II TREATY OF PARIS AND THE FILIPINO DIPLOMATS IN PARIS

II

1783, 1815, 1951—these are just some defining moments in world history where a “Treaty of Paris” was signed. These three particular treaties marked the end of the American Revolutionary War, denoted the defeat of Napoléon at Waterloo, and created the European Coal and Steel Community which eventually became part of the European Union. All these treaties marked major turning points in world history. But for the Philippines, it was the Treaty of Paris of 1898 that has held immense significance in its own history.

TREATY OF PARIS AND THE FILIPINO DIPLOMATS IN PARIS

France and the Treaty of Paris of 1898 Paris has historically been the site of negotiations settling wars between nations. And it was Paris, at the Quai d’Orsay, that both Spain and United States selected to be the venue for their peace negotiations held from 01 October to 10 December 1898 which led to the cessation of the war with the former ceding the Philippine Islands to the United States for twenty million dollars.

However, France’s role was not just to provide a venue for the negotiations. It was, in fact, France’s Ambassador to the United States, Jules Cambon, who was deputized by Queen Regent of Spain Maria Christina of Austria to represent her in Washington following the outbreak of the American-Spanish War in April 1898.

Figure 93. Signing of the Peace Protocol of the Spanish-American War by Jules Cambon and William R. Day and witnessed by US President William McKinley. President McKinley stands beside seated Secretary of State William R. Day and French Ambassador Jules Cambon, both of whom signed the Protocol. Also in photo are Assistant Secretary of State and later Secretary of the Treasury George B. Cortelyou, Asst. Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee, General Henry C. Corbin, Asst. Secretary to the President Oscar L. Pruden, John Bassett Moore, noted jurist and author of essays on international law, Charles Loeffler, Union officer and head doorkeeper of the White House, and Asst. Secretary of State Thomas W. Cridler, White House aide Benjamin Montgomery, and French diplomat Eugène Thiébaut. Cabinet Room (today the Treaty Room), White House, 12 August 1898. (U.S. Library of Congress Frances Benjamin Johnston Collection)

Cambon’s role in the Treaty of Paris of 1898 came to the fore on 19 July 1898 when he received his instructions from French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé.36

Mr. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic to Washington Paris, July 19, 1898

The Spanish Ambassador to Paris came to see me today to officially request France’s mediation between Spain and the United States.

The Madrid Cabinet would like for you to be allowed to give President McKinley a message in which the Government of H.M. The QueenRegent expresses the wish to put an end to the difficult situation in Cuba.

If the President of the United States were to accept this message, the Spanish Government would ask for you to be allowed to negotiate a suspension of hostilities on its behalf, as a preliminary phase to the peace negotiations.

Please let me know what your thoughts are on this suggestion by the Cabinet of Madrid and on the dispositions you think you would have to make with the President of the United States.

Delcassé

To this, Cambon replied on 21 July 1898 that “I believe that the proposal of the Madrid Cabinet will be favorably welcomed by the President of the United States.”37

On 26 July 1898, Cambon called on American Secretary of State William Day and presented a letter signed by the Duke of Almódovar de Río Don Juan Manuel Sánchez, the Spanish Minister of State, inviting the United States to state its terms on how to end the SpanishAmerican War.38 Following this, the diplomatic process moved very quickly with Cambon receiving a communication from the United States on the 30th of July addressed to the Duke of Almódovar where the terms of peace were listed down and this became the basis of the eventual protocol between Spain and the United States.

Figure 94. French Ambassador Jules-Martin Cambon signing the Memorandum of Ratification of the Treaty of Paris on behalf of Spain. (Photo from Harper’s Pictorial History of the War with Spain, page 431)

By the 10th of August, Spain’s reply to the terms, dated 7 August, was handed over to Day by Cambon. In this letter, Spain accepted the conditions ceding Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other islands in the West Indies to the United States but introduced reservations regarding the handling of the Philippine Islands. The issue regarding the United States’ occupation of the city of Manila and the harbor of Manila “pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines”39 was eventually resolved so much so that by the 12th of August, Cambon informed the United States that he received his full powers to sign the protocol and by the afternoon of the same day, Cambon and Day signed the Protocol of Peace, the precursor to the Treaty of Paris of 1898.

Cambon’s role did not end with the signing of the Protocol of Peace. He too was part of the negotiations between the Spanish and American Peace Commissions from 01 October to 10 December 1898 that culminated with the Treaty of Paris. Furthermore, Cambon signed the ratification of documents on behalf of the Queen of Spain

Figure 95. French Ambassador Jules-Martin Cambon receiving from United States Secretary of State John Hay the US $20 million due to Spain for developments made in the Philippines under Article III of the Treaty of Paris of 1898. (Photo from Harper’s Pictorial History of the War with Spain, page 434)

on 11 April 1899 and finally received the $20 million payment of the United States for the Philippines.

