Profit E-Magazine Issue 324

Page 1


08 Dear control-freak seth, welcome to the stock exchange

14 The landmark IHC ruling that could change how Pakistan’s pharmaceutical industry works

19 There is a bidding war for a loss making fertilizer plant. But why?

23 After pandemic losses, Pearl Continental is well on the mend. But did their problems run deeper?

27 Round two: Mitchell’s back on the market

28 Pakistan has proven cricket can be profitable without India. That’s why we can afford to snub them

Publishing Editor: Babar Nizami - Editor Multimedia: Umar Aziz Khan - Senior Editor: Abdullah Niazi

Editorial Consultant: Ahtasam Ahmad - Business Reporters: Taimoor Hassan | Shahab Omer

Zain Naeem | Saneela Jawad | Nisma Riaz | Mariam Umar | Shahnawaz Ali | Ghulam Abbass

Ahmad Ahmadani | Aziz Buneri - Sub-Editor: Saddam Hussain - Video Producer: Talha Farooqi

Director Marketing : Mudassir Alam - Regional Heads of Marketing: Agha Anwer (Khi) Kamal Rizvi (Lhe) | Malik Israr (Isb) - Manager Subscriptions: Irfan Farooq

Pakistan’s #1 business magazine - your go-to source for business, economic and financial news. Contact us: profit@pakistantoday.com.pk

After decades of being considered, it is finally here. Dual class shares are being allowed for publicly listed companies on the Pakistan Stock Exchange, and Mughal Steel has decided to jump into the fray by announcing the existing of what they are calling “Class C” shares, which will not be tradeable, not eligible for dividends or bonuses, but will have 50 times the voting power of ordinary shares listed on the exchange.

Needless to say, this move is expected to be highly controversial, and many people – especially the handful of advocates for the rights of minority shareholders – are likely to be deeply upset by this development.

So why is the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) even allowing such a thing to exist, whose explicit purpose is to reduce the power of minority shareholders and give insiders even more control over the companies they run?

Because there is more to dual class shares than meets the eye, and while it certainly has its downsides, it has benefits which the regulator is likely keen to see realized.

In this story, we will examine what dual class shareholding is and what its benefits and downsides might be, how it is done in other parts of the world, and then finally how it applies to the case of Mughal Steel.

What is dual class shareholding?

Consider the position of the Pakistani seth. After spending years of toiling and building up their business, in the naysaying culture of Pakistan that does not exactly encourage entrepreneurship, they want to make sure that they control every aspect. The seed that they nurtured and cared for has grown into a flourishing tree and they want to make sure they get to enjoy the fruits that they bear. In the case of companies that have managed to stay documented, they have even gone to the trouble of following all the rules while being treated like a criminal by the government at every turn.

But what happens when they want to get additional funds and capital to keep growing their business further. Either they have to head to the bank and ask for a loan – which Pakistani banks do not like giving to them unless they already have collateral worth much more than what they want to borrow – or they can go to the capital markets to raise the necessary funds. Once the banks have been maxed out (which does not take very long), the only option they have left is to head to the stock

exchange and issue shares of their business.

For many, the issue is not even about sharing profits. Investors who have invested in the business should get to share in the profits that are being earned and Pakistani business owners are no different from business owners all over the world in understanding that concept. The one thing that sticks in the seth’s craw is the fact that they have to give over some of the control over to these shareholders.

Shareholders get two things when they invest their money into a company. Firstly, they have a claim to a share of the company’s profits, particularly when they are paid out in the form of dividends. The second right, not one many retail investors often think about, is that they get to vote on important matters brought up before a vote of shareholders (including how much to pay out in dividends, and who to hire as CEO, being two of the most important). It is this voting on important decisions that can sometimes result in acrimony between the founding family and their minority shareholders.

With a dual class shareholding, there is no change to the claim investors have to the profits of the company, especially not to dividends and bonus shares. There are usually substantial changes to the voting rights, however. More specifically, a separate class of shares is created which carries more votes per share compared to ordinary shares.

In the case of Pakistan, there are other considerations, particularly some regulations that have tried to increase the number of shares available for trading for each company listed on the stock exchange.

In order to get listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange, the minimum initial public offering is expected to offer up 10% of the shares of a company to the public. The exchange then requires companies to increase their floated shares to at least 25% over time. Section 5.4 of the PSX Rulebook states that in case the offering is up to Rs2.5 billion, the listing company should initially offer 10% of the share capital and then increase it to 25% in a span of three years.

That 25% number is particularly important because under Pakistani corporate law, a 75% majority is required to appoint the CEO, which, as Asad Umar used to say when he was the CEO of Engro, is the single most important decision the shareholders can make. If a company floats 25% of its shares to minority shareholders, it needs absolute unanimity among the founders or family shareholders in order to ensure that they retain control over the decision to have their own CEO. For this reason, the 25% plus one threshold is called “negative control”, meaning that it gives minority shareholders a veto on an unacceptable CEO if all of them band together.

The giving away of power and control

is a big reason many companies choose to stay private. The two others are a desire not to share information about the company, and a desire not to share the profits. The exchange can do nothing about the latter two: after all, that is the very point of being listed. But they are betting that many Pakistani companies do not mind sharing information and profits, as long as they get to keep complete control, and that the founding family can never be ousted from controlling their company.

That is why the dual class shareholding is likely being allowed by the exchange, with the blessing of the regulator.

Dual class shares around the world

This may be a new concept in Pakistan, but how does the rest of the world handle it? Broadly speaking, the world’s markets are divided into three camps:

1. Allowed completely: United States, Sweden, and the Netherlands

2. Allowed with restrictions: Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, India, and China

3. Banned completely: United Kingdom, Australia, most of Europe and Latin America

Needless to say, there is far from a consensus on how to approach this matter, and different countries have arrived at very different conclusions on what is the most appropriate set of rules. Based on what the SECP and PSX appear to be allowing, Pakistan’s approach appears to be somewhat similar to the United States than the other two approaches.

Since the United States accounts for more than 45% of the total market capitalization of all stock markets in the world, and is generally considered the most sophisticated of the world’s capital markets, it may be pertinent to ask: how are things done in that market?

In the US, dual class structures are becoming more common, especially among technology and media companies. They allow

founders and insiders to maintain control with a minority economic stake. About 7% of the Russell 3000 – an index of the 3,000 largest publicly listed companies in the United States – have some form of dual class shareholding structure.

Even in that market, however, they are not without controversy, with critics arguing they reduce accountability to shareholders. Proponents say they allow long-term focus and protect from short-term market pressures.

Many of the most famous companies in the world employ a dual class shareholding structure, including Google, Facebook, Berkshire Hathaway, Levi Strauss, The New York Times Company, and Ford Motor Company. Equally famously, however, many companies do not, such as Tesla, Amazon, and Microsoft. In the case of Microsoft, Bill Gates has publicly stated that he was opposed to the idea of a dual class shareholding that would have given him more power over the company.

The Mughal Steel transaction

Mughal Steel is creating a separate class of shares that would give its founding family significantly more control over the company. They are creating a set of Class C shares that will have 50 votes per share, and issuing 50 million total shares, which would give these shares 2.5 billion votes. The company only has about 336 million ordinary shares, so these Class C shares would exercise 88% of the votes in any shareholder vote, and hence have complete control over all matters in the company.

It appears that this new class of shares being created is not being exempted from the requirement of being offered to all shareholders, which means that the sponsors of Mughal Steel have had to come up with a way to ensure that outsiders will not want to buy these shares: Class C shares will not receive any profits or dividends from the company.

Since the shares are not eligible to receive

dividends, they are being issued at a substantial discount to the current market price per share of the stock, which closed at Rs70.51 per share at the close of trading on the Pakistan Stock Exchange on Friday. The Class C shares are being offered for Rs30 per share to the controlling family (technically to everyone, but likely only the sponsors will be bidding for them).

At that price, the sponsors will pay Rs1.5 billion to acquire 88% of the control of a company valued by the market at Rs23.7 billion as of the close of trading on Friday.

What is somewhat perplexing is that the Mughal Steel sponsors do not appear to need much by way of additional control. Between their direct family holdings and those they own through other companies in which they have controlling stakes, the sponsors control about 75.4% of the company already.

But perhaps 75% of the votes – and full control over the board and CEO hiring decisions – is not enough for the sponsors. After the issuance of the Class C shares, minority shareholders will have 24.6% of the shares but just 3% of the votes at annual general meetings and any extraordinary shareholder meetings.

The official use of proceeds is to finance the working capital of the company, which effectively means there is no specific use in mind other than the cash being made available for the day-to-day operations of the company. There appear to be no growth or expansion plans being funded by these funds, based on the draft offering document released by the company.

The company does have approximately Rs28 billion in short-term debt, though the bulk of that debt appears to go into financing the company carrying about four months of inventory on its balance sheet.

The Mughal story

Mughal Steel itself is a company that has a long history, having been founded in 1950 as a steel trading company (unincorpo-

rated for most of its early existence) called Mughal Traders. It is currently the largest manufacturer of long rolled iron and steel products in Pakistan.

Through the years, that sole proprietorship kept on growing and becoming more and more formalized, providing some evidence for the hypothesis that the Pakistani informal economy will automatically formalize when the barriers to growth start getting removed.

In 1994, a steel production unit called Al-Bashir Steel Industries (Pvt) Ltd was established on the outskirts of Lahore. The company installed a melting unit along with medium section re-rolling mills to produce residential and structural sections like I-beams, H-beams, C-sections, L-sections etc.

