in_camera_affadavit_yeates by Robert Dave Myrland

II III

seeK!. ( '

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i FLYING OBJECTS SECRECY, ,f !

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY,

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}

Plaintiff,

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! CITIZENS AGAINST UNIDENTIFIED

...

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CJ i\qr!J"-'~

~pr r-=-- .,--' .._-_.

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".;; '.~',:

il - - - - - -Defendant. --------) IN CAMERA Ii AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE F.

Civil Action No. 80-1562 : ...~

YEATES

I ; County of Anne Arundel

ss:

State of Maryland

Ii I::1

Eugene F. Yeates, being duly sworn, deposes and 1.

(U)

s~ys:

I am the Chief, Office of Policy, of the National

Security Agency (NSA).

I: II r ,:

responsible for processing all initial requests made pursuant

As Chief, Office of Policy, I am

to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for NSA recoras.

The

statements herein are based upon personal knowledge, upon my

j!"

i· personal review of information ava~~able to me in my offici~l

capacity, and upon conclusions reached in accordance therewith.

\: .:

This affidavit supplements my unclassified affidavi~ (U) 2. , . I , I executed on September 30, 1980 regarding all documents which h~ve iI

I'i

been located by NSA pursuant to plaintiff's FOIA request but

I submit

i; I

II I I

! I I

I I

! i r

I II

! I

I I

I i

which have been wi thhe1d

\~ho1ly

or in part by NSA.

this affidavit in camera for the purpose of s~ating facts, wh i ch cannot be publicly disclosed, that are the basis for cxemptiny ~he

records

to the plaintiff. beginning of each paragraph of this

affidavit, the letter or letters within parentheses designat~(s) the degree of sensitivity of information tb~ paragraph contains.

I I

i i

.. ..:

',:,.~' ';~.

'.:' .:"\'.1".,; . ....: ',"

...

i i

Ii ,

.... The letters "U", "C", "s" and "TS" indicate respectively that the information is unclassified or is classified CONFIDENTIAL,

.Ii'

SECRET or TOP SECRET •

"SECRET CODE~iORD" and "TOP SECRET CODEWORD",' respectively.

The symbols "(SC)" and ~(TSC)" stand for

11 "CODEWORD" refers to one of the distinctive five-letter words

used to identify the source of the information as communications intelligence (COMINT), to distinguish between COMINT categories and sub-categories, and to facilitate the application of regulations for the dissemination and use of COMINT. ~he codeword

1\ "UMBRA" appearing in conjunction with the TOP SECRET classifica-

tion at the top and bottom of each page of this affidavit, is the codeword applicable to Category III (the highest category)

u II COMIN~ Documents revealing sensitive details about the pro\!

I' I! "

duction of COMINT must bear the classification and codeword

appropriate to the highest category or sub-category of COMINT to which they relate, even though they may not contain COMINT

" "

as such. G'he symbol "CCO", which stands for the caveat "HANDLE

I:,

VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY", is used to designate information

..;,

related to COMINT or COMINT activities, which, although it does

!',. not require codeword protection, must be kept within COMINT I.

I! channels, i.e., disclosed only to persons eligible to

r I! !!

receive COMINT itself~ THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

'~.~In

"i: total Ii

Ii,:

processing the plaintiff's FOIA request, a

of two hundred and thirty-nine documents were located

in NSA files.

Seventy-nine of these documents originated with

p other 9Qvernment agencies and have been referred by NSA to 11

those agencies for their direct response to the plaintiff. I

One document, which I addressed in paragraph 20c of my public

Ii IiI' affidavit, was erroneously tr~ated as part of the subject matter -, Ii of plaintiff's FOIA request. It is an account by a person

Ii"

H u Ii i'

•

assigned to NSA of his attendance at a UFO

s~nposium ~nd

cannot fairly be said to be a record of the kind sought by the

~Od of my

Another document, discussed in paragraph Ii plaintiff. public affiqavit, was recently declassified and released i"'

" "

plaintiff.

to'

Two additional non-COMINT records have been

I; released to the plaintiff with the exempted material deleted.

