Table A.6 Conventions in reporting data

insurance while leaving it up to an individual or their employer to choose between a public, not-for-proft or proft-making supplier of health care. Bridge International Academies offers a radical alternative: fee-paying education at a low price that African families may be able to pay (www. bridgeinternationalacademies.com). After evaluating criticisms by African governments of this alternative, an expert recommended that the more desirable response to dissatisfaction with public schools would be to improve public provision to ‘ensure that every child receives a better education than Bridge can offer–and drive it out of business’ (Pilling 2017).

Legalize some payments for public services. When proponents defend public services as free of charge to all citizens, they assume that if a service is free in law it will be delivered without public offcials collecting a charge on the side. As long as this assumption holds, the debate about charges can concentrate on political values. If bribes are paid to expedite the delivery of services to which individuals are entitled, this illegal charge can be legalized by adopting the principle of discount airlines: Charge for better treatment, as airlines do for wider seats or drinks in a plane that carries all passengers to the same destination at the same time. Charges are selectively made for public services on grounds that are not always normatively clear. Swimming is good for health and reading library books is good for education yet charges are made for the use of swimming pools but not for libraries. To renew a passport quickly rather than wait in a queue Britons do not pay a bribe: They pay a fee to get their passport quickly.

Align public laws and informal standards. By defnition, bureaucratic rules governing how public offcials ought to deliver public services are legal; however, they are not necessarily fair by informal standards of public opinion. When loopholes in tax laws allow rich individuals and enterprises to avoid the payment of large sums in taxes, such activities are not corrupt in law, but public opinion can regard tax avoidance as corrupt because it exploits public laws for private advantage. Standards are also misaligned when behaviour that is acceptable by private standards is labelled as an unlawful corruption of public morality. In Ireland and Italy for decades after 1945, the Roman Catholic Church had the political power to secure legislation imposing its standards of public morality on the whole population. This misalignment of standards did not prevent women getting an illegal abortion or partners living together without being legally married.

The government of the day has the authority to end misalignments between public laws and public opinion. The Europe-wide fall in church attendance has encouraged politicians to repeal restrictive laws adopted in the name of public morality and allow people to make choices in keeping with their private norms. Repealing laws making soft drugs illegal has the incidental advantage of reducing corruption, since sellers of cannabis no longer need to pay bribes to the police to carry on their business. Instead, like a pharmacist or a pub keeper, they can pay for a licence to conduct a business that is both legal and publicly acceptable. Aligning informal standards with the law is problematic when the standard is the object of political disputes, for example, the scope of anti-discrimination legislation and the defnition of minorities that should be protected by such laws. It is also problematic when there is an imbalance between public opinion and political power. Tax laws remain on the books allowing multinational corporations and billionaires to get by with paying trivial amounts on their earnings. These laws are protected by the political infuence that benefciaries have over governors. The infuence may be exercised legally but judged corrupt by informal standards and at times it may even be doubly corrupt.

4 imPLicaTions for BeTTer governance

Most principles for reducing corruption are also likely to make them more effcient and more user-friendly, for example, by reducing unnecessary paperwork and offering services online. They are not only relevant in countries where bribery is high but also in countries where it is not. Even if bribery is not a problem, governments everywhere are trying to contain the cost of delivering services. Democratic governments are particularly under pressure to do so in ways that satisfy their citizens. Doing more of the same maintains ineffciencies and opportunities for breaking standards at their current level. Applying principles that result in doing things differently can provide a double boost to good governance.

By contrast with proposals to change national cultures or retrain offcials accustomed to taking bribes, the foregoing principles emphasize structural changes within the power of government to enact, such as repealing laws that create opportunities for public offcials to collect bribes. Doing so gives citizens the choice about whether they deal with government online or with public offcials face-to-face. Increasing

alternative sources of supplying a service gives citizens the choice of getting it from a governmental or non-governmental institution, a particularly important point in countries where bad governance is the norm. These actions are within the power of citizens to enforce. People will not go to a municipal offce for a permit that is no longer required, nor will they pay a bribe to an offcial who wants one if they have an effective alternative. Broadening choice by giving citizens vouchers to use when making choices between non-governmental and public suppliers puts power in the hands of citizens rather than public offcials.

