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A Return to Normalcy

A Return to

Normalcy Steven J. Bolen, PRP

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As a society, we have weathered two seemingly long pandemic years. Parliamentarians spent this time keeping organizations operating on an emergency basis when they could not meet in the usual manner.

In our role as parliamentarians, we guided our clients through numerous changes to their bylaws, empowering officers universally to declare emergencies and take the necessary actions to keep their divisions operating . We assisted many of our clients in their struggle with how to transition from in-person to online meetings . Guided by the 2020 NAP Training Conference and 2021 Biennial Convention, along with multiple issues of the National Parliamentarian, NAP members analyzed the emergency and expounded upon the proper response . The Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised (RONR) authorship team supported us by adding an appendix for electronic meetings to their 12th Edition . Articles and workshops were presented that covered the steps needed to assure the continuity of services by our clients . Organizations survived the pandemic by implementing our suggestions while remaining compliant with governmental requests and mandates .

It now appears that the pandemic will fade away slowly, not with a bang but a whimper, hopefully over the next couple of years . In some places, the emergency has largely ended, while in others, it continues . Depending on their location, some organizations have been able to return to a semblance of normal operations .

Other groups, for many different reasons, have struggled with taking that definitive step to return to normal operations . Getting into the emergency mode was understood by all; but getting out can be a matter of contention .

While parliamentarians of NAP have rallied to support our clients’ emergencies, now it is time to support the next step in the process, that of exiting from the emergency mode and returning to normalcy.

Nationally, too many members are slow to return to in-person organizational meetings, and it is those gatherings for which the operations of the organizations depend . For instance, attendance at churches across the nation is down around 50%, a number consistent with other social clubs . Without active members, the organizations flounder and struggle to survive .

In Parliamentary Law, General Robert admonished that organizations must do what is necessary to recover from unwise bylaws and rules adopted in different situations . Organizations must not be permitted to commit “organizational suicide” through ill-advised actions . In the Q&A section, the General responded to a group whose bylaw requirements no longer made sense due to organizational growth, which meant that a quorum could no longer be achieved . In today’s world, it isn’t growth that creates difficulty in achieving quorums, but travel and isolation restrictions that prevent members from coming . The emergency uncertainty means that it will be difficult to either get back to normal or move on to a new normal . So as General Robert instructs, we may have to resort to the spirit of the rules rather than the rules themselves, because, above all, democracy must continue .

In his 1935 work, Parliamentary Rules Simplified, Arthur Lewis outlined his fundamentals of common parliamentary law, of which the first was “The organization is paramount .” During the pandemic, this fundamental principle was often used to justify taking any necessary actions . By this statement, Lewis meant that an organization often has to do what it must to remain in operation . Sometimes, this comes in the form of avoiding motions contrary to the organization’s object . And sometimes this means keeping the officers for another year when holding elections are impossible . It is better that the organization have officers that serve longer than intended as opposed to having no officers at all . In times of emergency, the organization is paramount . The lockdowns struck particularly hard those organizations whose primary purpose involved interfacing with the public.

During the lockdowns, these organizations simply could not function, which meant that annual requirements, such as officer elections,

were put off for up to two years . While, at the time, this seemed reasonable, there must be limits to the situation . While the organization is paramount, it must remain democratic if it is an organization for which RONR is the parliamentary authority .

Bylaws were universally updated to permit a president or board of directors to declare an organizational emergency, but few included a provision for rescission.

In the Fall 2018 issue of National Parliamentarian, Lorenzo R . Cuesta, PRP introduced the notion of antimotions (pp . 5-9), which are a pair of motions for which one undoes the effect of the other . In this case, there is a need for a motion to declare an emergency and an anti-motion to rescind those emergency powers . These new bylaw provisions greatly empowered officers to do what they could not do before, powers which they may be hesitant to relinquish . Primarily, authority rests within the members of the assembly because, as Lewis’ fundamental principles remind us, “Majority rules, usually .” He referred to usually as in the vote requirements, but it also applies to the running of organizations, wherein usually the majority rules . Officers have found that democracy can often be messy, and authoritarianism often makes things easier to achieve .

The easiest cases to resolve are those where the assembly passes a resolution declaring the emergency . This method was generally the approach when the deliberative body in question consisted of a small board or executive committee, whose numbers were small enough to accomplish a quorum even during the restrictions . Since in these cases, the assembly itself took formal action, they can easily take additional action to undo their resolution through a simple motion to Rescind, as found in RONR (12th ed .) §35 . In this scenario, the motion requires a two-thirds vote, a simple majority vote if notice is given, or a vote of a majority of the entire membership .

In larger bodies, it was often the case that executive boards and officers determined the new meeting procedures, which were later ratified by the assembly . Since the power to make such decisions always rests with the assembly, the assembly is free to Amend Something Previously Adopted and undo the declarations of emergency, returning the organization to normalcy .