In 1998, Mughal Steel – by then a partnership – was established. In 1999, Mughal Steel imported and established two induction furnaces. In the same year an Argon Oxygen Decarboriser (“AOD”) was installed along with ladle refining furnace reaching a complete melting, refining alloying cycle. AOD was the first of its kind in Pakistan, capable of producing stainless steel of high quality.

In 2003, a stainless steel sheet rolling mill was added to the previously established Mughal Steel. The new production unit resulted in increased product line and efficiency. To compliment several production units and ensure quality standard Mughal Labs (“ML”) was established. ML is equipped with chemical and mechanical analytics machines as well as an optical emission spectrometer.

In 2006, foreseeing the rising demand of electricity, Mughal Steel set up a 9.3 MW captive power plant. In 2007, Mughal Ferros was established. The project was aimed at utilizing existing deposit of manganese and chromites in Pakistan for the formation of alloys such as ferro manganese and ferro chrome. It is used for reducing metals from their oxides as well as for deoxidizing steel and other ferrous alloys.

In 2008, Mughal Steel took over the

plant and machinery of Al-Bashir Steel and installed two additional mini sectional mills.

By 2010, the company formally converted from a partnership to a private limited company. In the same year, the company installed a bar re-rolling mill with capacity of 150,000 metric tons per year.

By 2015, the company – which had started off as an unincorporated sole proprietorship 65 years prior – converted to a public limited company in preparation for its initial public offering on the Karachi Stock Exchange, raising just shy of Rs700 million.

Where the company stands today

Mughal Steel has been one of the most dynamic companies in Pakistan’s steel sector and one of its fastest growing. In the 13 years that the company has been an incorporated business, it has grown its revenue from Rs3 billion in financial year 2011 to Rs92.4 billion in the financial year ending June 30, 2024, an average annualized growth rate of 30.1% per year. And despite several difficult years, it has never made a loss during any of those years.

This is a company that has been able to steadily grow its market share and, unlike most of its competitors in the steel industry, has exposure not just to industrial users of steel, but also supplies steel directly to consumers looking for steel girders for home construction.

And the company continues to expand its industrial footprint. Mughal Energy Ltd (MEL), a subsidiary of Mughal Steel, plans to setup a 55MW coal-fired power plant with the proposed investment of $137 million in Lahore, it announced in June of this year. The energy from that power plant would be used to supply all of the production units for the company, which currently operates the second largest steel manufacturing plant in the

And earlier this year, the company had also announced an investment plan that would involve the company investing in Balancing, Modernization and Replacement (BMR) of existing bar re-rolling mill and procurement of 6 gas-fired generators (3.1MW each) at a total estimated cost of Rs1.75b. The company management plans to enhance its re-bar capacity from the existing 150,000 tonnes to approximately 350,000 tonnes. The company expects that the efficiency of the bar re-rolling process will improve resulting in reduced manufacturing costs and improved margins.

All of these moves have come as demand challenges have continued to weigh on the industry and may even be driving a consolidation in the industry, though Mughal appears to be the one company bucking broader industry trends. According to IMS Research, the industry’s profitability during the second quarter of calendar year 2024 was driven largely by a robust quarter from Mughal Steel.

Part of what drove the higher revenue and profitability was the surge in global copper prices, which tends to have a downstream impact on other metal products such as iron and steel. As the steel sector navigates these ongoing challenges, the focus remains on companies like Mughal, which are leveraging diversification and strategic growth in non-ferrous segments to bolster their financial performance amid a tough operating environment.

Zooming out, the steel industry faces its own set of macroeconomic challenges. Steelmaking in Pakistan relies heavily on imported raw materials, with iron ore and scrap metal comprising 60-70% of production costs. Between 2018 and 2024, scrap metal prices doubled, only to fall back to earlier levels. Yet, the rupee’s sharp depreciation has eroded the cost advantage this drop should have provided. Steelmakers are now grappling with a dollar that trades at Rs 280—up from Rs 100 just a few years ago.

Why the regulatory wants to allow this transaction

One suspects the reason the SECP is allowing this to happen is simple: they know that Pakistanis tend to be control freaks and are loathe to give up control. As a regulator, the SECP has competing responsibilities. Yes, having companies with strong corporate governance and accountability is important. But so is increasing the liquidity and investment opportunities open to the general public through the capital markets.

As matter stand today, the total market capitalization of all companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange is under 14% of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. This is significantly lower than even our regional peers. More worryingly, the market is not representative of the economy as a whole and many of Pakistan’s largest and most profitable businesses are not publicly listed.

While there are a great many reasons why each individual company might choose not to list publicly, the fact remains that fear of losing family control over what tend to be family-owned businesses is a major concern. The bargain the SECP is making is essentially hoping that more family businesses will be willing to share the economic value of their businesses if they do not have to give up meaningful control over their companies.

The Mughal Steel dual class shareholding, then is a trial balloon to see if some of the owners of Pakistan’s privately held companies take notice. In the next five years, if more of them decide to list their companies on the exchanges, this bet will have paid off.

Whether it will be worth the price – in the form of reduce accountability and potential for abuse of minority shareholder rights – remains to be seen. n

The landmark ruling could redefine the balance between consumer protection and industry viability, enabling drug manufacturers to sustain the supply of essential medicines amidst rising production costs

“To state that the most expensive drug is one that is needed but not available would be a truism”

These were the words in which Justice Babar Sattar of the Islamabad High Court delivered a delicately scathing indictment of the federal government’s continued efforts to exert control over drug prices in Pakistan. The historic verdict of the IHC was delivered on the 30th of October as the result of a writ petition filed by Getz Pharma against the Federal Government.

But it was not Getz Pharma alone. Nearly the entire pharmaceutical industry in Pakistan including ICI Pakistan Ltd, GlaxoSmithKline Pakistan Ltd, SAMI Pharmaceuticals Pvt Ltd and Indus Pharma Pvt Ltd had filed their own petitions, and this decision provides them the same relief as Getz Pharma.

What was the core issue? The government, as we all know, has long been involved in regulating drug prices in Pakistan for populist appeal. But since drug manufacturing is a private business, if pharma companies cannot sell at viable prices they end up with supply shortages. Of course, there is an argument to be made for regulation. Life saving drugs should be accessible to everyone, and this is a business where small margins should be encouraged and competition should be fostered to make pricing more competitive.

But this particular case revolves around existing laws. You see, there is a Maximum Retail Price (MRP) policy in Pakistan that was enacted for drugs in 2018. This policy governs how drugs are priced, but also has safeguards that allow drug manufacturers room to increase their prices during times of hardship. It was this core issue that led the pharma industry to the courts, and the government’s own law was what the IHC used to rule against them.

Of course, the core issue here is multifaceted: A government aiming to protect consumers but failing to adhere to its own pricing policies; a pharmaceutical sector teetering on the edge due to profitability concerns; and a national healthcare system stretched thin, where accessible pricing of essential drugs remains uncertain.

This ruling, along with recent developments, probes whether the government can balance these competing interests without collapsing under the weight of the country’s economic challenges.

Pakistan’s drug pricing structure, designed to protect consumers, has increasingly ignored the economic realities faced by manufacturers who are left bearing the brunt of inflationary pressures without government mitigation. In early 2023, 70 pharmaceutical companies issued a plea to the Ministry of Health Services and DRAP, highlighting the immediate threat posed by fixed MRPs. These companies warned of possible industry collapse without price adjustments that reflect inflation and

ensure sustainable profitability, critical for addressing drug scarcity.

This landmark decision shines a stark light on Pakistan’s urgent need for an updated approach to MRP policy, one that ensures affordability for consumers while preserving the viability of manufacturers.

At its heart, it raises a critical question. As prices rise and government intervention lags, will essential medicines remain within reach for Pakistan’s vulnerable populations?

So how did we get to this point?

Amid the spiraling dollar-rupee inflation and global supply chain disruptions since 2020, Pakistan’s pharmaceutical industry has been facing unprecedented financial pressure. For Getz Pharma and many others, the rising cost of imports, as over 80% of the raw materials used in drug production are imported, has forced a steep increase in production expenses.

Many small manufacturers, lacking the financial cushion to absorb these costs, were compelled to shut down operations, as over 200 small manufacturing plants had to close due to untenable production costs. The impact was felt even more acutely as, despite these challenges, the government maintained its fixed MRP policy, prioritizing consumer access to affordable medicines over industry sustainability.

Against this backdrop, Getz Pharma sought an MRP increase under the “hardship” clause of the Drug Pricing Policy, 2018. Under this provision in early 2022, Getz applied for an MRP increase through the DRAP to ensure it could continue manufacturing at a time it is becoming unfeasible to produce.

Feisal Naqvi, legal counsel for Getz Pharma, explained, “the drug in question is a lifesaving drug used in hospitals to provide anesthesia to children, and another form of this drug was already being sold in the market for Rs19,000.”

The name of the Getz-manufactured drug for which a hardship MRP was requested and found that it was ‘Sevof’ whose price was set at Rs5,526 by DRAP in 2019. Despite its DRAP-approved MRP-increase to Rs 17,571, on account of economic hardship, which the government later rejected in 2022, an alternative called ‘Sevofluorane’ was already being sold at around Rs19,000.

In contrast, Naqvi explains that, “the hardship MRP requested by Getz, and approved by the Drug Pricing Committee, was much lower at roughly Rs17,000,” which would have offered a more affordable alternative in the market.

Yet, even as the economic situation continued to worsen, the government failed to respond within its mandated time, leaving Getz without recourse and unable to raise prices by the allowed 10% in the absence of a timely response. This delay underscored the growing discontent within the industry, as pharmaceutical companies bore the burden of

inflation alone while consumers faced potential shortages of critical medicines.

