Iranian Nationalism in Iranian Diaspora

IRANIAN NATIONALISM IN IRANIAN DIASPORA

by Mihanparast

“Iranians believe themselves as a civili- zation rather than a territorially limited nation.” – Ali Ansari

A SIMPLE ONLINE SEARCH for protests by the Iranian diaspora results in a surprising set of images. Absent are the famous peace signs and emerald paint made internationally recognizable as the symbols of the Green Revolution, a movement that saw broad support in the Iranian-American community. Also missing are the compelling photographs of the fuel protests of late 2020 and the subsequent outrage among Iranian-Americans at having the Internet silenced across Iran. Rather, photos online of diaspora protests almost always consist of images of exiled opposition groups, most commonly those supporting a restoration of the monarchy through Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi or the Marxist-Islamist Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). It is likewise shocking that such a famously nationalist community only witnesses unity in its most controversial sub-divisions. Essentially, patriotic-nationalist conceptions of monarchism and Marxism have replaced classically nationalist interpretations of secular liberalism and socialism as the popular ideologies of organized Iranian diaspora groups. The theoretical phenomenon of nationalism is one that is widely prevalent in the Iranian diaspora as the community exists in America today, yet unique components of the ideology strongly distinguish it from both its roots in the secular nationalism of pre-1979 Pahlavi Iran and from its counterpart in the modern Islamic Republic. The questions arise as to how nationalism manifests in the Iranian diaspora, why this manifestation fails at garnering popular support or unification, and what consequences result from this attribute of contemporary Iranian-American society.

To provide answers, we must analyze not only scholarly theory but also social aspects and factors affecting the Iranian-American community today. First, we must define Iranian nationalism in terms of theory to identify what makes it unique amongst other forms of nationalism across the globe. The typology of nationalism in the international schema has been written on extensively; the broad definitions of Yael Tamir and David Miller will be sufficient for our purposes. Put simply, nationalism is considered as pride in the unique aspects of one’s historical nation – be it realistic or mythologized – being distinct and superior to similar aspects of other nations. Iranian nationalism, by and far, exists as cultural nationalism in the Iranian-American diaspora. This is sharply different from ethnonationalism, which centers on components of ethnic identity, as explained by Anthony Smith. At the same time, cultural nationalism exists in contrast to civic nationalism, which is rooted in shared belief of political values and institutions welded together by citizenship. Therefore, the majority of Iranians in diaspora focus their nationalism not around shared race or citizenship but rather around common historical and cultural heritage.

Visualizing the sense of nationalism in the international sense, we can turn our attention to typologies of nationalism within Iranian political history. Ali Ansari divides these into four general components as they have applied to Iranian politics in the twentieth century: monarchical nationalism, Islamic nationalism, secular nationalism, and leftist nationalism. Without retracing steps trodden by other writers, several assertions can be made as to which of Ansari’s categorizations can be said to describe Iranian Americans most accurately. To begin in this endeavor, it should be clarified that although the Iranian diaspora is nowhere near as secular as stereotypically idealized, very few families in the larger community subscribe to the notions of Islamic Shiite nationalism perpetuated by the Shiite ulama in the Islamic Republic. This aforementioned clerical class is the primary driving force behind Islamic nationalism, which seeks to unite the many Shiite minorities of the Middle East in a united national block. Shared religious traditions do not translate well into a highly diverse religious complex such as the Iranian-American diaspora, which has strong elements of Jewish, Zoroastrian, Baha’i, and Christian minorities as well as a Shiite and Sunni Muslim majority. Leftist nationalism similarly has not transitioned successfully into Iranian-American communities for a variety of reasons. The failures of leftist movements in early revolutionary Iran and the Soviet Union (the main backer of leftist groups in the country throughout the twentieth century) eroded confidence in the ideals of socialism as it intersected with realities of struggle under Islamic and American government systems.

As for monarchical nationalism, Ansari’s definition mandates pride in the institute of Iranian monarchy as the sole source of legitimacy for the Iranian state. This branch of nationalist ideology had significantly more efficacy in the United States than the two branches listed above, especially after the trauma unleashed by the Islamic Republic on the ancien régime and non-Islamic revolutionaries alike. Many Iranian exiles adopted the monarchy’s restoration as the healthy alternative for an Iran they viewed as damaged by the introduction of Shiite Sharia. Such a phenomenon occurred hand-in-hand with hese same Iranians consolidating their American identity with hardline politicians who promised the community a restoration of the son of the nowdead king, Prince Reza Pahlavi, onto the throne. Violent regime change and the Republican Party drew these same Iranians into a pipe dream of an ideology that slowly eroded the nationalism away, as political ambition replaced national pride. At the same time, Reza Pahlavi himself has publicly asserted that he seeks a democratic alternative to his father’s reign should he be placed at the head of a new provisional government, leaving the institution of monarchy innately separate from the ideologies of Pahlavi monarchists in the diaspora. Subsequently, for multiple reasons, we can characterize the Iranian-American diaspora as philosophically unable to truly be monarchical nationalists by Ansari’s definition.

