The merchant of revolution z a b zeman, w b scharlau1 by plekhanov

T H E M E R C H A N T O F R E V O L U T IO N

British Museum

Alexander Helphand. D raw ing by W alter Bondy

THE MERCHANT OF REVOLUTION The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus)

1867-1924 Z. A. B. ZEMAN and W. B. SCH ARLAU

London O X F O R D U N IV E R S IT Y PRESS New York Toronto 1965

Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E .C .4 GLASGOW BOMBAY

NEW YORK CALCUTTA

CAPE TOW N

TORONTO

MELBOURNE

MADRAS KARACHI

LAHORE DACCA

SALISBURY NAIROBI IBADAN

KUALA LUMPUR

WELLINGTON

ACCRA

HONGKONG

Â© Z. A. B. ZEMAN and W. B. SCHARLAU 1965

Printed in Great Britain by W . & J . M ackay & Co Ltd, Chatham , Kent

For F. W . Deakin and E . Lehnartz

G5x37088

Contents Introduction: The Nature o f the Enigma

Disengagement from Russia

The Great Fortune

The Schwabing Headquarters

St. Petersburg, 1905

Strategist without an Army

101

A n Interlude in Constantinople

125

Between the Socialists and the Diplomats

145

Not by Money Alone

170

Business and Politics

192

10.

Revolution in Russia

206

11.

Dirty Hands

235

12.

Schwanenwerder

260

Epilogue

276

Bibliography

282

Index

291

List of Illustrations Alexander Helphand. Drawing by Walter

Frontispiece

Bondy

i ii

Karl Kautsky, 1905

facing page 68

Helphand, Trotsky, and Lev Deutsch in the Saints Peter and Paul Fortress, 1906

Helphand and Deutsch on the way to exile in Siberia, 1906

84 \

Rosa Luxemburg a Christo Rakovsky

85 132

b Karl Radek, 1924

VI VII VIII IX

Rosa Luxemburg and Helphand

133

Lenin and his sister

148

Konrad Haenisch

149

Brockdorff-Rantzau

212

Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Gottlieb von Jagow, and Karl Helfferich, 1915

XI XII

Richard von Kuhlmann and Count Czernin, 1917

213 228

Philipp Scheidemann speaking outside the Reichstag, 1919

259

Preface This study has grown out o f an association o f the joint authors with St. Antony’ s College, Oxford. They have both enjoyed, at different times, the hospitality o f the College, and they have benefited from its stimulating international character. The authors are no less indebted to the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst in Bad Godesberg which financed, jointly with the College, a two-year scholarship in Oxford. The Warden o f the College and Professor D r. E. Lehnartz, the President of the Austauschdienst, have been most understanding and helpful while the work on this book was in progress, and to them the book is dedicated. The authors would also like to thank the Carnegie Trust for the Universities o f Scotland, the Court o f St. Andrews University, and the Landesregierung in N or dhein-Westfalen. Their generous grants made research in a number o f European archives possible. It is difficult to indicate the gratitude the authors feel towards Pro fessor Dr. Werner Hahlweg o f Munster University, and to Dr. George Katkov o f Oxford University, who supervised, with great patience, the two theses in which preliminary explorations were made. In addition, the authors have benefited by the advice and help o f many scholars, and they should especially like to mention Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin, Mr. David Footman, Dr. Michael Futtrell, Professor Dr. Heinz Gollwitzer, Mr. James Joll, Mr. Peter Nettl, Dr. Eberhart Pikart, and Professor Leonard Schapiro. The authors have also received valuable information from Helphand’ s friends and contemporaries, in particular from Frau Martha Jackh o f New York, Dr. Moritz Bonn o f London, Herr Arno Scholz o f Berlin, Herr Bruno Schonlank, jun ., o f Zurich, and Mr. Satvet Lutfi Tozan, O .B .E ., o f Istanbul. This biography, a joint work o f a German and a British historian, appeared in Germany last year. This edition can, however, be regarded as a separate book rather than as a literal translation o f the German version. January 1965

W . B . S charlau

Z . A . B. Z eman

Ham burg.

St. Andrews, Scotland,

Introduction:

The Nature of the Enigma About eight miles due west from the centre o f Berlin, the River Havel broadens into the W annsee: Schwanenwerder is the smaller o f two islands on the lake. In the nineteenth century it provided building-sites for the houses o f some o f the richest Berlin families; the cooks and butlers were still attending to the needs o f their employers between the two wars. A few large residences now remain; their private landing-stages are deserted. From time to time the desolate, shuttered peace o f the island is disturbed by a boatload o f tourists who come to inspect the ruined house that used to belong to Josef Goebbels. But twelve years before Hitler’s Minister o f Propaganda acquired his Schwanenwerder estate, a man who had been one o f the first tar gets o f Nazi vituperation had died there. His name was Alexander Israel Helphand: he died at the sumptuous house on 12 Decem ber 1924. His obituaries lightly glossed over a fife o f extraordinary eventfulness. Konrad Haenisch, then Minister o f Culture in Prussia, eulogized Parvus— he was better known under this pseudonym in socialist circles— as the ‘ ablest head o f the Second International’ .1 T he liberal Berliner Tageblatt regarded him as a ‘knowledgeable man in a class o f his ow n’ who, ‘ without being in the foreground, exercised a considerable influence’ .2 T he con servative Kreuzzeitung, on the other hand, saw Helphand as a man ‘ completely without character, a morally empty type o f a political and business crook’ . T he obituary in a communist magazine, by an erstwhile friend o f Helphand, discerned a sharp break in the fife o f the deceased man. Before the First W orld War, Helphand had been an original thinker, an influential socialist and revolutionary. But then he sold out; after August 1914 he 1 Parvus , E in B latt der Erinnerung, Berlin, 1925, p. 5.

2 13 December 1924.

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became a traitor to the working class, a German chauvinist, a corrupt war profiteer.3 Karl Radek, the leading Soviet publicist, took the same line on Helphand in Pravda, where Radek also described him as a ‘ traitor’ , while pointing out that he had been ‘ one o f the foremost o f the revolutionary writers in the era o f the Second International’ .4 After his death, Helphand’s striking personality and the unique role he had played in the history o f Russia and Germany in the first two decades o f the century sank farther and farther into oblivion. Admittedly, the restless, uncertain years o f the Weimar Republic that gave way to Hitler’ s dictatorship and the holocaust o f another war, as well as the conditions that obtained in the Soviet Union between the wars, were not conducive to dispas sionate inquiry into so recent a past. And then, there was some thing in Helphand’s activities that discouraged remembrance and prevented inquiry. The German Socialists intermittently remembered him as a leading Marxist theorist and a brilliant journalist; historians who concerned themselves with Germany’s eastern policy in the First W orld War, knew that Helphand had had connexions with the Imperial German Government, and that he had advised the Foreign Ministry. It also emerged that he had taken part in the support, by the government in Berlin, o f the revolutionary movement in Russia, and that he had played some role in con nexion with Lenin’ s famous ‘ sealed train’ journey across Germany in April 1917. Nevertheless, the politicians and soldiers who knew the facts preferred to surround the relations between the govern ment and the revolutionary movement in Russia with a conspiracy o f silence. The memoirs o f Bethmann-Hollweg, o f Helfferich, Nadolny, Ludendorff, and Kiihlmann made not a single reference to the name o f Helphand. It was given certain prominence when he became one o f the principal whipping-tops o f Nazi propaganda. As a rich Jew and a Marxist revolutionary, he presented the ideal target for men like Alfred Rosenberg and Josef Goebbels, who included him among the ranks o f the ‘November criminals’— the 3 Clara Zetkin, in D ie Kommunistische Internationale, No. i, January 1925. 4 14 December 1924.

Introduction: The N ature o f the Enigm a

enemies o f the German people who had destroyed Imperial Germany and who had opened, on the frontier o f Europe, the flood-gates o f Bolshevism. In the Soviet Union, Helphand’s name accompanied that o f Trotsky into the limbo o f forgetfulness. He was given an entry in the first edition o f the official Soviet Encyclopedia: but from the second edition he disappeared. The revelations from the captured archives o f the German Foreign Ministry, soon after the Second W orld War, made pos sible at least a partial decoding o f the enigma o f Helphand’ s life. The secret Great War series among these papers contain a large number o f documents concerning Alexander Helphand. He emerged as the central figure in the conspiratorial connexions between the Imperial Government and the Russian Social Dem o crat party, and in particular Lenin’ s Bolshevik faction o f it. T he contention that the Imperial German Government had taken a great deal o f interest in the spread o f rebellion in wartime Russia could now be supported by documentary evidence.5 Indeed, a far-reaching revision o f the accepted views o f the First W orld War resulted from the opening o f the Foreign Ministry’ s archives. It became apparent that policy-making in Berlin during the war had been a much more complex process than had been assumed. At the same time, men who had been ascribed historical greatness were demoted: the larger-than-life figures o f Wilhelm II, o f Ludendorff, or o f Hindenburg, dis appeared from their pedestals. Claims to historical prominence were staked on behalf o f new men: Alexander Helphand belongs among them. Nevertheless, our knowledge o f his motives and intentions, as well as o f his personality, is still only fragmentary. The newly available information raised new problems, and aroused fresh controversies. Behind them the enigma o f H elp hand’ s fife remained unsolved. Not that Helphand himself w ould have disapproved o f the mystifications that followed his death. In a brief apologia pro vita sua, published in Berlin in 1918, he wrote: 6My life is marked by 5 G. Katkov, ‘German Foreign Office documents on financial support to the Bol sheviks in 19 17 ’, in International Affairs , vol. X X X I I (April 1956), pp. 18 1-9 ; St. T* Possony, Jahrhundert des Aufruhrs, Munich, 1956; W. Hahlweg (ed.), Lenins Riickkehr nach Russland 1 9 1 7 , Leiden, 1957; Z. A. B. Zeman (ed.), Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 1 8 , London, 1958.

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my literary works as with milestones. From one year to another, one can establish what constituted the focal point o f my thinking, what filled my fife at any given time.’ 6 No potential biographer could have wished for more misleading advice. Helphand’s written works represent only the surface o f the iceberg. He was obsessed by a desire for secretiveness; he preferred legend to serve his memory. He took, in the last years o f his life, elaborate precautions to achieve this aim. The case o f Philipp Scheidemann’s book o f reminiscences, Der Zusammenbruck, throws a sharp light on the manner in which Helphand acted after the war. Scheidemann was a German Social Democrat leader, and he wrote the book under Helphand’s guidance, while staying at the house on the Wannsee; when the book appeared, it bore the imprint o f Helphand’ s pubhshing house. Although he had been closely associated with Helphand during the war, Scheidemann did not once mention his host’ s name in his reminiscences. And then shortly after Helphand’ s death, his son, together with a number o f his friends, searched the Schwanenwerder house for his political papers. They found nothing. It is very probable that he had destroyed the documents before his death: only after the last war was a small collection o f Helphand’ s business docu ments discovered in Berlin. A considerable number o f his papers must also have been deposited in Copenhagen: a young English scholar, who recently worked in the archives in the Danish capital, gained the impression that a mopping-up operation had been carried out there as well. All this sounds true to form: secretiveness was the hallmark o f Helphand’s activities. For more than three decades after his death, Helphand’s de termined effort to discourage inquiry into his secret operations appeared to have been successful. The authors o f this biography often found themselves following false trails; their patience was severely tested by the peculiar elusiveness o f their subject. Never theless, they believe that they have deciphered some o f the mystery which Helphand had done his best to create. 6 Im K am pf um die Wahrheit, p. 45.

1 Disengagement from Russia In 1867— the year o f Helphand’ s birth— Europe was still the powerful centre o f the civilized world. It was changing, but not very rapidly. There were trains, but no cars; in the capi tals gas was still providing the light, and horses the short-distance transport; although telegraph was available, there were no telephones. In this year, a clumsy typewriting machine made its appearance; Alfred N obel took out the patent for his new inven tion, dynamite. In Vienna, Strauss delighted his devoted public with the latest light-hearted composition, the Blue Danube Waltz; in London, Karl Marx completed the first volume o f his magnum opus, Das Kapital. And from now on, the course o f the main political develop ments in Europe was by no means difficult to forecast. T he unification o f Germany under Bismarck would soon be com pleted, and a trial o f strength between the new state and France was a matter o f speculation. Austria had been forced to withdraw from the affairs o f both Italy and Germany, but she would soon find a new interest in the Balkans. Here, the influence o f the Sublime Porte was fast declining: the question was whether Austria or Russia would fill the gap. Here, sooner or later, the interests o f the two powers would clash. In the country o f Helphand’ s birth, Alexander II, who had taken over the management o f autocracy after the Crimean War, was still preoccupied with internal affairs. In Russia, the imple mentation o f his reforms— the emancipation o f the serfs in 1861 and the reorganization o f local government three years later— left a lot to be desired. These were formidable tasks, the instru ments for their accomplishment had proved inadequate, and the ranks o f ill-wishers numerous. Even while the reforming zeal o f the Tsar lasted, it made no serious inroads into the citadels o f M .R .- b

The Merchant o f Revolution

autocracy. In an age when new sections o f the hitherto apolitical masses were forcing their way into the political affairs o f the other European states, when Russia’ s neighbours to the west, Germany and Austria-Hungary, were experimenting with con stitutions, Russia herself remained an autocracy, without a con stitution or a parliament. She was supervised by a corrupt police force and administered by an inefficient bureaucracy. Together with the autocrat, graft reigned supreme. The Tsar may have expected gratitude from his subjects for his edicts o f reform; if he did, he was bitterly disappointed. Karakozov’ s attempt on Alexander’s life in April 1866 put an end to the era o f reform. And as reform from above abated, the radicalism o f the Rus sians changed. Alexander Herzen and his generation had shared the hopeful atmosphere o f the fifties and the early sixties; they had had no use for violence and revolution. These now became fashionable. Although revolution remained a distant and hazy goal for the young radicals— only Bakunin dreamt o f it in exile, uttering, from time to time, the precise date o f its outbreak— terrorism became the accepted revolutionary technique. The repercussions o f the terrorists’ activities were out o f proportion to their real numbers: the first victims were slain and the first martyrs o f the revolution were created. In 1881 the Tsar himself was assassinated: his successor, Alexander III, could do no better than turn his back on the progressive aspects o f his father’s reign. Under the guidance o f Pobedonostsev, the Tsar’s chief adviser, plans for constitutional reform were shelved; the police force was strengthened and a stricter censorship introduced; the liberal university statute o f 1863 was repealed. Among these conditions, radical revolutionary doctrines exercised an ever-growing attrac tion on the young educated Russians. Soon, another group was to go through a process, similar to that o f the young radicals, o f alienation from the established social order; this was Russian Jewry. They had lived inside the 4pale’— their settlements in western and south-western Russia— in rela tive peace until the assassination o f Alexander II. Their time o f trials began in 1881. They suffered from further discriminatory legislation from above, and by persecution inflicted from below. It

Disengagement fr o m Russia

was tolerated and sometimes even encouraged by the Tsarist authorities: it deflected the fury o f the m ob from the genuine causes o f its suffering. T he w ord pogrom passed into the English language early in this century; it had acquired its frightful con notations in Russia some twenty years before. There were two periods o f violent outbreaks o f antisemitic feeling in Russia, in the years 1881 and 1883, and then again in 1903 and 1906. T he pogroms soon developed their characteristic pattern. T he localized disturbance spread like an avalanche; the mob would methodically proceed from one Jewish street to the next, from one Jewish shop to another. T he property that could not be stolen was smashed. The pogroms— the revolutionary movement o f the moronic m ob— drove many Jews away from eastern Europe. T he exodus to the west, as far afield as the east end o f London, the Bronx in New York, and Palestine, started soon after the first violence had died down. It was not surprising that many young Jews who stayed behind in Russia eventually join ed a revolutionary group o f one kind or another. Israel Lazarevich Helphand was born a Russian Jew, and became a revolutionary. T he place o f his birth was Berezino in White Russia, a small town some ninety miles east o f Vilno, in the province o f Minsk. This was the northern part o f the ‘pale’ , where the Jews accounted for more than a half o f the total popu lation.1 Russians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Poles made up the rest o f the population o f the province. T he Jewish community was self-contained. Barred from political appointments o f any kind and from many o f the professions, the Jews were either tradesmen or artisans; they rarely employed Gentiles, and were never employed by them. T he Jews were mostly literate, but they could read and write Hebrew only, they spoke Yiddish, and knew little or no Russian. They led their separate lives: trade and sex outside marriage were their only links with the Gentile world. They lived in the past, on their historical memories. T he exodus from Egypt, Abraham’s sacrifice, the occupation o f Canaan, these events were alive for them, and hotly disputed. Such subjects 1

rT *l

e census of 1897 gave these figures for the province of Minsk: total population— 9°>° 79; Jews—49,957.

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were more pleasant to think about than the drab, depressing, and often dangerous present.2 Helphand was born into a lower middle-class Jewish family in this province on 27 August 1867. There is very little we know about his descent, his childhood, and youth; even the date o f his birth is likely to be an approximation. After Helphand left Russia, he had to fill out a number o f forms, in Switzerland or in Ger many, and 27 August was the date o f birth he gave on these. He also adopted the name o f Alexander: it was as Israel Alexander Helphand that he appeared in the police files o f a number o f European countries. His father was an artisan, perhaps a locksmith or a blacksmith; we have only one vivid memory from Helphand’s childhood on record. It is an account o f a fire at his native town: A part o f the town in which we lived— it was a Russian provincial town— burnt down one evening. But at first I, a small boy, knew no thing about it, and continued to play in a corner o f the room. T he window-panes acquired a beautiful red glow, I noticed it, and it gave me pleasure. Suddenly the door was flung open, and I saw the frigh tened face o f my mother, who rushed towards me and who took me, without saying a word, into her arms, and carried me away. My mother is running through the street, I am toddling behind her, firmly held by the arm, stumbling, nearly falling over, puzzled, clueless, but without any feeling o f fear, surprised and looking around with the wide-open eyes o f a child, people running everywhere. They are all carrying beds, chests, pieces o f furniture. W e hear hurried, hollow voices. A confusion o f voices in the semi-darkness o f the night. I want to look round, but I cannot, I am being dragged forward too fast. Then we come to an open space, filled, in two rows, with all kinds o f possessions, pieces o f furni ture, beds, etc. There are some o f our things already there. A n encamp ment is built from beds and cushions, and I am sat down there with strict orders not to move. I was not thinking o f doing that anyway: everything around me is so unusual, fantastic, it came so unexpectedly, and now I am sitting so snugly among the many soft cushions. T he open space becomes enveloped in darkness. One sees the swaying hand-lamps cut across it like large will-o’ -the-wisps, they approach us or they merge

2 Jehudo Epstein, M ein Weg von Ost nach West, Stuttgart, 1929, p.8 et seq.

Disengagement fr o m Russia

into the darkness. A t first, one sees a red spot o f light in the distance, then nearer and nearer, a growing circle o f light, and behind it vague, shadowy outlines o f people, carriages, large pieces o f furniture. T h e sky is black, without stars, only in one place a glare can be seen, growing bigger, striving upwards, it hurriedly reaches out and flares up more brightly, but soon it draws back and grows dimmer, and then again the lost territory is quickly reclaimed by the glowing surfaces. D ogs are howling. But with all this going on I feel secure, so peaceful behind the entrenchment, among the enormous, white pillow s, that I stretch out and soon doze off, having no notion o f the catastrophe that afflicted a whole tow n.3

The destruction by fire o f the Helphands’ house was followed by their move to Odessa. T hey had a long way to go for they had to traverse the whole length o f the Ukraine, north to south, be fore they reached the Black Sea port. T he reason for the family’ s move may well have been the fact that Odessa was the birthplace o f Helphand’s father. In the circle o f his friends, young H elphand later fondly remembered his family’ s Odessa origins, where his ancestors had been well known for their physical strength among the Jewish stevedores in the harbour. At the time o f the family’ s arrival in the south, early in the eighteen-seventies, Odessa was going through a period o f un precedented prosperity. T he town itself was one o f the biggest trading centres o f the Empire; in the privileged free port, the dockers handled large cargoes o f Ukrainian grain. Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Turks, Tatars, and Persians made up the colourful crowds in the streets, where rows o f tradesmen’ s and artisans’ houses occasionally gave way to the splendid white palaces o f the rich merchants. T h e open horizons and the sun, the proximity o f the sea, and the active, prosperous citizens o f Odessa leading an alfresco existence, com bined to create the atmosphere o f a Mediterranean town. It did not encourage any section o f its inhabitants to brood and stagnate in isolation: the Jewish community in Odessa led a life which bore little resem blance to that o f the Jews in the northern provinces o f the ‘pale’ . Most o f them could speak Ukrainian or Russian; religious ortho doxy had never been strongly entrenched in the town on the 01. Lehmann and Parvus, D as hungernde Russ land, Munich, 1900, pp. 172-3.

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Black Sea, and many Jews there discarded the rigid ritual o f their faith. Some o f them belonged among the rich grain merchants, the vital and explosive figures o f Isaac Babel’s short stories. Their strong attachment to life was their main virtue; riches, they knew, came and went. They found as much satisfaction in the risk and uncertainties o f their business as in the profit they made. Although the Odessa Jews were not spared the horrors o f mob violence unleashed after the assassination o f Alexander II, the years young Helphand spent at the Black Sea port provided him with a Russian background. He went to a local gymnasium— a grammar school that stressed the classical disciplines— and he also received some private tuition in the humanities before he went to university. But formal education gave Alexander only formal qualifications. Influences outside the school were more decisive for his intellectual development. He returned to them many years later: I dreamed under the starry heaven o f the Ukraine, listened to the surf on the shores o f the Black Sea. In my memories the songs o f the Ukraine and the fairy tales and other yarns o f the master craftsmen from the central Russian provinces, who visited my father every summer, go together. Shevchenko was the first to acquaint me with the idea o f class struggle. I was enthusiastic about the haidamaki. Mikhailovski, Schedrin, and Uspenski played an important role in my further intellectual development. John S. M ill’s book, annotated by Chernyshevski, was the first work on political economy I ever read.4

Such accomplishments were not taught at Russian schools: like many other young men o f his generation, Helphand had to acquire them for himself. He learned about class struggle, rather surprisingly, from Shevchenko, the poet o f Ukrainian national freedom; his imagination was fired by the haidamaki, the peasants and the cossacks o f the Dnieper region who had repeatedly re belled against Polish domination in the eighteenth century. All this had specifically local, Ukrainian connexions: the rest o f his spiritual guides Helphand shared with the Russian intelligentsia. Mikhailovski, the journalist and the founder o f an influential school o f thought in sociology; Saltykov-Schedrin, a bureaucrat 4 Im K am pf um die Wahrheit, Berlin, 1918, pp. 4-5.

Disengagement fr o m Russia

by profession, whose vitriolic satire ridiculed the bureaucracy; Uspenski, one o f the founders, in 1879, o f the Narodnaia Volya, the secret terrorist organization. Such guides showed young Helphand the path to a reasoned contempt for the Tsarist order. In addition to the impulses he shared with the Russian intelli gentsia, his Jewish background may safely be assumed to have contributed to the formation o f his political attitudes. At the same time, however, he had to face the first problems and doubts arising out o f his revolutionary faith. What were the best means o f furthering the revolution? Should he dedicate him self to terrorist activity, and follow the example o f the Narodnaia Volya? The party was fast losing its prestige, and was found to have been riddled with police agents; some radicals had already started questioning the political effectiveness o f terror. ‘ Going to the people’— in order to establish contact between the intelli gentsia and the submerged masses, and to introduce them to revolutionary ideas— appeared, to Helphand, a more attractive alternative. He spent the year 1885 together with a friend o f his called Zhargorodski, learning a trade and getting to know the workers. The two friends became apprenticed to a locksmith, and subse quently they tramped from one workshop to another. T he people Helphand and his friend ‘ went to’ were workers and not peasants, an indication o f the path which his political interests would soon take. Nevertheless, the year o f experiment proved to Helphand the falseness o f his romantic revolutionary enthusiasm; it is un likely that he received much inspiration from his friend, for Zhargorodski was a simple, unintellectual young man, a natural rebel. Only their youth could have obscured the fundamental differences between the two friends, and their ways soon parted: Zhargorodski later became a Social Revolutionary, whose con temporaries in Russia knew him as a fat, uninspired journalist who lived in poverty with his large family, anaesthetized by alcohol.5 In 1886, when he was nineteen years old, Helphand went abroad for the first time, hoping that ‘ travel would resolve my political doubts’ .6 Since most o f the revolutionary literature was F eliks Kon, Z a piatdesat let, Moscow, 1936, vol. 3, p. 254. Irn K am pf urn die Wahrheit, p. 5.

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not available in Russia, and many o f the revolutionary leaders lived in exile, there was some justification for the young traveller’ s hopes. He went to Switzerland: her placid, orderly towns at tracted the discontented Russians. In Zurich the treasures o f revolutionary writings lay open to Helphand; he read with fervour, beginning with the early books o f Alexander Herzen. Although the young man may have been impressed with what he read, he certainly was not satisfied. His practical turn o f mind asserted itself. He came to Switzerland immediately after a year spent among the workers in South Russia, and he knew that very little o f what he was reading was suitable for their enlightenment. Although he perused all the revolutionary literature he could get hold o f in Zurich, he found ‘ nothing there for the workers apart from the book Clever Mechanics and Dickstein’ s pamphlet’ .7 The Khitraya Mekhanika was a light-weight propaganda handbook, used especially by the populists; Dickstein’s pamphlet had a selfexplanatory title— ‘W ho Lives on W hom ’ . Although young Alexander was able to explore revolutionary literature during his first visit to Switzerland, voracious reading did not entirely solve his doubts. Indeed, the new maze in which he now found himself was more complex than the one he had left behind him in Russia. The accumulation o f a large body o f literature o f an unusual kind was the most striking result o f the activities o f the Russian intelli gentsia during the preceding decades. It raised a large number o f questions, and it gave a bewildering variety o f answers. Problems o f the internal development o f Russia, o f her future, o f her place in the world, were examined and many fields o f intellectual activity were drawn on for illustration and evidence. And then in the early eighteen-eighties, Marxism entered into competition for the favours o f the Russian intelligentsia. Although the translation o f the first volume o f Das Kapital, by Nikolai Danielson— an economist and one o f Marx’ s correspondents in Russia— had appeared as early as 1872, Russian Marxism did not emerge as a movement until some ten years later. In 1882, a year before his death, Marx wrote the preface to the Russian transla tion o f his Communist Manifesto o f 1848, in which he attempted to provide an answer to the problem o f Russia’ s future development. 7ibid., pp. 5-6.

Disengagement fr o m Russia

He knew that the peasant commune, a form o f primitive collective property— an institution on which many Russian writers, includ ing Alexander Herzen, had placed high hopes— was being destroyed, but he was o f the opinion that ‘if the Russian revolu tion becomes the signal for the workers’ revolution in the West, so that one supplements the other, then the present form o f land ownership in Russia may be the starting point o f a historical development’ .8 Nevertheless, Russia was an uncharted territory for Marx: the main body o f his theories applied to the conditions obtaining in the highly industrialized countries o f western Europe. Russia, on the other hand, was going through the opening stages o f in dustrial development, and Marx’ s doctrine, even if correct, was hardly applicable to her. W hy should it then have exercised an attraction on a considerable section o f the Russian intelligentsia? W hy should they have complicated their already difficult lives with a doctrine unsuited to Russian conditions? First o f all, Marxism was a revolutionary doctrine: although the effectiveness o f revolution as a means o f political and social progress was soon to be questioned even by the Marxist socialists in the West, revolution remained the Russian radicals’ only bright hope. Marxism also offered them a ‘ scientific’ , all-embracing explana tion o f human society. It had an authoritative, even a prophetic ring; it claimed to be not only a dispassionate examination o f the past, but a blue-print for the future. It in fact dealt in terms for which the Russian intelligentsia were prepared by their earlier radical literature. In addition, Marx examined the kind o f society many Russians wished to construct: the ‘ westernizers’ o f an earlier generation, who maintained that Russia had to follow the path o f western European development, were the intellectual ancestors o f the Russian Marxists. By adopting Marx’ s doctrines, the Russians anticipated the development o f their country, while hoping that such a process would provide them with the classical Marxist revolutionary conditions. T hey indulged in an interesting piece o f wishful double-thinking. In 1883, Plekhanov, who had gone into exile three years earlier, started to expound Marxist doctrine in his pioneering w orks; in Communist M anifesto , Moscow, 1959 edition, p. 20.

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the same year, together with Vera Zasulich, the translator o f the Communist Manifesto, Pavel Axelrod, and Lev Deutsch, he foun ded the Emancipation o f Labour Group, the first Russian Marxist organization. When Helphand visited Zurich some three years after its foundation, it was this group o f exiles which most attracted him. He later wrote that a ‘programme, which put class struggle o f the proletariat into the foreground, appealed to me’ .9 But in the same place he remarked that ‘as far as Russia was con cerned, I was disturbed by the fact that Plekhanov’ s programme had no place for the peasantry; Russia is, whichever way one looks at it, an agricultural country’ . Helphand had become a Marxist revolutionary: the second remark hinted, however, at a certain confusion at the back o f his mind. He had a personal decision to make: was it possible to be a Russian Marxist? Was the description not a contradiction in terms ? Back in Odessa from his visit to Switzerland, Helphand was restless and he did not stay there long. In 1887, less than a year later, he left his native country for a much longer time. He re turned after twelve years, for a brief visit; he had started building a new life for himself abroad. It is possible that, during his stay in Russia between the two trips abroad in 1886 and 1887, the police became interested in Helphand, and that he had to leave for the sake o f his personal safety. On his return journey from Switzerland, he had had his suitcase searched for illegal literature, and had been subjected to a thorough personal search on the frontier; a plain-clothes man had kept him company on the train to Odessa.10 It is certain that he went through a protracted spiritual and personal crisis at the time. More important than the problems connected with his revolutionary faith were those arising from his Jewish back ground. In the autobiographical fragments scattered among his later writings, he tended to play down his Jewish origins, and he never made a single reference to their specific implications in nineteenth-century Russia. But he must have witnessed the pogroms o f the eighteen-eighties, which reached an especially violent peak in Kiev and Odessa. Such experiences must have 9 Im K am pf um die Wahrheit, p. 6. 10 G. Lehmann and Parvus, Das hungernde Russland, p. 12.

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made young Helphand search widely and intently for a solu tion to his personal problems. As a Jew, he would not have been able to rise above the inferior rank o f second-class citizen. Nevertheless, the town where he had spent the best part o f his youth made an indelible impression on Helphand. Indeed, the various aspects o f Odessa can be recognized as they unfold them selves in the adventurous Jew’ s life. T he cosmopolitan atmo sphere o f the town gave him some idea o f the infinite variety o f life; its wide horizons meant more than the mere absence o f physical barriers. Odessa was an eastern town, and it was a trading town. In his later travels Helphand rarely crossed the Rhine on his way farther west. He came to lead a wandering life, but within certain limits. France, England, and America, the lives and aspirations o f their peoples, the political traditions o f these countries, remained a closed book to him. In central Europe— inside the vast quadrilateral area demarcated by St. Petersburg and Constantinople, Copenhagen and Zurich— Helphand felt at home. And when he set out on the road to becoming a rich man, he did so in the manner o f the Odessa merchants: grain trade along the shores o f the Black Sea was the foundation o f his financial success. On his return to Switzerland in 1887, Helphand started to shed his former Russian and Jewish identity, discarding his purely Russian revolutionary interests, and turning towards the study o f political and economic developments farther west. Helphand himself tells o f a characteristic incident which happened to him shortly after his arrival in Switzerland. Plekhanov asked him to write an article on Belinski, the famous Russian literary critic o f the first half o f the nineteenth century; Helphand refused to do so, because, in his own words, he was then ‘busy with problems o f labour legislation and state m onopoly’ . Plekhanov used the opportunity to admonish young Helphand: ‘ D o you know what? First o f all, you must honour your own national literature.’ 11 Such patriotic sentiments fell on barren soil. Helphand thought he had more important problems than articles on oldfashioned literary critics to tackle. He felt a desire to get away from the life o f the Russian exiles, which could hardly have 1 Im K am p f urn die Wahrheit, p. 7.

The Merchant o f Revolution

agreed with his mood at the time. He did not settle down in one o f the main exile centres, but went farther afield, and, at the beginning o f the autumn term in 1888, he entered the University o f Basle. The atmosphere o f the quiet bourgeois town on the Rhine agreed with his studious mood, and with the exception o f one term in the summer o f the following year, for which he trans ferred to Berne, Helphand spent all his university years in Basle. Its reputation commended Basle to the young man. Jacob Burckhardt, the historian o f the Renaissance, Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher o f the superman, and Alphonse Thun, the author o f one o f the first studies o f the Russian revolutionary movement, had taught there. But when Helphand came to Basle, it was Professor Bucher who struck an especially modern note in his lectures. He had taught at the University o f Dorpat before he came to Basle early in the eighteen-eighties; at the Swiss univer sity he lectured on political economy and its history. He was careful to relate his academic discipline to contemporary econo mic and political problems; he gave his pupils the benefit o f his experience as a journalist— he had worked for the Frankfurter Zeitung— and tried to instil into them a regard for hard facts and an abhorrence o f empty theorizing. He exercised a strong influence on Helphand. Political economy— Helphand’s main subject at Basle— was still an un established academic discipline. The conservatives among the university teachers disapproved o f it because it ‘adversely affected legalistic thinking’ .12 Although the warning may have influenced Swiss students, it had no effect on the young Russians. Bucher’ s lectures dealt with subjects which concerned the Rus sians most intimately: the fundamental principles o f political economy, questions o f contemporary economic development, and especially the problems o f capitalism and socialism. Such a sylla bus exactly corresponded to the demands Helphand made on a university education. Bucher taught him the value o f precise statistical analysis: later, Helphand’s Marxism always contained a certain empirical element. Marx was for him a teacher and guide rather than a fountain-head o f preconceived ideas. Helphand’s four years at the Swiss university were by no 12 K arl Bucher, Lebenserinnerungen, 1 8 4 7 - 1 8go, Tubingen, 1919, vol. 1, p. 325.

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means carefree. Acquaintance with the police and the censor, the pogroms and the terrorist societies, made the Russian students impervious to the light-heartedness and youthful naivete o f their more fortunate Swiss colleagues. T he Russians were naive, but in a different way. T hey thought o f their studies as a kind o f preparatory course for the revolution; they were neither interested in a vocational training, nor were they preparing to become gentlemen. One o f Helphand’ s contemporaries observed that if the Swiss students had any problems at all, they were connected either with money or with sex, with ‘ accounting and marriage’ .13 T o the Russian students, on the other hand, such difficulties did not apply. Most o f them lived in acute poverty and they knew that, below a certain minimum o f income, accounting did not pay; a middle-class marriage was out o f the question for them. There was no prospect o f ordered lives before them, and if there were, they would have considered it humdrum and dull in comparison with their main preoccupations. T he Russian students were busy with problems they thought more important— the future o f the world, Russia’ s place in it, her future develop ment— such were the most popular subjects o f their endless, meandering conversations. T he attics o f bourgeois houses in Swiss university towns became the nurseries o f future revolu tionary leaders, who were already starting to disturb the noctur nal repose o f middle-class society. Helphand learned nothing from his Swiss colleagues: the Russian way o f life was much more congenial to him, and until the end o f his life he preserved a keen distaste for bourgeois values. But the doubts and questions which he had brought with him from Russia on his first visit to Zurich were finally resolved. T he youthful, romantic admirer o f the haidamaki became converted, under the influence o f Karl Marx, into a rational, or— this was then the fashionable description— a ‘ scientific’ socialist. Marx gave him a clear insight into the world o f politics; the uncertain ties o f an erstwhile sympathizer o f the Narodnaia Volya were replaced by the self-confidence o f a Marxist. His newly acquired self-confidence was reflected in his 1 3

T j'

F* Brupbacher, 6o Ja h re K eizer , Zurich, 1935, p. 53.

The Merchant o f Revolution

academic work. In the Michaelmas term o f 1890 he started, on Bucher’ s advice, to write a thesis on the problem o f the division o f labour. It gave him an opportunity to apply Marxist methods to a concrete piece o f research. Within six months he was able to put his ideas on paper. The historical part o f the study dealt with the views on the distribution o f labour expressed by the classical writers on political economy: Helphand examined in detail the theories o f Adam Smith, Wakefield, and John Mill; he reserved, nevertheless, many more pages for the consideration o f Marx’ s views. The conceptual framework o f Helphand’s study also pointed to the economist to whom Helphand felt himself most indebted: ‘ the suppression, or, to use a blunt but descrip tive modern word, the exploitation o f the masses— slavery— is the basis o f the division o f labour.’ 14 And Marx’ s ideas also inspired the young student to offer a suggestion which, he thought, would do away with the disadvantages o f the advancing division o f labour: ‘ There exist special circumstances that counter these harmful influences— mainly the organization o f the working class and the awakening class consciousness.’ 15 By the time Helphand completed his study in the summer o f 1891 an important change had occurred in his faculty. Bucher had left for Karlsruhe and was replaced by Professor Kozak, o f the Zurich Polytechnic. Kozak had no sympathy for Helphand’ s Marxist approach: he approved the draft o f the thesis only after some revision. Helphand then had a rough passage at his viva voce examination; in addition, he did not distinguish himself in his subordinate subjects, mineralogy and physics. On 8 July 1891 he was granted his doctorate, but with a rather disappointing rider— rite— the equivalent o f a third-class degree. The Univer sity o f Basle, Helphand must have perceived, was a ‘ scientific’ but not a socialist institution; it may even have been class conscious, but it certainly was not proletarian. In the future, Israel Alexander Helphand, Doctor o f Philo sophy, would never again have his Marxist studies considered by a board o f solemn academics. From now on, he would write for 14 I. Helphand, Technische Organisation der Arbeit kritische Studie, Fil. Dis., Basle, 1891, p. 50. 15 ibid., p. 72.

