on category of m em bers are the journalist s’ associations, included in all the councils but Portugal and t he UK. It is either that the associations nom inate the m em bers, or they only recom m end som e mem b ers, w hich is the case in Denm ark, Greece and in Malta w here t w o of the m em bers should be conversant w ith journalism b ut no longer active in the p rofession. The second big m ember grou p are the rep resentatives of public or lay members. They take part in the w orking of eight councils. O ther big member group are publishers (included in the w ork of six councils), editors’ associations (also in six councils) and m embers of public (in five councils). The industry as such is m entioned in three answ ers, bu t its meaning is not specified. T he m ost com m on type of press cou ncil in Europe h as both jou rnalists and edito rs or publishers as m em b ers. Yet, according to o ur 1995 survey, ten councils select their mem bers from am ong those w ho are in no w ay involved in the media bu siness. How ever, in these councils the num ber of m emb ers of the public is rem arkable. In Denm ark, Estonia and in Finland mem bers of the public constit ute o ne t hird of the mem bers. In No rw ay m em bers of the pu blic are the biggest single group. T he Sw edish coun cil nom inates as m any m em bers from the pu blic as from the edit ors’ association . In the Neth erlands public mem bers are as many as journalists. The Press Com plaints Comm ission in the UK, instead, relies heavily on the memb ers of t he p ublic: m ore than half of the mem bers may not be engaged in the m edia-publishing industry. O nly in Port ugal d o the m em bers of t he p ublic form a clear m inorit y. O nly few of the councils have academics as their mem bers. These include Iceland, Italy and Sw itzerland (one academic in each). Journalists’ associations are the m ost comm on financers of the councils. This is the case in 11 countries in our 1995 survey. Either they are the only source of finance (5 cases) or t hey finance the council together w ith the publishers and/or editors (5 cases) or together with the state (2 cases). The state finances the councils in 5 countries. These also include Finland and Germ any w here the state has only a financing role; otherw ise it is exclud ed from the w orking of the co uncil. In Sw eden, instead, besides journalists’ and publishers’ allow ances, pecuniary sanctions play a role in financing the council. No o th er council’s finance rests even partly upon pecuniary sanctions. The m ass m edia industry as sole financer is likew ise not com m on. Kaarle N ordenstreng

173

Table 3. The composition and the financing of the councils (according to survey of 1995)

174

Country

Composition

Source of financing

Austria

12 delegated persons from the journalists’ associationand 12 delegated persons from the publishers’ association

journalists’ association+ publishers’ association

Belgium

a president, a general assem bly (30 m em bers representing the institutions in the m edia sector including the journalists’ association) and a com m ittee of experts (10 representing editors, trade unions, press agency, audiovisual sector and political authority)

Flem ish budget

Cyprus

3 journalists, 3 editors, 4 m em bers of parliam entarynot functioning parties + an experienced law yer as a president

not functioning

Denm ark a chairm an + a vice-chairm an + 6 m em bers appointed by the Minister of Justice (tw o of them recom m ended by the Danish Journalists’ Union, tw o represent editorial m anagem ent and tw o representatives of the public

publishers + the Ministry of Justice

Estonia

a chairm an + 10 m em bers, one third are representatives of the public and should not be journalists

m ass m edia industry (The Union of New spapers)

Finland

5 journalists, 5 publishers and 5 representatives of the public

50 % by the organizations involved in the foundation and 50 % by the state

Germ any 10 journalists + 10 publishers that founded the council + m ostly 49 % state subsidy

the four organisations

Greece

4 m em bers appointed by the governm ent + 4 m em bers appointed by the political parties + one m em ber appointed by the president of the Parliam ent, 5 of the m em bers m ust be journalists

the state

Iceland

3 m em bers appointed by the journalists’ union + one from the university + one by the publishers, the president is appointed by the Union

the journalists’ association

Italy

a chairm an (judge), a professor of private law ,an expert (advertising com m ittee) 2 journalists

the tw o journalists’ organisations that founded the council

RESPO NSIBILITY

Luxem bourg

7 journalists + 7 editors

no inform ation

Malta

a judge + 2 experts on journalism + an honorary secretary

no inform ation

Netherlands

8 journalists + 8 lay persons, president and vice president are judges

board of foundation (by journalistsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; association, publishers and editors)

Norw ay

2 journalists, 2 editors and 3 lay persons

the Norw egian Press Association

Portugal

a president, 5 m em bers appointed by the parliam ent,3 by the governm ent and 4 m em bers representing the public opinion

the state

Rom ania

m em bers of the Rom anian Society of Journalists (1995) com m ittee of directors (9)

the m em bers of the Rom anian Society of Journalists

Slovenia

9 journalists

m em bership fee

Sw eden

a chairm an and 3 vice-chairm en (experienced law yers) + 4 publishers + 2 journalists + 4 lay persons

publishersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; associations and the journalistsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; union + sanction fees

Sw itzerland

17 journalists + one professor of m edia + one law yer

the Sw iss Federation of Journalists

Turkey

11 m em bers appointed by the Council of Representatives (6 journalists + 5 lay representatives) proprietors + journalist , m em bers appointed by new spaper publishers (6-10),the General Manager of the Radio and Television, delegates of professional organizations

publishers and broadcast m em bers w ith a certain fee

Great Britain

7 editors + 9 public persons (academ ics and the m edia industry people from related organizations including the chairm an)

Kaarle N ordenstreng

175

Table 4. The codes in relation to the founders and the sanctions (according to survey of 1995)

176

Country

Founder

Code

Sanctions

Austria

journalists’ association publishers’ association

ow n code

voluntary publication of the violations

Belgium

the state

none

Cyprus

the state

code of another institution

none

Denm ark

the state

ow n code

publication of the violation

Estonia

journalists’ association publishers’ association

ow n code

voluntary publication of the violations

Finland

journalists’ association publishers’ association

code of another institution

a notice to be publilished w ithin a short tim e

Germ any

journalists’ association publishers’ association

ow n code

Greece

the state

ow n code

pecuniary sanction

Iceland

journalists’ association institution

code of another of publication

a notice, the possibility

Italy

journalists’ association

code of another institution

a reprim and and a notification of the journal ist’s legal case to the O rdine that can censure and also adopt the expulsion of the journalist

Luxem bourg

journalists’ association editors’ association

ow n code

none

Malta

journalists’ association broadcasters association

ow n code

none

Netherlands

journalists’ association

code of another institution

voluntary publication of the violation in councils’ ow n paper and in the m edium in question

Norw ay

journalists’ association editors’ association publishers’ association

code of another institution

quick publication of the notice

RESPO NSIBILITY

advice notices, a notice of censure, a reprim and

Portugal

the state

ow n code

publication of the violation or pecuniary sanction

Rom ania

journalists’ association

ow n code

a protest to the publication

Slovenia

journalists’ association

code of another institution

expulsion

Sw eden

journalists’ association publishers’ association

code of another institution

publication of the violation or pecuniary sanction

Sw itzerland

journalists’ association

ow n code

publication of the violation

Turkey

journalists’ association

ow n code

publication of the violation

Great Briatin

journalists’ association editors’ association publishers’ association

ow n code

publication of the violation

Cases and sanctions. The num ber of cases processed by the councils varies from a couple to three hundred a year. In absolute num bers the German co un cil h as m ost com plaints t o handle. How ever, in relation to the population of the countries in question, the Icelandic and Norw egian councils have m ost w ork to do. The other Scandinavian and the Estonian councils also have a lot of co mplaints to d eal w it h. The Dutch council is among tho se w ho have t o deal w ith few cases b ut it has been trying to encourage the public to be more active. The fou r mo st comm on t ypes of com plaints the cou ncils deal w ith are identification of the suspects and victim s of crim e, right to reply and to rectification, accuracy of inform ation, and intrusion on privacy. O verall, the protests are usually concerned w ith violation of proper journalistic norm s and ethical rules. But in som e cases the councils also receive com plaints concerning advertising. Cases like discrim ination, libel and slander, one-sided u se of so urces and severe criticism of politicians w ere also m entioned. Th us, th e com p laint s u sually deal w ith the fam iliar concerns of journalism : accuracy, right to reply and privacy. These concerns w orry the public all over Europe. Table 4 on the previous page show s w hether the councils included in the survey have their ow n codes of ethics or w hether they follow other codes, as w ell as the kinds of sanctions w hich the councils can im plem ent against the m edium that has violated the code in question. Kaarle N ordenstreng

177

According to our 1995 survey, the codes are draw n up by the council itself in 10 cases and in 7 cases by anot her institution, usually th e journalists’ u nio n. O nly three councils do not base their verdicts on any codes (Belgium , Cyprus and Est onia). O f cou ncils fo un ded b y the st ate tw o have no code at all (Cyprus and Belgium ), tw o use their ow n code of ethics (Greece and Portugal) and one (Denm ark) bases its verdicts on a code set up by another institution. (Concerning Belgium it should be noted that the Vlaamse M ediaraad is an official body, installed by the governm ent to give advice on general topics. How ever, there also exists another council for ethics installed by the Belgian association of journalists. The council is com posed of journalists and it deals w ith com p laint s o n p rivacy, secrecy of sources, or to reveal or no t your ident ity as a jo urnalist. The council’s w ork is based on the code of conduct by the editors.) No evidence w as found on w het her th e fact that a council has its ow n code or uses a code draw n up by another institution has a connection to the organizations that founded the councils. Councils established only by the journalists’ association either draft their ow n code, or use a code w ritten by another institution (usually by the journalists’ association). If there are several organizations behind the council, it uses either its ow n code or som e other organization’s code. The councils have either no sanctions at all or they give t he medium in quest ion a no tice t hat m ust usually be publish ed w ithin a sh ort period . Three o f the councils m ay give pecuniary sanctions, nam ely the Greek, Portuguese and Sw ed ish councils. The Slovenian cou ncil can, in extrem e cases, expell the ‘misbehaving’ journalist. The Italian council w ill also have som e m eans of expulsion through the O rdine dei Gionarlisti w hich can also censure the journalists. Usually the sanct ions are respected, although there are som e exceptions, like Greece w here the sanctions are not respected and Austria w here tw o boulevard papers do not pay any attention to the council because their ow ner is not a m em ber of the publishers’ associatio n. T he p ublication of the not ice given by the council is the m ost com m on sanction. This im plies that the councils and the m edia industry rely on publicity of the violation as a sanction. Codes of Ethics. Follow ing up earlier st udies in the 1970s, I initiated in 1989 an inventory of the journalistic codes of ethics adopted in the countries of the then Conference on Security and Co-operatio n in Europe (CSCE). It w as made by a graduate stud ent (Pauli Juusela) w ith the assistance o f the Prague-b ased International Journalism Institute (IJI). With 24 codes as the source material for analysis, the conclusion w as that “there is developing among the CSCE countries some sort of basic, universal mo del of journalistic codes w here the accent is o n t ru th, freedom of inform atio n, and pro tection of the individual” (Ju usela 1991). Since 1989-90 Europe has fundam entally changed, and therefore w ith another graduate student (Tiina Laitila) I m ade a new inventory of the codes 178

RESPO NSIBILITY

that w ere valid in Europe in 1994-95. We locat ed 31 contem porary codes ad opted by journalists’ associations or other bodies, notably m edia councils (Laitila 1995). This inventory show s that m ost of the codes are quite fresh; over tw o thirds of them w ere adopted in the 1990s. Many of those, such as the Polish and the Russian codes, w ere preceded by other codes years and decades earlie r, b ut they w ere upd ated an d revised recent ly in o rd er t o keep u p w ith changing tim es, and m ore codes are in the m aking. Betw een 1995 and 1998 half a dozen new one w ere com pleted (including Arm enia and Belarus) and others are underw ay (including the Czech Rep ublic). By and large w e can say that there are current codes of professional ethics, adopted by journalists’ ow n associations, in w ell over thirty European countries – Europe understood from the Atlantic to the Urals.1 As show n by Laitila, the m o st w id ely covered aspects in these cod es are the journalist’s accountability tow ards the public, his/her accountability tow ards the sources and referents and the protection of the journalist’s integrity. Least salient of various functions of the codes is the jo urnalist’s accountability tow ards the state and the em ployers. It is significant how m uch em phasis is placed by the codes to the public, as w ell as to the sources and referents (som e 60 % of altogether 61 provisions m entioned in the 31 codes), seen against the natural functions of protecting the integrity and status of the journalist (som e 30 % ). This m eans that the codes are designed not just for the selfish purpose of safeguarding the professional autonom y of w hat could be called ‘fortress journalism ’ but also for an idealistic purpose of serving the public interest. An id ealist ic and altruistic em phasis is st ill present if w e pick up o nly those provisions w hich are present in at least half of the European codes. This list, w hich could be taken as a basis for a com mon European code, according to Laitila (1995), is as follow s: – Truthfulness in gathering and reporting inform ation – Freedom of expression and com m ent; defence of these rights – Equality by no t discrim inating against anyone on the basis of his/her race, ethnicity or religion, sex, social class, profession, handicap or any other personal characteristics – Fairness by using only straightforw ard m eans in the gathering of inform ation – Respect for the sources and referents and their integrity; for the copyright and law s of quoting – Independence/integrity by refusing bribes or any other outside influence on the w ork; by dem anding the conscience clause . 1

The texts of all these codes (translated into English) are now stored in an electronic databank called ‘EthicNet’ and operated at The University of Tam pere, Depart ment of Journalism and Mass Com m unication (see http://w w w .uta.fi/ethicnet/).

Kaarle N ordenstreng

179

These six them es m ostly represent conventional professionalism – in its less self-centred brand – except the third one (equality and non-discrim ination) w hich h as a bias on behalf of so-called ordinary people and their hum an rights, i.e. a clear tendency aw ay from fortress journalism . The them e of countering racial and other form s of discrimination w as indeed a central element o f the universal values advocated by the ‘International Principles of Professional Ethics in Jo urnalism ’.2 M o r e o v e r, com bat ing racism and xenophob ia in the m edia has becom e in the 1990s a com m on concern for journalist associations in Europe, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), the Council of Europe and the European Union.3 Despite a com m on ground it is not easy to arrive at an all-European code of ethics — not to speak about a w orld-w ide code. O ne should recall that an international code of ethics for the m edia is a project w hich has been pursued already for 50 years, since the United Natio ns Conference on Freedom of Inform ation in 1948 — m ostly w ithout a notable result. The only exercise w hich reached a consensus am ong organised journalists from different regions and political system s of the w orld w as the above-m entioned ‘International Principles’ of 1983. But even that docum ent w as not an international code but a set of principles serving as a source of inspiration for creating and updating m ainly national codes. Yet there is today an urgent need to co-operate am ong all interested part ies, first an d forem ost the associat ion s of journalist s and ed itors/p ublish ers as w ell as m edia educators and scholars, to continue docum enting and reflecting on codes of ethics as a central elem ent of self-regulation of the m edia. Like in the case of press councils, this project should in no case be left for the states or intergovernm en tal organisations alone or else t he id ea of self-regulat ion is lost. O n the other hand, there is no reason to dogm atically exclude the official and intergovernm ental parties from an ‘ecum enical’ project, as long as its leader ship and term s of reference are in the hands of m edia people, including journalism educators and m edia scholars.

180

The docum ent w as prepared and given in the nam e of 400,000 w orking journalists in all parts of th e w orld at a consultative m eeting of internat ional and regional organisation s of professional journalists held in Prague and Paris in 1983 (see Nordenstreng 1998).

The Council of Europe com m issioned in 1995 a com parative study on codes of ethics dealing w ith m edia and intolerance from the Departm ent of Journalism and Mass Com m unication at th e University of Tam pere. Its report is included in the sam e publication that reproduces the bulk of Tiina Laitila’s Master’s thesis (Nordenstreng 1995a). The IFJ for its part has launched a prize for tolerance in jou rnalism, supported by t he European Comm ission, the Council of Europe an d Europe’s leading broadcasters and publishers. The prize is given at the annual European Media Forum , to celebrate 21 March – the European Day Against Racism .

RESPO NSIBILITY

W hat ever the content and orientation of the codes of ethics, w e have to ask, w hat is their significance – to w hat extent they are put into practice in real life and to w hat extent they are even know n am ong rank and file journalists. In both counts evidence is rather distressing, to the effect of supporting the second – negative or cynical – angle of the three outlined above. Am I then naive in taking the codes seriously; am I not inconsistent in accepting them as true readings of posit ive professionalism , w hile suspect ing m ost other aspects of professionalism as negative building blocks of self-centred fortress journalism ? My response to this challenge is, firstly, that it is w orth taking the codes of ethics at face value, since they have after all been carefully elaborated and adopted by representative professional bodies. In no case should they be taken as dead letters of history, since m ost of them are quite recent and kept alive by period ic revision s (and b y instit utio ns such as EthicNet). In ot her w ords, the co des do represent real and p resen t profession al thinking – how ever rhetorical it m ay be in its relation to actual practice. Secondly, the codes are invaluable as an instrum ent of self-reflection by helping the practitioners to understand the nature of their w ork and relating their practice into broader m oral and ethical values. In other w ords, the codes serve as vehicles of sensitisation. In general, codes ethics m ay be assessed from three angles. First, one m ay take a positive look by seeing them as vehicles of professionalism , as m eans of professional education, as instruments of consciousnessraising. Such a constructive – or naive – app roach w as typically taken w hen the first codes w ere introduced betw een the late 19th century and the Second World War, and it continues to be taken in the so-called developing and post-

State

Capital Media

Civil Society

Kaarle N ordenstreng

181

Com m unist countries. And as I suggested above, this position has its continued m erits even in the contem porary w estern countries – to a certain degree. Seco nd , one m ay take a negative loo k by seeing the cod es of ethics as m ere rhet orical devices, as deliberate w in dow -d ressing and cam ou flage, or at b est as m anifestatio ns of hypo crisy. Such a cynical approach is h eld to day by m any in t he so-called w estern d evelo ped coun tries, w it h a m arked d iscrep ancy betw een the high ethical principles and the low practice of com m ercial m edia. Th is view is also w ell just ified – alread y as a m ean s of critical reflectio n. T hird, o ne m ay t ake an an alytical lo ok by seeing th e co des as a m echanism of self-regu lation , n ext to independ ent m edia councils and courts o f hono u r. In t his ap proach th e co des are und ersto od as p art and parcel of a b ro ader syst em of m edia regu lation , exten din g from legal im peratives t o cultu ral con ven tio ns. They are seen n ot just as an excuse to refrain fro m legislat ing again st th e m edia bu t also as true m ean s o f regulatin g t he m ed ia. Th ere are go od gro un ds for each of th ese three w ays of app ro ach ing th e cod es, b ut t he m o st im portan t an gle is op ened up b y th e last approach. As I p ointed o ut fo r Am erican colleagues of m ed ia eth ics and law : “T he m essage from post -Cold War Europ e is clear: m edia m ust be free and accoun tab le, w it h self-regu lation an increasingly im port ant form of ‘co nt rol’ of the m edia.” (Nord enstren g 1995b) Self-regulation in Persp ective. In the Europ ean t radition, t he m ass m ed ia are p art and parcel of th e legacy of Enlight m ent and hu m an righ ts, w hereby t hey should be free – free from coercion by t he pow er holders an d free for pursu it of tru th and exercise of creat ivit y. How ever, no social instit utio n can b e absolutely free, and even t he freest media are alw ays tied to so me social forces, servin g som e po litical o bjectives – often in directly an d even un int ent ion ally, but st ill so ciolo gically speaking far from absolu tely free. The questio n, t hen , is not w het her m edia are free or con trolled , but w h at are th e m ech an ism s of social ‘con trol’ and accou ntability (for accoun tab ility, see McQ uail 1997). Th ree m ain m echan isms o f m ed ia cont ro l can b e distin guish ed (see Bertran d 1998a): – the law promulgated by the Parliament and other state bodies and ex ecuted by the courts, – the mark et based on private property, commercial advertising, etc., and – the media themselves through various means of maintaining ‘ethics’. T hese are no t m utu ally exclusive catego ries, and in m ost co un tries t oday (all co un tries in Eu ro pe) th ey coexist. Th us th e last-m en tio ned cat egory of selfregulat ion is alw ays acco m panied by som e d egree of legal regu lation – n ot t o censor bu t to guarantee t hat m inim u m st and ard s o f d em ocrat ic ord er and h um an right s are resp ected . O n th e oth er hand, h eavy legislation and effective self-regulatio n are typ ically seen as alternatives, and t here is a clear trend 182

RESPO NSIBILITY

to day to favo ur self-regulatio n an d m edia au tonom y. Sim ilarly, at th e tim e o f m edia co ncent rat ion and ‘tablo id isation’, it is n atural to favo ur self-regulat ion over com m ercial m arket s. M ed ia eth ics as an ot her w ay of h igh light ing self-regulatio n is to day on e of t he b oom ing areas of co m m un icatio n stu dies and literature (see N orden st ren g 1995c). A c c o r d in g ly, w h ile self-regu lat ion is alw ays acco m panied b y legal and m arket regulatio n, w e should t ake it as a mo st valuable form of regulatin g th e m edia in societ y. It is on e asp ect o f a m egatren d in con tem p orary We s t e r n th in king, w hereby establish ed po litical in stitu t ion s, inclu din g n atio n stat es, lo st th eir im p ort an ce – at least in term s o f th eir int ellectual p oten tial – an d are grad ually rep laced b y m ore flexible structures, grassroots app ro aches, netw o rkin g, et c. Part an d parcel o f th is t ren d is a n ew em p hasis on (o rd inary) peop le as t he m ain subject in com m un icatio n — as co nsum ers, citiz ens an d ‘ow n ers’ of t he righ t t o freedom o f info rm at ion — instead of journalist s an d m ed ia proprieto rs. I have characterised t his shift in p erspective by saying th at peo ple are m oving fro m th e aud ien ce t o t he arena (No rd enstren g 1997). This t rend m ay not be so much a mat ter of real life as it is a m at ter of w ishfu l thinkin g u nd er t he con ditio ns of ‘glob aliz ation ’. Yet it is so m eth ing t hat is vital fo r u s in discu ssin g th e role an d regulat ion of m edia in societ y – particularly in the non-state and no n-m arket ‘civil society’. T his is w ell illu strated by Joh an Galtun g (1999) in h is p resentatio n o f so ciet y as a trian gle, w ith th e m edia ideally lo cated next t o Civil Societ y: (p age 181) Galtun g d oes no t predict th at t he m arket fo rces w ill co m pletely ab so rb glob alizin g society; he also sees a burgeoning strength in the civil society w ith its new m ovem ents. Thus th e m edia take a challenging p lace in a field of conflict s. T he m ed ia are a vital chan n el no t on ly for th e Civil Societ y in relatio n t o th e St ate and th e Cap ital (m arket forces), b ut also in co m m un icatio n b etw een t he Stat e and th e Capit al – in o rd er t o en su re a com m on ‘pub lic sph ere’ an d d ialogu e in society. If th e m edia succeed in att aining a stron g and in dep end ent positio n in th is triangle, th ey cou ld, accordin g to Galtun g, assum e th e st atus of a fourth pillar in t he p ow er st ru cture o f so ciety. Taking a b roader perspect ive o f polit ical scien ce, at issue is no t just journalism and th e med ia but ultim at ely dem ocracy as a system of governing society – no t least t he so-called civil society. M ed ia in th e con tem p orary w orld h ave beco m e so vit al th at th ere are in deed goo d grou nd s t o take t hem as a fourth bran ch of govern m ent – no t just rhet o rically bu t even in po litical t heory and legal/ eth ical pract ice. Accordingly, fo r exam ple t he Fin nish discu ssion am ong con st itut io nal law yers has gen erated a p ro posal (by Professo r Em eritus Kauko Sipp onen) th at t he t rad ition al th ree est ates (legislat ive, execu tive and jud iciary) b e com plem ent ed by such con tem porary forces as trade un ions, m arket forces – and th e m ass m edia. Kaarle N ordenstreng

183

This view is stro ngly sup ported by pu blic o pinion polls at least in Finland : m edia is on the top of the list of institution s w hich are considered to have to o m uch p ow er o r in fluen ce in society. Tw o thirds of Fin ns (67 % ) thin k to day that t he m ed ia have becom e to o po w erful, w h ile one th ird (31 % ) feel that m edia pow er is w ithin proper lim its (1 % says they have t oo little pow er). Next to m edia in the list are t he European Un ion , m arket forces, big corporatio ns, ban ks, and polit ical parties (in this order). Half of Finn s say th at p olitical parties have t oo m u ch pow er; 45 % think t hat their p ow er is adeq uate, an d 5 % respon d t he view th at parties have t oo lit tle po w er. At the oth er end of a 22p oin t list of various in st itut ion s is th e ordin ary citiz en: 77 % th in k he/ she has too little p ow er, 22 % feel t hat ordinary peop le have eno ugh pow er, w hile m ere 1 % resp onds here w ith th e alternat ive ‘t oo m u ch pow er’. (See h t t p :/ / w w w . e v a . fi) Acco r d in gly, m edia and ordinary citizens are far ap art fro m each other in t he p ublic m ind — obviously not o nly in Finland but gen erally in (post)m od ern societies. No w on der, th en, th at m edia con su m ers’ asso ciatio ns have gained m om entum in several Europ ean coun tries (see Cees Ham elin k’s art icle in No rd enstren g 1995c). Also, at th e w o rld w id e level, there is an em erging m ovem ent aro un d vario us fo rms of emp ow ering p eop le in relatio n t o m edia — beginning w ith alternat ive video s an d m ed ia education, and en ding at p ro jects such as ‘C ultu ral Environm ent Mo vem en t’ (CEM ) and ‘Peoples’ Co m m un icatio n C harter’ (PCC). For self-regulatio n t his m eans that the m ain fu nction shifts from p ro tecting m edia professionals to ordinary citizens. This does not m ean that the idea of m edia self-regulation is diluted. O n the contrary, taking a little bit distance to t he m ed ia themselves and taking the ro le of the aud ience and citiz en m ore seriously turns self-regulation closer to w hat it is supposed to be in the theories of dem ocracy. Actually self-regulation can and should be justified not just on the basis of defensive strategies by the m edia bu t first and forem ost seen through th e public interest — ultim ately as an innovative approach to dem ocracy. I have suggested to see the rationale as a four-step logic: – media are influential (operating and perceived as powerful socio-political institution) – media are free (autonomy guaranteed by national and international law) – media are accountable (responsibility determined by social relations and legal provisions) – accountablity of free media is best materialized by proactive self-regulation This logic w as articulated w ith a view to new form s of self-regulation: m edia crit icism based on syst em atic m onit oring of media perform ance (Nordenstreng & Griffin 1999). But it fits equally w ell to the old w ays of m edia self-regulatio n: 184

RESPO NSIBILITY

councils and codes. Given the ever m ore vital role played by the m edia — including the so-called new m edia — in the em erging inform ation society, it is a great challenge for both m edia professionals, m edia academ ics as w ell as m edia politicians to prom ote self-regulation.

References Bertrand, Claude-Jean (1998a). Key-note speech. Proceedings of the Inform ation Sem inar on Self-regulation by the M edia held at the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 7-8 October 1998 (s:\ m m se p \ 9 8 \ se m in a r\ d o cu m e n t s\ a se m 7.98), pp. 7-12. Bertrand, Claude-Jean (1998b). Les M*A*R*S: M oyens (non -gouvern em entaux) d’assurer la responsabilité sociale des m éd ias. M édiasPouvoirs, N um éro d’autom ne 1998. Galtung, Johan (1999). State, Capital, and t he Civil Society: The Problem of Comm unication. In Vincent, Richard C., Norden streng, Kaarle & Tra b e r, Michael (eds.), Towards Equity in Global Communication: MacBride Update. Cresskill, N.J.: Ham pton Press, pp. 3-22. Jones, Clem ent J. (1980). M ass M edia Codes of Ethics and Councils. Paris: Unesco Reports and Papers on Mass Com unication. Juusela, Pauli (1991). Journalistic Codes of Ethics in the CSCE Countries. University of Tam pere: Publications of the Departm ent of Journalism and Mass Com m unication. Reports B 31. Laitila, Tiina (1995). Cod es o f Ethics in Eu ro pe. In N ordenstren g, Kaarle (ed.). Reports on M edia Ethics in Europe, p p . 23-56. Ab ridged in European Jour nal of Communication Vol. 10, No . 4, p p . 527-544.

M cQ u ail, D enis (1992). M edia Perfor mance: M ass Communication and the Public Interest. London: Sage Publishers. McQuail, Den is (1997). Acco unt abilit y of M edia to So ciet y. European Journal of C om m u n ica tion Vol. 12, No. 4, p p . 5 1 1 -5 2 9 . N orden streng, Kaarle (ed.) (1995a). Reports on M edia Ethics in Europe. University of Tam pere: Publications of the Departm ent of Journalism and Mass Com m unication. Reports B 41. N ord enstreng, Kaarle (1995b). Wo r ld Media Councils Discuss Self-Regulation. Silha Center Bulletin (University of Min nesot a, Sch oo l o f Journalism ), 1/1995, pp. 4-5. Nordenstreng, Kaarle (ed.) (1995c). Special Issue on Media Ethics. European Journal of Communication Vol. 10, No. 4. Nordenstreng, Kaarle (1997). From the Aud ience t o th e Arena. N ordicom Review Vol 17, No. 2, pp. 3-20. Nordenstreng, Kaarle (1998). Professional Ethics: Betw een Fortress Journalism and Cosmopolitan Dem ocracy. In Brants, Kees & Herm es, Joke & Va n Zoonen, Lisbet (eds.), The M edia in Q uestion: Popular Cultures and Public Interests. London: Sage, pp. 124-134. Nordenstreng, Kaarle & Griffin, Michael (eds.) (1999). International M edia M on itoring. Cresskill, N.J.: Ham pton Press.