Lastly, according to Ansari, there exists the branch of secular liberal nationalism, the most commonly conceptualized version of the philosophy when one visualizes Iranian nationalism from a historical perspective. This was the primary political ideology of the Iranian Revolution prior to its being co-opted by the Islamist faction, and most political asylees from Iran to the United States during the several years following the foundation of the Islamic Republic fled due to their affiliation with secular nationalist groups. It should be noted that the National Front of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh in the 1950s and 1960s held similar political ideologies of its later version restarted in the 1970s; however, its agenda was far less coherent and agreed-upon as the earlier iteration. Whereas, in the initial inception of a united nationalist coalition, the primary objectives were reclamation of the Iranian oil industry and rejection of colonial influence in Iranian politics, during the revolutionary period, the movement was severely divided between advocates of a welfare state under the existing monarchy and those who sought democracy or, at the very least, constitutional monarchy through regime change. Namely, the National Front split between supporters of Shahpour Bakhtiar, the Shah’s last prime minister who desired secularism as opposed to the religious radicalism he foresaw in the revolution, and Karim Sanjabi, the official leader of the National Front, who viewed Mohammad Reza Shah as the tumorous cause of Iran’s political disarray. More importantly, these divisions would never truly heal in the Iranian community as a portion of it fled the homeland. Even today, it is easy to find Iranian Americans who agree that the revolution failed but quite challenging to come to a consensus as to how it could have been avoided or salvaged. Hence, secular nationalism may apply as a personal philosophy but cannot prescribe political ideology for the Iranian-American community.

It is with this perspective that we are able to diagnose specifically what general sense of nationalism pervades the diaspora. While certain fringe groups certainly adhere to each of Ansari’s four subdivisions of Iranian nationalism, we can clearly see that the geographical displacement of such a large and diverse community has crafted a sociological shift, effectively requiring the ideology to adopt a fifth category. This foreign, retrospective nationalism, or ‘external nationalism’ as it shall be referred to moving forward, is distinct for its various aspects of validity allowing individuals of multiple viewpoints to adhere to roughly the same political theory. External nationalism can collectively be understood to comprise three essential criteria. First, Iranians in diaspora can only be considered to be externally nationalist if they view the government of the Islamic Republic as needing some aspect of reform, be it internal policy shift or regime change. Second, Iranians abroad must visualize Iranian history and culture as a larger metanarrative that can exist within the hearts and minds of the community for generations to come without distinct ties to the homeland, such as citizenship or completion of mandatory military service. Third, the preservation of intangible cultural heritage, such as language, cuisine, and music, are to be seen as duties of task, replacing political or military achievements sought after by individuals subscribing to classical nationalism. This ideology is one that is not unique to a particular religion or ethnicity, and it does not advocate a united political end – adherents can have differing objectives for Iran but share the philosophy nonetheless. This makes external nationalism, just like the four subdivisions, a form of cultural nationalism. Finally, the position stands unique for its concentration of focus upon Iranians living in exile, prioritizing them — both consciously and unconsciously — over Iranians in the homeland in deciding the nation’s future. This creates overlap in several instances, where regime change-supporting monarchists adhere to both external and monarchical branches of nationalism; nonetheless, it should be made clear that such a practice is quite common in Iranian history and does not disqualify any branch of Iranian nationalism. For instance, the famous Marxist-Islamist juror Mahmoud Taleqani was known to combine aspects of both Islamic and leftist nationalism in his rhetoric, which fell cleanly behind support for the creation of an Islamic Republic.

Yet, as previously mentioned, external Iranian nationalism is far less unifying than its pre-revolutionary counterparts. This is telling, particularly in the field of politics and American foreign policy toward Iran. From the period of 2003 until today, many events have sharply divided Iranian-Americans along ideological lines; these include the Iranian nuclear program, Iranian influence in the Middle East, American sanctions policy, the Green Revolution, American and Israeli assassination campaigns, and the Iranian travel ban. (cont’d.)