I;Ii

The deletions in these documents are explained below: a.

â&#x20AC;˘â&#x20AC;˘

Qy~stio~

A document entitled UFO nypothesis and

Sur~ival

was released to the plaintiff witb the deletion on

"I I, page seven of the name of the employee who prepared the draft

I and I

a deletion of a reference to his NSA component.

1'\s I

II I

I; d~scussed in paragraph 20b of my public affidavit.

i~ I; ""

entitled YFO'~rand the I~telliqence C9J!munity Blind Spot to

Surprise or Deceptive Qata:] In this document, the author discusses what he considers to be a serious shortcoming in the Agency's COMINT interception and reporting procedures --~e

I I

inapility to respond correctly to surprising information or

I'II

deliberately deceptive data] He uses the UFO phenomena to

Ii"

illustrate his belief that ~ the inability of the U.S. intelli-

Ii Ii

gence community to process this type of unusual data adversely

Ii I:

(1)

! i

discusses

All of the title after UFO, which addresses

Ii r

the perceived shortcoming, and all of paragraph one, which

'I:,

in this document were made as follows:

affects U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities,] Deletions

employee's pe<ception of the negative implication!]

; Uj:

! i I

~ a?p'"j.'r~ t:":... ~...

'["~. -..- .. ~_.~.- ~~ --~ .P

:~:.: : ..

_iiRA . .:.-...

of the handling of UFO phenomena uS it demonstrates what he

believe,s is the rIess than optimum ability of the intelligence

i I

community to process and evaluate highly unusual dat~ As I

stated in mt public affidavit (paragraph 20b), the type of

Ii candor that is reflected in this record must be encouraged

especially in an intelligence Agency where the most meaningful

suggestions regarding ways to promote the efficiency of the

critical Agency mission will of necessity come from within.

n Public disclosure of such information, especially when it

l! advances a novel theory, could have I candor by the risk of diminutiOn of I

the effect of stifling such

I I employee runs if subsequently found wrong.

II Ii

professional standing the Thus, this matter

was deleted pursuant to 5 U.S.C. ยง552(b)(5). (2)

II1,

Paragrriph

thre~

of this document uses a signals

., intelligence operation ~~insiJ I'

to illustrate

I:I;

the ~uthor's point. This paragraph contains information abou~ : ,. \; SIGINT activities that is currently and properly classified and, ~

thus, is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 5552(b)(l).

i!"

The material in this paragraph also concerns the organization

\, ,

',.f

and operational activities and functions of NSAGiirected agains!j

.. -;

This material is exempt from disclosure uncer

...~

"I' 5.U.S.C. S552(b)(3) which exempts from release under the FOIA

matters specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute.

As noted in paragraph 20, sub-paragraph b of my public affidavit,

I I

I:'I

Public Law 86-36 pr.ovides that no law shall be construed to require disclosure of the org,mization or any function of the NSA or any information with respect to activities thereof.

,.,

";.. .

(3)

Paragraph four of the memorandum states the

conclusions and recommenda tions of the au thor.

\'lhile it talkS

of the ability of the Agency employees to deal with unusual 11I'

phenomena it is not responsive to the pluintiff's request 4

Ii I; " I'

\! I,

, :.

..... :. . " : ..

......

regarding UFO or UFO phenomena. ,

any event, as I stated in

my public affidavit (paragraph 20b), the subject that

parag~aPh .Ls

exempt

fro~

m~tte~

disclosure because it contains the

: ..

employee's'specific r eccmmenda cLons for addressj.ng· the problem of For the reasons stated in

responding to surprise material. !

I i.

sub-paragraph (1) above, these r ecommenda t.Lcns are exempt from

ji disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5).

One specific recom-

mendation suggests an operational approach to solving the problem

which reveals NSA activities and is, therefore, exem~t from

1\ disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) as

It of " " I;.;'". tactl.CS

III it

rj;

This section talks~bout deceptive communications

used biJthe Vietnamese against U.s. forces and does not

not responsive to plaintiff's request.