Kaarle N ordenstreng

185

186

IV. O ur Wo rk, w hat w e have do ne Reports and Interventions

I rem em ber the Third Basket of Helsinki, w hich for us w as the decisive argum ent in our debate on freedom . For m e, the Helsinki Conference is a sym bol of the presence of hum an rights in international politics. Adam M ichnik, Polish journalist, in his speech after receiving the first O SCE Prize for Journalism and Democracy in Stockholm in 1996. 187

188

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

D ecisio n No . 193 Mandate o f the O SCE Representatio n o n Freedo m o f the Media PC.DEC No. 193 O rganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 5 Novem ber 1997 137th Plenary Meeting PC Journal No. 137, Agenda item 1 1. The participating States reaffirm the principles and com m itm ents they have adhered to in the field of free m edia. They recall in particular that freedom of expression is a fundamental and internationally recognized human right and a basic com ponent of a dem ocratic society and that free, independent and pluralistic m edia are essential to a free and open society and accountable system s of governm ent. Bearing in m ind the principles and com m itm ents they have subscribed to w ithin the O SCE, and fully com m itted to the im plem entation of paragrap h 11 of the Lisbon Sum mit Declarat ion, the particip ating States decide to establish, under the aegis of the perm anent Council, an O SCE Represent ative on Freed om of the Media. The o bjective is to stren gthen the im plem entation of relevant O SCE principles and com m itm ents as w ell as to im prove the effectiveness of concerted action by the participating States based on their com m on values. The p articipating States confirm that they w ill co-operate fully w ith the O SCE representative on Freedom of the Media. He or she w ill assist the participating States, in a spirit of co-operation, in their continuing comm itm ent to the furthering of free, independent and pluralistic m edia. 2. Based on O SCE principles and com m itm ents, the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill ob serve relevant m edia develop m ent s in all participating States and w ill, on this basis, and in close co-ordination w ith the Chairm an-in-O ffice, advocate and prom ote full com pliance w ith O SCE principles and com mitments regarding freedom of expression and free m edia. In this respect h e or she w ill assum e an early-w arning funct ion. He or she w ill address serious problem s caused by, inter alia, obstruction of m edia activities and unfavourable w orking co nditions for journalists. He or she w ill closely co-operate w it h t he part icipat ing St ates, the Perm anent Council, the O ffice for Dem o cratic Institutions and Hum an Rights (O DIHR), the High Com m issioner on National Minorities and, w here appropriate, ot her O SCE bodies, as w ell as w ith national and international m edia associations. The M andate

189

3. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill concentrate, as outlined in this paragraph, on rapid response to serious non-com pliance w ith O SCE principles and com mitm ents by participating Stat es in respect of freedom of expression and free m edia. In the case of an allegation of serious non-com pliance therew ith, the O SCE Rep resentat ive on Freedom o f the Media w ill seek d irect cont acts, in an ap propriate m anner, w ith the participating State and w it h o ther parties concerned, assess t he facts, assist th e participating State, and contribute to the resolution of the issue. He or she w ill keep the Chairman-in-O ffice inform ed about his or her activities and report to the Perm anent Council on their results, and on his or her observations and recom m endations. 4. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media does not exercise a juridical function, nor can his or her involvem ent in any w ay prejudge national or international legal proceedings concerning alleged hum an rights violations. Eq u a lly, national or internat ional proceed ings concerning alleged hum an rights violations w ill not necessarily preclude the perform ance of his or her tasks as outlined in this m andate. 5. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media m ay collect and receive inform ation on the situation of the m edia from all bona fide sources. He or she w ill in particular draw on inform ation and assessm ents provided by the O DIHR. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill support the O DIHR in assessing conditions for the funct ioning of free, independent and pluralistic m edia before, during and after elections. 6. T he O SCE Representat ive on Freedo m of the Media m ay at all t im es collect and receive fro m particip ating States and ot her interested parties (e.g. from organizations or institutions, from m edia and their representatives, and from relevant NGO s) requests, suggestions and com m ents related to strengthening and further developing com pliance w ith relevant O SCE principles and com m itm ents, including alleged serious instances of intolerance by participating States w hich utilize m edia in violation of the principles referred to in the Budapest Docum ent, Chapter VIII, paragraph 25, and in the Decisions of the Rom e Council Meeting, Chapter X. He or she m ay forw ard requests, suggestions and com m ents to the Perm anent Council, recom m ending further action w here appropriate. 7. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill also routinely consult w ith the Chairm an-in-O ffice and report on a regular basis to the Permanent Council. He or she m ay b e invited to the Permanent Council t o present rep orts, within this mandate, on specific matters related to freedom of expression and free, indep end ent and pluralistic m edia. H e or she w ill report annually to the Im plem entation Meeting o n H um an Dimension Issues or to the O SCE Review Meeting on the status of t he imp lementation of O SCE principles and com mitm ent s in respect of freedom o f expression and free media in O SCE participating States. 190

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

8. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill not com m unicate w ith and w ill not acknow ledge com m unicatio ns from any person or organization w hich practises or publicly condones terrorism or violence. 9. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill be an em inent international personality w ith long-standing relevant experience from w hom an im partial perform ance of the function w ould be expected. In the perform ance of his or her duty the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill be guided by his or her independent and objective assessm ent regarding the specific paragraphs com posing this m andate. 10. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill consider serious cases arising in the context of this m andate and occurring in the participating State of w hich he or she is a national or resident if all the parties directly involved agree, including the participating State concerned. In the absence of such agreem ent, the m atter w ill be referred to the Chairm an–in–O ffice, w ho m ay appoint a Special Representative to address this particular case. 11.The O SCE Representat ive on Freedom o f the Med ia w ill co-operate, on the b asis of regu lar contact s, w ith relevant internation al organ izat ions, includ ing the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the Council of Europe, w ith a view to enhancing co-ordination and avoiding duplication. 12. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill be appointed in accordance w ith O SCE procedures by the Ministerial Council upon the recom m endation of the Chairm an–in-O ffice after consultation w ith the participating States. He or she w ill serve for a period of three years w hich m ay be extended under the sam e procedure for one further term of three years. 13. Th e O SCE Representative on Freedom of t he M edia w ill b e est ablished and st affed in accord ance w it h t his m an date and w ith O SCE Staff Regulations. Th e O SCE Represen tat ive o n Freedo m of the Media, and h is o r her O ffice, w ill be funded by the participating States through the O SCE budget according to O SCE financial regulations. Details w ill be w orked out by the inform al Financial Com m ittee and approved by the Perm anent Council. 14. The O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill be located in Vienna.

The M andate

191

Interpretative statem ent under paragraph 79 (Chapter 6) of the Final Recom m endations of the Helsinki Consultations PC.DEC/193 5 Novem ber 1997 Annex By the delegation of France: â&#x20AC;&#x153;The follow ing Mem ber States of the C ouncil o f Europe reaffirm their com m itm ent to the provisions relating to freed om of expression, including the freedom of the m edia, in the European Convention on Hum an Rights, to w hich they are all contracting parties. In their view , the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media should also be guided by these provisions in the fulfilm ent of his/her m andate. O ur countries invite all other parties to the European Convention on Hum an Rights to subscribe to this statem ent.

Albania Germ any Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Denm ark Spain Estonia Finland France United Kingdom Greece Hungary Ireland Italy

192

O UR W O RK, WHAT

WE HAVE DO NE

Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxem bourg Malta Moldova Norw ay Netherlands Poland Portugal Rom ania Slovak Republic Slovenia Sw eden Czech Republic Turkey

Freim ut Duve After having been elected

18 Decem ber 1997 Freedom and respo nsibilit y - th ese are fo r m e t he t w o guiding concep ts underlying this new office. Responsibility and freedom have alw ays been the tw in pillars of the Helsinki process, w ith out w hich the Berlin Wall and t he Iron Cu rtain m ight still be in existence. I thank you all for entrusting m e w ith this m andate. This is a m andate borne by all the participating States of the O SCE. Here w e have a reaffirm ation of the fact that the O SCE regards itself as a fam ily of dem ocracies that, today m ore than ever, nearly a decade after the end of com m unism , takes seriously th e com mit m ent to dem ocracy in heren t in th e Helsinki process. For m e personally this is an em otional m om ent. And I cannot help but rem em ber som e of the distinguished persons w hom I have had the honour to know personally: Willy Brandt and his partners in the East and West, w ithout w hose O stpolit ik the CSCE process w ould not have com e about; Mario Soares, the first President of the Portu guese dem ocracy after years spent in exile; Va cla v Havel, the first President of the Czech Republic after years of im prisonm ent. I learned a great deal from the last tw o of these men â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Mario Soares and Vaclav Havel â&#x20AC;&#x201D; and as a producer of books I published their writings on freedom in Germ any at a tim e w hen Soares w as still in exile and Havel still behind bars. Ladies and gentlem en, With the help of all of you I should like, in a sm all w ay, to contribute to ensuring that w hoever today or at any tim e in the future w ishes to assum e responsibility for liberal dem ocracy in his country w ill be able to com m it to w riting and publish his thoughts in his ow n land, and that no one w ill be forced into exile or into prison for so doing. I should also like to thank High Com m issioner Max van der Stoel. His successful w ork has set an exam ple for m e. To th e outgoing C hairm an , Dan ish Fo reign M inist er N iels Helveg Petersen, I w ish to express m y deep gratitude for the enorm ous w ork that he and his colleagues, in close co -operation w ith the Vienna O SC E Missions, have carried ou t for the establish m ent of this office. All of these perso ns deserve not only m y thanks but those of the m any political com m entators and journalists w ho are w orking for the cause of freedom of speech. The Copenhagen O pening Speech

193

Finally I should like to thank Foreign Minister Kinkel and his staff, w ho have toiled w it h such devo tion and co m m itm en t for the establish ment of th is office. I look forw ard w ith confidence to good co-operation w ith the new Chairm an-in-O ffice, m y friend of m any years, Bronislaw Gerem ek, as w ell as w ith Am bassador Stoudm ann in Warsaw , the Secretariat in Vienna, and the O SCE Parliam ent ary Assem bly, w h ich w it h the assum pt ion of m y office I am leaving as a m em ber but w ith w hich as Media Rep resentative I shall b e w o rking closely. The Bureau of the Assem bly has alw ays paid particular attention to the im portance of the hum an dim ension. In this connection, I am certain that the O SCE Prize fo r Journalism and Dem ocracy w ill becom e increasingly im portant in the future. This is not only an assignm ent to prom ote co-operation but, at the sam e tim e, an assignm ent to develop an aw areness of the long and painful history of freedom of speech in all our States. The fact that the O SCE num bers Canada and the United States am ong its m ost com m itted m em bers is a historical stroke of luck for this O rganization, for w ithout the splendid traditions of freedom represented by these tw o great Am erican natio ns the situat ion in Europe w ould look quit e different as this century draw s to a close. In m y ow n country, Germ any, this century has seen free speech radically su ppressed by tw o d ictat orships. Yo ur w illingness today, tw o years befo re t he end o f this century, to entrust a Germ an w it h this office fills m e w ith profound gratitude and m odest pride.

194

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

First Repo rt to the Permanent Co uncil 15 January 1998 It is an honour for m e to be invited today by the Chairm an-in-O ffice to take the floor in the Perm anent Council and to give you som e first ideas and inform atio n o n t his new field in w hich w e w ill w ork together after m y appointm ent in Copenhagen.. Since the office of the O SCE Media Representative is at this m om ent still in statu nascendi, let m e now first outline t he basic principles of our future w ork and then give an overview of the very practical steps w ithin the next three m onths. When, at the end of last year, the O SCE Mem ber States adopted by consensus the m andate of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, it w as an im portant step tow ards the im plem entation of the basic elem ents of our com m on values and dem ocratic convictions. We are the first international organization that has decided to have a new political institution to help to bring to reality w hat our basic docum ents say in w riting: to guarantee the freedom of the m edia. A sim ilar and very successful step had been taken w ith the appointm ent of the High Com m issioner on National Mino rit ies w ho w orks o n t he difficult task of reducing conflict s w hich m ay arise from m inority and ethnic problem s. Now the O SCE m em ber states have app ointed an omb udsperson w ho has the task - w hich w ill not be an easy one either - of looking into the difference that m ight occur betw een our w ritten convictions on freedom of the m edia and the day-to-day reality. T he Copenhagen decision of the Decem ber 19, 1997 strengthened our main com m on conviction: yes, the O SCE m em bers are and w ill rem ain a fam ily of dem ocracies. Any dem ocratic society requires the respect of free, independent and pluralistic m edia. The O SCE m em bers have reaffirm ed this tim e and again, and they have consequently established the O ffice of the Representative on Freedom o f the Med ia. This O ffice shall serve as an instrum ent to enhance t he effectiveness of relevant O SCE action and to assist Participating States in im plem enting O SCE com m itm ents. Any dem ocracy needs freedom of expressio n for tw o reasons: the first is t he great traditio n o f the st ruggle fo r hum an rights in w hich w e all believe. The second reason is: w e all have experienced w hat happens to societies and econom ies that do not allow for the necessary corrective function of public criticism . As I have already pointed out in Copenhagen, freedom and responsibility of the individual and of the m edia belong together as co re elem ents of the manThe Reports to the Permanent Council

195

dat e. When w e take a closer lo ok at the m andate, w e b ecom e aw are of its co mplexity. The m andate lists a num ber of tasks such as the observation of the situation of the m edia w ith regard to w orrying developm ents, rapid response to serious non-com pliance w ith O SCE com m itm ents, broad contacts w ith Participating States and interested parties. Apart from that, the m andate does not exclude the possibility of dealing w ith individual cases in a non -juridical w ay. The early w arning function w hich the O SCE Representative w ill assum e according to th e m andate deserves special atten tion, as the Chairm an in O ffice pointed out. My O ffice m ay b e approached for actio n b y Part icipat ing St ates or by interested p arties inclu ding NGO s. It m ay also take initiatives in co-ord ination w it h the Chairm an-in-O ffice and w ith other O SC E inst itut ions. Let me reflect at t his stage on the O SCE w orking conditions and w orking m ethods w hich w ill also apply to the O ffice of the Media Representative. O n the one hand , com m itm ent s in the field of th e hum an dim ension of the O SCE are m atters o f direct and legitim ate concern t o all m em ber states an d do not belo ng exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned. This is co mm on grou nd since the H elsinki Summ it 1992 that allow s for O SCE action in the com prehensive concept of security. O n t he other hand, O SCE actio n is subm it ted to the overall principle of cooperation and consensus. Therefore, the O SCE w ill only be as efficient, as the m em ber states w ant the O rganization to be. My O ffice w ill privilege the idea of assistance in the prom otion of O SCE com m itm ents. It should be as transparent as possible for all m em ber states. Acting in the aforem entioned sense, requires broad inform ation from various sources. I am convinced that the m edia them selves as w ell as relevant NGO s w ill not hesitate t o provide the O ffice w ith inform at ion. But I w ould also like to encourage the m em ber states to provide the O ffice w ith inform ation about the m edia situation in their countries. It goes w ithout saying that w e w ill establish close w orking relations w ith O SCE institutions, w ith the O DIHR, the High Com m issioner for National Minorities and the O SCE m issions in order to exchange inform ation on relevant m atters and to co-ordinate our w ork. The O ffice w ill also be in regular contact w ith other international organizations, such as the U.N. and the Council of Europe, in order to draw upon their already existing expertise in the field of freed om of expression and free m edia. We shall try to avo id du plication of w ork. I therefore hope that m y office can also serve as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;clearing bodyâ&#x20AC;? for the w ork w hich is done on m edia m atters w ithin the O SCE fam ily. I shall attend the tripartite m eeting of the O SCE, the U.N., and the Council of Europe w hich w ill be held in Geneva on January 23. 196

O UR W O RK,

WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

I am now getting into the O fficeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s program m e until the end of March. A first and basic practical priority for us is to becom e operational by the beginning of Feb ru ary. In this respect, I should like to express m y than ks t o th e Governm ent of Austria, our host country, w ho once again w as m ost generous in m aking already available a beautiful, but provisional office space on the top floor of the Krtnerring. The O SCE secretariat has already given kind support for the necessary practical and adm inistrative arrangem ents. The office needs to be equipped w ith furniture, com puters etc. As to the staff, I should like to inform you that tw o advisors w ill be seconded before long by Germ any and by the United States of Am erica, to take the tw o P5 positions foreseen in the budget. My Germ an advisor w ill be Dr. Beate Maeder-Metcalf and m y US-Am erican advisor Stanley Schrager. The budget further provides for a secretary and a P4 officer w ho both can be em ployed as o f the begin ning of April. Th e respective vacan cy not es w ill be issued shortly. During this starting phase of the office, it is also my intention to contact your delegations in Vienna. I am convinced that advantage should be taken of the O fficeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s location here in Vienna for good co-operation w ith all delegations. Please do not hesitate either to raise issues w ith the O ffice during the starting phase. O ut o f Vienna and after m y visit to the Chairm an-in -O ffice in Warsaw yesterday, I am planning visits, until the end of March, to the United Kingdom as the EU Presidency, to the U.S., to Russia, to Canada, to Italy and to Portugal and to the Council of Europe. Let m e say at this stage a w ord on m y personal com m itm ents, especially those tow ards Parliam ent of w hich I have been a m em ber since 1980. I shall for the tim e b eing rem ain a m em ber of the Bun destag. How ever, fo llow ing m y appointm ent as O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in Decem ber, I have resigned fro m all direct political functions in Parliam ent. This m eans that m y m ain place of w ork w ill be m y office in Vienna.

The Reports to the Permanent Council

197

Seco nd Repo rt to the Permanent Co uncil

23 April 1998 It is m y pleasure today to give you the first progress report on the w ork of m y O ffice. Consistent w ith m y m andate, I look forw ard to using the opportunity to m eet w ith you on a quarterly basis as suggested by the Chairm an- inoffice, Foreign Minister Gerem ek. Let m e start w ith so m e perso nal an d p ositive observat ions: After having discu ssed t he situ atio n of freedo m of th e m edia an d jo u rn alism w it h N GO ’s w h ich w ork on a glob al level, I do find th at h arassm ent and im priso nm ent o f jo urnalists as a day-t o-d ay problem is a less com m on occurrence to t he O SC E fam ily th an in o th er regio ns of t he w orld . I am p leased th at th e O AS in form ed m e on m y recen t trip t o Wash ington th at it has n ow est ablished a sp ecial rappo rt eur on freedom of t he m ed ia. O th er positive sign als recen tly cam e fro m Croatian acq uitt ance of th e form er edito r-in-ch ief of “Globu s” on ch arges of crim in al defam at io n. Also I find prom ising th e recent req uest of Bu lgarian Presiden t Stoyan ov to th e legislature to halt crim inal p ro secutio n o f jo urnalists in the cou rt s. T hese tw o in cid ent s dem onst rat e that O SCE family m em bers com e closer, in principle, to sh aring th e sam e basic com m it m ent s t o freedom an d d em ocracy. O n the other hand, as a form er journ alist, I w ant to ring an alarm bell about a severe problem for w hich governm ents m ay not necessarily be responsible and to w hich it w ill not be easy to find an answ er: I refer to the m urder of a practicing journalist, w herever it occurs, for som ething he has w ritten. This is the m ost brutal form of censorship : it is censorship by killing. When I addressed you for the first tim e in the PC, January 15, I set out our program m e until the end of March. O ur em phasis at that tim e w as on establishing the O ffice and m aking it operational w hich included recruiting personnel and installing hardw are. This objective has been achieved w ith your cooperation, for w hich I should like to thank you. According to my m andate w e then gave priority to setting up working relations w ith O SCE member States, within the O SCE system and w ith relevant international organizations such as the Council of Europe, w ith NGO ’s and w ith media. As to O SCE m em ber States, w e have started building up contacts w ith the support of your delegations here by also visiting several capitals. During these visits I have m ade it a point and I shall continue to do so - of m eeting w ith the “constituencies” quot ed in my m andate: firstly w it h governments, but also w it h m edia and journalists, and w ith NGO ’S. To these, I add national parliam ents. 198

O UR W O RK,

WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

As a form er Chairm an of the third Com m ittee of the Parliam entary Assem bly I recognize the im portance of the fact that a num ber of countries are in the process of drafting legislation on m edia law s. T hu s, visits have been paid by my O ffice since early March - in the follow ing chronological order - to the UK as the EU Presidency, to France, to Albania, to the U.S., to the Russian Federation and to the form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Let m e give you some exam ples of the kind of w ork w e are alread y engaged in: In Albania w e opened a Sem inar on Media, March 13, sponsored by the Albanian Media Institute and the O SCE Presence in Tirana. April 3, the O ffice took part in the target oriented m eeting concerning Albania organized by the Council o f Europe in Strasburg. With the support of the O SCE Mission in Skopje I visited the form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia last w eek. I m et w ith the Prim e Minister and other Cabinet m em bers, leaders in the m edia industry and groups of journalists. I intend to inform the Government of my conclusions and recom m endations in the very near future. O ne outcome of my talks in Washington and in European capitals w as the constant reference to different cultural and historical interpretations of the limits to freedom of the m edia or the relationship b etw een freedom and responsibility. 1 received great support w hen I suggested a Transatlantic discussion on this subject. Contacts w ith O SCE m em ber States further included letters w hich I have addressed to several Foreign Ministries on urgent issues w hich have been brought to m y attention. We have received som e replies and anticipate others in the near future. I shall inform the Council about relevant developm ents in due tim e. Let m e now briefly m ention the setting up of w orking relations w ithin the O SCE system . In February, the O SCE m issio ns and representations w ere kindly asked by the Secretary General to include in their reporting, in accordance w ith their m andates, inform ation about m edia related issues. In fact, w e have been in touch w ith several missions w ho w ere most helpful in providing ad vice and support for visits. Furtherm ore, w e established close cooperation w ith the O ffice for Dem ocratic Institutions and Hum an Rights. We agreed that the O DIHR w ill continue to w ork on m edia issues in the context of its election m onitoring activities, w hile m y O ffice w ill lo ok in to individual cases and into structural issues w hich lim it the activities of a free and independent m edia. O n March 3, w e paid a dayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s visit to the Council of Europe in Strasburg in order to create w o rking relations at the various levels w ith this oldest European organization w hich has great expertise in m edia issues, especially in the legal and the technical field. We appreciate the readiness of the Council of Europe to provide us w ith their expertise, as it m ight be appropriate in our w ork, and The Reports to the Permanent Council

199

keep us inform ed about their activities in various countries. This w ill provide us a m eans to avoid duplication of effort. Non governm ental organizations active in the field of press freedom have expressed great interest in our O ffice’s w ork. We are already in contact w ith m ore than 30 organizations w hich w ill constitute a valuable source of inform ation for our O ffice. We are planning a m eeting May 20, organized by the O SCE Troika, to further develop the relationship of NGO ’s and our new O ffice. The prelim inary conclusions I draw from adm ittedly only three m onths of w ork is that there is a broad acceptance of the O ffice’s m andate. It appears to m e that the very existence of., t his new o ffice has already produced, on the part of som e governments, the political aw areness of the need to deal cautiously and carefully w ith the m edia. The w ork of our O ffice needs to be focused on the concepts of cooperation and, w hen required, of assistance w ithout displaying a kind o f m issionary spirit , but rat her based on a deliberate assessm ent of how w e can im prove the m edia situation in a particular country. While m y O ffice w orks on issues w hich are of concern to all O SCE m em ber States, the very political nat ure of this office does no t favour the lon g-term listing of activities. We m ay have to act as an im m ediate fire-brigade and to be available on short notice. This is w here w e are at the present tim e. Let m e now say a few w ords about our future activities: Regarding the O SCE’s focus on Central Asia this year, m y O ffice is considering w ays and m eans of approaching issues of free m edia and freedom of opinion in this O SCE region during in the second half of this year. A joint m ission w ith O DIHR during this autum n is envisaged. Several Central Asian Delegations here in Vienna have already approached m y O ffice offering inform ation about the m edia situation in their countries. We have exchanged view s w ith the head of the O SCE Liaison O ffice in Central Asia and look forw ard to future collaboration in the interests of this organization. All States of t he form er Yugoslavia d eserve our special attention. The O SCE m ission in Sarajevo is actively involved in program m es to assist the establishm ent of independent m edia in that region. 1 plan a visit to organize a round table later this year w ith the different agencies already supporting these program m es. As to the envisaged m ission of the Personal Representative of the Chairm an-in-O ffice for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I have transm itted our thoughts on relevant m edia issues, March 12, to Foreign Minister Gerem ek. My O ffice w ill also continue to be in close contact w ith the “Royaum ont Process” for St ability and Goo d N eighbourliness in South Eastern Europ e w hich produced at its recent follow -up m eeting in Athens constructive proposals for m edia action in the region. 200

O UR W O RK, WHAT

WE HAVE DO NE

Next w eek I shall visit Belarus on the occasion of the Sem inar on “Structures of pluralistic dem ocracies” organized by the O SCE Advisory and Monitoring Group, April 28-30. This w ill be also an o pport un ity to raise a number of issues w it h o fficial Belarussian personalities, institutions and NGO ’S. T he d elegation of Belarus has offered its support for the visit. A sem inar on media in Zagreb is curren tly prepared w it h t he O SC E Mission to Croatia for the end of May. We w ill take into account the recent recom m endations of the Council of Europe on the draft law s on radio and television and telecom m unications. We w ould hope that our participation w ill encourage the Governm ent to m ove tow ard m eeting its com m itm ents to alleviate som e of the pro blem s in t he past and promote a more independen t m edia environm ent. Upon an official invitation from the Turkish Governm ent, I intend to visit, Turkey, 25 -28 May. This visit w ill include talks w ith the Turkish Governm ent in Ankara, w ith NGO ’s and m edia probably in Istanbul. Short calls d uring May w ill take Place in Ro me (12-13 M ay) and in Bratislava (20 May) w here I presently intend to give a lecture upon the invitation of a private foundation. To conclud e, I w ou ld like to take th is opp ortunity to thank all of you in this room for your cooperation in this pioneering effort. I or a m em ber of m y staff are alw ays available to provide any additional inform ation you m ight desire.

The Reports to the Permanent Council

201

Third Repo rt to the Permanent Co uncil 16 July, 1998 I am pleased to report to you about our w ork over the past three m onths and I look forw ard to our ensuing discussion. Let m e start by emphasizing the full support w hich my O ffice received from the Parliamentary Assembly of the O SCE in Cop enhagen last w eek. I w as grateful that all 54 delegations agreed to the report by the Third Com m ittee to support the w ork of m y O ffice. I appreciate this unanim ous expression of interest in our w ork by the representat ive m emb ers of p arliam ents of o ur organizatio n. Let m e now briefly review our m ost recent activities: Since April, w e have paid particular attention to the m edia situation in Belarus. I took part in a sem inar of the O SCE Advisory and Monitoring Group at the end of April in Minsk and m et Foreign Minister Antonovitch. You are aw are of the very detailed w ay in w hich he answ ered m y enquiry raising specific concerns related to journalists and to freedom of m edia in Belarus. Therefore, I hope that there is a basis for future cooperation. O n the other hand, the com m itm ent to freedom of expression and free m edia and the im plem entation of these principles by the authorities continue to be deficient in practice. Re-establishing the â&#x20AC;&#x153;free debate w ithout fearâ&#x20AC;? in Belarus, as the O SCE Ad visory and Monitoring Group rightly defined it, rem ains an essential need. President Lukaschenko him self had endorsed this objective earlier this year, but recently he introduced legal am endm ents, including crim inal penalties for defam ation of the President and increased fines for action directed against his dignity and honour. I urge the Governm ent to w ithdraw these am endm ents. As to the Slovak Republic, I have been concerned, since March, about the m edia related issues of the am ended electoral law . I recall that this law , as it is now , could deprive private electronic and local m edia of the right to cover the electio n cam paign for the parliam entary elections in Septem ber. O n this issue, the Director of the O DIHR and I subm itted som e suggestions to the Governm ent in early May, w hich w ere not taken into account. Recently adopted recom m endations by the Slovak Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting could be considered as a step tow ards further clarification of the role of the electronic m edia. Therefore, the Director of the O DIHR and I, addressed another letter to the Governm ent, earlier this w eek, asking for a m ore specific definition of the status and of the key term s of these recom m endations. We hope to receive a reply in the near future. My recent visit to Croatia, w here I participated in a sem inar hosted by the O SC E Mission in Zagreb, gave m e additional insight into a m ore co mplicat ed media environment. I have identified three major issues w hich w e w ill, over time, 202

O UR W O RK,

WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

concentrate on, all of w hich hamper, to some degree or another, the development of free and independent m edia. I refer here to a distribution system described as having close links to the Government side; to num ero us legal suits filed by governm ent officials and ot hers against the media under crim inal libel and defamation statutes; and, specifically, to the difficulty for Croatia’s independent electronic media to compet e w it h State-ow ned Croatian Radio and Television. We w ill rem ain engaged w ith C roatia on an ongoing basis to deal w ith these and o ther issues restricting the development of free and indep endent media. Let me finally refer to our visit to Turkey at the invitation of the Turkish Governm ent . I m et and spoke w ith a cross-sectio n of Cabinet mem bers and other Governm ent officials, w ith NGO s, w ith journalists and parliam ent arians, and I am grateful for the co-operation of the Turkish Government in facilitating all these sessions. Turkish officials noted during m y talks that it is the intention of the Governm ent t o “broaden” the existing freedom of expression by a draft bill containing, inter alia, narrow er definitions of w hat is not permitted under the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror law. I visited the human rights lead er, Akim Birdal, then still in seriou s condition in the hospital after an assassination attemp t. In Ist anbul, I made it a point to visit the family of Metin Göktepe, a photographer killed by local policemen in 1996. Those policemen found guilty of t his murder have been sentenced to prison. While recogniz ing the existence of independent and plu ralistic media in Tu rk e y, I am concerned about amendments to the Radio and Te le visio n Law of 1994 w hich w ould lift restrictions on cross-ow nership by large media companies of public utilities and rem ove regulations p reventing so far the mono polization of the media. Mem bers of the Turkish Parliament have informed me that there is considerable o pposition to let these am endments pass. Let m e draw at this stage som e prelim inary conclusions: My visits thus far, have confirmed the validity of the concept w e have developed of the “four constituencies”: governm ents, parliam ents, NGO s, and the m edia them selves. This has given us a useful cross-section of view s on m edia issues, and has provided the balance needed to effectively evaluate the m edia situation in a given country. In m ost of the countries visited there w as public interest in m y w ork, both in print m edia and in TV. I w ill look for w ays to even increase the public interest in our w ork by arranging press conferences and appearances in the particular country I am visiting. I continue to correspond w ith Fo reign Min ist ers w hen problem s o f freedom of t he media come t o m y attention. In general, this w orking m ethod has proved to lead us on the right path of cooperation. We are satisfied w ith the fact that w e receive very thorough and serious answ ers t o our questions. O bviou sly, t his is only one of the steps to achieve changes, if necessary, but the readiness of a governm ent to coo perate w ith m y O ffice show s the gro w ing aw areness of the The Reports to the Permanent Council

203

po sit ive role w hich the O SCE is able to assum e in the central field of civility and dem ocracy. In order to keep this Council inform ed, w e occasionally circulate m y letters and the responses, as has been the case recently w ith Albania, Belarus, and Azerbajian. Before the parliam entary elections in Ukraine in March, I also raised som e co ncerns in w riting to the Foreign Minister. Since t hen, these concerns have not dim inished. I hope to receive a reply shortly. Wh ile these exchan ges of let ters have been useful, and m y visits have highlighted m y concerns, I w ill consider sending an advisor to a given country to undertake info rm at ion-gathering and assessm ent. This w ill be an additional and useful step w hen w e believe that an on-the-ground evaluation w ould help us to take further action as w arranted. This is consistent w ith the general understanding, em phasized by the Chairm an-in-O ffice of the O SCE, Minister Gerem ek, that m y O ffice, as w ell as t he other O SCE inst itutions, has an early-w arning function in heading off a situation before the m edia becom e increasingly threatened. Furtherm ore, such on-the-ground evaluations w ill also enable us to play a positive role in encouraging and assisting governm ents to secure free and independent m edia environm ents. As to the Perm anent Council, I shall not lim it m y interventions to quarterly reports like the one you are hearing right now, but also raise here specific concerns in accordance w ith the early w arning function of m y O ffice. Let m e add som e rem arks about the cooperation betw een our O ffice and the NGO â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s. In May, I had the pleasure to at ten d a conference sponsored by t he N orw egian Delegation w hich gathered nearly fifteen NGO s. We are follo w ing up on som e of the m ore productive suggestions resulting from this m eeting. Generally, w e intend to present our m andate and our w ork as w idely as possible. I personally try to be present at m ajor conferences of organizations such as the PEN association of w riters in order to m ake this O SCE O ffice know n also to the cultural w orld. So do m y advisors. I w ould like to address our future p lans for this autum n. These plans include visits to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Central Asia. As to Bo snia and Herzegovina, w here media issues have b een dealt w ith in great detail by a number of institutions and agencies, I have agreed with the O SCE Mission to organize, after the elections, a round table d iscussion w ith agencies and other interested parties to assess recent achievements and shortcom ings. Another new field of action w ill be Central Asia, in accordance w ith the O SCEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s priority given to this region this year in term s of preventive diplom acy and conflict prevention. I am planning to visit the countries of the area after due preparation. We shall co-ordinate the tim ing w ith O DIHR and the O SCE Liaison O ffice. As I pointed out w hen w e had our m eeting here w ith the Mediterranean Partners 204

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

for Cooperation, I intend to stress in Central Asia the challenge for dem ocracy of the role of religion and the necessity of freedom . As part of our ongoing and increasingly productive collaboration w ith NGO s, I am pleased that t he International Press Institute, a m ajor m ed ia NGO based here in Vienna, is preparing media sem inars in Bulgaria and Romania during this autum n. O ur O ffice w ill participate. These are activities on w hich w e are able to focus already now . I am sure that the review of activities at the end of this year w ill include additional ones w hich - due to the m ere nature of our w ork and of our m andate - cannot be planned nor entirely predicted. I shall conclude this report w ith som e final observations: As I have stated earlier on, I rem ain concerned by a form of censorship w hich I call the indirect structural repression against freedom of the m edia. I am referring t o the efforts of cert ain governments to hinder the grow th of independent and free media through political u se o f freq uency allocation, for exam ple, or excessive fees for licenses. It includes more subtle form s of leverage such as the ongoing governm ent control of the distribution system , or the control of new sprint. It includ es other disincentives, economic or otherw ise, that make the developm ent of independent and free m edia m ore difficult. I have already m entioned here m y concern w ith “censorsh ip b y killing,” t he ultim ate act of taking the life of a person because of w hat he or she has w ritten or w as about to publish. While the overall number of killed journalists seems to decline according to reliable NGO sources, I keep on receiving inform ation about such cases. “Killing the m essenger,” as the “Econom ist” called it, m eans often elim inating those “w ho are w itnesses to violence and corruption in places w here the law offers lit tle or n o prot ection. If t hese profession al m essengers quail, m any other people w ill suffer.” Th e least I can do at the m om ent is to appeal to the respective Governm ents to do their utm ost to ensure legal persecution, but I shall go on to seek w ays and m eans to address this issue. In the recent case of a brutal killing in Kalm ykia, the Russian autho rities took legal action against those suspected of the crim e w ith adm irable speed. It has been a very challenging first five m onths. I believe w e have accom plished som e things, but m uch rem ains to be done. I look forw ard to w orking w ith th is C oun cil in th e future in order to prom ote m edia freedom t hrou gh out the O SCE region.