Cooperation’ und ‘Arbeitsteilung ’), Eine

Disengagement fr o m Russia

the audience o f the European proletariat: it might show a greater understanding for his exertions than did the bourgeois professors o f Basle University. W hen he finished his studies— he was then twenty-three years old— Helphand was faced with the most important decision o f his life. Should he return to Russia and help to organize the working class there? Or should he stay in Switzerland with the revolutionary Russian exiles? Or should he shed his Russian identity, and jo in one o f the western European workers’ parties? He had no desire to return to Russia: there was nothing there to attract him. H e felt an aversion towards her backwardness, perhaps even towards the harshness o f her native people. He had seen western Europe, and was impressed by its material and spiritual achievements. He had written his first study in German, and Germany was for him— as for many other Jews from the East— the key to western Europe. This aversion o f Helphand’ s to Russia was still more intense in regard to the Russian exiles, and it made the second possibility— namely to jo in one o f their groups— also distasteful to him. He thought o f them as a dead branch, cut o ff from the living body o f the people. They lived in a world o f shadows, where theory became a substitute for reality and talk replaced action. About this young Helphand had felt strongly at the very outset o f his studies: in 1887 he avoided Geneva and Zurich, the main marshalling-grounds o f the exiles; he went to outlying Basle instead. He retained his distrust o f the Russian intelligentsia, isolated from the masses, until the end o f his life. It was the last choice— to jo in a west European working-class movement— that Helphand was prepared to consider seriously. In this way he could both serve socialism and earn a living. As a Marxist, he knew that there existed a profound difference bet ween the revolutionary struggle in western Europe and in Russia: whereas constitutional and civil liberties were still the main object o f the revolution in Russia, western Europe had arrived at this stage o f development in 1848, or, at the latest, in 1871. The workers in the West had a socialist aim before them, namely, the overthrow o f capitalism and the introduction o f a socialist economic order. And in Helphand’s view, Germany was

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the country most advanced on the path to socialism; the Germans were running the best organized workers’ movement in Europe. Helphand was convinced that the world revolution, which would emancipate the proletariat everywhere, would be decided in Germany: the class struggle in Berlin was o f much greater impor tance to him than the opposition against Tsarism in Russia. Alexander Helphand was the first emigrant to decide to give his full loyalty and support to a socialist organization in western Europe. He thus became the predecessor o f a number o f wellknown socialists who made their names before the outbreak o f the Great War: Rosa Luxemburg, Julian Marchlewski, and Karl Radek in Germany, Charles Rapaport in France, and Angelica Balabanoff in Italy. None o f Helphand’s successors identified themselves with their adoptive parties as fully as he did. But it should be said at once that his break with the Russian revolutionary movement was not as clean as Helphand himself later chose to remember. Although, until the turn o f the century, he took no direct part in the movement, the personal contacts with the exiles he had established in Switzerland kept him in touch with Russian affairs for three decades to come. He might look down at the political achievements o f the exiles: he would, however, always value highly the personal contacts with his Russian and Polish friends. He regarded Plekhanov as too academic, ‘ classical’ , and vain. He was much more impressed by the selfless and retiring manner o f Pavel Borisovich Axelrod, the benign patron o f a whole generation o f Russian revolutionaries. Helphand also admired Vera Zasulich, the romantic heroine o f the Narodnaia Volya, an eccentric and motherly person, who affectionately called young Helphand ‘ the seal’ . Lev Deutsch appealed to the adventurous streak in Helphand: Deutsch had developed the technique o f escaping from Tsarist prisons into a fine art: he was a kind o f revolutionary Odysseus, whose resourcefulness was surpassed only by his desire for action. Apart from the older generation o f the Russian revolutionary leaders, Helphand also became acquainted with a group o f Polish students in Switzerland, who later came to play important roles in the history o f European socialism. Julian Marchlewski, Rosa

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Luxemburg, Leo Yogiches, and A d o lf Warszawski-Warski lived in Zurich at the time, where they were studying political econ omy. Marchlewski— who later used the pseudonym o f Karski— and Rosa Luxemburg came to figure prominently in Helphand’ s life. Late in the summer o f 1891, Helphand left Basle for Germany. It was a prosperous and hopeful country that he decided to make his home. Yet in his own view, his decision had somewhat nar rower implications: he wanted German Social Democracy, and not Germany as a whole, to receive him. He had no sympathy for the conservative, aristocratic, and absolutist side o f his adopted country; he gave little thought to the question o f how much o f a German he would have to become by becoming a German Social Democrat. As a Marxist, he could perhaps play down the national element involved in his decision; he later wrote: 6Whether Russian or German, the struggle o f the proletariat always remains the same, and it knows neither national nor confessional differ ences.’ And he added: ‘ W hen I became unfaithful to my native Russia, I also became unfaithful to that class from which I originated: the bourgeoisie. My parting o f company with the Russian intelligentsia dates from that time.’ 16 The party which received Helphand into its ranks had existed for sixteen years. T he policy o f repression o f the socialist move ment that had been initiated by Bismarck in the early eighteenseventies had drawn the two main streams o f German socialism together: at the Gotha congress in 1875 the Lassallians— the older, non-Marxist movement— merged with Liebknecht’ s Social Democrats, who, in the following years, consolidated their leading role in the party. Bismarck’ s anti-socialist laws lapsed in 1890: from a period o f rigorous chicanery, the party emerged unscathed. By then, German socialism had acquired its characteristic features. Belonging to the party did not only imply adherence to a certain set o f political beliefs; it was a way o f life. Social Dem o cracy claimed to look after its members from birth until death and it demanded, in return, their undivided loyalty. A similar demand was made by the Prussian State and the Catholic Church: the three-cornered fight was complicated and hard, and the resulting 16 /w K a m p f um die Wahrheit, p. 7.

M.r . - c

The Merchant o f Revolution

tensions were reflected inside the party itself. At a party congress, Vollmar, the leader o f the Bavarian socialists, was accused by one o f his comrades o f not really understanding the struggle o f the working class because he was a wealthy man; the accusation that a party member was ‘in the pay o f the state’ was a serious and frequently used charge. T he Social Democrat leadership became largely a lower middle-class preserve; the attitudes and morality o f this class dominated the organization. It was run primarily for the benefit o f the German workers; only lip-service was paid to the ‘international brotherhood o f the proletariat’ . Nor did the party have any great interest in foreign policy or in developments outside Germany. It was parochial but dedicated, with limited horizons, but confident. Stuttgart was Helphand’ s first stop. T he local party organiza tion enjoyed, at this time, a special position in the socialist move ment; it was a suitable jumping-off* ground for a socialist career in Imperial Germany, and it received the young Russian with great sympathy. It was dominated by two socialists o f conse quence : Karl Kautsky and Clara Zetkin. Nothing very kind is written about Kautsky nowadays. He is generally regarded as an eclectic and a popularizer o f ideas, who could seldom call a thought his own. H e o f course wrote too much, too dryly and didactically; Kautsky the politician and writer faithfully reflected Kautsky the petit bourgeois, the dispirited patriarch, who seemed to have been born already old. But when Helphand first met him, Kautsky, together with Friedrich Engels, was a leading ideologist o f European socialism. And after the death o f Engels, Kautsky, as his friend and heir, achieved a position o f power such as only a few socialists might since have claimed. H e was the pope o f socialism, a kind o f oracle o f the approaching revolution. H e had devoted admirers among the working class, and he profoundly influenced the young socialist intelligentsia. As the editor o f the leading theoretical organ o f the party, the Neue Zeit, he carefully tended journalistic talent: he was the foster-parent and mentor to a generation o f young socialist writers and theorists in the whole o f Europe. His house was an editorial office, a university, a school o f journalism, a meeting-place for socialists who came to learn and talk there.

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Kautsky recognized talent when he encountered it, and he opened the gate for Helphand to German party journalism. As early as the end o f 1891, Neue Zeit published his first contribu tions signed Tgnatieff’ or initialled T .H .’ : a review, an essay on Bohm-Bawerk’s theory o f the accumulation o f capital, and an other one on the position o f Jewish workers in Russia. Clara Zetkin— the other leading light o f the Stuttgart party organization— also helped the young man. This acid, embittered, socialist suffragette was not to be outdone by Kautsky in kind ness. As the head o f the socialist women’ s societies she ran her own magazine, Gleichheit. Helphand wrote for it, and its fees contributed to his meagre income. But it hardly covered his day-to-day needs. His appearance was pitiful; his trousers came down in shreds to the troddendown heels and he wore an oily, second-hand working man’ s cap. He gave the impression o f extreme poverty. Yet he made an indelible impression on his German comrades: he was an exotic phenomenon among them. In the tatty clothes there was a power ful body, supported by rather short legs: his head was solid, with a high forehead, further enlarged by the beginnings o f premature baldness. Karl Kautsky’ s children called their father’ s Russian friend 6Dr. Elefant’ (this, and not helfende Hand, was inciden tally, the etymological origin o f his name): there was indeed a certain heavy, powerful formlessness about his appearance. He was exuberant, larger than life, and used striking, angular gestures when he spoke: his vitality was somewhat overpowering. By the end o f 1891, Stuttgart had become too small for him. He wanted to go to Berlin, and Kautsky gave him the introduc tions he needed. His arrival at the nerve-centre o f German politics and commerce did not improve his material circumstances. He took a cheap room in a working-class district in North Berlin, and from there he had to walk several miles to the editorial offices o f Vorwdrts, the main daily organ o f the party, in Beuthstrasse, carrying his contributions to the newspaper in his pocket. He could afford neither the tram fare nor the postage. Nevertheless, he made a successful start in his career as a journalist. All the most important party newspapers and periodi cals printed articles by him; in 1892 he received a commission

The Merchant o f Revolution

from Vorwarts to write a series o f articles on the famine in Russia. The examination o f the Russian famine, following the catas trophic harvest o f 1891, was his first major success in socialist journalism.17 His German comrades were not accustomed to the presentation o f a well-informed analysis o f the foreign scene: Helphand’s views sounded convincing, and the Social Democrats accepted them— as they were to do on many later occasions— as authoritative and above question. Helphand did not regard the famine as an accident, but rather as a ‘ chronic illness o f long standing’ . The emancipation o f the serfs in the eighteen-sixties had transformed Russia into a pro ducer o f goods, and she was now undergoing the transition from simple to complicated forms o f production. The peasantry would supply the necessary reserve o f labour for the fast development o f a modern industry in Russia: the place o f the impoverished peasants, who had so far acted as a reliable support o f the Tsarist regime, would be taken by the rising bourgeoisie. Nothing could be expected, Helphand wrote, o f the Russian middle class in the way o f political progress— the freedom to enrich itself would become essential for this class, and it could be guaranteed only under the established order. The proletariat was, Helphand informed his readers, the only reliable revolutionary force in Russia. So far, Helphand’s reasoning was similar to that o f Fried rich Engels and Georg Plekhanov, who also concerned themselves with the famine. But in his conclusions, Helphand went much farther than either o f the two older men. Engels concluded that the weakening o f Russia would mean safety for Europe; Plek hanov described the famine as a ‘prologue’ to the rise o f the workers’ movement in Russia. Helphand, on the contrary, thought in much larger dimensions, in terms o f decades and con tinents. He was not misled by temporary set-backs in Russia: he forecast rapid progress in industry and in agriculture; in some ten or fifteen years the country would flourish in, o f course, the capitalist sense. Europe would thus find itself pushed out from its position o f economic hegemony by Russia and by America. The resulting competition would bring about, in Germany, an 17 Four articles entitled ‘Die Lage in Russland’, printed in Vorwarts in June 1892.

Disengagement fr o m Russia

increase in the price o f corn : the European proletariat should be prepared for a period o f sharp wage disputes. Helphand’s articles on Russia contained two points which later appeared in the key places o f his thinking: the position o f Europe between the two great capitalist powers, Russia and America, and the lack o f revolutionary enthusiasm o f the Russian In a postscript to his earlier series o f articles,18 Helphand made his first contribution to the relations between the Russian and the German socialists. Until this intervention, the German socialists had regarded the narodniki— the decaying populist revolutionary movement— as the embodiment o f progressive forces in Russia. Helphand demonstrated to his comrades the error o f their ways. He was highly critical o f the populists, and he pointed to the Marxist Emancipation o f Labour Group, placing it firmly among the European working-class movements. His argu ments made a profound impression on the German party. The contributions o f the two narodniki correspondents to Vorwarts, Lavrov and Rusanov, ceased to appear in the pages o f the Social Democrat organ; in December 1892, the newspaper printed an open letter from Plekhanov to Liebknecht, the first piece written by a Russian Marxist ever to appear in the newspaper. Nevertheless, the Prussian police became interested in the young man before his name became familiar to the German socialists. T he Ministry o f the Interior closely followed his literary activities; the file o f press-cuttings o f his articles was growing fast. As early as the beginning o f 1893 his presence in the capital appeared so dangerous to the Prussian officials that he— as an undesirable alien— was served with a police order to leave Berlin. Prussia was not to remain the only federal State where Helphand was accorded this kind o f treatment. 18 ‘Die Sozialdemokratie in Russland’, Vorwarts, 23 September 1892.

2 The Great Fortune For two years after he had been expelled from Berlin, Helphand led the life o f a wandering socialist scholar. He trav elled between Dresden and Munich, Leipzig and Stuttgart, with occasional expeditions to Zurich where his Polish friends, Marchlewski and Luxemburg, were always ready to listen eagerly to the descriptions o f his experiences in Germany. He travelled light, frequently, and invariably third class. But despite the way he lived, his position in the German party was full o f promise. Apart from his qualifications as an economist, he possessed an intimate knowledge o f foreign countries— an unusual accomplishment among the German socialists; he was a polyglot writer and journalist, which made it possible for him to consult, in the original, the publications that concerned his special interests. He found it easy to place his pieces in the social ist press: his theoretical studies in Neue Zeit were regarded as highly as his occasional articles in the daily press. Karl Kautsky was so favourably impressed by his new, still only twenty-sixyear-old contributor, that he recommended him to his Austrian comrades as a correspondent for their main organ, the Vienna Arbeiterzeitung. In a letter to Viktor Adler, a highly intelligent and sophisticated doctor, now leader o f the Austrian Social Democrats, Kautsky wrote: ‘ Here we have a Russian, Dr. Helphand, who has spent six years in Germany, a very shrewd chap . . . who attentively fol lows German developments and who has good judgement. . . . He is living in Stuttgart, because he has been expelled from Berlin. He would like best to become naturalized in Austria, in order to be able to join the movement openly. His naturalization in Germany is out o f the question, since his deportation order.

The Great Fortune

The party would gain in him an excellent, well-trained worker. D o you regard naturalization as possible?’ 1 In his letter to Adler, Kautsky mentioned the problem that very much occupied Helphand at the time: the question o f his naturalization in Germany or Austria. It mattered little to him whether it was to be Prussia, Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, or Austria, that would grant him the rights o f a citizen. Before he moved to Stuttgart he had written from Switzerland to Wilhelm Liebknecht, editor-in-chief o f Vorwdrts: T am looking for a fatherland, where can one get a fatherland cheaply?’ 2 His enthusiasm for German Social Democracy made him over estimate the actual political influence o f the Berlin party execu tive. Instead o f gaining Prussian citizenship, he was expelled from Prussia: the negotiations in Vienna, in spite o f Viktor Adler’ s help, led to nothing; another attempt in 1896, this time in Wiirttemberg, also brought no success. Until the First W orld War, Helphand, in fact, had no defence against the German police. And when, in February 1916, he finally became a Prussian citizen, it was in circumstances that the young revolutionary could hardly have foreseen in 1893. In spite o f the uncertainty o f his legal position, Helphand vigorously participated in the political discussions then taking place in Germany. In this respect, no reserve or carefulness was apparent in his behaviour. His German comrades were often astonished by the uninhibited and self-confident manner in which he conducted his public polem ics; he made his mark as an outspoken and independent young revolutionary. The German socialists were treated to a preview o f Helphand’ s assertiveness when, in October 1893, he put forward his views on the elections to the Prussian Diet in the Neue Zeit. As an expression o f their disapproval o f the three-tier suffrage, the Social Democrats had never taken part in the Prussian elections, and for a long time this practice was allowed to continue un challenged. Finally, before the elections in 1893, a distinguished voice condemned the socialist attitude to the Diet. Eduard Bern stein, then living in exile in London, was, together with Engels 2 Y* ^ l e r , Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und K a rl Kautsky , Vienna, 1954, p. 182. 171K am p f um die Wahrheit, p. 7.

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and Kautsky, a member o f the Marxist ideological triumvirate. An inquiring thinker, he was one o f the least dogmatic o f the party theorists. Bernstein suggested that, despite their customary attitude, the socialists should take part in the forthcoming Prussian elections: he pointed out that abstention was far from being an effective political weapon. The socialists should lay aside their objections to, in Bismarck’s words, ‘ the poorest o f all election systems’ , and take part in the elections. Bernstein’s suggestions were not well received in Germany. The JVeue Zeit wrote that ‘it might work, but it doesn’ t’ ; Forwarts referred to a ‘ fatal mistake’ . The old socialist guard were clearly attached to their demonstration o f moral disapproval: like Bernstein, Helphand was unimpressed by this show o f senti mentality. Under the pseudonym Unus he made a plea, in the JVeue Zeit, in support o f Bernstein’ s suggestions. His article was in fact a sermon to his comrades on the importance o f the Diet, which controlled justice and the budget o f the Prussian State. Such an influential institution could not be, according to Helphand, left at the mercy o f the reactionary parties. He realized that the political influence o f the socialist fraction would be small; but the socialists could use the Diet as an agitation platform. ‘ The enlightenment o f the masses can be achieved by action, by politi cal activity, by social struggle.’ 3 As far as Helphand was con cerned, inactivity and reserve were quite unsuitable as means to conduct the class struggle. The German socialists who read the attack on their sacro sanct practice in the JVeue Zeit were puzzled by the identity o f the person behind the pseudonym. W ho would dare, they asked, support Bernstein’s heresies, after the party had made its mind up in such a unanimous manner ? But before the pseudonym was deciphered, Helphand was ready for another foray. In the summer o f 1894 the socialists in the Bavarian Diet, led by Georg von Vollmar, decided to support the government’s budget proposals. Once again, a tradition o f the party was about to be challenged: to withhold support for the budget was gener ally regarded as a demonstration against the established order. Helphand thought the incident important enough to release a 3 Unus, ‘Die preussischen Landtagswahlen, Neue £ eit, 1893-4, vol. 2, p. 44.

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broadside against his comrades in Bavaria. Again, he signed the article with a pseudonym : this time it was Parvus. It remained with Helphand until the end o f his life. As Parvus he would be, from now on, praised and disapproved of, attacked and admired. But when the first article by Parvus appeared, the German social ists realized that they could not afford to ignore the name in future. Helphand’ s article in the Neue Zeit on support for the Bavarian budget shocked the party out o f its complacency. ‘Not a single man and not a single penny’ , Helphand proclaimed on the question o f support for the regime. ‘ Support for the budget is equivalent to the support o f the predominant political order, because it would make available the means for the maintenance o f this order.’ 4 Opposition to the budget proposals was, according to Parvus, the most powerful ‘means o f parliamentary struggle’ at the dis posal o f the party— the best way o f expressing its oppositional standpoint. He could not understand how support for the budget could be wrong in theory but right in political practice. ‘ W hen one is no longer able to reconcile theory and practice, to deduce practice from theory . . . it is a certain sign that something is wrong with the one or the other side.’ 5 This article by Parvus set o ff a discussion inside the socialist movement which continued, intermittently, until the outbreak o f war. D id support for the budget— even when it brought substan tial concessions from the government— mean a compromise with the established order, or was it merely a part o f the give and take o f political life? Was it opportunism or political wisdom? The party was unable to find an answer acceptable to all its regional organizations. Parvus thus opened a wound which it was impos sible to heal. T he following party congress at Frankfurt in 1894 witnessed the first debate o f principle in regard to this question: it was an inconclusive engagement. As Helphand had no mandate to the congress, Fritz Kundert, a delegate from the Halle con stituency, had undertaken to speak on Helphand’ s behalf, and to 4 Parvus, ‘Keinen Mann und keinen Groschen, Einige Betrachtungen iiber das bayerische Budget’, Neue J^eit, 1894-5, vol. 1, p. 81.

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lead the attack against Vollmar and the Bavarians. The majority o f the delegates preferred, however, to withdraw into a position o f neutrality, and the result o f the fight remained undecided. Parvus won no victory, but he had made a name for himself. Bruno Schonlank, editor-in-chief o f the socialist Leipziger Volkszeitung, read the article by Parvus with great interest. Schonlank, a man with artistic leanings, had a liking for eccen trics ; he discerned in Parvus the kind o f talent he needed on his newspaper. From Leipzig, Schonlank had initiated a journalistic revolution: from a rather ponderous vehicle for socialist agitation he attempted to transform the Volkszeitung into a modern daily newspaper, which would capture its readers’ interest and inform them, in a swift and comprehensive manner, o f current events. Such an experiment— it in fact meant that Schonlank entered into competition with the bourgeois press— was viewed by the party with consternation. Only many years later, when the Leipzig experiment could be regarded as a success, did other German socialist newspapers follow Schonlank’ s pioneering policy. At the beginning o f 1895, Schonlank was convinced that he had found a suitable assistant in Helphand. He invited the young man to come to Leipzig as an editor o f the Volkszeitung. Helphand could not afford to turn the offer dow n : it meant a secure position in German journalism, a position from which he could better influence the politics o f the party. Schonlank was not disappointed. The young immigrant from Russia soon proved his ability as a journalist. The articles he wrote for the Volkszeitung did not lack in substance or conviction; the political analysis contained in them was far-reaching, inter laced with considerations o f principle; they were based on sound facts, and their argument moved effortlessly. Schonlank also liked Helphand as a person. Their conversations which could not be finished in the editorial offices in the evening were usually wound up, late at night over a glass o f wine, at the Thiiringer H of. Helphand’ s zest for work appeared to have no limits. After a sleepless night he was back at his desk early in the morning, fresh and ready for another day. The early months o f the friendship between Schonlank and Helphand were almost idyllic: the calm

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o f their relationship was suddenly broken, by a difference o f opinion on a matter o f principle, late in the summer o f 1895. Together with Georg von Vollmar, Schonlank had suggested, at the 1894 party congress, that a committee should be set up to formulate a programme o f agrarian agitation in the coming year. Vollmar and Schonlank believed that the Social Democrats should look after the interests o f the small peasants, and draw the rural population into their organization. Schonlank became a member o f the committee which was set up at the congress: before it properly embarked on its delibera tions, Engels published, in the Neue Zeit, a forceful warning against the possibility o f ideological misconceptions in the agrarian question. Engels reminded the German socialists that the progressive concentration o f industrial and agricultural property— the trend towards large economic units forecast by Marx— would eventually destroy the small peasants. T he custo dian o f the great fortune o f Marxist inheritance appeared reluc tant to see the German socialists formulate a tactical line in regard to the party’ s agitation in the countryside: he elegantly avoided the issue by his proposal that the party should do nothing for the peasants. Karl Kautsky and Viktor Adler were outspoken in their con demnation o f any attempt to look after the peasants; Eduard David, on the other hand, a former teacher from the wine-growing district o f the Rhine, supported the necessity o f a constructive agrarian programme. Among the committee, opinion was equally divided. Its findings took the form o f a compromise which satis fied no one. Bebel, who had taken a mildly orthodox position, complained to Kautsky o f a ‘bastardization’ o f the party pro gramme. He asked Kautsky to put the committee’ s findings, without any regard to the comrades who had worked them out, under a magnifying glass and edit them’ .6 Before Kautsky was able to take up Bebel’ s suggestion, Parvus launched, from Leipzig, a ruthless campaign against the sup porters o f the agrarian programme. Although Schonlank intended to recommend the committee’ s findings to the party, he was broadminded enough to allow Helphand to examine them in the 6 A letter from A. Bebel to K . Kautsky, 11 Ju ly 1895, Kautsky-Archiv.

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columns o f his newspaper. The young man did not regard the editor’s magnanimity as a sufficient reason for restraint on his own part. Helphand’s series o f articles treated the committee’s findings as a worthless scrap o f paper. I f the party adopted the improve ment o f the existing order as its task, he wrote, Tor what purpose then the social-revolutionary struggle?’ 7 A social revolution should be the aim o f the party, and not ‘petty reforms’ . Helphand’s main charge against the findings o f the committee was that they were unrealistic and unpractical, because they were not revolutionary enough. On the whole, Helphand’ s views corresponded with those o f the majority o f his comrades who attended the party congress in Breslau in 1895. After three days o f heated debate, the congress rejected the programme o f the agrarian committee. Nevertheless, the decision made in Breslau did not satisfy the young man in Leipzig. There seemed to be no end to his acid comments in the Volkszeitung and in the Neue Zeit. Even the patient and broad minded Schonlank could not stand such overpowering fanaticism. He saw no other way o f stopping his assistant’s tirades, than to fire Helphand, which he finally did. This might well have been a serious set-back to the young man’ s career. Fortunately, the Dresden socialists were at the time looking for a new editor-in-chief for their financially ailing Sachsische Arbelterzeitung. They needed a man like Parvus: they wanted to appoint to the office someone who could put the news paper on a sound financial basis. Parvus accepted the offer. He was fully compensated in Dresden for his swift exit from Leipzig. Until the spring o f 1896 the Arbeiterzeitung had been edited by Georg Gradnauer, who then joined Vorwarts in Berlin. The rest o f the editorial board stayed behind— Emil Eichhorn, who be came head o f the Berlin police force during the revolution o f 1918, was one o f its members. When Helphand took over the direction o f the newspaper, Dr. Julian Marchlewski, his Polish friend from Switzerland, came to help him: Helphand also secured contributions from young Rosa Luxemburg, whose first 7 The series of articles was published in the Leipziger Volkszeitung on 18, 19, 22, 24, 31 July, and on 1 and 2 August 1895.

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articles in the German party press appeared in the Dresden newspaper. First o f all, Helphand gave his attention to the state o f the paper’ s finances. In order to make the newspaper profitable, he contemplated the acquisition o f its own printing-presses; but the credit he asked for was too high, and the party executive in Berlin turned down his request; the leaders there liked the provincial press to look after itself, without making demands on the central exchequer. Only the Berlin Vorwarts was in a privi leged position, and Wilhelm Liebknecht, its chief editor, did his utmost to maintain it. Helphand was undeterred by the refusal from the party execu tive; he secured an offer o f help from the trade unions. Their generous credit, together with some private contributions, provided enough capital for the purchase o f a printing-press for the newspaper. And success was not long in com ing: as Parvus had calculated, the finances o f the newspaper soon improved to such an extent that its balance-sheet began to show a small profit.8 As far as editorial policy and the make-up o f the newspaper were concerned, Helphand was much less successful. His temper and harshness made co-operation with his editorial board a delicate problem : his conflicts with them often just stopped short o f physical violence. T he situation eventually became so strained that Helphand moved to Stuttgart, from where he tried to guide the editorial policy o f the paper. Even its make-up reflected the editor’ s predilections. He seemed to have forgotten everything that Schonlank had taught him. Instead o f offering his readers concise information, news accompanied by short, sure-fire comment, he printed long series o f endless leading articles, often spilling over the front page, which could be reprinted— as they frequently were— in the form o f rather big pamphlets. He treated the Arbeiterzeitung as if it were his own publishing enterprise, serving no other purpose than as a receptacle o f his own unlimited journalistic output. Schonlank, his erstwhile guide, was shocked by the ‘ anarchy’ reigning in Dresden; even Rosa Luxemburg, who otherwise held 8 Parvus, ‘Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie’, D ie Glocke, 19 15, p. 30; cf. Im K a m p f urn die Wahrheit, p. 2 1.

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Helphand’ s writing in high regard, called the Arbeiterzeitung ‘ the most neglected paper’ .9 However shocked the professional journalists may have been, the working-class readers o f the Arbeiterzeitung and, even more, the young socialist intellectuals, read Helphand’ s articles with enthusiasm. They were unconcerned with journalistic formulas: they were more impressed by the spectacle o f the newspaper moving swiftly into action when a political controversy flared u p ; they liked its forthright attitude to matters that were overlooked by their comrades in Berlin, usually out o f fear o f government action; they were delighted to read Marxist tracts that made sense even to ill-educated workers. The voice o f the Saxon party organization could now be heard all over Germany; in Dresden, ‘ the Russian’ , or ‘Dr. Barfuss’— Parvus in Saxon dialect— was spoken o f with respect. With the support o f the local organization behind him, Parvus was able to exercise a considerable influence on the climate o f opinion inside the German party. For two years he continued to inundate the party executive and the congresses with suggestions, criticism, and polemic. He was obsessed by the idea o f revolution, and he conducted, single-handed, a war on the self-satisfaction and torpor o f many members o f the party. After the agrarian controversy had died down, Helphand remorselessly continued the argument. The question had been whether the policy o f trying to win the support o f the peasants for the party be aban doned because it ran counter to Marxist dogma: Parvus was single-minded in his defence o f the purity o f the Marxist laws o f development. In his view it was not the theory but political prac tice that needed shaking up. He intended to prove to his German comrades that they had to revise their policy within the frame work o f Marxist theory, that European socialists could not afford to wait, hands folded in their laps, for the automatic collapse o f capitalism. T o stand still meant, for him, to retreat; he argued forcefully that the German party should use its strength for the conquest o f one citadel o f capitalism after the other. He publicized his views on the tactics o f the attack soon after 9 In ‘Einige Briefe Rosa Luxemburgs und andere Dokumente’, Bulletin o f the Inter national Institute o f Social History , Amsterdam, 1952, No. 1, p. 17.

The Great Fortune

he had taken up the jo b on the Arbeiterzeitung in Dresden. Rumours were in circulation, at the time, o f the possibility o f a reactionary coup d’ etat which would do away with general suf frage on the federal level: this occasioned Helphand’ s examina tion, in the Neue Zeit, o f the effectiveness o f a political mass strike. His series o f articles entitled ‘ Coup d ’ etat and the Political Mass Strike’ 10 was intended to convince the German party that, although it could no longer fight on the barricades against a modern army (Engels had made this point some time ago), it was not entirely defenceless in regard to the power o f the state. In the mass strike the party possessed an up-to-date weapon. Parvus at first regarded the strike as a means o f defence, a show o f power, which had the advantage o f being legal. Again, together with Bernstein, who had first discussed the strike in the Neue Zeit some five years before, Helphand initiated a discussion o f socialist tactics, which continued to occupy party congresses until the outbreak o f the First W orld War. T he later discussion, however, in which Karl Kautsky, Henrietta RolandHolst, and Rosa Luxemburg figured prominently, was o f little interest to Helphand. He had said his last word on the subject before the beginning o f the official party debate, when, in August 1904, he raised the strike from a weapon o f defence to an instru ment o f attack. T he disruption in the life o f the state occasioned by the strike, he then added, would force the party into a position in which a ‘ basic decision’ would have to be taken: in other words, the party would have to engage in an open contest for power in the state. Such a strike could no longer mean, in the words o f Jean Jaures, ‘ tactics o f despair’ , but a ‘method o f revolution’ .11 By then Helphand did not expect the leaders o f German Social Democracy to be shifted from their position by the force o f his arguments; he was unmoved when his concept o f mass strike was described as ‘ general nonsense’ . He was hoping that, sooner or later, political events would make his points for him. Staatsstreich und politischer Massenstreik’, Neue ^ eit, 1895-6, vol. 2, pp. 199-206, 26^-6, 3 0 4 -11, 356-64, 389-95. In 1897, the articles appeared as a pamphlet, entitled ‘Wohin fiihrt die politische Massregelung der Sozialdemokratie ? Kritik der Politischen Reaktion in Deutschland’. The quotations given here are indicated 11 pCC0rc^ng to the pagination of the pamphlet. arvus, ‘Der Generalstreik’, in Aus der W eltpolitik , Munich, 16 August 1904.

The Merchant o f Revolution

His analysis o f the mass strike brought Helphand’s thinking on the problem o f instilling a new vigour into the socialist struggle to another point o f departure. This was the total and tight organization o f the proletariat. Socialist sympathies or even membership o f the party were not enough for him. The political organization had to be reinforced by the trade unions, which would represent the basic material interests o f the workers. In this respect, Helphand was again little concerned with the low view o f the value o f the trade unions which the Berlin party executive had adopted. At the Koln party congress in 1893, Bebel had expressed the opinion that Tor natural and self-evident reasons . . . one lifeline after another will be cut o ff’ from the trade unions: Helphand violently disagreed with this sentiment, and he wrote: ‘ The near future belongs, in Germany, to the trade unions.’ 12 Every trade union fight was a class fight, and every class fight was a political fight: the trade unions completed and lightened the political work o f the party. Although Helphand harped on the organizational indolence and petty suspicion o f the party executive in regard to the trade unions— they were not directly subordinate to the executive— he supplemented his criticism with a number o f constructive sug gestions. Social Democracy, he argued again and again in a series o f articles, must learn how to use its own strength. The prole tarian masses could not be contained within the movement in the expectation o f a revolution alone, a revolution that was to take place at an unspecified time in the future. The workers were after immediate and concrete gains. Helphand regarded the shortening o f working hours as an aim that could be successfully achieved; the slogan concerning the eight-hour day, coined at the founda tion congress o f the Second International in 1889, he regarded as a magic formula that could be used to inspire the masses to a more intensive fight against the established order. From Dresden he caused two resolutions to be put before the Gotha congress in 1896, which would bind the party to take the initiative in respect o f the eight-hour day. When the speakers at the congress said that such ideas, although ‘ stimulating’ were ‘ utopian’ , and that ‘ demands that cannot be achieved [should not 12 Leipziger Volkszeitung, 20 and 22 June 1895.

The Great Fortune

be] put forward as resolutions’ , Helphand was far from dis couraged. He tried again in the following year. He suggested to the Hamburg congress in 1897 that the demand for the eight-hour day should become the main plank in the socialist platform at the next general election. After his suggestion had once again fallen flat, he took it upon himself, in 1901, to surprise the party with a ready-made draft law : all the socialist deputies had to do was to put it before the Reichstag. Bebel, for one, was unimpressed with Helphand’ s legislative abilities. He informed the Dresden con gress in 1903 that he himself also wanted a law concerning the length o f working hours. But the evidence in this case was so complex that he preferred the law to be drafted by experts, such as the Prussian ‘ Privy Councillors’ .13 Bebel’ s pronouncement finally broke Helphand’ s patience. So much respect for the authorities, such coyness and lack o f political initiative was beyond his power o f understanding. He furiously reminded Bebel that ‘ complete withdrawal from all matters o f parliamentary initiative would mean . . . only pure opposition. An anti-government attitude would become the lode-star o f party tactics.’ 14 Again and again Helphand attacked the optimism that had nourished German Social Democracy since it threw off*, in 1890, the fetters o f Bismarck’ s anti-socialist laws. This optimism found a classical expression in the words o f August B ebel: ‘ T he bour geois society is working so forcefully towards its own downfall that we only have to wait for the moment to pick up the power that drops from its hands.’ 15 In an atmosphere o f such tawdry illusion, Helphand’ s plans for the unfolding o f offensive revolutionary tactics appeared more than ephemeral. His occasional pin-pricks did not move the worthies on the executive in Berlin from their optimistic lethargy. Instead, while Helphand was preaching the course o f a militant revolution from Dresden, another, equally distinctive voice was heard. Eduard Bernstein started his funeral oration over the grave o f the revolution. 13 Protokoll Dresden , 1903, pp. 3 11 et seq. 14 Parvus, ‘Nutzloser Streit’, Aus der W eltpolitik, 31 August 1903. 15 Erfurt Protokoll, 1891, p. 172.

M.R.-d

The Merchant o f Revolution

In October 1897, the first o f a series o f articles by Bernstein entitled ‘Problems o f Socialism’ appeared:16 they confronted the party with some o f its unquestioned, favourite assumptions. The capitalist system, Bernstein argued, was far from breaking down. The economic development o f the past years had proved that the periodic crises forecast by Marx had lost their sharp edge and were having little effect on the existing order. The socialist party, Bernstein suggested, would do well to take note o f the new facts o f capitalism, and then proceed to draw the right conclusions from them: instead o f waiting passively for a distant revolution, the outcome o f the breakdown, the party should unite in a deter mined effort o f reform which would ameliorate the position o f the working class, as well as transform the state in a ‘ democratic’ sense. Bernstein disguised his basic doubts o f the validity o f Marxist dogma so carefully that the party at first failed to perceive the importance o f the issues he had raised. Both Vorwarts and the Leipziger Volkszeitung welcomed his articles as ‘ stimulating obser vations’ , which could, but only in a few places, be somewhat misunderstood. Even Karl Kautsky appeared to have been afflicted by temporary blindness: he regarded Bernstein’ s essays with ‘ the utmost sympathy’ . But not so Helphand in Dresden. It may have been that the agrarian debate had first opened the gate to a revision o f Marxist dogma, and that he had expected an attack to take place soon, or simply that he had read Bernstein’ s thesis more attentively than his comrades; but be that as it may, he understood at once that Bernstein’ s blow was aimed at the very roots o f Marxist doctrine. In his view, it was now the moment to show, once and for all, whether German Social Democracy in fact stood for what it was generally taken to stand for. He could not allow the train o f Bernstein’ s thought to go unchecked; he at once grasped the communication cord. He devoted page after page in the Sacksicke Arbeiterzeitung to a fierce assault on Bernstein’ s ideas. What Bernstein was doing was, for Helphand, nothing less than the ‘ destruction o f socialism’ . Bernstein’ s doubts as to the breakdown o f the capitalist order, as to the lethal effects o f economic crisis, 16 ‘Probleme des Sozialismus Eigenes und tjbersetztes’, Neue £ eit, 1896-7 and 1897-8.

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only proved his inability to think in a ‘ scientific’ manner. There was no need for the German workers, Helphand fiercely argued, to take seriously Bernstein’ s prognosis that a premature revolu tion would end in a ‘ colossal defeat’ o f the socialist party. And then Helphand’ s battle cry rose to a shrill p itch : ‘ Give us half a year o f violence by the government, and the capitalist society will belong to history.’ 17 It shook the German socialists: one after the other, their news papers join ed the affray. Nevertheless, all the party leaders at first restrained themselves from making public pronouncements. They were accustomed to differences o f opinion in the party, and in particular to the disturbances caused by the editor o f the Arbeiterzeitung. Bernstein himself believed that a chance still existed o f silen cing his Dresden critic. Helphand’ s barrage, his statistical counter blows, and his revolutionary zest were nothing but cheap sound-effects for the ignorami. ‘It is indeed ridiculous to go on arguing, after fifty years, in the periods o f the Communist Mani festo, which correspond to entirely different political and social circumstances from those o f today. . . . In the field o f the modern workers’ movement it is not the sensational battles, but the positions gained, step by step, in a continuous, tenacious struggle, that matter.’ 18 The article did not achieve the intended effect: nothing could hold Helphand back any longer. He did not stop short o f attack ing Bernstein personally. He had never met ‘ Ede’ , and, unlike Kautsky, Bebel, or Liebknecht, he was unrestrained by personal considerations or any feeling o f a socialist Kameraderie. T he men on the executive were at first incredulous and then infuriated by the spectacle o f Helphand setting himself up as the Grand Inquisitor, o f Helphand prosecuting, with the most intense fury, the much-loved pupil o f the late Friedrich Engels. T hey watched their friend ‘ Ede’ being branded as an ‘ anti-socialist’ , a traitor, a saboteur o f the revolution. Every voice raised in Bernstein’ s defence Helphand haughtily brushed away; he acted as the prophet wronged. Finally, Helphand resolved that the official condemnation 17 Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung, 6 March 1898.

18 E. Bernstein, Kritisches, vol. i, p. 750.

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should break over the head o f the erring man at the coming party congress at Stuttgart in 1898. He caused the Dresden constitu ency to move a resolution which put it flatly that reform alone could not do away with the class character o f the existing state: this was the task o f the revolution. The party executive could not put up with Helphand any longer. Before the opening o f the congress, Bebel wrote to Kautsky, telling him frankly what he thought o f Helphand: ‘ The man is plagued by a devouring pride, and his resolution shows that he has not the slightest understanding o f our condition. The last thing we need is the congress solemnly resolving that it strives for a social revolution.’ 19 In the town where he had joined the party some seven years before, Helphand suffered, at the hands o f his comrades, his first deep humiliation. The congress in Stuttgart o f course rejected Bernstein’ s thesis as opportunist. But the author himself was treated kindly: he was asked to reconsider his ideas and then to publish them in the form o f a book. But no mercy was shown for Helphand. Speaker after speaker repaid him in his own coin; Heine, Auer, Frohme, Stadthagen, Bebel, and Liebknecht all intended to put Helphand firmly in his place. They condemned the tone in which he had conducted the controversy as schoolmasterish, unashamed, and unsuitable; and his criticism, though partly justified, as out o f proportion and ill-founded on facts. Only Clara Zetkin tried to make cordial, understanding excuses for him; she convinced no one. Although Parvus did not carry a mandate, he was allowed to defend himself before the congress. He did so very badly. He was embittered and disenchanted, but by no means discouraged from a detailed settling o f accounts with Bernstein. Helphand’s articles in the Arbeiterzeitung had been merely a tentative attempt at a reply. While the general discussion inside the party deteriorated into a series o f personal squabbles, and while many socialist leaders made an all-out effort to minimize the incident, Parvus settled down to dissect to the bone the body o f Bernstein’s argument. 19 ‘Einige Briefe Rosa Luxemburgs und andere Dokumente’, in the Bulletin o f the International Institute o f Social History , 1952, No. 1, p. 10.