I!I

report.

include any reference to UFO or UFO phenomena and is, therefore,

g matter ,;

The final deletion is in appendix A, paragraph 10

(4)

eXPlai~ed above.

Nonetheless the subject

of sub-paragraph 10 is currently and properly classified.

II 1

'.i.'hus, even if it we r e deemed to be within the scope of Plaintiff,::;l request, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552 (b)(l).

CorUNT REPOR'rs 5.

~ 'l'he

i II i

remaining one hundred and fifty-six r eco r d s

;: ,: being withheld are communications intelligence (COMINT) reports \, I; which were produced between 1956 and 1979. For purpo~es of my

j; p discussion here, these records are organized into three groups

based upon the source of the report.

a. produced by

One hundred and fifteen of these reports were

~he

oignals intelligence

1111.... ~hese

org~nization~~

COMINT reports are provided to

NS~

I i i \

: \

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___ ... _:l

.... __ ~. I~····'" .~~,..,:·--.·t

"Or'"

)

"' "! "I

(1)

i'l: : ;

Two of the records at issue here were

s~eme::Slt~.• :

If/_~as

provided to

NS~.

prcduce~ .G'he

[The .

772mp L

j: j

Two of these

CO~INT

reports originatc9 from

t·

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l: r i:

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~po,t "om;:,'1

Iii!

P"~

in exchange for the sharing of technology and COl-lIN'l' inrormtltion.

, ..

,. .-,,

'!.

The remaining, thirty-nine

CO~IIN'r

qo.cuments we r e

produced by NS/\ or relate to NSA SIGINT operations.

~ \:

That is,

.'.

these reports originated 'at liSA itself oi in field sites under

the operational and technical control of NSA.

I'I:

(U)

All of the COMINT reports are in either message or

summary format.

A report in message format contains a single

underlying communication

pres~nted

in a classic cable format,

i.e., the verbatim text of the particular transmission, preceded and followed by "extcrrials" consisting of:

data about the ce nde c

i and the recipient; the dates and times of transmission; and

other technical information.

/\ summary, as the label suggests,

provides in summary form the contents of a single message or

of a small number of related intercepted commun Lc a.t Lo ns , often

accompanied by some'technic"ll datu.

~one

hundred and fifty-four of the one hundred

and fifty-siy. COMINT reports are based \~holiy upon intercepted communications of foreign governments transmitted on non-public

. :. -.

cO~Runications

facilitieu in my public

The other record which is not on intercepted communications,

froiJ"gOvernme~t ne!',i, [facilities,

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.',....)

(") ~L.,

~a9C~

!: â&#x20AC;˘ ' .â&#x20AC;˘z ,

S... D .J.

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a description of an incident purported to have beon Le a r ne d

from U.S. interception and analysis

I~ommunicatiohs:.1 , I;

G"'~he C01HNT

Ii ~an

ll:!

mEr,

ElF

format, was produceu-b~"II.

F~cilities.

...

; (forn-

summaz y --

I I

;

-r

the intercepteci communications between tH0

~ircrafts and a 9found controller i~JtIIIf

I: U9 71 • .

1- 1F1~e- . . .

oil

in the sky north

•

on~lEeport, in

!TIunications

•

COMIN'r Reports tvhich-'

•

~argets as fOl~o~siJ

_Target Communications Tr.ansmi tteel on]·

l ~rom

bV~:1iI7'1 .•

be' further described in terms of

sources and intelli9:nce

reports originated

report a "phenomena"

F.frhre~eports

are

aummard e s 0 i l _ G e s s a g e s intercepted froEl) . • • • • • •

I~~o~munications.

I'-..-r: STlOi k~l!.adar ·operators

Ii ~I;essages,

The messages. were transmitted frolii]

to a central control station.

th~

In thestLJ

&erators report everything that

"I: " appears on their radar l;jcreens-.

t'1hen they cannot identify a

•

: [!extJ

~'l:_Hep'ortslihich

~ommunica~ions

~tinc

hundred

an~

System

T?rget the]

oiT

nine documents in summary

I I

uses

·unidentified

i II

,: particular object, they report it as an unidentifiable object.