Given the many differences between public services, it follows that broad-brush one-size-fts-all reforms are unlikely to have a signifcant impact on reducing corruption, especially changes that concentrate their impact on how central government is organized. These are unlikely to have much impact on the delivery of retail services at the grass roots, where public offcials have substantial discretion about how or whether to follow central government directives. To be effective, a reform must change the weakest link in the chain of steps required to deliver the service to its end users.

Attempts by intergovernmental organizations to introduce systemic reforms based on best practices in Western societies can be irrelevant if they do not take into account the extent to which practices of bad government have been institutionalized. Opposition to reforms may be expressed by refusing to adopt anti-corruption policies. More insidiously, it can be expressed by formally adopting anti-corruption measures in order to continue a fow of foreign funds but not enforcing new rules. If they so choose, intergovernmental organizations can exert infuence by suspending payments of capital-intensive grants that national governors value as a source of corrupt income. If a recipient government argues that suspending payments would be interference in their national affairs, so too is foreign aid.

Political obstacles to change are inevitable, because what appears to be bad governance by informal national standards or by the universalistic standards of international evaluators is a good thing for high-level politicians who enjoy political power and the benefts of corruption that goes with it. However, low-level public offcials who collect retail bribes have less political power than ministers beneftting from capital-intensive bribes. Nor can corrupt local offcials easily organize mass protests against making services available more effciently and honestly. A national leader effective in reducing the extent to which ordinary people are subject to bribery may thereby gain political support.

Breaking the low-level equilibrium trap that maintains a national economy at a subsistence level requires disruptive action to start a progressive journey of improvements (Hirschman 1963). Unbalanced growth can be promoted by such positive measures as raising national education levels above what is needed for a national economy not yet adapted to contemporary economic opportunities. Disruption can also come from a natural disaster or from military defeat.

A strategy to disrupt corruption requires policymakers to make a visible and substantial change that can establish a political momentum leading to more changes. A bonfre of unpopular regulations that public offcials may use to extract bribes can stimulate public support and weaken opponents. Introducing online services that people can access using free apps on their mobile phones cuts out public offcials entirely. To be effective, disruptive changes must be targeted at particular services. Doing so will not bring about across-the-board abolition of corruption in all services in a world in which bribery is the price that 1.8 billion people pay each year for access to public services. Nonetheless, removing the burden of bribery from little more than 5% of this group will beneft 100 million people. In sum, any measure that reduces bribery and increases access and quality is better than no progress.

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aPPenDix

See fig. A.1 and Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5 and A.6.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 R. Rose and C. Peiffer, Bad Governance and Corruption, Political Corruption and Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92846-3 187

Greece Italy Austria Germany Portugal Spain

Belgium France Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Denmark UK Sweden Finland

Morocco Egypt Sudan Yemen Algeria Lebanon Palestine Tunisia Turkey Jordan WESTERN EUROPE: Individuals paying bribes 7% 4% 2% 2% 2%

2% 1%

1% 1% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%

44% MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA: Individuals paying bribes 40% 38%

12% 34%

12% 10% 8% 6% 3%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Fig. A.1 Percentage paying bribe by country (Sources As in Table 2 in Chapter 1 plus: GCB 2013 surveys: United States, 5% paid bribes; Canada 2%. GCB 2016 survey: Cyprus, 2%. Percentage calculated as paying a bribe for any of fve services: health, education, permits, police or courts)

Table A.1 Chapters 3, 5 and 7: Aggregate measures of national context

Variable Source Description Mean Std Dev.