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He first tackled Bernstein’ s doubt as to the lethal effects o f the capitalist crisis. T h e present economic crisis, he allowed, bore little resemblance to the ideas o f Marx. This Bernstein had per ceived quite rightly. T he ten-year cycles which Marx believed he had discerned, had been discredited. T he reason for this was that capitalist development was taking place in circumstances different from those prevailing in the middle o f the nineteenth century. Economy had broken through the frontiers o f the national states to form one single unit, the world market, which had become the regulator o f the crisis cycles. Boom and slump came to reflect the situation in the world market: when it became too small for the offered products a crisis resulted; when it was extended through, say, the incorporation o f Russia or America, or the colonization o f Africa or the Far East, a boom followed. The answer to Bernstein therefore was that although the reasons and the forms o f the crises had changed, the crises themselves did not disappear. Parvus went as far as to forecast that the crises would be more serious for the capitalist economy than Marx could have possibly foreseen forty years ago. Studies concerning finance and economic crisis, land rents, and the laws governing the world market, became Helphand’ s recreation; they also confirmed his abilities as a theorist. He advanced far beyond the ideas current at the time. It is now accepted that economic factors had disregarded national frontiers and that the world market was on the way to becoming a single unit; that Europe found itself pressed hard, economically and politically, by two new world powers, Russia and America. But at the end o f the last century, all this was a closed book to the German socialists. When the Reichstag came to deal with the respective merits o f free trade and protective barriers, in the great debate o f 1900, the socialist party executive described the problem as an internal affair o f the bourgeoisie, quite ‘ alien’ to their party. T he debate went on far above the heads o f the socialist parliamentarians. Helphand’ s recommendations for free trade, by which the pro letariat could also benefit, found no response in the party. In 1900 Helphand had anticipated a development which assumed concrete form only half a century later:

The Merchant o f Revolution

T h ou gh hindered, the development o f the world market has made impressive progress. A n d its result at the moment is the displacement o f competition o f individual industrial states by that o f whole conti nents. In order to gain a place in this formidable

qua non

race, free trade is

sine

for western Europe. But insignificant as the European capital

is in relation to the working class, it is the same also in its trading policies. It is divided, and it chases after the interests o f the splintergroups and o f the moment. H ence the political strife. Europe is suffer ing, more than ever, from small-statesmanship [ Kleinstaaterei\. A lthough the states have become bigger the historical yardstick has also grown, only much more so. T h is is the curse o f political tradition. Free trade will do away with it, it will create great groups o f nations, it will lead to the

United States of Europe. 20

Such fantasies could n ot b e taken seriously in G erm any. H e lp hand fou n d m ore response to his suggestions on matters o f tactics, w h ich he developed in connexion w ith the revisionist debate. T o the last m an, every m em ber o f the party saw h im self as capable o f taking part in the discussion on socialist tactics. T h e y all w anted a revolution, bu t they h oped rather than fought for it. W a s the regim e n ot heading in the direction o f its inevitable fa ll? T o be patient and to keep his peace (‘ N o t to let ourselves be p ro v o k e d !’) was therefore the w orker’ s first du ty. A u g u st B eb el, w h o, as a speaker, exercised a hypnotic pow er over his p u b lic, particularly excelled in spinning fantastic dreams about the forthcom ing crash o f capitalism . T h is was an illusion o f w hich E duard D a v id perceptively said that its ‘ m other [was] the M arxist theory o f crisis, its father E n gels’ b e lie f in the proxim ity o f w ar ’

. 2 1

Parvus o f course w anted an early revolution as m uch as B ebel did. B u t he h eld an entirely different view o f capitalist aggressive ness and o f the tasks o f the pow erfu l socialist organization. T o wait and to rem ain inactive— in this respect he fu lly agreed w ith B ernstein— was a com pletely unsuitable tactical approach. H e was searching for a w ay to square the practical daily w ork o f the party w ith its ultim ate aim , that o f evolution w ith revolution. 2° Parvus, ‘Die Industriezolle und der Weltmarkt’, Neue Z e^> 1 900-1, vol. i, pp. 783 et seq. 21 E. David, ‘Die Eroberung der politischen Macht’, Sozialistische Monatshefte, Berlin, 1904, vol. 1, p. 16.

The Great Fortune

He came to realize that his ideas on the routine work o f the party did not differ much from those o f Bernstein. Nevertheless, the revolution was Helphand’ s main target, and here he left no room for dou bt; in his view, it was revolution alone that could do away with the class society. W hen Bernstein wanted to move the party to act in the intervening time, he could rely on Helphand’ s full support. The German socialists, who were used to thinking in either/or categories, were incredulous when, in the following years, Bernstein and Helphand formed a tactical alliance. In 1899, Vollmar had come to a limited agreement with the Centre Party in Bavaria, for the purpose o f the elections; he was hoping— not in vain, as it later appeared— to double the number o f socialist mandates in the Munich Diet. Rosa Luxemburg at once gave the alarm signal in order to prevent this alliance with the class enemy. Bernstein’ s followers were amazed as they observed Helphand combat Luxemburg’ s views. Eleven deputies were better than five, he argued, whatever his friend Luxemburg might think. Only power and the possibility o f exercising it mattered.22 The first doubts arose as to whether Helphand really was the radical Marxist he had hitherto seemed. Was not Vollmar simply the mouth-piece o f Bernstein, and the most advanced practitioner o f opportunism? Parvus disagreed: everything was permissible that helped the party to advance. His meaning became clearer during the discussion o f the problem o f the vice-presidency in 1903. In that year, the Social Democrats became the second-strongest party in the Reichstag, and could therefore claim the office o f Vice-President o f the parliament. Bernstein at once suggested that the socialists should accept the office. Bebel angrily dis missed the suggestion: a socialist Vice-President would have to attend the Court, and observe its protocol. This would be un worthy o f a socialist. Helphand pointed out that, although the protocol was a bitter pill to swallow, it could be gulped down for the sake o f the position o f power the party would thus achieve. Because he wanted the party to exercise its influence through the office, he agreed with Bernstein, ‘ although he is Bernstein’ .23 22

cf- R . Luxemburg, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 3, pp. 408 et seq., 419, and 423 et seq. 23 Parvus, ‘Nutzloser Strait’, Aus der W eltpolitik , 31 August 1903.

The Merchant o f Revolution

H e lp h a n d ’ s friends and enem ies cou ld hardly believe their eyes. T h e y had never had an op portu n ity to follow a course so zig-zag, yet fou n d ed in a logical system , in w h ich b oth evolution and revolution co u ld be accom m odated. B eb el was at the end o f his tether w hen he p ron ou n ced his ju d g e m en t on H elp h a n d at the D resd en congress o f

1903: T o o k at this Parvus (laughter), about

w h om everybody cou ld have sw orn, on ly recently, that he was a h ard -bitten radical. A n d this p rou d pillar . . .

is broken. . . .

N atu rally as a form er radical he is broken in a different w ay than that in w hich a revisionist w ou ld break, b u t he is broken all the sam e . ’

2 4

Parvus n ow grasped the fact that his tactical deliberations had reached the poin t w here it was difficult for him to make his view s intelligible to his com rades. C on cep ts o f revolution or routine daily w ork w ere too m eaningless to enable h im to com m unicate his ideas w ith any precision. H e began to search for an exam ple from the history o f the w orking-class m ovem ent, and he fo u n d it in F erd in an d L assalle. L assalle, he w rote to a frien d, had rightly recognized, already after the

1848 revolu tion , that the proletariat

cou ld n ot stand outside the state, bu t cou ld use every position it gained inside the state for its ow n advan cem en t: T have often w ritten that the proletariat, in its political struggle, sh ou ld not stand outside the general life o f the state. It has to penetrate every n ook and cranny and exploit the clash o f class in terests; b u t in practice,

parliam entary

bourgeois dem ocracy . ’

op p osition

com es

easily

resem ble

2 5

H elp h a n d also used the exam ple o f Lassalle to sh ow h ow he h im se lf regarded the m iddle-class parties o f op position — a q u es tion raised b y V o llm a r’ s alliance w ith the C entre Party. A c c o rd ing to H elp h a n d , Lassalle had achieved the separation o f the w orkers from the m iddle class, and had b u ilt up their organiza tion. D esp ite this, he su pported the liberal and progressive groups w henever their aims coincided w ith those o f the p ro le tariat: at all other tim es he did n ot hesitate to attack the

hour-

geoisie. Social D em ocracy had to behave in the same w ay as 24 Protokoll Dresden , 1903, p. 3 1 1 . 25 Parvus to Axelrod, 18 January 1904; in Sotsial-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, edited by A. N. Potresov and B. I. Nikolaevski, Moscow, 1928, p. 109.

The Great Fortune

Lassalle had d on e: it had to be prepared to support the Liberals, or to conduct, when necessary, a two-front engagement against both them and the government. T h e party executive cared little or n oth in g for w hat H e lp h a n d had to say. F or his ow n part, he d id n ot m ake it easy for his com rades to sh ow an interest. O n the contrary, sh ortly b efore the L iib eck congress o f

1901, he d ecid ed to em bark on the final and

fiercest assault on B ernstein and his follow ers. O n this occasion

1898. W ith o u t K a u tsk y ’ s k n ow led ge— the editor o f N eue Zeit was

his invective was even harsher than it had b een in

away on a sum m er h oliday— Parvus p u b lish ed , in K a u tsk y ’ s periodical, a series o f articles entitled ‘ O p p o rtu n ism in P ractice’ . B ernstein, V o llm a r, and Ignaz A u e r , the head o f the party organi zation, an experienced politician and an am iable senior m em ber o f the executive organization, w ere his m ain targets. A u e r w as, in H e lp h a n d ’ s view , the ‘ patron saint o f op p ortu n ism ’ w h o regarded his political actions as far above any id eological scruples. A s a ‘ fu ll-b lo o d e d G erm an ’ he was b y n o m eans as ‘ overp ow erin gly shrew d’ as h e w as generally regarded to b e . B ern stein ’ s revision ism H e lp h a n d described as a h otch p otch o f ou tw orn bou rgeois ideas, w h ich w ere n ow to becom e a substitute for the teaching o f M arx and E n gels. ‘ O n ly a revision to the left o f our party principles is n ow p ossib le . . . in the sense o f the exten sion o f political activity, . . . the intensification o f social-revolu tionary energy, . . .

o f a b o ld

endeavour and w ill, and n ot o f fearfu l, reserved softn ess . ’

2 6

B ernstein was spen d in g the accum ulated revolutionary capital in sm all change, w hile the enthusiastic agreem ent o f the bou rgeois social reform ers p rov id ed the backgrou n d ‘ chorus for his heroic deeds’ . C apitalism cou ld b e fo u g h t, H e lp h a n d in sisted , o n ly from the standpoint o f the social revolu tion . ‘ T h e proletariat can b e on ly the grave-digger or the su bject o f capitalism . ’

2 7

T h e m otives w h ich caused H e lp h a n d to renew his assault on the revisionists w ere o f a tw o fo ld nature. F o r personal reasons, he regarded the tim e as ripe to drive his critics w ith ‘ lashes o f the 26 Parvus, ‘Der Opportunismus in der Praxis’ , Neue Z eit, 1 900-1, vol. 2, p. 746.

The Merchant o f Revolution

w h ip into the fro g -p o n d ’ . T h e re were also political m otives. H e thought that the revisionists’ distaste for, and criticism o f, the sharpness o f his tone w ou ld provide his follow ers w ith a cover for the counter-attack. H e explained this in a letter to K a u tsk y : ‘ N o w they can, b y abusing m y abuse, and thus retaining a certain reserve, present our com m on standpoint all the m ore ru th lessly; they are therefore fighting under a cover. . . . w ithout a cover, they cou ld fight as bravely . ’

I dou bt w hether,

2 8

A u g u st B eb el felt that a catastrophe was about to occur in L iib eck . H e did not regard H e lp h a n d ’ s essays in the

Neue Zeit as

som e kind o f provocation, b u t as an ‘ objective even though not always correct criticism ’ . B u t he was afraid, he w rote to K autsky, that the ‘ em otion m erchants’ w ho had Parvus ‘ in their stom achs’ m ight n ow lose patience. ‘ Y o u w ou ld not believe’ , he con clu ded the letter, ‘ w hat anim osity exists in the party against Parvus and also R osa [L u xem b u rg], and although I do not think that we sh ou ld take this prejudice into consideration, one cannot dis regard it entirely . ’

2 9

T h e events at the L iib eck congress w ere even m ore dramatic than B eb el had feared. Parvus and R osa L u xem b u rg (w ho had recently distinguished h erself w ith a w ithering attack on the F rench socialists) had to run the gauntlet o f their critics. B ebel, w h o did n ot w ant to add fu el to the fire, m aintained a cautious reserve. In his opin ion , he said, it n eeded a ‘ certain am ount o f tastelessness to present, so to speak, leading party com rades in their bathing costum es’ . N evertheless, the enem ies o f H elp h a n d and R osa L u xem b u rg w ere in no m ood for restraint. R ichard Fischer m ade a reference to ‘ literary ruffians’ ; E rhardt, the delegate from L u d w igsh afen , expressed his

distaste

for the im m igrants

from

the

east:

appeared to him that the party life had been defiled b y ‘ the male and fem ale arrivals from the east’ . W o lfg a n g H e in e , a B erlin law yer and one o f the best-kn ow n o f B ernstein’ s partisans, excelled h im se lf: antisem itism was clearly discernible beh ind his attack on H elp h a n d and L u xem b u rg. It m ade little difference that 28 Parvus to Kautsky, undated 1901, in ‘Einige Briefe Rosa Luxemburgs und andere Dokumente’, 1952, No. 1, p. 27. 29 Bebel to Kautsky, 4 September 1901, in ‘Einige Briefe Rosa Luxemburgs’, p. 26.

The Great F ortune

the congress eventually con d em n ed H e in e ’ s v ie w s; underneath the surface th ey still cou ld do a great deal o f harm to the im m i grants. T h e w ithering attacks on h im b y the delegates to the L iib eck congress m ade no im pression on H e lp h a n d . H e took n oth in g b a c k : he th ou gh t o f his polem ic as in n o n eed o f an ap ology, on ly perhaps som e explanation. H e w rote to K a u tsk y after the co n gress : ‘ M ore than ever, the proletariat needs an op en , clear, u n afraid voice, w h ich ju d g e s events as w ell as p eop le w ith equal sharpness. Such a voice w ill n ot be generally acceptable. It w ill em bitter those w h o think differently, it w ill injure the w avering, it w ill anger the gen tle-m in d ed . B u t i f it is a true voice, its future trium phs w ill b e the greater, the m ore it is at present com bated and d en ied . ’

3 0

In p u b lic, H e lp h a n d a d d e d : ‘ T h e revolutionary spirit speaks in a b lu n t lan gu ag e.’ It w as necessary for the you n g m an to em ploy, at this p o in t, the w ords o f M artin L u th e r : ‘ I kn ow o f no other w ay than anger and zea l; w h en I w ant to w rite w ell, pray w ell, and preach w ell, I m u st b e a n g ry .’ A ll in all, he con clu d ed the discussion on w hat was perm issible in party debate— ‘ I m ain tain that a h u n d red rudenesses are preferable to one h yp o crisy . ’

3 1

W h e n Parvus was listening to the attacks on h im se lf at L iib e ck , he had lon g since lost the security the editorship o f the D resd en

Arbeiterzeitung gave h im . In order to present the revisionist debate and its offshoots as one piece, w e have had to anticipate our narrative. Parvus and his frien d M archlew ski had b een ex pelled from Saxony as early as the en d o f

1898; the local police

could no lon ger tolerate their activities. A t first, Parvus attem pted to exert som e influence on the editorial p o licy o f the new spaper from G era, the capital o f the n eigh bou rin g D u c h y o f R eu ss. In order to m ake quite certain o f the p ap er’ s political lin e, he had R osa L u x em b u rg ap p oin ted as his successor. T h e arrangem ent h eld g o o d for a short tim e on ly. A

few

m onths later, Parvus and M archlew ski w ere seen out o f G era as w e ll; the tw o friends w ere n ow lookin g for a safer and m ore perm anent abod e. T h e y n o lon ger had a large choice before 30 An undated letter, Kautsky-Archiv. 31 Parvus in Aus der W eltpolitik , 31 December 1904 and 5 January 1905.

The Merchant o f Revolution

th e m : it fell, in the end, on Bavaria, w here their old op p on en t, G eorg von V ollm ar, was kind enough to secure for them residen tial perm ission. H e lp h a n d ’ s departure for M u n ich m eant that he had been effectively rem oved from the centre o f the party activity. B u t he had n ot m u ch o f a position , no great influence, to lose. T h e attacks on B ernstein had cost him w hat rem ained o f the sym pathy o f the B erlin execu tive; even the socialist publishers no longer show ed any interest in printing his pam phlets. A fte r the L iib eck congress, his erstw hile protector K autsky started turning dow n his contributions to the

Neue Zeit : betw een 1901 and 1906, the

leading organ o f the G erm an Social D em ocrat party p u b lish ed n ot a single w ord b y H elp h a n d . In d eed , soon after the turn o f the century it seem ed as i f H e lp h a n d ’ s career in the G erm an party m ight com e to a prem a ture en d. It is true that, from the poin t o f view o f the party executive, he had b een very difficult for m any years. B u t he was n ot a trouble-m aker pure and sim ple. H e had his ow n vision o f the G erm an p a rty : he thought o f it as having inherited, in the M arxist revolutionary doctrine, a great fortune, and he abhorred the possibility o f it bein g w asted away in the sm all-change o f gradual reform . H e rem ained en ou gh o f a R u ssian intellectual to b e obsessed b y the reality and proxim ity o f a social revolu tion : this was the centre about w h ich all his thinking revolved. B u t his disappointm ents in the G erm an party w ere am ply com pensated b y the R ussians. Plekhanov, as w ell as the younger socialist leaders, M artov, P otresov, and L e n in , follow ed H e lp h an d ’ s attacks on B ernstein w ith adm iration. W h ile B eb el and K au tsk y

thought

them selves

fortunate

have

silenced

the

‘ literary ruffians’ , the R ussian party h eld Parvus in high esteem . Plekhanov, w h o personally had no liking for H elp h a n d , p u b licly thanked h im for his articles in the

Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung

; 3 2

L e n in w rote to his m other from Siberia, to send him copies o f

Arbeiterzeitung articles. M artov translated H e lp h an d ’ s series from the Neue Zeit, entitled ‘ O pportu n ism in

H e lp h a n d ’ s

32 G. Plekhanov, ‘Erorterungen iiber die Taktik. Wofiir sollen wir ihm dankbar sein? Offener Brief an K arl Kautsky’, Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung supplement, published on 30 October and 2 and 3 November 1898.

The Great Fortune

Practice’ , into R u ssian , and he described it, o n the occasion o f its p u blication in the R u ssian party organ , analysis ’

Zarya, as a ‘ m asterly

. 3 3

In d eed , already before the L iib eck congress, it had seem ed that H elp h a n d m igh t find his w ay back to the R u ssian Social D e m o crat party.

33 Zary a>Nos. 2-3, 1901.

The Schwabing Headquarters It was no accident that, at the turn o f the century, H e lp hand began to draw closer to the R ussian exiles. T h e nature o f his personal and political dilem m a had already becom e apparent in

1896, soon after his first m eeting w ith A lexan der P otresov, one o f the younger o f the R ussian M arxists. Potresov was very im pressed b y H elp h a n d , and set ou t to w in him over to the R ussian revolutionary m ovem ent.

suggested

that Parvus

should becom e a m em ber o f the R ussian delegation to the forth Â com ing congress o f the Second International in L o n d o n . Plekhan o v , w ho had, a few years b efore, m ade a similar b u t unsuccessful attem pt, at first op p osed the su ggestio n ; he d id , h ow ever, change his m ind and H elp h a n d was invited. A t this poin t certain difficulties arose, and it was H elp h a n d h im self w ho raised them . H e was hoping for a G erm an party m andate as w ell, and he was w illing to accept the R u ssian sâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; invitation on the condition that he w ou ld be allow ed to do m ost o f the w ork and the voting at the congress w ith the G erm ans. T o g e th e r w ith his friend R osa L u x em b u rg , he w ou ld alm ost certainly have voted against the R ussians in connexion w ith the P olish question. B u t his reservations fell flat. H e was not offered a m andate b y the G erm an party, and he was forced to drop the conditions. It was better to go to L o n d o n as a R ussian delegate than n ot to go at a ll; and this was w hat, in the en d, H elp h a n d did. D esp ite a som ew hat irritating quality in his behaviour towards the R ussians, they continued to treat him w ith consideration, even w ith respect. In L o n d o n , although he was unable to speak to the plenary sessions o f the congress, he took the chair at the separate m eetings o f the R ussian delegation : a m agnanim ous gesture on the part o f such lum inaries o f the m ovem ent as Plekhanov and V era Zasulich.

The Schwabing Headquarters

F or the tim e b ein g , the advances b y the R u ssian exiles p roved futile. W h e n he returned to G erm an y from L o n d o n , H e lp h a n d ’ s jo b as editor o f the D resd en

Arbeiterzeitung p roved too absorbing

to allow h im to take part in the R u ssian revolutionary m ovem en t. T h e controversy w ith B ernstein kept h im b u sy until the sum m er of

1898; then the expu lsion from Saxony and his m ove to M u n ich

revived his interest in R u ssia, and su b seq u en tly b rou gh t him nearer to his R u ssian com rades. T h e events in the country o f his birth also attracted H e lp h an d’ s attention. T h e century en ded on a harsh, distu rbed note in R ussia. In the early m onths o f

1899, a series o f strikes disru pted

the you n g industries o f the E m p ire. H a d they kn ow n o f the report b y the C h ie f o f P olice at M o sco w , the R u ssian socialists m ay w ell have b een en co u ra g ed : he th ou gh t their success had an extremely dangerous and prejudicial effect upon the State, inasmuch as they [the strikes] constitute an elementary school for the political education o f the working class. T h ey confirm the confidence o f the masses in their own power, teach them more practical methods o f com bat, and train and give prominence to specially gifted individuals o f greater initiative. T h ey further convince the labourer o f the possibility and advantage o f combination, and o f collective action in general. A t the same time, they render him more accessible to Socialist ideas which he had previously regarded as idle dreams. T h e consciousness o f a solidarity o f interests with the labouring classes throughout the world is developed in these local struggles. This involves a recognition that political agitation in the social democratic sense is indispensable to victory. T he present situation is so disquieting and the activity o f the revolutionary agitators so intense, that a combined action o f all autho rities affected will be necessary to combat it . 1 A p art

from

unrest am ong

the

w orkers,

disturbances

also

occurred at the universities. In F ebru ary, students at St. P eters burg clashed w ith the p o lic e ; violen t protest m eetings against the official m easures w ere organized at universities th rou gh ou t the country. T h e n the institutions o f higher learning w ere closed dow n , and an Im perial com m ission w as ap p oin ted . In M arch , w hile

its

m em bers

were

1 Annual Register, 1899, p. 301.

considering

u niversity

reform s,

all

The Merchant o f Revolution

students were expelled. I f they w ished to re-enter they had to sign individual petitions, bin din g them selves to subm it u n con d i tionally to university regulations. T h e fam ine, m ore serious than

1892, on w hich H elp h a n d had reported in the B erlin new spaper, Vorwarts, form ed the general background to the the one in

disturbances am ong the workers and the students. T h e T sarist G overn m en t was aware o f the gravity o f the situation in the cou n trysid e: in the b u d get p u b lish ed at the beginning o f the year (calendar and financial years were concurrent in R ussia),

m illion roubles were set aside for fam ine relief. B u t neither the h elp o f the governm ent, nor the w ork done b y the R e d C ross in the m ost severely afflicted areas, provided enough relief for the starving population o f rural R ussia. T h e disturbances o f

1899

tem pted som e o f the revolutionaries to return to their country from exile. V era Zasulich crossed the frontier illegally, shortly before H elp h a n d . E arly in M ay

1899 H elp h a n d left M u n ich for R ussia, carrying

an A u stro -H u n g arian passport under the im probable nam e o f a C zech called A u g u st P e n ; he was accom panied b y a friend o f his, L eh m an n , a socialist doctor o f m edicine. L eh m an n was older than H elp h a n d , and it was he w ho paid m ost o f the expenses o f the trip. H e was an idealist w ho started to study m edicine at an advanced a g e ; a son o f a w e ll-to -d o fam ily, he jo in e d the still illegal socialist party in the early eighteen-eighties. T h e jo u rn e y was n ot, at any rate for Parvus, w ithout excite m ent. A s the train approached the R ussian frontier he was filled w ith a feeling o f ‘ uncertainty and curiosity’ ; 2 he was m using on his chances o f ending the jo u rn e y in Siberia. ‘ T h e train stops. W e are at the door o f the carriage— and as i f rooted to the earth, there stood before us a com pletely still, hard and b on y figure in a grey m ilitary coat, the first R ussian gendarm e, and also the very first thing w e saw in R ussia. W ith o u t a change in his expression, he extended his arm and said ju s t one w o rd : “ Passport ”

. ’ 3

A fte r

they had handed over their passports, Parvus and L eh m an n left the train and follow ed the general stream o f p eop le w h ich was filling up a large, ill-lit hall. In the huge custom s shed there was a lon g, crescent-shaped co u n ter; the officials stood on the inside 2 C. Lehmann and Parvus, D as hungernde Russland , p. 6.

3 ibid., p. 11.

The Schwabing Headquarters

and the travellers on the o u tsid e ; at its focal p o in t, b eh in d the officials, there was the com m ander’ s table, and on it, a brigh t lam p, the on ly one in the room . T h e officials w ere o n ly co n cerned w ith the authenticity o f the passports an d w ith the litera ture the travellers w ere carryin g; they checked som e o f the travel docum ents against the ‘ black b o o k ’ , a list o f p eop le the R u ssian authorities regarded as undesirable. H e lp h a n d h ad g o o d reason to be n ervou s. H e was travelling on a forged A u stro -H u n g a ria n passport, and he h ad a police record in R u ssia. N everth eless, nothing unpleasant h ap p en ed to h im , and he was allow ed to enter the country o f his birth after a tw elve-year absence. A few hours later the train w en t o n to St. P etersbu rg, via K o v n o and P skov. W h e n the travellers w oke u p the follow in g m orn in g, they had passed the h alf-w ay m ark o f their jo u rn e y to the cap ital; during the n igh t, layers o f fine dust had covered all their personal b elon gin gs. H a v in g du sted them selves, the tw o socialist friends w atched the cou n tryside— n ot that there was very m u ch to look at for the landscape before them was bleak and desolate. D u st seem ed to have taken the place o f p e o p le ; in com parison, the sandy plains o f eastern Prussia appeared a lan d o f p len ty to the tw o travellers. T h e y am used them selves, for a w hile, b y tim ing the incidence o f the hum an elem ent against the desolate backgrou nd. O n ly one ob ject o f interest relieved the tedium o f the jo u r n e y : about tw o o ’ clock in the afternoon— an hour before they reached St. P etersburg— the travellers caught a glim pse o f

the

gloom y

castle o f

G atchina

w here

the

T sar,

A lexan der I I I , spent a large part o f his reign. H e was lo n ely there, but safe from the attacks o f the terrorists. T h e tw o friends spent a few days in St. P etersburg. N eith er o f them had ever visited the capital b efore, and they in d u lged in traditional

tourist

pastim es.

T hey

adm ired

the

m agnificent

architecture o f the city, and w ere am azed at the w ay in w h ich its white nights affected the lives o f the inhabitants. T h e re seem ed to be for them little difference betw een n igh t and d a y ; after m id m g h t, the streets w ere as b u sy as at n oo n . T h e y also visited the Saints Peter and Paul Fortress w ith its p rison , on e o f the toughest ln R u s s ia : a few years later, H e lp h a n d was to get to kn ow it m u ch Hiore intim ately. F rom St. P etersburg they travelled to M o sco w , m .r.- e

The Merchant o f Revolution

the m ore ‘ R u ssian ’ (to H elp h a n d this m eant the m ore ‘ A siatic’ ) o f the tw o tow ns. T h e y w ere amazed at the num ber o f pictorial sym bols that served as shop signs— an aid for the m any illiterates. L eh m an n had brou gh t w ith him a cam era, the latest m odel from the Zeiss w o rk s; som ething quite sim ple w ent w rong w ith the instrum ent, and the doctor had to spen d m ost o f his tim e in M oscow looking for som eone capable o f pu tting it right. F rom M oscow the tw o travellers set out on an arduous jo u rn e y w hich took them to N izh n i N o v g o ro d , then dow n the V o lg a to K azan, from there to the R iver K am a, and then up the river to a small landing stage called M ursikha, the easternm ost poin t o f their jo u rn e y . A fter a b rie f stay there, they turned south to the province o f Samara. T h e y w ent from O ren bu rg to the tow n o f Samara on the T ran s-S iberian R a ilw a y ; from there once m ore up the V o lg a to Sim birsk and then back to M oscow , W a rsa w , and G erm any. T h e w hole trip took them several m onths and they covered som e

5,000 m iles. T h e ir m ain purpose was a detailed

investigation o f the fam ine areas. Back in M u n ich , H elp h a n d and L eh m an n spent the rem aining m onths o f

1899 w riting their jo in t book. L eh m an n had kept a

diary o f the jo u rn e y , and he w rote the m edical parts as w ell as the accounts o f their visit to St. Petersburg and to M oscow . H e lp hand w rote m ost o f the b ook , and did also all the ed itin g : the political slant is recognizably his. T h e y sent the finished m anu script, together w ith a large num ber o f photographs taken b y L eh m an n , to their pu blish er, D ietz o f Stuttgart, early in the follow in g year. A lth o u g h the book still remains a valuable historical source, it com pletely lacks hum an sym pathy and its intention is all too clearly propagandist. In d eed , excerpts from it w ere later used in France, during the socialists’ drive against the subscription o f French loans to the T sa rist G overn m en t. T h e authors sum m ed up the purpose o f their book in the follow ing m an n er: T h e world exhibition in Paris and, before, in Chicago, gave the Russian government a magnificent opportunity for self-advertisement. By skilful arrangement, it conjured up before the visitors a picture o f riches and plenty. Is that not the old art o f Potemkin villages? W e have known, for

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a long time, that Russia is a land rich in natural resources. But what has always surprised us about her is how little she has exploited these resources, how poor she is among all her riches. H as there been a change already? T h is book shows the reverse side o f the coin : the official Tsarist Russia presents herself as a Russia o f affluence— our book describes the starving Russia.4

T h e re are also som e interesting and obviou s om issions in the book. A p a rt from tw o autobiographical references— one con cerning the B erezino fire, a m em ory from H e lp h a n d ’ s ch ild h ood , and the other relating to his bru sh w ith the custom s officials after his first visit to Sw itzerland in

1886— the b ook tells us n oth in g

m ore about H e lp h a n d personally. H e d id n ot even m en tion the fact that he was travelling on a forged passport, w h ich w o u ld have explained his nervousness— w h ich he d id describe— at the frontier p o st. H e m ade n o reference to the fact that at least on e o f his parents was still alive in R u ssia, and he is very u nlikely to have m ade a detour to visit them . N o r is there any m en tion in the book that H e lp h a n d tried to contact the leaders o f the socialist m ovem ent in R u ssia. T h e r e is on ly a reticent reference to a visit o f ‘ acquaintances’ in the su burbs o f M o s c o w : 5 in fact, H e lp h a n d and L eh m an n d id m eet P otresov, w ith w h om they discussed plans for the pu blication o f a R u ssian socialist new spaper abroad. A fte r his return to M u n ich , H e lp h a n d ’ s relations w ith the R ussian exiles becam e m ore intim ate. T h e Bavarian capital was at the tim e attracting the R u ssian s, students and political exiles alike, in large n u m bers. L ate in the sum m er o f

1900, L e n in and

Potresov— M artov jo in e d them later— arrived there as w ell. T h e three revolutionaries had m et in R ussia in M ay, and they decided to start p u b lish in g a new spaper a b ro a d ; they w ere in flu enced b y H elp h a n d in their choice o f residence. F rom G erm an y, L e n in and Potresov m ade a short visit to G en eva, w here they m et P lekhanov and A x e lro d . L e n in and his friend p u t their plans before the older m en , w ho w ere op p osed to the su ggestion that the paper should be p u b lish ed in G erm an y. P lekhanov w anted it to appear, under his editorsh ip, in G e n e v a ; he was clearly u n w illin g to exchange his pleasant legal refuge for the hazards o f illegal

4 Preface to D as hungernde Russland.

5 ibid., p. 32.

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existence in Bavaria. In the en d, the tw o you n g revolutionaries returned to G erm any w ith P lekhanov’ s reluctant blessing. T h e y w asted no tim e. E arly in N ovem ber L en in w rote a leading article on party press and organization, w hich was pu blish ed in one o f the first num bers o f

Iskra . T h e new spaper was turned out

b y a G erm an Social D em ocrat printing-press in L eip zig, on specially thin paper, in closely packed, neat type. Its every feature

bore

w itness

the

preoccupations

o f the younger

W h ereas Plekhanov and A x elro d had organized their group o f M arxists in exile and in isolation from their hom e country, L en in and his friends had undergone a different kind o f d evelop m ent. T h e y had em barked on their revolutionary careers in R u ssia ; they had lived through im prisonm ent and banishm ent to Siberia; they arrived in exile as hardened conspirators, w ith an intim ate know ledge o f the difficulties in volved in the organization o f a socialist mass m ovem ent in R ussian conditions. T h e y were m ore practical, tougher, and m ore ruthless than the older exiles o f the Plekhanov vintage. T h e y knew the value o f m aintaining close connexions w ith their hom e cou n try; they had bu ilt u p an u nderground netw ork in R ussia, and they in tended to run it. T h is m eant that they had to keep their com rades at hom e supplied w ith political directives and w ith material for the use o f the agitators. T h e y decided to produce their paper in G erm any because this w ou ld facilitate its dispatch to R u ssia ; its size and w eight were designed for easy sm uggling. In the first issue, L e n in ’ s concern w ith a strong, efficient party becam e apparent. It foreshadow ed the form ation, tw o years later, o f a party o f professional revolution aries under his leadership. T h e qualities o f the younger generation o f the R ussians ap pealed to H e lp h a n d ; he h im self had been critical o f Plekhanov and his friends w hen he had m ade their acquaintance. L en in m et H elp h an d for the first tim e in M u n ich . H e was three years youn ger, and he was quite familiar w ith the nam e o f Parvus. In M arch

1899 he had review ed a collection o f essays translated

into R ussian, on the crisis in agriculture, b y P a rv u s; he described the author as a 6talented G erm an p u b licist ’ 6 Collected. Works, vol. 4, pp. 51 et seq.

. 6

A few m onths later

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Lenin asked his mother to forward to him, in Siberia, Helphand’ s anti-revisionist articles.7 Helphand did not boast when he later wrote that he had per suaded the editors o f Iskra to live in Munich.8 The town offered many advantages for the Russian revolutionaries, and Helphand was able to render them a variety o f good services. Lenin lived in Munich illegally, using a Bulgarian passport provided for him by Christo Rakovsky, the wealthy young socialist from Dobrudja. Lenin did not like having too many contacts with the German socialists himself: Helphand was the only ‘ German comrade’ whom Lenin and his wife saw frequently— especially after they moved nearer to him, into the Munich artists’ suburb o f Schwab ing.9 Indeed, in the first five years o f the century, Helphand’ s flat in Schwabing was a focal point for the Russian exiles. Rosa Luxem burg met Lenin there for the first time; Lev Trotsky stayed there with his wife. Lenin’ s correspondence from Russia was sent to the addresses o f German socialists, which had been supplied by Helphand; they were then forwarded to Munich to one ‘ Dr. Leman’ 10 who was no other than Dr. Lehmann, Helphand’ s friend and companion on his trip to Russia. According to Mar tov,11 the two most active supporters o f the Iskra group among the Germans were Lehmann and Dietz, the Stuttgart publisher o f Das hungernde Russland. At his Schwabing flat, Helphand ran an illegal printing-press, a highly efficient machine which incor porated a device designed to destroy the printing frame instantly; a precaution against the possibility o f a police raid. On this machine, eight numbers o f Iskra were printed.12 The editorial board o f Iskra stayed in Munich until the begin ning o f the year 1902. Helphand was then in a position much to his own liking. He was the host, the man-in-between, an inter mediary between two worlds. He drew his strength precisely from this situation. There were as yet no differences between him 7 The Letters o f Lenin , edited by E. Hill and D. Mudie, London, 1936, p. 96. 8 Im K a m p f um die Wahrheit, p. 8. 9 N. K . Krupskaya, Lenin , Moscow, 1959, p. 68. 10 ibid., p. 60. 11 J . Martov, Geschichte der russischen Sozialdemokratie, Berlin, 1926, p. 59. 12 L. Stern (ed.), D ie Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution a u f Deutschland von 1 9 0 5 - 1 9 ° 7> Berlin, 1956, p. 40.

The Merchant o f Revolution

and Lenin; he consented to write for the Russian press on the German socialist movement and took pleasure in introducing the young generation o f the Russian socialists to his German com rades. In Helphand’ s own words, he ‘wanted to bring the intellectuals on the editorial board o f Iskra closer to the mass movement o f German Social Democracy’ .13 The Russians had retained their revolutionary fervour; the Germans had built up a mass organization; and Helphand believed they had a lot to learn from each other. At the same time, Helphand set to work among the Russian and Polish students at Munich University and the technical school. Together with his friend Julian Marchlewski, he became a well-known and highly esteemed figure among them. He wrote and printed propaganda pamphlets for the students’ societies; he took a prominent part in their social functions; and he organized demonstrations o f sympathy with the Russian revolutionary movement. W hen he could no longer resist the attractions o f the revolution in Russia in October 1905, he left Munich just in time. T he Munich police had prepared, two months before, a highly incriminating document on the subject o f Alexander Helphand. Had he stayed in Munich, the loss o f Bavarian residential rights would have been the lightest penalty. Helphand’ s endeavours to bring the Germans and the Russians together were so intense that even the Munich police could not help noticing them. On 30 August 1905, the C hief o f Police reported: H elphand w ilfully uses his relations with the Russian students on the one hand, and, on the other, w ith the local Social Democrats in order to gain sympathy for the Russian revolutionary m ovem ent, as well as for a systematic linking together o f our own trade union and socialist cause with the revolutionary tendencies abroad, a connexion which— because o f the persistence with which it has been pushed into the foreground on various occasions since the beginning o f the year— has become trouble some to the p u b lic; it seems to b e, at least, not commendable for the public good. In this respect we should remember the regrettable co incidence o f the great demonstrations o f sympathy for the Russian

13 Im

K a m p f um die Wahrheit,

p. 9.