~orm:~rreport

I I

i i _

I' on intercepted communications b e t w e e n _ · raelar

I:j:

operators and a central control point.

r ,similar il

These summaries arc

to the reports de s c r Lbed in SUb-po/Cl9raph a above arid

n Ii

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"it .~

I·

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_1'" r«r

. . .( ..:.,i.._

'~'?5e'l"

•

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~gain,

( ..5TET-~ unformation pertaining to the radar ST£r#~

/i operator's report of objects 0...n---:1-11..-·s--r-a-=di"r screen' whi ch ho I:

cannot identifyJ

c. JIIIIIIIIIIIII£COMINT Report Which Targets]

~ommunications. This document is a

I;. . . . I;

summary of intercepted messages prepared ·in 1976 which report]

rad~T~~aCking information

Ii Ii

central control point.

from

~"""'~a~; station

to a

It is similar. to the reports described

I I!

in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above~

d.~OMINTReport Which Tarqets]

TRlcommunic:ations.

Ii . . . .

This summary was prepared

••• 0t

in 1966 bi)

contains a

1\ summary of intercepted communications which were transmitted

IiI!

and the]

between the

&ommande~ regarding a.yellow objebt that

Iij;

was reported to have fallen into tile -sea,

~overnment ne~"l!acility.J

L were transmitted along

0:.

Product of

:: SIGINT I:" I..:.:==~=.:::...=..;:=.:.:=.-=-::.:::-=~=:.::-=::-. I'

produced from

These messages

Jfie~' fiite

which

ommunications

[The

tW<;l

....

reports wer e

i~(2perated by

the

C:!he reports were.prepared in 1966 and contain summaries o£ the communica~Sn:1

tions transmitted bi1~adar operators as discussed in

Ii I~

sub-paragraph b, above.

report to the other.

One of the two reports is a follow-up

The relevant activity reported deals

:' with the tracking of an object approximntely .50 nau t Lca L

l' ~iles i:

l!acility.

I Ii

northeast

oil~Gy

As ,,,ith the messages described above, these cmlINT

reports are summaries of

th~ ~essagesJ 9

9. i; I·

--;t:t~:;b~7.i:~~:::~~ .,J:'·3~~~~f.*:'~" .~

·'

~. ~~~~:rigi~a:ed reDort~ -

Thirty-eight

docu~ents

~re the direct prcd~ct of NSA SIGINT operations and one document describes classified SIGINT

acti~ities.

These documents cnn be

further des6ribed

I. I;

j I

The document uescribing SIG!NT operations r epo r t si

[3.n alleged intercept oij

factual circumstances of the incident

i; were received I; l: /pl~~tiff and :'1LI

IJi!S.ommunic;;J.tions. repo~tea

The

in this record

-~'"='"---~----~ by NSA from ran Fon!, requester other than the'

are considered to be fictitious by NSA analysts.

i~ I:

One record is a 1973 report which summarizes

••1'.. I

UI&essa9.e transmi tted)

Cfromthj _ _

purported UFO zighting

•

i· 1

F I i~ L i:

biJlllllllll,

L ..

follows:

." - . ...., . :i

>iu,ri",'j ITUX• •"'"

Ii II

Twelve NSA-originated COMINT reports target

the communications links and systems of• • • • • Two documents, in summary format, report t h e ~

commun ica t.ions.

Two of the records are

format and report the~"II,,"""II"

A. ~ ~n.~essa?e,

tions which relate that an unidentified flying object :::municasighted in the air by a

nit.

\; contains a summary of _

One report

activity based upon communica-

tions in reaction to an unidentified flying object along the

!~"""""""' .. '

1;""-"-"

Two documents report on communications

transmitted between

and_

.. ;,t.• • •~..ho report visual observations of luminous spheres. One "

is a summary of a transmission

Finally, "

four documents in this group of twelve were intercepted from other. • • • • •

communications targets. One document is based

on the intercei?ted transmission-of"a:; reporting a bright light.

