Legal Matters Issue 25
Personal Injury and Insurance
Quarter 3 2012 Our quarterly newsletter aims to highlight developments and recent case law in the areas of personal injury and insurance in a concise and readable style. We hope that you find it informative and useful.
Motor insurers’ right to recover under section 151(8) Road Traffic Act 1988 This appeal concerned the relationship of the provisions of UK legislation (RTA 1988 s 151(5)/151(8)) with the relevant provisions of the EU Second Motor Insurance Directive originally issued in 1983, and now incorporated within the 2009 Directive.
basis of an assessment of that particular case’
The purpose of the EU Directive is to achieve consistency between Member States as to the scope of motor insurance cover insofar as this affects persons injured in road traffic accidents.
The Claimants’/Appellants’ argument (paragraph 8) effectively excluded from the insurers’ right of recovery under s 151(8) any injured person ie one who was ‘entitled to the benefit of a judgment’.
A point of apparent conflict had arisen in circumstances where an insured has caused or permitted a non insured driver to utilise a vehicle, and an accident occurs. Conflicting UK first instance decisions had arisen upon whether the UK statute was in conflict with the EU Directive.
The COA considered 2 competing ‘notional’ additions proposed by the parties to the RTA in order to achieve compliance with the 2009 Directive.
The insurers argued (paragraph 9) for a more nuanced approach - ‘… proportionate and determined on the basis of the circumstances of the case’. The COA found in favour of the insurer’s interpretation.
A distinction is to drawn between 2 The following practical points arise situations: from the Judgment: case 1 - where the vehicle alone is 1 the key effect is that motor damaged; insurers’ rights of recovery under RTA s 151(8) are preserved to at case 2 - where the passenger/ least some extent. The degree of insured owner is also injured - an causative/culpability of an ‘insured ‘insured passenger victim’ - see passenger victim’ will be paragraph 73 of the Court of Appeal determined on a case by case (COA) judgment. basis; The COA was required to consider the issues arising following a decision of 2 this interpretation is therefore at first glance in insurers’ interests; it the European Court of Justice (CJEU) will remain to be seen how this is upon 2 questions. The key finding of applied in particular instances; the CJEU was (paragraph 49 CJEU) that ‘…national rules …may not refuse or restrict t o a 3 the case is remarkable in UK constitutional terms - it underlines disproportionate extent the the extent to which even UK compensation to be made available primary Parliamentary Legislation to the passenger …solely on the is subordinate to EU law. In effect, basis of his contribution to the the CJEU has caused UK primary occurrence …It is only in exceptional legislation to be rewritten. circumstances that the amount of compensation may be limited on the
Inside: The power to strike out dishonestly exaggerated claims
2
Whether injuries arose out of use of a vehicle on a road
2
Responsibility for one’s own adventure decisions
3
No cause of action against the police whilst investigating crime
4
NHS Trust could owe a duty of care to a Local Authority employee
4
School not liable for injury sustained during golf lesson
5
Vicarious liability extended to relationships that are ‘akin to employment’
6
ABI apply for review of 10% damages increase
6
Participation in activities: a further challenge to social sports
7
Airport not responsible for child playing with a luggage trolley
7
Partner Perspective
8
For further details contact Keith Gaston - details on page 8 Churchill Insurance v (1) Fitzgerald (2) Wilkinson : Evans v (1) Cockayne (2) Equity Claims Ltd & Secretary of State [2012] EWCA Civ 1166
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The power to strike out dishonestly exaggerated claims In Summers v Fairclough Homes Ltd the Supreme Court (SC) considered whether the court has the power under the CPR to strike out fraudulently exaggerated claims in their entirety. The Court of Appeal (COA) decisions in Ul-Haq v Shah [2009] EWCA Civ 542 and Widlake v BAA [2009] EWCA Civ 1256 indicated that courts did not have this power. In 2003 the Claimant (C) suffered fractures to his hand and foot after falling from a stacker truck. His claim was issued in 2006 and after a liability trial in 2007; judgment was entered with damages to be assessed. C’s Schedule of Loss totalled £838,616. The Defendant (D) obtained surveillance evidence which showed C to be grossly exaggerating the effect of his injuries and incapacity to work. D made no offers as the whole claim was 'tainted' by fraud. The Court was satisfied that C’s exaggeration amounted to fraud. However, he was awarded around £88,000 in damages to reflect genuine losses.