Although the government acknowledged these issues in May 2023, granting a onetime allowance for manufacturers to increase MRPs for essential drugs by up to 70% of CPI (capped at 14%) and non-essential drugs by CPI (capped at 20%), this move was viewed as too little, too late for an industry that had long voiced its grievances. The policy shift did provide some relief: pharmaceutical earnings rose by 70% to Rs13.3 billion in FY24, and sales increased by 19% YoY to Rs286 billion, with previously scarce medicines reappearing on shelves. Additionally, gross margins improved, better reflecting the industry’s increased costs.

In February 2024, the Ministry of National Health Services also responded by increasing MRP for 146 essential drugs and deregulating non-essential drug prices. This change allowed companies to adjust prices based on CPI inflation with specific caps, offering some relief to address supply challenges.

As a result, the start of the current fiscal year saw further gains with a 560% YoY growth to Rs5.6 billion in Q1FY25, attributed to a move that mirrors India’s approach to balancing free-market principles with price controls. This deregulation, however, only partially alleviates the financial strain facing the industry, as the MRP remains fixed for essential drugs.

Despite the government’s latest intervention, cost pressures remain high, with gross margins rising from 26% in FY23 to 30% in FY24, partly due to reduced raw material costs for some drugs. Meanwhile, selling and administrative expenses grew by 24% and 12% in line with inflation trends, and finance costs surged by 23% due to the increase in KIBOR rates from 18% to 22%

This brings us to the present legal challenge, where the recent judgment in favor of Getz Pharma calls for a critical examination of the MRP framework, its implications for industry stability, and the accessibility of essential medicines for consumers.

How does MRP and its legislation work?

MRP is a form of price-control inconsistent with the free-market system, but a much-needed form of government intervention in emerging economies like Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This not only protects consumers and provides them access to medicines at prices affordable to them, but also protects the domestic industry as foreign players are prevented from dumping artificially lower price rates.

This system also pays little regard to retailers as they lose control over what profits

they make, which compounds the existence of a black market given that at times of shortage, smuggled and spurious drugs are sold at 3 to 4 times the prices.

In emerging economies like Pakistan, where there’s two categories of drugs in terms of pricing, ‘Essential Medicines’ and ‘All other drugs’, an MRP system has been used to shift the burden of increased inflation from the consumers to the producers, with minimal government intervention to build manufacturer capacity to fulfill what should be the government’s responsibility.

Prior to the government’s commitment earlier this year to deregulate non-essential medicines, there existed, and still exists until further amendments, 3 unique categories of MRP, under the Drug Pricing Policy.

Firstly, Annual Adjustments (Clause 7) provide a controlled yet predictable mechanism for price increases across most drugs. These adjustments are tied to inflation, allowing MRPs to rise annually based on a formula that factors in economic indicators like currency depreciation. This measure helps cover manufacturers’ rising costs in a manner that remains affordable for consumers.

Secondly, New Entrants (Clause 8) addresses the pricing of new drugs entering the market. Here, DRAP sets MRPs by benchmarking prices in countries like India and Bangladesh, with the goal of encouraging innovation and fair competition while keeping prices aligned with regional standards.

Lastly and most importantly, Hardship Cases (Clause 9) offer an urgent response mechanism for price adjustments due to exceptional economic challenges, such as rapid currency depreciation or import cost spikes. This clause is essential for safeguarding the supply of critical drugs, allowing manufacturers to apply for MRP increases when production costs soar unexpectedly.

As per the governments own policies that led to the creation of DRAP, under the DRAP act 2012, and the Drug Act, 1976, the government has delegated this responsibility of determining prices to the Drug Pricing Committee, and therefore according to Naqvi and Justice Babar Sattar, bound by it in absence of a reasonable justification to reject it.

Did the Government act reasonably and responsibly amid Getz’s economic hardship?

In the recent judgment, Justice Babar Sattar criticized the federal government’s refusal to accept hardship MRP adjustments for Getz Pharma, emphasizing that this

decision reflected a failure to follow its own established policies. This rejection, which came without adequate explanation or adherence to the Drug Pricing Policy’s provisions, cast serious doubts on the government’s commitment to ensuring both consumer affordability and accessibility to essential drugs.

According to Naqvi, “it’s simple. If the government has a policy, it must follow it. If it doesn’t wish to follow it, then it should change its policy. But in this case, the policy that safeguards my client still exists.”

This pointed remark underscores the core of the issue. The government has failed to act in accordance with Clause 9 of the Drug Pricing Policy, which explicitly outlines the procedure for hardship MRPs. By ignoring both the policy framework and the Drug Pricing Committee’s (DPC) recommendations, the government effectively undermined the principles of fair governance.

Justice Sattar observed that the government’s decision appeared arbitrary and unreasonable, lacking in both transparency and accountability. He noted that the Drug Pricing Committee, composed of industry experts, had recommended an adjusted MRP of Rs17,000 for Getz Pharma’s drug, a price notably lower than the Rs19,000 charged by a competing manufacturer.

This recommended adjustment would have not only provided a more affordable alternative but also ensured the continued availability of the drug. In rejecting this without valid reasons, the government failed to balance consumer affordability with accessibility, a critical responsibility in healthcare policy.

Furthermore, Justice Sattar pointed out that by acting inconsistently with its declared guidelines, the government destabilizes the pharmaceutical sector, creating uncertainty for manufacturers and threatening the supply of essential medications to the public.

In a healthcare landscape where access to lifesaving drugs is paramount, this judgment underscores the necessity for the government to act responsibly, transparently, and in alignment with established policy. The arbitrary handling of Getz Pharma’s hardship request highlights the risk of bureaucratic inertia overriding the core purpose of policies meant to safeguard both consumer welfare and industry viability.

How does regulation impact the economy?

The complex web of regulations governing drug prices in Pakistan has far-reaching economic implications, affecting various stakeholders. Lets look at its impact on each stakeholder, including the government itself, to better understand the challenges and economic distortions creat-

ed by inconsistent and stringent price controls:

(i) Producers: rising costs without mitigations

Pharmaceutical manufacturers in Pakistan face an uphill battle to sustain operations amidst mounting production costs and volatile exchange rates. With 80% of raw materials imported, currency devaluation significantly raises costs, particularly for multinationals who already operate on thinner margins due to regulatory price caps. The government’s refusal to adjust MRPs in line with inflationary pressures and currency fluctuations leaves manufacturers with few options.

As a result, multinational companies are gradually exiting the market, as seen in previous financial disclosures, prior to the notification surrounding deregulation of non-essential medicines, where three publicly listed pharmaceutical companies reported losses of Rs600 million, Rs500 million, and Rs300 million, respectively. This exodus not only diminishes competition but also disrupts the supply of essential drugs, putting further strain on the healthcare sector.

(ii) Retailers: diminished profits, increasing risk

For retailers, the regulated MRP limits profit margins, making it financially unrewarding to stock and sell certain drugs. In a low-margin environment, pharmacies and medical stores find little incentive to prioritize medicines with stringent price caps. This situation is exacerbated during times of shortage when demand is high, yet legal channels of profit are constrained.

Consequently, the rigid pricing policies inadvertently encourage a black market, where unofficial channels sell these scarce drugs at unaffordable rates, undermining regulated prices. Retailers, thus, operate in an environment where potential profits are not only constrained by regulation but also siphoned off by illicit traders, leading to a fragmented and inefficient supply chain.

(iii) Consumers: limited access and the rise of the black market

The intended purpose of price controls is to make medicines affordable for consumers. However, the current regulatory structure often has the opposite effect, limiting the availability of essential drugs and pushing desperate consumers toward black-market alternatives.

In times of scarcity, medicines regulated by strict MRPs are often unavailable in legal retail stores but can be found on the black market at inflated prices, sometimes three to four times the controlled MRP. For low-income consumers, this creates a heartbreaking dilemma: pay exorbitant black-market rates or forgo potentially lifesaving medication.

The regulations intended to protect

consumers from price gouging have thus inadvertently made medicines both unaffordable and inaccessible, undermining the very goal of consumer protection.

(iv) Government: Economic Leakage and Burdened Imports

The government’s stance on maintaining low drug prices aims to safeguard consumer interests, but it simultaneously creates an unintended economic burden. By discouraging local production through stringent price caps, the government increases dependency on imported medicines, which in turn puts additional pressure on foreign reserves.

The regulatory environment has created a reliance on imports not only for raw materials but, increasingly, for finished drugs as well. As local producers find it financially unsustainable to operate, import bills rise, exacerbating the balance of payments issue. Moreover, the lack of policy flexibility means the government must deal with increasing black-market activity and the resultant loss in tax revenue, further straining public finances.

In sum, the rigid MRP regulation, while well-intentioned, triggers a cascade of economic consequences. Without adapting the regulatory framework to address these market realities, Pakistan risks deepening the healthcare crisis, driving manufacturers away, increasing the black market’s influence, and overburdening its already fragile economy.

The Public Health Paradox: do price controls limit access?

While MRP controls are meant to keep essential medicines affordable, they often result in unintended shortages, leaving patients without critical drugs. The reliance on imports means that fluctuations in foreign exchange and rising customs duties significantly impact production costs. With MRPs fixed by the government, manufacturers face constraints in adjusting prices to reflect these higher costs, leading some companies to cut back or withdraw products altogether.

For patients with chronic illnesses, the implications are severe. Limited production and market exits have led to recent shortages, pushing many consumers towards black markets or without any medication. In a country where healthcare spending is less than 3% of GDP, these price controls are squeezing both access and affordability, creating a cycle of artificial scarcity.