The second record is based on the

i' intercept of a transmission of an

I: a ~ station seeking a report on any shining phenomena or

falling meteorites observed on specified dates.

The third and

fourth reports are a summaries of on-going debates on UFOs among

based on intercepted communications t,ansmitted

Ii I

reports

\: :,

All five of these

Ii n H

. units and

reporting observa-

11 tions of luminous objects in the sky.

r\;

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I·

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;\' ~.

A,*:* .

.i~",,,:*•.

;

::,

Il~tl~g!!tji~~J:>i?~~2tl1Zii:;lIfi~~ME~]1if~~~~~~if.~i~Ri2~i~t', " ':, .....) J~<.);r...\..d IiI ::i"iDA. _ .... I.

•

~Q:'..~~:-----..

.,i."io!t'.,,_·/C)l

""A .

•

Four NSA-originated COMINT reports target

-:Ij ~ communications links

or systems.

Three 'reports are in

message~trans.

summary formrt and are based on an intercepted mitted

sites

unidentif.i~~flying object

reporting an

::.:..:e.r Y high altitude;

11'1t

an intercepted message transmitted from ........

rT'. reporting

that an unidentified flying object with two

.'_n·

\~~,li9htS"ha:d passed over _ a n d an intercepteo

\. • ns.. .

i,.~oicJ message transmitted to

facility by a

' - w h o :·reported an unidentified flying

L object.

lI!.,.~he

The fourth report is based upon a message bet\:/eenl?

'~~.un its ~

'bovernment

sightincr~

'Sixteen NSA-originated COMINT reports target

,net:tcomDlu~:,~ations:~ystemsand lin~:'Of

r:a,e'/eral different 1:

regarding a UFO

countrie.~.

This group contains summaries

of intercepted transmissions bet\'1een ....• • •

.J'

(two reports based on communica-

tions o f._ · . _ and an unidentified senc1er reporting

I:I:

sightings of a UFO), . . . .

\, on communications \: flying objects),

(two reports based

by1

reporting unidentified

7'.( a

report based on a message from a

I i _ t o an unidentified receiver

li- -

reporting a sighting of unidentified flying object"s},

II: . . I:l:

.r.

in~

(a report from an . . ,

SUMO

>i.to t h e _

in _ _ reporting an object that appeared based on

to be a rocket over

an~

communications between two

uni~entif1'e-d ~i:ilonJint..hich.:~reported

sightings of bright or light spots),

•

(a r epo r t" based

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.. .

I"'"

,"-1.:- .'"

f""~ ~'? e'~'''''' it..... 'f''! 'j" 1- .. • . , "'"...".. I

I'.

. - -.

r-~

··.

·,,·iit ')

J .; ':, :.: :_-~ ., ':,..

•.••••. •

I!i on atr.nsm~s~o: fro~:-:~~;;;":it t~-

reporting a sighting of an unidentified flying object),~

I: ,

.•

j: (a report based on a message f r o m ' - ' t o an a~ unidentified i: recipient whli.ch provided instructions for reporting the sighHng

I I I

(a report based upon a trans-.

j1 of flying objects), and

mission b e t w e e n _ reporting that some

:>aw a ball of light about the size of an orange moving overhead).

One document in· summary format is the product of an inteI;cepted

transmission reporting the sighting

H I! ball of fire.

l: . . . . to the' Il unidentified flying reports

frem , .

. reporting an

object.

One document in summary format

th~text

i" 1:

an elongated

One document in message format reports the text

of a _message sent by the

which was transmitted&lOng a Ugovernment

It reports, among other items, -:n increase in UFO

ne~ facility.

act~ity.

I~ The last three documents in this group report on intercepted I'

Each report

communications of • • • • •

:: contains information 'derived from intercepted transmissions I:

I: ""'''''''''''-

SrE;T

reporting the tracking of unidentified aircraft by ~Crada~

n operators.

IiIi i: j!

EXEMPTION OF THE COMINT REPORTS 10.