CPI TI (2016) Transparency International Corruption Perception Index: range 0–100 42.6 19.5

Early bureaucracy CSPP 1 if bureaucratized early, 0 if not 0.17 0.38 Post-Communist CSPP 1 if decades of Communist rule, 0.20 0.40 0 if not Colony post-1945 CSPP 1 if colony in 1946, 0 if not 0.44 0.50 Extent democratic freedom Average of fH’s political rights 4.4 2.0 House and civil liberties scores (2016) inverted; range: 1–7 foreign aid WB, WDI Net aid as % of Gross National 3.3 6.2 (2014) Income. Range: 0–44% Resource rents WB, WDI Natural resources rents as % of 9.1 11.4 (2014) GDP range: 0–54.5 Ethnic differences Alesina et al. Probability that two randomly 0.4 0.3 (2003) selected people will differ in ethnicity: range: 0–0.93 Births attended UNICEf % of births attended by skilled health staff; range: 35–100

Secondary enrolment UNESCO Gross % secondary school enrolment; range: 21–138

Regulatory quality WGI (2015) World Governance Indicator: Range: 1.9–2.2. minus 1.9 top plus 2.2

free, fair elections freedom House (2016) Index of free and fair elections; range: 2–14 86.2 18.3

80.0 27.0

−0.1 0.8

7.6 3.2

Sources UNICEf and UNESCO data most recent year available after 2005. Regulatory quality extracted from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators). Other sources: CPI: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi; freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org; Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8: 155–194

Table A.2 Chapter 5: Individual measures

Variable Coding and range

Any bribe 1: paid bribe for health, education, police, courts, or permit services; 0: not Bribe—health 1: paid bribe for health; 0: not Bribe—education 1: paid bribe for education; 0: not Bribe—permit 1: paid bribe for permits; 0: not Bribe—police 1: paid a bribe for police; 0: not Contact—health 1: contact with health; 0: not Contact—education 1: contact with education; 0: not Contact—permit 1: contact with permits; 0: not Contact—police 1: contact with police; 0: not female 1: female; 0: male Number of contacts Health, education, police, courts and permits. Range: 0: contacted no service; 4: contacted 4 or 5 services Educational status 1: minimum; 2: secondary; 3: highera Perceived corruption Perception of gov’t offcials and MPs. Average of 0: None involved; 1: some; 2: most; 3: alla High political effcacy 1: agree that ordinary people can fght corruption by refusing to pay bribes; 0: otherwise Low political effcacy 1: if disagree with ‘ordinary people can make a difference in fght against corruption’; 0: otherwise

Age

1: 18–25; 2: 26–35; 3: 36–45;4: 46–55; 5: 56–65 6: 66–75; 7: 76–85; 8: 86+ Age family 1: 26–55 years; 0: not Age young 1: 35 or younger; 0: not Age older 1: 56 or older; 0: not

aMissing values are coded to the country mean Mean Std Dev.

0.18 0.38

0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.59 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.52 0.50 1.58 1.34

1.91 0.97 1.47 0.73

0.20 0.40

0.32 0.46

3.20 1.68

0.59 0.49 0.41 0.43 0.24 0.49

Table A.3 Chapter 7: Afrobarometer variables

Variable Coding and range Mean Std Dev.

Trust Mean trust in executive, Parliament, electoral commission, and local council; 0 not at all to 3 a lot; standardized to 0–1 0.53 0.30

Voted

1: voted in recent national election; 0: all other responses Paid bribe 1: paid a bribe for permits, water, health, police, & education; 0: not 0.68 0.47

0.18 0.39

Services contacted Number of services; range from 0 to 5 1.81 1.43 Perceived corruption Mean perceived corruption in executive, 2.38 0.72 parliament, offcials, local government; 1: none are corrupt to 4 all are corrupt Important problem 1: mentioned corruption as being top three .12 .33 problems; 0: not Increased or decreased 1: corruption decreased a lot to 5: corrup- 3.8 1.3 tion increased a lot

Age

Age in years; 81+ recoded to 80 Education 0: no formal; 1: completed primary; 2: primary; 3: secondary; 4: post-secondary

Income Regularly going without fve basic goods: standardized factor score 37.33 14.7 1.88 1.27

0.00 1.00

Social capital 1: active member or offcial leader of community group; 0: not 0.24 0.43

Table A.4 Chapter 7: LAPOP variables

Variable Coding and range Mean Std Dev.