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revolutionaries with the obstinate demonstrations o f the unem ployed, the manner in which questions o f Bavarian internal and foreign policy were dragged in, the unauthorized collections for those killed during the events in St. Petersburg, at a time when aid for the unem ployed was introduced at the cost o f financial sacrifice, the Russian students’ dance, too obviously follow ing the murder o f Grand Duke Sergei, in order to prove that these developm ents, as they occur under the visible influence o f agitators like H elphand, are certain to lack in consideration for the public welfare o f the country and the to w n .14

The Chief o f Police in Munich expressed, at the end o f the report, the fear that as a result o f Helphand’ s activities the workers’ meetings in Munich would lose their hitherto peaceful character. Indeed, in the years Helphand spent in the Bavarian capital, he exerted himself to quicken the leisurely pace o f the local socialist movement. T he peaceful character o f the workers’ meetings was exactly what Krupskaya, Lenin’ s wife, disliked when she witnessed, in 1901, a May Day parade in Munich.15 The sight o f the German Social Democrats, with their wives and children, their pockets stuffed with horse-radishes, swiftly and silently marching through Munich in order to get to the beer gardens in the suburbs as quickly as possible, all this made Krupskaya profoundly sad. She wanted to take part in ‘ real mili tant demonstrations, and not a procession organized by the police’ . She did not stay in Munich long enough to see her heart’s desire fulfilled. Soon after the departure o f the editorial board o f Iskra from Munich, Lenin made the opening moves in his campaign to cap ture the control o f the Russian Social Democracy. At the second party congress in the summer o f 1903, the split took place be tween the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Conflicting views o f the party organization emerged: Lenin defended the need for a highly centralized society o f professional revolutionaries, the bind o f organization he had outlined in the first issue o f Iskra. In the meantime, however, the frontier guards and the Tsarist police started to inflict severe punishment on the underground traffic between the socialists abroad and at home. T he split 14 L. Stern, op. cit., pp. 41 and 42.

15 N. K . Krupskaya, Lenin , p. 68.

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between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was only faintly reflected, at first, in the party organization in Russia. Although Lenin was convinced that only his kind o f party was capable o f leading the Russian working-class movement, its direction in fact began to elude the grasp o f the party. In the early years o f the century, the growing revolutionary unrest among the workers in Russia’ s industrial centres was, on the whole, taking place inde pendently o f the Social Democrat organization.16 At the same time, competitors for the favours o f the Russian public were appearing on the scene. In 1901, an illegal group o f Social Revolutionaries— direct descendants o f the populists, with their predilection for terrorist activity— was set up; soon afterwards, the liberals began to seek agreement on a political programme among like-minded men, and to organize their ranks. Indeed, at the time o f the controversy on party organization, it seemed possible that Lenin might get too involved in emigre politics, and that, like so many revolutionaries before him, he would disappear into the futility and oblivion o f exile. Mainly through Potresov’ s good services, Helphand was well informed about the differences among the exiles, and he soon noted their growing alienation from their home country. By the summer o f 1904, he was aware o f the fact that the Russian party had lost contact with the masses, and that it was working as a ‘ motor without a fly-wheel’ .17 For some time after the conclusion o f the second party con gress in the summer o f 1903, European socialists remained un aware o f the momentous events that led to the split o f the Russian Social Democrat party. Helphand was the first to break the silence after the storm. He reported on the split in his agency news-sheet at the end o f November 1903.18 He was clearlv unwilling to take sides; Lenin appreciated Helphand’ s non-partisan tone, and he suggested to him to wait for the publication o f the protocol o f the congress, and not to take ‘party gossip for hard currency’ .19 Helphand regarded the restoration o f unity among 16 cf. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party o f the Soviet Union, London, i960, p. 41. 17 A. N. Potresov and B. I. Nikolaevski (editors), Sotsial-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, vol. 1, Moscow, 1928, p. 137. 18 Aus der Weltpolitik, in an article entitled £Der Anfang vom Ende ?’ 30 November 1903. 19 Collected Works, vol. 7, p. 105.

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the Russian socialists as imperative; he thought the authority o f the German party might help to heal the breach. For over a year he wrote a large number o f letters to Potresov, Axelrod, and Martov, who were now Lenin’ s adversaries and, since his resigna tion, in control o f Iskra: Parvus implored them, exhorted them, and, most frequently, sermonized them.20 In a letter to Axelrod at the beginning o f January 1904, Helphand made the first move in the campaign aimed at bringing the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks together. After reading an article by Axelrod in Iskra which dealt with the problem o f the unity o f Russian socialism, Parvus wrote to the author: ‘Y ou have touched upon a sore spot in the policy o f the Russian Social Democrat party. T he fight against autocracy demands the unity o f all the elements o f opposition and the concentration o f forces for an immediate political effect.’ Nevertheless, Helphand did not want to give Axelrod and his friends the impression that he was, without reservations, on their side. He told Potresov that he in tended to remain in touch with Lenin; in February, he urged the Mensheviks to co-opt Lenin, without making any fuss, on to the editorial board o f Iskra, and to do so even if Lenin refused to admit, by way o f compensation, a Menshevik to the central com mittee o f the Bolshevik faction.21 W hen Potresov complained that Lenin was a man with whom it was impossible to co-operate, Helphand replied that the unity o f the party was more important than personal animosities. A few months later, Karl Kautsky gave the Mensheviks exactly the same advice. In his zeal to mediate between the two factions o f the Russian party, Parvus made a bad blunder. He expressed the opinion that the whole leadership o f the party was suffering from the same disease as Lenin, in overestimating their importance in regard to the working masses. He lumped the leader o f the Bolsheviks together with his adversaries, and reprimanded them as a lot o f self-important adolescents. It pleased no one. Lenin was in no mood to take advice or criticism, and he firmly declined the offer to rejoin the editorial board o f Iskra. 20 A large part of this correspondence was printed in Potresov and Nikolaevski, op. cit., pp. 108-20, 136-44, 152-7. 21 ibid., p. 112 .

The Merchant o f Revolution

A few weeks later, a thoughtful Potresov wrote to his friend A xelrod: ‘ H ow Lenin is to be beaten, that is the question. I think that one should, first o f all, let loose on him authorities like Kautsky (we have him already), Rosa Luxemburg, and Parvus.’ 22 By this time, Helphand’ s sympathies, as well as most o f his con tacts, were with the Mensheviks. He came to regard Lenin’ s struggle for power in the party with an almost physical aversion. Kautsky also came down, in the end, on the side o f Lenin’ s critics; Rosa Luxemburg wrote with distaste o f the ‘ night-watch man spirit o f ultra-centralism recommended by Lenin and his friends’ .23 It was natural that Helphand and Luxemburg, who had received a large part o f their training as socialists in Germany, should have viewed Lenin’ s activities with suspicion and con tempt. T hey regarded mass organization— like the organization they knew in Germany— as essential for the advance o f socialism; they thought the employment o f absolutist methods unnecessary in the struggle against an absolutist regime. T he attitudes o f the Mensheviks had certain affinities with those o f H elphand: they were keen to learn from their German comrades, and were even prepared to overlook a certain amount o f patronizing. Lenin, on the other hand, went his own way. He was ruthless, willing to pay a high price for a clear-cut victory, hovering, at the time, on the verge o f a nervous breakdown. While the Russian exiles quarrelled and intrigued, and Helphand tried, in vain, to mediate between them, the Tsarist Government blundered into a war with Japan. Helphand was convinced that the war provided the weightiest argument for the unity o f the Russian Social Democrat party. In the issue o f Iskra that appeared soon after the outbreak o f hostilities, Helphand started a series o f articles under a significant title— ‘ War and Revolution’ .24 It opened with a prophetic sentence: ‘ T he RussoJapanese war is the blood-red dawn o f coming great events.’ Parvus then p roceed ed to develop the thesis that the p eriod o f E u rop ean stability that had b eg u n in 1 8 7 1 , after the last o f the 22 ibid., p. 125. 23 Neue £ e it, 1903-4, vol. 2, pp. 484-92 and 529-39. 24 They were reprinted in Parvus’s book Rossiya i revolyutsiya, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 83 et seq.

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wars for national unification, was brought to an end by the out break o f the war between Russia and Japan. It opened a new cycle o f crisis. Parallel to his theory o f economic crisis,25 he argued that the national state had played out its role. Future historical development would not be shaped by national hostilities, but by the economic interests o f the modern industrial states, which had already embarked on a ruthless struggle for domination o f the world market. Competition for the still unexploited sources o f raw materials and for overseas markets would involve the Euro pean Great Powers in a conflict which would ‘inevitably lead to a world war’ . Parvus then stressed the special position o f Russia in this development: unlike Japan, England, or Germany, she was not compelled to conduct wars for capitalist reasons. T he Tsarist regime needed the war with Japan to relieve internal pressures by military victories abroad, and to restore, through victory, its credit on the European stock exchanges. Nevertheless, Parvus was convinced that the war would act as a ventilator for the pentup frictions and energies inside Russia. H e argued that no radical overhaul o f Russia’ s political system could be expected from the Tsarist Government, and that the hopes o f the liberals for a constitution were unfounded. The Russo-Japanese war would, according to Helphand, further disturb the precarious internal balance in Russia. He warned his Russian comrades before taking a purely determinist view o f these developments. He thought it possible that the ‘ continuation o f the capitalist order will be due to the policies o f the Social Democrat party. It is impossible to make events. But it is possible to delay them. T he idea o f revolu tion fights against this. It fights against reaction, against political stupidity, against all vagueness, cowardice, and indecisiveness that slow down political development. It is not an independent political factor, but it makes the way for history clear.’ 26 Helphand advocated a united front o f all the opposition elements in the struggle against Tsarism; he did, however, fear that the contribution o f the working class to the struggle might lose its identity: he insisted that the proletariat must exploit class antagonism for its own political ends. He was convinced that the 25 See above, p. 41.

26 ibid., p. 132.

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international development o f capitalism would lead to a revolu tion in Russia and that this revolution, in turn, would influence the internal situation o f other countries. ‘ T he Russian revolution will shake the political foundations o f the capitalist world, and the Russian proletariat will take over the role o f the avant-garde o f the social revolution.’ 27 In the articles ‘ War and Revolution’ , Helphand emerged as a theorist o f great originality and power, capable o f writing in a more distinguished manner than anyone else in the movement. He rose above the main preoccupations— whether with reform work or with the shape o f the party— that exercised the minds o f the German and Russian socialists, and he took a broad view o f his main concern— revolution. The ideas Helphand expressed in Iskra were far-sighted and lucid. He rightly insisted on the importance o f interaction between the domestic and the inter national situation; he pointed out the connexions between war and revolution. He grasped the fact that war, just as much as the inexorable economic forces o f classical Marxist theory, would open the door o f revolution. He understood the manner in which war could act as a powerful solvent on the fabric o f the state. But, most important o f all, he substituted the Russian for the German proletariat as the avant-garde o f the revolutionary movement. It was a rationalization o f his disappointing experiences with the German party. It was at the height o f this impressive intellectual activity that Helphand met Trotsky for the first time. Trotsky was not the only Russian revolutionary, as the Munich police so carefully recorded, who found a refuge in Helphand’ s flat. Lev Davidovich Bronstein— Trotsky— received much more than hospitality from his host. His brief but intense friendship with Parvus was one o f the most important events in Trotsky’ s stormy life.28 It was, o f course, a friendship between two revolutionaries in which the political element overshadowed every other; nevertheless, much later, after years o f concentrated slander against Helphand from diverse quarters, Trotsky was able to find words o f the highest 27 ibid., p. 133. 28 In the first volume of Trotsky’s biography, The Prophet Armed , London, 1954, Mr. Deutscher devoted a chapter entitled ‘An Intellectual Partnership’ to the relations between the two men.

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praise for his former friend. A bond o f sympathy, even o f loyalty, remained between them although their ways had parted. They met for the first time in the spring o f 1904. Trotsky was some twelve years younger than Helphand but their backgrounds were similar. He was born into a lower middle-class Jewish family in South Russia and went to school in Odessa; revolution claimed him before he began his university career. By the time Trotsky came into exile in western Europe in the autumn o f 1902, he commanded a good inside knowledge o f the Russian move ment, and an intimate experience o f its hazards. Like Helphand, Trotsky knew the view from the Odessa harbour; but the younger man had also seen the inside o f the local prison. After he fled from Siberia in October 1902, Trotsky spent the first months in exile under Lenin’ s wing, who thought very highly o f him. He had Trotsky co-opted to the editorial board o f Iskra and used him, like all new arrivals, as a source o f information on the situation in Russia. But there existed sharp differences between the two men’ s characters; Lenin had none o f the warmth o f Trotsky’ s nature: it was inevitable that the passionate dema gogue and the calculating strategist would, sooner or later, come into collision. T hey did, on many occasions. At the London congress in 1903, Trotsky was one o f Lenin’ s sharpest critics. He remained on the editorial board o f the party newspaper even after it had passed into the control o f Lenin’ s adversaries; after some personal differences with Plekhanov, Trotsky then parted company with the Mensheviks as well, in April 1904. At the time o f their first meeting, Trotsky, like Helphand, stood outside either o f the two factions o f the Russian party, and shared Helphand’ s concern with the schism. Trotsky came to Helphand with an open mind. Although Marx was his spiritual mentor whose theories guaranteed the advent o f the revolution, Marxism was not, on the whole, an informative guide to political action. In this respect, Parvus was more helpful; in Trotsky’ s own words, ‘ his early studies brought me closer to the problem o f Social Revolution, and, for me, definitely trans formed the conquest o f power by the proletariat from an astro nomic “ final” goal to a practical task o f our own day’ .29 Indeed, in 29 M y L ife , New York, 1930, p. 167.

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regard to revolutionary action, Helphand’ s thinking was freer o f the dead weight o f determinism than that o f his contempo raries ; he had definite views on the manner in which the revolu tion would occur, and how it could be delayed or expedited. T he corner-stones o f the later ‘ Trotskyism’ were laid down in Munich. Helphand’ s thesis on the development o f capitalism into a universal system, on the decline o f the importance o f national states, and on the parallel extension o f both the bourgeois and the proletarian interests outside the framework o f these states, all this Trotsky took over in toto. But he was most strongly influenced by his friend’ s conception o f the mass strike, the starting-point o f the coming revolution. Trotsky’ s imagination was fired by H elp hand’ s abstract idea o f the strike, and he gave it concrete form in a pamphlet30 he wrote in the autumn o f 1904. T he event took place in Russia a year later. Nevertheless, Trotsky’s time in Munich was not all taken up in spinning political theory. Trotsky was happy at Helphand’ s flat in Schwabing and he asked his wife, Natalia Sedova— she was in Switzerland— to come and join him. Helphand was a considerate and entertaining host, and Schwabing was the ideal starting-point for an exploration o f the artistic and bohemian life o f Munich. Its small cafes and bars were well-suited for passing the time convivially, and, in this respect as well, Helphand proved a useful guide; the two friends became well known among the cartoonists and writers around the Simplicissimus. Much later in his life Trotsky was described— not entirely without justification — as a cosmopolitan who felt at home everywhere in the world, a revolutionary with artistic ambitions, an internationalist by con viction, who knew his way around the coffee-houses o f Vienna as well as around the Red Army trenches. For this kind o f life, the young man could not have chosen a better tutor than Helphand. In this relationship, Trotsky did not remain a pupil and junior partner. Although he greatly admired his host, he did not over look a certain characteristic instability in Helphand. He dis trusted the marked ambiguity in the older man in whose, as Trotsky put it, ‘ head o f a bulldog’ , desire for riches was inextric ably mixed with the quest for a social revolution. Trotsky dis30 D o devyatovo Tanvarya, Geneva, 1905.

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approved o f his friend’ s uncontrolled eagerness to live his life to the full, o f his frivolity and spiritual instability, o f the laziness that prevented him from developing his talent. T he young man’ s reservations made it possible for him to free himself from Helphand’s tutelage. He had, without doubt, assimilated his older friend’ s most important ideas, but he was independent enough to use them for the construction o f his own system, to develop them further. He went too far for Helphand: we shall have occasion, in the following chapter, to trace the collapse o f their intellectual partnership. In the meantime, in Munich, consideration o f the fastapproaching revolution was the focal point o f their interest. What tactics should the party employ, and what class aims should it pursue? And then— was the revolution in Russia a middle-class affair, like the European revolutions in 1848, or would it open the door to socialism? The results o f these deliberations indicate that Helphand was mainly concerned with the political and tactical aspects o f the problems, whereas Trotsky concentrated on the actual revolu tionary developments. Helphand’ s tactical suggestions were directed against the middle class: the proletariat had to be careful, Helphand explained in an open letter to Lenin,31 not to become an auxiliary unit under liberal command. It should, as Lassalle had shown, remain an independent fighting force, which, in case o f possible treason to the revolution by the middle class, could at once disengage itself from the united front against the Tsarist regime, in order to carry on, alone, a two-front war against the Government and the liberals. Helphand aimed not only at a victory for constitutional democracy, but also at the extension o f the class struggle; not only at the reorganization o f the existing order, but above all at the political advance o f the socialist organizations. Trotsky, on the other hand, recorded his views in a manu script which he finished shortly before his departure from Munich. He offered it to the Mensheviks in Geneva for publica tion: they were, however, somewhat taken aback by Trotsky’ s arguments, and the appearance o f the pamphlet was delayed. 31 Reprinted in Rossiya i revolyutsiya.

The Merchant o f Revolution

The Mensheviks disapproved o f Trotsky’ s attacks on the Russian bourgeoisie. Trotsky judged its revolutionary potential by the standards o f the socialist underground work, and his estimate o f the degree to which the middle class was unfitted to take part in the revolution far exceeded that o f Helphand. For Trotsky, the middle class was a negligible political factor that could be entire discounted in the plotting o f the course o f the revolution. T he proletariat would have to carry the main burden o f the struggle: the political mass strike would give the main impetus to the unfolding o f the strength o f the working class. A few weeks later Trotsky was proved right. Nevertheless, friendships with the Russian exiles, and their politics, however absorbing, could not occupy Helphand fully during his stay in Munich. His business transactions, and his unsettled family life also made heavy demands on his time. After the German party had put him into cold storage, his desire to be rich, and to be able to live independently both o f the meagre journalist’ s fees and o f the socialist publishers, became so intense and obvious that it was noticed by his friends. In this regard as well, he thought in large dimensions. Since, after the Liibeck congress, much o f the German party press was inaccessible to him, he wanted to found his own newspaper; a radical daily, he confided to Trotsky, which should appear simultaneously in four European languages. He was able to fulfil his wish some twenty years later; but then it was no longer a revolutionary organ but a solid, constructive magazine, more liberal than socialist. What he in fact accomplished at the time— he was never short o f magnificent ideas— was more modest. After his expulsion from Dresden, he had founded, together with his friend Marchlewski, a small feature-agency. It offered the provincial socialist press weekly supplies o f leading articles written by Helphand, and published under the title Aus der Weltpolitik. It was a difficult enterprise to run. The provincial press might well have benefited by accepting, more readily than it did, Helphand’ s services: he offered them a good coverage o f the main foreign events. But the party was still occupied almost exclusively with internal problems, and only a few newspapers made use o f the agency.

0 sterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna

I. Karl Kautsky, 1905

wmm

British Museum

II. Helphand, Trotsky, and Lev Deutsch m the Saints Peter and Paul Fortress, 1906

The Schwabing Headquarters

A lth o u g h it m ade it p ossib le for H elp h a n d to publicize his view s, its political influence was n e g lig ib le ; it d id , h ow ever, provide him w ith a sm all in com e, w hich h elped to bridge the first difficult m onths in M u n ich .

In order to acquire a bigger capital, Helphand embarked on another project. In the summer o f 1902 he founded a publishing house, the Verlag slawischer und nordischer Literatur. It was based on an original idea; since Russia was not one o f the signa tories o f the Berne copyright convention o f 1886, Russian authors were not protected by its provisions, and their work could be pirated abroad. (This is still the case nowadays. The lack o f a formal agreement o f course works also in the other direc tion, to the disadvantage o f foreign authors translated into Russian.) Helphand realized that he would establish the Russian authors’ claim to legal protection by publishing small editions, say 100 copies, in Germany. He himself remained in the back ground: Marchlewski became the titular head o f the new pub lishing house. An old friend o f Helphand’s since their student years in Switzerland, Marchlewski had worked with him since 1896. Born in Poland in the same year as Helphand— 1867— Marchlewski ideally complemented his friend. He was a natural diplomat, who later became the successful arbiter o f innumerable disputes inside the Polish party. While Helphand generated ideas and plans at a high rate, Marchlewski’ s strength lay in quiet, precise, and persevering work. He was able to bring Helphand down to earth from his flights o f fancy; he was concerned that the publishing venture should not only be started, but that it should also be efficiently carried on. He was, for Helphand, friend, partner, and managing director in one person. The enterprise made an astonishingly good start. Its first venture was a sensational success: the discovery o f Maxim Gorki — Russia’ s first genuine proletarian writer— for the western Euro pean public. In order to meet Gorki personally, Helphand risked, in the summer o f 1902, a short, illegal visit to Russia. At the rail way station in Sevastopol, on the Black Sea, the two men concluded an agreement by which Helphand was empowered to look after Gorki’ s author’s rights in western Europe. He was to M.R.-f

The Merchant o f Revolution

retain 20 per cent o f the p ro ceed s; G orki was to receive o n equarter o f the rem ainder, and three-quarters w ere to go to the funds

o f the R ussian D em ocrat party.

H elp h a n d

m ade

the

agreem ent on b e h a lf o f his publish ing h ouse, and G orki on b e h a lf of

Znanie, a R ussian agency w hich handled the financial side o f

his literary w ork.32 T h e tim ing o f the agreem ent was w ell chosen. H elp h a n d and M archlew ski thus acquired G ork i’ s latest play,

The Lower Depths,

w hich they introduced to G erm any on ly a few weeks later, w ith great success. M ax R ein h ardt’ s fam ous B erlin production was on ly the b eg in n in g : the play ran there for som e five h undred perform ances, and in the follow ing four years it did the rounds o f alm ost all the provincial theatres. B u t this was the first and last financial success o f H e lp h a n d ’ s pu blish ing house. T h e incom e from the play was soon used u p , partly to cover the subsequent losses incurred b y the

Verlag, and

partly b y H elp h a n d him self. N eith er G orki nor the R ussian Social D em ocrat party received any royalties. T h e re the m atter rested until the end o f

1905. D u rin g the revolution in R ussia in

that year, how ever, G orki and the Bolsheviks suddenly rem em bered the royalties H elp h an d ow ed them . A s they were not forth com ing, financial,

charges w ere

against raised.

H e lp h a n d ’ s integrity,

T hey

reverberated,

personal we

shall

and see,

through the R ussian and the G erm an socialist m ovem ents. A fte r the pu blish ing house had run into difficulties, because o f, as H elp h a n d p u t it, ‘ unfavourable business trends’ , he lost all interest in the venture. T h e

O cto b er strikes in R ussia then

indicated the high-w ater mark o f the

1905 revolu tion : H elp h a n d

packed his bags, and left M u n ich for St. Petersburg. M archlew ski w ent on looking after the ailing business u n til, finally, he had to liquidate it on his ow n. H elp h a n d behaved w ith total irresponsibility. O n this occa sion, the m ost serious flaws in his character lay revealed: an absence o f steadfastness and an utter lack o f consideration for his friends and colleagues. H e regarded hum an ties in strictly u tili tarian term s; he did not hesitate to sacrifice his friendship w ith M archlew ski to a m om entary advantage for him self. T h e end o f 32 cf. M. Gorki, Lenin , Moscow, 19 31, p. 7.

The Schwabing Headquarters

the p u blish in g house broke a friendship o f som e fifteen years’ standing. M archlew ski never forgave H elp h a n d . I f certain features in H e lp h a n d ’ s character repelled his frien ds, they had a disastrous effect on his fam ily life. L ik e the affair o f G o rk i’ s royalties, H e lp h a n d ’ s private life later becam e a source o f severe em barrassm ent to h im . T h is was a venue th rou gh w h ich he was frequ en tly attacked; he was especially vulnerable to criticism from his erstw hile frien ds, w h o had kn ow n him in ti m ately. T h e story o f H e lp h a n d ’ s private life can b e p ieced to gether, m ainly from in form ation contained in these attacks— p u rp osefu l attem pts at character assassination m ade in fu ll view o f the p u b lic— and from his ow n coun ter-th rusts. H elp h a n d h ad m arried early, p rob a b ly soon after his arrival in G erm any. O n e o f his Socialist com rades described his w ife as a R ussian m id w ife. H e lp h a n d h im se lf w rote, m any years later,33 that his w ife had gone throu gh m any adversities w ith h im , in cluding his expulsions from Prussia— this was in

1893— and

from Saxony, five years later. B u t he added that the conditions the fam ily lived in becam e w orse after the birth o f their son , an event w h ich took place shortly before his departure for R ussia w ith D r . L eh m an n in

1899. O n his return, his w ife and son w ere

w aiting for h im in M u n ich , in a flat in the B ohem ian su b u rb o f Schw abing. It was here that the H elp h a n d s spent the o n ly quiet interlude o f their m arriage, and that A lexan d er fo u n d tim e to refer, in correspondence w ith his friends, to his w ife, and their sm all son Lazarus, nicknam ed Z h en ya. T h is was the flat and the fam ily w h ich L en in and K rupskaya knew so w ell. N everth eless, the couple had perhaps lived throu gh too m any hardships to gether, and these had n ot h elped to strengthen the b on d s betw een them . T h e marriage broke u p in

1904. W h e n he later d efen d ed

h im self against charges o f irresponsibility, H e lp h a n d p o in ted out that he had paid his w ife 2 0 0 marks a m on th , h a lf o f his incom e at the tim e. H e cou ld n ot have con tin u ed to do so for lo n g . H e left for St. P etersburg in the autum n o f ture, his form er w ife got into

1905; after his depar

financial difficulties, and the

K autskys began to send her fifty marks a m on th . H elp h a n d left his first w ife, T a n y a , for another w o m a n : o f her 33 T

in an article, ‘Philister iiber mich!’ D ie Glocke, 1919, vol. 2, p. 1335.

The Merchant o f Revolution

he w rote that 6she m ade n o dem ands on m e’ , and that her on ly desire was to have a child b y h im . She w ent to R ussia w ith h im in O cto b er

1905, b u t the political developm ents allow ed them to

spen d o n ly a short tim e together in St. P etersburg. A fte r the failure o f the revolu tion , she bore H e lp h a n d his second son in a T sa rist

prison .

They

returned

G erm an y

separately,

and

H e lp h a n d show ed n o interest in continuing their relationship. A g a in , he retreated very sw iftly, w ith ou t giving m u ch th ou gh t to the consequences o f his action. H is fam ily ties w ere o f the loosest kin d. H e cared little about the later fortunes o f his son s, and, in d eed , very little can be fo u n d ou t about them . It has b een said that they w ere b o th b ro u g h t u p in R u ssia, and m ade their careers under the Soviet regim e. In

1920, H elp h a n d h im se lf m ade a reference to a son

w h o lived in R u ssia, w ith w h om he was n ot in tou ch. In the nineteen-thirties, tw o diplom ats appeared at Soviet em bassies in w estern E u r o p e : rum our had it that they w ere A lexan d er H e lp h a n d ’ s sons.

C o u n t C ian o, the Italian F oreign M inister and

so n -in -la w o f M u ssolin i, had frequent dealings, in the years and

1939

1940, w ith a L e o n H e lfa n d , the Soviet C harge d ’A ffaires in

R o m e. T h e last reference in C ia n o ’ s diary to the Soviet diplom at re a d s: July 14th, 1940. H elfand, who directed the Soviet Em bassy in R om e for so many m onths, has to return to M oscow , but he sniffs the odour o f the firing squad. T h is is why he has asked for help to escape to Am erica, where he will leave his family, and, I believe, stay him self. H e is a keen and intelligent man, whose long contact with bourgeois civilisation has made a complete bourgeois out o f him. U nder the stress o f imminent misfortune all his Jewish blood came to the surface. H e has becom e extremely obliging and does nothing but bow and scrape. But he wishes to save his fam ily; he adores his daughter. H e fears their deportation more than death for himself. T h is is very human and very beautiful.34

L e o n H e lfa n d fled to the U n ited States, w here he later m ade a considerable fortu n e, dealing in war surplus m aterial. H e recently died in N e w Y o rk , under an assum ed nam e. Ievgen ii G n ed in was the nam e o f the other Soviet diplom at, 34 Ciano’s Diary, edited by Malcolm Muggeridge, London, 1952, p. 276.

The Schwabing Headquarters

p o ssib ly the son o f H e lp h a n d ’ s secon d w ife. In the n ineteen thirties, he was the head o f the Press D ep artm en t in the F oreign M in istry ; about

1936, he was ap poin ted F irst Secretary at the

Soviet E m b assy to B erlin. H e was then arrested during Stalin’ s great p u r g e s; according to the rem iniscences o f his friend Ilya E h ren b u rg , he was released in

1955 and is still alive in the

Soviet U n io n . W e can on ly assum e that these tw o m en w ere H e lp h a n d ’ s s o n s : the difficulties in volved in verifyin g this assum ption show h ow little in clin ed H e lp h a n d ’ s relatives have b een to id en tify th em selves w ith his adventurous life. K n o w led g e o f his private affairs placed a sharp w eapon in the hands o f his adversaries and his erstw hile friends. K a rl K au tsk y d id n ot hesitate, shortly after the end o f the First W o r ld W a r , to use his know ledge against H elp h a n d . K a u tsk y ’ s sharp personal invective elicited a reply from H e lp h a n d , w h ich he prin ted in his ow n

w eekly,

Die Glocke, and w h ich he entitled ‘ Philistines

A b o u t M e ’ . T h e case he m ade in his defence d id n t sou n d en tirely con vincin g. H e p rod u ced n oth in g b u t a p om p ou s self ju stification . In his acid rep ly to his form er frien d, H elp h a n d attem pted to create the im pression that he had always b een , in an unphilistine m anner, a g o o d father. H e o n ly su cceeded in con veying the sim ple truth about h im self. A n d this was that his fam ily always cam e a poor secon d , an d his political interests and friends first. H e w rote that ‘ I look ed after m y nearest and dearest as often and as soon as I cou ld , b u t I d id n ot let m aterial cares and regards for m y fam ily hem in m y intellectual w ork and m y political a ctiv ity; I d id n ot hesitate, w h en it was necessary, to stake everyth in g: m y ow n life and the existence o f m y d ep en d an ts.’ 35 A n d anyw ay, he d id n ot think very h igh ly o f the in stitu tio n : ‘ T h e re is a great civilizing value in the fam ily, b u t the bourgeois fam ily, as w e know it n ow , is a nest o f rob b ers. It is predatory and it does n ot rest on c o n c o rd ; it is u n ited o n ly b y the consciousness w h ich looks u p on the rest o f the w o rld as its natural prey. T h e re is no m eanness, n o crim e, that has n ot b een com m itted in the nam e o f the fam ily. T h e m ost brutal, the m ost horrible person 35 D ie Glocke, 1919, p. 1336.

The Merchant o f Revolution

can be the nicest father o f a fam ily. W h e n the biggest scoundrel suffers from scruples o f conscience, then the fam ily serves as his d e co y .â&#x20AC;&#x2122; Such sentim ents H elp h a n d had entertained as a student at the U n iversity o f Basle. A fam ily, a regular life, a steady incom e, w ere n ot for h im ; his sights were set on higher aims. A n d H e lp h a n d â&#x20AC;&#x2122; s vitality, his contem pt for bourgeois m orals, rem ained w ith him throughout his life. T h e G erm an socialists did not share this attitude o f m ind. T h e scandals, the love affairs, all the colou rfu l rum ours connected w ith the nam es o f the socialist leaders were things left beh in d w ith the past o f the m ovem ent. W h a t Lassalle cou ld d o , K autsky or B eb el w ou ld not and cou ld not do. W h e n the M arxists came to dom inate G erm an socialism after the G otha C ongress o f U n ity , they im posed on it n ot on ly a new political doctrine, bu t also a new code o f m orality. It was puritan and, in the G erm an context, low er m iddle cla ss; it tolerated no excess or eccentricity. M any o f his

G erm an com rades were unable to

understand a personality o f H elp h a n d â&#x20AC;&#x2122; s com plexity and calibre, and they labelled and dism issed him as a w icked libertine. H elp h a n d was too preoccupied w ith socialism , w ith w riting, w ith revolu tion ; later, he even earned m oney for his political pursuits. H e always had an alternative to the G erm an party, in the R ussian socialist m ovem ent. H is interests w ere incom patible w ith a settled, quiet life. H e never m issed an adventure o f any kind.

St. Petersburg, 1905 T h e year

1905 op en ed in R ussia w ith a m assacre. E arly

in the afternoon o f Sunday, 22 January, a large and orderly p ro cession o f w orkers halted in front o f the W in te r P a la ce: they had com e to ask the T sa r for a constitution and an im provem en t in their living con ditions. B u t the T sa r was aw ay, and the soldiers had their ow n w ay o f dealing w ith dem onstrations. T h e salvoes fired b y the troops stationed outside the palace killed som e five h u n dred p eop le. A general strike, affecting alm ost the w hole o f the E m p ire, was the im m ediate outcom e o f the ‘ b lo o d y S u n d ay’ in St. P etersb u rg; it was a spontaneous, unorganized protest b y em bittered w orkers. T h e political clim ate o f the country started to take a storm y tu r n : in the follow in g m onths strikes, m utinies, con cessions from the T sa r, follow ed each other in rapid succession. T h e sm all ban d o f agitators, w h o had hitherto w orked u n d ergrou n d , m ade their p u b lic debu t in R u ssia’ s politics. A s far as the R u ssian exiles in w estern E u rop e w ere con cern ed , the new s from h om e w as, th ou gh w elcom e, rather u n expected . T h e y had b ad ly n eed ed the stim ulant o f the revolu tion , and their apathy and depression w ere fast replaced b y hectic activity. Y e t their exalted m o o d cou ld n ot conceal the utter unpreparedness o f the R u ssian Social D em ocrats. T h e thesis L e n in had developed during the discussion o f the party program m e in

1902— that

capitalism had already b een established in R u ssia, that the p ro letariat had to fight b o th the liberals and the governm en t, that the establishm ent o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat cou ld n ow be regarded as a practicable p ossibility— p rov ed useless in the situation in

1905; in addition, the party was d ivid ed , and was in

capable o f sw ift reaction to the new political developm en ts. N o t so H elp h a n d and T ro tsk y . T h e y had anticipated these

The Merchant o f Revolution

ev en ts: again and again, they had stressed the ‘ actuality o f revo lu tion ’ long before its ou tbreak; they had never desisted in their attem pts to restore the unity o f the party. O n ly now did it becom e obvious how far they had advanced, in political planning, beyon d their com rades’ concerns. T h e first new s from St. Petersburg reached T ro tsk y in G eneva. H e at once decided to return to R u ssia : on the w ay back, he m ade a stop in M u n ich in order to consult H elp h an d . T ro tsk y and his w ife, Natalia Sedova, fou n d their friend in a m ood o f exalted optim ism . B u t the younger m an was im patient, and he spent on ly a few days at the Schw abing flat, discussing the events in R ussia. T ro tsk y gave his friend the m anuscript o f his pam phlet,

devyatovo Yanvaryaf to read : H elp h an d was very pleased w ith it, and he told T r o tsk y : ‘ T h e events have fu lly confirm ed this analysis. N o w , no one can deny that the general strike is the m ost im portant means o f fighting. T h e 22 January was the first political strike, even i f it was disguised under a priest’ s cloak. O n e need add on ly that revolution in R ussia m ay place a dem ocratic w orkers’ governm ent in p o w er.’ 1 2 T ro tsk y left the m anuscript o f his pam phlet w ith H elp h an d , w ho prom ised to write an in tro duction for it, w hich w ou ld sum up their latest conversations; H elp h an d thought that it should not now be difficult to make the M ensheviks p u blish the tw o essays. H elp h an d finished the introduction at the end o f January, and the M ensheviks pu blish ed the pam phlet in G eneva, early in M arch. F ew m anifestos have m ade such a p rofou n d im pression on the R ussian socialists. For the first time in the history o f the R ussian m ovem ent, the thesis was advanced that the proletariat should at once grasp for political pow er, and that, as the vanguard o f the revolution, it had the right to form a provisional govern m ent. H elp h a n d ’ s introduction was an im passioned plea for such a governm ent, and he developed convincing argum ents in support o f his ow n and T ro tsk y ’ s view s. T o begin w ith, he dealt w ith the weakness o f the R ussian

bourgeoisie as a class, and their inability

1 ‘Till the Ninth of January’—according to the old Russian calendar; 22 January, according to the new. 2 M y L ife , p. 167.

St. Petersburg9 1905

to play a leading role in the revolu tion . In the T sa rist em pire there

existed

in dep en d en t

provincial tow ns

w h ich

politically active m iddle class cou ld have flourished. T h e central ism o f the G overn m en t in St. P etersburg p rod u ced on ly a sterile and apathetic bu reau cracy: it was politically insignificant, u n connected (this was n ot the case in E u rop e in

1848) b y the ties o f

class loyalty w ith the other liberal professions— doctors, tech nicians, teachers. A n d R ussia possessed n o parliam ent w h ich m ight have con tribu ted to the consolidation o f the classes and their interests. H e lp h a n d ’ s exam ination o f the peasantry fou n d them also lacking in political significance. A s an unorganized m ass, the peasants m igh t increase anarchy, b u t cou ld play n o in dep en d en t political role. T h e logical con clu sion fo llo w e d : the proletariat alone was in a p osition to assum e the leadership o f the revolu tion . ‘ O n ly the w orkers can com plete the revolutionary change in R ussia.

The

revolutionary provisional governm en t in R ussia

w ou ld be a governm ent o f w orkers’ dem ocracy. I f Social D e m o cracy stands at the head o f the revolutionary m ovem en t o f the R ussian proletariat, then this governm ent w ill b e Social D e m o crat. If, in its revolu tion ary initiative, Social D em ocracy becom es alienated from the proletariat, then it w ill becom e a faction o f no im portan ce.’ 1 2 3 O n ly radical tactics w ere suitable, in H e lp h a n d ’ s view , for the achievem ent o f this am bitious aim . T h e u n ited op p osition front w ith the

bourgeoisie, alth ou gh essential u n til the fall o f T sa rism ,

should be regarded as a tem porary alliance on ly. H e lp h a n d u sed the exam ple o f the E u ropean revolutions o f

1848 to p oin t ou t the

danger that, sooner or later, the m iddle class w o u ld becom e reconciled w ith T sa rism in order to deprive the w orkers o f the fruits o f their revolutionary struggle. H e therefore exhorted the workers n ot to lay d ow n their arms even after victory, and to be prepared for a p ossible ‘ civil w ar’ . H e succinctly expressed his tactical p rin cip le s: 1. Not to mix up the organizations. March separately, strike united. 2. Not to forget their own [the workers’] political demands.

3 Do T\

devyatovo Tanvarya, p. IX .

The Merchant o f Revolution

Not to conceal the differences of interests [between the workers and the middle class]. 4. To watch their allies as much as their enemies. 5. To pay more attention to ensuring that the situation created by the struggle is exploited, than to retaining one’s allies. 3.