The Reports to the Permanent Council

205

Fo urth Repo rt to the Permanent Co uncil 19 Novem ber 1998 The four m onth s w hich have p assed since m y last com prehensive repo rt to yo u here in th e Perm anent C ouncil have been increasingly busy for m y O ffice. I believe that the w eeks ahead, particularly before the Ministerial Council in O slo, w ill be sim ilar for all of us. I shall focus in this repo rt no w on our m ain concerns and act ivities over the past four mo nths. A broader overview of our activities until end of O cto ber has already been circulated to you in the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Item s of interestâ&#x20AC;? of 20 O ctober. O ur m ain focus throughout the past m onths w as on the m edia situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Since August, after receiving comp laints about the denial of visas to a num ber of journalists of various nationalities, I have urged the Governm ent in several letters to p ro vid e im m ediate and unim peded access for n ational and international m edia to Kosovo. The FRY authorities also refused to issue visas to international participants of the Conference on Independent Broadcasting sponsored by the Council of Europe and organised by the Belgrade-based Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM). As a result, the conference initially scheduled for 2-3 O ctober w as postponed. During August and Septem ber I had repeatedly offered to have talks w ith the Belgrade governm ent on these m edia related issues. How ever, the FRY Am bassador in Vienna rejected a visit to Belgrade in a letter dated 4 September for reasons dealing w ith the suspended m em bership of FRY in the O SCE. As you all know, the Government of FRY continu es to inflict m ore and m ore restrictions on free and ind ependent m edia in the count ry as a result of the escalatio n o f the conflict in Kosovo. I h ave therefore issued a num ber of statem ent s in O ctober concerning the banning of independent radio stations and new spapers and of the re-broadcasting of foreign radio program m es. I have also criticised the adoption by the Serbian Parliam ent of the Law on Public Inform ation on 20 O ctober, 4 days after the signing of the Agreem ent on the establishm ent of the Kosovo Verification Mission by the Chairm an-inO ffice of the O SCE, Minister Gerem ek, and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Jovanovic. This Law institutionalises the banning of foreign program m es, levies exuberant fees on offending media w ith a 24-hour deadline in w hich to pay and gives the authorities num erous pow ers to curtail free m edia. After the new Law w ent into effect, the Serbian Governm ent started prosecuting the ow ner and editor of the new s m agazine Evropljanin. Nasa Borba has decided not to publish w hile the Law w as in effect. To by-pass the Law , a 206

O UR W O RK,

WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

num ber of m edia o utlets registered t heir subsidiaries in Montenegro. I have met in Budapest w ith Serb ian journalists and politician s w ho have vot ed against the Law on Public Inform ation in the Serbian Parliam ent. The journalists stressed that the new steps against free and pluralistic m edia have led to virtual ignorance on th e part o f m ost cit izens in Serb ia of the actual st ate of affairs in Kosovo and w ith the role of international organisations. In m y view, this Law is the biggest setback to free m edia in Serbia and, therefore, also to any lasting peace in the region. It w as w idely condem ned by the international com m unity including by the Chairm an-in-O ffice of this O rganisation. I h ave asked the Council of Europ e to pro vide my O ffice w ith a det ailed legal expertise on this Law . FRY has, as you know , applied for m em bership in the Council of Europe. The expertise w ill be m ade available to you before the end of Novem ber. My O ffice has also prepared a report on the current situation of the m edia in FRY, as suggested during a debate in this Council o n 27 Augu st. It w ill be circulated to all delegatio ns today and w e are looking forw ard to yo ur comm ents. This report contains of reco mm endations w hich I w ould like t o sum up here as follow s: ensuring free, independent and pluralistic m edia - an O SCE com m itm ent essential to any dem ocratic society - should be one of the top priorities d uring discussion s w ith the FRY an d Serbian authorities. Any decisions on full m em bership of FRY in international organisations should also depend on concrete achievem ents in t his resp ect. The current attitu de of the Governm ent in FRY in this respect is offensive to the O SCE and to its political objectives. Considering the conflict in Kosovo, any lasting peaceful settlem ent of this conflict is only conceivable, if there w ill b e also an o pen and public deb ate w ithin FRY about this issue. Such a debate requires, how ever, free and independent m edia. It goes w ithout saying that equal access of journalists to Kosovo m ust be ensured in the current efforts of the O SCE to contribute to a peaceful settlem ent of the conflict. A num ber of critical references o n the m edia sit uation in Ukraine mentioned in the O DIHR repo rt on Parliam entary Elections in March 1998 and highlighted in internatio nal m edia rep orts as w ell as our ow n letters to the Ukrainian Go vernm ent have led m y O ffice to undertake an assessm ent in Kiev. Talks there w ere held w ith governm en t officials, new spapers and television ed itors of different political affiliations. The O SCE Mission w as very helpful in preparing the program m e. This visit has confirm ed the existence of w idespread com plaints about the relevant legal fram ew ork and about the im plem entation of law s con sidered to be arbitrary. The Governm ent seems to be aw are of this situation. To give you an exam ple: both Governm ent officials and journalists referred to the problem of unlimited fines dem anded and p aid in libel suits. This has obviously turned out to be a rather efficient legal and econom ic m eans of The Reports to the Permanent Council

207

bankrupting outlets, especially in the currently difficult econom ic situation. I have raised these and other concern s in a m eeting w ith the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Tarasyuk on 16 O ctober. Minister Tarasyuk expressed his readiness to co-o perate w ith m y O ffice on media relat ed issues, especially before the Presidential Elections scheduled for O ctober 1999. Follow ing up on this, it is m y intention to visit Ukraine early next year. I continue t o be concerned about m edia issues in Belarus. Recently, I have addressed a letter to Foreign Minister Antonovich about new provisions for obtaining a license needed for disseminating legal information, as of 1 December. I also expressed my hope that the competent authorities w ill ensure a rapid enquiry into the robbery of equipm ent from the offices of â&#x20AC;&#x153;Navinyâ&#x20AC;? on 31 O ctober. O n the other hand, I am pleased that the tripartite w orking group on freedom of the press m ight be established in Minsk by the O SCE Assistance and Monitoring Group in order to discuss com plaints by the press and by journalist s against censorship. The Chairman of the Stat e Com m ittee for Press accepted to co-operate w ith th is tripartite group. I h op e that this joint effort to secure conditions for m edia freedom in Belarus w ill be m ost successful. Let me at this stage also appeal to the Belarus au thorities to lift the year-lo n g travel restrictio n p laced o n t he jou rnalist Pavel Sherem et in order to enable him to receive the 1998 Internat ional Press Freedom Aw ard. T his aw ard w ill be present ed to him by the Comm ittee to Prot ect Journalists next w eek in New Yo r k . I w ould also like to draw your attention to the m edia situation in Croatia. O ne of the m ost central and urgent issues concerning media reform is the t ransform ation of Croatian Radio-Television (HRT) from a state broadcaster into a public service one. For the past six m onths, the O SCE Mission to the Republic of Croatia in close co-operation w ith the Council of Europe has outlined a num ber of concrete suggestions that w ould have ensured the transform ation of HRT into a public broadcaster. I have supported this action. How ever, m ost of these suggestions have been ignored and on 23 O ctober the HRT Law w as adopt ed in Parliam ent by m ajorit y vo te. M y O ffice intends to follow up on this and on som e other issues together w ith the O SCE Mission. My O ffice has begun to focus on Central Asian Mem ber States. Relevant d elegatio ns here in Vienna as w ell as th e O SCE Liaison O ffice in Tashkent have been m ost helpful in organising program m es for several visits. O ne of m y advisors has just recently returned from a visit to Bishkek. We are com piling a fuller report of the visit, and w ill follow up w ith as appropriate w ith Governm ent of Kyrgyz st an officials. O ur prelim in ary im p ression s are quite po sit ive regarding the Bishkek governm entâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s com m itm ent to a free and independent m edia. We are im p ressed by the recent legal safeguards that the Presid ent has pu t in place and b y recent court decision s firm ly u pholdin g the freedom and ind epen dence of the m edia. We believe that if Kyrgyzstan continues along this path, it can 208

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

serve as a m odel for sim ilar countries in their transition to dem ocracy. We are particularly struck by a recent com m ent by the Kyrgyzstan President to the m edia em phasising his appreciation for the m edia’s efforts to undercover corrupt ion w hich has enabled him to act m ore forcefully against corruptio n. I often speak of the “corrective function” of the m edia; this is a perfect exam ple. An advisor fro m m y O ffice part icipat ed in a sem inar on Governm ent -Media relatio ns sponsored by t he C ouncil of Europe follow ed by ro und table meetings w ith Azerbaijan journalists from both the print and the electronic m edia. In spite of the considerable efforts of the Governm ent to provide for freedom of speech, thought and inform ation, there are tw o elements w hich strike us: recent beatings by the police of journalists covering dem onstrations, and, on a m ore structural level, the near-total absence of independent television stations. We hope to w ork w ith Governm ent of Azerbaijan officials to bring about an electron ic m edia landscape w hich reflects Az erb aijan’s com m it ment t o promo ting an independent m edia enviro nment. I intend to accept t he invitatio n of the Foreign Minster of Azerbajian to visit his country in the near future. After the new Government o f the Slovak Republic has been formed, I intend to resum e d ialogu e w it h Foreign Minister Kukan on som e of o ur previo us concerns of w hich you are aw are. It is m y understandin g that the Go vernment w ill m ake new efforts to ensure com pliance w ith O SCE com m itm ents. Let m e address now som e organisational issues concerning our w ork: The staffing of m y O ffice has been com pleted w ith Alexander Ivanko join ing us in O ctober. Mr. Ivanko w as form erly spokesperson of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the sm all staff, tw o qualified interns have joined the O ffice for several m on ths. T hey d o research on specific issues an d th em es as requ ired by our day-to-day w ork. This research becom es increasingly im portant. I w ould like to inform you at this stage about another supportive elem ent for our w ork: a sm all private Austrian association has been set up to support individual projects of our O ffice - such as hosting interns - by external m eans. As to the flow of inform ation from our O ffice to you and to a larger public, let m e draw your attention to the O SCE hom e w eb page w hich contains since Septem ber an update of our reports, statem ents and press releases. Having participated for the first tim e in the O SCE Hum an Dimension Im plem entation Meeting, I support the suggestion of one delegation that keynote speakers -including m yself - lead off the debates on their respective clusters thus ensuring a coherent and intense exchange of view s w ith delegations and nongovernm ental organisations. My O ffice has focused in t he past m onths on early w arning act ivities as w ell as on rapid response to serious cases of non-com pliance w ith O SCE com m itm ents. These are the tw o core elem ents in m y m andate w hich require differThe Reports to the Permanent Council

209

ent forms of action ranging from dip lom atic and discreet action on the one hand to public action on the other. In sp ite of the t emp tatio n t o take a longer view back o n our first year, I w ill not pursue these reflections now but elaborate on them in an early report in 1999 w hich w ill look back on the activities of our first year and look forw ard to the them atic issues and projects w e w ill deal w ith in 1999.

210

O UR W O RK, WHAT

WE HAVE DO NE

Current Situatio n o f Media in the Federal Republic o f Yugo slavia Report to the Permanent Council

27. August 1998 Introduction. 1. The C on st itutio n of the Federal Repub lic of Yugoslavia (FRY) guarantees the right of citizens to express and publish their opinions and freedom of the press. The Constitution explicitly prohibits censorship. Article 38 of the Constitution states that “No one m ay prevent the distribution of the press or dissem ination of ot her pu blicat ions u nless it has been determined by a co urt decision that they call for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order or violation of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, violate the guaranteed rights and liberties of m an and the citizen, or fom ent national, racial or religious intolerance and hatred.” Basically, the constitutional guarantees are in line w ith relevant CSCE/O SCE com m itm ents. 2. The Helsinki Charter of 1975 that had been signed by Yugoslavia con tains in its “third basket” com m itm ents of all Participating States to free flow of inform ation and to im provem ent of w orking conditions for journalists including their access to States. Although FRY’s m em bership in the O SCE is suspended, this basic com mitm ent has never b een revoked by the Belgrade authorities. Throughout this year, how ever, the authorities have ensured that the entry of various foreign journalists into the country w as m ade alm ost im possible. 3. The current m edia landscape in FRY is quite diverse w ith hundreds of publications, radio and TV stations operating thro ughout the co untry. Most private statio ns broad cast w ithout proper licen ces because of the arbitrary licensing system often used by the authorities to elim inate autonom ous m edia. The only netw ork that covers the w hole country is Serbian St ate TV and Radio Netw ork RT S. The indepen dent print m edia d oes not play the sam e ro le as broadcast m edia in FRY because of the difficult econ om ic situ ation and lack of fun ds on the part of m o st of the co untry’s population. Cases of overt censorship w ere until the recent escalation of the conflict in Kosovo relatively rare and often w ell-docum ented, how ever the situation deteriorated drastically in O ctober. Country Reports. Dusan Reljic (Press Institute Dusseldorf: Republic of Y ugoslavia), M ark Thompson (O xford:Republic of Croatia), Alex is M artin (Bishkek: Kyrgz Republic) contributed substantially to the country reports. Country Reports, F.R. of Y ugoslavia

211

4. In early O cto ber, alon g w ith th e latest developm ents in Kosovo and then the est ablishm ent o f the O SCE Kosovo Verificatio n Missio n (KVM ), the Serbian authorities intensified t heir attack against the independent m edia that w as t rying t o provide its readers, list eners and view ers w ith a m ore ob jective picture of t he con flict in Kosovo. References t o ‘traito rs’ an d the ‘fifth co lum n ’ have now b ecome mo re com m on and part of th e lexicon of senio r govern ment officials. Recently, the Serbian Minister of Inform ation stated that the re-broadcast ing of foreign-p ro duced program m es w as a “direct attack on th e con stit utio nal system an d legal o rd er o f th e cou nt ry” an d qu alified such re-broad casting as “esp ion age”. O n 8 O ct ober th e Serb ian au thorities banned the rebroadcasting of program m es by Voice of Am erica, Rad io Free Europe, BBC and Deu tsch e Welle. Also in O ctob er, a APTV cam eram an w as beaten in Pristin a by t he p olice and a p hotograp her ph ysically evicted fro m a FRY Em b assy in Europ e w h ile tryin g to obt ain a visa. 5. The FRY authorities also refused to issue visas to international participants of the Conference on Independent Broadcasting sponsored by the Council of Europ e and organised by the Belgrade-based Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM). As a result, the conference initially scheduled for 2-3 O ctober w as postponed. 6. T he b iggest set b ack to free med ia in Serbia w as t he ad op t io n b y th e Serb ian p arliam en t o f th e Law o n Pu blic In form atio n o n 20 O cto b er. Th e Law w as w id ely co n dem n ed b y int ern atio nal o fficials inclu din g Po lish Foreign M in ist er Bron islaw Gerem ek, t h e O SCE Ch airm an -in -O ffice. T he Law instit utio nalised t he b ann in g of fo reign p ro gram m es, levied exuberan t fees on offen din g m ed ia w it h a 24-h ou r d ead lin e in w h ich to p ay and gave th e auth orities n u m erous p o w ers t o curt ail free m ed ia. Prior to t he ad op t ion of th e Law , th e Belgrade aut ho rit ies u sed a go vernm en t d ecree to close t hree p ro m inen t in d ep end ent new spapers: Dan as, Nasa Bo rb a an d D nevn i Telegraf. Aft er t he new Law w en t into effect, the Serb ian Go vern m ent st art ed p ro secut in g t he o w n er and edit o r o f th e new s m agaz in e Evro pljan in. N asa Bo rb a has d ecided n o t t o p u blish w h ile th e Law w as in effect . To b yp ass t he Law , a n um b er o f m ed ia ou t lets regist ered th eir su b sid iaries in M o n t e n e gr o . 7. O n e of th e ot her prob lem s facing th e ind ependent m edia in FRY is th at o ften it is un able to dissem in ate its m essage beyon d t he m ajor cit ies. W hile t he average in divid ual in Belgrade h as th e opt ion of tu nin g in to a nu m b er of in depen den t T V an d radio st ation s, his fellow cit izen s in m any other parts of th e co un try are o ften restrict ed to view ing RTS, th e official m out hp iece of Presiden t M ilosevic. An est im ated o ne-third of the po pulat ion of Serb ia on ly receives RTS. Lack of cho ice ou t side Belgrade and m ajo r cit ies sub st ant ially hin ders th e right of cit izens t o receive u nbiased in form ation . 212

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

Print Media. New spapers and m agazines m ay reflect a history of political and literary w riting in Serbia but today they do not play the sam e role in FRY as the broadcast m edia. The sheer num ber of registered new spapers does not really provide an accurate picture of its im pact on everyday life. According to the Deputy Minister of Inform ation, alm ost 2,500 new spapers are registered in Serbia alone. How ever, experts point out that Serbia has one of the low est rates of new spaper circulation in Europe. Like in som e other East European countries, new spaper print runs are exaggerated for the “benefit” of advertisers. A dim inishing middle class and poverty have pu t a serious dent in the new spap er business. In Belgrad e, w h ere the m edia scene is t he m o st diverse, eleven daily new spapers and three m agazines are available to the public. Num erous entertainm ent m agazines are also sold. Am ong the indep end ent-m inded publications, th e new spapers Nasa Borba, Danas and Dnevni Telegraf and the m agazine Vrem e stand out. After the governm ent took over the leading quality broadsheet Borba in 1994, m ost of its journalists participated in the founding of Nasa Borba and since day one it has been under constant pressure from the authorities. This August because of financial difficulties Nasa Borba tem porarily seized publication. It has then relaunched but in O ctober w as closed dow n by the Belgrade authorities. After the adoption of the Law on Public Inform ation, the authorities started taking legal action against m edia deem ed “offensive” to the current governm ent. For exam ple, on 8 Novem ber Dnevni Telegraf, recently re-opened after being closed dow n in O ctober, w as fined the equivalent of 120,000 USD by a local court for publishing an advertisem ent by a Belgrade University student group that called for the abolishm ent of the current governm ent. The ad vertisem ent w as ruled to b e “inciting destruction of the constit utional order.” Under the new Law , the publisher has only 24 hours to pay the fine. “This is a staged trial, a farce...w hat w e are dealing w ith is a ju dicial outrage,” the ow ner of Dnevni Telegraf told journalists after the court verdict. T he t w o main state-contro lled new spapers, Polit ika and Borba, pledge allegiance to the governm ent on a daily basis publishing inform ation accordingly. The com mentary is usually geared against the current “enem y” - be it the opposition, the independent m edia or the West. Tanjug, the state-run new s agency, oft en p ro vides information used by state-controlled new spapers. The tw o agencies that tend to take a m ore objective view of internal and external developm ents are Beta an d VIP. Both are frequently quoted by the in depen dent media. The Yugoslav print m edia is in urgent need of a new legal fram ew ork that w ill protect journalists from governm ent abuse and w ill allow them to objectively cover developm ents in it s ow n co un try as w ell as thro ughou t th e w orld. Public and diplom atic pressure should continue to ensure the abolishm ent of the current Serbian Law on Public Inform ation. Country Reports, F.R. of Y ugoslavia

213

Broadcast Media. Approxim ately 400 public and private radio and television stations broadcast throughout FRY, although the exact num ber is alm ost im possible to verify. The financial state of m any of these stations is very difficult w ith journalists being paid minuscule salaries. The situation among t he governm ent-controlled broadcasters is better, although the overall econom ic crisis has hit all enterprises, the m edia as w ell. The only netw ork that covers the w ho le cou nt ry is the state-controlled RT S. The independent broadcast m edia is grouped around ANEM w hose m em bership is close to forty stations. The Associationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s m ost w ell-know n m em ber is t he in dep end ent rad io-station B92, broadcast ing out of Belgrade. According to ANEMâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ow n estim ates, its m em bers cover m ore than tw o-thirds of the territory of Serbia w ith their daily new s and current affairs program m ing. O n 10 O ctober ANEM started producing TV reports from Belgrade on the new Serbian Inform atio n Law. According to AN EM, these repo rts are cu rrently the only independent source of inform ation on the Law available outside Belgrade. Because o f a lack of a coherent legal framew ork, m any private rad io and TV statio ns broadcast w ithout a licence m aking them selves prone to closures if the governm ent deem s their program m ing to be in contravention w ith its current policies. This already difficult situation w as exacerbated by a public tender announced on 7 February this year by the governm ent for radio and television stations to obt ain temp orary broadcast licences. The term s o f this t end er w ere vague and the criteria applied not clear.T he results w ere announced on 16 May. 247 stations out of 425 applicants w ere granted licenses. The vast m ajority of independent radio and television stations that applied for licences w ere denied, w hile num erous stations w ith close bu siness or p olitical ties to the ruling Socialist Party w ere granted perm ission to broadcast. Radio B92 applied for four licenses and w as granted only one. In contrast, all four m em bers of the Milosevic fam ily now control at least one m edia outlet. Initially, extrem ely high licensing fees w ere levied o n t hose broadcasters that did receive a licence, later, how ever, the fees w ere reduced. Som e exam ples suggest that the tender w as politically biased: - In Nova Sad, Radio 021, an ANEM affiliate, w as refused both a radio and television license; - In Pozarevac, Boom 93, another ANEM m em ber, w as denied a license, w hile Radio Fan, ow ned by Milosevicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s son, Marko, had its application approved; - In Kosovo, Radio 21 and Radio Koha, both independent broadcasters, failed to obtain their licenses. Th e Governm ent m ain tains that licenses w ere denied for technical reasons and that broadcasters can re-apply. How ever, no new licenses w ere further granted. O n the contrary, a num ber of radio and TV stations w ere closed dow n: 214

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

Radio Kontact in Pristina (1 July), Radio City in Nis (18 August), STV Negotin (17 September, the form al reason w as a lack of a building permit for a new transm itter). Although the country’s Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, the absence of a coherent legal fram ew ork nullifies this constitutional right. Tw o federal law s, th ree Serbian law s and n um ero us governm en t bodies at d ifferent levels regulate the m edia. Many of the currently applied rules and regulations are contradictory and m ake it virtually im possible for a broadcaster to com ply w ith all of them . O ne exam ple: the Yugoslav Ministry of Telecom m unications requires applicants for a broadcast license to pro ve t hat the station has been registered as a m edia com pany at the Ministry of Inform ation and at the appro priate co m mercial court . How ever, these do cum ents cann ot b e obt ained w it hout first having a license from the Ministry of Telecom m unications. While independent broadcasters are in serious dire straits, RTS, the official State TV, is spew ing out propaganda in the old com m unist traditions. “New s stories” are often fabricated in line w ith the policies of President Milosevic. Historical references propagating t he Serbian cause are in ab undance. Student protesters are often referred to as “vandals” and Kosovo Albanians as “terrorists.” Different groups are being targeted d epending on the current political situ ation. The internal opposition, independent-m inded journalists, m ost neighbouring countries and m any Western nations have fallen pray to this tactic. In early O ctob er RT S singled out the independent media as t he country’s main “enem y.” In a com m entary broadcast on 4 O ctober, RTS has gone as far as to eq uate independent reporting w ith “high treason.” The Governm ent’s direct control of the state m edia is clearly illustrated by the revolving door m any individuals use betw een governm ent posts and top jobs in the state-run radio or television. For exam ple, the current RTS Technical Direct or w as fo rm erly the Director of the Fed eral D irecto rat e for Tr a n s p o r t and Com m unications (later renam ed the Federal Ministry of Telecom m unications.) This Directorate w as responsible for the 1998 frequency tender. In April 1998, RTS leased a frequency to a new ly established Yu go sla v-w id e television st ation headed by Lju bisa Ristic from the Yu goslav Unit ed Left p art y (JUL). This p arty is run by Presiden t Milosevic’s w ife. Altho ugh the federal governm ent denies any involvem ent, m any m edia observers believe the station is secretly funded by taxpayers’ m oney, and w as int end ed to suppo rt Milo sevic’s favoured candidate, Mom ir Bulatovic, before the May 1998 elections in Montenegro. How ever, Radio Television Montenegro refuses to broadcast this station’s program m es. The Independen t Media Com m ission (IMC ), recen tly established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has inform ed the public that it is presently investigating the re-broadcasting of RTS program m es from Belgrade through SRT, the state-run Country Reports, F.R. of Y ugoslavia

215

television netw ork in the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska, and through other stations to evaluate possible violations of the IMC’s Code of Practice. The established situation makes it difficult for independent broadcasters to survive long-term unless they are supported locally or internationally. Their financial well-being is near catastrophic and by utilising the licensing tender and exuberantly high fees basically any independent broadcaster can be forced out o f business. The government-controlled media, on the other hand, has the needed financial and political support and can easily manipulate public opinion w ith impunity. To insure the provisions of its ow n Constitution, the Yugoslav authorities m ust stream line the current legislation in broadcast m edia, m aking it m ore coherent and clear. Contradictory rules and regulations should be abolished and the im plem entation o f the result s of th e ten der fro zen. Th ro ugh clo se co-o peration w ith independent broadcasters, especially those belonging to ANEM, a new legal fram ew ork should be established by the governm ent that w ould encourage rather t hen disco urage independent p ublic and private broadcast ers and protect their professional integrity. Media Coverage in FRY of the Conflict in K osovo. The latest escalation of the governm ent attack against the independent m edia w as as a direct result of the fighting in Kosovo. In O ctober, t he FRY authorities basically declared a state of w ar against m edia that tried to objectively cover the developm ents in that province. Am ong those targeted w ere local and foreign journalists. The m ethods are not in any w ay com patible w ith O SCE standards: journalists w ere harassed, som etim es beaten by security personnel, as m entioned above, rebroadcasting of fo reign p ro gram mes w as banned and many reporters w orking for reputed foreign m edia outlets w ere denied entry visas. The policy of denying visas continued in Novem ber. New spapers w ere ether closed or fined. Senior governm ent officials w ent on record denouncing those journalists w ho tried to cover the developm ents in Kosovo in a professional m anner. Vojislav Seselj, th e Serbian p aram ilitary leader and current D eput y Prim e Minister of Serbia, in a num ber of interview s in O ctober called the independent m edia “the Am erican fifth colum n”, “spies” helping Western countries’ “antiSerb efforts”. In an interview w ith B92 he characterised that radio station as being “anti-Serb.” Law m aker Zeljko Sim ic accused journalists of high treason and of abating the Kosovo Alb anians by reporting o n the w ar in t hat province. In O ctober, the Serbian Ministry of Interior advised Vrem e, a w idely respected indep end ent w eekly m agazine, to pro vid e it w ith info rmation regarding one of its journalists Dejan Anastasijevic. According to the m agazine, this request w as forw arded in less then 24 hours after the Serbian Minister of Inform ation denounced Vrem e and Mr. Anastasijevic at the Federal Assem bly session for rep ortin g on the m assacre in Gorn ja O brinja in Ko sovo. Vrem e co nsidered t his request to be part of a w itch-hunt against the independent m edia. 216