Other emerging economies have adopted flexible pricing for non-essential drugs, focusing controls solely on essential medicines. Adopting a similar approach could allow Pakistan to protect public health without stifling

the market, ensuring that lifesaving medicines remain accessible even in times of economic instability.

The recent developments

The recent price adjustments for essential drugs and the deregulation of non-essential medicines could mark a turning point for Pakistan’s pharmaceutical sector. As the government has recently signaled deregulation, approving higher MRPs for 146 essential drugs, while giving companies the freedom to price non-essential drugs, it promises to boost profitability, with gross margins rising from 26% in FY23 to 30% in FY24, and a further surge anticipated as interest rates decline.

However, the broader question remains whether these steps indicate a genuine shift in government policy or are simply temporary measures. Industry experts have previously emphasized Pakistan’s lack of domestic biotechnology infrastructure, contrasting sharply with India’s 300 and China’s 3,000 biotechnology plants. The absence of R&D facilities and API (Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient) production not only limits the industry’s growth but also keeps it reliant on expensive imported raw materials.

Dr. Khurran Hussain from Getz Pharma previously proposed that the government tap into the Central Research Fund, worth five billion rupees, to develop local R&D facilities and promote public-private partnerships. Such measures could pave the way for innovation and reduce import dependency. This would mirror the buffer-stock protections seen in the agricultural sector, where Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) safeguard farmers from market fluctuations.

As healthcare spending in Pakistan hovers below 3% of GDP, the IHC’s recent judgment underscores the urgent need for a balanced approach in drug pricing policy. This decision compels the government to rethink how it supports both consumer access and industry viability, key pillars that are currently misaligned. While recent measures like MRP adjustments and deregulation of non-essential drugs offer hope, they may only scratch the surface of deeper systemic issues in Pakistan’s pharmaceutical sector.

Will these reforms foster a competitive, innovation-driven industry, or are they simply short-term remedies? The true test lies in the government’s commitment to honoring the IHC’s ruling by establishing clear, actionable support for producers facing economic hardships. A genuine shift in policy could ensure a resilient supply chain for essential medicines, safeguarding the health of hundreds of millions while reinforcing the industry’s foundation. n

There is a bidding war for a loss making fertilizer plant.

But why?

Fauji Fertilizer and Maple Leaf have fired their first salvos in the bidding war for Agritech Ltd

ince March of 2024, there has been a renewed interest in the takeover of Agritech Ltd. Initially, Fatima Fertilizer and Maple Leaf were showing their intent and now Fauji Fertilizer has also jumped in a bid to take over the ailing fertilizer plant. After trying to buy shares from the largest shareholders, Maple and Fauji have made their public offers trying to outbid each other. With the stakes rising by the day, the question starts to emerge. Why are both the companies so interested in looking to acquire a fertilizer plant which is still reeling from its past losses?

Agritech is a fertilizer manufacturer that has a capacity to produce 433,000 metric tons of urea and 81,000 metric tons of phosphate. In the past 5 years, the share price of the has hovered between Rs2 and Rs7 which shows that the market does not value the investment in a favourable light. With fixed assets worth Rs71 billion and Rs181 per share worth of fixed assets, the market price might seem like an amazing bargain for starters.

It is only when the accounts are seen in depth that one realizes the true situation. With accumulated losses valued at around Rs24 billion, long term liabilities of Rs34 billion and current liabilities of Rs38 billion, it can be seen that things are not as peachy as they seem to be.

To put some context to these numbers, the total assets are worth around Rs84 billion while its equity is only worth Rs13 billion. This was one of the reasons that the auditors had stated that the assets could not bear the burden of its current liabilities. As the liabilities exceed current assets by a whopping Rs25 billion, the auditors felt that short term obligations could not be met with its assets and was not a going concern any longer.

So a company having such serious solvency and liquidity issues, why are two compa-

nies going at it hammer and tongs in order to take it over? Profit tries to make sense of this investment.

Agritech Ltd

In order to glance into the future, a look into the past is important. Agritech Ltd was part of the National Fertilizer Company which was the solitary fertilizer manufacturer in the country. It used to be called Pak American Fertilizer Ltd and is situated at Daudkhel. In the early 2000s, there was a push to privatize many of these plants which meant that Pak Arab Fertilizers was privatized in 2006 and was bought by Azgard Nine Ltd. By 2010, Azgard Nine sold 20.13% of the shares and got listed on the stock exchange. In 2008, Agritech also took over Hazara Phosphate from the National Fertilizer Company which was finalized by 2012.

After privatization, the initial years seemed to be good. Earnings per share were recorded at Rs17.5 in 2006 and saw sizable

profits from 2006 to 2010 reaching a high of Rs2 billion in 2009. This was the first time Fauji came knocking at the door to buy Agritech from Azgard Nine in order to expand its fertilizer business. A global fund by the name of Ashmore Global Special Situations Fund also disclosed that they were looking to buy Azgard’s stake.

In 2010, its fate took a turn for the worse. Due to a gas shortage in the country, gas was taken away which is the most important raw material to manufacture fertilizer. The government was facing a gas crisis and chose to divert gas supply from the fertilizer sector to the electricity sector. The diversion impacted the fertilizer industry and Agritech in particular. The net profit halved from where they were a year ago and this was just the beginning of a downward spiral that would have after shocks.

Even this early, liquidity and solvency issues were being faced as it was not able to make repayments of its liabilities worth Rs2.8 billion in June 2010 which increased to Rs3.4 billion by September 2010. As their ability to pay off its debts weakened, negotiations began with many of its creditors in order to defer its debt payments, issue new debt instruments or look to restructure the debt that it had on its books. In terms of its debt structure, banks and financial institutions had lent money through Term Finance Certificates (TFCs) that had been bought by the likes of Faysal Bank, Pak Brunei, JS Bank and KASB Bank.

With an asset base of Rs13.3 billion and accumulated profits of Rs4.7 billion some losses could be borne. As the magnitude of the crisis had not been realized, there was an expecation that things would get better.

They didn’t.

The crisis deepens

The crisis that had only reared its head in 2010 seemed to be setting in. The gas load shedding issues continued as the Government had no option but

to divert gas towards residential usage in the winter. The government also diverted the gas towards the generation of electricity in order to ease the electricity crisis as well. Coupled with a devaluing rupee and sky high interest rates, the operational and finance costs kept increasing. This further hurt the profitability and liquidity situation as it struggled to even raise funds to carry out its operations.

Through 2011 and 2012, the situation did not change. Its debt installments had grown to Rs4 billion by end of June 2011 and a grace period of one year was given to delay its principal and interest payments. At this stage, its principal and interest payments were around Rs17.7 billion from which Rs2.2 billion was turned into preference shares and additional TFCs.

The final blow came in 2013 where creditors got a court order to take over the shareholding of Azgard in order to compensate for its lending. The new shareholders elected a new board of directors who had been nominated by these financial institutions and aggressive steps were taken to address the debt situation.

In 2012, Azgard owned 79.87% while 17.55% was owned by financial institutions and banks. After the share transfer took place, the share of financial institutions increased to 96.26%. Among the top shareholders were National Bank of Pakistan, Faysal Bank, Summit Bank, KASB Bank and Silk Bank which owned 28.2%, 11.9%, 9.34%, 4.63% and 2.22% of the shareholdings respectively as associated companies.

The auditors at that time, KPMG Taseer Hadi & Co., were already raising red flags over the fact that the current liabilities exceeded its current assets. They were providing this as a note rather than a qualified opinion on a consistent basis. The management replied each time by saying that the situation was out of their control and that they were seeing extraordinary circumstances due to the gas

shortage. They were looking to restructure their debt in order to address this issue and expected to become profitable in the future.

2014 proved to be the worst year where the company operated the plant for 54 days due to the gas curtailment. Things were expected to get better in 2015 when the government signed an LNG supply agreement with Qatar. The new gas would come online in 2016 and was expected to ease some of the gas curtailment issues being faced.

As the new option was present, Agritech had the option to choose to either operate its plant on the high cost Regasified Liquefied Natural Gas (RLNG) or keep using the same system where gas was provided to them by the Sui Northern system. The management felt that operating the plant on RLNG was going to be too expensive. The management decided to work on a two pronged strategy. Firstly, to operate the plants on a blend of system gas and RLNG to reduce the cost of RLNG alone when there was gas that could be provided by the Sui Northern system. In cases where gas was not available, a subsidy could be given in order to reduce the cost of RLNG that would be levied. The advantage of this approach was that local production could be carried out rather than importing urea which would be a burden on the reserves of the country and to provide for a subsidy. The government could fund a subsidy rather than lose out on precious foreign reserves.

Profits go into the red

The gas situation and curtailment stayed the same as the company started to sustain heavy losses from 2012 to 2022 with losses per year clocking in at around Rs4 billion per year. These losses started to weigh down the unappropriated profits as these became accumulated losses in 2013. The losses even had an impact on the equity as equity without surplus for revaluation became negative in

2015 and was negative Rs22 billion before revaluation surplus was taken into account. The revaluation surplus was proving to be the only saving grace as it allowed equity to be shown as being positive. The revaluation surplus had gone from Rs4 billion in 2012 to Rs34 billion in 2022.

As losses started to mount up, they had to be funded from somewhere. Banks and creditors were expected to bear most of the brunt of these losses through long term and short term liabilities in order to keep operating. In profitable times, long term liabilities were worth Rs15 billion in 2010 and current liabilities of Rs12.5 billion. As borrowing started to rack up, the long term liabilities were worth Rs13 billion in 2022 and current liabilities were around Rs56.5 billion.

