THE PECULIARITIES OF PEACEKEEPING A Historical and Comparative Analysis

JOSIAH SSEMPA

Abstract

Peacekeeping is a staple in the global community today. It is relied on as a consistent avenue for countries to pursue resolution in intrastate and interstate conflict areas. This study explores the role of peacekeeping and then seeks to shed light on these research questions: firstly, what are some of the factors that result in failures on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (UNPKO)? And secondly, what is the nature of the United Nation’s problem with sexual exploitation? The paper finds that disinterest from the United Nations Security Council, the situational difficulty of the conflict, and organizational dysfunction in the UN Secretariat are key factors that greatly harmed the UN’ s peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. The paper then turns to an analysis of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and finds the Zeid Report instrumental in catalyzing important reform for this issue.

Introduction

“Are you ready to die in a foreign country?” This was the question asked to Filipino Lieutenant Colonel Catherine Gadayan by the president of her country during her exit call. A simple yet scary question, it gave Gadayan serious pause as she realized she might actually perish during her first tour of duty as a UN peacekeeper.. The role of peacekeepers is filled with questions not unlike the one Lt. Col. Gadayan considered. This research paper looks into some of those questions and explores instances where peacekeeping failed and when peacekeepers fell short of the values of the United Nations charter they agreed to abide by. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role and failures of peacekeeping and overview one of the key peacekeeping problems - sexual exploitation. The research questions this paper seeks to delve into are twofold; firstly, what are some of the factors that result in failures on UN peacekeeping missions? And secondly, what is the nature of the United Nation’s problem with sexual exploitation? This paper does not advance a scientific hypothesis but rather narrows its research to three elements 1) the nature of the role of a peacekeeper, 2) historical analysis of critical factors that catalyzed the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and 3) secondary analysis into peacekeeping’s problem with sexual exploitation and abuse. The paper concludes by recounting the research explored.

Literature Review

The state of scholarship on this topic is mixed. While there has been substantive scholarship on some facets of peacekeeping, there has not been extensive research on the implications of the distinction between intrastate conflict and interstate conflict. However, in more recent years, there has been an increase in the scholarship on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) also known as “Blue Helmet Missions” (Isely, 2010). Furthermore, there is also more literature on the impact of peacekeeping. Current quantitative data from the United Nations Missions shows that, while not completely effective, UN peacekeeping does help make “bad situations better” (Andrews, 2007).

This paper turns now to Alan James’s comprehensive, seminal work, Peacekeeping in International Politics. In this work James convincingly argues that peacekeeping is not exclusive to the United Nations. He provides multiple examples of peacekeeping that preceded the creation of the United Nations and traces the origins of the term back to the delimitation commissions which were established in the early 1920s to redraw several European borders post World War I (James, 1990). This scholarship is referenced by former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Marrack Goulding in his article “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping.” In that article, Goulding notes that while the UN has developed the concept of peacekeeping into what it is generally understood today, there is no widespread definition of peacekeeping (Goulding, 2002). In this respect, and as Alan James shows in his book, the concept of peacekeeping varies. In his book, James examines the position of a peacekeeper in four main areas: “personnel, values, function and context” (James, 1990). For James, a peacekeeping body is predominantly composed of military personnel. Their expertise is necessary for the high tension and difficult situations they are placed in and grants them rapport in

dealing with foreign military or police members which also operate from a similar authority structure (James, 1990). Secondly, James contends that peacekeepers do not employ threatening force. The arms that peacekeepers utilize are to protect themselves rather than harm others (James, 1990). This notion ties into the concept of impartiality which peacekeepers are known for. As for the third category of function, James identifies the primary goals of peacekeepers as defusion, stabilization, and peacekeeper-provided assistance (James, 1990). The imposition of a nonhostile force between two hostile forces may elicit a cease-fire or inhibit other regional actors from joining the fray (James, 1990). The second function of peacekeeping is stabilization. This stabilization refers to the bodies that stop hostile parties from warring then monitors the situation or navigates a peace agreement. The third function of peacekeepers is facilitating dispute resolution between the two parties. James points out some ways in which this goal can be achieved and provides a counter objection to this function which he dismisses: In any event, the function of such a body is then to assist in the maintenance of stability, which may be done in one of several ways. The peacekeepers may help in the reduction of anxiety; they may contribute to the prevention of incidents, and they may be able to alleviate or remove tension. However, they do it, they may be in for a long stay, as such operations seem particularly prone to longevity. This has sometimes led to the claim that they stand in the way of the negotiation of political settlements, diplomatic complacency being induced by the maintenance of calm. The argument, however, is less than compelling (James, 1990). The last factor regarding peacekeepers is context. The context behind the organization providing the peacekeeping operation is of particular importance, for there must be a “competent authority” behind the peacekeeping operation (James, 1990). James does not limit his analysis to the United Nations. He notes how there can be other organizations or even coalitions of states with common interests in mitigating a neighboring state’s internal disputes. Under context, another variable that must be considered is the provisions needed for these operations, including personnel, resources, and finances. James next points to the consent of the host country to allow the peacekeeping mission. This consent is important for two reasons: 1) countries that donate are hesitant to jeopardize their lightly-armed troops at the hands of a strong heavily-armed host nation, and 2) the international organizations that commission these peacekeeping organizations (such as the United Nations) generally realize that the concept of peacekeeping is jeopardized when peacekeeping turns into foreign states overstaying their welcome and not acting in line with the impartial nature of their mission. James concludes by highlighting that it is of the utmost importance that there be political cooperation of all the immediate parties to the dispute which resulted in the operation. If parties in the area do not allow the peacekeepers to do their job, the odds of the mission succeeding decrease. Ultimately, the values of personnel, values, function, and context that James elaborates on here are key for a proper understanding of peacekeepers.