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

O n 27 O ct ober Freim ut Duve, the O SCE Representative on Freedom o f th e Media, m et in Budapest w it h journalists fro m Serbia/Vojvo dina. Nenad Canak, the President of the League of Social-Dem ocrats of Vojvodina, accom panied them . He and four other m em bers of the Serbian Parliam ent had strongly criticised and then voted against the new ly adopted Law on Public Inform ation. The jou rnalists and Mr. Canak underlined the repressive ch aracter of the Law. Th e jo urnalists stressed t hat th ese new st eps against free an d pluralistic m edia has led to virtual ignorance on the part of m ost citizens in Serbia of the actual state of affairs in Kosovo and w ith the role of international organisations. The threats of physical violence against journalists by Vojislav Seselj, the Deputy Prim e Minister of Serb ia, are at the extreme end o f governm ent harassm ent against the independent m edia. These threats have insured that there is alm o st no public deb ate concerning Kosovo and its fut ure. In the view of m any independent-m inded journalists, this current situation is dangerous for their w ell-being and is extrem ely counterproductive to the political solution of the Kosovo crisis. The Governm ent of Serbia should im m ediately distance itself from any threats of violence against journalists. Serbian Parliament member Nenad Canak explained in detail the reasons for his opposition tow ards the Law and called u pon the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media to use all possible means to ensure that this Law is revoked. He st ressed t hat the opposition to this Law is very strong am ong the media com mu nit y w hich w ill seek its ow n m eans to counter the effects of t he Law. RTS is seen to be am ong those instigating hatred through propaganda. O n 8 O ctober, this TV channel carried a program m e referring to the bom bing of Belgrade during World War II and to the Nato bom bing cam paign against the Bosnian Serb Arm y in 1995. The program m e alleged that during the Second World War the Am ericans w ere bom bing Belgrade targeting “m aternity w ards and kindergartens” and not Germ ans. “Did they really w ant to kill Germ ans, or w ere they actually trying to Kill Serbs,” asked the presenter. The “spin doctors” representing the Kosovo Albanians, and especially, the Kosovo Liberation Arm y have also taken on board som e of the m ethods used by FRY state m edia. “Spin doctors” on both sides try to convince the new s m edia t o report on at ro cities and m assacres alleged ly com m itted b y the “other side.” Num erous obstacles ham per the free collection of inform ation in Kosovo and t heir fair presentation in t he m ed ia. Local journalists risk their life if they attem pt to enter the com bat areas. They are threatened not only by the police and the arm y or the KLA gunm en, but also by arm ed civilians. In O ctober tw o journalists, Nebojsa Radosevic and Vladim ir Dobricic from the Yugoslav new s agency Tanju g w ent missing. The KLA later inform ed the pub lic that t hey both have been sentenced to tw o m onths im prisonm ent by a ‘m ilitary court’. Free journalism is especially im portant for an open debate on the future of Country Reports, F.R. of Y ugoslavia

217

the country in w hich governm ent critics are not labelled as traitors as they are now under the Serbian Law on Public Inform ation. There w ill be no peaceful settlem ent in Kosovo w ithout a public debate and it is im perative that a free m edia becom e the basis for such a debate. It goes w ithout saying that equal access to all journalists, foreign and local, t o Kosovo m ust be ensured in the current international efforts for a peaceful settlem ent of the conflict in Kosovo. O bservations and Recommendations. An open public debate to ensure the basic elements of a free demo cratic society is impossible w ithout freed om of the m ed ia. This issue sho uld be one of the top priorities during discussions w ith the FRY and Serbian aut horities. Sanctions can not be eased and the government has little chance of re-entering t he international organisations it is either suspended from or its application is on hold until it can prove its comm itment to freedom of expression and free, independent and pluralistic m edia. Freedom of expression should be guaranteed to all media outlets throughout the country. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media then recom mends the follow ing : 1. The Governm ent of FRY should be encouraged to adopt a clear set of law s dealing w ith the m edia w ith an em phasis on the protection of the rights of journalists against censorship of any kind. The draft m edia law prepared in June 1998 by t he Centre fo r H um an Rights in Belgrad e could be used as a basis for all further legislative actions. The current Serbian Law on Public Inform ation should be abolished. 2. The Government of FRY should ensure that all program m es on state-controlled m edia instigating hatred cease im m ediately. 3. Radio and television stations that are currently broadcasting w ithout a license should be allow ed to continue until new law s are in place. 4. The 1998 frequency tender and its results should be revised w ith an eye on clarifying its rules and offering all applicants a fair chance in participating in the tender. Those w hose app licatio ns w ere refused should be allow ed t o reapply. Until then the im plem entation of the results of the tender should be frozen. 5. Any im portant decisio ns m ade by the Governm ent concerning the media should be initially also discussed w ith those organisations that represent the independent m edia. 6. All bans on re-broad casting of foreign p ro gram mes should be lifted imm ediately and all journalists applying for an entry visa to FRY provided w ith one in the shortest possible tim e. Unhidered access should be guaranteed for all journalists to areas of conflict, especially in Kosovo. 7. The int ernational com m unity should provide indepen dent m ed ia in FRY w ith political, material and financial support. E.g.: Training program m es should be initiated for jo urnalists from FRY, especially in ad vertising and m arketing so as to allow the independent m edia to becom e self-sufficient in the future. 218

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

Report on media in Croatia Report to the Permanent Council 11. March 1998 Introduction 1. Since becom ing an independent state, Croatia has com m itted itself to establish and uphold dem ocratic standards regarding the freedom of m edia, inform ation and expression, and also regarding public service broadcasting. These standards are specified in international conventions and agreem ents w hich Croatia has signed. They are also partly reflected in domestic legislation. 2. Am ong relevant international conventions and agreem ents, m ention should be m ade of the European Convention for the Protection of Hum an Rights and Fundam ental Freedom s, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Inform ation as adopted b y the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (April 1982), the Resolut ions of the Fourth European Ministerial Conference on Mass Med ia Policy (December 1994), and Recom mendation no . R of the Com mittee of Ministers of the Cou ncil of Eu ro pe on guaranteeing the independ ence of public service broadcasting (Septem ber 1996). The Dayton Peace Agreem ent (1995) also contains p rovisions that Croat ia has, as a signatory and guaran tor of the Agreem ent, accepted as com m itm ents. 3. In view of these co mm itments, the Government has also u ndert aken to introduce specific reforms. Som e of these are contained in O pinion no. 195 (1996) of the Parliamentary Assem bly of the Council of Europe: “to implement the recomm endations of Council of Europe experts on legislation relating to the media”, and “to comply, w ell before the next elections, w ith the recomm endations made by the election observers of the Council of Europe and other international organisations […] w ith regard to […] the need to increase the independence of the state broadcasting corp oration (HRT)”. In view of the above, the follow ing recom mendation by the O SCE/O DIHR O bservation Missio n to Croatia in June 1997 has the status of an obligation up on the Governm ent: “The Croatian authorities should consider taking im mediate steps to ensure t hat the governing b oard of H RT [i.e. the HRT Council] becom es a truly depoliticised and independent body, in ord er to prevent future abuses of access t o the state media.” Much rem ains to be d one if these com mitm ents and obligations are to be fulfilled. 4. The period since 1997 has seen cert ain changes in the situation and performance of the mass media. These changes do not point in only one direction. For example, the volume of ‘hate speech’ in the main media has certainly reduced. Country Reports, Croatia

219

Yet, recent months have brought a resurgence of hate speech in the new s p rogram ming of Croatia’s m ost significant m ediu m: the state-controlled broadcaste r, Croatian Television (Hrvatska televizija, HTV, w hich forms part of Croatian Rad io -Television, Hrvatska radio-televizija, HRT). Likew ise, the reappearance of several ‘banned’ journalists on HTV is a positive development; yet some of these journalists’ programmes have been subject to blatant political censorship. Another positive development was the appearance of a new, independently ow ned daily new spaper in April 1998; yet, at time of writing (March 1999), the difficulties facing independent new spapers – as also for independent bro adcasters – are form idable. Broadcasting: HTV. 5. HTV is the biggest and most influential mass medium in Croatia. Broadcasting on all three of Croatia’s ITU-allotted television channels, HTV forms Croatia’s only television netw ork and the only television at the state (national) level. Surveys show that around half the adult population regularly w atches the 19.30 evening new s bulletin. O ther new s and current affairs program mes show n at prime-tim e slots also attract audiences that are beyond the reach of any other medium. 6. During 1998, several im provements w ere introduced in these programmes. For exam ple, the programm e Hrvatski spomenar, sho w n before t he 19.30 new s bulletin each w eekday, had added to the sense of insecurity in war-affected parts of the country. Under pressu re from the United Nations and the O SCE, this progr a m m e ’s co ncept w as eventually am ended in March 1998, remo ving mo st of the contro versial content. Later in the year, the qualit y and variety of several other polit ical program mes w as imp roved . These changes can be p art ly attributed to the launch in autumn 1997 of a lobby group, ‘Forum 21’, comprising journalists w ho argued fo r d em ocratic reform o f electronic m edia. They are also the result of efforts by Mr Ivica Vrkic, w ho becam e HRT ’s direct or in August 1998. 7. How ever, as already m entioned, political censorship is som etim es imposed by the HRT leadership, allegedly acting on direct instruction from highlevel officials. For exam ple, the results of an opinion-poll survey w ere banned from a program m e on 21 Decem ber – reportedly because the results favoured the SDP and its leader, Mr Ivica Racan. Another program m e in this series w as bow dlerised on 1 March 1999. In February 1999, the presenter of HTV’s highly popular farm ing program m e, Mr Ivo Loncar, w as rem oved for political reasons: the ruling party resented his criticism of agricultural policy. O n 10 February, Mr Mirko Galic resigned as Vrkic’s assistant. Galic, w idely regarded as the leading reform ist at HRT, stated that his resignation w as a response to biased reporting, interventions in program m ing, and Loncar’s rem oval. He added that the political atm osphere at HRT w as unfavourable to free and creative w ork as w ell as to standards of p ublic television and objective journalism . 8. Nor has aggressive propaganda been elim inated from the screen; on 17 February 1999, HTV broadcast at prim e tim e a docum entary program m e that 220

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

incited hatred against Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslim s). This film depicted individual Bosniak victim s of the Croat-Bosniak conflict as if they w ere Croat victim s of Bosniak forces. O n 16 December 1998, HTV broad cast a program me in a regular series that w as replete w ith hate speech (“…In our corner, a select group has grow n close to Soros. The disgusting Serb-Jew ish lobby w hich alw ays reem erges so that Croatia can be battered dow n. These are prudent m asons, m any o f w hom are sexually pecu liar. They are corrup ted foreigners and Croats w ho have been fed so luxurio usly by Skadarlija [i.e. Belgrade]”, etc. et c.). Croat ia ’s Jew ish co m m unity has anno unced a legal actio n against t he au thor of this program m e. 9. The 19.30 new s bulletin rem ains essentially unaffected by the lim ited improvem ent s n oted above. Go vern ment or ruling party officials are still granted virtually unlim ited access to the bulletin. Far from questioning these officials, the journalist s either m ake no com m ent o r endo rse the officials’ argum ent s and assessm ents. O pposition politicians are rarely given an opportunit y to comm ent directly on these officials’ statem ents. Inform ation and view s w hich reflect poorly on the Governm ent or ruling party are often distorted or om itted. The bulletin continues to include editorial com m entaries w hich have no place in public service broad casting. O ne such com mentary, on 7 January 1999, accused the US am bassador to Croatia of hypocrisy; another com m entary in the sam e bulletin accused the international w ar crim es tribunal in The Hague (ICTY) of “superficiality”. Reporters, too , openly take sides; on 30 January 1999, a reporter covering the afterm ath of a traffic accident apparently caused by a SFO R vehicle observed that “the arrogance of UNPRO FO R [sic] has draped this area in black. … For these people, this is an exam ple of brutality by individuals in SFO R w hich is turning Croatian roads into an execution ground”. 10. In light of these practices, the O SCE Mission to Croatia expressed the view , in its 26 January 1999 report on Croatia’s progress in m eeting international co mm itm ent s, that HRT ’s compliance w ith its legal o bligat ion “to inform the pub lic truthfully, objectively an d p rom ptly ab out political, econo mic … and other events” (Law on HRT, Art. 6) is seriously in question. 11. Particular m ention should be m ade of HTV’s refusal to provide coverage of efforts to encourage reconciliation am ong Croatian citizens. Such coverage is not m erely desirable in a context w here com m unities rem ain deeply divided by recent conflict; it is an explicit comm itm ent in the Governm ent’s Program m e on Establishm ent of Trust (O ctober 1997). Despite this com m itm ent, HTV’s m asters do nothing to encourage a “general clim ate of tolerance and security” o r “the establishm ent of trust betw een all citizens”. O ppo rtunities to report on positive, trust-building initiatives are rarely taken. Indeed , HTV’s outpu t reflects antago nism or at best indifferen ce t o th e return of refugees an d displaced persons to their homes – unless these persons happen to be ethnic Croats. Country Reports, Croatia

221

12. It is important to point out the connection betw een the HTV program m ing on one hand, and the legislation that go verns HRT on the other hand . The key legislation is the Law o n HRT. Since its original adoption in 1992, this law has tw ice been amended . The first set of am endment s (1996) served to tighten the ruling party’s cont rol in HRT, for example by raising the nu mber of m em b ers of Parliam ent on the HRT Cou ncil – the netw o rk’s nearest eq uivalent to a governing body – to an absolute majority. The second set of amendments (1998) w as relatively progressive, though w itho ut t hreatening the cap acity of the ru ling party to dom inate HRT. The fact that the lat ter amendments ignored a number of concrete suggestions for reform provided by the Council of Eu ro pe in March 1998, cau sed particular concern both to the int ernational comm unity and t o the activists in ‘Forum 21’. In short, the Law on HRT ensures th at HRT cannot at tain the level of institutional aut onom y w hich is a precond ition of p ublic service broadcasting. The credibility of the Government’s stated intention to convert HRT fro m a st ate to a pub lic service b roadcaster w as further harm ed in February 1999 w hen Mr Zlatko Canjuga, a deputy president of the ruling HDZ party, w as app ointed as head of t he new HRT C ouncil. 13. Before leaving the to pic o f HRT, m entio n m ust be m ade of another highly controversial aspect of its operations: nam ely, its activity in the neighbouring state of Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH). During the arm ed conflict, Croat forces seized a num ber of transm itter facilities belonging to RTVBiH, the state b ro a d ca st e r. These facilities, together w ith others im po rted for the pu rpose, are used for the illegal re-broadcasting of all three HTV channels inside the neighbouring country. This activity provides the HDZ-BiH, the dom inant party of Croats in BiH – w hich happens also to be an offshoot of the ruling party in Croatia – w ith an invaluable propaganda tool. It also obstructs in the m ost literal sense the restructuring of RTVBiH in line w ith public service norm s, as envisioned by the international com m unity. Lastly, this activity am ounts to a form of double theft: firstly, theft from the foreign production com panies w hose program m es are purchased by HRT for show ing in Croatia, not in BiH; and secondly, from Croatian citizens w hose m onthly subscription paym ents to HRT are used to subsidise HTV’s operations in the neighbouring state. The O ffice of the High Representative and the Independent Media Com m ission are currently leading international efforts in Sarajevo to regulate and legalise HTV’s presence in BiH. These efforts are fiercely resisted in Zagreb as w ell as in the Bosnian Croat stronghold of w estern Mostar. Broadcasting: independent 14. T he 1998 am endm ents to the Law o n HRT co nfirm ed that HRT retain s occupation of Croatia’s three state television and radio frequencies. The subsequ ent opening of a tender fo r a fo urth (actually non-existent) televisio n channel, in Novem ber 1998, w as revealed as a som ew hat cynical gesture w hen a 222

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

Governm ent official adm itted that start-up costs for such a channel w ould include DEM 20 to 25 m illion to construct a netw ork of 120 transm itters. It is indicative that Mr Ninoslav Pavic, w ho is w idely regarded as Croatia’s only m edia entrepreneur w ith the resources to establish a fourth channel, has stated that the term s of the tender are “absolutely unacceptable” (Jutarnji list, 02 December 1998). In sum , there is little prospect that a fourth channel w ill broadcast w ithin th e next few years, and no guarantee that w hen it st art s, it w ill provide a real alternative in term s of new s and inform ation. 15. By law , concessions for private television and radio stations m ay be aw arded to each of Croatia’s 20 counties and 121 cities. The licensing procedure is overseen by the Telecom m unications Council, established under the Law on Telecom m unications (1994). Five of its nine m em bers, nom inated by the Governm ent and appointed by Parliam ent, are senior figures in HDZ, including tw o vice presidents of the party w ho serve as advisors to President Tudjm an . To date, the Council h as dispensed 110 radio concession s, in clu ding three at state (national) level, and 11 television concessions, including four at co unty level. Since t he closure of th e new s-roo m at TV M rez a in aut um n 1998, only one of these broadcasters, Zagreb’s Radio 101, provides a serious alternative to HRT’s new s program m ing. The licensing procedure has on occasion been manipulated to the advantage of the ruling party, especially in areas w here the party has not gained pow er through elections. The costs of applying, purchasing and retaining a broadcast licence are extrem ely high. Paym ents are scheduled arbitrarily, w ith little or no room for negotiation. Notw ithstanding the discouraging econom ic situation in Croatia, the legal and political conditions for independent broadcasters are unfairly restrictive. Printed media: distribution 16. The daily and weekly new spapers provide a w ide range of political inform ation and view s. The m ost w elcom e recent addition is Jutarnji list, a daily new sp aper launched in April 1998. This paper has set a quite consistently high standard in covering sensitive political issues. It is not too m uch to say that Jutarnji list is Croatia’s first ‘norm al’ new spaper, reflecting (for the m ost part) actual new s values rather than a political agenda. O ne corollary is that the highest-selling daily paper, Vecernji list, has been obliged to im prove som ew hat the quality of its ow n political coverage, if not the objectivity of its editorial com m entaries. How ever, it has been estim ated that less than half the adult population now reads new spapers. Circulation figures have fallen in recent years, due above all to im poverishment. The objective reporting and comm entary provided by a few new spapers does not com pensate for the one-sidedness and sensationalism of others, let alone for the HRT new s program m ing. 17. At present, new spaper publishers face a grave problem w ith distribu tion. The printed m edia distribution m arket is dom inated by the ‘Tisak’ com Country Reports, Croatia

223

p a n y, w hich m ay co ntrol as m uch as 75 per cent of the market. In autumn 1998, the w ithholding of sales revenue by Tisak forced certain privately-ow ned new spapers to the brink of closure. O ne new spaper, the w eekly N acional, claim ed to receive 85 per cent of its revenue through Tisak. Early in 1999, Tisak itself verged on collapse, unable to pay its creditors. With debts am ounting to US$ 1.6 m illion by m id Jan uary, Tis a k ’s crisis threat ened the existence o f all but the largest publishing groups. At the sam e tim e, Hrvatska Tiskara (HT), Croatia’s principal new spaper printer, w hich is itself, state-controlled, w arned that it w ould stop servicing publishers w ho did not settle their debts. 18. New spaper pu blishers dem anded paym ent of ou tstanding sum s, and appealed to Prime Minister Matesa not to igno re the p roblem . In late January 1999, Matesa m et w ith the new spaper publishers and prom ised to assist in finding an equitable and speedy solution. It w as decided to give co ntro l over Tis a k to a number of creditor banks, and to exclude foreign investment. The publishers agreed to a repayment schedule. The new arrangement w as announced as being in place on 22 Feb ruary. O n 26 Febru ary, t he p ublishers w rote again to Matesa, w arning t hat – despite some in itial disb ursem ents to credito rs in late Janu ary – Tis a k ’s undertakin g to pay half its debts fo r new sp aper sales du ring November and Decem ber 1998 w ithin ten days, and the balance w ithin 20 days, had not been fulfilled . By early March , Tis a k ’s total deb t to publishers w as est im ated at over DEM 26 m illion. The fut ure of Tisak rem ains uncertain. Moreover, even if the restructuring plan can be successfu lly im plem ent ed, and state-co ntro lled banks control Tisak, t he p otential fo r political m anipulation w ill rem ain. 19. Although Tisak has denied any political dim ension to its non-paym ent of debts, it is the smaller and more editorially independent publishers w ho suffer most. Besides, Tisak’s difficulties are the direct and entirely avoidable consequence of politically motivated corruption. Tisak, w hose cash income from new spaper and tobacco sales had placed it among Croatia’s 10 biggest companies, is yet another victim of a dubious privatisation process in w hich sound businesses w ere taken over by politically-favoured tycoons and exploited as ‘cash cow s’. Documents obtained by Feral Tribune indicate that Tisa k ’s main shareholder, Mr Miroslav Kutle, may have siphoned as much as DEM 150 million from Tisak during 1998 alone (Feral Tribune, 8 March 1999). Nevertheless, the authorities reconfirmed Kutle in his position at Tisak as late as Novem ber 1998. During the same month, Kutle relinquished his control of Croatia’s second-largest new spaper distributor, Slobodna Dalmacija, to the state. (Kutle had acquired the profitable Slobodna Dalmacija by highly questionable privatisation in 1993; by autumn 1998 he had apparently bankrupted the co m p a n y.) As a consequence, an independent new spaper such as Feral Tribune is currently unable to obtain sales revenue from either Tisak, w hich ow es Feral m o re than DEM 340,000, or from Slobodna Dalm acija, w hich ow es Feral almost DEM 700,000. As a result, Feral Tribune is deeply indebted to its printer, Novi List, w hich 224

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

itself publishes an independent daily new spaper. The outline here of a vicious circle, narrow ing around the necks of independent publishers, is plain to see. 20. Tisa k ’s failure has added to the difficulties facing the formerly profitable Hrvatska Tiskara (HT). In February 1999, HT’s failure to pay value-added tax to the tune of more than DEM 500,000 led to its accounts being blocked by the Ministry of Finance. According to HT’s director, the com pany had already w arned the Government that it w ould not be able to pay VAT u nless publishers p aid off their ow n debts to HT. O n 6 March 1999, the authorities arranged a merger betw een HT and the Vjesnik Group, under the overall control of the pension fund. The original intention behind this merger w as, presumably, to offset the sizeable losses incurred by the ruling party’s preferred daily new spaper, V jesnik, w ith profits from HT – a design that m ay backfire if HT should fall victim to the insolvency crisis. 21. Another source of pressure on journalists in the independent press is created by litigation initiated by Governm ent or ruling party officials. Civil and criminal law s provide broad scope for public figures to prosecute journalists for insult and defam ation. Accord ing to official statistics, over 700 defamation suits w ere filed betw een 1994 and 1997. Many of these suits were and continue to be brought by officials. Particular concern has focused on a 1996 am endment to the criminal code, w hich obliges the public prosecutor to start proceedings against anyone suspected of offending or slandering any of five state officials (the president, the prime m in ist e r, the speaker of parliament, the presidents of the supreme and constitutional courts). The amendment carries a maxim um prison sentence of three years. So far, no suits brought by the public prosecutor under this amendment have been successful. It is clear, how ever, that it has facilitated the crim inal prosecution of journalists. In civil cases, m any prosecutions have succeeded, leading to the award of substantial damages that drain the financial resources of media – the very media w hich, being independent, usually do not have access to state or party coffers. Whether this situation has a directly chilling effect on the independent press is, how e ve r, hard to say with any certainty. The leading independent new spapers remain boldly outspoken in their criticism of the au thorities. Elections. 22. International and dom estic m onitoring of the Croatian m ed ia during the cam paigns before successive elect ions since 1995 have confirmed that the m ain m edia, both electronic and printed, have displayed a strong bias in favour of the ruling party. According to the European Institute of the Media, during the final phase of cam paigning for the June 1997 presidential elections, HRT gave eight to 12 tim es m ore coverage to President Tudjm an than to the other tw o candidates.1 The O SCE / O DIHR O bservation Mission concluded that “the process leading up to the elections w as fu nd am entally flaw ed, and did not m eet 1

Q uoted in the US Dept. of State Country Report on Hum an Rights Practices for 1997.

Country Reports, Croatia

225

the m inim um standards for a m eaningful and dem ocratic election in line w ith O SCE standards”, in part because of the “overw helm ing coverage” given to Tudjm an by HRT. With ou t urgen t reform of election legislatio n and o f the regulations governing HRT’s pre-election coverage, this pattern w ill surely be repeated in the next elections, due to take place by January 2000. Conclusions 23. Governm ent officials often com plain that th e actual and legal situation of t he med ia in Croatia is no w o rse than in other transitional countries w h ich, m o re o v e r, have not passed thro ugh a w ar. Yet, these officials say, Croatia is singled out for international censure and pressure on this issue. This line of response o verlooks tw o crucial consid erations. Firstly, Croat ia falls far short of im plem enting its ow n com m itm ents regarding m edia freedom. Seco ndly, Croatia exists in a specific regional co ntext , a post-conflict context w h ere hundreds of thousands of peo ple are still unable to take element ary decisions about w here they w ill live. Croatia has ob ligations to m any of these people, w hether they are its citizens, refugees o n its t erritory, o r citizen s of neighbou rin g countries. The fulfilment of these obligatio ns requires thoroughgoing reform of HRT ’s out put. 24. No account of the m edia in Croatia w ould be com plete w ithout reference to the extrem ely politicised clim ate that is fostered by the state authorit ies at th e highest level. O ver th e years, Presid ent Tud jm an has frequently lent his unique authority and prestige to d enouncing Croat ia’s independent o r proopposition journalists and criticising international pressure for m edia reform . Speaking t o a party com m itt ee last Decem b er, fo r exam ple, he said th at w henever governm ents change in dem ocratic countries, the media personnel change w ith it – “from the doorman to the editor in chief”. By such statements, the head of state has encouraged obstruction of m edia reform at low er levels of authority, including am ong the ranks of the party w hich he leads. 2 Recommendations 25. As a m atter of urgency, the political authorities should: reform the Law on HRT and t he Law on Telecom munications in line w ith the March 1998 “Recom m endations by the Council of Europe experts for the further dem ocratisation of the broadcast ing sector in Croatia”reform electo ral legislation to ensure that electoral coverage is independent and balanced in quantity and neutral in tonedesist from seeking to influence t he lead ersh ip of HRT, includ ing the HRT C ouncil an d the director’s office, and also o ver the Telecom m unications Council ensure that com plete and accurate inform ation concerning the ow nership of m edia and distribution com panies is in the public dom ain. 2

226

After resigning in O ctober 1998 as the head of President Tu d jm an ’s office, Mr Hrvoje Sarinic disclosed that “there is a strict order inside HDZ as to w hich journalists you should and should not talk to. … At the same time, the ownership structure of the new spapers is not clear today, so even the hardliners have had problems defining w hom you should or shouldn’t talk to.” (Nacional, 21 October 1998.)