Cambon, as a seasoned diplomat, knew the importance of France’s and his own role in the search for peace between Spain and the United States. He was likewise fully aware of the imperialistic ambitions of the United States and its consequences for the Philippines and for Europe as well. In his diplomatic dispatches to Delcassé, Cambon writes:40

Washington, 1 July 1898 My dear Minister,

I wrote you a long personal letter 8 days ago which was sent with the last mail shipment but it now lies at the bottom of the sea with the Bourgogne.41

Yesterday and today, we exchanged very official dispatches, but I wish to specifically express how happy I am to see you at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The game that is currently being played in

I dare not ask you to read my correspondence with the Department. I tried to monitor its events and to prevent some of them. In this correspondence, you may see the development of the authoritarian ambitions of the Americans. I do not know if the public in Paris is aware of that. The French in general, and Parisians especially, imagine that we only conduct our affairs through words and feelings. First, we showed Spain too much sympathy: we came back and we had a heated discussion about sister republics and the memory of Lafayette. These are nothing but words. The only likeness between our institutions and those of this country lies in their names. These people do not like us.

This is all the more true as we are witnessing an event that goes far beyond the fight between the two peoples that are involved, and which draws the attention of the whole universe.

Mr. Moore, the First Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs dined at my house last night and said something very true: “This is our second revolution”. He was right, and he was sorry about it. Imperialistic ideas are growing dreadfully. All these people have read Seeley’s works, who wrote about the theory of a Greater Britain. They want to apply his doctrines and create a Greater America. This idea is an infinite breeding ground for the infinite vanity of this nation, and especially of women, who are jealous of Europe.

The declarations they made at the beginning of the war stating that they were disinterested have thus been forgotten. The West Indies are an open-and-shut case. Perhaps we went to the Philippines with a certain lack of foresight. They are there: they would like to stay, they want to stay. Please note that this will not be without consequences on the future life inside this country. The importance this will give to the west and to the Pacific coast will change its balance. But will they stop there? If peace is not achieved soon, it is said that the United States will go to the Canary Islands, and that they will step foot in the Mediterranean through a coal deposit. If that happens, and if we let it happen, Europe will be exposed to all kinds of possibilities. These people pretend to ignore our business. They claim to be modern and they do not care about difficulties that cannot reach them. A military officer recently told me that, for the United States, this war against weak Spain was the same as what the war in Denmark had been to Prussia—a lesson, a test, a beginning. We should mark these words because they reveal a certain mindset.

Fascination has taken over these people: a demon took them to the mountain and they feel temptation. The tempting demon is England. England is not a good European, and it skillfully worked on annihilating Europe. Americans are snobs and they got flattered by its sweet talk, though they had known that it was a self-serving move on the part of England. It was like a flirt. Up until now, this has not gone any further. If America worries about the Philippines too much, and if we bother the English elsewhere before the end of the war, the flirt may very well go further, and this is what we must pay attention to. Other considerations must not push us to act too shy or too self-serving. (illegible) We therefore need to be careful and keep the continental powers united. Common apprehension will be bound to create common interests. We saw that in the Far East, at the end of the war in Japan. This successful union could appear again, if this business ends up in a Congress like the German Ambassador seems to wish.

Forgive me for writing such a long letter. As you know, my attention has been focused on African issues for a long time. While our hopes in the Mediterranean area may have been weakened, we still need to make sure that no new element will come to make our goals even less achievable. We cannot allow the work of the past three months be brought down to nothing. The incapacity of the Spaniards exceeded the expectations of its enemies. We saw, in 1866, that we could be beaten in other battlefields than those on which we are actually fighting, and this is when we must be wise.

That is why, dear Minister, I am so glad to know you are the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Yours sincerely,

Cambon was not immune to intrigue regarding his role or that of France as Spain’s interlocutor.42 He noted that the English wanted to be the intermediary between the United States and Spain. In his letter dated a week after the signing of the Protocol of Peace, he conveyed to Delcassé England’s desire and noted that the European colleagues of the Foreign Minister would have already mentioned this fact to him. Cambon contends that if the English were allowed to do so, peace would not have been achieved between the US and Spain.43

“The people are equivocating on the purpose of my mission (in Europe). It is being exaggerated in order to shrink it down to nothing and the newspapers are observing all sorts of subtle distinctions that no one is paying much attention to here (in Washington). Of course, the French newspapers and especially the most serious ones—which are considered serious for professing a kind of superstitious deference to anything that bears the stamp of London—[...] readily follow the footsteps of their English counterparts.”44