Data and Methods

Peacekeeping is a complex and difficult affair. It has brought much good but is not without its tragedies. The purpose of this paper is to spotlight the role of peacekeeping and overview a key problem that peacekeeping has sexual exploitation. The research questions this paper explores are twofold; firstly, what are some of the factors that result in failures on UN peacekeeping missions, and secondly, why does the UN struggle with sexual exploitation? The research in this paper heavily utilizes secondary and historical analysis and compiles and assesses various pieces of research on this subject to further shed light on some of the intricate factors involved in peacekeeping. This paper does not advance a hypothesis but rather narrows its research to a historical analysis of critical factors that catalyzed the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. The paper has already assessed the broad view of peacekeepers and important factors regarding the nature of their role. The paper then performs historical and secondary analysis on several secondary sources that detail the Rwandan Genocide and reviews some major factors that furthered the crisis.

This paper is divided into three major sections. Section one deals with the literature review which details several key factors regarding peacekeepers and then outlines the data and methods this paper utilizes. Section two overviews peacekeeping failures and then dives into a deeper analysis of the underlying factors behind the UN’ s peacekeeping failures in Rwanda. Section three surveys the United Nation’s problem with sexual exploitation and details historic reforms that have been achieved in this area. The paper concludes by summarizing the research performed.

For the purposes of this paper, the variables examined are the United Nations, peacekeeping, the nation of Rwanda, and sexual exploitation. The paper proceeds by defining these terms: “The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945. Currently made up of 193 Member States, the UN and its work is guided by the purposes and principles such as a commitment to maintain international peace and security, uphold international law, and achieve "higher standards of living" for their citizens found in its founding charter” (UN, About Us). The term “peacekeeping” is slightly more complicated to define as there are many different alterations in what peacekeepers should do. A general definition this paper will elaborate further on is that peacekeepers are individuals who mediate conflict on an international scale. The nation of Rwanda is a small, landlocked East African country located just south of the Equator. While small, Rwanda boasts one of the largest populations in sub-Saharan Africa. This paper will examine Rwanda in the context of its horrific 1994 Hutu Tutsi genocide (Rwanda 2021). Shifting to the concept of “sexual exploitation and abuse”: for the purposes of this paper, this term will denote “a wide spectrum of misconduct much of which amounts to serious criminal behavior, including rape and sexual abuse of women and children, prostitution, trafficking, exploitative sexual relationships which include sex in exchange for money, food or medicine and/or with the promise of security” (Stern, 2015). The paper does not operationalize these variables but rather reviews them to gain perspective on the breadth of this issue.

Research

Peacekeeping Failures

L.M. Howard identifies three sufficient conditions which can be found in the peacekeeping failures of Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As research for these countries is primarily historical, qualitative data in most of this section will be composed of historical accounts of the peacekeeping facts of the various countries. Due to space limitations, this paper will survey Rwanda as representative of the author’s argument and then proceed to an analysis of the characteristics of successful UN peacekeeping missions. A detailed historical analysis on these subjects, while appropriate, exceeds the size constraints of this paper. To adapt, this paper will summarize the events of the various instances and then provide the specific aspects in which the peacekeeping failure fits with the three criteria provided by Howard. These conditions are situational difficulty, disinterest from the Security Council, and organizational dysfunction in the UN Secretariat.