Trusta Mean trust in national legislature, executive, local government political parties; 1: not at all to 7: a lot; standardized to 0 to 1 0.44 0.25

Voted 1: voted in last presidential election; 0: not 0.73 0.45 Paid bribe 1: paid a bribe for police, government 0.17 0.38 employee, permit, courts, healthcare, & education; 0: not Number of contacts Number of services had contact with; 1.13 0.98 range: 0–4 Perceived corruptiona Corruption of public offcials; 1: uncommon to 3.17 0.81 4: very common Important problem 1: Corruption is one of the most important 0.08 0.27 problems; 0: not

Age Educationa Age in years; +80 recoded to 80 0: none; 1: primary; 2: secondary; 3: post-secondary 40.51 15.96 1.97 0.73

Incomea 0: no cash income to 10: highest national level 7.00 2.81 Social capital 1: attends local meetings, tries to solve prob- 0.79 0.41 lems; 0: not

aMissing coded to country mean

Table A.5 Chapter 7: EBRD variables

Variable Coding and range Mean Std Dev.

Trusta Mean trust in President, government, local government, Parliament, political parties; 1: complete distrust to 5 complete trust; standardized to 0–1 0.55 0.23

Voted 1: voted in last Parliamentary election; 0: not 0.62 0.49 Paid bribe 1: paid a bribe for police, permits, courts, edu- 0.14 0.35 cation, medical, unemployment, other social security benefts; 0: not Number of contacts Number of services had contact with; range 1.31 1.26 0–8

Perceived corruptiona

Mean perceived corruption in executive, parliament, offcials, local government. 1: none are corrupt to 4: all are corrupt Important problem 1: mentioned corruption as being top three problems; 0: not

Increased or decreased 1: strongly agree to 5 strongly disagree with there is less corruption now than 4 years ago

Age

Age in years; 81+ recoded to 80 Education 0: none; 1: primary; 2: secondary; 3: post-secondary/some university; 4: university degree

Incomea

Self-assessed household wealth; 1: poorest 10% of country to 10: richest 10% Social Capital 2: Active member of any of 10 social groups; 1: inactive member; 0: not a member 2.43 0.73

0.38 0.48

3.48 1.11

48.5 17.2 2.42 0.89

4.50 1.67

0.40 0.71

aMissing coded to country mean

Table A.6 Conventions in reporting data

1. Missing data for an individual is normally dealt with by substituting the country’s mean value 2. Countries are list-wise deleted from analyses when country-level variables are not available. However, in Chapters 5 and 7 we imputed missing education values for

Portugal and Spain using Italy’s mean education score; Australia, with Germany’s mean education score; and Hong Kong with China’s mean education score 3. All multi-national statistics are reported with each country’s number of respondents weighted equally 4. Since all survey responses are estimates, answers are rounded to the nearest whole number, with 0.5 rounded up

inDex

Note: Bold page numbers indicate fgures; italics indicate tables.

A

access to information costs of, 149–50 eligibility for, 149 Acton, Lord John, 4 Afrobarometer variables, 17, 193 age and bribe payment, 94, 99 and citizen behaviour, 131 and trust, 138, 139 Alesina, A., 57 anti-corruption efforts, evaluation, 48 anti-corruption institutions, independence, 152 Anti-Corruption Manifesto, 168 Anti-Corruption Summit, 168 apologies, 121–2 aristocracy, protection of power, 3 arms sales, 148, 172 autocracies, 10–11 Aven, P., 41

B

bad behaviour, 114–20 BAE Systems, 148, 172 Bauhr, M., 146 Behaviour standards, 5ff, 107ff benefts in kind, 77 best practice, 170 Blair, T., 113, 115, 123, 162, 163 blame, and transparency, 163 bribe payment age effect, 94, 99 basic model, 87 bureaucratization effect, 91–3

Communist legacy hypothesis, 86, 90–1, 103 contact effects, 88, 129–30 contact hypothesis, 84 context and overview, 83–4 democratic institutions hypothesis, 86, 91–3, 103