To some extent, this is a result of the Islamic Revolution inflicting severe trauma on Iranians who managed to flee the country during the tumultuous events and in the Iran-Iraq War that followed in the next decade. Specifically, Iranians split rather cleanly into two American political camps that each had their separate approach to combating the Iranian government. Those with less-lasting connections to Iran (meaning those who lost significant wealth, members of family, or who no longer consider Iran their homeland) largely lived an emigration experience that drew them to the Republican Party, which offered – and still offers – intervening regime change and ‘maximum pressure’ to attempt to bring the Islamic Republic to its knees. On the other hand, many Iranians managed to salvage their ties to their country — be they monetary, familial, or ideological— and, as a result, these emigrants eventually sided with the Democratic Party and its message of diplomacy and normalization of relations. While there are outliers in both camps, we see that partisan divisions in the American political system certainly lead to some divisions in today’s diaspora community. These same divisions unfortunately have political ramifications beyond simple policy goals.

Crucially, another damaging factor against intracommunal unity is an overwhelming number of prejudices sourced from both Western culture and Iranian history that pervade the diaspora like a disease. These include but are not limited to anti-black racism, anti-Latino racism, sexism, anti-Arab racism, anti-Afghan racism, homophobia, and Islamophobia. The majority of these stem from American social policies in the 1980s, specifically in the Republican Party. Reagan-era political maneuvering, such as the infamous Southern Strategy, pitted communities of color against white, white-passing, and Middle Eastern model minorities to recover conservatism from the political disasters of the 1970s. Messaging and signaling introduced Iranians fleeing from persecution to the role of persecutor as propaganda explicitly and implicitly implanted ideas of Iranian supremacy over other races. Whereas the Aryan myth of the early twentieth century began scientific racism in Iranian communities against Arabs and Afghans (the latter of whom are ethnically Iranic peoples), American systemic racism amplified these sentiments upon black and Latino peoples as well. More dangerously for community unity, however, conservative Islamophobia has compounded upon Iranian trauma from the Islamic Revolution to solidify a fear and hatred of organized Islam, be it Shiite or Sunni. Symbols of the faith, from the turban of the Shiite clergy to a female headscarf, have been known to trigger vile and disgusting incidents of racism, let alone subtle microaggressions common to the community. Despite Shiite Islam being the majority faith of Iran, the diaspora rapidly deteriorates into divisions of hate upon the first mention of religion.

A final factor to be discussed (although many more do indeed exist) in the failure of external nationalism to unite Iranians in the diaspora is the lack of education in the immigrant community, especially in younger generations. External nationalism sadly manifests itself in a surface-level understanding of Iranian history and politics, with cultural education being the only field claimed ‘safe’ by a diaspora disillusioned by what they largely see as a government brought about by political misjudgements committed by their compatriots in 1979. Even in cultural learning, it is exceedingly rare to find Iranian children abroad enrolled in Persian language education programs, let alone Iranian music, literature, or art classes. As young Iranian-Americans depart from their Iranian identity for any number of reasons, so too does the core tenet of external Iranian nationalism, the central role played by the international Iranian diaspora determining Iran’s future, slowly fail.

For instance, American universities, the University of California, Berkeley being a telling example, stand by as Iranian Studies programs are cut and discarded in favor of more profitable Arab and Turkish Studies curricula paid for by wealthy investors. As the recently idealized MENA (Middle East North Africa) coalition replaces the uniquely Iranian-American voice, that voice is silenced in academic institutions just as it is suppressed in home environments. The blame, of course, lies not just in external manipulations of Iranian identity but also in a rise in internal inaction on behalf of newly created Iranian families among upcoming generations within the diaspora.

In conclusion, the Iranian diaspora in America has crafted a new nationalism that is starkly different from commonly understood types of Iranian national pride such as secular or monarchical nationalism. This external nationalism is defined by the centrality of the diaspora in Iran’s political future and an emphasis on cultural pride rather than civic duty as means of ideological legitimacy. Unfortunately, the divisions present in the Iranian-American community present obstacles that will be extremely difficult to surmount, most of which stem from the political atmosphere of a partisan United States combining with trauma of an Islamic Revolution. This phenomenon, coupled with a national decline in Iranian Studies programs and an unwillingness to explore the Iranian identity among younger generations, paints a dark future for the prospects of the diaspora existing as an Iranian entity. The paradoxes inherent in external Iranian nationalism require an ideological shift toward inclusivity and education lest they doom the diaspora to the end of a silent and forgotten chapter in the storied history of Iran.