“However, I think we can easily see the purpose of this campaign. It seems to try to dim the hopes of London and to create sensitivity towards France and towards my character. But the press overlooked how people behave here: these people are business people who do not associate with the nonsense of the Chanceries (Embassies) and who did not care whether I served as a mailbox or acted as a plenipotentiary for as long as I brought the submissions of Spain.”45

“Today, the same people, the same agencies, and the same newspapers are campaigning in order for the United States to be merciless regarding the Philippine issue (because from you to me, Mr. McKinley still wants a lot while acting as a moderate) and I see in diplomatic dispatches from Paris that the Paris newspapers fear that we may have gone too far by preventing England to find, in these troubled waters, the honor and the profit that it hoped to get. This really makes you wonder what evil force is constantly making us act against ourselves.”46

Cambon emphasized that France’s role as peacemaker not only benefited Spain, but also itself as well as the entire continental Europe.

“It has been a long time since I got to see an occasion where France honored itself more; there has never been an occasion with lesser risk that gave you (referring to Delcassé) the opportunity to show the role that France is playing and that it must play in the world. This is an eminently pacifist and conservative role. There has never been an occasion which gave you

as good a position from the very start and it seems that, pushed by some kind of jealousy, people are trying to cast doubt on this first success of your administration.”47

On the ambitions of the United States to gain influence over Europe and how France’s role in the negotiations was able to avert this, Cambon writes:

“Yet it would be easy to say that a bigger service has never been rendered not only to Spain, which could no longer stand it, but also to Europe and especially to France. The moment was a critical one. The United States was on the verge of taking a step that would take them to the European side for the first time. They did not take the step: just like the barbarians respected the borders of the Empire back in the day, they still respect the borders/surroundings of Europe. They will lose that bias soon enough but they will still need to make an effort. Let’s hope that the worst has been avoided this time and for a long time.”48

“I do not know if England can feel this common peril as much as we can because it is not a European power so to speak. But according to us, there was not a moment to lose, and I think that, over the course of fifteen days, we faced a huge risk. Luckily, we were dealing with the United States and not with some Chancery imbued with tradition, and that is why, this time, diplomacy failed to prove the point of Bismarck who said, referring to the diplomacy of others, that it was the art of preventing things from being timely.”49

“What I find funny in all of this, is the cowardice with which some newspapers in Paris (and I fear others) fear that we may have angered the Americans but this means that they do not really know these people or how strong their optimism is. If the war had continued, they would be waging it with fury. But peace has been achieved and it is an event that will mark the history of the White House.”50

Felipe Agoncillo and the Filipino Diplomats in Paris

When news of the impending Spanish-American peace agreement which would induce American acquisition of the Philippines reached him, the leader of the Revolutionary Government, Emilio Aguinaldo, signed Felipe Agoncillo’s appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary on 26 August 1898. In this role, Agoncillo’s goal was to convince the American leadership that the Philippine Revolutionary Government was valid, moral, and capable of governing the country independently.

Realizing the need for foreign recognition of his revolutionary government, Aguinaldo earlier signed two decrees on 24 June and 10 August 1898 creating a committee that would take the lead in promoting the interests of the Philippines abroad. Following these decrees, the Filipino Central Committee was created and diplomatic representatives were assigned to Barcelona, Madrid, Hong Kong, London, Paris, the United States, Japan, and Australia. In Paris, Pedro Roxas and Juan Luna represented the Central Committee while Agoncillo represented it in the United States.

As soon as he received his instructions on the 1st of September in Hong Kong, Agoncillo, together with Sixto Roxas as his secretary, promptly boarded a ship to San Francisco and arrived at his destination on 22 September 1898.

Agoncillo and Roxas eventually met with President William McKinley on the 1st of October but only through the efforts of Brig. General Francis V. Greene, Commander of the second United States expeditionary force to the Philippines. While the American President did receive Agoncillo at the White House, McKinley refused to receive Agoncillo as an official foreign envoy. During this encounter, which lasted about 30 minutes, Agoncillo attempted to lobby the American President to help the Philippines acquire independence or to allow Philippine representatives to participate in the negotiations of the Spanish-American Peace Commission in Paris.

Realizing the futility of his mission in Washington, Agoncillo made his way to Paris to join other Filipinos in order to work on the recognition of the Philippines and to try to participate in the peace negotiations which began on the 1st of October.

Figure 96. Aguinaldo remained in Bacoor, Cavite while he sent Agoncillo as delegate to Washington, and the Junta in Hong Kong sent someone to Paris. This article also places General Greene and Agoncillo on the same passenger boat China. L’Aurore, 01 September 1898.