Finally, the most challenging situation is where the officers declare the emergency, e .g ., the frequent use of the Governor’s Executive Orders to enable them to do so, and where this action was never ratified or approved by the assembly . Within this group, there are two scenarios, one where officers want to get back to normal and the other where a few overzealous officers refuse to relinquish their newly found powers . In either situation, it is within the power of any member to make a simple motion to “repeal the emergency operation,”

requiring just a majority vote to pass . In essence, this is a motion to refuse to ratify the officer’s actions . Asking an assembly to unratify or reject the ratification is likely to confuse them . So, it is probably better to word the motion as “to repeal the emergency and return to regular order . ”

If, however, the presiding officer refuses to recognize or honor such a motion, the assembly must act and decide if the response is so egregious as to require replacement of the officers (62:16) or retention in their positions and only temporary replacement (62:10-15), so that the motion can be resolved . If the officers must be replaced, then hopefully, the bylaws have been written in such a way as to empower the assembly to replace the current officers with the phraseology “or until their successors are elected .” If the assembly is generally happy with the current officers, then it should be sufficient to temporarily replace the recalcitrant chair during the consideration of the motion to rescind the emergency declaration . A motion from the floor to “Suspend the Rules so as to take away the authority of the president to preside during the consideration of the motion to rescind the emergency declaration” should accomplish the task .

The obstacle with this approach may be that since the question is about getting the president to relinquish control, the president may not do so willingly.

Therefore, the members may be forced to resort to use of a provision in 62:9, that allows a member to put an appeal to a vote against the will of the chair . It may take multiple attempts on the part of the member to make the motion, but when the chair repeatedly refuses to state the question, then since the assembly holds the power to make decisions, it is reasonable for a member to place the question before the assembly directly . The organization is paramount and if necessary, the members must return the organization to a deliberate democracy . Ultimately, while many bylaws were updated to allow the president to declare emergencies and adopt special powers of authority, the authority always rests with the assembly itself.

Parliamentarians may be required to aid assemblies to wrestle the emergency powers back from the officers . As Past President Allen reminded us, parliamentarians are the “Keepers of the Democratic Process .” As the pandemic fades into the past, a return to normalcy in the form of deliberative democracy through the undeclaration of emergencies is the next step forward . NP

Steven J. Bolen, PRP, a NAP member since 2019, is vice-president of the Martha Knowles Memorial Unit in Dallas, TX. He serves as consulting parliamentarian for several local organizations and clubs. He presented at 2020 NAP Training Conference and 2021 NAP Biennial Convention. He serves on various city and county advisory boards.

Special Rules of Order:

A N EGLECTED C OMPROMISE

Lorenzo R. Cuesta, PRP

A society is governed by a series of documents of governance containing rules which are related in many ways but especially in one particular way . Each document allows the society a different degree of flexibility to be amended and stability from being suspended . Every document of governance is unique in the nature of the rules it contains as reflected by this desirable balance . (My reference to suspending a motion excludes those rules that provide for their own suspension or exist in the nature of a rule of order .)

comparison of Flexibility and Stability in Three Documents of Governance:

A rule related to meetings could be handled in the following manner: 1 . In the constitution: “The board will meet at least 4 times a year.” (Amendable by 2/3 vote of the members of the House of Delegates at the

Annual Meeting . Cannot be suspended .) 2 . In the bylaws: “The board will meet on Saturdays.” (Amendable by the board of directors with a notice and a 2/3 vote at a monthly meeting . Cannot be suspended .) 3 . In the standing rules: “The board will meet from 2:00-4:00 pm.” (Amendable by the board of directors without a notice and with a majority vote at a monthly meeting . Can be suspended .)

Placing all three related rules together in either the constitution, or the bylaws, or the standing rules would result in a level of flexibility and stability that may either be too strict or too relaxed for the independent parts of this rule .

What the society needs is a document of governance that offers a compromise between flexibility and stability . And that document is the special rules of order .

Comparison of Some documents of Governance as to Flexibility and Stability

adopt amend without Notice amend with Notice Suspend

Constitution majority mem 2/3+ no

and Byl.0aws

Special rules 2/3+ notice; mem 2/3 2/3 of order mem

Standing rules majority 2/3; mem majority majority

+ = often 2/3 is the least required. mem = majority of entire membership

1 . The constitution and the bylaws offer the most stability and the most consistent structure, yet sacrifice flexibility . 2 . Standing rules offer the greatest flexibility, but sacrifice stability and structure . 3 . The special rules of order offer the best compromise . But special rules of order are a neglected compromise, because most clients are not aware of this available solution to the desired flexibility and stability of specific rules .