Finally, H elp h a n d discussed the aims the workers should pursue through their provisional governm ent. In this connexion it becam e obvious that H elp h a n d was not considering a purely socialist revolution. H e stressed the fact that R ussia w ou ld go through a bourgeois revolution— the first stage o f the classical M arxist theory— w hich w ou ld , paradoxically, be carried out not b y the m iddle class b u t b y the w orkers. T h e introduction o f socialism was therefore not the aim o f the revolution in R ussia. At

m ost, it could achieve the

establishm ent o f a ‘ w orkers’

dem ocracy’ . T h is m eant, for H elp h a n d , the introduction o f a constitutional system w hich w ou ld guarantee— apart from the usual civil rights— special class provisions, such as the eight-hour day and other progressive social legislation. H elp h a n d had the exam ple

o f G erm an

Social D em ocracy

before

his

ey es:

accepted the further developm ent o f capitalism in R ussia as an historical necessity, bu t he w anted to place restrictions on this capitalism

the

introduction

o f certain

social rights.

believed that, as a reward for their essential contribution to the victory o f the revolution, the R ussian workers w ou ld acquire the necessary room for the construction o f their ow n mass organiza tions, an aim for w hich the proletariat in w estern E u rope had fou gh t, on ly w ith partial success, for a num ber o f decades. H is conception o f the w orkers’ dem ocracy w as, therefore, based u p on the right o f the socialist organizations to exist and to develop freely. H elp h a n d was n ot thinking o f a fu ll and im m ediate transi tion to socialism . H elp h a n d ’ s introduction to T ro tsk y ’ s pam phlet ran to tw elve pages on ly, and it was a m asterpiece o f political analysis. H e did not hesitate to develop his argum ent to its logical con clu sion : none o f his R ussian com rades had dared to tread the territory H elp h a n d was now exploring. H e dem anded no less than that the R ussian socialist m ovem ent should concern itse lf w ith the

St. Petersburg , 1905

p rob lem o f the im m ediate acquisition o f political pow er. A t the tim e, the socialist leaders w ere far from ready to take u p the challenge. T h e M ensheviks w h o had on ly recently w anted to use the ‘ au thority’ o f H elp h a n d against their adversaries, w ere quite unable to follow h im . T h e y cou ld n ot accept his suggestion for a provisional g o vern m en t; they thou gh t he had overshot the target, that his im agination had

finally trium phed over his

critical

faculties. H e lp h a n d h im self, they argued, had had to adm it that R ussia was going throu gh a bou rgeois revolu tion . It follow ed therefore, that the m iddle class w o u ld have to assum e the leading r o le ; the proletariat sh ou ld renounce all its class dem ands, and sim ply concentrate on the su pport o f the op p osition to the T sa rist regim e. W h e n the M ensheviks cam e to use quotations from M arx and E n gels against h im , H e lp h a n d p oin ted ou t that the basic principle o f M arxist tactics lay in the exploitation, for the purposes o f social revolu tion , o f every phase o f historical developm en t. H e asked his critics: ‘ D o you w ant to use the revolu tion in the interests o f the proletariat, or do you w ish , like M r. Struve, to exploit the w orkers for the re v o lu tio n ?’ 4 T h e B olsheviks too, w ere som ew hat terrified b y H e lp h a n d ’ s plan. T h e y beh aved as i f H elp h a n d had betrayed a carefully concealed

party

secret.

The

im m ediate,

th ou gh

provisional

acquisition o f pow er b y the proletariat appeared such a h igh ly dangerous con ception to L e n in , that he at once lau n ch ed an im passioned refutation. In the m iddle o f M arch in his new spaper,

1905 he w rote

Vperiod : ‘ T h is cannot b e , since the discussion

does n ot concern an accidental, transitory ep isod e, b u t a revolu tionary dictatorship o f a certain duration, w h ich cou ld leave certain traces in history. T h is cannot b e , since on ly a revolu tionary dictatorship, w h ich is su pp orted b y a h uge m ajority o f the nation, can be o f a certain duration (naturally n ot absolu tely, b u t relatively). T h e R u ssian proletariat, h ow ever, n ow form s on ly a m inority o f the n ation .’ It was n ot H e lp h a n d ’ s political program m e, b u t the exhorta4 cf. Winfried Scharlau, ‘Parvus und Trockij: 19 0 4 -19 14 ’, Jahrbucher fu r Geschichte Osteuropas, October 1962, vol. 10, p. 365.

The Merchant o f Revolution

tion to the w orkers to grasp pow er, that appeared so m onstrous to L e n in . H is ow n plans, w h ich he described as a ‘ revolutionary dem ocracy’ w ere in fact alm ost identical to those o f H elp h a n d . L e n in also w anted to achieve certain class a im s; h e, also, w anted to

have

certain w orking m en ’ s dem ands

guaranteed b y

the

constitution. B u t he was irritated b y the idea that the R u ssian proletariat, a fraction o f the p op u lation , sh ou ld alone reach for political pow er. H e therefore preferred to w ork for a coalition w ith the agricultural proletariat and w ith the left-w in g

petite

bourgeoisie. F or h im , the provisional governm ent w ou ld largely consist o f the ‘ greatest variety o f representatives o f revolutionary dem ocracy’ . Social D em ocracy w ou ld o f course b e represented, bu t as a m inority and n ot a m ajority. T h e progress o f the sum m er o f hair-splittin g

polem ics.

the

1905 was m arked b y en dless, m eantim e,

the

revolutionary

situation in R ussia sh ow ed n o signs o f abating. O n 6 A u g u st, the T sa r finally m ade a fundam ental concession to the m ovem ent o f o p p o sitio n : an Im perial m anifesto announced the T s a r ’ s in ten tion o f establishing a consultative parliam ent, retaining his right to dissolve it at w ill. A g a in , the question o f their attitude to the

Duma precipitated

a violen t debate am ong the exiles. L e n in regarded n on -p articip a tion in the elections as a m atter o f prin ciple. T h e M ensh eviks, on the other h an d , recom m en ded at least participation in the election cam paign. In this discussion as w ell, H e lp h a n d cou ld n ot resist the tem ptation to have his say. H e su pp orted neither the B o l sheviks nor the M ensheviks. H e h ad, after all, preached participa tion to the G erm an m ovem ent for som e ten years: he n ow recom m en ded the same course o f action to the R u ssian socialists. T o m ake fu ll use o f every op p ortu n ity that presen ted itse lf was the axiom o f his tactics; he w as, h ow ever, as u n su ccessfu l as was the invitation o f the T s a r , in convincing the R u ssian party leaders to interest them selves in the forth com in g elections. A t this p oin t, the first signs appeared that his polem ics against the tw o factions o f the Social D em ocrat party had fou n d som e response in R u ssia herself. T h e socialist agitators w ho actually w orked on the spot had never quite b een able to follow the various political subtleties that resulted from the split in the

St. Petersburg, 1905

party, and that proved so absorbing for the exiles. A man like Parvus, who said that he was neither a Bolshevik nor a Menshe vik, and that he was content to remain a Social Democrat, appealed to the party workers in Russia. His name now stood for a political programme: on 29 March 1905, the Bolshevik organ Vperiod reported, significantly, that on the margin o f the Men shevik group in St. Petersburg a new circle had formed: its members called themselves ‘ Parvusists’ . Ryazanov, who later became the Director o f the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow, and Ermanski, who was to find his place among the Mensheviks during the war, were the leading figures in the circle. Its official secession from the Menshevik group was expected to be announced very shortly. Although no independent organization was formed in the following weeks, the existence o f the circle indicated that Helphand had accumulated considerable political capital in Russia. It was o f course not sufficient for him to make a bid for supremacy inside the party: this much he certainly knew. But it was an expression o f confidence, an indication that he would be welcome to take his place among the leaders o f the revolution, without any regard to party discipline. It was pre cisely in this position o f an independent politician, who relied on spontaneous support rather than on a party organization, that Helphand made his mark, in the following months, in St. Petersburg. In the meantime, the political situation in Russia had deterio rated further. A printers’ strike early in October was transformed, unexpectedly, into a general strike. It again brought the workers out into the streets in their thousands. On 13 October, a workers’ council— the Soviet— was set up, and assumed the leadership o f the revolt. Trotsky was on the spot at the right time. After having spent some time in Kiev and then underground in Finland, he arrived in St. Petersburg in the middle o f October. He now assumed the leadership o f the movement. The October strike also provided the final motive for Helphand’s return to Russia. He brushed aside the warnings o f his German comrades, that such an expedition might well end in Siberia. He disregarded danger and difficulties, and relied on

The Merchant o f Revolution

luck and h elp from his friends. H e n eeded as m u ch o f b o th as he cou ld g e t; for he d id n ot have en ou gh m on ey for his trip to St. P etersburg. A b o u t 20 O cto b e r, he u n exp ected ly turned u p in the editorial offices o f the

Leipziger Volkszeitung. Paul L e n sch , the n ew s

paper’ s ed ito r-in -ch ief, and K o n ra d H aen isch , his assistant, cou ld hardly believe their eyes. H elp h a n d was com m itting a crim inal offen ce, a breach o f banishm ent from Saxony. In his rem inis cences, H aen isch vivid ly described the encounter. Is it really you? W here have you come from ? W here are you going? From Munich o f course! T h e beast is finished! [This was a reference, by Helphand, to the Tsarist regime.] Is it really finished? Has it really gone so far? Can you now, without danger . . .? A crushing glance from the grey, enormous eyes, and a contemptuous shrug o f the shoulders were the only answer to such

petit bourgeois

faint-heartedness. A nd the fare ? Advance for the book I shall write on my experiences. A nd I shall experience a lot— you can rely on that! And your publishing house ? T h e publishing house can go to the devil! W hat do I care about the silly publishing house? Marchlewski will have to sort that one out. It is the revolution now, my friend! And he vigorously slapped me on the back.5 A fte r cashing the cheque for advance royalties, H elp h a n d left for St. P etersburg. A g a in , he was travelling on a forged p a ssp o rt; again, nothin g untow ard h app en ed, and he reached the R u ssian capital in the last days o f O cto b e r. T ro tsk y was there to w elcom e h im : their early arrival gave the tw o m en , in contrast to the leaders o f the tw o party factions, a flying start. So far, none o f the exiles had braved the perils o f returning h om e. O n ly after the T sa r declared, on

30 O cto b e r, a general am nesty for political

offenders, d id the party leaders in w estern E u rop e feel safe en ou gh to make their w ay back to R u ssia. M artov, L e n in , and V era

Z asu lich

reached

St.

P etersburg

early

5 K . Haenisch, Parvus , E in B latt der Erinnerung, Berlin, 1925, p. 21.

N ovem b er;

St. Petersburg, 1905

A x e lro d was preven ted from going b y illn e ss; Plekhanov was so absorbed in his theoretical studies that he d id n ot even consider m aking the jo u rn e y . T h e workers o f St. P etersburg n eeded leaders w h o w ere on the sp ot, and it did n ot m u ch m atter w hether they w ere B o lsh e viks or M ensh eviks, socialists or n ot. H elp h a n d and T ro tsk y knew

this, and they u sed

the

situation to

their advantage.

T h e y assum ed the leadership o f the m ovem ent, and received popular su p p o rt: b oth o f them becam e m em bers o f the S o v ie t; T ro tsk y had taken part in its very first session. T h e tw o friends knew w hat they w anted and they w ere energetic and skilful enough to strengthen their leading positions. T h e ir m aster-stroke was the acquisition, early in N o v em b er, o f the hitherto insignifi cant liberal new spaper, the

Ruskaya Gazeta, w h ich they trans

form ed into the first truly popular socialist daily in R u ssia. H elp h a n d n ow p roved that he had n ot w asted his years o f apprenticeship on B ru no Schonlank’ s staff. W ith in a few days,

Gazeta becam e a lively, easily in telligible paper. Its price was one kopek on ly— the the vaguely liberal, deadly soporific

equivalent o f the first E n glish m ass-circulation p en n y papers— and its sales shot u p rapidly. A t first its circulation w ent u p from

30,000 to 100,000; early in D ecem b er, the sales o f the Ruskaya Gazeta reached the h alf-m illion mark. T h e B olsh evik new spaper, the Novaya Zhizn, on the other hand, had to content itse lf w ith a circulation o f 50,000 copies. In the field o f p u b licity , the original

Parvus and T ro tsk y had stolen the show . A n d w h en the party leaders finally arrived in St. P etersburg, they cou ld do n oth in g bu t accept the situation. T h e split in the Social D em ocrat party fou n d little or no reflection in the S o v ie t; it accom m odated a variety o f groups and their different political ideas. It form ulated no socialist p rogram m e: L en in was at first highly suspicious o f its activities, and gave the Soviet his approval on ly after lon g hesitation, w h en he con vin ced h im self that there was nothing he cou ld do about T r o tsk y ’ s and H e lp h a n d ’ s leading roles on the council. T h e attitude to the Soviet o f the M ensh evik leaders, M artov and P otresov, was cleverer than that o f the B olsheviks. Instead o f behaving

w ith L e n in ’ s

grave

reserve,

they accepted the

The Merchant o f Revolution

situation, and then proceeded to invite H elphand and T rotsky to take part in the foundation o f their newspaper, to the illegal

Nachalo, successor

Iskra. T h e two friends accepted the invitation in

principle, but put forward their own conditions. T h e y insisted that their contributions should not be subject to any form o f editorial control; they wanted to be able to express their opinions freely, without regard to the political line o f the party faction. Martov and Potresov agreed in the end. T h e y did not know, at the time, how m uch they were giving away. Both H elphand and Trotsky made unlimited and ruthless use o f their freedom : they turned the

Nachalo into a militant anti-liberal organ. T h e M en

sheviks, on the other hand, pursued the policy o f alliance with the liberals; they found themselves in an invidious position, in which they had to connive, as one o f them put it, at ‘propaganda for a rather risky idea’ , w hich ran directly counter to their own views. T h e activities o f the two friends, H elphand and Trotsky, were perfectly complementary. A t the age o f tw enty-six, Trotsky became the favourite o f the crowds. H is talent as an orator o f intense passion, his ability to persuade, gave him decisive sway over the Soviet. It was not Krustalev-Nostar, a dull lawyer who happened to be the president o f the workers’ council, but T r o t sky, who directed its work. Parvus, on the other hand, remained more in the background: in terms o f influence, however, his own position equalled that o f T rotsky. H e controlled an immensely influential publicity apparatus, and he shaped the opinion o f the Soviet by his frequent pronouncements on points o f programme. In a leading article in the very first number o f the Menshevik

Nachalo, H elphand made a lucid statement on the future course o f the revolution. H e entirely disregarded the objections raised by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and insisted again on the necessity for a provisional workers’ government, and for the establishment o f a workers’ democracy. A s the leaders o f the revolution, the workers had every right to make their ow n de mands. H elphand again stressed that the introduction o f the eight-hour day, guaranteed by law, should become the central aim o f proletarian tactics. But only now did H elphand make it clear that he did not regard the Russian revolution as an event

III. Helphand and Deutsch {centre, to left o f guards) on the way to exile m Siberia,

1906

Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna

IV Rosa Luxemburg

St. Petersburg, 1905

completely isolated from the class struggle in western Europe; he forged another link in his chain o f thought. Russia, though an industrially under-developed country, formed a part o f the world market, which, as a whole, was ripe for socialism. And since capitalism formed a global unit, the revolution in Russia was bound to have a world-wide effect. The workers o f St. Peters burg would therefore become the spearhead o f a social world revolution. T he demand for the eight-hour day was the spark which would set the whole o f Europe aflame. For more than a decade, the German party had generated an intense agitation in precisely the same direction; the achievement, by the Russian workers, o f this demand would become the signal for a revolt in Germany. T he fight for the eight-hour day, aimed against absolutism as much as against liberalism, Helphand regarded as the testing-ground o f a genuinely working-class policy, which would also become the first step towards a socialist world revolution. Many years later, Helphand accurately described his inten tions during the revolutionary weeks o f 1905, in the following way: My tactics during the revolution, in the year 1905 in Russia, were based on the following point o f departure: to pave the way for the revolu tionary energy o f the proletariat in the west. Although I knew very well that socialism could not be achieved in Russia at the time, it was clear to me that a victorious revolution, supported by the working masses, would have to give the proletariat power, and I demanded that the proletariat should use this power in the interests o f the introduction o f a workers5 democracy. A n d if the talk should come round to the estab lishment o f a bourgeois parliamentary system in Russia only’ , I told my Russian friends, then I would have quietly remained in Germany, where this parliamentary system had already a rather long history behind it.6

Indeed, early in November, it looked as if the workers might succeed in achieving a decisive political break-through. T he Tsar was cautiously avoiding an open trial o f strength with the Soviet; The middle class, in so far as it was politically active, declared Im Kam pf urn die Wahrheit, pp. 9-10. M.r. - g

The Merchant o f Revolution

its solidarity with the workers’ demands for a democratic and constitutional order. Some o f the industrialists in St. Petersburg even paid the wages o f the workers on strike, to encourage them to carry on the struggle. Following an order by the Soviet, St. Petersburg editors no longer sent their newspapers for inspection by the Imperial censor. The Russians had never experienced so much freedom in their history. The socialist leaders clearly enjoyed the power that had fallen, quite unexpectedly, into their hands. For a few weeks, men who had previously borne the hardships and ignominy o f exile, banish ment, or imprisonment, were able to act as the representatives o f a new Russia. Not all o f them assumed their new role lightly. Lenin found it especially difficult to abandon the hazards, as well as the anonymous security, o f illegal underground work, and to venture into the harsh light o f public activity. Helphand and Trotsky, on the other hand, were in their element. From the assembly rooms o f the Soviet, at the Technological Institute, they rushed to their editorial offices, from party meetings they hurried to the political salons, where they monopolized all interest. They stood head and shoulders above the crowd. They were the men o f the day, well known and respected. Helphand was in a state o f permanent elation. The prospect o f victory stimulated him to boundless activity. Outside his political interests, he found time to take enthusiastic pleasure in the cultural life o f the capital. On one occasion he bought fifty tickets for a satirical revue, which he had greatly enjoyed. But he was denied the pleasure o f passing them on to his friends; the policemen who arrested him could make no sense o f their curious find in one o f Helphand’s pockets. Trotsky, who told the story in his reminiscences, added: ‘ They did not know that Parvus did everything on a large scale.’ Helphand bought the theatre tickets with the payment he had received for a collected Russian edition o f his theoretical writings: ever since his arrival in St. Petersburg, he had taken great care over the arrangements for this book. He knew that it would strengthen his position in the Russian socialist movement, and he may well have hoped that, in the political circumstances, the publication might bring him a good profit. It was easy to find a

St. Petersburg , 1905

publisher; but the collection o f his studies, which had appeared in many German newspapers over the years, presented a more difficult problem. It took Helphand some time to solve it. In the end he wrote to Motteler, one o f the senior members o f the German party, who had earned for himself the nickname the 4red postmaster’ by efficiently organizing, in the eighteen-eighties, the smuggling o f illegal socialist literature from Switzerland into Germany. Motteler found the articles, and sent them to Helphand’ s publisher in St. Petersburg. Early in 1906, two volumes o f selected studies by Helphand appeared, under the title ‘Russia and the Revolution’ .7 They contained his most important articles from Iskra, as well as studies from Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung and Neue Z eit: the reprinting o f them impressively proved Helphand’ s originality as a prolific socialist writer. Nevertheless, before the two volumes were published, the sands o f the revolution had started to run out. It seems very likely that the intensive publicity for the eight-hour day, con ducted by Helphand and Trotsky, made a large contribution to the difficulties that the revolutionary leaders now faced. T he demand had o f course been made before the two friends launched their campaign; they, however, had raised it to the focal point o f the revolutionary programme. Nothing else could have appealed so greatly to the imagination o f the workers in 1905. On 8 November, several working-class districts in St. Petersburg made an attempt, on their own initiative, to introduce the eight-hour day. T w o days later, workers employed in heavy industry made the same demand. The Soviet then passed a resolution, by acclaim, to the same effect. Against the opposition o f the Mensheviks, and despite the numerical weakness o f the proletariat, Helphand and Trotsky pursued the policy— implied in the campaign for the eight-hour day— o f separation o f the workers from the liberal opposition. Their ultimate aim was the achievement o f power, at least tem porarily, in the state; their instrument was the general strike. The middle class reacted promptly. T he unilateral introduction o f the eight-hour day occasioned a sharp clash between the bourgeoisie R ossiya i revolyutsiya

and

V riadakh germ anskoe sotsia l-d em ok ra tii ,

St. Petersburg, 19 0 6 .

The Merchant o f Revolution

and the workers’ movement. The industrialists replied to the great strike on 20 November by locking out some 100,000 workers. The policy o f the Soviet, now clearly directed both against the Government and against the bourgeoisie, led to the ultimate trial o f strength. Both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks feared that the workers might become politically isolated, and they advocated moderation. For Helphand and Trotsky, on the other hand, the growing pressure exerted by the middle class against the policies o f the Soviet, was a certain sign that the bourgeoisie was about to betray the revolution. Instead o f avoiding an overestimate o f the forces at their disposal, and then countering the middle-class opposition in a less rigid manner, Helphand and Trotsky con tinued with their policy o f further intensification o f the class struggle. They contemptuously dismissed the proposal, published in the liberal newspaper Rus, that the representatives o f the Soviet as well as o f the liberal parties should form a revolutionary government. They were convinced that for the ‘ stoppage o f production in the whole country the proletariat was not depen dent on the support o f the bourgeoisie’ , and that they could therefore afford to turn down the offer o f a coalition: at this point in the revolution, the possibility o f political co-operation no longer existed. They believed that victory could be achieved by rapid advance, rather than by entrenchment. At the same time, the two friends looked beyond Russia, towards the socialist parties o f western Europe, which would follow Russia’ s example, and which would make it possible for the Russian proletariat ‘ to stretch a permanent revolutionary chain between the immediate and the final aims’ .8 It became quite obvious, early in December 1905, to what extent Parvus and Trotsky were misled by their own calculations. They overestimated the revolutionary preparedness o f western Europe as much as they underestimated the ability o f the coali tion between the middle class and the Tsarist system to strike back. They had overlooked the fact that the insignificance o f the Russian provincial towns, as well as the political ignorance o f the muzhiki, did not necessarily favour the revolutionaries. An army 8 Trotsky in Nachalo, No. io.

St. Petersburg, 1 90 5

o f peasants knew no difference between a foreign enemy and their own people, once the orders to shoot were given: this factor Helphand and Trotsky had entirely neglected. St. Petersburg was not the whole o f Russia, and despite support from Moscow and some industrial towns in the provinces, the revolutionary movement did not succeed in severely disrupting the administra tion o f the state. By the beginning o f December, the days o f freedom were definitely numbered. On 5 December, Count Witte’ s Govern ment resolved to embark on a trial o f strength with the Soviet: Krustalev-Nostar, its president, and several other members o f its executive committee were arrested. T he Soviet— having elected Trotsky as its new president— was no longer capable o f counter ing force by force. T he weapon o f the mass strike was fast becom ing blunt, and it could not be used indiscriminately. Instead, the Soviet chose the method o f passive resistance. In the meantime, the Peasants’ Union proposed to the Soviet that it should support the Union’ s declaration for a tax strike, and for a withdrawal o f all deposits from the banks. The Soviet set up its own commission, which was to supplement the sugges tions o f the Union and to produce a general protest against the Government. Helphand was entrusted with the preparation o f the first draft; after consultations by the special commission o f the Soviet, a financial manifesto was distributed, on 14 December, to St. Petersburg newspapers. In popular language— it revealed Helphand’ s authorship— the manifesto fiercely attacked the financial abuses current in Tsarist Russia. T he Tsar was obstructing the convocation o f the con stitutional assembly, it was pointed out, because he feared any outside control o f the state. By cooking accounts and by foreign loans, the Government was robbing the nation and hindering the free development o f trade, industry, and transport. There was only one way o u t: to deprive the Government o f its income, and to overthrow Tsarism. T he manifesto ordered the following measures: ‘ T he payments o f amortization as well as all payments to the state are to be refused. In all business transactions, as well as the payment o f wages and salaries, gold must be demanded, and sums under five roubles [must be paid] in ringing coin o f full

The Merchant o f Revolution

weight. All deposits are to be withdrawn from the savings banks and from the state bank, and the payment o f the whole sum should be in gold. The people have never given the government either confidence or full powers. At the present moment the government treats its own country as an occupied territory. We therefore resolve that the debts the government incurred in the course o f its open and ruthless war on the people will not be repaid.’ 9 On the following day— 15 December— the manifesto was pub lished by all the important socialist and liberal newspapers in St. Petersburg. They were all confiscated, and the members o f the Soviet were arrested. The Government launched an all-out attack on the workers’ council; its last session ended in the cells o f the Saints Peter and Paul Fortress. By chance, Helphand avoided arrest that day: he was away from the chamber when the police broke in. He was by no means ready to give up the fight. The formation o f a new cadre o f leaders was essential, and Helphand at once set to work. Under the most difficult circumstances he succeeded in bringing together the second Soviet. It was an improvised body, consisting o f 200, instead o f the original 400, members; the full number met only on one occasion. The actual work was carried out by the executive committee; Viktor Semenon, Boris Goldman, Timofei Smirnov, and Eugenii Frenkel were its leading lights, and Helphand its president. As a spectacle, with continuous ovations, revolutionary songs, and other shows o f high-spirited enthusiasm, this assembly could not compete with the first Soviet. The Tsarist Government had no intention whatever o f prolonging the agony o f the revolution. The Soviet was forced to operate underground, with very limited means at its disposal. Its original organ, Izvestia, appeared twice only, in time to inform its readers o f the formation o f the second Soviet. Severnyi Golos, successor to both Nachalo and Novaya Zhizn, could also be published only twice before it was con fiscated. A further attempt to re-establish contact with the workers — it took the form this time o f the Nash Golos— did not succeed either. In addition, the Soviet was short o f money. The coffers 9 P.Gorin, Ocherkipoistoriisovetovrabotchikhdelegatovv 19 0 5 , 2nded., Moscow, 1930,p. 363.

St. Petersburg, 1905

were empty, and it was impossible to ask the workers to make any more sacrifices. Lev Deutsch, the past-master o f escape, offered to visit western European capitals in order to collect some funds. He did not get very far. Berlin was his first stop, and it was there that he received the news that the striking workers were beyond help. He returned to St. Petersburg, resigned, with a ‘ few thousand roubles’ .10 In spite o f these difficulties, the executive committee decided to declare, on 20 December, a protest strike against the arrest o f the original Soviet. T he proclamation o f the strike was addressed to ‘ the whole nation’ : ‘ Citizens! Freedom or slavery, a Russia ruled by the nation, or a Russia plundered by a band o f robbers. That is the question. . . . It is nobler to die fighting than to live in slavery.’ 11 The opening stages o f the strike seemed full o f promise. Some 83,000 workers came out on strike in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and thirty-two provincial towns that followed suit. Yet the weaknesses o f the cause soon became evident. T he workers were exhausted, and they had had enough o f strikes: they had come out three times within nine weeks. And economic measures alone were no longer sufficient in face o f the armed might o f the state. T he situation appeared to Helphand to demand an armed uprising, a brutal civil war for power in the state. After four or five days the strikers in most o f the provincial towns ran into trouble; only in Moscow, under Bolshevik leader ship, the first street fights were taking place. In the meantime, the executive committee in St. Petersburg was conducting an embittered debate about the tactics o f the revolution. Helphand made an impassioned plea for an armed uprising. But the Soviet had no arms at its disposal, it had no military experience, and its president developed fantastic plans as to the ways in which this difficulty could be overcome. He intended to disarm the police by using water-hoses; the morale o f the army was to be under mined by propaganda, and the troops were to take the side o f the workers.

Helphand was spinning revolutionary dreams; he was fast Deutsch, Viermal entflohen, Stuttgart, 1907, p. 117 .

1 Gorin, op. cit., p. 375.

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losing contact with political realities. This was accompanied by a sharp decline in his authority on the executive committee o f the Soviet. He was incapable o f taking the place o f Trotsky. The members o f the committee came to regard Helphand as a confused theorist, an ineffective intellectual. He was unable to convince and inspire. He possessed none o f the charismatic qualities o f a great leader: he had a good deal o f self-confidence, but he was unable to inspire confidence in others. After a long discussion the committee agreed, in principle, to his proposal for an armed uprising. In the present situation, however, it could not be carried out, and the committee also resolved to break off the strike on 1 January. Yet another pro clamation informed the workers that the disruptive economic strike was no longer adequate for this phase o f the revolution. They were further instructed to arm themselves for an uprising, and to prepare for the future struggle. Helphand, who knew that the workers in Moscow were still fighting on the barricades, registered his protest against the resolution, and resigned his office in the Soviet. He decided that his place was not in the chair on a committee, but at a desk in a newspaper office, and he made the decision at the right time. While Helphand was trying to produce another newspaper, the executive committee o f the second Soviet was arrested, on 16 January. Once again, chance helped him to escape arrest. What Helphand, however, did not know, was that important material had fallen into the hands o f the police when the Soviet was arrested. The security officials were able to establish the details o f his work on the executive committee. His name was put on the list o f wanted men.12 Helphand nevertheless suc ceeded in living underground until the beginning o f April 1906. He then produced a pamphlet, which somehow escaped the censor’ s attention, entitled ‘ The Present Political Situation and the Prospects for the Future’ .13 In it, Helphand attempted to draw up a balance-sheet o f the revolution. He anticipated a criticism which was yet to be made— that he 12 Police report of 8 Ju ly 1906, in 19 0 5 god v Peterburge, Moscow and Leningrad, 1925, pp. 159 -6 1. 13 Nastoiashtshee politicheskoe polozhonie i vidy budushchee’, reprinted in Rossiya i revolyutsiya, pp. 212-25.

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and Trotsky, by their agitation for the eight-hour day, had led the revolution into a blind alley— and he insisted that sooner or later an armed clash with the Government was inevitable. He added that the workers themselves had indicated the rhythm o f the movement, and that the Soviet had then assumed the leading role: ‘ W e were nothing but the strings o f a harp, on which the storm o f the revolution played. . . . Whether or not we . . . had made mistakes, one thing is certain: the attacks by the government were not aimed at us because o f our real or imaginary mistakes, but because o f the strength and decisiveness that was our own.’ Helphand wrote o f the Soviet in terms o f the highest praise. The fact that it had not formally adopted a socialist programme appeared to him especially remarkable. It united the workers not through agitation but by practical work, and, in the same way, it acquainted them with the aims o f socialism. T he Soviets were not, for Helphand, a thing o f the past: they would have to be used in the future, since ‘in the St. Petersburg Soviet an organization came into being which worked not only destructively, but also constructively. One felt here, that a force was being created and developed which would be capable o f undertaking the recon struction o f the state.’ With prophetic insight, Helphand hinted at a possibility which, eleven years later, was put into practice by Lenin, but with a difference: in 1917 the Soviet did not ‘reconstruct’ the state— it completely replaced the old machinery. Nor did Helphand have any intention o f substituting the national assembly by the Soviets: workers’ councils inside a workers’ democracy were part o f his idea o f the future. By 1917, Lenin had acquired a keener understanding o f the realities o f political pow er: he, and not Helphand, put the revolutionary ideas into practice. And then the police finally caught up with Helphand; he was arrested early in the morning o f 3 April 1906. He was now on the way to becoming a fully-fledged Russian revolutionary; most o f his friends had been arrested at least once. Imprisonment— a term o f ‘ sitting’ in jail— or banishment to Siberia were integral parts o f the experience o f several generations o f rebels against the Tsarist State. It was their school, their social club, even a kind o f

The Merchant o f Revolution

holiday. Though the prisons were often unpleasant, and the demoralizing effect o f banishment deep, their standards can hardly be compared with those developed later in the century, with the organized brutality o f the great modern totalitarian states against their citizens. In prison, Trotsky was able to write some o f his most ruthless indictments o f Tsarism; during his banishment to Siberia, Lenin went out shooting ducks; Lev Deutsch simply left when he got tired o f captivity. After his escape from Russia, Helphand proudly carried with him a picture o f himself, together with Trotsky and Deutsch. It could have been taken by a fashionable photographer in St. Petersburg. T he three friends all looked well, respectable in their dark suits and stiff collars above the rich cravats, completely selfassured. The picture was in fact taken in a Tsarist prison, with a warder in attendance. On the day o f his arrest, Helphand was brought from his hiding-place to the local police station; the long, untidy room was heated by a large tile oven. A servant was tending it, stuffing piles o f tightly packed paper on to the grate: Helphand realized that copies o f a revolutionary pamphlet, written by a friend o f his, were keeping him warm.14 Some time after lunch, which was obligingly fetched for him by a policeman, Helphand was trans ferred to a prison. And on the way there, an illuminating incident occurred. He was locked up in a carriage which, in his own words, was ‘ not without claims to elegance’ , but which was battered, dirty, with torn upholstery: the kind o f carriage used for ‘ third-class funerals’ . He was accompanied by one guard only, and he con templated escape. He realized that he would have to overpower the guard, knock him out, perhaps even kill him. Helphand’ s inusings suggest that he did not feel his situation to be desperate. He was, after all, not a murderer but a writer, and he cautioned himself: ‘ Be careful, this is not a newspaper article you are writing, you are playing with a human life!’ He did nothing, chatted with the guard, and, after a while, they both arrived 14 Parvus, In der russischen Bastille wahrend der Revolution, Dresden, 1907. This part of the chapter is mainly founded on Helphand’s only detailed autobiographical fragment, based on a diary he kept during his imprisonment.

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safely at the Cross Prison. It was in the Viborg quarter o f St. Petersburg and contained a thousand individual cells. No. 902 was a pleasant place in most respects, rather like a room in a comfortable provincial hotel. There was electric light there, and central heating, but no plumbing o f any kind. In a corner o f the cell stood the inevitable parasha, a bucket half filled with water, and a source o f discomfort, especially in the summer months, to the inmates. An icon was hanging in the corner, diametrically opposite to the parasha; above the table there was a list o f rules and regulations, and, on the reverse side, a price-list o f the articles that prisoners could purchase at their own expense. Its longest section, which gave a good choice o f chocolates and sweets, bore witness to the fact that the establish ment was often visited by members o f the younger set o f the Russian intelligentsia. There was a good library in the prison, and Helphand soon started to w rite: it gave him rare pleasure ‘ not to have to synchronize the tempo o f thinking with the pace o f the printing presses’ . The first interrogations were concerned with Helphand’ s identity; no formal accusation was made. Helphand produced his forged Austro-Hungarian passport, this time in the name o f Karl Wawerk. It was no use: from their agents’ reports, and from the papers confiscated on the occasion o f the arrest o f the Soviet, the police knew that they had the right man. The days o f Easter 1906 were the last Helphand spent at the comfortable Cross Prison. He was woken up one night by the chime o f bells; the light in his cell was on. T he warder stood at the door, and he brought the prisoner the traditional offerings o f the Russian Orthodox Easter: coloured eggs, white bread, milk curd with raisins. Helphand realized that the festivities had reached their point o f culmination. T he Easter greeting set o ff a characteristic chain o f thought in Helphand’ s mind. ‘ Christ has arisen! T he Redeemer has left this world o f martyrdom and tears. Himself steeped in pain, He forgave every body. Yes, so it should have been. So it was at the time when the pnests o f the Christian church were themselves persecuted and thrown into prisons, as we are now. That was at the time when they shared their board and lodgings with the poor. Christ has

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arisen. They are now singing in fat voices, thinking o f the drinks and hams waiting for them at home.’ 15 Soon after Easter, Helphand was transferred, together with Trotsky, to the ill-famed prison in the Saints Peter and Paul Fortress. It was a change for the worse after Cross Prison. The cells were cold, without ventilation, and badly lit; for the first time since his arrest, Helphand had to change into regulation uniform. Built in 1747, the Fortress was one o f the oldest o f the official buildings in the capital; although it contained the Imperial Mint and the tombs o f the Romanov Tsars within its walls, it was best known as a prison for the elite o f the political offenders. Chernyshevski, Bakunin, and many other illustrious names o f the Russian revolutionary movement had been its inmates before Helphand and Trotsky. The prison was difficult to endure not because o f the in humanity o f the warders— there was very little o f it— but because its inmates were kept in strict solitary confinement. Selfdisciplined men like Trotsky easily came to terms with the imposed solitude. When he left the ‘ hermetically sealed cell’ , he did so with a tinge o f regret. ‘ It was so quiet there, so eventless, so perfect for intellectual work.’ He soon transformed the room into a monastic cell; it was rather untidy, full o f manuscripts and books. It was here that Trotsky worked out the first draft o f his theory o f permanent revolution. Helphand, on the contrary, could not endure the new prison; the feeling o f oppressive isolation from the outside world fell on him as soon as he had said good-bye to Trotsky, before entering his cell. In the tomb-like peace, Helphand had to fall back on his own resources, and he found them lacking. He relapsed into selfpity, dreams, sentimentality; he thought o f himself as a helpless victim o f Tsarist brutality. He paced up and down the cell like a wild animal, counting the minutes and the hours, trying to nourish illusions o f a political amnesty which would bring him back to the world o f the living. Self-analysis did not help: on the contrary, Helphand came to resent his fate bitterly. His former life in Europe, the adventures and the hectic activity, had left their mark, and they made it impossible for Helphand to 15 ibid., p. 40.

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remain satisfied with his own company. Hell for him was solitude. The best he could do was to keep a pathetic diary, in which he registered his moods and impressions. His life was shaken down into a new pattern: it was later described, fittingly, as ‘parvocentric’ . Early in May his spirit began to break. T he lack o f air, o f light, o f physical and mental exercise brought him to the brink o f madness. He made frequent attempts to improve the conditions o f his imprisonment, and his efforts resulted in a number o f clashes with the prison administration. He believed that the authorities were open to persuasion by rational means, and he expended a lot o f nervous energy in this way; an experienced revolutionary would have known better. Only after some three months’ solitary confinement, his position somewhat improved. Books were issued three times a week; letters were handed out, and there was a twenty-minute walk every day. Helphand was finally able to overcome the crisis o f the last weeks. He was convinced that he would be tried together with the other members o f the Soviet, and he energetically started to make preparations for his defence. He knew that political trials could be used for the purposes o f political propaganda; he would turn the tables on the prosecution, and convert the accusations against himself into an accusation o f the Tsarist regime. W hen he wrote his speech, he constantly thought o f its effect outside the court room. In drafting the speech for his defence Helphand was much more cautious than Trotsky, who made no attempt to dispute the accusation that the Soviet had been preparing an armed uprising, a forcible overthrow o f the established order. Helphand hinted repeatedly at the rift between the Government and the people: there was no cohesion, no unanimity between them; then came the clash in October 1905; even after the publication o f the Imperial Manifesto on 31 October, conceding the Russian people certain constitutional rights, there existed, in Helphand’ s words, no government, but only abuses o f government’ .16 T he people therefore regarded the Soviet as their own representative body: it never prepared an armed uprising. For reasons o f 16 Parvus, op. cit., p. 112 .

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self-protection— against the mob, the reactionary Black Hun dreds organization, the Cossacks, the police, the army— the workers needed arms, and they were resolved to acquire them. But they in fact never did. ‘ I will tell you where these arms were,’ wrote Helphand, ‘ they were in the barracks, in the hands o f the troops. The reactionary government had on its side the rifles, but the workers wanted to win influence over the minds that controlled these rifles. They wanted to convince the soldiers to defend, side by side with them, those political demands which I have mentioned many times in the course o f my speech.’ 17 Helphand was, however, unable to complete the draft. At the end o f July, the leaders o f the Soviet were transferred to a civil prison for interrogation. Although he had succeeded in smuggling his manuscripts out o f the fortress, he could no longer find an opportunity to carry on his work. There was a good deal o f activity going on in the prison, and he was glad to see his friends again: his concern with the forthcoming trial abated. Lev Deutsch was there, and with him, Helphand made the first plans to escape. T he fact that they came to nothing did not much depress the two conspirators. The doors o f the cells were locked only at night, and in the day-time, the prisoners could move about freely. And there was distraction from the outside: Rosa Luxem burg, who had taken part in the revolution in Warsaw, and who had just been released from prison there, visited her friends in St. Petersburg. She reported to Kautsky that ‘ the fat one has lost weight, but he is full o f energy and zest’ .18 In the meantime, the Government decided not to prosecute the members o f the second Soviet: the honour o f a public trial was granted only to the leaders o f the first. Helphand was not given an opportunity o f delivering his defence speech; he received an administrative sentence only. It was not very stiff: three years’ banishment in Siberia. He was not very proud o f it, and did not mention it in the account, published in the following year in Dresden, o f his imprisonment. He probably regarded three years 17 ibid., p. 128. 18 A letter from Rosa Luxemburg to K arl Kautsky, 13 August 1906, in ‘Einige Briefe Rosa Luxemburgs und andere Dokumente’, Bulletin o f the International Institute o f Social History , Amsterdam, 1952, No. 1, pp. 9-39.