D appealed but the COA was bound by the decisions of UlHaq and Widlake. Permission was granted to appeal to the SC. The SC held that the court has the power to strike out a claim for abuse of process under CPR 3.4(2) or under its inherent jurisdiction even where there has been a trial and the judge was able to assess damages fairly. It was accepted that deliberately bringing a false claim and adducing false evidence is an abuse of process. However, the claim should only be struck out if the claimant forfeited the right to have his claim determined following Masood v Zahoor [2009] EWCA Civ 650. A claim should only be struck out in 'exceptional circumstances'. The SC found it difficult to provide examples of circumstances where this would be 'just and proportionate'. The SC indicated that where there is a ’massive’ exaggeration of the value of the claim but the genuine losses are very modest it may be appropriate to strike out a claim. The power to strike out is
compatible with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. However, the SC declined to use it in this case as C suffered a 'significant injury' as a result of D's breach of duty and concluded that it would not be proportionate and just to strike out the claim. The SC stated that the d e t erre nc e of dis ho ne s t claimants can be achieved in other ways including costs penalties, reducing interest and proceedings for contempt of court. Calderbank offers to settle genuine parts of the claim to include offers for costs were encouraged as Part 36 offers are not appropriate in these cases. This is a step forward from the disappointing decision in UlHaq. Fairclough Homes provides authority for the striking out of genuine claims tainted with fraud but probably only where the genuine loss is very modest. For further information contact Tim Short - details on page 8 Summers v Fairclough Homes Ltd [2012] UKSC 26
Whether injuries arose out of use of a vehicle on a road The Claimants (C) were victims of a taxi driver (W) who lured women into his taxi. During their journeys home W would persuade women to consume alcoholic drinks which had been laced with sedatives and sexually assaulted or attempted to assault them. W was convicted of a number of offences against the women. Proceedings were issued against W and his motor insurers for damages for injuries including assault by poisoning, sexual assault and false imprisonment. The preliminary issues centred on whether and Legal Matters Personal Injury and Insurance
to what extent C had a valid cause of action against W’s motor insurer as the provider of compulsory motor insurance under Section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988(the Act). The preliminary issues were:
whether C’s injuries arose out of the use of W’s vehicle on a road or other public place pursuant to s.145 (3) of the Act; whether liability for the acts of poisoning and assault was required to be covered, and was covered by W’s motor insurance policy;
whether W’s use of the vehicle at the material time was a use insured by the policy; whether the motor insurer was liable under s.151 of the Act to satisfy any judgment obtained against W in favour of C.
C argued that the use of the taxi meant the injuries sustained had ‘arisen out of the use of a vehicle’ within the Act and that the motor insurers were required to meet any judgment they obtained against W. Continued on page 3...