'-iE, 6)

Pprimary and often overriding consideration

regarding the classification of CmlIN'r reports is tha t the need

to protect communications intelligence sources and methods is

greater than the need to protect sensitive contents of the

underlying intercepted message$. Nevertheless, no portion of j; j; the contents of COMINT reports may be disclosed, where, as here, I' I: revealing the information would have the effect of identifying

rI ~ I·

Ir~

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.....'m., ..... '10,.. TF -",._:.,.1."_, .. 'II' I' ~~ i ?J IIfi 6l';~~ T ..."..,. ....... ",.:.....

_,T

...

'..

£or the target communicat6rs the specific communications that had been

;.-0.

intercep~ed

and exp1oLted.

One hundred and fifty-four of

the CONINT reports being \'lithheld are the product of intercept operations directed against_foreign' government

ccmmun Lca t Lcrls systems within their territorial boundar Le s ,

1::

In 1'·1 ; c:evea :l.ng the con ten ts of these r cpo r ts I ,.-. i

'\ l '.

controrl~~

capabil i ty of NSA to target munication systems.

\~ould }i;is'close

the .-

thes!1~vernme.nt'controlle~om-

Even where the .underlying commun Ica-

Hons

1\ I'

I; proces~ing

had been intercepted ,£or

by NSA.

Moreover, the

disclosure of these reports would reveal much more than the identity of the targeted communications systems •., It

\~ould

reveal as

I:,:

communication~

11.

sources involved in

I: I:

this case -- which are specified or implicitly identified in

r:. the CO!'lINT repor ts being \d thheld by NS~ --L,E-re· the s~urC'e:of"

extremel~

l~ ;

valuable. communications'

range of kinds of information

~ctiViti~s

til

•

illt~ligence covering

a broad

gl ~n~Glatter.s.J

,,!

\: melease of these d oc ume n cs would seriously damage the ability of

the United States ~o gather this vital "intelligence information

I'!,

for the following reasons: a) would

Disclosure'of the report diSCUSsed in paragraph 9b

infor~.

communications

I'lm

U:hat their

b~nternationat common' carrie~acilitiesJ -

' ..

fro~e&nd othe~

I:C

"1I1I~~an

.e. be intercepted and selected

out by NSA, and, even more importantly, that

th~

• v.

i; l:

more, revealing the NSi\ intercept cpe r a t i.o n

tional

commo~

access carrier

to the communication.:;

in::eJi:1a-

rout.~Ghi':h yielded, th~

~;le

! : ' - f e s s a g e could :ause

<:!.g<lin:::;ll~e"

un i ted sr a tez to lose acc e s s

oiJ~her foreign governments

wh o use tlElt

-'''-~

i same communications rOllt~ Ii

j !: ~;

(lbl'

ta .rnu fne

The

at issue here, based on messages transmitt~d~;ia :J~,

international common access carrier this Agency's capac I cc~tions

tiJ:o

As I

to the extent of

h~ve

NS~'s

potenti~l

I; "

intelligence value. ___

stated in my open affidavit, when

ale~ted

capability, and if given information from

reveal

select from such in tercepted communi-

those messages having

(c)

facilitii.~~OUld also

;' \;hich inferences could be drawrl as to the prcc~zsing !~ethods

i' I

used, foreign intelligence services defeat portions of NSA's present

I~,

r[iargetinili,rlternational I

could

~;culd

for~ign

be able to

e~a~e

intelligence efforts

common carrier linW

'rhcs~

countries

~e expected to use different routes of com~unic~tion or

I I'i

,.I i:

o·

r I

I: j;

r. " I:

j: l'

disclosure of other records at issue here, would

result in the loss of the intelligence

informatio;f~~thered .,v,..:.

!: from the interception of the government net communications

i t.

systems:"'-·, The value of the intelligcnce data collccted fl."om s' these sources is obvious.