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in Siberia as an inadequate reward for the role he had played in the revolution. On 4 September 1906, the adventurous trip to Siberia began. The party, which left St. Petersburg that morning under military supervision, was a colourful one. Apart from a small group o f the ‘politicals’— among them, Helphand and Deutsch— it consisted o f some fifty criminal prisoners; Turuchansk, in the Yenisei province near the Arctic circle, was their destination. Helphand was glad he had Deutsch with him; he could hardly have a better companion. T hey were both well provided with the means for escape: concealed in their small bundles o f linen there were glazier’ s diamonds, forged passports, addresses o f local party agents and, above all, enough ready cash. They had no intention o f accompanying their party very far. They stopped at Krasnoyarsk, where they were supposed to board a steamer, which would take them down the River Yenisey. Here, Deutsch went on a shopping expedition, from which he never returned. Helphand had to wait a few days before he succeeded in escaping; by then, the party had already passed the town Yenisey, far in the north. He plied the guards with drinks, and only when they were well past caring, Helphand and some other o f his comrades took their leave. Guided by a local peasant, they made their way, across the deserted, desolate taiga, back to Krasnoyarsk. T he local station o f the Trans-Siberian Railway was heavily guarded; a friend bought a ticket for Helphand, who then boarded the train disguised as a muzhik. He o f course travelled third class, and in order to remain undetected— there was an armed guard on the train— he had to mix with the peasants. He was safe with them, but nauseated. He shared not only their vodka but also their dirt and their smell; direct contact with the people was no source o f inspiration for Helphand. After he had got through the most heavily guarded territory, he changed at the house o f some friends. As a respectable gentleman in a second-class carriage, Helphand returned to St. Petersburg. Instead o f a hiding-place, he moved into a hotel. Although he was using a forged passport, the police did not let him rest in peace. A comrade warned him in time; he could not return to his hotel, and he left the capital

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without his luggage. His stay in Russia was becoming too perilous for his liking. At the beginning o f November, carrying only a brief-case crammed with manuscripts, he crossed the frontier into Germany. He never returned to the country o f his birth.

Strategist without an Army Despite the high expectations o f many socialists, especially those who took part in the events in St. Petersburg, the shock-wave o f the Russian revolution did not travel far west wards. T he underground rumble in the east evoked hopes and fears, but not a revolutionary mood. Instead o f fighting on the barricades, the peoples o f Germany and Austria-Hungary chose their new parliamentary representatives. T he election campaign in Germany began to warm up early in the winter o f 1906. It became fierce, and revolved around the crisis inside the group o f the middle-class parties, leaving the Social Democrats undisturbed to increase their growing strength. Colonial policy, and a trial o f strength between Bernhard von Biilow, the Reich Chancellor, and the Catholic Centre Party, proved the most absorbing sub jects in Germany’ s politics. The Social Democrats were allotted an unrewarding role in the campaign. T he party would not and could not come to an agreement with the middle-class Centre; the quarrel inside the bourgeois camp concerning colonial policy, compelled the socialists to face certain problems for which Marxist theory offered no unambiguous solution. Should the party simply oppose colonial expansion? Were all these activities outside Europe nothing but a reactionary adventure? Could socialism offer an alternative policy, incorporating the demands o f class struggle? The party executive was disinclined to give a clear answer to any o f these questions. It meticulously avoided pro nouncements on the major foreign themes. Hesitation and confusion as to the aims o f the party were the result. The workers in its local organizations were on their own, having to develop, as best they could, a policy suited to the regional cir cumstances. m .r. - h

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Helphand returned to Germany at the right time. T he political excitement was entirely to his liking, and he continued his trip from the frontier to the Ruhrgebiet. It was a brave decision. In the Ruhr territory Helphand was under Prussian legislation, and he would have been unlikely to have got away with a short term o f imprisonment had he been caught in the act o f a ‘breach o f banishment’ . The German Government was at that time extra diting Russian revolutionaries, and he might well have found himself on his way to Siberia for the second time. In Dortmund, Helphand’ s friend Konrad Haenisch, as the editor o f the Dortmunder Arbeiterzeitung, carried the main burden o f the election campaign in the west o f Germany. Haenisch was the son o f a Prussian civil servant: an unusual background for a left-wing socialist. He came into contact with the movement as a young student; his family retaliated, and, to cure him o f his political convictions, had him confined to a lunatic asylum. After his release, young Haenisch at first worked on the distribution side o f the Leipziger Volkszeitung, and then as an assistant in the editorial office o f the same newspaper. Paul Lensch, Rosa Luxemburg, and Franz Mehring guided his first steps in socialist journalism. In the middle o f the eighteen-nineties, at the height o f the agrarian debate, he met Helphand for the first time. A young man o f an inflammable, yet extremely obstinate temper, he took Helphand’s side in such a violent manner that his comrades in Leipzig nicknamed him ‘ Parvulus’ . He never lost his pride in the name. After the turn o f the century, Haenisch moved to Dortmund, where he stayed until 1910, editing the local socialist newspaper. His comrades regarded Haenisch as a militant partisan o f the left-wing group around Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg. Haenisch, with his heavy, stocky figure, his flaming red beard, his vitality, added to their policy a good dose o f revolutionary romanticism o f his own. As a prodigal son o f the middle class, he found the greatest satisfaction in parading before the bourgeoisie its grave digger— the proletariat. On a dull day in the middle o f December, Haenisch found a brief note on the desk at his office. It read: ‘Dear Haenisch, I will look you up soon. I f any letters arrive for Peter Klein, they are

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for me. See you soon. But please— discretion at all costs. Yours ever, Peter.’ 1 Haenisch had no doubt as to who this Peter Klein in fact was. A few days later, Helphand arrived in Dortmund; he had with him nothing but an old brief-case. Haenisch was glad to see his friend unchanged: he was confident and energetic, his imprison ment in Russia had left no mark on him. W hen Haenisch asked how he had survived the time in the lion’ s den, Helphand replied modestly: ‘ It’ s not really worth talking about.’ But he could not resist adding, perhaps to keep up his own courage, perhaps to please his friend: ‘ But the fact that in the prison, during the journey, and on the flight I did not waste a single day without working hard for the good o f the party, o f that I am really proud.’ 2 He was prepared to work hard again, this time in Germany. He told his friend straight away that he came to Dortmund to help him with the election campaign, and that he needed a refuge, safe from the police. Haenisch was glad to do his friend a favour. He was very busy on the newspaper, and he was happy to have a man o f Helphand’ s standing to work with him. He told only two o f his closest assistants that Helphand was staying in his flat; during this time, Haenisch got to know his friend better and to like him more. Helphand got on very well with Haenisch’s children, and he derived as much pleasure as they did from buying them presents. He obviously enjoyed other people’ s children more than his own. He was o f course unable to do his work for the Arbeiterzeitung publicly; his contributions appeared unsigned. For eight weeks Helphand lectured his comrades on the problems o f home and o f foreign policy. Billow and the Centre Party, which was particu larly well entrenched in the Catholic Rheinland-Westfalen, were to be fought with their own weapons. In order to put down his ideas on the ‘ Hottentot elections’ in a longer study, Helphand retired to a boarding-house near Diisseldorf. Early in 1907, the pamphlet was ready for the printers. But the Reichstag Elections and the Working Class3 appeared too late to affect socialist agitation at the federal level. T he party was bitterly disappointed 1 K . Haenisch, Parvus , p. 24.

2 ibid., p. 25.

P ie Reichstagwahlen und die Arbeiterschaft.

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with the election returns. Although more people had in fact voted socialist, it lost a number o f mandates because o f an unfavourable division o f constituencies. The socialists had won an empty victory: they had gained votes, but lost political influence. Even after the elections, the problem o f colonial policy appeared, to Helphand, still important enough to be examined in detail. The election pamphlet made enough money for a fort night’ s holiday on the Lago di Guarda in North Italy. Helphand needed the peace the hotel room provided, and his work made rapid progress. After the nerve-racking months in Russia, and after the excitement o f the German elections, he greatly ap preciated the opportunity to record, unhurriedly and without any kind o f pressure, his thoughts. The satisfaction he had failed to achieve as a practical politician, he was now able to derive from his writing. His interest in colonial policy dated back to the eighteennineties ; he was one o f the first socialists to have recognized the fundamental importance o f the problem. He had followed the moves o f the Great Powers in this field with interest, and had repeatedly accused the party o f overlooking the importance o f colonial expansion, thus giving the Government a dangerous freedom o f action. On these foundations, he now resumed the construction o f his theories. He intended to survey the situation o f the world market, and to produce, at the same time, a blue print for a socialist foreign policy. The study published at the end o f the year 1907, and entitled Colonial Policy and the Breakdown,4 was a pioneer analysis o f modern imperialism. In sharp contrast to the later works o f R udolf Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg, who concerned them selves mainly with the economic causes o f colonial expansion, Parvus was mainly interested in its political aftermath. The hostilities that might lead to a war, rather than the capitalist contradictions that forced the Great Powers to expand overseas, formed the hard core o f Helphand’ s thinking. The connexion between the protective customs barriers and colonialism, Helphand regarded as the most dangerous element 4 D ie Kolonialpolitik und der Zusammenbruch,

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o f capitalist foreign policy. T he erection o f customs barriers occasioned a movement o f capital out o f the home countries; at the same time, however, the barriers were extended into colonial territories. ‘An industrial state together with a colonial empire’ , was the imperialist entity which resulted from this process.5 Nevertheless, Helphand did not regard imperialism— in contrast to the opinions o f many o f the later explorers o f this territory, Lenin and Radek among them— as the inevitable con sequence o f the capitalist economic order. He looked on pro tectionism as a freely chosen restriction, a ‘premium for retreat’ , an adequate illustration o f the political blindness o f the middle class. It was, Helphand thought, to everybody’s disadvantage that the unity o f the world market was in the process o f being disrupted by the rival colonial empires. And this was, for Helphand, the high road to an international cataclysm: ‘ I f trade policy is replaced by colonial policy, this is the way to political breakdown.’ As to Germany’ s position, Helphand expressed his concern with the fact that, in the course o f expansion in Africa and Asia, the Berlin Government was bound to encounter the hostility o f Britain and Japan. In such a situation, an alliance with Russia was the only way out for Germany. And against the ‘Russian orientation’ Helphand trained his heaviest guns. Tsarist Russia, ‘ the cornerstone o f monarchist violence for the whole o f Europe’ , would not be able to resist internal political pressures; it would collapse in the near future. I f it came to an imperialist conflict, Germany would be fatally isolated. Helphand added, with pro phetic foresight, that Britain would then become Germany’s most dangerous enemy. Helphand offered an antidote to this catastrophic development, a development which would benefit neither capitalism nor socialism. He advocated free trade, which would keep the world market open for everybody. T he Social Democrat party should conduct, he suggested, its future agitation under the slogans o f ‘ Democracy, the unification o f Europe, free trade’ .6 T he pro gramme would make it possible for the party to take the initiative m the field o f foreign policy. 5 ibid., p. 97.

6 ibid., p. 30.

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In these conclusions, Helphand returned to his old tasks. He saw himself as the grand strategist, destined to make the German socialists take up the offensive. But neither encouragement nor arguments could change the customary attitudes o f the party leaders. They had built their entrenchment, and no power on earth could move them to advance into the open battlefield. Once again he was reduced to the rank o f an outsider, o f a theorist without influence; he was sharply reminded that his absence from Germany had earned him no promotion in the party chain o f command. A more reasonable man would not have been surprised. For the time being, Helphand was immune to disappointÂ ments. External circumstances were favourable and they helped to preserve his internal balance. And on his Italian holiday he met Rosa Luxemburg, who also came to recuperate on the shores o f the Lago di Guarda. T he reunion with Rosa was important for him at this poin t: a lot had changed since their last meeting, at the prison in St. Petersburg. After the intense companionship o f the revolution, they were both suffering from its aftermath, from isolation and a feeling o f loneliness. T hey both knew what they could expect in Germany. T hey had had enough experience o f the party machinery, and yet they were both resolved to carry on the fight, as before. Although they were both intensely political people, and politics was their primary concern, underneath this, they faced similar personal problems. Helphand had left his second wife and their son behind in Russia. T he friendship with the temperamental, sarcastic, but infinitely feminine Rosa made it possible for him to forget the past quite easily. For her own part, she was glad to have found some support, a compassionate understanding, in Helphand. Soon after the Warsaw revolution, she had parted company with her friend, Leo Yogiches. She now seemed to prefer a looser relationship with Helphand than she had had with Yogiches; she regarded Helphandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; s company as a pleasant distraction which eased her over the spiritual crises o f the past months. They were both very discreet about their friendship. It was their personal secret, a conspiracy between them which they treated with the utmost tact. T hey were not romantic lovers, but they shared an understanding and could rely on each other.

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W hen Helphand returned to Germany early in the summer, he found out, with satisfaction, that the role he had played in Russia had brought him quite a lot o f popularity. He was a man who had taken a personal part in a revolution. Mass strikes, army mutinies, street fighting— all the things the German socialists knew from romantic songs— he had seen, taken part in, directed. It was safer to raise a man who had taken part in a revolution to the rank o f hero, and to celebrate him in this role, than to accept his views, or give him political support. Helphand did not see the snag in the enthusiasm o f his German comrades. He was genuinely pleased, especially since he derived certain benefits from the situation. T he party could come to his aid and it did so, swiftly and magnanimously; his enthusiasm for it was now about to be rewarded. T he old quarrels and disappoint ments were forgotten, and Helphand was welcomed back into the centre o f German journalism. Karl Kautsky asked for contribu tions by Helphand for the Neue Zeit, for the first time since 1902; even Vorwarts, a newspaper with which he had conducted a bloody feud since the middle o f the eighteen-nineties, reopened its columns to Helphand. T he past was forgotten, at any rate for the time being. Helphand used the opportunities offered to the full; he allowed no editor to run short o f his contributions. He also revived his news-sheet Aus dev Weltpolitik, which had ceased to appear at the end o f 1905. T he book o f reminiscences o f the Russian revolu tion was his greatest success. It appeared in the summer o f 1907 in Dresden, under the title In the Russian Bastille during the Revolution.1 Its contents matched the title: the political events in Russia in 1905 were pushed aside, to provide the background for the adventurous life o f the hero, Alexander Helphand. The author knew his German comrades and their tastes: a large majority o f them had found out about fife inside a prison from Casanova’ s memoirs, rather than from their own experience. Helphand spared no effect to press home the awfulness o f his own imprisonment; the narrative culminated in his flight from

Siberia. The book scored on two counts, and they were both finely 7

in der russischen B astille wahrend der Revolution.

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calculated by the author: it sold extremely well, and it left its mark on the socialist agitation in Germany against the Tsarist regime. In this last regard, Helphand could well be satisfied with his achievements. He may have found it impossible to in fluence the course o f the domestic policy o f the party; he may have found it difficult to arouse a wider interest, among his comrades in Germany, in foreign policy. But he contributed hugely to the formation and the acceptance, by the socialist movement, o f a particular image o f Tsarist Russia. This Russia was the bulwark o f monarchist reaction, beyond redemption, quite incapable o f reform. A revolution was the only way out, and the Social Democrats the only people who could achieve it. And on a more practical level, Helphand had introduced the Russian party leaders to their German comrades. All this did not seem very important at the time, but later, during the First W orld War, it became so. W hen Trotsky returned from London, from the Russian party congress in the summer o f 1907, he found his friend in an opti mistic mood. T hey were very glad to see each other again— Trotsky also had escaped from Siberia— and they decided to spend their holidays together. But first o f all, Helphand took care o f the German edition o f Trotsky’ s memoirs o f the revolu tion: like Helphand’ s own reminiscences, they were published by Kaden’ s house in Dresden. Together with Trotsky’ s wife, Natalia Sedova, they went from Dresden to the Saxon mountains and then crossed the frontier into neighbouring Bohemia, where they stayed at a small village favoured by junior Austro-Hun garian civil servants as their summer residence. It was a very pleasant holiday, but one person was still missing. Helphand sent Rosa Luxemburg a most pressing invitation to join the three o f them in Bohemia. But his cautious friend preferred to stay in Berlin. Early in the autumn, Helphand and Trotsky returned to Germany; Sedova had in the meantime left for Russia, to collect her son. Helphand took it upon himself to acquaint his friend with the German socialist movement. He introduced Trotsky to Karl Kautsky; to Lenin’ s intense displeasure, Trotsky became a correspondent o f the Neue Zeit and o f Vorwarts. Trotsky was

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glad o f the goodwill o f the German comrades: he was, however, unable to settle in Berlin. T he atmosphere inside the party was too petit bourgeois, too inbred for him. He respected Kautsky as an authority on Marxism, but he was bored by the dryness o f the German theorist’ s book learning. They were small things that irritated Trotsky; they added up, however, to an unpleasant picture o f the German party. It was Maxim Gorki who recorded the kind o f impression the German party made, in 1907, on a visitor from Russia; the follow ing extract is an account o f his own visit to Berlin that year: My dejection began in Berlin where I met almost all the leading Social Democrats, and dined with August Bebel, with Singer, a very stout fel low, beside me, and other distinguished people around. W e dined in a spacious and comfortable room. Tasteful embroidered cloths were thrown over the canary cage and embroidered antimacassars were fastened on the backs o f the armchairs so that the covers should not get soiled from the heads o f the persons sitting in them. Everything was solid and substantial. Everyone ate in a solemn manner and said to each other in a solemn tone ‘Mahlzeit’ . This was a new word for me, and I knew that ‘mal’ in French meant bad and ‘Zeit’ in German meant times — ‘ bad times’ . Singer twice referred to Kautsky as ‘ my romanticist’ . Bebel, with his aquiline nose, seemed to me somewhat dissatisfied. W e drank Rhenish wine and beer. T h e wine was sour and tepid. T h e beer was good. T h e Social Democrats spoke sourly and with condescension about the Russian Revolution and the Party, but about their own Party — the German Party— everything was splendid! There was a general atmosphere o f self-satisfaction. Even the chairs looked as though they delighted in supporting the honourable bulk o f the leaders.’ 8

Despite Helphand’s exertions to show his friend the more attractive sides o f the German socialist movement, he does not seem to have had much success. And when the police started creating difficulties at the end o f 1907 about Trotsky’ s resi dential permit, he left Berlin, without much regret, for Vienna. During the last weeks o f Trotsky’ s stay in Germany, the two friends must have felt that their ways were about to part. Their 8 Gorki, Lenin, Moscow, 19 31, p. 6.

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reunion after the revolution lacked the warmth o f their relation ship in the Munich days; Trotsky was now more independent and more mature. Although he still held Parvus in high esteem, he was now convinced that their ideas were developing in different directions. T he differences between the two friends were occasioned by a theory, which was to become famous, developed by Trotsky: the theory o f permanent revolution. He had first drafted it in his cell in the Saints Peter and Paul Fortress, while Helphand was busy with the popular account o f his experiences in Russia. T he foundations o f the theory were borrowed, almost in their entirety, from Helphand. In an essay entitled ‘ Prospects and Perspec tives’ ,9 Trotsky first recapitulated Helphand’ s most important findings: the sociological and political reasons for the impotence o f the Russian middle class, the leading role o f the proletariat, the conception o f the global unity o f the world market, as well as his belief in the avant-garde mission o f the Russian proletariat in the world revolution. From these premisses, Helphand had developed his concept o f the ‘workers’ democracy’ , which was to be, as we have already seen, a modified phase o f capitalist development. In Helphand’ s view, the revolution could on no account introduce socialism to Russia. This could occur only when the country reached a high degree o f industrial development, and the working class formed the majority o f the population. From the same premisses, Trotsky now drew completely different conclusions from those o f Helphand. He argued that the proletariat, after achieving provisional power in the state, would have to transcend, under the internal pressure o f the revo lution, the frontiers o f the middle-class as well as o f the workers’ democracy, and proceed to make deep inroads into the capitalist order o f property. T h e revolution could not be confined within artificial frontiers: it could only be extended. T he co-operation between the Russian and the western European proletariat should make it possible for the Russian workers not only to assert their power, but to take the first steps into socialism: ‘ Without the direct political help o f the European proletariat, the working 9 ‘Itogy i perspektivy’, in Nasha revolyutsiya, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 224-86.

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class in Russia would not be in a position to retain power in its hands, and to transform its temporary domination into a lasting socialist dictatorship.’ 10 Helphand could not agree with this view o f the revolution. It was not that he lacked the courage and the perception to draw radical conclusion from the premisses he himself had laid down. Instead, his unwillingness to go along with Trotsky may be regarded as an indication o f his doubts as to the spontaneous revolutionary potential o f the proletariat in western Europe. He thought that Trotsky relied too much on foreign aid: Helphand knew better what could be expected from the German party. At the same time, in contrast to Trotsky, who concerned himself largely with revolutionary action, Helphand had made a thorough examination o f the technical and economic conditions that were necessary for the successful introduction o f socialist economy. Socialism meant for him the transformation— and not the con struction— o f an industrial society. He had himself stressed the international implications o f capitalism. But his concept o f a party capable o f the construction o f socialism had nothing in common with the Russian view o f a party o f revolutionary elite. For the purposes o f the organization o f the future, Helphand thought the German type o f movement the most suitable: a disciplined and tightly organized mass party, together with its auxiliary troops, the trade unions and the co-operatives. He was not convinced that the backwardness o f Russia would prove a political advantage. Their differences as to the theory o f permanent revolution marked the end o f the intellectual partnership between Helphand and Trotsky. At first they took great care to paper over the cracks: they were still treading the lonely path between the two Russian party factions, and they had no interest in airing their differences in public. W hen Trotsky left for Vienna at the end o f the year the quarrel was set aside, but by no means forgotten. It was finally concluded a decade later, in circum stances which the parting friends could hardly have imagined in 1907. The benevolent reception by his German comrades helped 10 ibid., p. 278.

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Parvus to find his bearings. It resolved his doubts as to his proper place in European socialism. There was no point in his following Trotsky back into the Russian organization: once again, he had had enough o f his mother country and o f his former compatriots. And the wheel o f history had somehow got stuck in Russia: in the West, the historical process would continue to unfold. Again, a profound aversion to emigre circles came upon Helphand. Contemptuously, in measured terms, he declined several offers to take part in Russian exile journalism. It was again operating in a vacuum; the exiles did not have to respond to the demands o f a mass movement, and Helphand was convinced that they would relapse into a state o f chaotic disunity. He accused the Menshevik editors o f their new Golos Sotsialdemokrata o f jettisoning the principles o f class struggle in order to secure circulation in Russia herself. He therefore could make no contributions to their organ: he would be content with the ‘ role o f an observer’ , who would work mainly for the German party.11 This was precisely what Helphand intended to do, and he resolutely stuck to his decision. It did not mean that he had chosen the simplest and most comfortable way out. T he delight o f the first months after his return from Russia was an exception, an oasis in the wilderness that lay before and after him. It would not take long for him to be reduced to his old status. And Ger many was, at the time, no paradise for socialist emigres. The necessity to remain on good terms with the Tsarist Government occasioned a tougher attitude, on the part o f Berlin, towards the exiled revolutionaries. T w o o f them had been extradited to the Russian authorities shortly before Helphand’s arrival in Dortmund; when the social ist deputies protested in the Reichstag, the Chancellor’ s reply amounted to a declaration o f war on the Russian ‘ extortionists and conspirators’ . Prince von Biilow was convinced that they represented an unbearable burden for Germany’s foreign policy. This warning was doubtless sufficient for Helphand. Arrest in one o f the states from which he had been banned would have meant extradition, and another trip to Siberia. Nevertheless, he 11 Parvus to Martov, February 1908, in Sotsial-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie.

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stayed on in Germany. He knew enough about the habits o f the police, and was able to keep out o f their way. In the years between 1908 and 1910, he led an unsettled, wandering life in Germany. For a short time, he worked on the Chemnitzer Volkstimme\ illegal visits to Prussia and Saxony alternated with more peaceful weeks in Stuttgart or Munich. He earned his living by running the feature-agency, and by contri butions to the socialist press. Despite the way he lived, it was a very productive period o f his life. After many years o f employ ment as a journalist, when he had had to mould his ideas into the form o f articles and, at best, o f short pamphlets, he now decided to write a longer study, perhaps his magnum opus. T he time had come, Helphand thought, to draw up a preliminary balance-sheet. It took him two years to complete his work. In the summer o f 1910, he sent his publisher the manuscripts o f two books, which were published, in the following months, under the titles The State, Industry, and Socialism and The Class Struggle o f the Proletariat Parts o f both these studies had appeared, in the course o f the year 1909, as separate pamphlets; it was impossible, however, to form a judgement o f Helphand’ s first comprehensive account o f his theoretical work until the publication o f the two books. T hey were his last original contribution to the ideology o f socialism. A retrospective glance at the history o f the German workers’ movement served Helphand as an excuse for a brief examination o f his own contribution to the party controversies. In a short chapter, he stated his own views on the following problems: political mass strike, trade unions, revisionism, economic crisis, the world market, protective tariffs, and colonialism. Helphand was able to say that the party had, though painfully and in the midst o f internal convulsions, considerably increased its theoreti cal arsenal. And then an appraisal o f the relative positions o f power o f the two sides engaged in the contest revealed the following picture. T he capitalist economic order, protected by a powerful army and controlled by monopolies and cartels, was, without an , 1 2

. 1 3

12 D er Staat, die Industrie und der Sozialism us , Dresden, 1910. 13 D er Klassenkam pf des Proletariats, Berlin, 19 11.

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impulse from the outside, far from breaking down. T he ‘break down’ theory beloved o f so many socialists, Helphand dismissed as erroneous without much ado. There was still life in capitalism, though not life eternal. He had a low view o f the value o f the occasional economic crisis: the greatest danger to the capitalist system was armed conflict between the imperialist states. A war could be occasioned by competition on the world market, and by the resulting imperialist power politics. A two-front engagement would thus be forced on the state— against the external imperialist enemy on the one hand, and, on the other, against the internal class enemy. This situation, in Helphand’ s view, would bring about the final breakdown: in the future, war and revolution would be indivisible. ‘ The war sharpens all capitalist contradic tions. A world war may therefore be concluded only by a world revolution.’ 14 Helphand did not believe in the inevitability o f the internal breakdown o f capitalism, nor in the automatic victory o f Social Democracy. He abhorred equally both these complementary ideas. T he writing on the wall indicated that it was not the bourgeoisie, entrenched behind the power o f the state, but the proletariat, that had reached the limit o f its possibilities. E cono mic concentration had provided a counterbalance to the might o f the trade unions; the parliamentary influence o f the party had been cancelled out by the decline in the powers o f the parliament. In Helphand’ s view, the proletariat had to develop new revolu tionary tactics. He was convinced that these new tactics would have to make use o f what he described as ‘ combined weapons’ .15 T he nineteenth century had been a period o f isolated battles: the proletariat had developed and proved the various weapons at its disposal. In this century, however, a grand revolutionary strategy was needed, which would bring all the component parts o f the class struggle into concerted and effective action. ‘ There are no specific means o f revolutionary struggle. T he revolution uses all the available political means o f struggle . . . since the revolution is not a method o f fighting, but a historical process.’ 16 In the demand for the strategic integration o f all the available 14 Klassenkam pf des Proletariats , p. 147. 15 ibid., p. 109. 16 ‘Die russische Revolution’, in Leipziger Volkszeitung, 13 November 1908.

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means o f struggle, Helphand gave a timely hint to his comrades. This piece o f homespun advice has been absorbed into the very texture o f the revolutionary method o f the communist parties. In this regard, there are no differences between Moscow and Peking. But how should these weapons be used? Here, Helphand touched the most sensitive nerve o f German socialism. During the year 1908, among the party leaders there raged an embittered controversy. T he problem was whether the time was ripe to lead the proletariat into the streets and, by the employment o f the mass strike, to force reaction into retreat. The suggestions offered, led to a three-way split in the party. T he moderate group simply warned the socialists o ff any kind o f political adventure. T he left wing, on the other hand, represented by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the son o f the late socialist leader, pressed for revolutionary action. The workers, so their argument ran, were ready for the decisive fight, and it was high time to join it. Rosa Luxemburg especially, frightened her German comrades: after one o f her speeches to the party congress, August Bebel was so impressed by her vision o f the revolution that he already believed himself to be wading, up to his ankles, through blood. And she addressed Kautsky, with whom she was now continually falling out, after many years o f close friendship: ‘ W e do not need you, comrade Kautsky, at the brakes.’ T he decisive influence belonged, however, to a third group centred around Bebel and Kautsky: their intermediate position was acceptable to the majority on the party executive. Kautsky pointed out, on many occasions, that the party leadership was ready for an offensive; the proletariat, however, was not strong enough for the final engagement. The solution therefore fol lowed : ‘ Neither revolution nor legality at any price.’ This was the situation inside the party when Helphand was working out the new strategy. It was self-evident that he should have found nothing to his liking in the attitude o f the moderate group. But he also viewed all the other suggestions with sus picion. He thought o f Rosa Luxemburg’ s policy as an attempt at a blind crash-through, a mere Revolutionismus. It was dangerous, he thought, to whip up the passion o f the masses and then to direct all the released energy at one single point. He put it this

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way in a letter to Kautsky: ‘ The revolution will become the mass strike, the mass strike a demonstration strike, and the struggle for political power will be reduced to the struggle for the Prussian suffrage.’ 17 This contraction o f the target was, in Helphand’ s view, a very grave error. Rosa Luxemburg knew o f one aim only, and she was unconcerned with the political and economic background. Instead o f starting with the highest demand, Helphand proposed, the aims should be set in such a manner that their achievement would naturally lead to the intensification o f the revolutionary struggle. Nevertheless, Helphand was disinclined to deliver ammuni^ tion to Rosa Luxemburg’s opponents. She wanted the right thing the wrong w ay; Kautsky, on the other hand, was wrong all along the line. He was in fact making a plea for peace and moderation; he feared the defeat o f the socialist movement in some kind o f cataclysmic engagement. In Helphand’ s view, Kautsky’ s policy would have led, in practice, to utter stagnation. Kautsky taxed his mind beyond endurance, calculating the advent o f the time o f reckoning: he was afraid that it might be wrongly chosen, and that the choice might ‘ corrupt’ the whole course o f history.18 At this point, Helphand had cleared the ground sufficiently to advance his own propositions. The revolution, he said again and again, could not be confined in time in the same way as, for in stance, a battle. It had to be seen as a dialectical process, as a long chain o f victories and failures. The two alternatives— an imme\ diate victory or a catastrophic defeat— were nothing but a negation o f political realities. There was, according to Helphand, an analogy o f the revolutionary process in the cycle o f economic crises. Peaceful development would be disrupted by social explosions; the revolutionary period would then ‘ undergo its own development, and appear as a historical process and not as one single action’ .19 The revolutionary period demanded an offen sive strategy. Helphand recommended a dynamic, dialectic method o f combat, planned deployment o f all the available arms, and steadfastness in face o f defeat. Against the background o f contemporary socialist thinking 17 Helphand to K arl Kautsky, 14 June 1910, in the Kautsky-Archiv. 18 Klassenkam pf des Proletariats3 p. 137. 19 ibid., p. 137.

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his views were highly personal and distinct. Most o f the party theorists were so constrained by a narrow approach to Marxism that they failed to understand Helphand’s breadth o f vision. He was neither a radical nor a revisionist, and yet he had points o f contact on both sides. He was a complicated, but logical theorist o f revolutionary action, who integrated the various trends current in the party in one plan. He was a Tarvusist’ : the only one. He worked hard to push forward the advance positions o f ideological development. He went so far that most o f his contem poraries came to regard him as a dreamer irretrievably lost in fantasy. It was said that his mother had died in a state o f mental derangement: hence his revolutionary day-dreams. In order to protect themselves against his visions, the European socialists chose to regard him as a lunatic. He had shocked his Russian comrades by the idea o f a provisional workers’ government in January 1905; this was the first step towards a Utopia. Five years later, when he completed the two studies, the German socialists returned the same verdict. It was especially the publication o f The State, Industry, and Socialism which occasioned concern for Helphand’s sanity. There was really no cause for alarm. His interest in trade cycles, monopolies, and trade unions, convinced Helphand that examination o f the past and the present no longer sufficed. Capitalism had been analysed frequently and in detail; the workers had learned what kind o f weapons stood at their disposal, and how they should attack the established order. But nothing had been said about the tasks o f the future, about those political and economic problems the Social Democrats would face on the day after the revolution. What was socialism in practice? Where and how did one begin to build it u p ? H ow would the system function? Here, Parvus found himself in uncharted territory. Marx and Engels had indicated the shape o f the future socialist society only vaguely, and the German party ideologists were very reserved in this respect. Indeed, anyone rash enough to concern himself with the future state ran the risk o f incurring ridicule and the charge o f indulging in utopian and unscientific fancies. Until 1910, the German socialist writers had confined themselves to producing apologies concerning this society, without suggesting a concrete M .R .-I

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picture o f its structure. Their belief in the inevitability o f historical development allowed them to disregard problems which, they were certain, would be automatically solved in the coming years. When, at the Hanover party congress in 1899, Bernstein pointed to the difficulties the party would face after the revolu tion, Bebel described Bernstein’ s attitude as a Tear o f victory’ , and he added that, by introducing artificial difficulties, Bernstein was destroying faith in the possibility o f victory. Behind Bebel’ s forceful pronouncement, there was a good deal o f mental con fusion. Bebel had had enough o f the party intellectuals, who were creating problems that he himself, a practical politician and an experienced parliamentarian, could afford to disregard. He asked his comrades in Hanover: ‘D o you believe that the clerks, the technicians, the engineers and others will strike, that they will not stick with us if we promise them better treatment and better pay? (Laughter, applause.) I will tell you that there are many privy councillors who will then come to us, perhaps even Ministers.’ 20 Helphand, on the contrary, remained entirely unmoved by dreams o f governments which would include venerable privy councillors and Ministers willing to serve whoever was in control. He insisted that the socialists would have to be less silly than Bebel, and more precise. After all, the conception o f the socialist state o f the future was, in his view, ‘ the most important theoreti cal problem o f the living generation’ .21 Despite the general attitude o f the party, Helphand developed the following programme for the socialist transformation o f the economy. He regarded the nationalization o f the banks as the starting-point. I f the socialist Government controlled the money and capital market, it would be in a position to direct the whole econom y: the banks themselves had created the necessary basis for this change. In this connexion, Helphand quoted Walter Rathenau, who had once spoken o f 300 men who controlled the ‘ economic fortunes o f the continent’ . Such a concentration o f control, Helphand regarded as a symptom o f the ripeness o f European economy for a social revolution, and also as the main 20 Protokoll Hannover, 1899, p. 127.

21 Klassenkam pf des Proletariats, p. 4.

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venue o f attack. There was, in his view, no need for an immediate abolition o f private ownership o f the means o f production. T he construction o f socialism had also to be a gradual organic process, and the nationalization o f the banks would give it the initial momentum. T he socialist state would then be in a position o f power, enabling it to push the private economic sector farther and farther back.22 Helphand’ s blue-print for the future was o f course greatly oversimplified and there was a good deal o f romantic zest in his programme. He ignored the problems o f all-embracing planning by the state, and he failed to envisage the massive unwieldiness o f the bureaucracy which would be needed to carry out his plan. Nevertheless, at the time he was writing, there existed neither interest, nor practical experience o f these problems. And Helphand did not return from his explorations with a completely idyllic tale o f the promised land. In fact, he encountered a number o f difficulties. T he nationalization o f the means o f pro duction, it occurred to him, would change ‘ only the form o f capitalist domination’ . It would provide the state with more power than it had ever possessed before, and although the state would now be the instrument o f the proletariat— the majority o f the population— it still ran the danger o f being misused. T he plenitude o f economic power in its hands was dangerous, unless certain controls were introduced. At this point Helphand discovered the final argument in support o f his old thesis that the proletarian organizations were not an end in themselves. They were necessary for the achieve ment o f pow er: they would, however, be essential for the realiza tion o f a socialist order. Only they could be entrusted with the task o f the protection o f the individual; they alone were in a position, and this was true especially o f the trade unions, to maintain balance in regard to the strengthened machinery o f the state. Socialism, therefore, did not mean only the, transformation o f capitalism: it meant also the further development o f the workers’ organizations. Helphand touched here on a crucial point in the theory and practice o f socialist development. W e, in fact, have the example 22 D er Staat,

die Industrie und der Sozialismus, passim.

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o f the Soviet State before us, where the first steps into dictator ship were the dissolution o f the opposition parties and the neutralization o f the power o f the trade unions. In addition, the concentration o f economic power in the hands o f the state had an adverse effect on the rights o f the individual. Nevertheless, Helphand’s suggestions as to the checks and balances that should operate within a socialist state cannot be regarded simply as an early warning against a Bolshevik dictatorship. In 1910, the socialists were still incapable o f imagining a situation in which the party might use its power, acquired through a revolution, against the majority o f the nation. However, the fact that Helphand, as early as 1910, pointed at the dangers inherent in an all-powerful socialist state, certainly deserves special mention. His study anticipated a possibility which eluded the imaginative grasp o f men steeped in the traditions o f democratic socialism, a possibi lity which was translated into hard political terms in Russia in 1917. Helphand’ s German comrades received his message as i f it came from another world. T h e JVeue Zeit critic was even incapable o f noticing that Helphand had written o f a socialist state. He took it that the author o f The State, Industry, and Socialism was merely advising the current Imperial Government to nationalize the banks. Rosa Luxemburg did better than anyone else. ‘ T he fat one has written a beautiful book’ , she wrote to a friend o f hers, ‘ but I believe that he is slowly going mad.’ Although Rosa Luxemburg knew a lot about the circumstances o f Helphand’ s life, she was, on this occasion, neither perceptive nor charitable. T he act o f writing was Helphand’ s one firm link with the world o f sanity; in every other regard, the difficulties he now faced would have broken a weaker man. He saw his predica ment clearly enough. He may well have felt that he had written the two recent books in vain. N obody understood them, and nobody took them seriously. He had wasted two years, and he had received 2,000 marks for the two manuscripts. And by the time he wrote the last sentence, the whole miserable sum had been spent. T he ideas he tried to put across, he knew, were too complicated, too intellec tual, and quite unsuitable for mass agitation. T he leaders o f the

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party were sometimes puzzled, more often hostile to what Helphand had to offer. He had completely failed in his attempt to keep the revolutionary consciousness o f the party alive. A group o f dedicated followers might have lent some weight to his policies. But he had always been rather careless about rallying reliable support around himself; he possessed a monu mental disinterest, amounting to arrogance, in the practical details o f organization. He could call Konrad Haenisch his friend and devoted admirer; Rosa Luxemburg could be protective and considerate towards him, but only at the cost o f coming to regard him as an utterly helpless person. Otherwise, Helphand had succeeded in antagonizing most o f his prominent comrades. From Bernstein to Bebel they had all, at one time or another, been given the sharp side o f his tongue. And then the Schonlank and the Marchlewski incidents were remembered, and held against him. There were too many features in his conduct and his think ing that alienated him from his German comrades, and con demned him to political isolation, even to personal loneliness. He came to be looked upon as a natural catastrophe, both unexpected and devastating. It was therefore not surprising that the German socialists kept their distance, and that they should try to circumscribe his influence. During the nineteen years he had spent in Germany— though with occasional breaks— he was never entrusted with an official party jo b . He never attended, as a delegate with a right to vote, one o f its annual conferences. As an alien, a Reichstag mandate was for him out o f the question. Only a few newspapers and periodicals remained, in which he could give vent to his anger. T he German party did not, as he had hoped as a young man, become his fatherland. He did not know where to turn. He had learned, during the 1905 revolution in Russia, that he was incapable o f directing political action: he had completely failed as a leader o f men. He realized, after the failure o f the revolution, that he was out o f touch with Russian conditions; he had shown no interest in securing a place for himself in the Russian party. And now, at last, he came to believe that despite his considerable talents as a writer the written word would secure for him no power, no influence.