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 R. Rose and C. Peiffer, Bad Governance and Corruption, Political Corruption and Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92846-3 197

early bureaucratization hypothesis, 86, 103 economic status hypothesis, 85 education effects, 90, 102 foreign money hypothesis, 87, 91–3, 104 gender hypothesis, 86, 90, 94–5, 99

Heckman analysis, 97ff, 100–1 impact of signifcant infuences, 92 individual differences, 84–7 infuences by service, 98 monopoly/choice hypothesis, 96–7, 102 national context effect, 90 payers, 44, 71–80, 87–8 percentage paying, by country,

188–90

perception of corruption hypothesis, 84–9, 103 political effcacy hypothesis, 85, 89 public services differences, 93–104 regulatory burden hypothesis, 96 service scarcity hypothesis, 95, 102 service-specifc hypotheses, 94–104 social role hypothesis, 94–5, 99 social status hypothesis, 85, 90 and socio-economic status, 90 under-reporting, 78–79, 160, 161 value of bribes, 77. See also bribery; grass-roots corruption bribery, 25 attitudes to, 27–8, 27 by hook or by crook, 21–2, 24–8, 26, 44, 68 consistent payers, 75 contingency, 79–80 cost-beneft calculation, 35 credibility of evidence, 78–9 cultural norms, 78 individual and institutional infuences, 88 opportunities for, 31

payment, variation in and between continents, 72 and speed of service, 76 timing, 74–7 use of cues, 75–6. See also bribe payment; grass-roots corruption Britain, Politicians Behaving Badly (PBB) survey, 115ff brown envelope journalism, 157 Buchanan, P., 112–13 bureaucracy alternatives to, 21–2 by the book governance, 22–8 in public services, 66

Weberian view, 5–6 bureaucratic standards, 108 bureaucratization, 50–1, 108 effect on bribe payment, 91–3

C

Cameron, D., 123, 168 capital, infrastructure projects, 40 capital-intensive services, 65–6 consequences of corruption, 176 corruption reduction, 175–6 China, 12, 13 choice services, 96–97 corruption reduction, 167–84 citizen behaviour corruption and trust in developing countries, 136–9 impact of corruption on voting, 127ff, 132–5, 133 and income, 130–1, 138 perceptions of corruption, 130 political engagement, 129 and political party support, 141–2 and social capital, 131–2, 135, 138 willingness to protest, 159 citizens, as stakeholders, 146 civil servants, job security, 115–16

civil society organizations, 155–7 clientelism, 8 Clinton, B., 113, 121 Clinton, H., 14–15, 124, 154 collusion, public—private, 44 colonial legacy hypothesis, 51–2, 55 Commonwealth countries, 168 Communist legacy hypothesis, 50–1, 54–5, 86, 90–1, 103 computers, delivery of public services, 23, 178ff contact hypothesis, 84, 131, 135, 138, 139, 178–9 contracts, drafting and awarding, 42–3 Control of Corruption Index (CCI), 45, 47–8 corporations, public interest claims, 156–7 corruption, 14 defnitions, 2–10 legal and informal standards, 4, 6, 14–5 legal defnition, 4 socially constructed, 3 stretching meaning, 10 theories of, 32–6

Weberian modern state, 5 corruption indexes, 39, 49 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 11–12, 45–7, 54–7, 62, 71ff, 83, 115, 127 and gross domestic product (GDP), 35, 41 corruption reduction access to records, 179–80 aligning laws and standards, 182–3 capital-intensive services, 175–6 choice expansion, 181–2 contact reduction, 178–9 electronic monitoring of service delivery, 179 grass-roots changes, 177–83

increasing spending, 170–2 legalization of payment, 182 matching supply to entitlements, 180 repeal of laws, 177 trade-offs, 172–4 credibility, of evidence of bribery, 78 cues for bribery, 75–6 cultural norms, 78 culture, 112–13 customary behaviour, 7–8 Czech Republic, 25–6

D

data reporting conventions, 196 decentralization effects of, 14 service delivery, 176 democratic institutions hypothesis, 52, 55–6, 86, 91–3, 103, 153–54 discretion, in service delivery, 24 dismissal, for bad behaviour, 122 distrust effects of corruption, 136–43, 137 prevalence, 128