1:-

Ii i:

(a)

I:I:

example, analysis of data collected from

of~G.ommllniCatiOn~t.2&.7£/~f.J government:j.b"I~._lUli.' •••

the intercept

1 foreign Il"

~or

(paragraphs (lo, o, c , e and 9f) I

,.. nll'(£ommllnications

(p~rilgraph

{paragraphs

9cl, or transmissions I: ,

I " !:

J: I,

, " L

~"',ij~~:J~j'.'.it .... '

•••.. vtiisn."iat• -'.. . - -•llff' -.'

-.~

1J~~i[&~tt:i~~~t}~~!iL~~~~;~[~~~~~~!4~$~~~~I~i~:\":\ '.;:. Ii

:rOP'eeeRE7~ i~j"ta!i£.::r.r

iI:l~easurably aids U.S. analysts'

!: 3d and 9d, e, f) j:

~.,: th~_ a

..... ::~'."

~nalysts

studies of

I I

This information enables planners in turn to assess

I the capabil i ty ofl I : . J

i &nd \;

b'.

, ,

til~~c~ivity

: _ f!y monitorirnr..

l;_~ansmissions u.S. analyst

j ! I

! and other

targetei7t1111111t~ommuni-

i' cations provide critical technical

as dati]

I· i i'i' 'the

is vital to

developrn~nt

re9ardin~eir nation'i)

\: LIntentions, in both the short and long ter'ms.

;\~overnment net systei:.l~scribed here .

l-loreover, .thi]

corrt.Lnue to yield valuable

-,CC

th~.'• • • • • • • •

intelligence data -- including

tion systems discussed in paragraph

9g.

communica-

••••••••••r

·~

Ii i.

l: !:'rom these sources u. S. analysts,. are able to compile reports on ,.

Si9nific~ d

r. I'

&Ctivit~J t:

and~~vents. ,Also, by monitoring thes~

·-" ..····T~~ranSmiSSi.'bnS, analysts are ab,le to obtain d a t a to) l . . . . . . . .~ :..J - ,. i: 17 i'

L \.

[":

'ssH&

among th2f

!; ~urces of intelligence information

I . I

of U. S. countermeasures.

. t '_~ominunicati"ons-are

....

and relating' it to geographic areas, the

useful in evaluating!

;~ the performance capabilities o i ) '

' .

transmitte~_ommunicationsis

,':,

are able to report

th~.:::Ipabilitiesof forei9~.Un. . . ill

generally.

'I"

..11 U

F•

'.: ,':,

',: II:

(~'I'he

13.

.' ':- .

need to ,prote.ct against any identification

of the target.s of intercept operat.ions is equaled by th.e need to protect against revealing the identity of the

i; @sclosu::e

..".

I..

have ex·treme1~r adverse repercussions

L '

.,I~.'

•

..... ":.'

of the

....,

sources

:.:.'

. ';

to the U. S. over

...-

':.

;

.':

..;.

,.'11

;" • _,' ,'..'

...

.....

...

.~.

...,,.,....

. .......t_,,;, ..... ·

L"';. ..~t-... -:.

I;'

,,:'

: ...

CLASS~FICATION

OF THE 'WITHBELD COMINT REPORTS

1I~""IIII".reports relating to COMINT

activities at issue H

rl."

he~e

of foreign governments or SIGINT operations and, thus, remain properly classified.

are based on intercepted communications

In conducting this review I have weighed

the significant need for openness in government against the

i! likelihood of

d~.m3ge

to our national security at this time and

~: I

I, 1:

have determined that each record should continue No meaningful portion can be segregated from the records without revealing classified information about the intercepted communi-

! cations un.:lerlying the CO/'IINT reports. Because each record ! each portion thereof is properly classified under Executive !. Order 12065, it is exempt from 'disclosure pursuant to 5 i

and

U.S~C.

I, S552(b) (1).

....

r J "

:: .. '

interception, processing and exploiting ~ of fOrei?~ communications sent o.~:,internatiOnal common carrier

. 15.

..... "}

l~ facilitia}. or by government net channels are within the COMIN'l'

j:'--

i. mis~ion

II III.

of NSA.