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Whether injuries arose out of use of vehicle on a road It was held that Cs’ injuries did not arise out of the use of W’s vehicle within the Act. It was necessary to consider whether the injuries to C were matters arising out of the use of a vehicle and to analyse W’s activities at the time when C suffered the injuries. Under the Act the wording ‘arising out of’ created a broader range of circumstances than ‘caused by’. However, a strong causal connection had to be established. It was necessary for the connection to be a relationship short of a direct or proximate relationship between the injuries suffered and the use of the vehicle when the incident occurred, not at the start of the
journey. A link between the wrongful acts and the vehicle
they were poisoned and assaulted and the use of the taxi on the road. The chain between W’s use of the taxi and Cs’ injuries was broken by W’s criminal acts of providing laced drinks and assaulting C and had not arisen out of the use of the taxi on the road. Siber J determined the remainder of the preliminary issues in the favour of the motor insurer. For further information contact Joanne Pizzala - details on page 8
would not be enough to establish a causal connection. Here there was no causal link between the injuries that C sustained when
AXN & ORS v (1) John Worboys (2) Inceptum Insurance Co Ltd (formerly HSBC Insurance (UK) LTD [2012] EWHC 1730 (QB)
Responsibility for one’s own adventure decisions The case concerned an accident that occurred in 2004. The Claimant (C) travelled with Sir Ranulph Fiennes on a pre Everest Expedition to Ecuador. During filming (for publicity purposes) it was suggested that 2 staged falls should be recorded. C agreed to participate and was subsequently injured sustaining head and soft tissue injuries during the stunts and brought a claim under the Package Travel, Package Holiday and Package Tours Regulations 1992. At first instance the Judge found that whilst the staged falls did not form part of the package, the local guides, provided by the Defendant (D) who had assisted with the staging, had assumed some responsibility to provide that assistance with reasonable skill and care, extending the principles laid down in Parker v TUI [2009] EWCA, Civ 1261. The Judge found in relation to the first fall, which had been badly managed and executed, that
tortuous responsibility laid with D but with a 40% reduction for C’s lack of questioning. The Judge found no liability in respect of the second fall. D appealed.
services. Therefore, it concluded that D was not liable in negligence to protect participants from risks arising from unauthorised or unforeseen activities (the staged falls) and that D was therefore not liable for the injuries sustained by C. “When a person is perfectly well aware of the risks they are taking, the Defendant does not owe such a duty. The activity in which Miss Harrison agreed to become involved had been no part of the itinerary for the purposes of the contract.”
The main issue to be dealt with by the Court of Appeal was the extent of liability of D. The Appeal determined that there was a distinction between a contract of service and a contract for service and the employer could escape liability for collateral acts of negligence if the tortfeasor (the guides in this instance) were employed under a contract for
This outcome reaffirms that there is a limit of responsibility for tour operators in negligence and that undertaking activities involving inherent risks, such as C did in this case, may well negate any duty of care on behalf of any defendant. For further information contact Julian Morris - details on page 8 Harrison v Jagged Globe (Alpine) Ltd EWCA Civ 835
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No cause of action against the police whilst investigating crime The Claimant (C), who lived in South Wales, made a 999 call to Gwent Police and told them that her former partner had assaulted her and would return to hit her. The call was not given a high priority by South Wales Police to whom details of the call were passed. Shortly afterwards a further emergency call was made by C. When the police attended her home she had been killed. There was a history of the police attending C’s home to deal with domestic violence matters. Claims were brought alleging negligence and a breach of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It was accepted that there had been serious failures in the handling of the 999 calls. Nevertheless, both Defendants applied to strike out the claims as disclosing no cause of action or having no prospect of success. At first instance the Judge held that there were issues of fact which had to be determined at trial and refused to strike out the claim. In respect of the negligence action the Court of Appeal (COA) followed Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 and subsequent cases. The police were investigating crime and hoping to suppress crime. A duty of care therefore, did not arise on public policy grounds for