In the same period, the fixed assets increased from Rs36.5 billion in 2010 to Rs72.6 billion in 2022. It is pertinent to note that out of the total fixed assets, over 96% of these assets were constituted by Rs70 billion of plant, property and equipment which had mostly seen an increase through revaluation rather than through capital expenditure. Fundamentally, the assets grew with little or no substantial investment being carried out in that area. The current assets went from Rs4.4 billion in 2010 to Rs8.9 billion in 2022.

There were developments taking place in 2019 which showed that the things might be getting better. With better supply of gas to its plant, the plant operated for 313 days of the year due to better gas supply. The plant operated efficiently throughout the year and the company saw growing demand in the market which meant local production was able to meet the demand needs. Even having such a great year, the results saw a loss of Rs1 billion.

In 2019, the auditors were changed to Grant Thornton Anjum Rahman who started to place a qualified opinion on the future viability. The source of this opinion was the fact that they saw the debt obligations could not

be met with the assets.

So it is evident that Agritech was suffering through a financial crisis and that its situation would only get better once the gas curtailment issue was addressed. So why would there be a bidding war?

Maybe there is some method behind the madness.

Are the fortunes finally turning?

Even though the picture might look bleak, it seems that things are finally looking up. Back in 2021, the government passed the weighted average cost of gas bill which would mean that Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) would be allowed to charge a weighted average cost for both indigenous gas and imported RLNG. Before the bill was passed, there were two different tariffs that had to be placed for these two types of gas. This would address the major issue plaguing Agritech. In the past, it had chosen to operate on the cheaper alternative in order to keep its costs low. Now with a new tariff structure, even though the cost can be expected to go up, the supply issues will be addressed. Due to higher tariffs, the problem of circular debt would also be addressed as the gas supply companies would be able to generate higher revenues which can be used to decrease the debt issue. The government also removed a capping of fertilizer prices which meant that the producer could transfer the cost of its raw materials onto the customers.

It seems that the impact of this is already being seen. In the latest year, Agritech was able to grow its revenues from Rs17 billion to Rs22 billion. One of the biggest improvements was in the gross profit margin which increased from 12.27% in 2022 to 19.84% in 2023. With better gross profits and operating efficiency, it was able to earn a net profit of Rs1 billion which was a loss of Rs3 billion last year. After

2011, this was the first time a profit was earned even when its finance cost was around Rs6 billion.

The same trend has continued into the first quarter results which show that revenues increased from Rs0.8 billion to Rs9.2 billion for the same period this year yielding a gross profit of Rs1.6 billion. After taking other expenses into account, a loss per share of 0.44 was made this quarter while they had made a loss of Rs4.87 for the same quarter last year.

The courts have also sanctioned a scheme of arrangement which will restructure the debt. At this point, Agritech owes Rs19.5 billion in principal and 6.1 billion in related markup as at 31st December 2023. The scheme proposes an additional issuance of preference shares and the company has already disbursed 0.9 billion in order to show its commitment to the new scheme. The scheme also looks to increase the authorized share capital from Rs15 billion to Rs35 billion in order to allow for the preference shares to be issued. Based on the scheme, the company would see an increase in preference shares of Rs18.5 billion, increase in zero coupon TFCs and sukuks of Rs2.2 billion and Rs0.9 billion, preference dividend payable by Rs21.8 billion and other payables would increase by Rs4.7 billion. These amounts would be used to pay off current liabilities of Rs48.3 billion accordingly.

Interest from different companies

It seems that other companies are taking notice of these developments as well.

Back in February of 2022, three companies had disclosed an interest in buying Agritech, however, that deal did not go through. Now it seems there are new suitors in the market. Since 29th of March, three companies have looked to pursue Agritech in an active manner.

In one corner was Fatima Fertilizer

which is interested in buying. At December end 2023, Fatima owned around 8.4% of the Agritech. In July of 2024, Fatima announced that they were looking to acquire the equity instruments of Agritech that were held by the financial institutions. Since its initial interest, it seems Fatima has backed away from this acquisition.

On the other corner is Maple Leaf Group which had one share in Agritech in 2020 and has increased its shareholding to 38.67 million shares by December end 2023 which were around 9.85% of Agritech. These shares were owned by Maple Leaf Capital which is a private equity firm owned by the Maple Leaf Group. From 2020 till 2023, Maple Leaf Capital bought Rs350 million worth of shares. Since January 2024, Maple Leaf Cement has been on a buying spree to buy shares of Agritech. Latest figures show that Maple Leaf Group owns 24.28% of Agritech shareholding. After trying to get the shareholding away from the major shareholders, a bid for 160 million shares at Rs39 per share was made which will make up 37.86% of additional shareholding.

The newest entry in the list is Fauji Fertilizer which has shown a renewed interest in taking over Agritech yet again. Fauji started their process by buying 27.77% of the shares that were held by different financial institutions and once it felt it had enough, it made its own bid for 151 million shares at Rs38.84 per share making up 35.57% additional shares that they want to acquire in order to gain control of Agritech.

A deal too good to be true?

Both these bids showcase that Fauji and Maple have spent around Rs3 billion in order to get to the point that they are and they are willing to spend another Rs6 billion. With fixed assets worth Rs71 billion, this seems like a very good move

to make. This is one of the biggest reasons that both companies are in this battle. Agritech is turning profitable and is being valued at a much lower price allowing either bidder to own a large asset base for pennies on the dollar. The land and property on which Agritech is located also needs to be revalued and revised which will further increase the value of these assets. With so much value ready to be unlocked, the scramble does make sense. In addition to that, both these companies are weighing the option of either looking to buy a plant or to set one up from scratch. The cost of setting up a new plant will be worth much more considering Agritech was set up decades ago. Setting up a similar plant would be a large endeavour and would likely be much more than buying an old one.

On the other side of the debate, the acquiring company also needs to consider that once it gets to own the assets, they also have to be party to the liabilities. Considering the latest accounts, accumulated losses are worth Rs24 billion and equity is only worth Rs13 billion. If the revaluation surplus is taken away, equity will fall to Rs-20 billion.

Similarly, Agritech currently classifies Rs1.6 billion as convertible, cumulative preference shares which have increased to Rs20 billion due to the new restructuring plan that has been executed. These form part of the liabilities and will have to be redeemed and paid off in due time. In addition to that, there is deferred taxation liability of Rs10 billion which has to be paid off or adjusted in the future. In terms of the current liabilities, even though Rs46 billion has been transferred to long term liabilities, the preference dividend payable has increased from Rs1.9 billion to Rs24 billion. The acquirer will have to put in measures and checks in place in order to pay off these debts as they will keep on accumulating in the long term.

Let’s take a sidebar here to understand the nature of the preference shares that had

been issued back in 2012. There were initially 159 million preference shares that were issued which were 10% non-voting, convertible, redeemable, cumulative preference shares. Let’s take each part of that word one by one. 10% return means that the shareholders would get 10% return on their investment that they have invested In this case, it would mean that they would be given a fixed amount every year. The seniority of the preference shares means that the creditors are paid off first followed by the preference shareholders. Once these two have been paid, the remaining can be given to the ordinary shareholders.

The voting or non-voting status of the preference shares would determine whether the preference shareholders can vote in the meetings and have a say in the affairs of the management. Ordinary shareholders get this right automatically. In the case of Agritech, the preference shareholders were given no such right. The convertibility meant that at any future date, the shareholders can convert their preference shares into ordinary shares. If a shareholder feels that the company is going to make a profit, they can convert their shares and reap benefits from the profitability. Redeemable means that these shares can be redeemed in the future if there are funds to do so.

All these things seem nice and dandy when profits are being earned. There is a smooth payment to creditors and preference shareholders.

But what if the losses are being made? In case of a loss, creditors get their interest without any complications. Next comes the turn of the preference shareholders. In case of non-cumulative shares, the preference shareholders will get nothing in case a loss is made. However, in this case the shares were cumulative which means that the dividend will still accrue in the next year if it was not paid the last year. The dividends will keep accumulating until all of it is paid off sometime

in the future. In the case of ordinary shareholders, they will only get something once profits are being earned. This deal was made as the restructuring being carried out was for the benefit of the creditors in order to reduce some of the burden and pay off its creditors with these preference shares.

Now these debts would become onerous on whoever ends up with Agritech who will have to pay off these preference dividends. By a conservative estimate, both these companies have committed to invest Rs10 billion in order to end up with more than 60% of the shareholding. In addition to that, the acquirer will still be liable to pay a preference dividend of Rs24 billion that is on the accounts of Agritech. A good measure can be to look to reduce the dividend expense in the future by buying off the preference shares from the market but even that will cost Rs20 billion. So it is evident that the new owners will end up investing more before they can expect to reap the benefits of their acquisition. In case Agritech needs additional working capital for better operations, that will also have to be injected which will further increase the burden.

With all this being said, it can be seen that the acquisition that will be carried out can prove to be beneficial. Agritech seems to be getting better in terms of its performance and their profitability can be capitalized on. However, this acquisition comes with baggage that would need to be addressed as soon as possible. The actual price tag of the acquisition could end up being higher than the one estimated here and the liabilities on the books of Agritech will need to be settled as well as they have a potential to further burden the new acquirer with additional complications. At this point, it is clear that the acquirer will have to further commit additional funds before they can expect any return on the investment that they have made. There will be a need to sow the seeds and water this plant before it can be expected to reap any benefits. n

When the Covid-19 pandemic hit the world, two industries came to a virtual standstill. With travel restrictions in place, aviation and the hospitality industry both faced an unprecedented crisis. They simply had a sudden and very drastic drop in customers.

Sure, they tried many different things. In Pakistan, for example, the Pearl Continental Hotel was offering covid getaways where customers could isolate themselves in hotel rooms

After pandemic losses, Pearl Continental is well on the mend. But did their problems run deeper?