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He was well known, but without pow er; he was ambitious and talented, but, apart from his writing, unable to show positive p roof o f his quality. He would have to take some drastic steps to break out o f the impasse; and he did not yet know in which direction. T hen suddenly he was made to act, and to act quickly. Since December 1905, the storm-clouds had been gathering above him, and he tried hard to take no notice. T he Bolsheviks, under Lenin’ s leadership, were then fighting against heavy odds in Moscow, and, like the Soviet in St. Petersburg, they ran into financial difficulties. Their large printing plant was proving especially expensive. It was to be expected that they should now remember that Helphand owed them royalties for Gorki’ s play, and they did. I. P. Ladyzhnikov, a close friend o f Gorki, was then in Berlin: under the instructions o f the Bolshevik central committee, he was trying to set up a publishing house there which would specialize in Marxist literature, as well as in the works o f the ‘progressive’ authors, and in particular those o f Russia’ s first proletarian writer. T h e profits made by the enterprise were intended to augment the Bolshevik party funds.23 First o f all, however, Ladyzhnikov had to acquire the rights that Gorki had trans ferred to Helphand in 1902. Sometime late in December 1905, Ladyzhnikov wrote to his friend: ‘ I have already given my agreement to a court o f arbitration. I had consulted Nikitich and Ilich [Lenin], and they should have told you about it. O f course we do not have to inform everybody about this case, so that we should not deal any trump cards into the hands o f the bourgeoisie. Either I or Ilich should have seen Parvus about it— but so far, there has been no time. W e wanted to demand from him the immediate transfer to us o f all the rights, from which he is still making a good profit. . . ,’ 24 The Bolsheviks estimated that Helphand had embezzled some 130,000 marks, which rightfully belonged to them.25 They by no means had an open-and-shut case against him. T he original agreement with Gorki had been made in 1902, a year before the Bolshevik-Menshevik split: the Social Democrat party as a 23 Arkhiv Gorkovo, Moscow, 1959, vol. 7, p. 292. 24 ibid., pp. 1 3 1-2 . 25 ibid., p. 294.

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whole was supposed to benefit by it, not any one o f its factions. Their estimate o f the profits made by the play was overoptimistic: it would have had to earn some 180,000 marks, a very large amount by the standards o f German theatre productions at the time. In any case, the legal owner o f the rights was the publishing house in Munich, which, apart from Gorki’ s play, had done very badly. W hen Ladyzhnikov wrote to Gorki, it was on the point o f being liquidated; Ladyzhnikov made no reference to his negotia tions, if any, with Marchlewski. Be it as it may, the affair blew up into a big socialist scandal. Rumours started to circulate, especially after Gorki’ s visit to Germany in 1907. He then lodged a complaint against Helphand’ s conduct with the party executive. Helphand had em bezzled this large sum, and, in reply to a letter to Helphand, Gorki maintained, he had received the ‘bland’ explanation that the money had been used for a number o f trips to Italy. The furious poet advised the German party executive that Helphand, the publisher, should ‘have his ears cut o ff’ . Helphand defended himself as best he could. He said again and again that Marchlewski had arrived, during the liquidation o f the publishing house, at a settlement with Gorki. T he whole affair, he said, was libellous nonsense. And when it was resusci tated during the First W orld War, for the purposes o f character assassination, Helphand let it be known that he was quite ready for another consultation, and even for the eventual settlement o f any outstanding debts. Gorki himself then said that certain publicists— men like Burtsev and Alexinski— had distorted the facts o f the affair, and he added: ‘Nevertheless, I regard it as neither necessary nor possible to complete and to straighten out the reports.’ 26 The story did not end here. Some years after the war Gorki returned to it, and to his old assault on Helphand. He did so in a rather extraordinary place: in an obituary for his recently deceased comrade, Ilich Lenin. Nevertheless, in the years after the first Russian revolution, Gorki’ s perseverance did Helphand a great deal o f harm. And what he had to say in his own defence did not sound entirely convincing. As great an admirer o f Helphand as Haenisch, wrote 26 Birshevye Viedomosti, 20 October 1915.

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in his reminiscences that, as far as matters o f finance were concerned, he always behaved on ‘ a very grand scale indeed’ . And when Helphand started to deal, during the war, in terms o f millions, he often told his friend that ‘his head was his main book o f accounts’ . Negligence in keeping o f accounts was a poor excuse in an affair in which Gorki, Lenin, and the Bolshevik party funds were involved. Financial carelessness was a hangman’ s noose, and Helphand himself had put his head into it. He left himself wide open, and in a matter about which his German comrades would tolerate no joke. Dishonesty and transgressions against private property were, in their eyes, much graver offences than, say, political stupidity. T he complaint Gorki had lodged with the party executive in Berlin delivered Helphand into the hands o f party justice. A commission o f inquiry, consisting o f Bebel, Kautsky, and Zetkin studied, in the years 1908 and 1909, this extremely complex case. T he proceedings were surrounded with the utmost secrecy: the rank and file o f the party knew nothing about them. T he verdict was never made public. Helphand had a bad case, and the findings o f the commission went against him. T he German socialist leaders were innocent o f scandals on Russian party lines, and they did not know how to deal with them. Rumours soon started to circulate that Helphand had been warned, and that he had been told not to apply, for the time being, for editorial posts on any o f the German socialist newspapers. Although truth and fiction became interchangeable in the course o f the Gorki affair, it had the most unpleasant personal repercussions for Helphand. He was enmeshed in a situation from which there was no obvious way out. One thing must, however, have been clear to him : further stay in Germany would have broken him once and for all. His demoralization was now complete, and he went through a deep spiritual crisis. He wanted to be able to regard the hopelessly bleak situation with some detachment, and he decided to leave Germany for the time being. In the summer o f 1910, he moved to Vienna. He thought the trip would give him a change o f climate: it became a turningpoint in his life.

An Interlude in Constantinople Late in the summer o f that fateful year, 1910, Helphand certainly needed a change. The Habsburg capital was well suited to provide it. Its leisurely pace, its tolerant, easygoing ways eased him over the personal crisis o f the past months. The Austrian socialists were unlikely to be much concerned or informed about the recent party inquiry in Germany. Trotsky was still living in Vienna, but from him Helphand had no secrets. From Vienna, Helphand might be able to start afresh; he could console himself with the thought that the years he had spent in the socialist movement had not been, after all, entirely wasted. He had played a distinguished part in all the most exÂ plosive socialist controversies in Germany, as well as in the first revolution in Russia. He had learned a lot, about himself and about politics, and he was unlikely ever again to make the same mistakes, or to lay himself open as much as he had done. And most important, he had developed a sensitive, seismographic reaction to politics. He possessed a very keen eye for the irreguÂ larities, the eruptions which punctuated the broad movements o f European history. For the time being, the political life o f neither Germany nor Russia offered any prospects o f excitement. Having discarded every vestige o f revolutionary zeal, the German movement had stagnated; in Russia, the revolution had suffered defeat only too easily. Helphand was an impatient and ambitious man, for himself and for socialism: he now felt that neither he himself, nor, for that matter, the cause o f revolutionary socialism had made any great advance. Looked at from Vienna, however, the situation south-east o f the Habsburg capital appeared more promising. T he decline in the influence o f the Sublime Porte in the Balkans, the revolutionary

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developments inside the country itself, the subjection o f Turkey to the system o f the Great Powers’ Capitulations: here were the components o f high-grade political dynamite. Some time after his arrival in Vienna, Helphand wrote to his friend, Rosa Luxemburg, that he was leaving for a three-month visit to Constantinople. He in fact stayed in Turkey for nearly five years. Helphand now made the final preparations for his trip to the Near East. He knew that his articles from Turkey would be acceptable to a number o f newspaper editors in Germany and Austria; Trotsky arranged for his contributions to appear in the popular Russian liberal newspaper, the Kievskaya Mysl. His forwarding address in Constantinople was c/o Albrecht Dvorak, Poste Autrichienne: a Czech name and an Austro-Hungarian address. Helphand reached Constantinople early in November 1910. His socialist past gave his life, from the first, a certain continuity. Workers’ parties were then growing up in the former Turkish territories on the Balkans; the name o f Parvus was familiar to many o f the Serbian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian socialists, and the Turkish capital still provided them with a convenient meetingplace. T he part that Trotsky had once played in Helphand’ s life was now taken over by Christo Rakovsky. T he son o f a wealthy Bulgarian landed family in Dobrudja, Rakovsky became a Rumanian partly by choice, and partly by accident, due to the shifting frontiers in this part o f Europe. He had studied medicine and law in France, and already at that time was a socialist o f some years’ standing. After a long absence — he went from France to Germany, to be expelled from Prussia in the early eighteen-nineties, soon after Helphand— he returned to Rumania in 1905. He had now become the man who later, after he had been executed by Stalin in the great Soviet purges, was fondly remembered by his comrades; an ubiquitous, poly glot Marxist, a revolutionary with a taste for historical research. Nevertheless, Rakovsky’ s political activities in Rumania earned him yet another deportation order; he then spent much o f his time travelling between Vienna and Constantinople. He became a friend o f Trotsky’ s, and he had made the acquaintance o f Rosa Luxemburg and Helphand in Germany; now, during the early

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part o f his stay in Constantinople, Helphand met, through Rakovsky, many o f the leading Balkan socialists. Some o f them were then toying— not entirely to the displeasure o f the Ottoman authorities— with a variety o f plans for a Balkan federation; Helphand was especially impressed by a young Bul garian socialist called Vlachov,1 whose activities on behalf o f the federation even succeeded in arousing the interest o f the Austrian Ambassador to Constantinople; and who, in addition, made con tact with the Russian Union o f Sailors. Helphand became ab sorbed in the investigation o f the economic and political situation in the Near East; the extremely unsettled atmosphere suited him well and he showed no desire to return to western Europe. For the time being, he was still suffering for his interests. A native o f the city on the Bosphorus could live quite cheaply there: the Europeans, however, were expected to maintain European standards, and this Helphand could not quite afford. I f he lived like a respectable European, he would have to eat like a poor Turk, or the other way round. During the early months o f his stay in Constantinople, he got to know Scutari, the Asian part, and the dock area near the Galata bridge, quite well. He had to rub shoulders with the humblest inhabitants o f that proud city, and share their simplest nourishment at the cheapest o f eating-places. W hen he later described this time o f his life to a friend o f his, he said that ‘often I had to tread carefully, so that nobody could see the holes in my shoes’ . However, it was in Constantinople that he laid down the foun dations o f his fortune. He had tried to make money before: the feature-agency publishing Aus der Weltpolitik (he founded, inci dentally, a similar and more successful enterprise in Turkey), and the publishing house in Munich, were Helphand’ s first commercial ventures. T hey both failed. T he German socialist press did not need much foreign news to keep going; the establishment o f foreign authors’ copyrights in western Europe was not as good a financial proposition as it had, at first, seemed to Helphand. In Turkey, however, he at last found the key to the treasure that had hitherto been denied him. The exact details o f the way in which Helphand became a rich 1 Parvus to Kautsky, 3 April 19 11, Kautsky-Archiv.

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man must remain a matter o f conjecture. T he wealthy Turks themselves, the indigenous and permanent inhabitants o f the capital, were either administrators or soldiers, who held business in contempt, and left it in the care o f a heterogeneous community which consisted largely o f Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. Theirs was a very transient society: their business deals left behind no traces. It is possible that Helphand succeeded in attracting the attention o f European business circles, and that he became their adviser and representative in the Ottoman Empire— the Krupp concern and Sir Basil Zaharoff have both been mentioned in this connexion; it is possible that he began dealing in corn and other commodities on his own initiative. By 1912— the beginning o f the Balkan wars— he was doing both these things, and doing them quite successfully. It is also certain that he conducted his business under the protection o f the local politicians. He had established some con nexions with the leaders o f the rising nationalist party o f the Young Turks, and in 1912 he became the economic editor o f their newspaper, Turk Yurdu'f1 he is said to have been entrusted, during the Balkan wars, with providing supplies for the Turkish Army. There can be no doubt that, at this time, Helphand had closer connexions with Turkish official circles than he later cared to admit. He travelled extensively in the Balkans and he was in a good position to supply the Turkish Government with useful intelligence. His political experience and financial expertise had finally found an appreciative audience. During the two years before the outbreak o f the First W orld War, Helphand acquired, for the first time, political contacts that could be put to an eminently practical use. T he man who, for many years, had always moved on the periphery o f political power— in the German party and, even more so, in the German State— was now gradually approaching its very centre. He learned that in the conditions obtaining in the Ottoman Empire, power could be reached through money, and that money could be acquired through political power. He was to make a good deal o f use o f this knowledge. 2 cf. K . Haenisch, Parvus , p. 50, and M . Harden, ‘Gold und Weihrauch’, in D ie Zukunft, Berlin, 1920, pp. 2-35.

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And then, on 28 June 1914, the shots fired by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo shattered the high-summer repose o f Europe. T he assassinations o f the Habsburg heir apparent and his wife, were followed by an upsurge o f patriotism everywhere: first the mobili zation orders, and then the declarations o f war, received en thusiastic support. The inhabitants o f the European capitals welcomed the prospect o f a military show-down; counsels o f moderation were drowned in the clamour o f patriotic slogans. T he socialist member-parties o f the Second International were among those who attempted to avert the threatening catastrophe, and, at the end o f July, they demonstrated for peace. It was too late. From Constantinople, Helphand observed the crisis with detachment. He was content to advise the Turks, in a highly regarded article in Tasviri Efkar published a fortnight before the outbreak o f the war, that their country should derive the greatest possible benefit from Germany’ s victory in the coming contest, and he suggested that she might rid herself o f the onerous capitu lation treaties. Otherwise he said no more in public and did nothing in support o f the peace campaign o f the Second Inter national. His socialist friends in Europe noticed Helphand’ s absence from their ranks. Trotsky remarked testily that Helphand must be waiting until he could 6come to St. Petersburg when every thing is ready’ .3 Trotsky was quite wrong. Despite the change in his personal fortunes, Helphand had not sold out. His main interests had not altered, nor had he laid them aside: his ap proach, however, had. He still regarded himself as a socialist, and he was more than ever ready to help the socialist cause. But he would do so in his own way, and on his own terms. He had his old self-confidence, and he was near to achieving one o f his most cherished aims. As a man o f substance, with useful political con nexions, he saw himself in a position to help his comrades in their hour o f need. He was ready to make concessions to the realities o f politics, but, above all, he was ready to act. And i f he needed an explanation for his behaviour there was one at hand. He was observing, in the last days o f peace, the 3 R . Abramovich, In Tsvei Revolutsies, New York, 1944, vol. 1, p. 374.

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collapse o f the Second International, the collapse o f pre-war socialism, for which he had tried to do so much. It had paid no regard to him, and it had achieved little or nothing. And now the war, which he had foreseen a long time ago, was about to break out. It mattered little to Helphand that it had been set o ff in a fortuitous manner, by a young fanatic in a small provincial town in Bosnia. It was the war he had been waiting for, and he found the perspectives that it opened up not at all displeasing. He envisaged the road to socialism as leading across the ruins o f the middle-class national states, rather than through the tidy avenues o f the existing order. In the weeks immediately before and after the outbreak o f war, Helphand plunged into feverish activity. Agitation on behalf o f the Central Powers, economic mobilization o f the Ottoman Empire, and the first subversive moves against Russia, kept him fully occupied in Constantinople. From Turkey, Helphand extended his agitation in Germany’ s favour to Bulgaria and Rumania. T he two countries were still neutral, and both the belligerent camps desired their entry into the war on one side or the other. Helphand made use o f the local socialist press: a few days after the outbreak o f the war, the Bucharest Zapta and the Rabotnichesky Vestnik carried the same article by him, with the telling title T o r Democracy— Against Tsarism’ .4 His old habit o f writing, and his skill as a journalist now stood Helphand in good stead. T he socialists were, however, divided: a situation which had had no place in their thinking before the war— namely, that the workers would face each other on opposite sides o f the battle-lines— became a stark reality. T he new situa tion forced the socialists to take an unequivocal decision, and Helphand, too, made it. In the course o f proving it acceptable, to himself and to his comrades, he put forward some interesting arguments. But they could no longer move in the vacuous world o f pure socialist theory: it had to be tailored to fit the hard facts o f war. He wrote, in the Rumanian and Bulgarian socialist organs, that there was no point whatever in discussing the question o f war 4 A German translation of the article later appeared in D ie Glocke, 19 15, pp. 77-85.

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guilt. T he war simply carried on the economic competition o f the imperialist states by military means, and those socialists who looked for the causes o f the war in diplomatic intrigues, had forgotten, according to Helphand, to ‘ think in the socialist manner’ . T he war was not merely a temporary breach o f an essentially harmonious capitalist order: it should be transformed into a vehicle o f socialism.The crisis o f capitalism, he pointed out, must be exploited for the sake o f a social revolution. This was the proper task o f socialist policy in the war. T he socialists could not therefore afford to stand aside during the hostilities: but for whom— and this was the crucial question, especially in the countries not yet committed one way or the other— should they fight? According to Helphand, the choice before them was clear. Germany, with her powerful workers’ organization, embodied progress. Since Russian absolutism was to be found on the other side, in the Entente camp, no further p roof was needed as to where the enemies o f socialism were to be found. He informed the Rumanian and the Bulgarian socialists that the victory o f the Entente would bring about the triumph o f Tsarism, which, in turn, would do infinite harm to the cause o f revolution in Russia, while inaugurating a ‘new era o f boundless capitalist exploitation’ in the whole o f Europe. The workers’ parties everywhere had to unite in their struggle against Tsar ism. It was one way o f looking at the war, and its appeal to some continental socialists was not at all badly calculated. It was inspired by Helphand’ s profound hatred o f the Tsarist regime; the achievement o f a revolution in Russia was the aim o f all Helphand’s thinking about the war. He disregarded the demands a victorious German empire might make on Russia; he was un concerned with the strengthening o f the semi-absolutist German State; the implied defeat o f the French and English democracies were outside his field o f vision. Later in the war he would have to make concessions and compromises, and all o f them in the direction o f German chauvinism. Helphand regarded himself neither as a chauvinist, nor as a renegade from the socialist movement. No price was too high, as far as he was concerned, for the destruction o f Tsarism. His

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concern for Germany’ s victory made him o f course a bitter opponent o f any kind o f revolutionary movement inside Germany, during the hostilities. T he reasons he gave were that the destruc tion o f Tsarism would, in its turn, considerably weaken the reactionary forces in Germany, and help to accelerate the develop ment o f socialist revolutions everywhere. But writing for socialist newspapers could not occupy Helphand fully: there was a lot to do on the spot, in Turkey. First o f all, the Government had to be persuaded to join the war, on the side o f the Central Powers: before it could do so successfully, it would have to undertake the mobilization o f the country’ s econo mic resources. T he German Ambassador to Constantinople was o f the same opinion.5 In this respect also, Helphand’ s services could be o f use. He was mainly concerned with the supply o f grain to the Turkish capital, and with the modernization o f the Turkish railways. By swift improvisation, he succeeded in obtaining grain from Anatolia and Bulgaria; from Germany and Austria, he imported railway equipment as well as spare parts for the milling industry.6 By assisting Turkey in her economic preparations, he made a substantial contribution to her early entry into the war. The personal profit he made enabled him to extend his business interests to many parts o f Europe. After Turkey, he turned his attention to Bulgaria, where he carried out similar work. The call-up o f the Turkish Army was followed by Helphand’ s first wartime experiment in subversion against the Tsarist regime. In Vienna and in Lvov, the Ukrainians— also known as the Ruthenes, whose western settlements extended into the Habsburg Empire— had set up a society called the Union for the Liberation o f the Ukraine; after the outbreak o f the war, it began to agitate extensively in the press and in the camps o f the Russian prisoners o f war. T he Union aimed at the establishment o f the Russian Ukraine as an independent state, and it soon began to receive protection and financial support from official quarters in 5 A A . (Auswdrtiges Amt. Unpublished documents in the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry.) Telegram No. 362 to the Foreign Ministry, 22 Ju ly 1914, in Deutschland N r. 128 geh. 6 cf. Parvus, ‘Meine Entfernung aus der Schweiz’, in D ie Glocke, 1919, p. 1488; also K . Haenisch, op. cit., p. 34.

Osterreichische JVationalbibliothek, Vienna

V (a) Christo Rakovsky

Radio Times Hulton Picture Library

(b)

Karl Radek, 1924

Ullstein Bilderdienst

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Vienna and Berlin. T he Austrian and the German Governments were now favouring, eagerly but without much discrimination, a variety o f activities aimed at the weakening o f the Tsarist Empire. They put considerable sums at the disposal o f the Union, and then placed it under the control o f the Foreign Ministry in Vienna.7 Towards the end o f September, the Union put forward a plan for direct military action against Russia. It was suggested that an expeditionary force should be dispatched to the Ukraine where it would incite rebellion, behind the front, against Tsarist rule. T w o o f the Union’ s leaders, Marian Basok-Melenevski and Dr. Leo Hankiewicz, left Vienna for the Balkans; they intended to explore the situation in the area surrounding the region o f their proposed action, as well as to secure additional assistance. T he heads o f the Austrian diplomatic missions to Constantinople and to Sofia were advised by the Foreign Ministry o f the impending arrival o f the two Ukrainians, and asked to assist them in every way.8 Melenevski had known Helphand since the Iskra days at the turn o f the century, and Helphand’ s attitude to the war had been received with special attention by the socialist contingent inside the Ukrainian Union. It was therefore Helphand, rather than Pallavicini, the Austrian Ambassador, whom Melenevski at once sought out in Constantinople. Helphand was ready to assist his Ukrainian friends. First, he gave Melenevski a letter o f introduction to the editors o f the big Constantinople newspapers; towards the end o f October, the Tasviri Efkar printed the first proclamation by the Union, and the Austrian Ambassador at once reported to Vienna on this initial success o f Melenevski’ s mission.9 At the same time, the Armenian and the Georgian socialists also declared themselves for the independence o f their countries. They, too, found encourage ment from Helphand. His house in Constantinople became the 7 Memorandum by Consul Heinze, 6 August 1914, A A , W K 2; for the Austrian side cf. H H uStA (Haus-, H of-, undStaatsarchiv. Unpublished documents in the Vienna State Archives), P.A.Krieg 2 1, 948. 8 The Foreign Minister to Pallavicini and to Freiherr von Mittag, 29 September 1914, H H uStA , P.A.Krieg 8b, 902. 9 Pallavicini to Berchtold, 22 October 1914, H H uStA , P.A.Krieg 8b, 902.

M.r . - k

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meeting-place o f both the nationalist and the socialist conspira tors against the Tsarist Empire. At the same time— late in October 1914— Basok-Melenevski asked Helphand for his permission to publish, by the Ukrainian Union, his article T o r Democracy— Against Tsarism’ . Helphand gladly gave his consent, and then proceeded to use the opportunity to formulate his attitude to the question o f national revolutions. He did so in a special preface to the pamphlet, the translation o f his essay, which appeared in Constantinople in December 1914. He perceived the revolutionary energy in nationalism, and he was prepared to harness it for the purpose o f the overthrow o f the Tsarist regime. T he experience o f the year 1905 had shown, he explained, that the greatest reserves o f power at the disposal o f the autocracy lay in the tight administra tive centralization o f the Russian Empire. T he socialist opposi tion could, in his opinion, achieve success only if it allied itself with the national minorities. T he centralized, autocratic state had to be replaced by a Tree union o f all the nations o f the large Empire’ . He told Basok-Melenevski, without much ado, that he thought it pointless for the national leaders to continue to organize their activities in exile; Helphand maintained that the revolutionary movement would remain ineffectual i f it confined itself purely to the traditional pastimes o f exile. T he work performed on the spot, in Russia, was what mattered. In this respect, however, there existed no differences between the two men. T he Union’ s plans for the dispatch o f its own private army to Russia met with Helphand’s full approval. In the course o f the preparations for the expedition, Melenevski introduced Helphand to Dr. Zimmer, who was now super vising the activities o f the Union on behalf o f the Austrian and German diplomatic missions. Like Helphand, Zimmer knew the Balkans well; he was the son o f a German industrialist from Mannheim, and he had settled, in 1909, as a gentleman-farmer on the Black Sea. He had taken an interest in the tensions resulting from the national aspirations o f the minority groups in Russia: when, in September 1914, he offered his services to the German Embassy to Constantinople, they were gratefully accepted. He was entrusted with the general, on-the-spot supervision o f the

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revolutionary movements supported by the German and the Austrian Governments. T he Ukrainian Union benefited greatly from the co-operation between Zimmer and Helphand. On 2 December, Pallavicini again reported to Vienna on the surprising success o f Melenevski’ s mission. His valuable socialist connexions, Pallavicini indicated, gave Melenevski the entry into Russian Social Dem o crat circles, and secured the Russian socialist’ s support for the policy o f the Ukrainian Union. And two days before, Count Tarnowski, the Austrian Minister to Sofia, had also reported in an optimistic manner on the work o f Dr. Hankiewicz, the local representative o f the Union. Dr. Hankiewicz, who had made contact with a number o f politicians and journalists, also enter tained, in Tarnowski’ s words, ‘ certain secret relations’ with assorted socialists.10 In the meantime, the Union had succeeded in recruiting the nucleus o f the expeditionary force. There now existed a group o f Ukrainians and Caucasians who were prepared to carry out subversive activities deep behind the fronts, in Russia’s hinter land. But Zimmer’ s private army never left Constantinople: the project which had begun with high promise came to a pitiful end. The mistakes made during the past weeks now became painfully apparent. First o f all, in its endeavour to recruit enough volunteers, the Union had engaged men who were in fact quite unsuited to partisan and subversive work. They possessed no expert know ledge or experience o f such activities, their approach to the difficult task was amateur, with too much sense o f adventure and too little military organization. And, worst o f all, they had no notion o f the meaning o f security. As early as November 1914— to the surprise o f the governments in Berlin and Vienna— the Russian emigre press published the first reports on the activities o f the Ukrainian Union.11 In these articles early in the war, the first sinister reports o f Helphand’ s subversive activities appeared: for the first time the web o f rumour, that later was to be spun 10 Pallavicini to the Foreign Ministry, telegram No. 898, and Count Tarnowski to Consul Urban, telegram No. 1256, of 30 November 1914. H H uStA , P.A.Krieg 8b, 902. 11 Golos, 11 November 19 14 ; cf. P. S. Melgunov, <0/0/0/ nemetskii klyuch, Paris, 1940, pp. 18-20.

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in su ch com p lexity that it was im possible to disentangle, began to gather around his nam e. H e had to learn h ow to deal w ith it ; w e shall have occasion to observe w hat kind o f tech niqu e he d evelop ed . T h is first tim e, h ow ever, he was con vin ced that the R u ssian

emigres in Sw itzerland and in France cou ld kn ow b u t

little, and he flatly denied his connexions w ith the U n io n .12

Finally, the whole enterprise came to a complete standstill when Enver Pasha raised objections against the expedition on strategic grounds. Supported by General Liman von Sanders, a German who was then in Turkish services, Enver succeeded in having the dispatch o f the expeditionary force postponed until Turkey should have gained naval supremacy in the Black Sea. This was in the middle o f November, a few days after Turkey entered, on the side o f the Central Powers, into the war.13 Despite the failure o f the Union to advance beyond political agitation, Helphand was far from discouraged. He had convinced himself, by the beginning o f December 1914, that he possessed an unfailing method for the overthrow o f the Tsarist regime. It could not long resist a direct alliance between the Central Powers and the Russian revolutionaries, between the Prussian guns and the Russian proletariat. Although the motives o f the two parties to the alliance differed, in the defeat and overthrow o f Tsarism they shared an immediate aim. Helphand believed this alliance to be o f immense and immediate advantage to both sides; he was quite unconcerned with their obvious incompatibility, or with the difficulties which lay in the distant future. It was early in January 1915 that he asked Zimmer to arrange a meeting for him with the German Ambassador to Constantinople. On 7 January Freiherr von Wangenheim received Helphand, who put the following plan before him : ‘ T he interests o f the German government’ , Helphand stated bluntly, ‘ are identical with those o f the Russian revolutionaries.’ Helphand said that the ‘ Russian Democrats could only achieve their aim by the total destruction o f Tsarism and the division o f Russia into smaller states. On the 12 cf. ‘Ein Verleumdungswerk’, in D ie Glocke, 1915, p. 127. 13 Pallavicini to the Foreign Ministry, telegram No. 837, 17 November 1914, H H uStA , P.A.Krieg 8b, 902.

A n Interlude in Constantinople

137

other h an d , G erm an y w o u ld n ot be com pletely successful i f it w ere n ot p ossible to kindle a m ajor revolu tion in R ussia. H o w ever, there w o u ld still be a danger to G erm an y from R u ssia, even after the w ar, i f the R u ssian E m pire w ere n ot d ivid ed in to a n u m ber o f separate p a rts.’ Som e o f the R u ssian revolutionaries w ere already at w o rk ; there w as, h ow ever, still a certain lack o f cohesion betw een the various factions. T h e M ensh eviks, for instance, had n ot yet jo in e d forces w ith the B o lsh ev ik s; H e lp h a n d told the A m bassad or that he saw it as his task ‘ to create unity and organize a rising on a broad basis’ . A

congress o f the R u ssian revolutionary leaders

sh ou ld m eet, p ossib ly in G en eva, as the first step tow ards restor ing u n ity ; b u t for all this, considerable sum s o f m on ey w o u ld b e n eeded . H e lp h a n d expected , h ow ever, the Im perial G overn m en t in B erlin to do m ore than dole ou t m on ey for the purposes o f the revolu tion in R ussia. H e A m b assad or,

that

the

was confident, H e lp h a n d

G erm an

Social

D em ocrats

told the

w o u ld

rew arded, for their ‘ patriotic attitude’ , b y an im m ediate im p rove m ent in prim ary schools and in average w orking hours. T h e follow in g day, on 8 January, W a n g e n h e im reported on the conversation w ith H e lp h a n d in a detailed telegram to the F oreign M in istry .14 T h e A m bassador stressed the ‘ u sefu l services’ w h ich H elp h a n d had rendered in C on stan tin ople, and added that the attitude o f this ‘ w ell-k n ow n R u ssian socialist and p u b licist’ h ad b een , since the begin n in g o f the w ar, ‘ definitely p ro -G e rm a n ’ ; he also transm itted H e lp h a n d ’ s request that he sh ou ld b e allow ed to present his plans personally to the F oreign M inistry in B erlin . H e lp h a n d ,

for his part,

cam e aw ay from

the m eeting w ith

W a n g en h eim w ith the im pression that he co u ld expect a favou r able reception at the W ilh elm strasse. H e set o ff on the trip before the telegram reached the F oreign M inistry. H e m ade a n um ber o f stops on the w a y : the first one in B u ch a rest, w here he arrived on 9 January. O f the local socialists, H e lp hand knew D im itru M arinescu and D o b ro g e a n u -G h e re a ; b u t m ost im portant, his o ld frien d R akovsky was n ow back in the R um anian capital, leadin g the local party and editing its daily new spaper. 14 Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia , document No. i, London, 1958.

138

The Merchant o f Revolution

H e lp h a n d knew he had to tread carefully in B ucharest. A few weeks before his arrival there, Siidekum , the R eichstag d ep u ty, had visited the R um anian capital on a m ission sponsored b y the G erm an F oreign M inistry and b y the party executive, in an attem pt to influence the local socialists in G erm a n y ’ s favour. Siidekum had succeeded on ly in bringing the R um anian socialists under

suspicion

o f having

accepted political subsidies

from

B erlin . A n d as far as H e lp h a n d was con cerned, their attitude to the war b y n o m eans corresponded to his ow n . T h e party leaders w ere determ ined to rem ain neutral and to keep their country ou t o f the war. T h o u g h at all events preferable to war on G erm an y, neutrality did n ot necessarily im p ly an an ti-G erm an attitude. H e lp h a n d u n d erstood the p osition o f the R um anian socialists, and he m ade n o attem pt to w in them over for the p o licy o f an alliance w ith G erm an y. H e lp h a n d u n d erstood the Balkan m ilieu w ell, and he was

m u ch

m ore

successful

than

Siidekum .

w anted

assurance o f a V e il-d is p o s e d ’ neutrality, M arinescu and G herea w ere quite prepared to give it. R akovsky, on the other h an d , cou ld see b ey o n d the narrow confines o f local p o litic s: w ith h im , H e lp h a n d cou ld speak quite op en ly, and n ot on ly about the R u m anian situation. A ll the evidence points to the fact that R akovsky declared h im se lf ready to accept subsidies for the R u m anian party, and that he agreed w ith H e lp h a n d ’ s plans in regard to R u ssia. T h re e days after H e lp h a n d ’ s arrival in B ucharest, the G erm an M inister there, vo n dem B u ssch e-H ad d en h au sen (w ho had b een advised b y the F oreign M inistry o f H e lp h a n d ’ s im p en d in g visit) tele graphed B erlin that he was n ow in a p osition to let the R u m anian socialists ‘ have m on ey in an in con spicu ou s m ann er’ , and he asked for the approval o f an expenditure o f 1 0 0 ,0 0 0

lei.lb O n the day

w h en the approval from B erlin reached B ucharest, B ussche m et the socialist leader personally, for the first tim e. N everth eless, at the party congress in the sam e year, R akovsky claim ed that on ly H e lp h a n d h im se lf had su bscribed

300 lei for the socialist n ew s

paper, a sum w hich was later paid b a ck .16 A t the tim e o f the 15 Zeman, op. cit., document No. 84, note 1. 16 Internationale Korrespondenz, Berlin, 19 15, No. 45, p. 545.

An Interlude in Constantinople

139

congress R akovsky was the m ain speaker at a socialist mass dem onstration for peace, w h ich B ussche described as having b een ‘ su pp orted b y m e and the A u stro -H u n g a ria n M in ister’ .

Entente side, the R um anian police arrested R akovsky at the end o f 1916, on charges o f having con d u cted propaganda against the w ar. In 1917, A fte r R u m an ia’ s entry into the war on the

after R u m an ia’ s speedy defeat, R akovsky em erged in Stockholm , ru n n in g, as usual, a R um anian socialist new spaper. H e then asked the G erm an authorities to allow his w ife transit across G erm an y so that she cou ld com e and jo in him

in Sw eden.

B ussche was n ow in B erlin , w orking as U nder-Secretary o f State in

the

F oreign

M in istry ;

su pp orted R ak ovsk y’ s request,

stating quite plain ly that ‘ form erly, R akovsky was connected w ith us and w orking for us in R u m an ia’ . T h e r e is an ironic postscript to the story. W h e n R akovsky stood in the dock at the great M o scow trial o f, in Stalinist official ja rg o n , the ‘ B lock o f R igh ts and T ro tsk y ites’ , V ish in sk y m ade, on b e h a lf o f the p rose cu tion , precisely the same charge against R akovsky. T h e veteran socialist, the form er Soviet A m bassador to L o n d o n , m igh t w ell have w on dered w here the p u b lic prosecutor got his in form ation. H o w e v e r, in January

1915 H e lp h a n d had every reason to b e

satisfied w ith the ou tcom e o f his ligh tn in g descent on B ucharest. In a m atter o f a few h ours, he succeeded w here a prom inent G erm an socialist had failed so dism ally. H e was n ow m ovin g fast. W h e n B ussche asked the B erlin office for a special allow ance o f 1 0 0 ,0 0 0

lei, H elp h a n d had already spent tw o days in the B u l

garian capital. H e arrived in Sofia on 10 January. H e was w ell know n am ong the B ulgarian

socialists w ho still regarded h im , in

a rather

ou tdated w ay, as an orth od ox M arxist, a leading critic o f revision ist tendencies. T h e party was d ivid ed at the tim e into tw o fac tio n s; the ‘ narrow ’ and the ‘ b ro a d ’ socialists. T h e split had b een caused b y a p roblem — the attitude to the sm all peasants— similar to that w hich had occu p ied the G erm ans during the agrarian debate in the eighteen-nineties. Because o f the position he had then taken, H e lp h a n d was h eld in especially h igh esteem b y the ‘ narrow ’ faction o f the Bulgarian party. A lth o u g h its leaders, D im itar B lagoev and G eorgi K irk o v , hardly differed from their

140

The Merchant o f Revolution

R u m anian com rades in their attitude to the w ar, they th ou gh t they ow ed it to H e lp h a n d , their o ld com rade-in -arm s, to enable h im to p u t his ideas before a large audience. T h e y in v ited him to appear as one o f the m ain speakers at a mass m eeting on the follow in g day. H is nam e retained its o ld pow er o f attraction am ong the B ulgarian socialists. O n 11 January

1915, som e 4,000 people assem bled in a hall called ‘ N e w A m erica’ , the largest theatre in tow n , and w h en H e lp h a n d arrived o n the platform

was greeted

‘ tum ultuous

applause’ . 17 W h a t

H e lp h a n d had to say, h ow ever, soon m ade the ovations die d ow n . T sa rism , he p oin ted o u t, threatened E u ropean dem ocracy. T h e achievem ents o f socialism w ere bein g threatened b y the R u ssian A r m y , and G erm an y was carrying the m ain b u rd en in the struggle against M u scovite absolutism . H e then cam e ou t in to the op en . H e exh orted the Bulgarians to enter the war o n the side o f G erm an y. H e r victory, he said, was n ot o n ly necessary in the interest o f socialism , b u t also for the national developm ent o f the Balkan states, and for the in dependence o f the U krainians, the C aucasians, and the P oles. B y the tim e H e lp h a n d finished the speech there was an icy silence in the hall. T h e B ulgarian socialists w ere clearly n ot prepared to b u d ge from their position o f neutrality. Som e tim e b efore the m eetin g, P lekhanov, the fou n d er-fath er o f R u ssian M arxism , had b een trying to d o , on b e h a lf o f R u ssia, w hat H e lp h a n d was n ow doin g on b e h a lf o f G erm an y. T h e y w ere b o th u tterly u n su ccessfu l. In the party organ,

Move Vreme, B lagoev

w rote that H e lp h a n d , like P lekhanov, was a patriot an d a chau vinist. T h e B erlin party leadership, w h ich H e lp h a n d h ad d e fen d ed w ith con viction , h ad , in B lag oev’ s view , betrayed the G erm an w orkers on

4 A u g u st 1914. T h e true representatives o f

the G erm an proletariat, B lagoev h op efu lly b elieved , w ere the extrem ists around R osa L u x e m b u rg , L ieb k n ech t, and M eh rin g, w h o h ad op en ly con d em n ed the war. A n d then the p ro-R u ssian B ulgarian patriots also ch ip p ed in . T h e y fu riou sly attacked first H e lp h a n d ’ s political lin e, and then his personal integrity. T h e y dism issed him as an agent o f G erm an 17 D. Blagoev, Izbrany Proizvedeniya\ ‘Plekhanov i Parvus’, Sofia, 1951, vol. 2, pp. 66976.