the reasons set out in the earlier cases. The argument that the police had assumed responsibility for C was also rejected. The matter was therefore suitable for summary disposal. Turning to the Article 2 claim, the COA applied the test laid down in Osman v United Kingdom (23452/94) [1999] 1FLR 193]. A duty would only arise where the police knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to an identified individual. Facts relevant to that issue were to be determined, so that the matter could not be disposed of summarily; the facts would have to be considered at trial to decide whether there was any breach of the Article 2 obligations. In such cases it seems highly unlikely that a claim in negligence will succeed in the absence of any clear assumption of responsibility for a victim’s safety. Article 2 claims are less susceptible to being struck out. Claimant lawyers are bound to continue to try to push the boundaries of the Osman test, perhaps to encompass identifiable groups. Recently we acted on behalf of Humberside Police and had a claim under Article 2 struck out as disclosing no cause of action. There, 2 people were assaulted, one very seriously, by a group of violent youths who had been
known, by the police because of calls made; to be roaming the neighbourhood. The seriously injured victim was not named by those making emergency calls until the time of, or shortly after, the assault. The Judge reaffirmed the strict Osman test. She confirmed that Michael was restricted to its facts and in any event, could be distinguished as it was a domestic incident. No different test applied, but because of the background of domestic violence there was, at least, the potential for the police to have had knowledge of risk. ECHR jurisprudence has broadened the scope where, for instance, the perpetrators of the crime were under the control of the State in the first place (Mastromatteo v Italy (app 37703/97)) and consideration to broadening the scope was given during the Inquest into the July 07 London bombings. However, the test remains that of a risk to an identified individual. Challenges to that are likely. For further information contact Simon Hills - details on page 8 Michael (Administratrix of the Estate of Michael deceased & ors) v (1) Chief Constable of South Wales (2) Chief Constable of Gwent [2012] EWCA Civ 981
NHS Trust could owe a duty of care to a local authority employee The Claimant (C) employed by Durham County Council (D1) was a designated Social Worker for the daughter (X) of a man referred to by the Court as GB. Tees & Wear NHS Trust (D2) operated a team which was involved in the care of 2 of GB’s children, including X. Northumberland NHS Trust (D3) operated a mental health admissions ward to which GB had been admitted. GB had a known history of violent behaviour and posed a risk of harm to others.
All 3 Defendants had signed a policy document regarding working together in providing services to adults and children. GB spent time in D3’s ward and through a series of meetings it was clear that he had made known his violent intentions towards C to both D2 and D3. They were not passed on to D1. At a subsequent meeting GB stabbed C. D2 and D3 applied to strike out C’s claim on the basis that no
duty of care was owed, either in common law or under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Both claims were struck out at first instance. It was said that it would not be just, fair and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the NHS Trusts. This appears to have been largely based on the argument that there had been no assumption of responsibility by them towards C. The Article 2 claim was struck out Continued on page 5...
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NHS Trust could owe a duty of care to a Local Authority employee on the basis that there was no real and immediate risk to C from GB. The Court of Appeal overturned the decision in both respects. Dame Janet Smith said that the Judge had come close to erring in law in holding that an assumption of responsibility was the only route by which a public authority could fall into the special circumstances needed to impose a duty of care, but in fact had not so decided. However, she accepted that the Judge was wrong to reject the existence of an assumption of responsibility on the facts. The Judge appeared to have thought that before there could be an assumption of responsibility, something positive to that effect has to have been said or done, which clearly indicated such assumption. She
said it was possible to infer an assumption of responsibility from the circumstances. It was open to a judge, having heard all the facts, to find that there had been an assumption of responsibility and therefore the matter had to proceed to a trial. Where a claimant did stand in a ‘special relationship’ with a public authority, there may be grounds to impose a duty of care whether through an assumption of responsibility, or because it would be just, fair and reasonable to do so. Of relevance in this case was the close working relationship amongst the 3 Defendants and, in particular, between C and D2. As to Article 2, the facts could lend themselves to the possibility that there was both a real and immediate risk to C, which facts
would have to be considered at a trial. This area continues to be a fertile one for incremental changes to the law. Social Services, Education Authorities, schools, police forces and NHS Trusts, working within multidisciplinary partnerships may be the target of innovative claims based on arguments of proximity and/or assumptions of responsibility. Nevertheless, where there is no real evidence of proximity, applications to strike out at an early stage can still be worthwhile. For further information contact Simon Hills - details on page 8 Selwood v (1) Durham CC (2) Tees Esk & Wear NHS Foundation Trust (3) Northumberland Tyne & Wear NHS Foundation Trust [2012] EWCA Civ 979
School not liable for injury sustained during golf lesson swing the clubs until told. The District Judge held that the teacher had failed to supervise.