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

Press Freedo m in the Kyrghyz Republic 11. March 1999 Int r od uct ion. The Kyrghyz Republic has m ade significan t progress tow ard the developm ent of a strong, indep endent m ass m edia in recent years. Despite setbacks, the governm ent seem s com m itted to freedom of the press. T he ab ility of t he Kyrghyz Repub lic to m aint ain a liberal stance w ith regard to the m edia is su rprising, given its difficult geopolitical situat ion. It is a sm all, resource-poor country, bordering on C hin a, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, countries w ith po or hu m an rights records. Because it needs to im port the m ajority of its basic supp lies such as oil and natu ral gas, the Kyrghyz Repu blic is highly indebted to it s neighbors and relies on international aid for support. T his makes it vulnerab le to pressure both from the near abroad and Western countries. Despite w avering at tim es, President Akaev has successfully m aintained a skillful balance w ith the contradictory interests of these countries. Akaev has been no less skillful dom estically. He has m aintained peace and stability in an ethnically diverse country, geographically divided by h igh m ountains. Serio us differences b etw een the historically n om ad ic n orth and th e long settled south ern regio n have fractured d om estic p olitics. N ationalists have frequently clashed with ethnic m inorities. Influential people, including several p arliam entary deputies, have urged the president to rein in the press, after the media describ ed them in a negative light. Yet, t he country has m anaged to develop and follow a relatively liberal dom estic policy. This report finds that: – The atmosphere for the media has improved greatly since the 1997 criminal libel trials. – O vert political pressure is rare and the government is generally accountable to the media. – Although violations of press freedom continue to occur, they are declining in seriousness and frequency. They are resolved quickly, usually with high-level intervention. – Self-censorship amongst independent journalists is decreasing and journalistic responsibility is increasing. Despite t he govern ment’s favorab le policy tow ard the m edia, im po rtant problems still exist. The m ost important challenge facing the Kyrghyz Republic in the next few years w ill b e the institutionalization of freedo m of the press. Measures need t o be t aken t o ensure t he irreversibility of press freedom . Currently, t here are very few lim itations on th e po w er of the p resident. Akaev nam es and Country Reports, Kyrgistan

227

rem oves ju dges, the h eads of go vernm ent m edia, and the oblastâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; govern ment s. The parliament is comparatively week w ith respect to the executive branch, and recent internal d isagreements w ithin the parliam ent have slow ed its activities. It is clear that the extensive freedo m s t hat the m edia enjo y today are clearly a result o f an active president ial policy. This is beneficial w h ile the presid ent su pp orts press freedom , but should this p resident change his opinion or should a hard-liner prevail in th e 2000 elect ions, these gains could quickly be reversed. O verview. As of January 1999, there w ere m ore than four hundred new spapers registered w ith the Ministry of Justice and tw enty-five broadcast stations. At any given tim e, only about one hun dred new sp apers actively publish. O f those, approxim ately tw enty publish in Bishkek, the capital. The national governm ent ow ns four new spapers. Tw o of those, Slovo Kyrghyzstan and Nasha Gazeta, are Russian-language new spapers. The others, Erkin Too and Kyrghyz Ruuhuu, are in Kyrghyz. Local governm ents and other governm ent agencies also publish their ow n new spapers. The national governm ent ow ns and operates a new s service, Kabar. The majority o f independent new spapers publish in Bishkek. There are several large, Russian-language new spapers, including Vecherny Bishkek, Utro Bishkek, and Delovoy N umer. Vecherny Bishkek has the largest circulation at betw een fifty and eighty thousand copies. There is also one w eekly, Russianlanguage journal on political and econom ic topics, AKI Kyrghyzstan. Major in dependen t, Kyrghyz-langu age new spapers in clud e Asaba, ResPublica, Kyrghyz Ruuhu, and Aalam . Kyrghyz language new spapers tend to be m ore vocal in criticizing the governm ent. Asaba has the highest circulation of the Kyrghyz new spapers, at approxim ately 40,000 copies. Vecherny Bishkek and Asaba have lim ited dist ribution t hroughout the country, although in w inter, distribution to som e of the regions is not reliable due to im passable m ountain roads. They do have correspondents in each of the other Kyrghyz cities and som e other Central Asian cities. Independent new sp apers o utside o f Bishkek are virtu ally no nexistent, mainly because o utside t he capital, the econom y cannot support them . O ne exception is the southern new spaper, O sh Park. A sm all num ber of new spapers publish in English (notably, the Central Asian Post), and other languages. Fourteen independent television stations and nine independent radio stat ions operate in the Kyrghyz Rep ublic. Four of t he television statio ns broadcast from Bishkek, as do seven of the radio stations. O ne television station broadcasts in Karakol, one in Naryn, four in O sh, four in Jalal-Abad, and zero in Ta la s. In addition, a sem i-independent television station, Koort, began operating in 1998 in Bishkek. Although it considers itself independent public television, it is for profit and is believed to have close ties to the current governm ent. This com pany w on a coveted VHF channel and the rights to sell national and local 228

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

advertising on the tw o Russian netw orks, RTR and O RT. Th e national government ow ns o ne t elevision station (KTR) and tw o radio stations. Each oblast’ governm ent also operates its ow n television station, although these stations broadcast only a few hours per w eek. Local governm ents generally use these stations to buffer their ow n im ages and to criticize their neighbors. C u rre n t ly, only the national government has the technical capability to broadcast throughout the republic. Several indep endent st ations have form ed a rudimentary coop erative for t he exchange of new s and inform ation. How ever, tim ely exchange o f footage is nearly im possible, as this requires trading vid eo tapes by commercial ground or air transportation. The largest independent broadcaster, Pyramida Television and Radio Corporation, now broadcasts in three of t he six Kyrghyz oblasts using the governm ent’s netw ork of comm unication lines. Media Legislation. The constitution w as adopted in May 1993 and guarantees th e right to freedom of the press. Article 36 of t he constitut ion obligates the state to “create the necessary conditions for the developm ent of m ass m edia.” A constitutional am endm ent adopted by national referendum in O ct ober 1998 prohibits the passage of legislation lim iting freedom of the press, although because freedom of the press w as already guaranteed by the constitution, this w as a m ostly sym bolic m ove. Despite substantial discussion of m edia regulation in the parliam ent and presidential adm inistration , there is rem arkably litt le legislation governing th e activities of the m edia. The legislation that does exist is generally vaguely w orded , duplicative, and unenforceable. T his lack o f clear guidelines has led to a p rotracted struggle to define the rights and responsibility of the m edia. It has not inhibited the m edia from operating m ore or less freely. Law on Mass Media. A 1992 Law on Mass Media is the foundation of m edia regulation. The law explicitly prohibits censorship of the m ass m edia in article one. Article eight states that the “activities of a m ass m edia can be stopped only be decision of the founders or by a decision of the court.” O ther articles give governm ent bodies, non-governm ental organizations, and other respon sible officials the right to pro vide inform ation to the press and the press the right to receive and distrib ute information. The law includ es a provision on author’s rights (article sixteen) and forbids the press from publishing inform ation that advocates w ar, violence, religious extrem ism or intolerance tow ards other nationalities. It bans the desecration of national sym bols and prohibits pornography (article 23). Accord ing t o this law, all m ass m edia m ust register w ith the Min istry of Justice (article 6). A person or group of perso ns w ishing to open a new spap er or station m ust first apply to the m inistry as an organization and then as a mass m edia. Althou gh the process is not com p licated, it len gthen s the tim e it takes to regisCountry Reports, Kyrgistan

229

t e r, increases the exp ense of starting a m ass m edia com pany, and gives t he m inistry the pow er to delay or refuse an ap plication from an u nd esirable source. The registration process creates a conflict w ith article eight of the media law, as it gives the m inistry the pow er to nullify the registration of m edia com panies for violations of the law , effectively stopping their activities. An alternative to m edia registration is a “declaration of intent to w ork as a m ass m edia.” This declaration w ould not require approval from the m inistry and could the m inistry could not refuse or cancel this declaration. O ther legislation. Tw o other law s, on Access to Inform ation and on Protection of the Professional Activities of Journalists, passed in Novem ber 1997. Th e Law on Access to Inform atio n has tw o im po rtant provisions. The first th eoretically requires governm ent autho rities to m ake in formation available to the pub lic, generally w ithin ten days (article 6). The regulatio ns laid out in this law are vague and not universally applied. Both high and low level officials violate this law regularly. Regulations at low er levels frequently contradict and supercede it. Inform ation is often prohibitively expensive for journalists to obtain. Certain inform ation is available over the Internet, including Toktum , a searchable database of Kyrghyz legislation. This law does contain an im port ant provision protecting journalistic sources of inform ation. Article nine states, “Mass m edia shall not disclose the source of inform ation or the pseudonym of the author w ithout their express perm ission. The source of the inform ation and the nam e of the author m ay be disclosed only by a court decision.” The Law on Protection of the Professional Activities of Journalists sim ply restates the rights of journalists and duplicates parts of the m ass m edia law . It officially prohibits prior restraint of the m ass m edia. Libel. That there is a provision for libel included in the crim inal code. Defam ation of character is punishable by a prison sentence of up to five years. Despite am endm ents proposed to the crim inal code by both parliam ent and the president, libel has not been decrim inalized and this continues to be an issue. Broadcast regulation. Desp ite several drafts, a Law on Televisio n and Rad io Broadcasting has not been adopted nor is there a standard code of practice for broadcast m edia. Licensing of television and radio stations is governed by a 1998 Law on Telecom m unications, the 1997 Law on Licensing and various other licensing regulatio ns adopted. The Natio nal Agency on Com m unicatio ns (NAS) is directly subordinate to the president and controls all activities that require use of the frequency spectrum . NAS has draw n up and registered the frequency distrib ution m ap for the Kyrghyz Rep ublic and has registered it w ith the International Telecom m unications Union. The distribution of frequencies is available to the public through NAS. The National Agency on Com m unications gives out licenses on a case by 230

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

case basis w ithout a tender process. A com m ission w ithin NAS decides conflicts over free ch annels. So far, no ch annels have been officially contested. Stations that ow n transm itters m ust receive both perm ission to broadcast and a license to use a frequency. This process seem s duplicative and unnecessary, as one is im possible w ithout the other. O ddly, stations broadcasting on the governm ent channel are not required to receive either broadcasting license. All broadcasters m ust register w ith the m inistry of justice as both an organization and a m ass m edia. Stations are eligible to receive licenses for a period of betw een three and seven years. The pricing schem e for receiving a license is based on a com plicated form ula, and varies w idely am ong stations. The pricing schem e is concerning to stations as it seem s arbitrary. NAS requires stations to broadcast in Kyrghyz, but the percent age of airtim e t hat mu st be in Kyrgh yz varies from t en to seventy-five percent. The application process requires all equipm ent to be certified b y NAS. NAS has requested certification for even non-broadcast equipm ent, such as television cam eras and VCRs. NAS occasionally requires university diplom as for all station em ployees, ostensibly to prove that the station is capable of operating professionally. To date, ten stations in Bishkek and one station in Karakol have received licenses. No stations in the south of t he country have received licenses yet. This is probably due to the lengthy process of settling frequency distribution w ith Uzbekistan. History of press freedom. Though the Kyrghyz Republic w as founded on th e principle of freedo m of the press, that has not alw ays been the realit y in its seven years of independence. President Akaev announced during his first speech accepting the presidency of the Kyrghyz Republic, that â&#x20AC;&#x153;the Kyrghyz Republic m eans the freedo m of speech.â&#x20AC;? Du ring the first years of ind ependence, independent new spapers such as Svobodnye Gory and ResPublica opened and began openly criticizing the president. In 1993, the Kyrghyz lead ership began to chafe under the in tense criticism , but did not act. Follow ing a spring of intense personal criticism , the president issued a decree creating a com mission on the activities of th e m ass m ed ia in t he sum m er of 1994 w hich w as designed to im plem ent press restrictions. In July, Akaev su pported the closing o f tw o independent new spapers, Svobodnye Gory and Politika. Relat ions b etw een the governm ent and the m edia co ntinu ed to deteriorate and in 1995, the president initiated a series of defam ation trials against independent journalists. In March 1995, the independent new spaper, ResPublica, printed an article that claim ed President Akaev had hom es in Sw itzerland and Turkey. President Akaev personally sued for libel. As a result, the journalist, Tam ara Slasheva and ResPublica editor, Zam ira Sydykova w ere sentenced to Country Reports, Kyrgistan

231

prison and prohibited from w orking as journalists for one year. Sydykova w as released for tim e served in 1996. During spring and sum m er 1997, press freedom in the Kyrghyz Republic arguably reached its low est point. ResPublica w as on trial again for libel and defam ation. The head of the national gold com pany, Dastan Sarygulov, sued three journalists and Sydykova over articles pu blished about him betw een 1994 and 1996. In June 1997, Sydykova and journalist Aleksandr Alianchikov w ere sentenced to prison, and the other tw o journalists w ere banned from practicing journalism for three years. At the sam e tim e, another ResPublica journalist , Yrysbek O m urzakov, w as on trial in a separate case. A privat e factory ow ner accused him of libel for depicting w orking conditions in his factory as horrific. Worse still, t he governm ent h eld O m urzako v in prison w h ile aw aiting trial. During the 1997 trials, President Akaev w as condem ned for the incid ent by all sides. Dom estically, local journ alists dem onstrated against Sydykovaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s trial and w ent on a hunger strike in front of the Kyrghyz White House. International hum an rights organizations organized letter w riting cam paigns and protests. This w as highly em barassing for a liberal-m inded president w ho had sold his cou nt ry as an islan d of dem ocracy. Perhaps m ost im portantly, foreign governments,especially the United States, app eared to link this issue to aid m o n e y. During m eetings w ith Congressm en during a July 1997 visit to the United States, President Akaev w as constantly asked about the problem s journalists w ere having in his country. Im m ediately after his return, the courts reheard the Sydykova case. They acquitted Alianchikov and found that Sydykova had served enough time in 1995 that she could be released as w ell. O m urzakov w as also freed pending trial. Although the court convicted O m urzakov o f libel in Septem ber and sent enced him to tw o and a half years in p rison, he w as quickly released under an amnesty order the president issued for all persons convicted of criminal libel. Hillary Clint o n â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Novemb er visit resulted in m ore co ncession s for the m edia, includ ing the passage of law s on Access to Inform ation and Protection of the Professional Act ivit ies o f Jo urnalists. In addit ion, prior to Clintonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s arrival, Presiden t Akaev spoke out for the first tim e in favor of rem oving libel from the crim inal code and subm itted the proposed amendments to parliam ent. The parliament did not adopt these am endm ents. Throughout the spring of 1998, the president w orked to im prove the environment in t he Kyrghyz Republic for the p ress. The presid ent ial administrat ion forw arded to parliam ent new , libel legislation for the m ass m edia. The parliam ent vet oed it, under pressure from journalists o pposed to any sort of increased m edia legislation. The president also vetoed several pieces of legislation that w ould have further inhibited freedo m of the press. These included amend ment s t o the law on m ass m edia that rem oved art icle eigh t, t he article that lim ited the 232

O UR W O RK,

WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

ab ility to shut d ow n media com panies. President Akaev repeated his call for the decrim inalization of libel in June, shortly after an O SCE conference on hum an rights an d libel. In May an d June 1998, television and rad io stations in Bish kek and Karakol finally received licenses to broadcast. In O ctober, Akaev included a constitutional am endm ent on freedom of the press in the referendum . Since sum m er 1997, journalists have con tinued repo rting various p roblem s w ith the governm ent. It now appears that they are caused by officials acting w ithout the president’s support. O nce brought to the attention of the presid e n t ’s advisors, t he pro blem s are o ften rap idly and satisfacto rily resolved. O n e exam ple of this tendency is the licensing problem s w hich occurred in w inter 1998. O n January 8, the head of NAS, O roz bek Kaikov, declared all perm issions to broad cast issued by its predecessor invalid, and announ ced t hat all television and radio stations in the country had to apply for frequency licenses. Betw een January and March, NAS ordered five o ut of nine exist ing radio stations an d ten ou t of fo urteen televisio n stations to cease broad casting for technical o r adm inistrative reasons. H ow ever, Kaikov made it clear that the stations had displeased him in one w ay or another. The m edia w ere slow to respond to t he closures. Though NAS closed som e statio ns months earlier, the Association of Independent Electronic Mass Media (ANESMI) did not respond until March. When they finally acted, they w rote an open letter to the president, w hich expressed the concerns o f the closed stations. ANESMI also appealed to international organizat ions, such as the Co mm ittee to Protect Jo urnalists, the Kyrghyz -Am erican Hu man Rights Bureau, and foreign embassies in Bishkek to support their plea. Akaev responded by ordering the head of NAS to answ er ANESMI’s questions and resolve the issue imm ed iately. At a March 10 m eeting w ith station ow ners and ANESMI, Kaiko v prom ised to issue new licenses by summ er and perm itted all stations to begin bro adcasting again until they received a license. In an effort to introduce transparency into the actions of the NAC, an ANESMI mem ber w as inclu ded o n t he licensing co mmission. Although the problem w as favorably resolved, it dem onstrated t he d etrim en tal effects o f the ResPu blica trials on th e assertiveness of t he m ass m edia. No ne of the other m edia organ izat ions w as w illing to speak ou t against the station closures. Th e stations th at co ntinu ed broadcasting distanced them selves from the st ations that NSA shut dow n. The director of ANESMI resisted acting on their behalf. Not a single n ew sp aper printed stories about the closures or the op en letter to the president. Lead ing m em bers of the jo urnalistic com m unit y w ere either openly h ostile to w ards the stations or rem ained silen t. This w as in sharp contrast to the Sydyko va case, d uring w hich several new spapers and at least o ne radio st ation covered the trial. T he conviction and imprison ment of Zam ira Sydykova and Yrysbek O m urzako v had left a lasting im pression. The positive resolution of the licensing problem and the president’s conCountry Reports, Kyrgistan

233

cessions to the m ass m edia helped to increase the w illingness of journalists to cover stories that touched topics potentially em barrassing to the governm ent. Most notably, Vecherny Bishkek published a highly controversial story about an accident caused by Kum tor, the leading gold com pany. A speeding truck crashed off a bridge, spilling cyanide into river near Lake Issyk-Kul. Although the accident had happened several days before, the governm ent had not released any inform ation about it. This incident emb arrassed high-ranking governm ent officials and nearly resulted in Kum tor’s closure. The public’s angry response forced the Canadian director to resign. Later, the sam e new spaper broke the new s about illegal arm s shipm ents from Iran to Afghanistan, w hich w ere driven through O sh w ith the alleged consent of Kyrghyz officials. The governm ent risked im portant foreign ties w ith Iran w hen it shipped the arm s back to Teheran. Neither the journalists nor the new spapers reported any significant political pressure resulting from the publication of these stories. Referendum a nd the Committee on Morals. In spite o f the presid ent ’s recent support of the m edia, an O ctober 1998 referendum dem onstrated that these gains are easily retractable. There exists a significant danger is that the gains m ade recently w ill be lost during the run up to presidential and parliam entary elections in 2000. During the w eeks leading up t o the referendu m , m ost new spapers filled their pages w ith articles from politicians, educators, and econom ists supp orting the referen du m, reportedly at the request of govern ment officials. Governm ent new spap ers and m ost of the Russian- langu age new spap ers published little or no dissenting inform ation. Independent television stations aired only official new s. The day of the vote, both governm ent and independent stations aired interview s w ith voters, nearly all of w hich claim ed to have supported the referendum . Som e oppositio n new sp apers, including ResPublica, Asaba and journal AKI the Kyrghyz Republic, actively protested against the referendum . The day before the referendum , the governm ent p rinting house d id not d ist rib ute Asaba to Jalal-Abad or O sh, tw o regions w here anti-referendum sentim ent w as at its highest. The edition, w hich ran the head line “Vote N o on the Referendum ,” w as not available in these areas until the next Monday. O n O ctober 6, the Minister of Justice form ed a Com m ittee on Morals. The com m ittee w as created to advise the Minister on the activities of the m ass m edia. It also seem ed designed to intim idate the opposition new spapers. The w eek follow ing the referendum , the com m ittee found that the new spapers Lim on, a profitable subsidiary of AKI Kyrghyzstan, and Paisham ba ow ned by Asaba, guilty of “publish ing pornography, vulgar and unnatural scen es t hat are harm ful to hu m an d ignit y and th e religious feelings of cit izens, and p ro m oting violen ce and aggression.” The com m it tee recom men ded th at the Minister take action to shut the new spapers dow n, w hich then init iated criminal proceedings 234

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

against the p apers. While the Kyrghyz m ust decide for them selves w hat is p erm issible to print in th eir country, the ow ners of these new spapers felt t hat they had been singled out for closure because of their criticism of the referendum . The com m ittee also decided that ResPublica had illegally published a photograph of Akaev’s head on the body of a bear. This w as determ ined to be defam ation of the president’s character and aspersion of a national sym bol. All three cases w ere settled out of court. Lim on and Paisham ba agreed not to print similar articles in the future, and the m inistry dropped its case. The president refused to su pport the libel suit, and the m atter w as closed . Before a recent trip to m eet w ith O SCE officials in Vienna, the president ordered the dissolution of the Com m ittee on Morals. Media and the Courts. The president has the pow er to nam e and rem ove judges, giving him a significant m easure of authority over the judicial system . It is difficult to say how often or how overt ly he exercises this. The president’s influence w as clearly involved in the final resolution of the Sydykova case im m ediately follow ing Akaev’s July 1997 trip to the United States. It is probably his influence as w ell, perceived or direct, that inhibits the courts from rulin g again st the m edia. Since th e cou rt s convicted Sydyko va and the ResPublica journalists, the m edia has prevailed in nearly every case heard by the courts. O nce exam ple is the case against Irina Stepkicheva, a journalist w ith the governm ent new spaper Nasha Gazeta. In 1997, she w rote an investigative report entitled “How shall w e call you,” in w hich she alleged that the attorney general abused his authority and illegally avoided prosecuting a case against his son’s com pany. The attorney general sued her for libel and insisted that the case be transferred to court w here he apparently had som e influence. Stepkicheva appealed to the Constitutional Court. In January 1999, the constitutional court ruled against the attorney general and ordered the case heard in an independent jurisdiction. More often, how ever, they sim ply avoid hearing the case, as w ith suits brought against Vecherny Bishkek by parliam entary deputies O m urbek Tekebaev and Duranbek Sadyrbaev in 1997-98. O ther cases have been dropped before they m ade it to trial, or have been decided ou t of court. This w as the case w ith the Lim on and Paisham ba pornography cases, the suit against ResPublica for the Akaev bear, and several others. Print Media vs. Electronic Media. Th e ind ependent print m edia developed m uch m ore quickly than the electronic m ass m edia, in term s of both num bers and content. By 1993, there w ere nearly one hundred indep endent new spapers, but only three independent television stations. This is m ainly because it takes vastly m ore investm ent to open a television or radio station than to start a n e w sp a p e r. This is also because television and radio st ations are b y their natu re m ore dependent on the good w ill of the governm ent. A station m ust acquire Country Reports, Kyrgistan

235

perm ission to use a channel, w hich is often easily retractable. For this reason, new spapers have historically covered m ore controversial topics than the broadcast m edia has. The new spapers at tim es have seem ed w illing to print virtually anything, regardless of the truth or new sw orthiness of the story. Far from censuring them selves, print journalists have gone after the m ost sensationalist stories to attract readers. By contrast, broadcast m edia censured them selves to the point w here they w ere w illing to cover only official new s, press con ferences, and sem inars held by international organizatio ns. Evidence of this is that w hereas hundreds of libel suits have been brought against newspap ers, only one has been brought against a t elevision or radio station. O ccupying their respective extrem es, neither print nor broadcast m edia could be considered exam ples of responsible journalism . This situation is slow ly im pro ving. In January 1999, the leading opp osition new spaper Asaba pledged not to violate the current law on mass m edia, to cover new s objectively and to give eq ual space in their new spaper to differing opinions. It is too early to tell w hether this is an accurate statem ent of Asaba’s future policies. The Associat ion of Journalists (AJ) also has plans to ask m embers to ado pt and follow a code of ethics during a conference on m edia law in June. O n the other hand, during the second half of 1998, broadcasters have becom e m ore inclined to air controversial topics. In August 1997, Adyl Biinazarov, the ow ner of Pyram ida television and radio stated in an interview, “O ur policy is not to get involved in politics. We only do info rm at ion and ent ertainm ent program s.” Yet, in O ctober 1998, Piram ida produced a series of television debates on proposed am endm ents to the constitution prior to the referend um . The m inist er o f ju stice and the chairm an of the election com m issio n along w ith tw o parliam entary deputies heatedly debated controversial issues of private land ow nership and parliam entary im m unity for over three hours. The station w as surprised by the favorable reaction they received both from m em bers of the governm ent and parliam en t, and also from their audience, and decided to devote m ore airtim e to them than they had originally planned. Follow ing the Pyram ida debates, another television station did a sim ilar series of debates on regional aspects of the referendum . This production is an even better indication of freedom of the m edia as it took place in the conservative southern city of O sh, w as aired live, and w as produced by the controversial Uzbek statio n, O sh TV. Alt hough the station ow ner w as very concerned about the governm ent’s reaction to the debates, the ow ner reported only positive feedback. New s production and content has also im proved. The tw o largest independent television stations covered stories this fall on pensioners’ dem onstrations, the closing of Paisham ba and Lim on new spapers, and a highly controversial trial of ethnic Uighurs. These stations report that they do not exp erience political pressu re, and Independent Bishkek Televisio n d irector Ta l236

O UR W O RK,

WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

gat Asyrankulov recently claim ed that he w ould broadcast any genuine new s story even if it is critical of the current governm ent. G overnment Media. T he p resident has direct control over Kyrghyz n atio nal m ass m edia and has the pow er to ap point and d ism iss the edito rs of t he fo ur national governm ent new spapers and the head of the governm ent television station (KTR). He does not seem to have a consistent policy regarding editorial cont ro l. The edito r of Slovo K yrghyz stan is a respected veteran journalist and the new spaper seem s to have achieved a m easure of editorial independence. By contrast, KTR is run by a form er Soviet ideologist and airs strictly governm ent propaganda. Journalists at KTR have com plained about censorship and political interference, and called for his rem oval. Economy and Development of the Mass Media. The im poverished econom y has stunted t he gro w th of both prin t an d bro adcast med ia. O nly the largest Bishkek new spapers and television and radio com panies are financially independent. Most advertising comes from international com p anies, such as CocaCoca. There is negligible foreign investm ent in the m edia, and because of extrem ely high in terest rates, borrow in g m on ey is nearly im possible. Taxes on incom e, advertising, im port and export, and the VAT take betw een forty and seventy percent of com panies’ earnings. The econom ic situation sharply w orsened during the econom ic crisis this fall. After the August Ruble crisis, m any advertisers cut back or cancelled their contracts. This is having several effects. First, although the strongest media co mpanies have and w ill continue publishing, the num ber of sm aller independent m edia com panies is falling. Since sm aller new spapers often represent m inorities, the economic crisis is likely to have a detrim ental affect on diversity of opinions. Second, the quality and quantity of new s available has decreased. Utro Bishkek halted publication for several days after the crisis began, Vecherny Bishkek decreased the length of its daily new spaper. Som e new spapers w ere forced to tem porarily stop paying their em plo yees or to layoff journalists. Third , it has m ade the press m ore vuln erable to p olitical pressure. Journalists w ho are not paid are m ore open to bribery and ow ners are m ore inclined to “sell their new s.” This is a w id esp read and openly acknow ledged prob lem in the Kyrghyz Republic. International organizations com m only “purchase” articles to publicize their activities. Minority O wnership of the M ass Media . Th e Kyrghyz Repub lic has a m ixed reco rd w it h regard t o m edia o w ned b y eth nic m ino rit ies. In the su m m er of 1996, a Uigh ur-ow n ed n ew sp aper, Ittip ak w as shu t do w n by t he governm ent, u nder pressure by the Chin ese to crack dow n o n Xinjiang separatist s. In 1997, the Ministry of Internal Affairs d enied journalists from an Uigh urow ned new spaper access to a press conference on the arrests of several ethically Uigh ur cit izen s o f Ch ina. Program s in m ino rity languages, su ch as D ungan , Country Reports, Kyrgistan

237

Karakalpak and Tajik d o air on governm ent radio and televisio n. Minority-ow ned m edia, in t he sou th of the country m ore frequently report difficulties w ith the local adm inistrations and national governm ent, especially those m edia ow ned by ethnic Uzbeks. Relations betw een the Uzbeks and t he Kyrghyz have b een tense since sum m er 1990, w hen disp utes over land distribution erupted into w ar. Several hundred people w ere killed and thousands of buildings w ere destroyed. The Soviet m ilitary w as called in to suppress the conflict. Tho ugh the region has since rem ained p eaceful, interethnic prob lem s rem ain difficult. It is thus notew orthy that of the four independent broadcasters in O sh, t w o of them , Mezon TV and O sh TV, are o w ned b y ethnic Uzbeks. O ne of these, O sh TV, is t he only independent station that b roadcasts on a VHF channel and enjoys w ide support in the local com m unity. Both Uzbek stations report m inor on-going problem s w ith both local and national authorities. O ne of the m ore serious problem s involves the distribution of frequencies. In Novem ber 1997, shortly after its creation, the National Agency of Com m unications annulled Uzbek-ow ned Mezon TVâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s perm ission to use the other free VHF channel in the O sh region. This occurred despite the fact that Mezon TV had already purchased a transm itter and had begun to broadcast. Although NAS stated that the channel could not be used for technical reasons, the stationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ow ners believed that the government w as concerned about the im plications of Uzbek stations broadcasting on the only tw o available VHF channels. The tw o independent Kyrghyz broadcasters had yet to acquire enough capital to purchase transm itters and w ere each still broadcasting only a few hours a w eek. A Ru ssian net w ork (RTR), Kyrghyz National Te levision (KTR), and tw o stations broadcasting from inside Uzbekistan use the other VHF channels. O sh T V also had a series of conflicts w ith the government including being nearly shut dow n by N AS in February 1998. Although NAS ordered the statio n closed because of prob lems w ith its licensing application, the head of NAS told station ow ner Halilzhan Hudaiberdiev t hat he did no t believe that an ethnic Uzbek should ow n a station in the Kyrghyz Republic. After repeated w arnings to stop broadcasting, w hich O sh TV ignored, NAS sent an employee t o the station to physically turn t he station off and to confiscate t heir equipment. The station director w as in Bishkek at the tim e, trying to find support against NAS. Jou rnalists at the station refused to stop broadcasting and cited article eight of the law on mass m edia. How ever, a scuffle ensued betw een the NAS representative and the journalists and som e equipment w as d estroyed. The NAS representative left, pro mising to ret urn w ith the police. The journalists contacted influential m embers of the Uzbek co mm unity, and a crow d soon gathered at the statio n. Realizing the volatility of the situat ion, NAS retracted its order to sto p broadcasting. Although O sh TV and Mezon TV continue to report occasional problem s 238

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

w ith local officials, both claim to broadcast m ore or less independen tly of political pressure. Hudaiberdiev adm its that he is careful to m aintain objectivity in his new s stories, especially w ith regard to other nationalities. He also ensures that he hires a mix of both Kyrghyz and Uzbek employees, and gives them equal opportunities to attend training and cover im portant stories. Both stations broadcast in Russian, Kyrghyz, and Uzbek. Local O rganiza tions. Until very recently, journalist s in the Kyrghyz Republic w ere opp osed to form ing any t ype of journ alist’s association . Many jou rnalists believed t hat an associat ion w as un necessary an d in effective. If they w ere t o have p ro blem s w it h t he go vern m ent , int ernatio nal organiz ations w ould defend th em . Many had also att ended m eetings for vario us associations that had not resulted in anythin g tan gib le. They further b elieved th at form in g an associatio n w ou ld earn t hem t he lab el “o ppo sit ion al,” m akin g t hem a target for governm en tal p ressure and creatin g prob lem s w ith th eir edito rs. Leadin g jou rnalists also refused to w o rk t oget her because of hist oric personal and po litical d ifferen ces. Alt hough several asso ciatio ns exist , th ey have played a relat ively m inor ro le in t he d evelo pm en t of p ress freedom in th e Kyrghyz Rep ublic. Th e follow ing m edia o rganiz ation s are registered in th e Kyrghyz Repub lic. Association of Independent Electronic Mass Media (ANESMI). ANESMI is a pan-Central Asian organization that originally started w ith a grant from UNESCO . Its head quarters is located in Almaty, Kazakhst an, w ith a local director in every country. There is no m em bership application or requirem ents. ANESMI considers every electronic mass media a m em ber, w hether or not they participate in ANESMI m eetings or support ANESMI activities. In t he Kyrghyz Repub lic, AN ESMI has also regist ered under another nam e, Electronic Mass Media in the Kyrghyz Republic (ESMIK). ESMIK received grants from USIS to hold a television festival and the Eurasia Foundation to publish a m ont hly bulletin abo ut event s concerning m ass m edia in the Kyrghyz Republic. Aside from a letter to the president during the 1998 closures, the organization avoids involvem ent in political issues. Journalists Union of the K yrghyz Rep ublic (JUK ). Th e Jo urn alist ’s Un ion of t he Kyrgh yz Repu b lic is a pseud o -governm ent organ izatio n, creat ed du ring th e So viet era. M em bers osten sib ly include o ver 1300 go vernm ent al and ind epen den t journ alist s from t hrou gh o ut t he rep u blic. Real m em b ersh ip is difficu lt to ju dge b ecause th ere is n o ap p licat io n process. Every jou rn alist in th e cou nt ry is a m em ber by d efault. Som e journ alists do n ot even kno w t hat th ey are m em b ers or u nd erstan d w hat ben efits m em bersh ip b rin gs t hem . Th e JUK recent ly received a gran t from t he Eurasia Fo un datio n t o h old sem in ars fo r jou rn alists. Association of Journalists (AJ). The Association of Journalists registered only Country Reports, Kyrgistan

239

in Decem ber 1998. The association form ed after the Com m ittee on Morals brou ght criminal suits against t he Paishamba and Lim on new spap ers. Its m em bers include both governm ental and non-governm ental journalists. Thus far, only approxim ately fifty journalists have com pleted the application and paid the hundred-som fee (about five dollars). Director Kuban Mam betaliev hopes to increase m em bership to five hundred journalists during 1999. The association plans to take an active ro le in politics. The o rganiz ation has lobbied against th e Comm ittee on M orals, urged the President to m ake the media exem pt from the VAT, and is representing television stations in the south in the National Agency of Com m unications w ith licensing problem s. Conclusions. The m edia landscape com pared to the other countries in the region is favorable. This is due m ostly to President Akaevâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s liberal policies t ow ard s t he m edia and internatio nal influence. Associations of journalists and other local organizations have played a relatively m inor role in influencing governm ental policy or in defending freedom of the press. For that reason, the m edia in the Kyrghyz Republic continue to be at risk.