Figure 97. Filipino diplomats in Paris, France, 1898-99. From left: Antonino Vergel de Dios, Ramon Abarca, Felipe Agoncillo, and Juan Luna. (Retrato Collection of the Filipinas Heritage Library)

Arriving in Paris in mid-October, Agoncillo immediately set out to seek the members of the American Peace Commission who were billeted at the Hôtel Continental.51 Agoncillo himself stayed at this hotel in the hope that he would run into the Americans and use the opportunity to plead his case.

Agoncillo mobilized the Filipinos in Paris, most of whom were members of the Philippine upper class and studying in France, to form their own revolutionary committee supporting the Philippine Revolutionary Government of Aguinaldo. The revolutionary committee was composed of Jose Ramirez as president; Felix M. Roxas and Fernando Zobel, as secretaries; Ramon Abarca, as treasurer; Félix Resurreccion Hidalgo, Antonio Vergel de Dios, and Ramon Ramirez as councilors.52

In the latter part of November, Aguinaldo, at the behest of Agoncillo, issued a decree creating Diplomatic Commissions in Europe and in Washington53 whose members were imbued with the credentials to make representations on behalf of the interests of the Philippines to any foreign government. The Diplomatic Commission for Europe was composed of Agoncillo as president; Emiliano Riego de Dios, who was based in London, as vice-president; Gregorio Araneta, as secretary; Benito Legarda, Juan Luna, Jose Lozada also based in London, Pedro Roxas, Antonio Regidor, Felix Roxas, and Jose Albert as members.

Figure 98. Agoncillo’s arrival in Paris covered by the American media. San Francisco The Call, 17 October 1898

Figure 99. Agoncillo with Filipinos in Paris. First row, from left: F. de Amores, Felipe Agoncillo, Pedro Roxas and Antonino Vergel de Dios. Standing, from left: B. Villanueva, Antonio Roxas, E. Brias and P.A. Roxas. Note the Philippine flag and Emilio Aguinaldo’s photo in the background. (Retrato Collection of the Filipinas Heritage Library)

Figure 100. There were indications that Aguinaldo himself wanted to attend the peace conference in Paris. L’Aurore, 26 October 1898

Agoncillo, together with Luna, Roxas, and other Filipinos in Paris as well as the other diplomatic representatives based in London and Madrid (Rafael del Pan), worked tirelessly to make their voices heard in the Peace Commission. None were allowed to enter or address the Peace Commission. However, Agoncillo was allowed to submit a short position paper which was submitted to the Peace Commission by General Greene who by then was the military adviser to the American Peace Commission. In the end, this position paper did not aid the Filipino cause. The Spanish-American peace negotiations came to a close on 10 December 1898.

He did not stop there. During the negotiations and shortly after the signing of the treaty, Agoncillo sent multiple telegrams and letters

from Paris to President William McKinley, Senator Sherman Hoar, Vice President Garret Hobart, Secretary of State John Hay, and other American politicians trying to advance the Philippine cause.

With the signing of the treaty, Agoncillo decided that the last hope was to block the ratification. There was a significant amount of apprehension from Americans about the treaty, mainly as a result of the Philippine acquisition. Given the anti-imperialist sentiments at that time, Agoncillo thought it likely that the treaty might not pass the legislature. Agoncillo arrived back in Washington D.C. on 25th December, and began his quest to stop the treaty. Agoncillo’s work was unsuccessful and the United States Senate ratified the treaty on 06 February 1899 and the Memoranda of Ratification were officially signed on 11 April 1899.

Following the ratification, Agoncillo returned to Paris and held office at the Le Grand Hôtel de la Havane located at No. 44 Rue de Trévise in the 9th Arrondissement together with Luna and Felix M. Roxas55 as the office secretary.56 As the leading Filipino diplomat in Europe at that time, Agoncillo continued to lobby for recognition of Philippine independence. He would eventually be joined twice in Paris—in November 1899 and again in December 1900—by Galicano Apacible, a member of the Central Committee in Hong Kong. Together, they met with Papal Nuncio Benedetto Lorenzelli in Paris in the hope of seeking an audience with Pope Leo XIII at the Vatican.

Figure 103. Interior of Grand Hôtel de la Havane (postcard)

Agoncillo also found ways to have the Philippine Diplomatic Commission recognized by the French government and other diplomatic missions in Paris. On the occasion of the jubilee of the Emperor of Austria-Hungary, he sent Aguinaldo’s congratulations to the Emperor through a letter sent in December 1898 to Ambassador Anton Graf von Wolkenstein-Trostburg. Agoncillo also sent a wreath and condolences to the French government at the demise of President Félix Faure in February 1899. Agoncillo also gave interviews to the French media who covered developments in the Philippines. It was while in Paris that Agoncillo wrote and published his book To the American People in 1900.

By July 1901, Agoncillo would eventually leave Paris for Hong Kong to rejoin other Filipinos who continued to work on Philippine independence, closing this chapter of Philippine diplomacy in France.