2 minute read
Leveraged buy-out
leaving their minds to atrophy.
Globally, the harm that school closures have done to children has vastly outweighed any benefits they may have had for public health (see International section). The World Bank says the share of tenyearolds in middle and lowincome countries who cannot read and understand a simple story has risen from 57% in 2019 to roughly 70%. If they lack such elementary skills, they will struggle to earn a good living. The bank estimates that $21trn will be wiped off their lifetime earnings—equivalent to about 20% of the world’s annual gdp today.
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This should be seen for what it is: a global emergency. Nearly every problem that confronts humanity can be alleviated by good schooling. Bettereducated people are more likely to devise a cleaner energy source, a cure for malaria or a smarter town plan. Workers who can read and manipulate numbers are more productive. Bookish populations will find it easier to adapt to climate change. They will also have fewer babies, and educate them better. If the damage the pandemic has done to education is not reversed, all these goals will be harder to reach.
Politicians talk endlessly about the importance of schooling, but words are cheap and a fitforpurpose education system is not. Spending has risen modestly in recent decades but fell in many countries during the pandemic. Scandalously, many governments spend more on rich pupils than they do on poor ones. Moreover, too little development aid goes to education, and some is selfinterested. A chunk goes to donor countries’ own universities, to fund scholarships for the relatively welltodo from poor places. Such exchanges are welcome, but funding primary schools in poor countries does more good.
Many of the most critical changes are not things that money will buy. Testing is a mess, leading governments to overestimate levels of literacy. New teachers have been hired but not trained properly. Lessons in reading and maths are too often cut short to make room for instruction in whatever other subjects happen to be faddish, from the moral certainties of leftleaning Westerners to the thoughts of Xi Jinping. Teachers, who have come through the same education systems they are supposed to be improving, often struggle to teach. They would benefit from clear lesson plans, as well as the freedom to pause and help children who have fallen behind. Politicians must stop pandering to teachers’ unions, many of which want schools to be run for the comfort of unsackable adults, rather than for the benefit of pupils.
At present a quarter of countries do not have any plans to help children claw back learning lost during the pandemic, according to a survey carried out earlier this year by unicef. Another quarter have inadequate catchup strategies. The same energy that was once poured into building schools and filling up classrooms should now be used to improve the lessons that take place within them. At stake is the future not only of the generation scarred by the pandemic, but of all the pupils who will come after them. No more children should stumble through their school days without learning to read or add up. n
Leveraged buy-out Private pain
The buy-out business may struggle in a changed economic climate
Held in february 2007, the 60thbirthday celebrations of Stephen Schwarzman, a privateequity magnate, captured the spirit of an age. Nothing distils the hubris of Manhattan on the eve of a financial crisis like Rod Stewart belting out “Maggie May” to a fizzdrinking crowd in Hermès ties. Within two years Mr Schwarzman’s firm, Blackstone, had lost more than 80% of its market value. Yet the striking thing is that the privateequity industry, including Blackstone, soon bounced back to enjoy a gargantuan boom. Today private equity is again on the ropes (see Business section). But shifting investment patterns and higher interest rates mean it is unlikely to enjoy such a miraculous recovery.
As central banks raise interest rates and shrink their balancesheets, markets are reeling. This year equities have suffered the worst selloff in a generation. Things are also messy in debt markets, particularly the risky “highyield” corners where privateequity funds gather ammunition for deals. Junkbond yields have reached 9%.
All this raises questions about one of the biggest investing fashions of the past two decades. Privateequity assets have more than tripled over the past decade to reach $4.6trn. Desperate for higher returns as interest rates fell, almost all pension funds, endowments, sovereignwealth investors and life insurers piled into private assets. It is commonplace for a pension fund to have 10% of its holdings in this asset class.
Now a crunch is coming, in two ways. First, the deals done at
skyhigh valuations look a lot less clever. Higher costs and slowing economic growth will squeeze the profits of privateequityowned firms. With share prices lower it becomes harder to sell or float firms at attractive valuations. In contrast with the last boom, buyout funds have loaded up on tech firms that are facing a bigger valuation hit than the market overall. It will take months for funds to mark down their valuations and for investors to get a clear view of the damage, but it is possible that funds raised since 2018 will struggle to return any profits of note. The second part of the crunch relates to fuPrivate-equity-backed buy-outs ture investments. The industry is sitting on Global value, $bn $1.3trn of “dry powder” and investors are still 200 increasing their allocations. Yet whether the 100 business model works in the new macroeconomic environment is uncertain. Buyouts, 0 which involve buying firms using debt, can 2016 17 18 19 20 2221 generate returns in three ways: through rising valuations, high leverage or improving operational performance. Today two of the three levers are impaired. As interest rates rise, reversing a longterm downward trend, it seems unlikely that asset prices will bounce back. Meanwhile, higher borrowing costs may be here to stay. Leverage is the lifeblood of buyouts: the calculations have fundamentally shifted. Privateequity managers will struggle to find a playbook from the industry’s 40year history. The first cycle, in the 1980s, saw a band of pioneers capitalise on the inefficiencies of lumbering public corporations. The music stopped when credit markets,