The

hospitality business is seeing a return towards pre-pandemic times but how has the company changed during that time?

at very cheap rates. But perhaps more than anything else, the pandemic was a wakeup call for hotels. A time where they did not have their usual business and could take a moment to reflect and chart a new course.

Now, things are starting to return to normal. Pakistan Services Limited, the company which owns the Pearl Continental chain, has seen its revenues and capacity return to levels at which they were in 2018. The average occupancy of its hotels stood at 63.86% in 2018 which fell to 46.57% in 2020. After some troubling years, it has finally started to see its occupancy average increase to 60%. Similarly, there has been a revival in revenues and profits in recent years. Of course, the obvious answer

is that with the pandemic well and truly over things have just gone back to normal. Business as usual. But to believe only this would be a dangerous game. The recovery is not just to do with resumption in normal affairs, but there is a story of external and internal forces being harnessed to change its fate.

How were they doing before

Pakistan Services Limited was established back in 1958 and the company is engaged in running and operating the Peal Continental chain of hotels all over Pakistan. It has hotels in Karachi, Lahore,

Rawalpindi, Bhurban and Muzaffarabad currently. Hotels in Peshawar and a budget hotel under the name of Hotel One located in Lahore was also part of the hotel portfolio which had more than 1,500 rooms back in 2014. From 2014 to 2018, an average occupancy rate of around 60% was seen on an annual basis. Net revenues clocked in at around Rs 7.6 billion in 2014 which steadily increased to Rs 10.5 billion by 2018. As the revenues grew, the gross profits also increased from Rs 3.5 billion in 2014 to Rs 4.8 billion in 2018. The cost management needs to be credited here where it saw its gross margins improve from 44.14% in 2014 to 46.35% in 2018.

Even though revenues increased, its administrative expenses climbed from Rs 2 billion to Rs 3.2 billion which was much faster than the increase in revenues. This led to operating margin actually falling from 19.18% to 16.75% in 2018. The biggest cause of concern in 2018 was the fact that its net profit margin was plummeting on a steady basis from 18.44% in 2014 to 4.71% in 2018. The primary reason for this decrease was the fact that Pakistan Services had started to take long term

loans which had increased from Rs 35 crores in 2014 to around Rs 9.7 billion in 2018. This was an increase of 27 times which was used to finance fixed assets, capital work in progress and equity investments being carried out. The asset side did not lead to the growth in revenues that was expected while the interest expense grew by Rs 1.2 billion. In 2014, finance income earned was more than the expense of Rs 42 crores which turned into a cost of Rs 88 crores. This cost was the reason earnings per share decreased from Rs 43 per share to a third of Rs 15 in a space of 5 years. In terms of the interest rate during this period, the rate was stable in 2014 at 9.5% and actually fell to 5.75 by end of 2017 only to increase to 6.5% by June of 2018. The increase in expense was caused by the loans taken from 2014 to 2018. In terms of revenue generators, it saw average occupancy of 61% in 2014 and 64% in 2018. Even though the revenue source was leading to a higher amount of revenues, the costs associated with earning them were increasing at a faster rate. This was the situation as it stood in 2018.

In order to provide some context to the performance during and after the pandemic

struck, the performance of 2019 can be made the benchmark. The issues that were seen in 2018 actually worsened during 2019 where the occupancy rate fell from 63.86% to 57.57%. As occupancy fell, this was the first year that revenues actually shrank rather than grow as the earned revenue of Rs 10 billion fell down from Rs 10.5 billion earned previous year. In addition to falling revenues, the gross profit margin fell from 46.35% in 2018 to 40.14% in 2019. The cost of goods sold was calculated by taking into account goods imported in order to provide a higher quality provision of services to its customers. From July 2018 to June 2019, the dollar depreciated from Rs 115 to Rs 145 which led to many of its direct costs rising. This fall was further translated to the rest of the operating profit margin which fell from 16.75% to 10.12% and net profit margin which fell from 4.71% to -8.52%. This was the first time Pakistan Services made a loss in the last 10 years. In terms of its indirect expenses, there was little change, however, the debt burden was rising. In lock step with the rupee depreciation, the interest rates had more than doubled from 6.25% to 13.25% by June of 2019.

More long term loans were taken out which increased the interest expense from 88 crores in 2018 to Rs 1.4 billion in 2019. All these factors combined to cause the company to see a loss of Rs 86 crores where it had earned a profit of Rs 50 crores in 2018.

The pandemic makes things worse

Things only got worse once the pandemic struck in 2020 and its effects were seen in 2020 and 2021. Occupancies took a major hit as they reached 47% by 2020 before increasing slightly to 48.5% in 2021. Revenues fell to Rs 8.2 billion in 2020 and to Rs 7 billion in 2021. As the revenues decreased, the gross profits fell to 33.4% in 2020 and 31.6% in 2021. Gross profits had almost halved from Rs 4 billion to Rs 2.2 billion in 2021. As revenues fell, operating loss increased for the company of Rs 28 crores in 2020 recovering to operating profit of Rs 53 crores in 2021. There was some respite seen as the interest rates fell from 13.25% to 7% by 2021 and rupee stayed stable against the dollar. Still, profitability was weighed down by the debt that it had on its books and losses were made worse due to the added burden from the interests. Initially a loss per share of -53.62 in 2020 was seen which improved to -12.17 in 2021.

Seeing these dire circumstances, it was decided to make some vital decisions in order to become more efficient and leaner. The first step was to impair the investments that were making a loss like the investments carried out in the budget Hotel One by considering all of its value as a loss in 2021. The second decision was to look to sell its Peshawer hotel in order to reduce some of its losses. The new direction being chartered is where joint ventures are being carried out in real estate projects. The business model is that the developer builds the

projects and then Pearl Continental commits to provide services to the project. The brand of the hotel chain is based on its hospitality services and it guarantees to service these projects after they have been completed. There is also a movement to pay off its long term loans that have accumulated on the balance sheet.

Even before the results of these changes were seen, there was a blip in the performance. After going through lockdowns and not being allowed to travel, tourism saw a spike in 2022 as soon as things started coming back to normal. The hotel chain saw its average occupancy jump from 48.5% in 2021 to 63.8% in 2022. As things had been kept under control for a long time, the opening up was going to see a huge jump which was also reflected in the revenues which totalled to Rs 12 billion up from Rs 7 billion a year ago. The gross profit went from 31.6% to 41.3% in one year and this would have been better if the rupee had not depreciated by almost 60% in the same period from Rs 150 to Rs 240. Similar changes were seen as operating margins jumped from 7.6% to 17% and net profit margin went from -11% to 5%. As the rupee was depreciating, the government of Pakistan used the only tool it had at its disposal and started to increase interest rates which went back to 13.25% in 2022 from 7% in 2021. The increased rates again increased the magnitude of its interest expense which led to profit after tax to be dampened.

The trouble with normal

The effect of the end of lockdown saw an initial overreaction before things started to go back to normal. After seeing the highs of 63.8% occupancy, things came back to normal as occupancy fell to 53.8% in 2023 and have now tapered off at 5.9.6% in 2024. The recent results show that things have gotten back to levels they were

operating at in 2019 but there is still some more improvement to be seen before the highs of 2018 are realized again. One thing that has improved is that even though the occupancy rate has fallen, the revenues are still higher than they were in 2022.

The chain saw revenues of Rs 15 billion in 2024 which stood at Rs 12 billion in 2022. During 2023, the rupee depreciated further against the dollar hitting a high of Rs 300 but has stabilized around Rs 270 from Rs 240 in 2022. This stabilization has meant that the gross profit margin fell from 41.3% in 2022 to 37.9% while it has increased to 39.4% in 2024. This is closer to the 40% that was seen in 2019 but again there is some time before it reaches the high of 46% in 2018. With better cost management, the company has been able to earn an operating profit margin of 16.5% which is close to its margin in 2018. In terms of its net profit margin as well, it was able to earn a margin of 2.8% compared to 4.7% it earned in 2018. The interest expense is still weighing down the overall performance as it paid out Rs 1.9 billion in interest. There was an active effort to pay off its long term loans which had grown to Rs 11 billion in 2021 and taken to less than 25 crores in 2024. The interest expense has grown in size in 2024 as interest rates hit an all time high and debt has been paid off in piece meal which has weighed down its results.

An industry that was reeling from the aftershocks of the pandemic seems to be getting back on its feet slowly. There has been an active effort to cut out some of the fat and weight bearing down on it and now there are signs that things are heading in the right direction. It can be expected that going forward, it will look to diversify its revenue stream and bank on additional sources of income to make sure it remains profitable and get back to the performance it was seeing before 2019 in regards to its upwards trajectory. n

Round two: Mitchell’s back on the market

On 11th of November, Mitchell’s Fruits Farms Limited announced a board meeting which would consider special business to be resolved and decided upon by the board of directors. There were already rumors that the company was looking to sell itself to an interested buyer. The meeting took place the next day and on the 13th it was announced that two of its major shareholders are considering a strategic review of their investment.

Collectively, Syeda Miamanat Mohsin and Syeda Matanat Ghaffar currently hold 40.63% of the issued share capital and are looking at options in regards to their investment in the company. One of the options in consideration is a complete sale or divestment of the investment. In order to accommodate the shareholders, the company has set up a data room in order to facilitate the shareholders.

To some extent, the rumors seem to be holding true. The reason the rumors were floated were not out of conjecture either. Mitchell’s had been placed up for sale in 2019 as well, however, the sale could not go through as the terms being offered were not favorable to the management.