E

early bureaucratization hypothesis, 50–1, 54, 86, 103 EBRD variables, 17, 69ff, 73, 129ff, 195 economic inequality hypothesis, 53, 57 economic status hypothesis, 85 education and citizen behaviour, 130, 134–5 effect on bribe payment, 90, 102 as measure of inequality, 89 and reporting of bribery, 78–9 responsibility for, 29–30 and trust, 138, 139

elections, and corruption, 135, 139, 167 electronic monitoring, service delivery, 151, 179 eligibility criteria, public services, 177–8 eligibility, for access to information, 149 Estonia, technology in, 180 ethnic inequality hypothesis, 53, 57 Eurobarometer, 17, 63, 69ff, 77, 128 Europe, political funding, 14 European Commission, corruption study, 32 expenses, elected offcials, 111

F

face-to-face relations, and trust, 136 false electoral promises, 117–18, 123–5, 124 favouritism, 8 fillon, f., 115 fnes, for bad behaviour, 122 foreign aid, 41, 48 conditionality, 170 and control of institutions, 168–9 hypothesis, 52–3, 56, 87, 91–3, 104, 172 forest rangers, 67–8 fragmentation, of responsibility, 150–1 france, Politicians Behaving Badly (PBB) survey, 115ff free-market perspective, 171 freedom House, 132 freedom of Information (fOI) acts, 16–63 effectiveness, 162

UK requests, 151–2. See also transparency

G

gender hypothesis, 86, 90, 94–5, 99 geography, effects of, 29–30 Gini Index, 57 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), 16, 25, 62, 63–4, 69ff, 71ff, 84, 89, 92, 128ff, 159 global poverty, and aid, 172–3 globalization capital-intensive services, 176 and transparency, 155, 158–9 governance by the book, hook or crook, 22–8 bureaucratic, 5–6 categorization, 6 changing practice, 3 culture-based evaluation, 15 defned, 2 ideal system, 28–31, 92–3 incompetent, 10 social relationship, 24 government audits, 153 grass-roots changes, 177ff grass-roots corruption benefts in kind, 77 bribe payment, 71–80, 72–4 bribe payment, controlling for contact, 74 bribe payment, variation within and between continents, 72 consistent payers of bribes, 75 contact variation by service, 65–71, 70 speed of service, 76 variation in public services, 65–8, 74. See also bribe payment Grimes, M., 146 gross domestic product (GDP), 40 and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 35, 41 guanchi, 12

Gupta, A., 8 Gyurcsany, f., 123

H

health analogy with governance, 28–32 Heckman analysis, 97ff Heidenheimer, A., 32 Heywood, P., 32 hierarchy, institutions, 29, 61 history, and standards, 7–8 Hollande, f., 115 household size, and payment of bribes, 73 humanitarian perspective, 172–3 Hungary, 112 Hunt, J., 85 hypocrisy, 123–5

I

impartiality, 22–3 incivisme, 127 income, 130–1, 138 Index of ethnic fragmentation, 57 Index of Public Integrity, 147 India, 12–13 individual-level variables, 192 inequalities, measurement of, 89 informal knowledge, 44 information as weapon, 163 infrastructure projects, 39–40 institutional corruption, perceptions of, 64 institutional theories, 34 institutions, 29 changing, 169–74 trust in, 136–43 intergovernmental organizations, 176 International Monetary fund, 155 Iraq War Inquiry, 162

J

job security, civil servants, 115–16 Johnston, M., 14, 32

K

Karklins, R., 25 Kenya, 14 Key, V.O., 142

L

Lambsdorff, J.G., 45 Latin American Public

Opinion Project (LAPOP), 17, 25, 129ff, 194 law of the hammer, 168 laws aligning with standards, 2ff, 111, 182–3 introducing new, 170 libel laws and transparency, 157 repeal of, 177 league table, national corruption, 49 legal/illegal corruption, 6–7, 14–15, 152–3 legal standards and informal practice, 6–7 legislative choices, and transparency, 147–9 legitimacy, autocracies, 10–11 libel laws, and transparency, 157 local government, responsibilities, 29–30, 61 logic of appropriateness, 67