Rwanda

In October 1993, the United Nations launched its peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. The purpose of the UNPKO was to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the Rwandan Hutu government and the rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front (primarily composed of Tutsis). The mission, unable to use military force for its goals, was restricted to examining violations of the cease-fire, facilitating humanitarian aid deliveries, and contributing to the security of the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The mission proved insufficient after the government slaughtered an estimated 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus following the downing of the Rwandan president's plane on April 6, 1994 (Winfield, 1999). Howard points out how the key failure for the UN in Rwanda was that “at the height of the genocide in late April 1994, the Council voted, counterintuitively, to reduce the size of the dysfunctional United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2,500 to 270” (Howard, 2008). While Howard notes this, she points to the root of the problem of why some UNPKO flounder and others thrive. Howard points to three factors that are present in this scenario and are also evident in the case of Angola, Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These factors are the situational nature of the conflict, the disinterest of the UN Security Council in the matter, and organizational dysfunction in the UN Secretariat.

Situational Difficulty.

Situational difficulty refers to the problems regarding the nature of the conflict. With respect to Rwanda, this factor refers to the reluctance of the Hutu tribe to negotiate and reconcile with the Tutsi tribe. As Paul Diehl and Michael Grieg point out in the “Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma,” parties must be willing to come to the table for a lasting peacemaking resolution to begin. For Rwanda, this reluctance materialized in an unwillingness to cooperate from nearby regional actors. An emergent political faction, the so-called “Hutu Power” underscored this reluctance with belligerent resistance to political reconciliation with the Tutsi tribe (Greig & Diehl, 2005). Hutu Power

had been a growing political force in the early 1990s and by 1993 it was a burgeoning political force that carried substantive power, albeit power that mostly went unrecognized by the government and the UN. As for the composition of the group, Howard writes, The movement, which culminated in a well-planned genocide, was made up of the following groups: members of Habyarimana’s government (an ethnic Hutu who served as the second president of Rwanda from 1973-1994) who were unwilling to open up the political sphere to other parties and most certainly not to the Tutsi-dominated RPF; Interahamwe and Ipuzamugambi militias numbering 50,000 (who had originally been trained mainly by the French); the Gendarmerie or rural police (also trained by the French); the government’s Forces Armées Rwandaises who were less involved in the planning and execution, but did take part; and finally, ordinary peasants who carried out most of the genocidal killing after “years of indoctrination in the ‘democratic majority’ ideology and demonization of the ‘feudalists.’” (Howard, 2008)

Disinterest from the UN Security Council.

This factor functions in tandem with the situational difficulty of the Rwandan conflict. This factor relates to the lack of motivation and political wherewithal that Permanent Five members encountered in Rwanda. It is important to understand the context of this conflict. The Rwandan genocide came on the heels of another UN peacekeeping failure that is not dealt with in this paper – Somalia. The same year as the Rwanda conflict reached a climax, the U.S. led a peace-enforced mission known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Subsequently, a second group from the United Nations, UNOSOM II - The United Nations Operations in Somalia - encountered attacks from Somali militia forces resulting in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers (Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide - Refworld). These deaths were politically unfavorable within America and catalyzed disinterest in substantively contributing to other peacekeeping affairs. Understandably, the United States was not eager to throw its resources into another African civil war. A report from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) elaborates on this shift:

Rwandan Tutsi, already victimized at home, now became the tragic victims of terrible timing and tawdry scapegoating abroad. The murder of the 18 American soldiers in Somalia indeed traumatized the US government. The Rangers died on October 3. The resolution on UNAMIR came before the Security Council on October 5. The following day the American army left Somalia. This coincidence of timing proved disastrous for Rwanda. From then on, an unholy alliance of a Republican Congress and a Democratic President dictated most Security Council decisions on peacekeeping missions. The Clinton Administration immediately began to set out stringent conditions for any future UN peacekeeping operations. Presidential Decree Directive 25 (PDD25) effectively ruled out any serious peace enforcement by the UN for the foreseeable future. This American initiative in turn deterred the UN Secretariat from advocating stronger measures

to protect Rwandan citizens.[59] Washington's domestic political considerations would take priority over catastrophes abroad – unless the victims were lucky enough to make the television news (Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide - Refworld). Ultimately, when it comes to the interest that the United Nations bore towards civil wars at the time, the events in Sudan sorely impeded the motivation the UN needed to adequately deal with the crisis in Rwanda. Especially when considering how the reluctance of a Permanent Member of the Security Council like the United States influenced other potential sponsors.

Organizational Dysfunction in the UN Secretariat.