Earlier, a bid was made by Bioexyte (Private) Limited and Waves Singer Pakistan Limited who made an attempt to acquire more than 30% of the voting shares as separate acquirers. By early 2020, only Bioexyte Foods (Private) Limited was left as the interested party and the company informed the exchange that they considered Bioexyte to be the preferable bidder for them. The negotiations were still ongoing and the deal and its terms would be announced once they were finalized. By July 2020, the negotiations were terminated after favorable terms could not be sought. After the deal could not go through, the company decided to take control over its own fate and appointed Najam Sethi as the chairman of the board. The purpose of this was to turn the company around and make it profitable again.

The company had a past of stellar financial performance and it was earning profits on a consistent basis. The trend broke in 2016 when the company reported its first loss in decades. As the losses started to pile up, the company saw its equity shrink and by 2020, the accumulated losses were around Rs 14 billion. As the company could not find a good bidder, they chose to change their approach and try to make

the company profitable again. In addition to the change in management, there was also a fresh injection of equity through a right share issue which raised an additional Rs 750 billion. The company was going to clean house and improve its performance.

An initial improvement was seen as the company showed a small profit in 2021 before it suffered its worst year in its history losing Rs 62 crores in 2022. The board had appointed Ms Naila Bhatti as Chief Executive Officer back in August of 2020 which was expected to turn the fortunes of the company. As the performance actually worsened, Najam Sethi decided to take over the reins at the top and was appointed as the new CEO in 2022. The financial performance under Sethi has shown some recovery. He has been able to help reduce some of the losses that were taking place and reduced losses around 10 times in 2023. In 2024, the company registered a profit of Rs 46 crores which was a massive increase considering its recent past. The reason for the profits was two pronged. On one hand, Sethi was able to control costs, however, Rs 37 crores of profit were attributable to sale of land that had taken place in the year.

Now it seems that the story has come full circle. With better financial performance taking place, it seems that Mitchell’s in the market yet again to find a new buyer or acquirer for its shares. It is pertinent to note that any bidder who is looking to buy the complete shareholding of the two shareholders will have to make an additional public offer of 29.68% according to Section 111 of the Companies Act 2017. This is mandated by law in order to make sure shareholders who have invested in the company are allowed a chance to cash out their position once such a huge change is taking place at the company. As soon as a new acquirer crosses the 30% threshold of shareholding, they are obligated to buy 50% of the remaining shares through a public offer after they have disclosed a bidding price.

The share price performance of the company shows how the affairs and operations of the company have a constant impact on its share price. In profitable times, the price was hovering around Rs 900 and was touching new highs based on its financial performance. As losses started to take hold, the share price fell to Rs 190 by 2019. As the news of the takeover started to trickle into the market, the share price rebounded to Rs 300, however, as the deal negotiations broke down, the share price fell yet again. The market was finally buoyed after the

Two major shareholders are considering options including a bid to sell 40.64 percent of their holdings in the company

management change and the injection of fresh capital was announced which took the share price to Rs 500 yet again. As the company again stumbled towards its greatest loss in history, the share price broke into double digits touching a low of Rs 70 in 2022. With better results in 2023 and 2024, the share price is finally rising and with the announcement of a sale of its shares, the price has again reached Rs 200 and is expected to retain its upward momentum.

According to the latest pattern of shareholding, Syeda Matanat Ghaffar and Syeda Maimanat Mohsin hold 40.63% of the shares. Syed Mohammad Mehdi Mohsin holds 20.41% while NIT holds the largest chunk outside the company of 9.6%. Local and international investors hold 28.94% of the remaining shares.

It is too early to say anything regarding what the deal would cost and what it would entail for the future. The composition of the board, the running of the company and the new company outlook will be primarily based on assumptions for now. What can be said with authority is the fact that Mitchell’s right now is not the same company that came on sale back in 2020. The company was making consistent losses in 2020 and needed a fresh injection of equity which was carried out. The ailing company of 2020 has turned a corner, to an extent, and it is showing that it has value that can be unlocked by a new acquirer. Recent profits show that the company is improving and could fetch a better price tag than it could in 2020. Things can be said for certain only once details of this strategic review are disclosed but one thing is for certain that the company seems much more attractive now.

After Mitchell’s announced the intention of their shareholders, CCL Holdings (Pvt) Limited has come out and stated that they are interested in acquiring voting shares of the company. They have appointed Arif Habib as the manager to the offer and have disclosed their intention to acquire the shares. At this time, the quantum of purchase and the subsequent public offer has not been disclosed. CCL Holdings has stated that the purchase is based on regulatory approvals that still need to be obtained. CCL Holdings is a company involved in the manufacturing and marketing of pharmaceuticals and health products and also has Wholesun (Private) Limited in its portfolio of companies which are involved in the food market. The details of the acquisition and the end price would be negotiated and communicated with the investors accordingly. n

Pakistan has proven cricket can be profitable without India.

That’s why we can afford to snub them

The BCCI has acted with no regard for Pakistan or any other country in world cricket. This is why the response should be in equal measure

Courage, the kind that is stern as steel, is smelted out of circumstances.

At this moment in time, the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) finds itself in such circumstances. Until last week, Pakistan was set to host an international cricket tournament for the first time since 1996. The ICC Champions Trophy 2025 being held entirely on Pakistani soil was a dream 15 years in the making.

Since 2009, Pakistan has risen from the misery of the terror attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team to painstakingly rebuild trust amongst the international cricketing community. After being displaced from its home grounds, the team played in exile for years, making the UAE its home away from home. But slowly Pakistan Cricket built itself back up. Beginning with a tour by Zimbabwe in 2015 and culminating in seven editions of the HBL PSL, multiple tours by most major test teams, Pakistan cricket has learned to fly again. The cricket board is profitable, Pakistan has one of the most watched franchise T20 leagues in the world and our cricket team is internationally competitive with some big names on the world stage.

Perhaps what makes this feat even more remarkable is that it has been accomplished without India in the equation at all. In fact, since even before 2009 the Board of Control for

Cricket in India (BCCI) has consistently made it a point to demean, belittle, and bully the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB). Of course, the BCCI is more than happy to treat anyone this way and has regularly conducted itself this way with other cricketing nations. Now, they are trying to take away the ICC Champions Trophy from Pakistan as well.

Last week, the BCCI announced they would not send their team to Pakistan for the Champions Trophy. And no, they were not withdrawing from the tournament, rather stating simply that their matches be shifted to a neutral venue like the UAE or Sri Lanka. Not only would this throw the schedule off completely, it would also mean Pakistan would not host the final game of the tournament as well as at least one of the semi-finals. What is more, the PCB would lose out on a big payday that would come in from the event.

International cricket tournaments are the lifeblood of any cricketing nation’s finances. Just take a look at the PCB’s revenue sources for 2023 when it hosted the regional Asia Cup. Even though India refused to tour Pakistan for this tournament as well, resulting in joint hosting with Sri Lanka, it was a major earner for the PCB. The financial year 2022-23 was the first time since 2018 that the HBL PSL was not the biggest source of income for the cricket board. Instead, the biggest source of revenue for the board was international cricket hosted by Pakistan. The total revenue for the HBL PSL for 2023

came out to Rs 3.55 billion. In comparison, the revenue Pakistan made from international tournaments was nearly Rs 5.5 billion. Of this, as the host of the Asia Cup, the PCB received a preparation fee of more than $ 3.57 million (around Rs 99.4 crores), and saw an uptick in broadcasting revenue of around a billion rupees as well.

And this was for a smaller tournament with split hosting, once again due to India. This year, the Champions Trophy was supposed to be a very big payday for Pakistan Cricket. That is why the PCB has also been on a spending spree, including massive renovations of its stadiums.

So what should Pakistan do? For now, what the PCB has done is to take a strong stance against India’s move and insist there be no hybrid model. And despite the massive difference of power between India and Pakistan in the cricketing world, Pakistan might have one thing up its sleeve. The only question is, will the PCB find the courage to stand up to the bully of international cricket?

Understanding the scale

This is very much a David and Goliath story. To understand it, we need to understand how the business side of international cricket works. There are a few basics you should understand for this story. Firstly, the Pakistan Cricket Board is an autonomous government entity with its own

constitutions. What most people do not understand is it is supposed to be run like a corporation. The cricket board handles money coming in from cricket played in Pakistan, it hires players, coaches, staff, stadiums etc and pays the bills. At the end of the day, they are ideally supposed to make a profit which they can then pump back into promoting cricket in Pakistan.

Now the board has a few different sources of income. They receive an annual payment from the International Cricket Council, which is Pakistan’s share of revenue from international tournaments such as the world cup etc, and which was a record high $17 million last year, shown as Rs 4.24 billion on the PCB’s books. For 2023, this was the singest largest source of money that the board got.

Why does the ICC pay this amount to the PCB? As the international members organisation responsible for cricket, the ICC organises tournaments like world cups and champions trophies. The ICC has the rights to these events and earns money from broadcasting, tickets, and other sources of revenue. The profits from these tournaments are then split between the ICC’s many members of which Pakistan is also a pretty big one.

This is simple enough. The reason India has such a disproportionate amount of sway in the ICC is because they have the single biggest market in the world when it comes to cricket. With a population of nearly 1.5 billion people and cricket played across the entire country, just the broadcast revenue from India is huge. It is this colossal number of eyeballs that India uses to also run tournaments such as the Indian Premier League (IPL), which has broadcasting rights worth $1.5 billion a year. The ICC knows matches involving India will have the most eyeballs, which is also when advertisers will advertise the most. As a result, India gets preferential treatment.