240

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

Visits and Interventio ns February 1998 - February 1999 The O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media visited or corresponded w ith the follow ing Participating States of the O SCE : Albania Visit - Participation of Advisor Stanley Schrager at a conference, March 12 and March 13, on â&#x20AC;&#x153;Media Developm ent and International Institutionsâ&#x20AC;? Intervention - 9 April to Foreign Minister Pascal Milo sum m arizing visit of office Adviso r Stanley Schrager in March, 1998, comm ending recent efforts of the Governm ent of Albania to prom oted freedom of the m edia. Azerbaijan Visit - Freim ut Duve paid an official visit to Baku, 23 - 24 February 1999, w hich included tw o days of visits w ith governm ent officials and journalists. Mr. Duve also w as received by President Aliyev. Interventions - 5 February 1998 to Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov regarding concern over n ew developm ent w h ich requires a seco ndary license for the prin t m edia. - 5 May 1998 to Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov regarding recent halting of local rebroadcast of Radio Liberty. - 7 August 1998 to Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov com m ending recent decree to abolish censorship. - 1 O ctober 98 to Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov announcing the visit to Baku of Advisor Stanley Schrager. - 19 November 1998 to Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov summarizing visit of Advisor Stanley Schrager. - 25 Novem ber 1998 to Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov on recent libel suits filed against journalists and the lack of licensing of independent television stations. - 14 Decem ber 1998 to Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov on reports of recent beatings and harrassm ent of Azerbaijan journalists. - 18 January 99 t o Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov on recent series of high libel suits directed against Azerbaijan journalists and the lack of licenses granted to independent television stations. - 9 February 1999 to Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov announcing his planned visit Feb. 22-25. Visits and Interventions

241

Belarus Visit - Freim ut Duve paid an official visit to Minsk, 29- 30 April 1998, including talks w ith Foreign Minister Antonovitch and participation in the sem inar “Structures of Pluralistic Dem ocracies” organized by the O SCE Advisory and Monitoring Group. Interventions - 28 April 1998 to Foreign Minister Antonovitch on the cases of Pavel Sherem et, Yurii Khashchevatsky and on executive discrim ination of independent m edia - 12 Novem ber 1998 to Foreign Minister Antonovitch on licensing the dissemination of legal info rm at ion and t he ro bbery of eq uipm ent in th e offices of the independent new spaper “Naviny”. Bosnia and Herzegovina Visit - Participation of adviser Alexander Ivanko at the O SCE Inter-Entity Conference of Journalists in Decem ber 1998 in Sarajevo. Interventions - 24 Septem ber 1998 to Milorad Dodik, Prim e Minister of Republika Srpska, voicing concern regarding the harassm ent of journalists from RTVBiH in Banja Luka. - 7 O ctober 1998 to Enes Musabasic, Director of the School of Journalism in Sarajevo, congratulating her on the initiation of the school. - 14 Decem ber 1998 to Am bassador Robert Barry, Head of the O SCE Mission in Bosnia and H erz egovina, congratulating h im on th e activities of t he O SCE Media Experts Com m ission and its Final Report. - 13 January 1999 to Senad Pecanin, editor-in-Chief of Dani Magazine, congratulating him on being aw arded the 1998 O lof Palm e Prize. - Appointm ent of Freim ut Duve in Septem ber 1998 as Chairm an of the Council of the Independent Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria Visit. - Visit by Advisor Stanley Schrager 24-27 Septem ber 1998 to participate in a conference sponsored by the International Press Institute on “The Media in Transition.” Interventions - 11 Ju ne 1998 to Foreign Minister Nadjez hda Mihaylova urging Bulgaria to abolish statutes from the Penal Code w hich crim inalizes the libel prosecution of journalists. 242

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

- 5 Au gust 1998 to Foreign Minister Nad jezhd a Mihaylova regardin g recent decision of Bulgarian Constitutional Court to not rescind statutes punishing journalists w ith im prisonm ent for crim inal libel. - 7 August 1998 to Fo reign Minister Nadjezhda Mihaylova on recent assault on Bulgarian journalist. - 1 O ctober 1998 to President Peter Stoyanov sum m arizing recent visit of Advisor Stanley Schrager and raising co ncern about t he proposed Radio and Television Law. - 27 January 1999 to Foreign Minister Nadjezhda Mahaylova on investigation opened by Public Prosecutor against journalist Tatiana Vaksberg for “at tacking t he h onor and dignit y” and “insu lting th e aut horit y of the State.” Canada Visit - Freim ut Duve paid an official visit to Canada on 7-8 O ctober w here he held con sultations w ith the Can adian Governm en t, Mem bers o f Parliam ent and m et w ith Canadian NGO ’s, in particular w ith the international NGO netw ork dealing w ith freedom of expression issues. Croatia Visits - Participation by Freim ut Duve on 21-22 May 1998 in a Sem inar on the Media in Croatia hosted by the O SCE Mission. - Particip ation by Freim ut Duve in m eetings on 9 February 1999 w ith Franjo Tudjm an, President of Croatia, Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa, other senior Croatian governm ent officials. Interventions - 11 June 1998 to Dr. Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of Croatia, voicing his concerns regarding certain legislative issues in the m edia field. - 16 Decem ber 1998 to Dr. Mate Granic draw ing the Minister’s attention to charges filed by the w eekly Nacional against the Interior Ministry for allegedly illegally spying on them . - 13 January 1999 to Victor Ivancic, Executive Editor of Feral Tribune, con gratulating him on being aw arded the 1998 O lof Palm e Prize. Czech Republic Visit - Freim ut Du ve paid a first official visit to Prague on 21 September. Mr. Duve m et w ith the First Deputy Foreign Minister Professor Pick and w ith Czech journalist s. Mr. Du ve also visited the O SCE O ffice in Prague t o discu ss inform ation technology support for the O SCE w eb page. - m eeting w ith journalists Visits and Interventions

243

France Visits - Freim ut Duve h ad talks in Paris, 9-10 March 1998, at th e Min istry for Foreign Affairs, w ith the Chairm an of the Foreign Affairs Com m ittee of Parliam ent follow ed by m eetings w ith non-governm ental organizations and journalists attending the editor conference of â&#x20AC;&#x153;Le Mondeâ&#x20AC;?. - Freim ut Duve took part in the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the UN Declaration on Hum an Rights, 7 Decem ber 1998. Georgia Visit -Visit to Tbilisi by Advisor Stanley Schrager to deliver an address at the O SCE Parliam entary Assem bly and m eet w ith governm ent officials and journalists. Interventions - 30 September 1998 to Fo reign Minister Irakli Menagarishvili regarding tw o reputed cases of recent violence directed against journalists. - 27 O ctober 1998 to Foreign Minister Irakli Menagarishvili sum marizing the visit of Adviso r Stanley Schrager, requ esting inform at ion on rep orts of journalists beaten during a demonstration, and urging the Georgian Government to move expeditiously on the drafting of a new Freedom of Information act.. Germany Visits - Freimut Du ve gave a keynote speech at a conferen ce of t he Germ an-Russian Forum in Bonn, 10 Septem ber 1998, dedicated to current m edia issues in the Russian Federation. - Freim ut Duve m et Foreign Minister of Germ any, Joseph Fischer, in Bonn, 19 Novem ber 1998. - Adviser B. Maeder-Metcalf took part in a panel on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN Declaration on Human Rights, Frankfurt, 5 December 1998 - various public lectures on Media Ethics and his OSCE function by Freimut Duve Greece Interventions - 27 January 1999 to Fo reign Minist er Theo doros Pangalos on reports of verbal attacks by a m em ber of the Governm ent officials against journalists. Italy Visit - Freim ut Duve had talks in Rom e, 12 May 1998, at the Farnesina follow ed by m eetings w ith non-governm ental organizations and w ith the press. 244

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

Kazakstan Interventions - 29 June 1998 to Foreign Minister Kasym zhom art Tokaev concerning an investigation into publications for allegedly defam ing a high personality of Kazakstan. - 6 August 1998 to Foreign Minister Kasym zhom art Tokaev com m ending the governm ent on the abolition of the VAT for print m edia. - 1 O ctober 1998 to Foreign Minister Kasym zhom art Tokaev concerning inform ation about the shutting dow n of a leading daily new spaper by Kazakstan authorities. Kyrgizstan Visit - Visit to Bishkek 12-14 No vemb er 1998 by Advisor Stanley Schrager resulting in favorable impression of a country com mitted to freedom of the media. Intervention - 19 Novem ber 1998 to Fo reign Minist er Im analiev Mu ratbek sum m arizing recent visit of Advisor Stanley Schrager and com m ending the governm ent on recent actions to guarantee the independence of the m edia. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Visit - Freim ut Duve visited the Form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRO M) on 14-17 April 1998 w here he m et w ith Prim e Minister Branko Crvenko vski, other senio r govern m ent officials, jou rn alists, university students and professors, NGO â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s. Interventions - 17 April 1998 to Pande Kolemishevski, General Manager of Nova Makedonija, regarding the hunger strike by journalists of the new spaper Flaka e Velaz erim it . - 26 August 1998 to Blagoj Handzhiski, Foreign Minister of FYRO M, concerning the high capitalisation fees for electronic m edia. Romania Intervention - 7 Augu st 1998 to Fo reign Minister And rei Gabriel Plesu on recent sentence of Rom anian journalist to one year im prisonm ent for defam ation.. Russian Federation Visit - O fficial visit by Freimut Duve to Moscow, 2-3 April 1998, including talks w ith Deputy Foreign Minister Afanassiew ski, at the State Dum a, w ith state m edia officicals, independent media and w ith non-governm ental organizations. - Lecture to the students of journalism Visits and Interventions

245

Interventions - 2 July 1998 to Foreign Minister Prim akov concerning the killing of the journalist Larissa Youdina - 22 July 1998 to Foreign Minister Prim akov concerning assaults on several journalists and editors - 5 August 1998 to Foreign Minister Prim akov concerning the Grigori Pasko - 17 November 1998 to the Chairm an of the Stat e Dum a of the Russian Federation, Gennadi Seleznyev, on statem ents of Dum a Deputy Makashov - 23 November 1998 to the Chairm an of the Stat e Dum a of the Russian Federation, Gennadi Seleznyev, on the killing of Galina Starovoitova Slovak Republic Visit - Freim ut Duve paid a first official visit to Bratislava , 20 May 1998 including talks at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a pub lic lecture on â&#x20AC;&#x153;D em ocracy and free m ediaâ&#x20AC;? organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. Interventions - 8 May 1998 (together w ith the Director of O DIHR) on media related issues of am endm ents to the electoral law. - 22 June 1998 to Foreign Minister Zdenka Kram plova on com parative m edia related provisions. - 13 July 1998 (together w ith the Director of O DIHR) to Foreign Minister Zdenka Kram plova on recom m endations for electonic m edia during election cam paign. Spain Intervention - 15 June 1998 to Foreign Minister Don Abel Matutes Juan on reports of death threats to tw o Spanish journalists. Tajikistan Interventions - 8 July 1998 to Foreign Minister Talbak Nasarov on m urder of journalist killed by unknow n assailants 8 June 1998. - 6 August 1998 to Foreign Minister Talbak Nasarov on w ithdraw al of accreditation for Russian reporter in Tajikistan.. Turkey Visit - Freim ut Duve w ith Advisors Stanley Schrager and Beate Maeder-Metcalf visited Ankara and Istanbul, 24-27 May 1998, during w hich he had discussions with government officials, parliamentarians journalists, and NGO s. 246

O UR W O RK, WHAT WE HAVE DO NE

Interventions - 5 May 1998 to Foreign Minister Ism ail Cem regarding alleged beating by police of journalists covering a trial in Aydin, Turkey. - 11 June 1998 to Foreign Minister Ism ail Cem su m m ariz ing recent visit to Turkey and expressing concern about the Radio and Television Bill being consid ered by Parliament . (The Bill w as not passed by t he Turkisn Parliam ent) - 18 June 1998 to Foreign Minister Ism ail Cem on arrest of several journalists urging legal options to rescind court rulings against these journalists. - 1 Septem ber 1998 to Foreign Minister Ism ail Cem on recent actions by Turkish authorities against journalists. - 18 Decem ber 1998 to Foreign Minister Ism ail Cem expressing co ncern on provisional release from prison of five policem ent w ho had b een sentenced for m urder of journalist Metin Gรถktepe in January, 1996. Turkmenistan Interventions - 8 July 1998 to Foreign Minister Boris Shikhm uradov on reports of harrassm ent, im prisonm ent and intim idation of Radio Liberty journalists. - 29 O ctober 1998 to Foreign Minister Boris Shikhm uradov announcing a visit early in 1999. Ukraine Visits - Assessm ent trip t o Kiyv by advisers Beat e Mead er-Metcalf and Alexander Ivanko on 12-14 O ctober 1998. - Meeting betw een Freim ut Duve and Borys Tarasyuk, Foreign Minister of Ukraine, on 15 O ctober 1998. - Meeting b etw een Freimut Duve and Bo rys Tarasyuk on 2 Decem ber in the m argins of the 7th O SCE Ministerial Council Meeting in O slo. Interventions - 16 February 1998 to Hennadiy Udovenko, Foreign Minister of Ukraine, concerning the closure of the new spaper Pravda Ukrainy. - 7 August 1998 to Borys Tarasyuk co ncerning an attack on jo urnalist Sergei O daritch and regarding a five year ban from w orking as a journalist issued by the Donetsk Court against journalists Igor Alexandrov. - 16 Decem b er 1998 t o Borys Tarasyu k regarding the annulm ent of t he registration of the new spaper Polityka. United Kingdom Visit - Visit by Freim ut Duve to London, 4-5 March 1998 including talks at the Foreign and Com m onw ealth O ffice ( UK being in charge of the Presidency of the European Union) and m eetings w ith non-governm ental organizations and the press. Visits and Interventions

247

United States Visit - O fficial visit o f Freim ut Duve to Washington in March, 1998, to m eet w ith U.S. Go vernm ent officials and NGO s to brief them on the establishm ent of the new office. - Discussion w ith “Washington Post” Uzbekistan Interventions - 22 July 1998 t o Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kam ilov concerning th e decisio n t o sentence a rep orter to an eleven year prison term for defamation and extortion. - 15 September 1998 to Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kam ilov concerning allegations of pressure exerted against Association of Independent Electronic Media of Uzbekistan. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Visits - Freim ut Duve m et on 27 O ctober 1998 in Budapest w ith journalists from Serbia/Vojvodina and w ith Nenad Canak, the President of the League of Social-Dem ocrats of Vojvodina. - Adviser Alexander Ivanko part icipat ed in a one-day C onferen ce ‘O pening Up Serbia’s Media’ organised in Prague by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on 20 Novem ber 1998. Ten prom inen t Serbian edito rs to ok part in the Conference. - Freim ut Duve gave alecture at the Council of Europe-sponsored Conference ‘Media for a Dem ocratic Society’ in Belgrade on 4-5 Decem ber 1998. Interventions - 5 May 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, concerning the closure of local independent TV station T V PIRO T. - 4 Jun e 1998 to Zivadin Jo van ovic regarding the Governm en t’s decisio n to deny licenses to a large num ber of m edia outlets. - 10 July 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic concerning the closure or Radio Kontakt in Kosovo. - 27 July 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic regarding the denial of visas to journalists from the Polish new spaper Gazeta Wyborcza. - 28 July 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic regarding the jam m ing of the signal of Belgrade’s Radio INDEX. - 5 August 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic concerning the accusations levelled by the official p ress agency Tanjug against tw o jo urnalists from Germ an T V 248

O UR W O RK, WHAT

WE HAVE DO NE

station ZDF that they w ere acting as spies for foreign secret services. - 18 August 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic regarding the expulsion of a num ber of foreign journalists from the country. - 28 August 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic regarding points m ade on different m edia issues by Yugoslav Am bassador Dobrosav Veizovic. - 17 Sept em ber 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic concerning the denial of Yu go sla v entry visas to a BBC World Service team . - 30 Septem ber 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic regarding com m ents m ade by Serbian Deputy Prim e Minister Vojislav Seselj and the denial of entry visas to the participants of the Conference â&#x20AC;&#x153;Broadcasting for a Dem ocratic Europe.â&#x20AC;? - 23 O ctober 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic on a num ber of issues related to m edia freedom , including the disappearance of som e Serbian journalists in Kosovo, denial of a visa to a Sw iss journalists, the recently-adop ted Serbian Law on Public Inform ation and statem ents attributed to Vojislav Seselj. - 4 Novem ber 1998 to Zivadin Jovanovic inform ing the Minister of a letter Duve sent to the Contact Group states regarding the case of tw o Serbian journalists sentenced to im prisonm ent by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Arm y.

Visits and Interventions

249

Mr. D uve o r his adviso rs participated in the fo llo w ing O SCE and o ther internatio nal meetings and co nferences : (in chronological order) OSCE meetings: - O SCE Ministerial Troika, Warsaw , 8 April 1998 - O SCE Heads of Mission Meeting, Vienna, 23 June 1998 - O SCE Parliam entary Assembly, An nual Meeting, Cop enhagen, 7-8 July 1998 - O SCE Ministerial Troika , O slo, 21 O ctober 1998 - O SCE Hum an Dim ension Im plem entation Meeting, Warsaw, 26 O ctober - 5 Novem ber 1998 - O SCE Parliam entary Assem bly Sem inar in Georgia, Tiblissi, 6 O ctober 1998 - O SCE Sem inar on Hum an Dim ensio n Issues w ith Medit erranean Partners fo r Cooperation, Malta, 19-20 O ctober 1998 - O SCE Ministerial Council, O slo, 2 -3 Decem ber 1998 - O SCE Ministerial Troika Meeting, Vienna, 20 January 1999 - O SCE Heads of Mission m eeting, O slo, 3 February 1999 Other Institutional meetings and conferences: - Tripartite m eeting O SCE-UN-Council of Europe, Geneva, 23 January 1998 - Consultations w ith Council of Europe on future cooperation, Strasburg, 3 March 1998 - Consultations w ith Com m ission of the European Union, Bruxelles, 16 June 1998 - EU - CFSP Working Group on O SCE, Bruxelles, 17 June 1998 - EU - CFSP Working Group on Central Europe, Bruxelles, 8 O ctober 1998 - Conference on European Educational Cooperation for Peace, Stability and Democracy/ Joint m eeting w ith the EU â&#x20AC;&#x153;Process on St ability and Go od-Neigh bourliness in South-East Europeâ&#x20AC;?, Graz, 16 Novem ber 1998 - Council of Europe: Participation in the Steering Com m ittee on Mass Media, 1-4 Decem ber 1998 - 2+2 Ministerial Meeting O SCE and Council of Europe, Strasburg, 26 January 1999 - Consultations w ith Com m ission of the European Union, Bruxelles, 27 January 1999 - Tripartite high level m eeting O SCE-UN-Council of Europe, Strasburg, 12 February 1999 This is a selected short list of our activities during the year. The extensive programmes of the visits are not included. 250

O UR W O RK, WHAT

WE HAVE DO NE

V. Where to find tho se w ho help the Media NGO s in the O SCE Wo rld

Note: This is a list of N GO s with which we have established contact or whose materials h a v e proven useful to our work during the past year. However, this list is not an exhaustive one of all those N GO s who are doing valuable work on freedom of media issues in the O SCE region. 251

Accuracy In Media (AIM) Contact: Jo hn Wessale Address: 4455 Co nnecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite #330, Washingto n, D .C. 20008, USA Country: USA Language: English Tel.: (202) 364-4401 Fax: (202) 364-4098 Email: info @aim.o rg, ar@aim.o rg W ebsite: w w w .aim.o rg Topical focus: Mass media. Self description:AIM (Accuracy In Media) is a non-profit, grassroots citizens w atchdo g of the new s m edia that critiques botched and b ungled new s stories and sets the record straight on im portant issues that have received slanted coverage. We encourage m embers of the media to report the new s fairly and objectively— w ithout resorting to bias or partisanship. By advising them of their responsibility to the public, w hom they claim to serve, AIM helps to nudge the members of the new s m edia into greater accountability for their actions. AIM publishes a tw ice-monthly new sletter, broadcasts a daily radio commentary, promotes a speaker’s bureau and syndicates a w eekly new spaper column—all geared to setting the record straight on im portant stories that the media have bo tched, bungled or ignored. We also attend the annu al sharehold ers’ m eetings of large m edia organisatio ns and enco urage ou r mem bers to bom bard new sroom s w ith postcards and letters abou t biased and inaccurat e new s coverage.

Alternativna Info rmativna Mreza (AMI) Address: Country: Language: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

AIM, 17 rue Rebeval, F-75019 Paris Fo rmer Yugo slavia Serbian, Cro atian, Bo snian, English, Albanian admin@aimpress.o rg w w w .aimpress.o rg Mass media.

Self description: AIM is a project of independent journalists from former Yugoslavia and the European Civic Forum . AIM w as established in 1992 and its netw ork of journalists now adays covers all the states of form er Yugoslavia and Albania. The main objective of AIM is penetration through the information blockade and offering unbiased highquality professional information. AIM engages independent journalists enabling them to remain in the profession and to inform readers of independent media about devel252

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

opments in their environm ent. AIM helps independent m edia by offering them objective inform ation from the entire region free of charge. AIM encourages foundation of new independent m edia providing them w ith a reliable source of inform ation. AIM is not a classical new s agency since its produ ction is oriented tow ards analytical articles, rep ortage, com mentaries and interview s aim ed at preventing m anipulation w ith inform ation, offering a com prehensive picture and background of an event. AIM supports all initiatives leading to strengthening of dem ocratic processes in the region. In its editorial p olicy, apart from current political and econom ic topics, AIM devotes m o st of its attention to to pics co nnected w ith civil society, hum an and m inority rights, position of refugees, etc. AIM op erates on the principle of a m ail-box system . Info rm ation are exchanged via a central com puter lo cated in Paris. AIM now has edito rial offices in Bosnia & Herzegovina (Sarajevo and Banja Luka), Croatia (Zagreb), Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Podgorica, Pristina), Macedonia (Skopje), Slovenia (Ljubljana) and Albania (Tirana). Apart fro m the m ain project, AIM also has tw o sp ecial services w hich it offers to its users: BALKAN PRESS, a w eekly press review w hich refers to the issue of Koso vo, and IZBO RBIH, a service w hich offers sho rt informat io n, new s, com mentaries, analytical texts, interview s and reportage from the entire space of Bosnia & Herzegovina.

American So ciety o f New spaper Edito rs (ASNE) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Em ail: Website: Topical focus:

Lee Stinnett, Executive D irecto r ASNE, 11690B Sunrise Valley D rive, Resto n, VA 20191-1409, USA USA English 703/ 453-1122 703/ 453-1133 stinnett@asne.o rg w w w .asne.o rg Mass media.

Self description: The ASNE Editors is dedicated to the leadership of Am erican journalism. It is committed to fostering the public discourse essential to democracy; helping editors m aintain the highest standards of quality, im prove their craft and better serve their com m unities; and preserving and prom o ting core journalistic valu es, w hile em bracing and exploring change. ASNEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s priorities are: To protect First Am endm ent rights and enhance the free flow of information; To drive the quest for diversity and inclusion in the w orkplace and new spaper content; To prom ote the n e w s p a p e r â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role in providing informat ion necessary to the inform ed practice of citizenship; To encourage innovat ion and celebrate creativity in new spapers; To respect and encourage the involvem ent of all its m em bers. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

253

Asso ciatio n o f Independent Electro nic Media (ANEM) Contact: Address: Country: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Veran Matic, ANEM Chairman, Edito r in Chief Radio B92, Makedo nska 22/ V, 11000 Belgrade, Federal Republic o f Yugo slavia Yugo slavia +381 11 322 91 09/ 324 85 77/ 322 99 22 +381 11 322 43 78/ 324 80 75 matic@b92.o pennet.o rg, marija@b92.o pennet.o rg, anem@o pennet.o rg w w w .b92.net/ ; w w w .anem.o pennet.o rg Mass media.

Self description: In 1993 a gro up of lo cal ind ependent broad cast m edia in Serbia and M on tenegro — Rad io B92, Radio Bu m 93, Radio Antena M, Rad io Bajin a Basta, Rad io Sm ederovo, and N TV Stud io B — fo und ed the Association o f In depen d ent Electro n ic Media (ANEM). Today that netw ork collectively reach es 80% of Yu go s la v ia ’s population and the m embership h as increased to 32 radio and 17 Tvstat ions. ANEM’s m em b ership criteria is that any stat io n t hat exp resses interest in join in g it and proves that its editorial p olicy is indepen dent m ay jo in as an affiliate mem b er. ANEM also belo ngs to th e Co m mittee t o Protect Indep end en t M edia in FR Yu go slavia — Free 2000. From th e o utset, ANEM’s o verarching aim has been t o bu ild a netw ork o f professio nal broad cast m edia across Yugo slavia w hich is equipp ed to provide citizen s w ith tim ely, accu rat e and balanced new s, p olitical analysis and pu blic inform ation. Th is h as been achieved throu gh pro viding lo cal station s w ith in-country and int ernation al net w orking op tio ns to enhance t he q ualit y of pro gram m ing, by co ordinat in g th e effo rts of m em ber st ations to acqu ire, pro du ce, and dist rib ut e program s to estab lish higher journalistic standards. In add it ion, a key goal o f the Netw ork is to bu ild so lid co mm ercial m anagem ent stru ctures for self-su stain abilit y. AN EM also provid es regular jou rn alism skills train in g, a p roduction facility for inhouse t rain in g, equ ip m ent aid, free legal supp ort an d political defence fo r all affiliate mem b ers. The mem b er stat ions are all united by a sh ared com m itm ent to t he fund amental p rincip les o f p ro fessional jo urnalist ic eth ics an d st an d ard s, d em o cr a cy, respect for h um an right s and t olerance.

Amnesty Internatio nal Contact: Address: Country: 254

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Internatio nal Secretariat 1 Easto n Street, Lo ndo n WCIX 8D J UK

Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

English 0044171-413 55 00 0044171-9561157 username@amnesty.o rg w w w .amnesty.o rg Human rights

Self description: Am nesty International w as founded in 1961 in London and is a w orldw ide voluntary hum an rights m ovem ent that w orks im partially for the release of prisoners of co nscience and an end to torture, â&#x20AC;&#x153;disapp earancesâ&#x20AC;?, p olitical killings and executions. Am nesty International cam paigns to stop anyone being returned to a country w here they w ould be in danger of these abuses. The organisation is fin an ced by its million-plus m em bers an d supporters aro und the w orld and accepts no m oney from governm ents.

The Andrei Sakharo v Fo undatio n (ASF) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.:

Fax: E-mail: Website: Topical focus:

Ed Kline, President Alexey Semyo no v, Vice President 65 Park Ave, 5D , New Yo rk, NY 10128, USA; 57 Zemlyano y Val Street, bld 6 Mo sco w , Russia Russia, USA English, Russian. 1-212-369-1226 (NY, USA); 703-569-2943 (Wash., USA); 7-095-923-44-0l (20) (Mo sco w , Russia) 1-212-722-0557 (NY, USA); 7-095-917-26-53 (Mo sco w , Russia) anls@mail.w dn.co m (Alexey Semyo no v) w w w .w dn.co m/ asf Wo rk w ith archives o f Andrei Sakharo v and other histo ric do cuments related to So viet Unio n, building demo cratic society, general human rights, humanitarian assistance.

Self description: The An drei Sakharov Foundatio n is clo sely related t o several o rganisations in th e Unit ed Stat es and Ru ssia, all of them dedicat ed to the preservation o f the m em ory o f An drei Sakh aro v, prom otion of his ideas an d the d efence of hum an rights. T he Sakharov Fo undation(Russia)/Public Co mm issio n w as organised sh ortly after his death on Decemb er 14, 1989. The Andrei Sakharov Fou ndation (USA) w as o rgan ised in 1990 in o rder to sup po rt the Ru ssian Co m m issio n. Elen a Bon ner, N GO s in the O SCE W orld

255

Sa k h a r o v ’s w ido w is ch air of t he And rei Sakh aro v Fo un dat ion . T h e An drei Sakh aro v Fo un dat ion s h ave spo nsored m ission s to Nago rn o-Karabakh an d to In gushetia to facilitate peaceful settlem ent of ethnic conflicts. The Sakharov Fou nd at ion s have also assisted the reset tlem ent of refugees in th e su ccessor st ates o f th e fo rm er Soviet Un ion, spo nsored th e first visit of Kirgiz stan ’s Presid en t Askar Akaev t o t he Un ited Stat es, and d efend ed t he rights o f scien tists p ersecut ed for th eir p olit ical o pin io ns.

ARTICLE 19 Contact: Address: Country: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Ilana Cravitz, press o fficer Lancaster Ho use, 33 Islingto n High St., Lo ndo n N19LH, UK UK +44 171 278 9292 +44 171713 1356 article19@gn.apc.o rg w w w .gn.apc.o rg/ article19 Freedo m o f expressio n issues.

Self description: ART ICLE 19 (Th e Int ern atio n al Centre Again st C enso rsh ip) takes its nam e an d p urpose from th e nin eteen th art icle o f t he Unit ed N ation s’ Universal D eclaration o f H um an Righ ts, w hich states “Everyon e has t he righ t to freedo m of o pinio n an d exp ression; t his right in cludes the freedo m to h old o pinions w it ho ut in terference an d to seek, receive an d im part info rm ation an d ideas t hrough any m edia and regardless of fron tiers.” ARTIC LE 19 defen ds t he hu m an righ t w hen it is t hreatened, o pp oses go vern m en t practices w h ich vio lat e it an d w o rks t o iden tify an d exp ose censorsh ip in all cou n tries. ARTIC LE 19’s m and ate is to p rom o te and d efen d freed om of expressio n, to co m b at censorship an d to encourage action an d aw areness at natio nal and int ern at ion al levels. Th e organ isatio n ’s p rogram ad d resses cen so rsh ip in it s m an y fo rm s and in volves research , cam paign in g, ed u cat io n an d o ut reach. In p art icu la r, ART ICLE 19 has active regional programm es in Africa, Asia, Middle East and N ort h Africa, and Cen tral and Eastern Europe. W h erever po ssib le, th ese p rogram m es are im plem ented in clo se collab oration w ith local partner organisatio ns. Its law p rogram m e is en gaged in int ernatio nal lit igatio n in favour o f freed om of expression , an d th e o rganisation also fo cu ses o n key po licy issues affecting freedom of exp ression , su ch as “h at e speech”, t he righ t t o p rivacy; restrict ion s based o n grou nd s of nat io nal secu rity, and the ro le of pu blic service broad castin g du ring election cam p aigns. 256

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Asso ciatio n Mo ndiale des Radio diffuseurs Co mmunautaires (AMARC) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

So phie K. Ly (Secretary general) 3575 bo ulevard St Laurent, bureau 611, Mo ntr(al, Q uebec, H2X 2T7, Canada Canada French, English and Spanish (1-514) 982-0351 (1-514) 849-7129 amarcho @amarc.o rg w w w .amarc.o rg Cultural diversity, enviro nment, SID A, racism and yo uth.

