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The Presidentialization of Democracies
restrained by the fact that the monarch concentrates the regard of so ciety upon his or her person. No one should suppose that such distinctions in any way absolve presidentialism of its failings. But it is important to understand that it is not by “reparliamentarizing” democracies—here I use the term in a po litical (rather than a functional) sense—that they w ill be delivered from them. This is what all those who call for the establishment of a Sixth Republic in France assume. The idea of modeling a successor regime to the Fifth Republic on an “English-style prime ministerial regime”19 springs from a desire not merely for a more active parliament but for a system in which parliament would actually be the center of gravity. In this scheme the president would appoint the prime minister, but in so doing he (or she) is obliged to “take into consideration the national w ill and the majority of the National Assembly” (per Article 9 of the draft constitution),20 which is to say, to name the head of the coalition that prevailed in the legislative elections, who furthermore cannot be dis missed. The prime minister, enjoying greater autonomy than before, would have correspondingly greater powers, including the authority to choose and appoint ministers, and to set the agenda of the Council of Ministers, even if he (or she) does not preside over it. To avoid the pit falls to which the assembly government of the Third and the Fourth Re publics was vulnerable, he would be allowed greater independence in carrying out his cabinet’s policy: he would have the right to dissolve par liament, to submit any item of proposed legislation to a referendum, and to take advantage of the expedients authorized by the third paragraph of Article 49 of the present constitution, especially for the purpose of forcing adoption of a finance bill. Finally, although the prime minister is not elected by the p eople, he would nonetheless be responsible to the National Assembly. The proposed constitution retains election by universal suf frage of the president (whose term of office would be fixed once again at seven years), but he would be limited to performing the duties of an um pire or referee and would no longer have prerogatives of his own in gov erning (even in respect of foreign policy, since there he would merely be informed by the government of any negotiations entered into for the pur pose of concluding an international agreement). He would thus become a sort of constitutional monarch—but an elected monarch. It is here that the difficulty presents itself. A scheme of this sort says nothing about the conflicts over legitimacy that would inevitably arise in a situation