M

Macron, E., 115 Mandelson, P., 113 McClean, T., 145 measures of corruption, 39

multiplicity, 49–50. See also Control of Corruption Index (CCI);

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

media coverage of bad behaviour, 115 freedom, 114 and transparency, 157 military leaders, 29, 63–4 Modi, N., 13 monopoly/choice hypothesis, 96–7, 102 multi-national frms, trade-offs, 174 Mungiu-Pippidi, A., 8, 33 Myrdal, G., 85

N

national context, effect on bribe payment, 90 national corruption colonial legacy hypothesis, 51–2, 55

Communist legacy hypothesis, 51, 54–5 context and overview, 39–41 contextual infuences, 54 democratic institutions hypothesis, 52, 55–6 early bureaucratization hypothesis, 50–1, 54 economic inequality hypothesis, 53, 57 effect of natural resources, 56 ethnic inequality hypothesis, 53, 57 foreign money hypothesis, 52–3, 56 high-level corruption, 40–4 national differences, 50–7 political history and institutions hypothesis, 54, 57 national politicians, perceptions of, 63 national security trade-offs, 172–3

and transparency, 148 natural disasters, 173 natural resources licensing, 41 and national corruption, 56 Nigeria, 13–14 Nixon, R., 112–13 non-voters, 119 norms. See standards Norwegian Agency for Development

Cooperation, 170

O

OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 43 offceholders, behaviour standards, 5–7 offcial data, use of, 49 Okonjo-Iweala, N., 167–8 Old Corruption, 3 open government. See transparency Open Society foundations, 156 Orban, V., 112 overpromising, and service quality, 180–1

P

Panama papers, 158–9 particularism, 8 partisanship, 118–20, 120 Partnership for Transparency fund, 159 party-political interests, and transparency, 154 path dependence, 33, 169 patronage, 8 payment for services, legalization, 182 pensions, delivery of, 23 perception of corruption hypothesis, 84–5, 103 personal relationships, and informal norms, 108

physiology of governance, 28–32 police perceptions of, 63–4 street-level bureaucracy, 31 policymakers’ guide (UNDP), 49–50 remuneration, 111 role of outsiders, 118–19 theories of interest group politics, 111 tolerated and shameful, 109–14 variation in informal standards, 109–10 and voting behaviour, 124–5 voting laws, 110–11. See also standards political economy theories, 34 political effcacy hypothesis, 85, 89 political history and institutions hypothesis, 54, 57 political inexperience, 123 political trust, 128ff Politicians Behaving Badly (PBB) survey, 115ff, 139–40 principal-agent theories, 31 privacy, and transparency, 148–9 private behaviour, 123 private enterprise priorities, 113–14 transparency, 154–5 privatization, 41 procurement, infrastructure projects, 40 Profumo, J., 121 protest parties, 118–19, 125 protest, willingness to, 159 public employees contact with public, 31 discretion, 67–8 pay, 31, 171 rules, 68 self-identifcation, 67 self-image, 30

standards, 67–8 public expenditure, social services, 42 public institutions, perceptions of, 62–5 public interest, 110 corporations’ claims of, 156–7 and good governance, 10 public services access to records, 179–80 benefts in kind, 77 bribe payment, 71–80, 72–4 capital-intensive vs. retail scale, 65–6 contact with, 65–71, 70 contingency of corruption, 79–80 differences between, 65–8, 93–104 eligibility, 66, 177–8 levels of contact, 93 matching supply to entitlements, 180–1 skills involved, 66 speed of service, 76 timing of bribes, 74–7. See also bribe payment; social services public spending, transparency, 153 publicity, 114 punishments, 109, 121–5, 122 dismissal, 122 fnes, 122 for hypocrisy, 123–5 imprisonment, 122 private behaviour, 123 Putin, V., 156, 157 Putnam, R., 131–2