Organizational dysfunction on a bureaucratic level is another significant factor in the failure of the Rwandan peace mission. As mentioned, when the Security Council considered UNAMIR, UN multidimensional peacekeeping was on the decline due to the failures in Somalia. Neither adequate funding nor troops were provided given the extensive mandate assigned to UNAMIR. UNAMIR was mandated under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes) to observe the cease-fire, contribute to the security of Kigali, monitor the integration of a new army, investigate non-compliance with the Arusha Agreement, oversee policing, monitor human rights, monitor refugee repatriation, assist with landmine removal, assist with the coordination of humanitarian aid, and assist with preparations for elections (Howard, 2008) (Gourevitch, 2015). The mission was to implement all of these tasks with a mere 2,548 military troops and 60 civilian police. The budget, from October 1993 through April 1994, was little more than a paltry 35,000,000 (Gourevitch, 2015). To add to the dysfunction, there were also serious inadequacies on the part of mission leaders. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNAMIR was Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, former Minister of External Relations of Cameroon, and the military commander was Canadian Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire (Howard, 2008). On January 11, 1994, Dallaire had sent an important fax noting the details of plans for genocide, which an informant within the government had relayed in exchange for the protection of his family. At worst it was disregarded and at best improperly assessed;regardless, there were serious breaks of communication between the UN headquarters and their people on the ground. As Howard explains, The informant explained that radical elements within Habyarimana’s government, over which Habyarimana had no control, were actively planning to re-ignite the civil war. They plotted to kill Belgian peacekeepers to provoke Belgian withdrawal; were compiling extensive lists of Tutsis and political enemies for “extermination”; and were indoctrinating and training thousands of Interahamwe militia to do the killing. The informant also explained the location of a weapons cache, which Dallaire wanted to raid. This fax was all but dismissed at UN headquarters. A fax with the name of Kofi Annan, then head of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but signed by his aide Iqbal Riza, told Dallaire simply to notify Habyarimana of the information, notify the Belgian, French, and US governments of the warning, and not to raid the weapons cache (Howard, 2008).

Less than four months later, the predictions of the information came true. The death of the president opened the door for radical forces to instigate a coup. Horrifically, the next day the Prime Minister Agathe Uwlingiyimana, who was being protected by Belgian peacekeeping troops and UN Volunteers, was killed along with multiple Rwandan government officials under UNAMIR peacekeeper protection. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were violently slaughtered, and consequently, the Belgian government decided to unilaterally leave completely, which devastated the remnants of the UNAMIR operation (Howard, 2008). The UN also substantially delayed in dealing with this issue as the news of the genocide in Rwanda spread like a fire across the world. Acting Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was in Europe when the news broke but waited a week to return to New York where he submitted three response plans to the Security Council, but even then, he did not recommend an approach. The options Boutros-Ghali gave were to 1) withdraw altogether, 2) send in a massive operation under the mandate of Chapter VII, or 3) simply reduce the size of the operation on the ground in an attempt to maintain some kind of international presence while saving the lives of UN peacekeepers (Howard, 2008). Member States such as the United States and Belgium advocated for a swift withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces while New Zealand, Nigeria, and the Czech Republic strongly discouraged those actions. The Non-Aligned Movement also advocated for a more comprehensive peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. Due to the conflicting opinions, decision-making in this area was further delayed at the expense of the lives of the Rwandan people. The situation on the ground became so dire that eventually nearly a month later on May 13th, the Security-General finally labeled the conflict in Rwanda a genocide, pushing the Security Council to take decisive action on the matter (Howard, 2008). The organizational dysfunction of the Secretariat and the indecisiveness proved to be an important reason behind this peacekeeping failure.

Peacekeeping and Sexual Exploitation

Next, this section will explore aspects of the peacekeeper role by addressing the peacekeepers’ reputation for sexual exploitation that peacekeepers have regretfully accrued. Due to the depth of literature on this subject key points regarding this subject will be primarily explored. According to a September 2017 Report on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations by human rights organization REDRESS, “sexual exploitation and abuse” encompasses a wide spectrum of misconduct, much of which amounts to serious criminal behavior, including rape and sexual abuse of women and children, prostitution, trafficking, and exploitative sexual relationships, which include sex in exchange for money, food, or medicine and/or security. REDRESS derives this definition from the 2015 Report of the External Independent Review of the United Nations Response to Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Central African Republic. This definition was constructed by Marie Deschamps, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Yasmin Sooka, the Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa, and Mr. Hassan Jallow, the Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). While retroactive, this definition broadly defines the acts that catalyzed global concern regarding sexual exploitation by peacekeepers (SG/SM/17425-AFR/3291-HR/5285, 2015).

