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NOTES TO PAGES 261–267
Conclusion 1. I have explored the forms assumed by this disenchantment in France in Le sacre du citoyen: Histoire du suffrage universel en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1992); see esp. 3.1 (“Le pouvoir du dernier mot”), 299–338. 2. See Pierre Rosanvallon, Democ ratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), esp. 203–218. 3. See Pierre Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), esp. 61–66, 253–257, 291–299. 4. I explain the reasons for my reluctance to proceed in this direction in the postface to Florent Guénard and Sarah Al-M atary, eds., La démocratie à l’œuvre: Autour de Pierre Rosanvallon (Paris: Seuil, 2015). 5. In France these tasks are partly combined in the mission of the High Au thority for Transparency in Public Life and, to a lesser degree, that of the Commission for Access to Administrative Documents. 6. In France, the constitutional nonrecognition of a fourth branch of govern ment has led the Constitutional Council to restrict the prerogatives of the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life. On the intellectual history of plans for such a fourth branch, see my discussion of new directions for popular sovereignty in Rosanvallon, “From the Past to the F uture of De mocracy” [2000], in the volume of my selected essays edited and translated by Samuel Moyn, Democracy Past and F uture (New York: Columbia Univer sity Press, 2006), esp. 199–204; also my books Counter-Democracy, 76–103, and Democratic Legitimacy, 154–167. 7. It is in accordance with such just such a principle of functional representa tiveness that u nions in France have a seat on the boards of directors of a whole range of public agencies. On this point see Rosanvallon, La question syndicale: Histoire at avenir d’une forme sociale (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1988), 35–44. 8. In the French case this would lead also to a reconsideration of the role of the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council, which in its present form constitutes a rough-a nd-ready compromise between the commis sion model as I have described it h ere and the parliamentary assembly model. 9. Recall that this is what represent at ion was once expected to do, before it came to be associated with the idea of mere electoral ratification. On this point see John P. Reid, The Concept of Repres entation in the Age of the American Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), esp. 31–42, 140–146. 10. It should be kept in mind that the prohibition against r unning for office during the French Revolution, which no one today would think for a mo