Q

Quality of Government Institute, 2

R

rational choice theories, 31, 35 regulatory burden hypothesis, 96

Regulatory Quality measure, 96 religious leaders, perceptions of, 63 Republic of Korea, 25–6 resource curse, 13–14 responsibility, fragmentation of, 150–1 retail-scale services, 65–6, 175–6 Rose-Ackerman, S., 32 Rules. See bureaucracy Russia, 12, 25–6, 41

S

satisfcing strategy, 22 service delivery. See public services short-term change, 48 social capital, 24–5, 132, 135, 138 social media, and transparency, 146, 158 social psychological theories, 34, 62 social relationships, in governance, 24 social roles hypothesis, 94–5, 99 social science, disciplinary divisions, 32–3 social services cost of, 61–2 share of public expenditure, 42. See also public services socio-economic status, 85, 90 sociological theories, 34 soliciting bribes, 75–6 Soreide, T., 32 Soviet Union, break up, 51 Spain, Politicians Behaving Badly (PBB) survey, 115ff stakeholders in open data, 151–63 standards aligning with laws, 182–3 behaviour evaluation, 107 bureaucratic, 108 and citizen behaviour, 139–41, 141 contested, 112 informal, 6, 107

international, 112 legal standards and informal practice, 6–7, 17, 111 offceholder behaviour, 5–7 partisan, 108 persistence, 48 personal, 108, 113 social construction, 109 state-owned enterprises, 26, 41 statistical testing, theories of corruption, 35–6 street-level bureaucracy, 31 Summers, L., 168 surveys, 15–16, 17, 71–3

T

tax avoidance, 9–10, 107 tax effort, 41 tax evasion, 8–9, 107 technocracy, 29 theories of corruption, 36–8, 50ff, 84ff theories of impact of corruption, 129–32 trade-offs, 172–4 traditional norms, 7–8 transparency, 145–63 and blame, 163 citizens stakeholders, 159–60 conditions for, 147–51 costs of, 149–50 demand for, 146 effect of increased, 160–3 and electronic technology, 151 eligibility for access to information, 149 existence of public records, 150 and good governance, 153–4, 161–2 good government theory of democracy, 153–4

linking records, 150–1 lobbying laws, 148 and national security, 148 political choices in legislation, 147–9 and privacy, 148–9 private enterprise interests, 154–5 reporting payment of a bribe, 160,

161

role of media, 157 and social media, 146, 158 stakeholders in open data, 151–63

UK fOI requests, 151–2 whistleblowing, 158. See also freedom of Information (fOI) acts Transparency International, 4, 11–12, 16, 36, 40, 45–7, 49, 62, 92, 128, 134, 156, 159 Truman, H., 173–4 Trump, D., 14–15, 122, 124, 142, 154 trust, 128ff age effect, 138, 139 and contact with public services, 138 and education, 138, 139 face-to-face relations, 136 free and fair elections, 139 and income, 138 and maintenance of standards, 139–41, 141 and political party support, 141–2 and social capital, 138 Tukey, J., 50

U

UK Department for International

Development, 173 UK Independent Commission for Aid

Impact, 173 under-reporting, payment of bribes, 160, 161 United Nations Convention Against

Corruption, 170 United Nations Development

Programme, 49–50 United Nations Offce of Drugs and

Crime (UNODC), 73, 75 United States, election campaigning, 14–15 Unmasked: Corruption in the West, 14 unrecorded corruption, 49

V

validity, measures of corruption, 44–5 virtue, 34 voting behaviour and age, 131 contact with public services, 131, 135 and education, 110–11, 134–5 free and fair elections, 135 impact of corruption, 132–5, 133 implications of analyses, 142–3 and income, 130–1 and individual resources, 130, 134, 135 infuences on, 124–5, 127ff and social capital, 131–2, 135 and trust, 130 vulnerability to corruption, 34, 42–3, 129, 175–6

W

watchdogs, technical knowledge, 42 Watergate, 112–13, 162 Weber, M., 5–6, 62, 167 whistleblowing, 158 World Bank, 2, 45–48, 96 Worthy, B., 145