The first recorded instances of UN peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse date back to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the early 1990s, Cambodia and Timor-Leste in the early and late 1990s, West Africa in 2002, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004 (A/59/710: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects 2005). As noted by print media at the time, the reputation of the UN suffered as evidence regarding the revolting behavior of UN peacekeepers emerged in a landmark study published by Jordan’s ambassador to the UN assembly, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, then Permanent Representative of Jordan. In 2005, the Guardian stated some of these shocking allegations showing the hypocrisy of peacekeepers. The report noted:

“[UN] troops sent to police Liberia were regularly having sex with girls aged as young as 12, sometimes in the mission's administrative buildings. In the DRC, peacekeepers were said to have offered abandoned orphans small gifts - as little as two eggs from their rations - for sexual encounters. Used condoms, an inquiry by the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services discovered, littered the perimeter of military camps and guard posts. Alarm about the involvement of UN peacekeepers in sex trafficking first became widespread during the 1990s when investigators found soldiers were customers in brothels run in Bosnia and Kosovo which relied on women sold into forced prostitution. One recent estimate suggested up to 2,000 women have been coerced into sex slavery in Kosovo (Report reveals shame of UN peacekeepers 2005). A former peacekeeper himself, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan submitted several recommendations to reform the United Nations approach towards dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. His suggestions ranged from “banning all sexual relations between local populations and members of resident UN military missions in high-risk areas to encouraging better recreational facilities for soldiers off duty. Sites could [include] sports areas, free internet facilities, and subsidized telephone lines to enable contact with family and friends. One of his more bold proposals suggested the creation of proposals to overhaul the investigation of allegations of rape and abuse. The report further advocates for the creation of a Court-martial within mission areas for ‘serious offences’ to maintain the integrity of witnesses and evidence” (Andrews, 2007). Although bolder in its conception, the Zeid Report was particularly impactful as it brought about numerous reforms that the UN benefits from today. Important reforms include:

• ‘Applying standards of conduct to all categories of personnel, including military contingents, and requiring wider dissemination of standards throughout the mission’ (Stern, 2015).

• ‘Establishing a permanent professional investigative mechanism to investigate serious misconduct, including SEA, committed by all categories of personnel’ (Stern, 2015).

• ‘Holding the UN accountable for extensive training, effective community outreach and personnel quality of life’ (Stern, 2015).

• ‘Incorporating the implementation of measures to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse into the performance goals and evaluation of civilian managers and military commanders’ (Stern, 2015).

• ‘Requiring individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability, including liability to victims and dismissal from UN service, for all categories of personnel’ (Stern, 2015).

• ‘Amending the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that regulates the relationship between the TCC and the UN to require TCC reporting of any action taken on cases referred through UN investigation’ (Stimson Center, 2007), (Stern, 2015).

These suggestions have led to 1) “clarification of the standards of justice for civilian and military peacekeepers, 2) the establishment of a Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU for training, monitoring and enforcement activities of military and civilian peacekeepers and the bolstering of investigation protocols. Furthermore, 3) standardized measures for outreach and training were formed across all categories of personnel, as well as procedures to improve peacekeeper morale and welfare. 4) Civilian managers and military commanders have instituted more rigorous measures, such as curfews, lists of off-limits establishments, off-duty uniforms, and abuse-reporting telephone hotlines. 5) Protocols for assistance and support to victims have been issued by the UN General Assembly and Secretariat to field missions, MOUs between the TCCs and the UN have been revised to unequivocally lay out the obligations of states regarding conduct and discipline of their troops.” (Andrews, 2007) (Stern, 2015).

Ultimately, the Zeid Report is an integral aspect of peacekeeping reform. Policymakers still strive to meet this high mark as they combat the pervasiveness sexual exploitation in peacekeeping today.

Conclusion

The research this paper details is primarily qualitative and by no means comprehensive, aiming instead to substantively overview crucial facets of the role of the peacekeeper. This paper concludes that when it comes to the failures of peacekeeping, the three conditions evident in Rwanda are considerations that must be recognized and dealt with by future peacekeeping operations. These factors are the situational difficulty, the disinterest of the Security Council, and the organization of the Security General and the Secretariat in handling the matter. Secondly, turning towards the pressing matter of sexual exploitation, the proposals within the Zeid Report have catalyzed incredible change in interactions between peacekeepers and populations and in the management of sexual exploitation issues. As the analysis of these two issues shows, the role of a peacekeeper is by no means easy or convenient. It is stressful and full of risk and high-paced decisions. However, peacekeepers objectively do (at least marginally) help what would be even worse situations, and that is worth celebrating.

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