,j;

These

I' functions and activities of NSA are particular j' I'

I. that may be withheld under 5 U.S.C. r. I"

, I

I: "

i, t r

typ~s

of matters

ยง552(b)(3)" since Section 6

;.,

':.:

~~'~:~I' ;.~l::~~~ .:; :~;;;:.:~~~rq~ti:i~;~:.~~: ~~~:f..~::' '~;,;'~i,;:;~ii;:: ~~~~.k~~ ~.:..:~~~A~ ~:::{~·~~~r:!'~?;~~~~ . ;~::~~~t:ts~.::~t~~~~~~l/~tJ~t~; . :.~~~ ".".:, ~~:~ . ;;J.~~~"~~':i:1"5*tii*"W·~~.s-d'··A'g}.;,~~·@Jiih't;·~A:-s '·-9;"\j,,.q&'''''~t~·it·; '4~:~;j;,,·t ¥i;';:a~~....,

?"~~~\Q G C giii] P -:"''"1'' U99.W(~7'.RJii ..... ..;d, f::0, .. .....' ,. ,-_........ ..... _ ... v

I,;,

'Ii

• '-'"'

•

. th e Agency . t 0 re f use t 0 re 1 case tl1em. o f PublJ.·c Law -8·...6 :36 permJ.ts

\ &

iI 'I

Ii In this case, the COMINT reports reflecting those functions and

";~,fficac~..

activities must be withheld to avoid compromising the

of the sourc'es of CONINT information involved.

\ill/J'" Information

16.

L I'!'

about the interception, pro-

cessing and exploitation C?f the foreign communications underlying the records being wi thheld by NSA is classified information

" concerning communications intelligence activities of the , 1\\ United States the unauthorized disclosure of which is prohibited by 16 U.S.C.

I,:"

S798, paragraphs (a)(3) and (a) (4).

This information because

I! i

I I

1 I

i I

I I

it is prohibited from disc;.losure by statute, is exempt from

IiI!,;

release under the FOIA pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3).

that would be disclosed by these records is information about

IiI;

17.

(U)

As stated in my public affidavit, the information

I: intt!lligence sources and methods protected from unauthorized

disclosure under 50 U.S.C. 5403(d) (3).

i",;',

The reports are therefore

i ' Iii,

exempt from release under Exemption 3 of the FOIA. 5 U.S.C.

r !'

S552(b)(3).

18.

I:,.

(U)

In view of the foregoing, and in order to

protect existing sensitive and important foreign intelligence

i I I !

Ii I

L sources and processing techniques vital to the national

I: security,

I certify that disclosure of past and present foreign

I: intolligence communications activities of NSA reveal€d in the · ...

I!I; records

the plaintiff seeks would endanger highly valuable

:: sour cea of foreign intelligence.

I;, 19. (U) Finally, I respectfully I: Court treat this affidavit in the same

request that the secure manner as it

has been handled in submission to the Court, and to return

it to appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice

as soon as possible after review by the Court.

The Department

"[:

! j'

I: I.

11 Ii

..;

I; of Justice will retain custody of this document under the !. i; ,. Court's seal, subject to any further orders of this Court

!';.

or any other' court of competent jurisdiction.

.t.

\I; I I j,

I:: t'll1UJ.._&.1tg..:A...~

~P. YE~ES~'~~~-------

Chief,

0~ce

of Policy

Ii ..· .... ·· . ..•••l~ ,Sll.b!?Cf ibeu and sworn to before me this

.. ' ~. -I~;;;.:.c}ay of October 1980. '.

: I.,;

~. , I ~ .0...

,',

. ".

,. :,., ,

.' j t

.....

.. . .' .. \ "~. .... .::. ' M~ . ~.omrii·ission expires

,'.

Ifrl2

I·

-.~

, I:

I I

.... ::

I '.

-,'

•

,I:

I"·

. t•

I, !:

,. i:

1·

I·

I:b .'.' I'

I: .t. :'

I~':"!i;~"~~ ti L..:-j ~t-·.~:~~

W \.t..~· ~\

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