The Claimant (H) suffered significant facial injuries when he was hit by a golf club swung by another pupil in a golf lesson. Up to the time of the accident all the pupils had behaved well and there was no criticism of the lesson plan. The teacher had emphasised safety matters and had instructed the pupils not to
The Court of Appeal allowed the Council’s appeal, concluding that on the District Judge’s findings, a lack of supervision was not made out. The actions of the boy who hit H were wholly unexpected. The teacher could not be expected to see every action no matter where he positioned himself. There was no finding on the balance of probabilities, that any action by the teacher would have prevented the accident.
Although this case does not set any new standards, it supports the proposition that activities which carry some risk can be carried out in schools provided lesson planning is thorough. Accidents can and will occur during activities involving moderate risk, without that being the fault of the teacher or the school. Plexus acted on behalf of the Council and further details of this case can be found in the E-Alert on our website. For further information contact Simon Hills - details on page 8 Hammersley-Gonsalves v Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council (2012)
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Vicarious liability extended to relationships that are ‘akin to employment’ In this recent case the Court of Appeal (COA) determined the preliminary issue of whether a Diocesan could be held vicariously liable for the alleged torts of one of its priests. The facts were as follows: the Claimant (C) had been placed in a children’s home at an early age. Father Baldwin (B) was the parish priest at the time. In the course of his duties B regularly visited the children in the home. C alleged that she was sexually abused by him during those visits.
whether a priest is an employee of its Diocese; and
whether vicarious liability could extend to a relationship that is merely akin to an employer/ employee relationship.
The COA found as follows: i
the business of the Roman Catholic Church is to spread the word of God and the priest responsible for the local branch of the Church holds a central role in fulfilling that objective (the ‘organisation test’);
The Defendant denied the ii a priest is wholly integrated into allegations. It further argued that, the structure and organisation of whilst B was following his calling as the Church, rather than a mere a priest and was the holder of an accessory to it (the ‘integration office, he was not an employee and test’); so the Diocesan could not be held vicariously liable for his alleged iii whilst a priest does not receive a salary, the bishop is obligated actions. to ensure ‘decent support’ of his The Lower Court had priest in addition to the acknowledged that whilst the level donations received at mass, of control over the wrongdoer (the which the COA considered ‘close connection test’) is a factor, comparable to a wage. there had to be regard to justice Moreover, any surplus and fairness. donations go to the parish funds and thus the priest derives no The COA was accordingly asked to benefit from any risk he consider: undertakes, unlike an independent contractor (the
‘entrepreneur test’); iv whilst a priest’s appointment is made pursuant to religious beliefs, without an intention to create a legal relationship and with no contract or letter of appointment, the COA acknowledged that priests are bound to show obedience to their bishop, and are ultimately subject to the sanctions and control of the bishop. For example, the bishop has the power to remove a priest from office (the ‘control test’). In being guided by these 4 tests, the COA concluded that B was not an independent contractor; the relationship was akin to employment within the ordinary meaning of the word. The Diocesan appeal against the finding of vicarious liability for B’s alleged actions was accordingly dismissed. For further information contact Katherine Van Aardt - details on page 8 JGE v Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust [2012] EWCA Civ 938
ABI apply for review of 10% damages increase ‘With effect from 1st April 2013, the level of general damages for (i) pain, suffering and loss of amenity in respect of personal injury, (ii) nuisance, (iii) defamation and (iv) all other torts which cause suffering, inconvenience or distress to individuals, will be 10% higher than previously’. The above judgment, announced by the Court of Appeal (COA) in the Simmons v Castle case, confirmed that the 10% uplift is to coincide with the civil costs reforms introduced in the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. As a key feature of Lord Jackson’s ‘package of recommendations’, the
Legal Matters Personal Injury and Insurance
intention of this reform was to help compensate claimants for the non recoverability of success fees and ATE premiums from 1 April 2013 onwards. Insurers have raised concerns that the single date for implementation will facilitate some claimants achieving ‘double recovery’ in terms of increased general damages and recoverable success fees under a pre April 2013 CFA. Accordingly, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) have submitted an application for the COA’s judgment to be reviewed and the outcome of this challenge is keenly anticipated.