Just recently, in response to the BCCI’s announcement India would not travel to Pakistan, the England Cricket Board was quick to put out a statement saying there are “lots of contingencies available” in the event that India do not travel to Pakistan for the tournament but, to “protect broadcast rights”, replacing India in the line-up is not one of them. And why would they not? The BCCI has felt the sting of the BCCI in the past.

Playing India is usually the most important part of any cricketing nation’s calendar. According to a report published in The Guardian in 2022, India’s 10-match tour of South Africa last winter, for instance, was worth £80m to the hosts. Similarly, when India pulled out of a test match in England last year, it left the England Cricket Board (ECB) with a gaping £40 million hole in their finances. Even Australia depends on bilateral series with India, and the two countries play each other more often than any other two teams.

The size of the audience

The crassness with which the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) makes world cricket dance to its tune is matched only by the complete deference of other cricket boards.

Just look back at the Asia Cup that was supposed to be hosted by Pakistan last year. During the tournament, an announcement was made that a Super Four game between India and Pakistan in the ongoing Asia Cup would have a reserve day has made a complete mockery of any semblance of equality in world cricket. For the reader unaware of how cricket tournaments work, this gives an undue advantage to both India and Pakistan in the tournament. Reserve days as a concept in cricket are only ever used for big matches such as world cup finals. So why is a reserve day being set for a group stage encounter in a tournament not half the size of the world cup? Mostly because no matter where in the world it happens or under what circumstance a clash between India and Pakistan is the most watched event in the world.

With hundreds of millions tuning in to watch India versus Pakistan matched, even a billion people at times according to some estimates, the sheer economic power of this rivalry is massive. Yet this potential is ridiculously ignored only because of the BCCI’s continued insistence on politicising cricket and punishing Pakistan for the antagonism in foreign relations between the two countries. Just look at the ruckus being created over the Champions Trophy by the BCCI just as they did with the Asia Cup last year.

The BCCI’s secretary general, Jay Shah, also the son of India’s home minister and Prime Minister Modi’s right-hand man Amit Shah, was more than happy to play spoilsport last year and he has taken delight in doing so again. Normally you’d think the country with the hosting rights would give this a “fine-by-us” and continue making arrangements.

But in the world of cricket India gets what India wants because it controls the pursestrings. With a cricket economy worth tens of billions of dollars (only the broadcasting and media rights for the IPL were worth more than $6 billion) the BCCI is more powerful than the entire ICC combined. Thanks to this financial muscle, almost every cricket board in the world, including other big fish like England, Australia, and South Africa, depend heavily on the rich spoils that they get from bilateral series with India.

Since consolidating its position as head honcho of the cricket world over the past 16 years, India has gone on a concentrated effort to strengthen its relationships with other big boards such as Australia and England and systematically turn Pakistan into a pariah. The last time the two neighbours played a test series

PCB’s earnings from HBL PSL Central Revenue Pool

2018 — Rs 56 crores

2019 — Rs 1 billion

2020 — Rs 1.1 billion

2021 — Rs 1.2 billion

2022 — Rs 57 crores

2023 — Rs 58.4 crores

was in December 2007 in India. Since then, other than one short-format bilateral series hosted by India in 2012, the two arch-rivals have exclusively faced off in larger tournaments such as the cricket world cup. Pakistan’s players have also been excluded from the IPL since at least 2010 after the Mumbai Attacks.

Pakistan is living proof that the BCCI is not invincible

There is a silver lining to this. Despite everything, Pakistan cricket has found a way to not just survive but thrive through these trying times. At the same time other boards have stayed quiet over the injustices and regular snubs suffered by Pakistan because they have been surviving off the scraps of Indian cricket. Pakistan had no choice but to exert its independence and it has managed to do so with aplomb.

The biggest architect of this success has been the HBL PSL. Just take a look at what the tournament has meant for them financially over the past few years.

In 2018, the cricket board made a loss of Rs 53 lakhs. Out of a total revenue of Rs 5.13 billion, the board received Rs 2.2 billion from the franchise tournament, meaning it was responsible for 43% of the board’s revenue that year. Now, the tournament itself saw Rs 1.3 billion come in that year from broadcasting, sponsorships, and other revenue streams into the central revenue pool. Of this, the PCB took a hefty cut of Rs 56 crores, leaving the teams to split Rs 74 crores six-ways. The remainder of their revenue came from the Rs 1.55 billion in franchise fees that the six teams paid.

This means that in 2018, the HBL PSL had a total revenue of Rs 1.3 billion, the costs associated with it were Rs 1.6 billion, meaning it made a loss of around Rs 30 crores.

These early hiccups would not last long. In 2019 the PCB made a profit after some years. The PCB saw revenues of Rs 11.3 billion, and a before tax profit of Rs 5.34 billion. The year also saw the HBL PSL grow, posting a total revenue of Rs 3.31 billion for the PCB. The tournament’s

central revenue pool also improved, swelling to Rs 2.78 billion of which the board took a cut of just over Rs 1 billion.

In 2020, the PCB collected revenue worth Rs 9.34 billion and posted a before tax profit of Rs 4.31 billion. The HBL PSL was once again the largest contributor to this overall revenue with the PCB collecting Rs 3.62 from the tournament, making it responsible for 38% of the overall revenue.The board also received international payments of around Rs 2.6 billion including a one time $16 million payment from the ICC, which made up around 27% of the total revenues.

The HBL PSL itself continued to be a very profitable business for the PCB. The board made Rs 3.63 billion from the tournament in revenues, including Rs 2.43 in franchise payments and around Rs 1.1 billion in central revenue share, basically the same as last year.

Since 2018, the PCB had been using revenues from the HBL PSL to slowly shore up the cash reserves they had in the bank. In 2018, the board had a general fund bank balance of close to Rs 9 billion. By 2019 these rose to Rs 13 billion, and by 2020 they had gone to Rs 17 billion. At the end of 2023, this figure stood at over Rs 20 billion.

Thanks to this, the PCB was able to get through the difficult year that was 2021, when cricket was not being played due to Covid-19. In 2022, the PCB saw revenues of Rs 9.03 billion. The HBL PSL still had a pretty big portion in

the overall revenue. In fact, it had the largest portion at 38% of the total revenue at Rs 3.34 billion. The tournament did very well in 2022. The total central revenue pool ballooned to a massive Rs 5.4 billion.

The current scenario — Pakistan is ready

This brings us to the present. In 2023, the PCB saw the largest amount of revenue it has ever seen at Rs 12.45 billion, and posted a profit of nearly Rs 4 billion at the end of the year. This is the second largest profit the board has ever made for a financial year. Of this total revenue, the HBL PSL contributed the expected Rs 3.55 billion, which is an improvement from 2022 but still not the highest amount the PCB has ever made from the tournament.

The PCB has gradually been taking less and less of a cut from the HBL PSL to give more to the franchise owners. However, the tournament has done its job. International cricket is alive and thriving again in Pakistan, and with tournaments coming in, the PCB has new avenues to make money beyond the HBL PSL, which is very lucrative but slow in terms of growth. One reason the HBL PSL’s share in revenue fell in 2023 compared to other years.

In fact, the biggest contributor to the PCB’s revenues in 2023 was not the HBL PSL, but international payments made to Pakistan by the ICC and ACC. These amounted to Rs 5.43 billion, making up nearly 33% of the total revenue. For context, this is not even close to the highest share in revenue the PSL has had in any single year which we saw was 48%, but it is still big. So why the sudden increase? Because 2023 marked the first time since 1996 that Pakistan was hosting an international tournament. Pakistan was host of the Asia Cup, and even though India made us co-hosts with Sri Lanka, it was a big pay day. You see before this we’ve seen that international payments come to Pakistan for preparing and participating in these tournaments but hosting gets you the real big bucks. For example, Pakistan received a total of $250,000 for its participation in the 2022 T20 World Cup, which was the largest international tournament to take place in 2023. But because Pakistan was co-host for the Asia Cup, they received a payment of $3.57 million, even though this is a comparatively small scale tournament.

On top of this, the HBL PSL is actually trailing behind at number three in terms of revenue streams as of now. That is because revenue from tours inside Pakistan was Rs 3.69 billion this year, which is a little more than what the HBL PSL brought in. The reason for this? The broadcast rights for Pakistan matches went from Rs 62.9 crores in 2022 to Rs 2.52 billion in 2023. This was still not as high as it once was, but the increase was also attributable to the

Earnings from International Tournaments in 2023 Asia Cup — $3.57 million

ICC Men’s T20 World Cup — $250,000

ICC Women’s U19 T20 World Cup — $25,000

ICC Women’s T20 World Cup — $50,000

Where does this leave us?

Pakistan has proven cricket can thrive and be profitable in a country without being reliant on the massive Indian market. That is exactly why we can afford to take a tough stance with the BCCI. It was no surprise that the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) has refused to allow the Indian Cricket Team to travel to Pakistan for the 2025 Champions Trophy.

It is a shame. The India-Pakistan rivalry remains the biggest ticket item in world cricket, and both countries could cash in on this. However, the BCCI with its big money has consistently proven to be a bully in world cricket. It is particularly bad for Pakistan. International cricket, especially major tournaments, are the biggest sources of revenue for most cricket boards.

Pakistan was set to make some big bucks from hosting the Champions Trophy. India refusing to play Pakistan could hurt this revenue stream, especially if India plays its games in the UAE or some other country. But the PCB should remember, they have a bargaining chip in their hand: If Pakistan refuses to play India unless it is in Pakistan, the BCCI will also lose out on the revenue from a Pak-India game, which often garners over a billion viewers. As of now, the PCB does seem to be taking a hard stance on the issue. One would hope they will continue to hold their nerve in front of the blustering and bullying of Jay Shah and the ICC. n

Asia Cup taking place in Pakistan.

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