Some characteristics of the Special Rules of order:

1 . Whereas neither the constitution nor the bylaws may be suspended, the special rules of order may be suspended as long as the effect of the suspended rule is limited to the duration of the meeting, and does not interfere materially with the freedom of a later session . RONR (12th ed .) 8:13 Suspension beyond the duration of a meeting is the motion to rescind which is a different motion with different requirements compared to the motion to suspend . 2 . Special rules of order supersede any rule in the selected parliamentary authority . A society should seldom need special rules of order if it adopted a suitable parliamentary authority . RONR (12th ed .) 2:16 However, all societies constantly develop unique needs . 3 . Special Rules of Order may not supersede a rule in the parliamentary authority if the parliamentary authority states that the rule may be superseded only by the bylaws . RONR (12th ed .) 56:49 4 . Too often a society places the special rules of order in the same document as the bylaws . The bylaws specify their own amending requirements and may not be suspended . RONR (12th ed .) 2:20 This practice leads to unnecessary limitations on the special rules of order . Ultimately, this unintended fusion defeats the purpose of the special rules of order .

The Most common Uses of Special Rules of order:

1 . To set a society’s order of business . RONR (12th ed .) 2:16 2 . To set the limits on number of speakers or length of speeches in debate .

RONR (12th ed .) 2:16 3 . To set less formal procedures in a small assembly functioning as a small board .

RONR (12th ed .) 2:16 4 . To establish the assignment of the floor in large assemblies . RONR (12th ed .) 42:16 5 . To require a vote greater than a majority in order to take certain action .

RONR (12th ed .) 10:8(7a)

6 . To reserve the right to fill a vacancy by a body other than the body that originally filled the position . RONR (12th ed .) 47:58 7 . To control the executive committee . RONR (12th ed .) 49:15 8 . To control the other committees . RONR (12th ed .) 50:26 9 . To control the board . RONR (12th ed .) 56:39 10 . To establish a consent calendar . RONR (12th ed .) 41:32 11 . To incorporate a custom into a rule . RONR (12th ed .) 2:25 12 . To modify RONR’s disciplinary procedure . RONR (12th ed .) 63:32n10 13 . To replace a majority vote with a plurality vote as the requirement on an election, except an officer election . RONR (12th ed .) 44:11 14 . To drop the nominee with the fewest votes . RONR (12th ed .) 46:32n1 15 . To modify the rules of what goes in the minutes . RONR (12th ed .) 48:3 16 . To modify a policy on which a precedent was based . RONR (12th ed .) 23:11 17 . To set the size of a minority that can order a roll-call vote . RONR (12th ed .) 45:46 18 . To set the size of a minority that can order a counted vote . RONR (12th ed .) 45:14 19 . To create a standing committee . RONR (12th ed .) 50:8 20 . To set a voting basis other than a majority, a 2/3 vote, or a majority of the entire membership . RONR (12th ed .) 44:10

Any of these rules could arguably be placed in the bylaws or the standing rules . But then the rule would not benefit from the flexibility and stability inherent to special rules of order .

The Most Urgent Use of Special Rules of order

But perhaps the most urgent use of special rules of order this decade is related to electronic meetings as discussed in the RONR (12th ed .) Appendix, pp . 635-649

Boards: The authority to conduct electronic meetings must be written in the bylaws, but the rules that govern the conduct of such meetings need to be more flexible and suspendable . RONR (12th ed .) 9:30 Thus, these rules should be included in special rules of order or standing rules .

Committees: A special committee does not need special rules of order to authorize its electronic meetings . A special committee may be authorized to meet electronically by a standing rule, or a motion, or instructions in a motion that established the committee . RONR (12th ed .) 9:35

The special rules of order governing the conduct of electronic meetings should require and specify at least the following factors and responsibilities: 1 . Login info/time – start and end hour, time zone, URL, access code, cost . 2 . Sign in/out – how a member must self-identify in order to be admitted to the meeting . 3 . Technical requirements – each member must be informed of the technical requirements, and be responsible for his/her own connectivity, software, and hardware . 4 . Video display – at least the chair and the current speaker should activate their video display . 5 . Technical assistance – how a member may obtain technical assistance during a meeting . 6 . Forced disconnections – explain under what interference or disturbing conditions the chair may force the member to be disconnected . 7 . Quorum calls – require audible roll call to establish quorum . 8 . Motions in writing – all motions must be submitted in writing by whatever online means the rules specify . 9 . Display of motions – specify how pending motions will be displayed for all the participants . 10 . Assignment of floor – state the method for preference in recognition, as well as how a member must announce himself or herself . 11 . Interrupting a member – allow for the proper interrupting motions without undue delay . 12 . Voting – specify how voting will be conducted, such as unanimous consent, anonymous voting, electronic roll call, audible roll call, and zoom buttons, as well as how and when the polls are opened and closed . 13 . Minutes – explain how the voting results will be included in the minutes .

The beauty of Robert’s Rules of Order is that it offers a society so many opportunities to focus on having an effective and productive meeting without interference from rules that may hinder flexibility and stability of the rules . Our clients would benefit from special rules of order only if we helped them utilize these rules . NP

Lorenzo R. cuesta, PRP, is a past president of the California State Association of Parliamentarians. He has served as a parliamentarian for boards, conventions, and annual meetings in and beyond California for more than twenty years. He typically offers a three-hour interactive parliamentary procedure workshop that focuses on members’ rights and efficient meeting management.

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