James Dalton, the Head of Motor and Liability Insurance at the ABI echoed the opinion of many commentators in stating that “the Simmons decision represents a significant departure from Government policy and left unchallenged, is likely to lead to increases in car insurance premiums and employers’ liability premiums. We are pleased that the Court has agreed with the ABI’s submission to reopen the case”. For further information contact Helen Randall - details on page 8 Simmons v Castle [2012] EWCA Civ 1039
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Participation in activities: a further challenge to social sports The Claimant (C), a teacher, attended a week long residential adventure course with his secondary school pupils on Dartmoor in April 2007 where he partook in a mini Olympics event. The event involved throwing a wellington boot as far as possible and to ensure that C did not have an advantage, he was instructed to throw the welly backwards between his legs. No further instructions were provided. C bent so low and threw with such force that he slipped forward hitting his head on the ground causing significant spinal injury; permanent tetraplegia. C brought a claim on the basis that he was instructed to adopt an unsafe method of throwing the welly and that his injury was a logical and foreseeable consequence of throwing the welly in the manner requested. C maintained that the Defendant (D) had breached its duty of care by failing to carry out an adequate risk assessment; D argued that it had conducted a dynamic risk assessment of the event. Significant injuries, whilst participating in social sport/ activities, have received regular judicial comment over the last few years; Barnes v Scout Association [2010] EWCA CIV
1476, Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Limited [2011] EWCA CIV 66. As Smith LJ stated in Barnes “Whether the social benefit of an activity is such that the degree of risk it entails is acceptable is a question of fact, degree and judgment, which must be decided on an individual basis and not by a broad brush approach”. In this case and on the facts, the Judge concluded that C’s throw was no ordinary one as the boot went up rather than traversing any distance and was therefore evidence that it had been thrown in an unusual manner which could not have been foreseen by D. There was good evidence that a number of other individuals had managed to throw it through their legs with no difficulty, no falls and no injuries. As a result, the Judge concluded that D could not have foreseen the unusual way in which C fell; it was a tragic and freak accident.
social value of any activity, which gives rise to risk, should be balanced against the likelihood and seriousness of injury that may occur Tomlinson (FC) v Congleton Borough Council and Others [2003] UKHL 47. The risk, which needs to be foreseen by a defendant, is the risk of serious injury and not just a risk of any injury Uren. Organisers must continue to carry out risk assessments. However, where injury occurs with no foreseeable risk and dependent upon the facts, defendants should be in a position to defend any potential claim. As Jackson LJ stated in the minority decision in Barnes “it was not the function of the law of tort to eliminate every iota of risk or to stamp out socially desirable activities”. For further information contact Julian Morris - details on page 8 Blair-Ford v CRS Adventures Limited [2012] EWHC 2360
The outcome confirms the previously held assertions that the
Airport not responsible for child playing with a luggage trolley Plexus has had recent trial success defending an interesting claim brought against Cornwall Airport. The Claimant (C) was an elderly lady who sustained a laceration to her leg in the arrivals hall at the airport when a child pushed a luggage trolley into her. C issued a claim against the airport for damages alleging a failure to keep her reasonably safe in breach of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. The claim was of limited value. C alleged that the accident had been caused by a sharp edge on the trolley which made it inherently dangerous for use. C also alleged that the airport had failed to supervise the baggage reclaim
process and the child. The claim was defended on the grounds that the trolley was entirely suitable for purpose if used as intended and that it was not the airport’s duty to supervise children. Witness evidence was admitted at trial to support the airport’s system of inspection with regard to the trolleys. There were also questions surrounding C’s credibility as she changed her version of events throughout. The claim was dismissed at trial. The Judge found that it would be too high a duty to place on the airport to expect it to be responsible for the actions of unsupervised children on its premises. The Judge was