Self description: AM ARC is an in ternat ion al n o n -govern m en t al organ isat io n serin g the co m m u nit y radio m ovem ent . Its goal is t o su p p ort an d co nt rib u te to t h e develo pm en t o f co m m u n it y an d part icipat o ry rad io alo n g t h e p rin cip als o f so lid arity and internatio nal cooperatio n. AM ARC’s intern ation al secretariat is locat ed in M o nt real, C an ada. AM ARC ’s regio nal offices p lay an essential ro le pro viding train ing and o th er services and coo rd inatin g exchange project s. T he Lat in Am erica o ffice locat ed in Q u ito (Ecu ado r) o ffers o n -sit e co urses an d evalu at io n fo r com m un it y rad io pro ject s and m aint ain s regu lar con t act w it h t h e regio n’s 300 m em bers. An European office has been set up in co op eration w ith t he Com m un it y Radio Asso ciat io n in Sh effield , En gland . O n e o f t h e o ffices cu rrent pro ject is O pen Chan n els, an exchan ge program b etw een bro adcasters o f w estern, cen t ral and east ern region s o f Eu ro pe. A region al o ffice fo r Africa w as o pened in 199 6 in Jo h ann esbu rg, reflectin g the grow in g presen ce of com m un it y radio on t h e co n tin en t . — InteRadio is a m agazine d edicat ed to com m u nity radio. Pub lish ed bi-an nually in French , English and Sp anish, it featu res new s and analysis on issu es of con cern to th ose int erested in com m un it y radio and th e dem ocratisat ion of co m m u nications. It is distrib uted to AM ARC m em bers and to a t ot al of fou r t ho usand ind ividu als an d organ isations aro un d t he glo be. — AM ARC -Lin k is a n ew slet ter abo ut AMARC’s project s and activit ies. It inclu des new s from t he internat io nal secretariat, region al o ffices, t he Wo m e n ’s Netw o rk, the So lidarity Netw ork and m ore. AMARC-Lin k is published every tw o m o nth s in French, En glish and Span ish and is distrib uted free to AMARC m em b e rs. — AMARC h as p u blished a n um ber o f st udies, con feren ce rep orts, am id es as w ell as a bo o k feat urin g th e sto ries o f 21 com m un it y st atio n s from arou n d t he w orld . Man y o f AM ARC ’s p ub lication s are available in Fren ch, En glish an d Sp a n i s h . N GO s in the O SCE W orld

257

— Lo bb yin g: AM ARC represents the com mu n it y rad io sect o r at certain in ternational forum s dealing w ith issu es rangin g from th e right to com m unicat e to d igital au dio broadcast ing (DAB). — AMARC’s Solidarity Netw ork exists to m obilise the w orldw ide com m unity radio m ovem ent in solidarity w ith com m unity radio broadcasters w hose right to freedom of speech is threatened. The Solidarity Netw ork’s Regional and National Coordinators, distribute Radio Action Alerts and overall coordination of the Net w ork is provided by AMARC’s secretariat. — The w om en’s netw ork: AMARC’s Declaration of Principles m akes specific recognition of the “Role of Wom en in establishing new com m unication practices”. Its objective is to p rom ote exchange and solidarity among w om en w orking in alternative radio projects. The Netw ork has published a directory of w om en w orking in com m unity radio. The Wom en’s Netw ork has m ade a project “Starting point”, w hich is a series of radio p ro grams produ ced by Wom en on m ultiple social them es. — AMARC has established a netw ork of skilled professionals w ho can provide training and consultation in all aspects of com m unity radio. — AMARC organises regional and global conferences and sem inars on com m unity radio and the dem ocratisation of com m unication.

Canadian Civil Liberties Asso ciatio n (CCLA) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

D . S. McLaughlin 229 Yo nge Street, Suite 403, To ro nto , Canada M5B 1N9 Canada English (416) 363-0321 (416) 861-1291 ccla@ilap.co m w w w .ccla.o rg Fundamental human rights and civil liberties.

Self description: The CC LA w as co nstit ut ed to p ro mo te resp ect fo r and o bservance of fun dam en tal hu m an rights and civil lib erties and to defend, extend, an d foster th e reco gnition of th ose rights and libert ies. T he m ajor objectives of the CC LA include t he p rom o tion of legal protectio ns fo r individ ual freed om and d ignity against unreasonab le invasion by pu blic au tho rity an d th e protection of fu nd am ental rights and liberties. CC LA perfo rm s a w id e range o f law an d p olity reform w ork, including cou rt interventio ns, sub missions before legislative com m ittees and other pu blic b od ies, pu blic speaking and education, and m edia w ork. CC LA is no t a service agen cy h ow ever, and, as a gen eral m at ter, does no t pro vide m em bers o f the pu blic w ith legal ad vice. 258

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Canadian Co mmittee to Pro tect Jo urnalists Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Wayne Sharpe, Executive D irecto r 489 Co llege St. 403, To ro nto , O ntario , M6G 1A5 Canada English, French. +1 416 515 9622 +1 416 515 7879 ccpj@ccpj.ca w w w .ccpj.ca Freedo m o f expressio n and press freedo m, media o w nership co ncentratio n, jo urnalistsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; training, access to info rmatio n.

Self description: The Canadian Comm ittee to Protect Journalists w orks to pro m ote freed om of expression w orldw id e and circulates inform ation to its m em bers and the m edia in Canada about violations that take place in Canada and the rest of the w orld. It runs training program s for journalists w o rldw id e and lo bbies Canadian and foreign governments to take action against freedom of expression violations in Canada and internationally. The CCPJ m anages the International Freed om of Expression eXchange (IFEX) Clearing House on behalf of m ore than 30 IFEX m em bers, w hich circulates freedom of exp ression new s w orldw ide. CCPJ also provides journalism training w orldw ide and operates a Journalists in Distress Fund. In add ition, CCPJ offers an International Press Freedom Aw ard annually.

Co mmittee to Pro tect Jo urnalists Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Co mmittee to Pro tect Jo urnalists, 330 7th Avenue, 12th Flo o r, New Yo rk, NY 10001, USA USA English (212) 465-1004 (212) 465-9568 info @cpj.o rg, euro pe@cpj.o rg (Central and Eastern Euro pe) w w w .cpj.o rg Mass media

Self description: The Comm ittee to Protect Journalists is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization founded by a group of U.S. journalists in 1981 to m onitor abuses against N GO s in the O SCE W orld

259

the press and prom ote press freedom around the w orld. CPJ depends on private donations from journalists, new s organizations, and independent foundations. By publicly revealing abuses against the press and by acting on behalf of imprisoned and threatened journalists, CPJ effectively w arns journalists and new s organizations w here attacks on press freedom are likely to occur. CPJ organizes vigorous protest at all levels, ranging from local governm ents to the United Nations, and , w hen necessary, w orks behind the scenes through other diplom atic channels to effect change. CPJ also publishes articles and new s releases, special repo rts, a q uarterly new sletter and the m ost com prehensive annual report on attacks against the press around the w orld. Through its o w n reporting. CPJ has full-tim e program coordinators m onitoring the press in the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. They track developments through their ow n independent research, fact-finding missions and firsthand contacts in the field, including reports from other journalists. CPJ shares information on breaking cases w ith other press freedo m o rganizations w orldw id e through the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (lFEX), a glob al E-m ail netw ork. Using local contacts, CPJ can intervene w henever foreign co rrespo ndents are in trouble. CPJ is also prepared to imm ediately notify new s organizations, government officials, and hum an rights organizations of press freedom violations. C zech Helsinki Co mmittee Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Martin Palo us, Chairman; Jana Chrzo va, Executive D irecto r Jeleni 5, P. O . Bo x 4, 11901 Praha 012 - Hrad, Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech, English, Russian. 420-2-24 37 23 34 420-2-24 37 z3 35 mpalo us@beba.cesnet.cz; chrzo va@helsincz.anet.cz w w w .helco m.cz Human rights in general.

Self description: Czech Helsinki Com m ittee is an NGO running the follow ing cen tres and programs: Cou nselling Centre for Refugees: asylu m seekers com ing to CR; Citizenship Counselling Centre: the stateless, form er citizens of CSFR; Hum an Rights Docum entation And Inform ation Centre: hum an rights library/international focus; Mo nitoring of legislatio n and hum an rights situ ation/CR; Educational program s: publishing activities, organisation of sem inars and conferences; International program s of cooperation. 260

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Co mmo nw ealth Press Unio n (CPU) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email:

Mark Ro binso n, D irecto r 17 Fleet Street, Lo ndo n EC4Y 1AA UK English 0044 171 583 7733 0044 171 583 6868 106156.333@co mpuserve.co m

D erecho s Human Rights Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Margarita Lacabe 3205 San Mateo St. 1, Richmo nd, CA 94804, USA USA English and Spanish are the main languages, also Italian, French, D utch and German. 510-528-7794 510-528-7794 rights@derecho s.o rg w w w .derecho s.o rg Human Rights in general.

Self description: Derechos Hum an Rights is an Internet-based o rganisation that w o rks to prom ote respect for hum an and civil rights, including the right to freedom of speech and the press, all over the w orld. We also w ork for the right to privacy and against im punity for hum an rights violations. Derechos understands hum an rights as those co nsidered as such under international law -b ut do es no t accept lim itations to fundam ental rights im posed by international law.

Electro nic Fro ntier Canada Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Jeffrey Shallit, Vice President 20 Richmo nd Ave., Kitchener, O ntario N2G 1Y9, Canada Canada English (519) 743-8754 shallit@graceland.uw aterlo o .ca (Jeffrey Shallit) w w w .efc.ca Free speech N GO s in the O SCE W orld

261

Self description: Electronic Frontier Canad a is a sm all, all-volunteer non-profit organisation devoted to the preservation of “Charter” rights and freedom s in cyb erspace. It conducts educational and research regarding application of Canada’s “Charter of Rights and Freedoms” to the Internet and other computer and comm unications technologies.

Euro pean Alliance o f Press Agencies Contact: Address: Tel.: Fax: Topical focus:

Rudi V. D e Ceuster, Secretary General c/ a Agence Belga, Rue F. Pelletier 8 B, 1030 Brussels, Belgium 00322 743 1311 00322 735 1874 Mass media.

Euro pean Institute fo r the Media Contact:

Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Francisco Pinto Balsemão , President; Ina Navazelskis, D irecto r o f Pro jects, East-West Co o perative Pro gram Kaistrasse 13, D -40221 D üsseldo rf, Germany Germany English, German, French 49 211 90104-0 49 211 90104-56 info @eim.o rg w w w .eim.o rg Mass media

Self description: The European Institute fo r the Media (EIM) w as established in 1983, in Manchester, in co-operation w ith the European Cultural Foundation in Am sterdam . In June 1992, the EIM m oved to at the invitation of th e Governm ent of North Rhine-Westphalia and the city of Düsseldorf, and is now located in the Düsseldorf m edia-area. The European Institute for the Media w as created to give expression to the grow ing interdependence of European countries in the field of comm unication. The EIM’s m ain activities are: the docum entation and comparative analysis of developments in the European m edia the provision of a forum for exchange of inform ation and opinions on m ed ia issues. 262

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Fairness & Accuracy in Repo rting C ontact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical Focus:

Peter Hart 130 W. 25th Street New Yo rk, NY 10001, USA USA English (212) 633-6700 (212) 727-7668 PHart@FAIR.o rg (Peter Hart) w w w .fair.o rg Media bias, censo rship, co rpo rate o w nership and do minatio n o f mainstream new s o utlets, co nservative bias in the new s.

Self description: FAIR is the national media w atch group offering w ell-docum ented criticism in an effort t o correct bias and im balance. FAIR focuses pu blic aw areness o n the narrow corporate ow nership of the press, the m edia’s allegiance to o fficial agendas and their insensitivity to w o men, labo ur, m inorities and other public interest constituencies. FAIR seeks to invigorate the First Am endm ent by ad vocating for greater m edia pluralism and the inclusion of public interest voices in national debates. FAIR’s major activities include m edia analysis & research, outreach, lectures, m agazine (EXTRA!) and radio program (CounterSpin).

Feminists fo r Free Expressio n Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Jo an Kennedy Taylo r 2525 Times Square Statio n, New Yo rk, NY 10108, USA USA English (212) 702-6292 212) 702-6277 reedo m@w ell.co m w w w .w ell.co m/ user/ freedo m Freedo m o f expressio n issues, stressing the dangers censo rship ho lds fo r w o men.

Self description: Feminists for Free Expression is a group o f diverse feminist m en and w om en w orking to preserve the individual’s right to read, hear, view and produce m aterials of her choice w ithout the intervention of the state “for her ow n good.” FFE believes freedom of expression is especially im portant for w om en’s rights. While N GO s in the O SCE W orld

263

m essages reflecting sexism pervade o ur cu lture in many fo rm s, sexual and non-sexual, suppression of such m aterial w ill neither reduce harm to w om en nor further w om enâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s goals. Censorship traditionally has been used to silence w om en and stifle feminist social ch ange. It never has reduced violence; it led to the imp riso nment of birth control advocates Margaret Sanger and the sup pression of fem inist w ritings. There is no fem inist code about w hich w ords and im ages are dangerous or sexist. Genuine fem inism encourages individuals to choose for them selves.

Freedo m Fo rum Contact:

Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Chris Wells, Senio r Vice President/ Internatio nal; Jo hn O w en, Euro pean D irecto r The Freedo m Fo rum Euro pean Centre, Stanho pe Ho use, Stanho pe Place, Lo ndo n W2 2HH, UK; US headquarters: 1101 Wilso n Bo ulevard, Arlingto n, VA 22209, USA USA English 001 703 284 2861 001 703 284 3529 new s@freedo mfo rum.o rg w w w .freedo mfo rum.o rg Mass media

Self description: The Freedom Forum w as established in 1991 under the direction of Fou nder Allen H. Neuharth as successor to the Gannett Found atio n, w hich w as created by Frank E. Gannett in 1935. It is a nonp artisan, international fo un dation dedicated to free press, free speech and free spirit for all people. The foundation pursues its priorities through conferences, educational activities, publishing, broad casting, online services, fellow ships, p artnerships, training, research and other programs. O perating program s are the New seum at The Freedom Forum World Centre headquarters in Arlington, Va., the First Am endm ent Centre at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tenn., the Media Studies Centre in New York City and the Pacific Coast Centre in San Francisco. The Freedom Forum also has operating offices in Cocoa Beach, Fla., Buenos Aires, Hong Kong, Johannesburg and London.

264

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Freedo m Ho use Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Leo nard Sussman 120 Wall Street, 26th Flo o r, New Yo rk, NY 10005, USA USA English (212) 514-8040 (212) 514-8055 frho use@freedo mho use.o rg w w w .freedo mho use.o rg Po litical rights, civil liberties, human rights, press freedo m, demo cratisatio n.

Self description: Freedom House is a clear voice for dem ocracy and freedom around the w orld. Founded nearly sixty years ago by Eleanor Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie, and other Americans concerned w it h m ounting threats to peace and dem ocracy, Freedom House has been a vigorous voice for democratic values and a steadfast opponent of d ictatorship of the far left and far right. Non-partisan and b road -based, Freedom House is led by a Board of Tru stees com po sed of leading Dem o crats, Rep ublicans, and Independents; business and labour leaders; form er senior go vernm ent officials, scholars, w riters and journalise. All are united in the view that Am erican leadership in internatio nal affairs is essential to the cause o f hum an rights and freedom . O ver the years, Freedom House has been at the Centre of key issues in the struggle for freedom . We w ere outsp oken advocates of the Marshall Plan and NATO in the 1940s, of the US civil rights m ovement in the 1950s and 1960s, of the Vie t n a m e se boat p eo ple in the 1970s, of Po landâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Solidarity movement and t he Filipino dem ocratic oppo sition in the 1980s, and of m any d em ocracies that have em erged around the w orld in the 1990s. Freedom House has vigorously opposed dictatorships in Central Am erica and Chile, ap artheid in South Africa, the suppression of the Pragu e Spring, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, genocide in Bosnia and Rw anda, and t he brutal violation of hum an rights in Cuba, Burm a, China and Iraq. We have cham pioned the right s of religious believers, trade u nionises, journalists, and free-m arket entrepreneurs. To d a y, w e are a leading advo cate of the w orldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s young d em ocracies that are co ping w ith the d ebilitating legacy of statism , dictato rship and political repression. We w ork through an array of U.S. and o verseas research, advocacy, edu cation, and training initiatives that p rom o te hum an rights, democracy, free market econo mics, the rule o f law , independent m edia, and US engagement in international affairs. Thro ugh ou r w ork at hom e and abro ad, w ith support fou ndations, labo ur unions, corp orations, private donors, and the US governm ent, Freedom House gives impetus to the rem arkable expansion of political and econom ic freedom that is transforming the w orld at the daw n of a new m illennium . N GO s in the O SCE W orld

265

Free 2000 Self description: Because of continued and m ounting pressure on free m edia in Yugoslavia, th e Association of Ind epend ent Electronic Media (ANEM) in itiated the establishm ent of the International Com m ittee to Protect Free Media in Yugoslavia - FREE 2000. Established in August 1998, FREE 2000 currently gathers individuals from 17 international and six local non-governm ental organisations engaged in the protection of hum an rights. The aim s of FREE 2000 are: To help institutionalise successful defence and protection o f indepen dent m edia in FR Yugoslavia; To initiat e co ntinuo us w ork to protect independent m edia in FR Yugoslavia against system atic repression; To insist on the dem ocratisation of local inform ation- and telecom m unications-related jurisdiction, in keeping w ith the international standards; To encourage governm ents of the countries participating in the resolution of the Balkans problem s to bring sufficient diplom atic attention on authorities jeopardising independent m edia to stop doing so; To take part in direct actions initiated by independent m edia and associations in FR Yugoslavia; To encourage local journalists in their effort to m ake their w ork professional; To aid the flow of inform ation betw een m edia and journalists in the countries of the form er Yugoslavia, w hich m akes an im portant elem ent for successful im plem entation of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also for resolution of the Kosovo crisis and a lasting peace in the region.

Glasno st D efence Fo undatio n Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

VladimirAvdeev 4, Zubo vsky Bul., ro o m 432, 119021 Mo sco w , Russia Russia Russian, French, English. +7 095 201 4974 +7 095 201 4947 simo no v@fo nd91.msk.ru w w w .internew s.ras.ru/ GD F Legal pro tectio n and training fo r jo urnalists.

Self description: The Glasnost Defence Foundation (GDF) is one of the oldest and best organised non-pro fit media w atchdogs in the former USSR. Its roots go back to 1991 w hen a decision by the USSR Confederation of Cinem atographers Union gave birth to GDF. At that tim e it w as a source to w hich any journalist cou ld turn to find so lace and support. The activities of GDF fo llow several fun dam ental p aths. We provide legal assistance to journalists and m edia involved in any kind of conflict in w hich the pow er structure or any other influence-w ielding body m eddles w ith the legitim ate w ork 266

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

of the press. GDF m onitors violations of the Russian Constitution and press law, providing legal consultations and staying up to date on all legislation concerning the m ass med ia. We provide hum anitarian aid to those w ho need it. We try to assist fam ilies of jou rnalists killed on the job, ou r colleagues w ho find them selves out of w ork because of political m otives and even new spapers struggling to stay afloat. GDF, w ith the help of other hum an rights organisations, leads cam paigns in defence of our colleagues in need . We organise press conferences, issue press releases, take part in pickets and make appeals to the government. GDF leads sem inars and conferences designed to m ake journalists m ore fam iliar w ith the law . In cooperation w ith the Russian Prosecutor’s O ffice w e started a series of sem inars to provide participants w ith specialised know ledge of how the law and m ass m edia interact in society. We have a team of qualified experts trained in m edia law, ready to travel to any region of Russia and the CIS. It’s a sort of “Rescue Squad” for journalists in trouble. These consu ltants w ork to inform persecuted journalists of their legal rights and help m ediate conflicts. GDF has a regional netw ork in 10 regions of the Russian Federation w hich help to m onitor p ress law violations in the territory of the Russian Fed eration. O ur experts have produced a num ber of useful publications that w e distribute free of charge to journalists or anyone w ho needs them . With the assistance of our colleagues w e started publishing Dosje na Censuru, the Russian version of the British publication Index on Censorship. The Russian version contains several articles concerning censorship in the USSR and in Russia, pressure on journalists and the m edia, memoirs of w riters and journalists and human rights activists. We are now conducting scientific and practical research into Mass Media and Ju dicial Pow er designed to show the m ain tendencies in cou rt, its reflection in m ass m edia, journalists and public opinions about the courts, to determ ine som e possible steps to im prove the legal system of the Russian Federation and the understanding betw een tw o professional groups - journalists and judges.

Glo bal Internet Liberty Campaign Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

D ave Banisar 66 Pensylvania Ave, Ste 301 SE, Washingto n D C 20003, USA USA English, Spanish, French, German, Arabic, Sw edish (202)544-9240 (202)547-9240 info @gilc.o rg w w w .gilc.o rg Internet po licy, encryptio n po licy, freedo m o f expressio n o n the Internet. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

267

Self description: The Global Internet Liberty Cam paign w as form ed at the annual m eeting of the Internet Society in Montreal. Mem bers of the coalition include the American Civil Liberties Unio n, the Electronic Privacy Info rm ation Centre, Hu man Rights Watch, the Internet Society, Privacy International, the Association des Utilisateurs d’Internet, and other civil liberties and hum an rights organisations. The Global Internet Liberty Cam paign advocates: Prohib iting prior censorship of on-line com m unicatio n; Requiring that law s restricting the content o f on-line speech distinguish betw een the liability o f content providers and the liability of d ata carriers; Insisting that on-line free expression not be restricted by indirect means such as excessively rest rictive governm ental or private co ntrols over com puter hardw are or softw are, telecom m unications infrast ructure, or other essential com ponents of the Internet; Inclu ding citizens in the Glo bal Information Infrastru cture (GII) development process from countries that are currently unstab le econom ically, have insufficient infrastructure, or lack sophisticated techno logy; Prohibiting discrim ination on the basis of race, colour, sex, langu age, religio n, political or o ther o pinio n, natio nal or social o rigin, pro perty, birth or other status; Ensuring that personal inform ation generated on the GII for one purpose is not used for an unrelated purpose or disclosed w itho ut the person’s inform ed co nsent and enabling individuals to review personal information on the Internet and to correct inaccurate information; Allow ing on line users to encrypt their com m unicatio ns and inform ation w ithout restriction.

Greek Helsinki Mo nito r & Mino rity Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical Focus:

Panayo te Elias D imitras, spo kesperso n P O . Bo x 51393, GR-14510, Kifisia, Greece Greece Greek, English. +30-1-620 01 20 +30-1-807 57 67 o ffice@greekhelsinki.gr w w w .greekhelsinki.gr Religio us, linguistic, ethnic o r natio nal mino rities’ rights in the Balkans.

Self description: Minority Rights Group — Greece w as created as a Greek affiliate of Minority Rights Group International in January 1992. Its m em bers founded Greek Helsinki Monitor in late 1992, follow ing the encouragem ent of the International Helsinki Federation for Hum an Rights (IHF). A year later, in December 1993, the latter’s General Assem bly accredited it as its Greek National Com m ittee w ith an observer status; in Novem ber 1994, the General Assem bly elevated Greek Helsinki Monitor to full m em bership. In April 1998, Greek Helsinki Monitor also becam e mem ber of the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX). In 1994, Greek 268

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Helsinki Mo nitor launched a project to p repare detailed repo rts on all national, ethnolinguistic and m ajor religious minority com m unities in Greece (M acedonians and Turks; Arvanites, Pom aks, and Vlachs; Catholics, Jehovah Witnesses, Protestants, and New Religious Movem ents), as w ell as the Greek m inorities in Albania and Turkey, and the Albanian im m igrants in Greece. Besides the usual m onitoring of hum an rights violations and hum an rights related trials, the issuing of public statem ents, alone or along w ith other NGO ’s, and the m onitoring of Greek and Balkan m edia for stereotypes and hate speech, Greek Helsinki Monitor started in 1997 a Rom a O ffice in cooperation w ith the European Rom a Rights Centre.

Human Rights Center o f Azerbaijan Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Elano r Zeynalo v 165-3 Bashir Safaro glu Str:, Baku 370000, Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Russian, Azeri +994-12-973233 +994-12-942471 eldar@hrcenter.baku.az w w w .ko an.de/ eldar Po litical priso ners, freedo m o f expressio n, refugees.

Self description: The Hum an Rights Center of Az erbaijan is non-governm ental, nonpolitical, non-registered, non-profit organisation created on 29 April, 1993 by freelance journalist and hum an rights activist Eld ar Zeynalov. The m ain m otives o f that w ere the disagreem ent w ith the restored political censorship in Azerbaijan, w hich blocked the publications about the hum an rights violations in the country, and the necessity of the perm anent inform ation of local and global organisations on the hum an rights situation in the country. The m ain form of the w ork of HRCA is the m onitoring of the hum an rights situation w ith the publication of the inform ation bulletin, them atic reports, lists of prisoners etc. O ther direction of its w ork is the re-printing the hum an rights reports of other organisations w ith translation to the local languages. HRCA propagates also the electronic m ail in the inform ation exchan ge in th e human rights field. It provides som e local NGO ’s b y the e-mail link w ith Western colleagues. The program s carrying out by HRCA, are the follow ing ones: Monitoring the hum an rights situation in Azerbaijan; Monitoring the forced m igration in Azerbaijan; Monitoring of prison conditions; Monitoring of w om en’s rights; Free translation office for local e-m ail netw ork of NGO ’s. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

269

The w eekly bulletin o f HACA covers the current hum an rights situation in Azerbaijan. Since Decem ber t996, it is divided into tw o parts: Part 1 contains the inform ation on struggle for the pow er; problems of press and telecomm unications; arrests and trials; m eetings; strikes; social problem s. Part 2 includes ethnic problem s; religion; w ar and peace issues; refugees and humanitarian aid; environm ental problems.

Human Rights Watch Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

US headquarters: 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Flo o r New Yo rk, NY, 10118-3299 USA; UK: 33 Islingto n High Street, N1 9LH Lo ndo n, UK; Belgium: Rue Van Campenho ut, 1000 Brussels, Belgium USA English, French, Spanish, Po rtuguese, Chinese, Russian, Arabic (212) 290-4700 (US); (171) 713-1995 (UK); (2) 732-2009 (Belgium) (212) 736-1300 (US); (171) 713-1800 (UK); (2) 732-0471 hrw nyc@hrw .o rg;hrw atchuk@gn.apc.o rg; hrw atcheu@gn.apc.o rg w w w .hrw .o rg Human rights.

Self description: Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the w orld. We stand w ith victims and activists to prevent discrim ination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhum ane conduct in w artime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose hum an rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governm ents and those w ho hold pow er to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of hum an rights for all.

Index o n Censo rship Contact: Address: Country: 270

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Ursula O w en, Edito r and Chief Executive; Michael Griffin, New s Edito r Index o n Censo rship, Lancaster Ho use, 33 Islingto n High Street, Lo ndo n, N1 9LH, UK UK

Language: Tel.: Fax: Email:

Website: Topical focus:

English 44 171 278 2313 44 171 278 1878 co ntact@indexo ncenso rship.o rg, ursula@indexo ncenso rship.o rg, michael@indexo ncenso rship.o rg w w w .indexo ncenso rship.o rg Mass media

Self description: Index on Censorship, the bi-m onthly m agazine for free speech, w idens the debates on freedom of expression w ith som e of the w orld’s best w riters. Through interview s, reportage, banned literature and polem ic, Index show s how free speech affects the political issues of the m om ent.

Internatio nal Center fo r Jo urnalists Contact:

Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Vjo llca Mici, Assistant D irecto r, the Knight Internatio nal Press Fello w ship Pro gram 1616 H Street, NW, 3rd flo o r, Washingto n, D C 20006, USA USA English (202)737-3700 (202)737-0530 edito r@icfj.o rg w w w .icfj.o rg Mass media

Self description: The International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) w as established in 1984 to im prove the quality of journalism in nations w here there is little or no tradition of independent journalism . ICFJ believes that a vigorous, independent press is one of the m ost p ow erful w eapons availab le in the stru ggle for freedom and civil rights. ICFJ believes that w orking w ith our colleagues overseas — providing journalistic, media m anagem ent and technical expertise as w ell as inform ation an d su pp ort services —is critical to the developm ent of an effective, independent press that is ethically grounded and financially stable. T he ICFJ provides professional development program s that prom ote excellence in new s coverage of critical com m unity and global issues. The Center offers m any fellow ships and exchanges, conducts a variety of training sem inars, w orksho ps and conferences, and provides a range of consulting services. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

271

Internatio nal Co nso rtium o f Investigative Jo urnalists (a project of the Center for Public Integrity) Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

ICIJ at The Center Fo r Public Integrity, 910 17th St, NW, 7th Flo o r, Washingto n, D .C. 20006, USA USA English 1-202-466-1300/ 3519 1-202-466-1101 info @icij.o rg w w w .icij.o rg Mass media

Self description: Fou nded in Septem ber 1997 and headq uartered in Washington, D.C., at the Center for Public Integrity, its p arent organiz ation. it is a w orking netw ork o f the w o rld â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leading investigative reporters. Its mission is to conduct investigative reporting projects across nation-state borders on the premise that an enlightened populace is an empow ered one. It identifies international investigative reporters and linking them via the Internet, conferences and through an institutional support structure.