persuaded that the accident was caused by the unforeseeable actions of the child rather than an inherent defect with the trolley itself. Whilst only a County Court decision, this is a pleasing judgment for defendants which serves as a useful reminder that ultimate responsibility for the actions of minors remains with their parents and guardians. For further information contact Rebecca Gibb - details on page 8 Emily Marsh v Cornwall Airport, Truro County Court, May 2012
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Partner Perspective Tim Short, Partner, comments on developments in the Manchester office It is nearly 3 years since I became involved in the plan to open an office for Plexus Law in Manchester. The Manchester office opened in City Tower in March 2010. In the first few days after the office opened a small Team of solicitors and support staff moved into what then seemed like a vast and dauntingly large office. The City Tower office is now into its third year of trading. There are over 60 solicitors and support staff, split between 5 sector focused Teams, which span a wide range of claim types. Matthew Smith and Andrew Steel lead a thriving Public Sector Team, which played a major role in the Firm’s success in its appointment to the Metropolitan Police led National Framework Agreement earlier this year. The Team advise a range of ‘blue light’ and other public sector organisations in the North West and across the country. Nicola Skeldon leads an ever growing Costs Team at City Tower. With the Jackson reforms just over the horizon, the issue of claimant costs has never been higher on the claims’ agenda. City Tower is also the home of the Plexus Law Counter Fraud Team. The Team advises a range of clients across all sectors on potentially fraudulent claims. The Team also provides regular training and advice to other Teams across Plexus Law, highlighting the indicators of fraud in what might
otherwise apparently be routine and straightforward claims, ensuring that the ever present threat of fraud is countered across our business. The Casualty and Public Liability Team in City Tower is led by Louise Shaw. The Team deals with all manner of complex and high value casualty and public liability claims, working in close partnership with our Casualty Team in Leeds. Finally, we have the sector closest to my professional heart, Motor Claims. We have a Volume Motor Team led by Amanda Jones and a Large and Complex Loss Team dealing with claims of the utmost severity as well as providing advice and guidance on indemnity, coverage issues and providing legal defence to criminal prosecutions. As the importance of Manchester and the North West in the insurance claims market continues to grow, I look forward to further growth of the Manchester City Tower office, adding to the comprehensive service offered by Plexus and the Parabis Group to the claims industry in these challenging and ever changing times. For further information contact Tim Short - details below
Contact Information If you have any queries or require advice on any of the matters discussed in this issue, please see contact details below : Keith Gaston
Julian Morris
Helen Randall
E: keith.gaston@plexuslaw.co.uk
E: julian.morris@plexuslaw.co.uk
E: helen.randall@plexuslaw.co.uk
DDI: 0844 245 4956
DDI: 0844 245 5273
DDI: 0844 245 4233
Tim Short
Simon Hills
Rebecca Gibb
E: tim.short@plexuslaw.co.uk
E: simon.hills@plexuslaw.co.uk
E: rebecca.gibb@plexuslaw.co.uk
DDI: 0844 334 1008
DDI: 0844 245 4133
DDI: 0844 245 4214
Joanne Pizzala
Katherine Van Aardt
E: joanne.pizzala@plexuslaw.co.uk
E: katherine.vanaardt@plexuslaw.co.uk
DDI: 0844 245 4772
DDI: 0844 693 5546
If you have any suggestions for future issues, please email jason.omalley@parabis.co.uk
www.parabislaw.co.uk The content of this newsletter is merely informative and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice.
We hope you have enjoyed this issue of Legal Matters. However, if you do not wish to continue receiving the publication, please email : toni.maguire@parabis.co.uk, providing your name, company name and address. Plexus Law is a trading name of Parabis Law LLP, a limited liability partnership registered in England under number OC315763 and is authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority
Legal Matters Personal Injury and Insurance