International Federatio n fo r Informatio n and D ocumentation (FID ) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Martha Sto ne, President PO Bo x 90402, 2509 LK, the Hague, Netherlands The Netherlands English, French 00 3170 314 0671 00 3170 314 0667 secretariat@fid.nl fid.co nicyt.cl:8000/ w ho 1.htm Info rmatio n

Self description: Since 1895 FID Memb ers, representing organizations and individuals in over 90 nations, have prom oted best m anagem ent practice o f info rm ation as the critical resource for all so ciety. FID aims to: advance the frontiers of science and technology; improve co mp etitiveness of business, indu stry and national econom ies; strengthen possibilities for developm ent and enhance the quality of life w herever possible; improve the ability of decision-makers to make appropriat e decisions; stimulate educational strategies and life-long learning; m ake expression possible in all sectors of the Inform ation Society including the arts and hum anities and w ill strive and continue to be at the leading edge of the development of the m anagement of inform ation. 272

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

The Internatio nal Federatio n o f Jo urnalists Contact: Renate Schro eder (Euro pean Federatio n o f Jo urnalists) Address: The General Secretary, Rue Ro yale, 266 B-1210, Brussels, Belgium Country: Belgium Language: English, French, German, Spanish Tel.: (+32 2) 223 22 65 Fax: (+32 2) 219 29 76 Email: ifj.safety@po pho st.eunet.be , ifj.pro jects@po pho st.eunet.be Website: w w w .ifj.o rg Topical focus: Mass media Self description: The International Federation of Journalists is the w orldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest organisation of journalists. First established in 1926, it w as relaunched in 1946 and again, in its present form , in 1952. Today the Federation represents m ore than 400,000 m em bers in over 90 countries. The IFJ prom otes co-ordinated international action to defend press freedom and social justice through the d evelop m ent of strong, free and ind ependent trade unions of journalists. The IFJ does not subscribe to any given political view point, but prom otes hum an rights, dem ocracy and pluralism . The IFJ is opposed to discrim ination of all kinds - w hether on grounds of sex, creed, colour or race - and condem ns the use of m edia as propaganda to prom ote intolerance and social conflict. The IFJ believes in freedom of political and cultural expression and defends trade union and other basic hum an rights. The IFJ is recognised as the organisatio n w hich speaks for journalists at international level, notab ly w ithin the United Nations system and w ithin the international trade union m ovem ent. The IFJ supports journalists and their unions w herever they are subject to oppression and w henever they are fighting for their industrial and professional rights. It has established an International Safety Fund to provide hum anitarian aid for journalists w ho are the victims of violence. The IFJ supports trade union solidarity internationally and w orks particularly closely w ith other international federations of u nions representing trades related to journalism and the m ed ia ind ustry. Its basic policy is decided by the Congress w hich m eets every three years and w ork is carried out by the Secretariat based in Brussels under the directio n of a ruling 20-m ember Executive Com m ittee.

N GO s in the O SCE W orld

273

Internatio nal Federatio n o f the Perio dical Press Contact:

Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Topical focus:

Per Mo rtensen, President; Helen Bland - FIPP general manager; Greg Stevenso n - FIPP info rmatio n executive Q ueens Ho use, 55/ 56 Linco ln’s Inn Fields, Lo ndo n WC2A 3LJ UK English 00 44 171 40 44 169 00 44 171 40 44 170 info 1@fipp.co m, fipp.nemo @nemo .gels.co m: Mass media

The International Freedo m of Expressio n eXchange Clearing Ho use Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

89 Co llege Street, Suite 403, To ro nto , O ntario , Canada, M6G 1A5 Canada English +1 416 515 9622 +1 416 515 7879 ifex@ifex.o rg w w w .ifex.o rg Mass media.

Self description: IFEX w as born in 1992 w hen m any of the w orld’s leading freedom of expression organizations cam e together in Montreal to discuss how best to further their collective goals. At its core, IFEX is m ade up of o rganizations w hose m em bers refuse to turn aw ay w hen those w ho have the courage to insist upo n their fundam ental hum an right to free expression are censored, brutalized or killed. It is com prised of nearly 40 different freedom of expression groups — located everyw here from the Pacific Islands to Europe to West Africa. The nerve-centre of IFEX is the Clearing House, lo cated in Toronto, Canada and m anaged by Canadian Journalists for Free Expression. O ne of the central com ponents of IFEX is the Action Alert Netw ork (AAN). Mem ber organizations report free expression abuses in their geographic region or area of expertise to the Clearing House w hich, in turn, circulates this inform ation to other m em bers and interested organizations all over the w orld. The AAN also provides updates on recent d evelo pm ents in ongo ing cases and circulates important freedom of expression press releases. Em ail: alerts@ifex.org 274

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Independent Jo urnalism Center, Mo ldo va Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Website:

Co rina Cepo i, D irecto r; Angela Sirbu; Pro gram Co o rdinato r O PEN WO RLD HO USE, 20 Armeneasca St., 2012, Chisinau, Republic o f Mo ldo va Mo ldo va Russian, English (3732) 222507, 264225, 260040 (3732) 264050 w w w .internew s.ras.ru/ eng/ IJC_Mo ldo va

Self description: The Independent Jo urnalism C enter is an NGO and as a constituent part of the O pen World Hou se w as opened at start of 1994. The open World House’s goal is to facilitate the transition from a totalitarian regim e to a dem ocratic society by providing training and other resources in these areas. The IJC is founded on the principles of a profitable, free and open press. Its intent is to provide professional new sm en and w om en, journalist trainers, and journalism students w ith m edia instruction and resource m aterials; thus contributing to the independence of the m edia environm ent in Moldova. The roots of the IJC lay in the field of m edia training. The center’s tw o prim ary sources of funding are the Soros Foundation-Moldova and the Eurasia Foundation. It also has received m any in- kind and program -support contributions from other organisations. The IJC is overseeing m ore than 30 projects for 1995-1996, m any planned in cooperation w ith the O rganization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (Warsaw ), the European Journalism Netw ork (Prague), the Freedom Forum , the PBN Com pany (San Francisco and Moscow ), Internew s (Moscow ), Am arc (London) and the Journalists’ Union of Moldova. Th e IJC h ost s a Press C lub organized in co op eratio n w it h Mo ld ovan Com m it tee for the Freedom o f Press. An in dep endent radio station is being established an d a televisio n p roductio n stu dio is alread y fu nctio n in g. Ho pefully these associated training laborato ries w ill b e u seful fo r the journalists. The IJC’s activity also inclu des th e p ublication of a w eekly info rm ation d igest for M oldovan jou rn alists an d ot hers, as w ell as a bi-annu al research m agazin e o n act ual m ed ia situat io n in th e cou nt ry.

N GO s in the O SCE W orld

275

The Internatio nal Press Institute Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Jo hann P. Fritz Spiegelgasse 2, A-1010, Vienna, Austria Austria English (+43 1) 512 90 11 (+43 1) 512 90 14 ipi.vienna@xpo int.at, info @freemedia.at w w w .freemedia.at Mass media,

Self description: The International Press Institute is a global netw ork o f editors, m edia executives and leading jou rnalists from new sp apers, magazines, radio, TV and new s agencies in over 100 nations. IPI w as founded in New York in 1950 by an internatio nal gro up of edito rs from 15 cou ntries. To d a y, the IPI is the w orld’s leading organization fo r th e defense of press freed om . To d a y ’s training activities are focused on the countries of the form er Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. IPI has brought journalists together and allow ed them to learn from one another. IPI’s main office is in Vienna. National co mm ittees in several countries and Com m ittees of Experts (e.g. for public broadcasting, p rivate broad casting, new s agencies, et c.) support its w ork. As an international non-governm ental organiz ation, it enjoys consultative status w ith the UN, UNESCO , the Council of Europe and the O SCE. Its m ain objectives are: to defend and prom ote press freedom ; to organize media campaigns against p ress freedom violations; to publish studies of governmental pressu re on the med ia; to carry o ut on-the-spot investigations in areas w here press freedom appears to be endangered; to prom ote the free exchange of new s and the free flow of inform ation regardless of national boundaries; to ensure the safety of journalists and to allow them to w ork w ithou t interference; to pro mo te coo peration and an exchange of professional experience am o ng its m embers to im prove the practice of journalism . IPI’s activities include: form al protests to governm ents and organizations restricting the free flow of inform ation; confidential interventions w ith governm ent leaders against infringem ents on press freedom on-the-spot investigation by IPI observers in areas w here press freedom appears to be endangered; publication of studies of governm ental pressure on the m ed ia regu lar docum entatio n of any attack on press freedom; conferences, sem inars and rou ndtable meetings o n hum an rights as w ell as a broad range of political, social and professional issues; publication of the quarterly “IPI Repo rt”, the annual “World Press Freedom Review ” and the “Congress Report;” IPI holds a World Congress in a different country each year, thus underlining its global perspective 276

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

Jo urnalist Safety Service Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Jo urnalist Safety Service, Jo h. Vermeerstraat 22, 1071 D R Amsterdam, The Netherlands The Netherlands English +31 20 676 6771 +31 20 662 4901 jss@euro net.nl www. Mass media

Media Center Belgrade Contact: Country: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Hari Stajner, General Manager Yugo slavia mediac@o pennet.o rg 207.10.94.56/ media-centar/ uvo d.html Mass media.

Self description: Media Centre is a unique institution in Belgrade, founded on 1 July 1994 upon the initiative of a group of independent jo urnalists and their associations to soon becom e a true m eeting place for independent journalists and m edia in Yugoslavia. Media Center enables journalists unobstructed w ork including the use of the Centreâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s technical facilities. Fo reign jo urnalists are, in add ition, offered other professional services - briefings, interview s, m eetings w ith co m petent personalities, travels in the country, etc. The prem ises of Media Centre also house the seat of the Independent Journalists Association of Serbia (IJAS). IJAS has been the m em ber of the International Federation of Journalists since O ctober 1994. Activities of Media Centre include publishing, research and education. Media Centre has a com plete data base on all electronic and printed m edia in Serbia. Researchers o f M edia Center are about to com plete a co m prehensive project called Hate Speech w hich w ill try to give the answ er to the key question of the role and im portance of the m edia in initiating the w ar in the form er Yugoslavia. Educational activities of Media Center in 1996 developed through three journalist schools: a school for journalists of printed m edia, organized w ith Press Now Am sterdam (June 1996) and tw o schools for reporters of Yugoslav radio stations, organized w ith BBC World Training Service, London (June and O ctober 1996). In cooperation w ith Article 19 from London Media Center organized tw o sem inars on m edia in the Balkans. In parallel, Media Center continues to fulfil its m ain purpose: it remains the centre of com m unication, inform ation and solidarity of independent journalists, their m edia and associations. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

277

Medienhilfe Ex-Jugo slaw ien Address: Medienhilfe Ex-Jugo slaw ien, PO Bo x, CH-8031 Zürich, Sw itzerland Country: Sw itzerland Language: English, German Tel.: +41-1-272 46 37 Fax: +41-1-272 46 82 Email: MED IENHILFE@quelle.links.ch, info @medienhilfe.ch W ebsite: w w w .medienhilfe.ch Topical focus: Mass media. Self description: Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslaw ien w as founded in Decem ber 1992 by a group of journalists and other interested people w ho w ere — and still are — com m itted to the struggle for independent m edia. All the w ork is done on a voluntary basis. Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslaw ien financially and m aterially supports in all parts of form er Yugoslavia independent m edia w hich contribute to this noble aim . Further w e are interested in know ing our ow n m edia and how do they com m ent on the w ar. Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslaw ien supports various radio- and TV-stations, new spapers and m agazines. We are in close contact w ith journalists in form er Yugoslavia and independent political experts both in Sw itz erland and ab road. The sup ported m edia must be independent from any governm ental influence and deny the politics of w ar and ethnicity.

Natio nal Freedo m o f Info rmatio n Co alitio n Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Nancy Mo nso n, Executive D irecto r 400 S. Reco rd St., Suite 240, D allas, TX 75202, USA USA English 214/ 977-6658 214/ 977-6666 username@airmail.net w w w .nfo ic.o rg First Amendment/ Freedo m o f Info rmatio n

Self description: A lo ose co alition o f state groups w h o com e together to sh are w hat’s happening in their state and attem pt to learn from each other. We w ould perhaps w elcom e an international com ponent to our organisation in the future. 278

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

No rw egian Fo rum fo r Freedo m o f Expressio n Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

No rw egian Fo rum fo r Freedo m o f Expressio n, Menneskerettighetshuset Urtegata 50, N-0187 O slo , No rw ay No rw ay English +47 22 67 79 64 +47 22 57 00 88 nffe@o nline.no w w w .nfy.o rg? Mass media

Open So cie ty Institute Netw o rk Media Program, Soro s Fo undatio n Contact:

Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Go rdana Janko vic, D irecto r Biljana Tato mir, Pro ject D irecto r Algirdas Lipstas, Pro ject Manager Netw o rk Media Pro gram, O pen So ciety Institute - Budapest, Nado r u. 11, 6th flo o r, Budapest, Hungary Mailing address: H-1525 Budapest 114 P.O .Bo x 10/ 25, USA English (36 1) 327 3824 (36 1) 327 3826 gjanko vic@o si.hu,btato mir@o si.hu, alipstas@mail.o si.hu w w w .o si.hu/ nmp Mass media.

Self description: The Netw ork Media Program acts as a consultant, resource, liaison and partner for the m edia pro gram s of natio nal foundations as w ell as for other netw ork entities w orking on m edia-related projects, and for various organisations w orking in the m edia field in Central and Eastern Europe and the form er Soviet Union. NMP seeks to bridge inform ation gaps in the media field, b oost cooperation am ong national foundations, as w ell as betw een national foundations and other m edia institu tions and donor/partner organisations, w orks to m inimise d uplication, foster costeffectiveness and m axim ise recourses w ithin the netw ork. NMP activities include assistance to the national foundations in shaping the strategies of their m edia program s, finding international partners/donors for their N GO s in the O SCE W orld

279

projects. The Program also initiates, facilitates and supports cross-country m ediarelated projects imp lem ented bo th by the nat ional foundations and/or other organisations. Through its activities NMP offers a possibility of support (by netw orking independent dem ocratic m edia in the region) to the m edia w hich are w orking on positioning them selves in the em erging m arkets. Prim ary concern of the Program is assistance in establishm ent of the environm ent favourable to the viability and further developm ent of free, independent and responsible m edia in the region. Working tow ards this goal, NMP is concentrating on the projects addressing the issues of dem ocratic m edia legislation, m onitoring violations of med ia freedom , protection of journalists, estab lishm ent of m edia selfregulatio n system s an d strong independent professional organisations, raising professionalism of journalists and m edia m anagers.

Press No w Contact: Address: Country: Tel.: Fax: Email: Topical focus:

Paul A. J. Staal, Executive D irecto r c/ o D e Balle, Kleine-Gartmanplantso en 10, NL-1017, RR Amsterdam, the Netherlands The Netherlands 31-20-5535165/ 67 31-20-5535155 pressno w @xs4all.nl Mass media

Self Description: Ever since April 1993 Press Now stands for the independent m edia in form er Yugoslavia. Press Now w ants: to inform politicians, press and general public on the subject-m atter of m edia in former Yugoslavia by means of public pro grams and cam paigns; to raise m oney and to gather an equipm ent for independent m edia in form er Yugoslavia, and to deliver it to those places w here it is needed; to officiate as an inform ation cross-point betw een the m edia in ex-Yugoslavia, supporters in the Netherlands and Europe, and the Dutch m edia; to bring the m edia there in touch w ith the m edia here, so that the Dutch m edia can provide a structural support to the related new spapers and broadcasters. Press Now supports those m edia in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia w here it is an established fact: that they are not state-ow ned; that their editorial p olicy is not influenced by go vernmental structures; that they are not connected to any po litical party; that they do not spread propaganda; that they take a stand against w ar and ethnic conflicts; that they contribute to a reconstruction of dem ocracy. Seventeen different new spapers and broadcasters w ere supported. While in 1994 m ost help still consisted of em ergency aid, m ore attention w as given to structural investm ents for the independent m edia in 1995. 280

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

The Repo rters Co mmittee fo r Freedo m o f the Press Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Email: Topical focus:

Jane E. Kirtley, Executive D irecto r Suite 1910, 1101 Wilso n Bo ulevard, Arlingto n, VA 22209, USA USA English 703 807 2100 rcfp@rcfp.o rg We deal exclusively w ith legal issues (as dis tinguished fro m jo urnalism ethics) affecting the ability o f jo urnalists to gather and dis seminate new s. We do no t deal w ith labo r relatio ns o r emplo yer/ emplo yee disputes. We do no t lo bby.

Self description: The Reporters Com m ittee for Freedom of the Press w as created in 1970 at a tim e w hen the nation’s new s m edia faced a w ave of governm ent subpoenas askin g reporters to nam e confidential so urces. A group of p ro minent Am erican journalists form ed a com m ittee intervening in court cases. In the last tw o decades the Comm ittee has played a role in virtually every significant press freedom case that has com e b efore the Sup rem e Co urt as w ell as in hundreds of cases in federal and state courts. The Com m ittee has also em erged as a m ajor national — and international — resource in free speech issues, dissem inating inform ation in a variety of form s, including a quarterly legal review , a bi-w eekly new sletter, a 24-hour hotline, and various handbooks on m edia law issues. Academ icians, state and federal agencies, and Congress regularly call on the Com m ittee for advice and expertise, and it has becom e the leading advocate for reporters’ interest in cyberspace. Im portan t as these activities are, the Co m mittee’s prim ary mission rem ains serving w orking journalists — 2,000 of them every year.

Repo rters Sans Fro ntières Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Internatio nal O ffice, Repo rters sans fro ntières, Secrétariat internatio nal, 5, rue Geo ffro y-Marie, 75009 Paris, France France French, English, Spanish 01.44.83.84.84 01.45.23.11.51 rsf@rsf.fr w w w .rsf.fr Mass media N GO s in the O SCE W orld

281

Self description: RSF w as founded in June 1985 by Robert Ménard, a journalist w ith Radio France Hérault to report on disasters that the established m edia too often ignored. So for fou r years, from 1985 to 1989, it paid for coverage of w ars and countries that had been “forgotten” by the m edia. The m oney cam e from public funds (the Hérault departm ental council and the Languedoc-Roussillon regional authority) and from private contributions (sponsorship by com panies). Meanw hile, throughout those years a problem underlying the initiative taken by becam e steadily m ore apparent: the difficulties faced by journalists trying to do their w ork in freedom . The sm all group supported by local charity gradually grew , broadening its contacts w ith sim ilar organisations w orking for freedom of expression. It now has 15 perm anent staff, 1,200 m em bers in about 20 cou ntries, 110 co rrespondents w orldw ide, six national branches (France, Germ any, Spain, Belgium , Sw eden and Sw itzerland) and desks in Istanbul and Washington. It holds consultative status w ith the Council of Europe, the United Nations Commission on Hu man Rights and UNESCO . Its goals are: to help im prisoned jo urnalists; to pu blicise violations o f press freedom ; to help media that are victim s of rep ression; to encou rage d ebate on problem s connected w ith press freedom .

STATEWATCH Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

To ny Bunyan, Edito r PO Bo x 1516, Lo ndo n N16 0EW, UK UK English 00 44 181 802 1882 00 44 181 880 1727 o ffice@statew atch.o rg w w w .statew atch.o rg The State and civil liberties in the EU.

Self description: Statew atch w as founded in 1991. It is a non-profiting m aking voluntary group w ith a netw o rk of 34 contributors draw n from 12 Euro pean count ries. It is no w one of the leading so urce o f inform atio n on justice and hom e affairs in the European Union, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs, The Schengen Agreement, surveillance and civil liberties. In O ctober 1997 the Statew atch European Monitoring & Docum entation Centre (SEMDO C) w as launched at the UK offices of the European Parliam ent. Seventy individuals and organisations signed up as supporters law yers, MPs, MEPs, researchers, journalise, academ ics national and com m unity groups from across the EU. In Novem ber 1996 Statew atch lodged six com plaints w ith the European O m budsm an concerning access to docum ents on justice and hom e affairs against the Council of Ministers. To date the first three com plaints have 282

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

been w on. As a resu lt of ou r com plaints the right t o put co mplaints concerning justice and hom e affairs w as w ritten into the Am sterdam Treaty. O n 28 April Statew a t ch ’s editor Ton y Bunyan w as presen ted w ith a Freedom O f Information Aw a r d 1998 for our w ork on tackling secrecy in the EU. The prize w as presented by the Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine a m em ber of the UK Cabinet.

Wo rld Asso ciatio n o f Co mmunity Radio Bro adcasters (AMARC) Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

AMARC Internatio nal Secretariat, 3525 bo ulevard St Laurent, bureau 611, Mo ntreal, Q uebec, Canada, H2X 2T7; AMARC Euro pe, 15 Paterno ster Ro w , Sheffield S1 2BX, UK Canada English, French, Spanish (1-514) 982-0351 (Canada); (44-114) 221 0592 (Euro pe) (1-514) 849-7129 (Canada); (44-114) 279 8976 (Euro pe) amarcho @amarc.o rg, euro pe@amarc.o rg (Euro pe) w w w .amarc.o rg Mass media

Self description: AMARC is an international non-governm ental organization serving the community radio movement. Its goal is to support and contribute to the development of comm unity and participato ry radio along the p rincipals of solidarity and internatio nal cooperat ion. All continents are represented o n AMARC’s Board of Directors.

Wo rld Asso ciatio n o f New spapers Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Timo thy Balding, D irecto r General 25 rue d’Asto rg, 75008 Paris, France France English, French, German, Spanish (33-1) 47 42 85 00 (33-1) 47 42 49 48 co ntact_us@w an.asso .fr, tbalding@w an.asso .fr, w w w .fiej.o rg Mass media N GO s in the O SCE W orld

283

Self description: Founded in 1948, the World Association of New spapers (ex-FIEJ) groups 57 new spaper publishers associat ions in 53 co untries, individ ual new spap er executives in 90 nations, 17 national and international new s agencies, a m edia foundation and 7 affiliated regional press organisations. In all, the Association represents m ore than 15,000 publications on the five continents. The World Association of New spapers has three m ajor objectives: defending and prom oting press freedom and the econom ic independence of new spapers as an essential condition for that freedom ; contributing to the developm ent of new spaper pu blishing by fostering comm unications and contacts betw een new spaper executives from different regions and cultures; prom oting co-operation betw een its m ember organisations, w hether national, regional or w orldw ide. In pursuit of these objectives, the World Association of New spapers notably: represents the new spaper industry in all international discussions on m edia issues, to d efend both press freedom an d the p ro fessional and business interests of the press; promo tes a w orld-w ide exchange of information and ideas on p roducing better and m ore profitable new spapers; opposes restrictions of all kinds on the free flow of inform ation, on the circulation of new spapers and on advertising; cam paigns vigorously against press freedo m violation s and ob stacles; helps new sp apers in developing countries, through training and other co-operation projects; channels legal, m aterial and hum anitarian aid to victim ized publishers and journalists;

Wo rld Press Freedo m Co mmitte Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Topical focus:

Marilyn J. Greene, Executive D irecto r; Ro ny Ko ven, WPFC Euro pe, Paris 11690-c Sunrise Valley D rive, Resto n, Virginia 20191, USA U.S. English (703)715-9811 (703)620-6790 freepress@w pfc.o rg Mass media

Self description: The WPFC, w ith 40 affiliated journalistic organisations on six contin ents, is in the forefront of the struggle for a free press everyw here. It em phasizes m onitoring and coordination, vigorous advocacy of free-press principles and practical assistance p rogram s. It is a w atchdog for free new s m edia at UNESCO , the UN, O SCE, Council of Europe, European Union, and at hum an rights and other interna tional m eetings considering free-press issues. Its Charter for a Free Press provides guideposts for press freedom w herever these are needed. It has been w idely 284

W HERE TO

FIND THO SE WHO HELP

endorsed and is available in seven languages including Russian, Chinese and Arabic. The Fund against Censorship, w hich WPFC adm inisters in cooperation w ith other free press groups, extends selfĂ&#x; help legal grants to help new s m edia to fight back w hen governm ents m ove in. More than 150 WPFC training and related projects to date include publication of journalism m anuals in Africa and in 10 Central and Eastern Europ ean languages. The WPFC implem ents joint activities for a Coordinating Com m ittee of m ajor w orld free-press organisations.

N GO s in the O SCE W orld

285

Authors Tchingiz Aitmato v - a Kirghiz national bo rn in 1928, Aitm ato v w as a highly prominent, established Soviet writer. Heâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s been a mem ber of the Supreme Soviet, a w inner of the Lenin Prize for literatu re, a Hero of Socialist Labour, an editor of Novy Mir, an official co rrespondent fo r Pravda. O ver the years he has w ritten num erous stories, novels, and plays, am ong them such classics as The First Te a ch e r, The White Ship, The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years. He is internationally renow ned and many of his w orks have been published in Europe and the Unit ed States of Am erica. In t he p ast years, Aitmatov has been representing his country, new ly independent Kyrgyzstan, as an Ambassador in Brussels. Clifford G. Christians - is a Research Professor of Co mm unications at the University of Illionois, Urbana-Champaign, where he directs the doctoral program in comm unications. He holds joint appointm ents as a Professor of Journalism and a Professor of Media Studies. He has been a m ember of the Execut ive Com mittee of the Program for the Study of Cu ltural Values and Ethics at the University of Illinois. For the PSCVE, he w as a program fellow studying norm ativity, chaired its conference on higher education, participated in a facu lty consortium on professional ethics, and lectured in its series on technology and ethics and on the one on literacy, and chaired its faculty research aw ards com mittee. Freimut D uve - a Germ an politician, hum an rights activist, w riter and journalist w as elected the O SCE Represen tative on Freed om of the Media b y the O SCE Minist erial C ouncil in Decem ber 1997. Duve w as born in 1936 in Wurzburg and received his education in Modern History, So ciology, Political Science and Englich literature at t he University o f Ham burg. He w orked as an Edit or at the Row oh lt publishing hou se and w as a Social-D em ocrat ic m em ber of the Bundestag (Germ an Parliam ent) in 1980-1998 representing his city H amburg Bro nislaw Gereme k - Polish p olitician, h istorian of th e m edieval era, university professor and scholar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. He w as b orn in 1932 in Wa r s a w. In 1955-1985 Gerem ek w orked at t he Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences. In 1985 he w as dism issed from the Academ y for political reasons. In 1989 he w as form ally invited to resum e his professional duties as a professor. In 1968 Gerem ek resigned from the Polish United Workers Party in protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1980 Gerem ek becam e one of the senior advisors to the Solidarity t rade m ovem ent. Detained after the im positio n of m artial law in 1981 and released a year later, he becam e an advisor to the underground Provisional Co mm ittee o f Solidarity and a close aid to Lech Walesa. In 1989 he w as elect286

ed a deputy to the Sejm (low er cham ber of the Polish Parliam ent) and has held this seat ever since. Gerem ek is one of the founders of Unia Dem okratyczna (later renam ed as Freedom Union) and has chaired the parliam entary caucuses of the party since 1990. During 1998 in his capacity as the Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Gerem ek acted as the Chairm an-in-O ffice of the O SCE. Jim Ho agland - a tw o-tim e Pulit zer Priz e w inner, is associate editor/senior foreign correspondent for T he Washington Post. Hoagland joined The Wa s hingt on Post in 1966. In 1969, h e w as assigned to N airo bi as the Post’s correspondent in Africa. Fo r nearly tw o years he concentrated on t he racial conflicts of Sou thern Africa, covering colonial w ars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, the revolution in w hat w as then Rhodesia and apartheid in South Africa. He w as aw arded t he Pu litzer Prize for internat ional reporting in 1971 for his 10-part series on apartheid. Ho agland w ent to Beirut as Middle East co rrespondent in 1972, coverin g the Arab w orld, Israel and Iran. He mo ved to Paris in 1976 to co ver France, Italy an d Spain. In 1978, he becam e diplom at ic correspon dent on the Post’s national staff in Washington, and in 1979, foreign new s editor. In 1991, Ho agland received a second Pu litzer Prize, this tim e for Dist inguished Com m e n t a r y. Jim Hoagland w as b orn in Rock H ill, So uth Carolina. Bei Hu - a graduate student at Princet on University, she is currently w orking as an intern w ith the O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. Michael Ignatieff - a native of Canada born in 1947, holds a doctorate in history from Harvard University and has been a fellow at King’s College Cam bridge; Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Paris; and St. Antony’s College, O xford. Among his academ ic pu blicat ions are Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Po litical Econom y in the Scottish Enlight enm en t an d The Needs of Strangers, an essay on the philosophy of human needs. Since 1984, he has worked as a free-lance w riter, scripting t elevision plays, feature films, novels and w orks of n on-fiction . The Russian Album , a fam ily m em oir, w on Canada’s Governo r General Aw ard and the Heinem ann Prize of Britain’s Ro yal Society o f Literature in 1988. His second novel, Scar Tissue, w as short-listed for the Booker Prize in 1993. He has just completed a biograp hy of the liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin and is now com pleting a 10-part h ist ory of the 20th centu ry fo r BBC and CBC radio. Alexander Ivanko - a form er Russian journalist w ho w orked for Izvestia Daily, a leading Moscow new spaper, in 1984-1994. Since 1994 until 1998 he w as posted as the United Nations Spokesm an in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ivanko joined the O ffice of the O SCE Represent ative on Freedom of t he Media as an Adviser in O ctober 1998. 287

Anto nin J. Liehm - a Political O bserver and Journalist, born 1924 in Prague, Czechoslovakia, Founder and Editor of the European intellectual journal Lettre internationale, educated at Charles University in political Sience. He w orked as a journalist and translato r, m em ber of the editorial board of Literarni Noviny. Em igrated in 1969, held professorships in Paris, New York and Pennsylvania. In 1977 he w as coordinator of the Biennial on Dissident Cultur in Eastern Europe (Venice) and received a Guggenheim fellow ship in 1972, the Theatre Library Aw ard in 1978, the French Jean Mitry Aw ard in 1990 and the Leipzig book aw ard for European Understanding in 1997. Beate Maeder-Me tcalf - a senior Germ an diplom at in the Germ an Fo reign Service since 1987. She has prim arily w orked on hu man rights issues and Eu ropean security. She has a Ph.D. in Rom ance Languages and Philosophy. She w orked on establishing the O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and joined it as an Adviser since its outset in early 1998. Kaarle No rdenstreng - a Professor of Journalism and Mass Com m unication, born 1941, received his PhD in Psychology at the University of Helsinki, w orked as journalist and editor for the Finnish Broadcasting Com pany (YLE). Became Professor of Jou rnalism and Mass Com munication at the University of Tam pere in 1971. Mem ber of the Board of Directors of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, the Advisory Com m itee for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. He has been Vice-President of the International Association for Mass Com m unication Research (IAMCR) and President of the International O rganisation of Journalists. Stanley Schrager - a senior US diplom at w ho has been w orking in the dip lom atic service and public affairs for 25 years. He served in Rom ania, Ph ilippines, several African countries and in 1993-1996 w as the US Em bassy Spokesm an in Haiti. He briefly served as Public Affairs Adviser to the US Mission to the O SCE befo re join ing from the out set as an Ad viser the O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. Mukhtar Shakhano v - a revered Kazakh w riter, poet and political leader, he w as born in 1942. Starting his career as a tractor driver and m echanic, he m oved to journalism and w riting in 1961. Shakhanov w orked for local new spapers, Kazakh Radio and Television, the State Com m ittee for Publishing and since 1984 headed the alm anac Zhalyn. After the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s independence, Shakhanov co-chaired the National Congress of Kazakhstan and w as elected a m ember of Parliament. Since 1993 he is representing his country as an Am bassador to Kyrgyzstan. 288

289

290

291