A n Interlude in Constantinople

141

Im perialism , a traitor to socialism ; they m ade it quite plain that he was a m an w h o cou ld be b o u g h t, a shady businessm an w h o had m ade a fortune b y sinister transactions, and in w hose support for the G erm an G overn m en t pecuniary m otives played a large part. H elp h a n d believed that the press cam paign against h im had been inspired b y the R ussian legation in S o fia : be it as it m ay, his visit there brou gh t him a lot o f p u blicity b u t little success. T h e G erm an M inister h im self, v o n M ichahelles, a conventional and reserved diplom at o f the o ld sch ool, cou ld n ot quite believe in H e lp h a n d ’ s authenticity as a political ad viser: the tw o m en got on very b ad ly. In contrast to B ussche in B ucharest, w h o was op en -m in d ed and w ho had a flair for political im provisation, M ichahelles had no tim e for experim ents o f H e lp h a n d ’ s kind. It was to B ussche that H elp h a n d reported on his m ission to B u l garia; he returned to the R um anian capital at the en d o f January. E arly the follow in g m on th , H elp h a n d arrived in V ien n a. H e was m u ch m ore interested in establishing contacts w ith the rem aining R ussian exiles than w ith the local A u strian socialists. M ost o f the R ussians o f the large pre-w ar colon y in the H a b sb u rg capital had been com pelled, as enem y aliens, to cross the frontier into Sw itzerland on the outbreak o f the w a r; H elp h a n d was fortunate

that R yazanov was

am ong

those

w ho

had

stayed

b eh in d . A s an expert on M arx, R yazanov en joyed a g o o d reputa tion am ong the A u strian and G erm an socialists; he was w ellconnected in V ien n a, in the university and official circles, and felt quite at hom e there. H e was an o ld friend o f H e lp h a n d . A lon g tim e before their reunion in

1915, they had been p u p ils,

in the eighteen-nineties, at the same school in O d essa. W h e n R yazanov came to G erm an y at the turn o f the century, H elp h a n d in trod u ced him to the G erm an socialist leaders and arranged for

Neue Zeit. A n d since the split in the R u ssian Social D em ocrat party in 1903,

his contributions to appear in K au tsk y’ s m on th ly,

b oth m en w ere h igh ly critical o f the R u ssian party organization. In com parison w ith the mass m ovem ents in w estern E u ro p e, they fo u n d it lacking, m ainly on account o f rem oteness from the political realities affinities betw een

R ussia.

the

T h e re

existed

striking

political

tw o m e n : in St. Petersburg in

1905,

142

The Merchant o f Revolution

R yazan ov em erged as the leading m em ber o f the grou p

‘ P arvusists’ . T h e ir frien dsh ip was based on a sim ilarity o f political attitudes, as w ell as o n certain features o f character com m on to the tw o m en . T h e y w ere b o th too detached, too critical and self-con fid en t to fit easily in to an organization ; alth ou gh R yazan ov’ s tastes w ere m ore in the direction o f precise scholarship— he later becam e the D irector o f the M a rx -E n g e ls-L e n in Institute in M oscow — the tw o friends w ere u n ited in their contem pt for intellectual m ed iocrity, and con vin ced o f the originality o f their ow n ideas. T h e r e w ere, h ow ever, differences in their attitudes to the w a r: R yazanov sym pathized w ith the internationalists— w ho w ere o p p o sed to participation b y

the

socialists in

the war— around

T r o tsk y ,

M artov, and the circle o f their friends con n ected w ith the n ew s paper

JVashe Slovo in Paris. T h is d id n ot, h ow ever, stop R yazan ov

offering his friend hospitality at his house in V ien n a. H e lp h a n d stayed there a few m onths after L en in had done so, w h en the A u strian authorities had allow ed the B olsh evik leader, after a b r ie f term o f im prison m en t, to proceed on his trip to Sw itzerland. T h e stay w ith R yazanov was o f the u tm ost im portance for H e lp h a n d , and he m ade g o o d use o f it. H e was looking for u p -to date inform ation about the R u ssian Social D em ocrat ex iles: on their policies and m o o d , on their latest alliances and enm ities. H is host was in a position to provide it. R yazanov had at his house all the im portant legal and illegal p u b lica tio n s; he was in tou ch w ith the R u ssian party leaders, and he knew w hat they w^ere doing and thinking. Such inform ation was ju s t as im portant for H e lp h an d as the private contacts w ith the R u ssian socialists, w h ich R yazan ov was able easily to establish. T h rou gh

R yazanov,

H elp h a n d

op en ed

another

secret

channel w h ich le d deep into the com plex netw ork o f the R u ssian socialist grou ps. R yazan ov’ s past tied him to H elp h a n d w ith links o f affection and political sym p ath ies; he was n ot a m an o f p etty scruple w h o was afraid to com prom ise for the sake o f tactical advantage. It did not require a high degree o f political sophistica tion to perceive that the R u ssian socialists— and in particular those w h o h ad, or w ere about to declare them selves against the war— w ere a sm all, d ivid ed , and isolated grou p , and that they

A n Interlude in Constantinople

143

m ight need allies w ho cou ld offer concrete assistance. R yazanov had every reason to believe that H elp h a n d w o u ld becom e such an ally. H is w ork d id n ot go unrew arded. A m o n g the few extant papers that H elp h a n d left beh in d him there is a banker’ s order for

5,000 m arks, m ade out in R yazan ov’ s favour in 1915.18

T h e re w ere a few other sm all matters for H elp h a n d to attend to in V ien n a. R yazanov in trodu ced him to A b ra m o v ich , a m em ber o f the M enshevik central com m ittee, and on e o f the leaders o f the Jew ish socialist

Bund . H e was deeply im pressed b y H e lp h a n d ,

b u t n ot so m u ch as to approve o f his attitude to the w a r.19 H e lp hand also talked to the ed ito r-in -ch ie f o f the Italian new spaper

Avanti, G eaccinto Serrati, w ho assured him that Italy w o u ld rem ain n eu tral: V ien n a,

vo n

H elp h a n d

T sch irsch k y ,

told

the

about

G erm an

the

view s

A m bassad or of

the

Italian

H elp h a n d was n ow ready to go to B erlin . H e had done a great deal on his w ay from C on stan tin ople, and he had gathered m u ch o f the inform ation he n eeded . H is was n ot a return o f the prodigal son. Som e five years earlier, H elp h a n d had stop p ed in V ien n a on his w ay to the N ear E ast. H e was then a penniless jo u rn a list, living from hand to m ou th , driven b y the n eed for tem porary escape and b y the desire for adventure. N o w , although he had broken som e m ore o f the unw ritten rules o f socialism — he had m ade too m u ch m on ey, and his connexions w ith the p ow ers-th atbe w ere too intim ate— he cou ld face his com rades w ith confi dence. H e thou gh t they cou ld use his services, and he knew he cou ld use theirs. H is m aterial circum stances had changed con sid era b ly; so had his political position . H e was n ow one o f those socialists w ho approved o f the w a r: that he did so for other than patriotic reasons was not im m ediately apparent. H e had had the first taste, in C on stan tinople and in Sofia, o f the kind o f price he w o u ld have to pay. A new picture o f his personality w o u ld soon e m e rg e : the im age o f a radical socialist and revolutionary w o u ld be overlaid b y that o f a propagandist o f G erm an y’ s victory. It was n ot too 18 Nachlass Helphand, Report 92. 19 Abramovich, In Tsvei Revolutsies, vol. 1, p. 374. 20 A A , von Tschirschky to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, 10 February 1915, in W K 1 ic sec.

144

The Merchant o f Revolution

h igh a p r ic e : it w o u ld n ot m ean his exclusion from the socialist ranks. H e had had his first encounters w ith the G erm an diplom ats, the m en w h o w ere n ow goin g to play an im portant role in his life. Som e o f them trusted h im , b u t n on e entirely, and he did n ot trust them . In the w orld they w ere accustom ed to, he cut a bizarre fig u re; it w o u ld take som e tim e, especially for the stiff b u tterflycollar m en , to com e to term s w ith his existence, let alone w ith his political plans. H e o f course d id n ot have to tell them everyth in g, and he very rarely d id . H e becam e u sed to operating in the shadow y backgrou nd o f the political sta g e : he becam e accustom ed to the exercise o f influence w ith ou t ever appearing as one o f the leading actors. H e cou ld b e anonym ous w h en he chose to, and w ithdraw n . F rom this p osition H e lp h a n d w as able to observe the w orld w ith equanim ity and, perh aps, even w ith contem pt.

Between the Socialists and the Diplomats T h e interview w ith the A m bassad or to C on stan tin ople early in January had brou gh t H elp h a n d firm ly to the attention o f the F oreign M in istry. It set in m otion an intricate and p ow erfu l m achinery w ith w h ich he w as, as yet, little acquainted. O n 10 January, v o n Jagow , the State Secretary, gave his agreem ent to H e lp h a n d ’ s reception at the W ilh e lm stra sse ; D r . K u rt R iezler was sent over from the G eneral H eadquarters to B erlin ‘ w ith m ore detailed instructions’ , b u t H e lp h a n d was n ot to b e told w here R iezler had com e fro m .1 D r . M ax Z im m er, w h o had returned from C on stan tin ople, was also in vited to H e lp h a n d ’ s audience in the F oreign M in istry, n o t, o f course, w ith ou t having first b een p led g ed to special secrecy. H e lp h a n d ’ s m eeting w ith the diplom ats took place at the en d o f F eb ru a ry : because o f the nature o f the business on h an d , no record o f it was m ade. W e are, h ow ever, fortunate in possessing

a detailed m em orandum w h ich H e lp h a n d h anded in to the F oreign M in istry a few days later, on 9 M arch 1915. It gives an accurate picture o f H e lp h a n d ’ s part in the conversation. It is a u n iqu e d ocu m en t, a p lan , on a vast scale, for su bversion o f the T sa rist E m p ire. H elp h a n d p u t a th ree-poin t plan before the G erm an diplom ats. H e su ggested that su pport be given to the parties w orking for social revolu tion in R u ssia, as w ell as to the m inority nations w h ich w ere striving for in dependence from the T sa rist E m p ire ; he p rop osed the infiltration o f R u ssia b y propaganda, and an international press cam paign against T sa rism . In regard to the su pport o f the refractory nationalist grou p s, H e lp h a n d p u t forw ard detailed suggestions on the w ay in w h ich the program m e o f national subversion cou ld best be carried ou t. 1 Zeman,

G erm any and the R evolution in R u ssia ,

document No. 2.

146

The Merchant o f Revolution

In his view, the Ukrainians occupied the key position among the minority nations; he regarded the conflict o f economic interests between the Ukrainian peasants and the Russian landowners as especially promising. T he Ukraine was the corner-stone which, once removed, would destroy the centralized state. More than a quarter o f a century later, Alfred Rosenberg, one o f the Nazi experts on Helphand, incidentally held and practised precisely the same views. Finland offered, according to Helphand, a similar promise. T he Finns had opposed Russian rule in 1905, and they were ready to resume their fight for independence. Helphand recom mended that the Swedish Government should draw the Finns into negotiations, and that military and political contacts should be established between Berlin and Helsinki in order to prepare the Finns for an armed uprising against Russia. He laid special stress on the fact that these contacts would be valuable, before the out break o f the revolution in Russia, for intelligence and communica tions. T he easiest way o f smuggling arms and explosives into the Russian capital led across the Finnish frontier. Helphand was less optimistic about the chances o f success in the multi-national area o f the Caucasus. T he independence move ment in the South was fragmentary because o f the existence o f various national groups: Helphand recommended consultation with the Turkish Government. He suggested that the Turks should convince the Moslems o f the Caucasus to conduct a H oly War on Russia only with the support o f the local Christians. Helphand expected the Armenians and the Georgians to give the most vigorous lead; agitation among the Kuban cossacks could also be conducted from Turkey, through the Ukrainian liberation movement. It was, however, the support o f the socialist opposition that lay at the centre o f Helphand’ s interest. T he history o f the first Russian revolution o f 1905 had shown that the Tsarist Govern ment needed speedy victories in order to counter the growing discontent o f the population. Since the development o f the war had dashed such hopes to the ground, it could now be assumed that the refractory forces o f nationalism would ally themselves with the socialist revolutionary movements. It was, Helphand

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insisted, in Germany’ s interest to accelerate this development. First o f all, connexions with the local strike committees had to be established. Apart from the industrial areas in the South— the Donets basin, the oil industry in Baku and on the Black Sea, as well as the Black Sea merchant marine— Helphand emphasized the revolutionary potential o f Siberia. A large part o f the popu lation there was made up o f political exiles, the military forces stationed in Siberia were weak, and centres o f political and mili tary subversion could easily be established. At the same time, preparations should be made to facilitate the flight o f the exiled revolutionaries to European Russia. In this way, St. Petersburg would gain ‘many thousands o f the ablest agitators’ . Helphand regarded the local movements as a basis on which, early in the following year, a general strike could be organized: it should be conducted under the slogan ‘Freedom and Peace’ . He then singled out the Putilov, Obukhov, and Baltic works in St. Petersburg as the centres o f industrial unrest; the support o f the railwaymen for the strike he regarded as o f the highest importance. He was convinced that ‘Strikes here and there, the risings produced by distress and the increase in political agitation will all embarrass the Tsarist government. I f it takes reprisals, this will result in growing bitterness: if it shows indulgence, this will be interpreted as a sign o f weakness and fan the flames o f the revolutionary movement even more.’ 2 Helphand made it quite clear to the German diplomats that the Russian Social Democrats were alone capable o f organizing the strike: he pointed to the Bolsheviks, under Lenin’ s leadership, as the most effective organization. He thought it essential that all the socialist groups that were to be supported by Germany should form a united front. The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks would have to come to an agreement; the Jewish Bund, the Spilka (the Ukrainian organization), the two Social Democrat parties o f Poland, as well as those o f Lithuania and Finland, would also be represented. A socialist congress o f unity in Switzerland or in another neutral country, Helphand regarded as the most suitable way o f achieving this aim. Finally, the press campaign that was to be conducted inside 2 Zeman, op. cit., Appendix I, Memorandum by Dr. Helphand, p. 144.

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and outside Russia; infiltration o f pacifist propaganda should be accompanied by support for the emigre press, in so far as it took an anti-war, defeatist line. Helphand mentioned Golos— which later appeared under the name Nashe Slovo— as a newspaper which maintained a ‘ thoroughly objective attitude’ to the war. Helphand envisaged a world-wide drive for peace and against Tsarism, in which the socialist press o f all countries would play an important part; he saw the two campaigns, inside and outside Russia, as closely linked. He added that the United States, because o f the ‘ enormous number o f Jews and Slavs there’ , who represented a ‘very receptive element for anti-Tsarist agitation’ , deserved some special attention. Such was the plan Helphand put before the German diplomats. Attached to the March memorandum, however, there was a fivepage supplement: its appearance and contents differ from the main body o f the document, and it is very likely that it was added a few days later. Helphand summed up in it the result o f his activities in Bucharest, Sofia, and Vienna, as well as adding a few afterthoughts on the contents o f the memorandum. He regarded the Balkan trip as a success. A change o f mood in favour o f Germany was noticeable in the Rumanian as well as in the Bulgarian press. ‘ The Bulgarian press is now completely pro-German, and there is a noticeable swing in the attitude o f the Rumanian press. The provisions which we have made will soon show even better results.’ 3 Helphand also reported that he had succeeded in establishing the first contacts, through Sofia, with the organization o f the Russian sailors in Odessa, and he hoped that he would be able to maintain the connexion through Amsterdam. He then concluded the supplement with an elevenpoint programme, which somewhat modified the views expressed in the main part o f the memorandum. He now gave the Bolsheviks the key place in his revolutionary plans. Under point 1, Helphand wrote: ‘Financial support for the majority group [i.e. the Bolsheviks] o f the Russian Social Demo crats, which is fighting the Tsarist government with all the means at its disposal. Its leaders are in Switzerland.’4 In Helphand’s opinion, Lenin’ s experienced group o f professional revolu3 Zeman, op. cit., p. 150.

4 ibid., p. 150.

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tionaries offered the best guarantee o f success for the mass strike; his previous central idea o f a socialist congress o f unity was now relegated to the eighth place. After the reference to the Bolsheviks, Helphand’s second point mentioned the possibility o f strikes in Odessa and Nikolaev. Helphand had already put out the first feelers to South Russia: we shall have occasion to discuss the events in Nikolaev, where the strike movement in January 1916 reached the highest pitch o f intensity. It was not the day-dream o f a fanatical conspirator: Helphand had drafted a blue-print for the revolution. It was practical, detailed, with all its parts creating an impressive whole— and it was original. Helphand worked with the combined forces o f national and social disintegration; he built on the experiences o f 1905, knowing that the World War would provide a more suitable background than the Russo-Japanese War to revolutionary events. He spoke o f the ‘preparations for a political mass strike’, rather than o f the organization o f the revolution, which, in his view, was latent, needing only the appropriate impulse for its release. Helphand’s plan for subversion was a calculated and sophisti cated policy aimed at knocking Russia out o f the war. He was prepared to use every means for the achievement o f this aim. ‘ Thus the armies o f the Central Powers and the revolutionary movement will shatter the colossal political centralization which is the embodiment o f the Tsarist Empire and which will be a danger to world peace for as long as it is allowed to survive, and will conquer the stronghold o f political reaction in Europe.’ 5 He nevertheless left open the question o f which other states in Europe would be deprived o f protection by the downfall o f Tsarism, the ‘ stronghold o f political reaction’ . There was no need, Helphand may well have thought, to spell out all his intentions for the benefit o f the German diplomats. The strategy Helphand suggested can, o f course, be faulted on grounds o f the long-term incompatibility o f the two partners to the alliance. He knew about it, but that was not, at the time, his concern. In the long run he expected socialism to benefit more than the Central Powers: early in 1915, Helphand was in fact 5 ibid., p. 150. M.R.-L

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deceiving the diplomats rather than the socialists. His indirectly expressed intention— to make socialism into the leading force in Europe with the help o f Imperial Germany— shows that his readiness to co-operate with the Berlin Government was not, as Lenin came to suspect, based on Helphand’s German chau vinism. He was working with the Imperial Government, but not for it ; he was sufficiently independent, financially and politically, to indulge in his own pursuits. The situation had a certain ironic quality: he was helping capitalism to dig its own grave. The diplomats, confident o f the strength o f their own position, cared even less than Helphand about the long-term incompati bility o f the allies. Helphand was offering them a lot, and he had made his appearance on the scene at the right time. T he ground had been prepared for him. On 18 November 1914, Falkenhayn, then the Chief o f the General Staff, informed the Reich Chancellor that the war situation was serious. T he failure o f the Marne offensive had convinced the German military leaders that the opportunity for a decisive, lightning victory had been lost. Germany was now facing the danger o f collapsing, after a pro tracted war o f attrition, in face o f the material preponderance o f the Allies. T he military leaders therefore requested the Chan cellor to take steps to break the enemy alliance by political means. The Reich rulers were thinking in terms o f a separate peace with either France or Russia: it would leave them in a better position for the settling o f accounts with Britain. The first peace feelers put out to Paris brought no encouraging results. And as the hopes for a separate peace in the West declined, the expectations for an agreement with the Tsar rose. Falkenhayn and Tirpitz in particular supported the idea o f a peace in the East. It was Crown Prince Wilhelm who took it upon himself to open up contacts with the Court at St. Petersburg. In his letter to the Grossherzog von Hessen, on 6 February 1915, he was clearly excited and pleased with the idea: 6I am o f the opinion that it is absolutely necessary to conclude a separate peace with Russia. First o f all, it is too silly that we should hack each other to pieces only so that England could fish in dark waters, and then we would have to get all our forces back here, so that we could put the French in order, because this protracted stationary war costs

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much sacrifice, and it does not improve the morale o f our troops. Could you not establish contact with Nikki [the Tsar] and advise him to agree with us amicably, the desire for peace is apparently very great in Russia— only we would have to get rid o f that bastard Nikola Nikolaevich [the Commander-in-Chief o f the Russian forces]. . . .’ 6 However, there existed serious objections against a separate peace in the east. Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary o f State in the Foreign Ministry, argued that Russia, no less than England, was the Reich’ s enemy. ‘ The Russian is not a friend o f ours. . . . Russia’ s ultimate aim is the union o f all Slavs o f the Balkans and o f the Dual Monarchy under her rule. . . . I am convinced that we must, for the sake o f our own desire for self-preservation, oppose, with all our strength, such a drive for Russia’ s expansion. I f we don’ t settle accounts with our eastern neighbour now, we shall certainly run into new difficulties and another war, perhaps in a few years. . . .’ 7 Nevertheless, a separate peace with Russia remained the only way out o f Germany’ s military impasse. T he Reich Government soon decided to extend, in earnest, peace feelers to Russia; until the end o f July 1915, separate peace in the East was thought to lie within the reach o f Berlin. Helphand’ s March memorandum therefore fitted well into the general scheme. T he German diplo mats did not, o f course, believe in any nonsense about ridding Russia o f her dynasty and paving the way for socialism. But they were interested in the encouragement o f internal unrest in Russia, in order to bring home the point, in St. Petersburg, that the conclusion o f peace was urgent. T he Foreign Ministry simply regarded the support o f the Russian revolutionaries as a means o f exerting pressure on the Tsar, and thus speeding up diplo matic negotiations. For Helphand, on the other hand, separate peace with the Tsar meant the collapse o f his whole plan. Peace w ould free the Russian Government to suppress the revolution by force, in the same way as in 1905. This diversity o f aim— the diplomats wanted peace, Helphand a revolution— was the main source o f 6 E. Zechlin, in D as Parlament, 15 M ay 1963, p. 54. 7 E. Zechlin, D as Parlament, 17 M ay 1961, pp. 275-7.

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friction between them in the early months o f their co-operation. Helphand never tired o f warning the diplomats o f the dangers o f a separate peace with the Tsar. For their part, the diplomats were not greatly worried about the ultimate socialist aims Helphand was striving for. Only the Minister to Copenhagen, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, thought it necessary to point out, in a private letter to the Under State Secretary, the dangers involved in supporting Helphand: ‘ It might perhaps be risky to want to use the powers ranged behind Helphand, but it would certainly be an admission o f our own weakness if we were to refuse their services out o f fear o f not being able to direct them. . . . Those who do not understand the signs o f our times will never understand which way we are heading or what is at stake at this moment.’ 8 Both parties knew what they wanted, and were prepared to take risks. Peace with Russia and the victory o f Germany, revolu tion and the triumph o f socialism, were at stake. T hey were able to come to an agreement. From the middle o f March 1915, Helphand became the leading adviser to the German Government on revolutionary affairs in Russia. His assignment was to organize a united front o f European socialism against the Tsarist regime, and to enable the socialist party organizations in Russia to pro mote their country’ s collapse through defeatist propaganda, strikes, and sabotage. At the end o f March he received, from the Foreign Ministry, the first payment o f one million marks for these purposes. According to his request the money was transferred, ‘ exclusive o f losses incurred in exchange’ , to Bucharest, Zurich, and Copenhagen.9 T he Foreign Ministry also had the Prussian deportation order o f 1893 against Helphand, withdrawn. He was issued with a police pass, which freed him from all the restrictions on enemy aliens then in force. But what o f Helphand himself? Was he doing all this for the love o f the game? Only partly. He represented a special kind o f revolutionary: not for him were pockets stuffed with explosives and illegal literature, the secret codes and frontier crossings, and, at the end o f the journey, imprisonment. Instead, he operated on a grand scale, using the levers o f pow er: money, high-level con8 Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia , document No. 5. 9 ibid., document No. 3.

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tacts, a formidable machine o f war. All this was sheer delight for him. Behind it there was a hard, calculating ambition. He was preparing the ground for his ultimate entry as a reformer, a saviour, the leader o f the revolution. There was more than a hint o f this in the suggestion he had made for a socialist congress o f unity. T he idea might well have occurred to him that, with the help o f unlimited financial means, the Russian party could be reorganized. It could be converted, under his influence, from a factious clique o f conspirators into an instrument o f revolu tionary power. Yet in the immediate future, Helphand had a difficult time before him. He had been out o f touch with European socialism for nearly five years: the leaders o f the German party he had known at the turn o f the century had been replaced by a younger generation o f politicians. Bebel, Auer, and Singer were dead; Karl Kautsky had severed his connexions with the party leader ship and formed an alliance with Eduard Bernstein: they were highly critical o f the conniving, by the majority o f the German socialists, at the war. Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring had made a clean break with the party, openly declaring their opposition to further war credits. Helphand knew none o f the current party leaders: Hugo Haase, Friedrich Ebert, Philipp Scheidemann. T hey were all practical politicians; they had no interest in theory in general, nor in Helphand’ s past achievements in that field in particular. They did, however, know something o f the scandals connected with his name, especially that o f the Gorki affair. Then the rumours which reached Berlin from the Balkans, early in the war, did nothing to vindicate his reputation. Tales o f his legend ary riches, as well as the first critical references in the socialist newspapers to his work with the Ukrainian Union, preceded his arrival in Germany and again revived interest in Helphand, as well as the old, unforgotten resentments. T he first calls Helphand made on his comrades in Berlin did not succeed in allaying their suspicions. Even those socialists who gave the Imperial Government their full support, whose political position was, in this regard, the same as Helphand’ s, found themselves unable to say anything in his favour. Hugo

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Haase, the chairman o f the party, went as far as warning his comrades against any kind o f contact with Helphand: he ex pressed the suspicion that Helphand was a Russian agent.10 Eduard David summed up the attitude o f the party leadership to Helphand in his diary. ‘A very splendid case indeed: an ultra radical revolutionary; a Russian informer, a scoundrel, a con fidence trickster (Gorki affair!), and now a Turkish agent and speculator.’ 11 W hen Parvus called on the editor o f the party organ, Vorwdrts, Heinrich Strobel received him with ill-con cealed contempt. He was ironical and insulting; when Helphand complained that he could not get rid o f the ‘ bad smell o f his radical past’ , and that he still had not been granted German citizenship, Strobel advised him not to show so much ‘ selfassurance and talent’ but simply to write ‘patriotic articles like a good boy, as Haenisch was doing, and then he might even receive an honorary citizenship’ .12 Nor were Helphand’ s former friends on the radical left o f the party delighted by his return to Berlin. W hen he visited Rosa Luxemburg, she gave him no opportunity to speak and showed him the door. Helphand’s second trip to her flat was also un successful: by then, Rosa Luxemburg had been arrested. Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, and Leo Yogiches also received him coldly. Zetkin, who, at the Stuttgart party congress many years before, had been Helphand’ s only comrade to take his side in the controversy with Bernstein, now called him a ‘souteneur o f imperialism’ , who had sold out to the German Government. Helphand’ s appeals to their former friendship failed to make any impression. T he break was final: their ways had parted, once and for all. Helphand was, however, tenacious, and he had one ally. His old friend Konrad Haenisch was completely on his side. On the outbreak o f the war, Haenisch’ s radicalism had proved shallow: there was a hard patriotic core in him and, on 4 August 1914, he gave his whole-hearted support to the Government. He was glad that Helphand had reached, though in a different way, the 10 Sudekum papers, entry for i March 19 15 in the diary; Bundesarchiv Koblenz . 11 Entry for 28 February 19 15, Bundesarchiv Koblenz • 12 H. Strobel, D ie Weltbuhne, No. 51, 11 December 1919.

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same decision. He was one o f the few German socialists to give Helphand an enthusiastic welcome. Owing to Haenisch’ s cautious mediation, Helphand succeeded, in the following months, in removing the suspicions o f the right wing o f the party under Eduard David and Lensch, as well as in gaining direct access to Ebert and Scheidemann. His reception in Germany was a foretaste o f what was awaiting him in Switzerland, the home o f most o f the Russian exiles. But before he embarked on the trip to the decisive meetings with the Russians in Switzerland, Helphand returned, in the middle o f April, to the Balkans. H e first wanted to wind up his private affairs in Constantinople. On his way there he made a stop in Bucharest, where he once again met Rakovsky and Bussche, the German Minister. Having had a part o f the one million marks the Foreign Ministry had put at his disposal transferred to a bank in the Rumanian capital, Helphand attempted to persuade Rakovsky — Trotsky’ s old friend and political associate— to siphon the money o ff to the Russian socialist exiles in Paris, who, under Trotsky, Martov, and Lunacharsky, were engaged in publishing the defeatist newspaper, Nashe Slovo. Helphand was probably successful: Trotsky said later, in New York, that he had received the money for Nashe Slovo mainly from Rakovsky.13 It is ironical to consider that it was Trotsky, who, a few weeks before Helphand’ s meeting with Rakovsky in Bucharest, had lashed out against his former friend in Nashe Slovo. In his ‘Epitaph for a Living Friend’ , published in the middle o f Feb ruary, Trotsky drew a sharp distinction between the old radical Parvus before 1914, and the ‘ political Falstaff’ and chauvinist who emerged after the outbreak o f the war. Trotsky conceded that Helphand had been a figure o f historical importance, a friend and a teacher o f his. Since 4 August 1914, Parvus was, in Trotsky’ s eyes, dead. ‘ This is Parvus, whom, for many years, we saw as our friend, and whom we now have to place on the list o f the politically deceased.’ 14 T he distinction between the old and the new Parvus, first drawn by Trotsky, has remained valid for the 13 cf. David Shub, ‘Lenin i Vilgelm II. Novoe o germano-bolshevitskom zagovore I 91 Novy Z h u rm l, June 1959, pp. 226-7. 14 Nashe Slovo, 14 February 19 15.

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communist publicists and historians. T hey still find words o f praise for Parvus, the socialist thinker; Parvus in the war, on the other hand, is described as a chauvinist and a profiteer, a horrible example o f the decline o f the Second International. Trotsky’ s article certainly contributed to the hardening o f opinion against his former friend in exile circles. Yet Helphand was anything but petty. Although Trotsky had made his mission more difficult, he was bent on swiftly carrying it out. He was not without assistance. About the time o f the publication o f Trotsky’ s article, Karl Radek was busy making Helphand the subject o f a lively discussion among the Russian exiles in Switzer land. As a Jewish immigrant from Austrian Poland, Radek had join ed the German party before the war. He then played a con spicuous role— first as Rosa Luxemburg’ s friend, later as her enemy— in the party’ s radical group. He was a talented and cynical publicist, and as such he had made his name in the German movement. On the outbreak o f the war, in order to avoid military service in the Austro-Hungarian forces, Radek moved to Switzerland. His pacifist views did not prevent him from develop ing a warm admiration for Helphand. Helphand, for his own part, could not have wished for a better public-relations man. Though unpaid, Radek was very active on his behalf. He was fond o f telling political anecdotes about Helphand in the Berne cafes, to any o f the Russian exiles who cared to listen. Radek spun tales about Helphand’ s relations with Melenevski and the Ukrainian Union; even when he told o f Helphand’ s affairs with women, or his dishonesty in financial matters, Radek did not really sound very disapproving. He may have felt that Helphand had realized a lot o f what he himself was secretly desiring; his listeners certainly got the impression that there was in Radek a hipsch shtik— a good bit— o f Helphand.15 In the middle o f May 1915, Helphand himself arrived in Switzerland. T he impression he made on the Russian exiles surpassed even Radek’ s fantastic yarns. Helphand did not just move into Bauer au Lac, one o f the most expensive hotels in Zurich: he set up court there. He lived like an oriental potentate, surrounded by an ostentatious show o f wealth. There was usually 15 A. Litwak, Geklibene Schriftn (in Yiddish), New York, 1945, P* 254.

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a retinue o f rather well-endowed blondes about; his liking for enormous cigars was matched by his indulgence in cham pagne: preferably a whole bottle for breakfast. His appearance, too, had changed. His massive, gigantic figure was more puffed out than ever. T he broad, bull-like face with its high forehead, tiny nose, and carefully trimmed beard, had developed a flabby double-chin, behind which his neck completely disappeared. T he small lively eyes were deeply embedded in fat. His short legs were barely strong enough to support his body, and when he was standing up or walking, he seemed to use his arms to maintain himself on an even keel. This was not the man many o f the Russian exiles remembered from the time o f the first revolution when he was scraping a meagre living as a journalist, when his old and tattered clothes made him, even in appearance, one o f them. Now his actions seemed almost calculated to arouse the con tempt o f his former friends. Comrade Ekaterina Groman— at one time Helphand’ s mistress, who was known under her cover name ‘ the wave’ when she worked illegally in St. Petersburg— did, however, take it upon herself to spread the news o f Helphand’ s arrival in the Russian colony; he also gave her money for distribution among the poorer exiles. T he gesture further inten sified the rumours o f Helphand’ s fantastic riches. A meeting with Lenin was, however, Helphand’ s most urgent task. He knew that o f all the various factions o f the party, the Bolsheviks ran the most experienced and efficient organization. Lenin had already spoken out against the victory o f the Tsarist regime in the war. He wanted an immediate revolution— an international revolution in all the belligerent countries: the transformation o f the imperialist war into a series o f civil wars— but a revolution above all else. I f Helphand therefore achieved an agreement with Lenin, it should then not be difficult to win over the remaining factions o f the party; in Helphand’s scheme, Lenin was the key to success. Sometime at the end o f May, Helphand, accompanied by Ekaterina Groman, suddenly appeared at a restaurant where the Russian exiles usually lunched. After inquiring if Lenin was there, one o f the Russians took him over to the Bolshevik leader’ s

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table: Lenin was having a quiet meal with Nadezhda Krupskaya, his wife, Inessa Armand, his friend, and Kasparov. After a brief conversation, Lenin and Krupskaya left the restaurant with Helphand, and took him to their modest flat in Distelweg. Helphand himself described the ensuing conversation: 6I exÂ plained to him my views on the social-revolutionary consequences o f the war, and at the same time drew his attention to the fact that, as long as the war lasted, no revolution would occur in Germany and that, at this time, a revolution was possible in Russia only, where it would break out as the result o f German victories. He dreamt, however, o f the publication o f a socialist journal, with which, he believed, he could immediately drive the European proletariat from the trenches into a revolution.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; 16 A Bolshevik called Siefeldt, who was told by Lenin about the meeting shortly after it had taken place, reports that Lenin hardly gave Helphand enough time to finish talking, saying that he regarded Helphand as an agent o f Scheidemann and the other German socialists turned chauvinists, and that he wanted to have nothing to do with him. Lenin then apparently saw his visitor to the door, asking him never to return.17 Whatever turn the conversation took, the essential point is quite clear: Helphand and Lenin did not reach an agreement. T he conversation took place under the shadow o f the old personal aversion, dating back to the early years o f the century; since the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, Helphand had repeatedly criticized Lenin for his dogmatic narrowness and an egocentric approach to matters o f organization; for his own part, Lenin resented Helphandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; s overbearing and patriarchal attitudes. And differences in character, in their ways o f life, must have reinforced the sharply divergent political attitudes o f the two men. In addition, the likelihood that Lenin saw in Helphand a rival for the leadership o f the revolutionary movement may also have influenced his decision. Lenin had to take into account the fact that, i f successful in his scheme, Helphand would eventually acquire control o f the Russian socialist organizations, and, with his financial resources and his intellectual ability, would be able 16 Im K a m p f um die Wahrheit, p. 50. 17 A. Siefeldt, B akinskii Rabochii, No. 24, 1 February 1924.

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to outmanoeuvre all the other party leaders. W e know that the same thought had occurred to Helphand himself. Yet Lenin treated the whole incident with the utmost caution. In his public declarations he never made a single reference to his meeting with Helphand, nor did he denounce, as so many socialists did, Helphand’ s personal qualities or his political designs. It is not inconceivable that Lenin wanted to keep a back door open: he certainly used it later, as we shall have occasion to see. In May 1915, however, the important thing for Helphand was that he had failed to secure Lenin’ s co-operation, and that the use o f the Bolshevik underground organization had been denied him. T h e plans he had outlined in Berlin early in March were deprived o f their main foundation. Without Lenin he was able neither to create a united socialist front, nor to operate, with any hope o f success, inside Russia. Helphand now had to make a choice. He could inform the Foreign Ministry o f the failure o f his mission to Switzerland and then confine himself, in agreement with the German diplomats, to, say, socialist propaganda in western Europe. Or else he could attempt to form his own organization, powerful and effective enough to extend its activities into Russia. In this event, the aims o f his programme would remain unchanged: its implementation would have to be revised. It would have been out o f character for Helphand to take the first choice. He possessed a firm faith that there was no problem that money and inspired improvisation could not solve. After all, he had learned such methods in business, and he saw no reason why they should not prove equally successful in politics. He knew full well that he could not build up this independent organization in Switzerland, in full view o f the Russian party leaders. Helphand needed a change o f political climate, and the Scandinavian countries were best suited to provide it. Stockholm and Copenhagen were the clearing-houses for business trans actions between the belligerent countries, and the centres o f a multitude o f more or less effective espionage networks. In addition, the ‘northern underground’— the traditional secret channel linking the Russian exiles with their home country, in successful operation since the days o f Alexander Herzen— passed

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through the Scandinavian capitals. Helphand’ s writings were well known to the Danish socialists, and it was to Copenhagen that he decided to move. Before leaving Switzerland, however, Helphand had one more thing to do. He had to recruit exiles who would be prepared to work for him. He asked Ekaterina Groman to let it be known among the Russians in Zurich that he wanted to get together a group o f research workers to staff an institute for scientific and statistical studies in Copenhagen. It was a typical Helphand idea: the institute was to be a front organization, giving protection to secret and conspiratorial activities; recruitment for it could be carried out quite openly. I f the research workers later refused to engage in political activities, they could still carry on with their research; if not, so much the better, from Helphand’s point o f view. Initially, the recruitment drive was not a success. Helphand’s promise that the members o f the staff could travel through Germany on legal passports somewhat detracted from the value o f the assurance that their work would take place in neutral Denmark, and not in Germany. T he Russians became still more suspicious when Hermann Greulich, the veteran Swiss Social Democrat, revealed to the exile press the fact that he had been commissioned to obtain visas at the German Consulate for their transit through Germany. W hen Helphand left for Copenhagen early in June 1915, he was accompanied by four Russian exiles. Apart from the inevitable Ekaterina Groman, the others who travelled with Helphand were Vladimir Davidovich Perasich, Georgi Chudnovski, follower o f Trotsky, and Arshak Gerasimo vich, an Armenian Menshevik, and former deputy to the second Duma. T he five travellers’ departure from Switzerland occasioned yet another flare-up o f the controversy concerning Helphand. The rumours finally filtered through to the leading Russian patriotic newspapers: Helphand’ s research workers were described as German agents, and he himself as a man heavily committed to the German Government. Martov, the Menshevik leader, summed up the views o f the majority o f the exiles when he wrote, in a letter to a friend, that he regarded the behaviour o f Helphand’ s

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recruits as ‘ tactless’ even when, at best, it might be assumed that Helphand was not a direct agent o f the German Government.18 Regardless o f growing hostility, Helphand carried on recruit ment among the Russian and Polish exiles in Scandinavia. He knew he had financial security and political action to offer, two things the exiles badly needed, but could never get. His activity met with a mixed reception. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin— an un worldly Marxist scholar who was to rise high in the Soviet State, only to be struck down, like most o f his comrades, by Stalin— had arrived in Scandinavia shortly before Helphand, and he was by no means averse to joining the Copenhagen institute. He declined the offer only after Lenin’ s intervention.19 Another refusal came from Zeth Hoglund, the leader o f the left-wing group in the Swedish Social Democrat party, who, three years before, had translated a number o f Helphand’ s studies into Swedish. Helphand was more successful with a Menshevik called Moisei Uritsky. In 1910, Uritsky had moved close to Trotsky and be came responsible for organizing the transport o f the newspaper Pravda, then being published in Vienna, to Russia. W hen the war broke out, Uritsky was in Germany, from where he went on to Stockholm; he remained in Scandinavia until the outbreak o f the revolution in Russia in 1917. In that year he became a prominent member o f the Bolshevik central committee: in January 1918 he was entrusted with the dissolution o f the Constituent Assembly. Uritsky’s promising career ended in the same year, at the hands o f a member o f the Social Revolutionary party, who murdered him. His first reaction to Helphand’s advances was unfavourable: Uritsky was not interested in working for a scientific institute. He did, however, appreciate the value o f Helphand’ s practical plans, and in this respect the two men soon reached an agree ment. Uritsky remained in touch with Helphand, occasionally organizing courier services for him, which were usually carried out by Alfred Kruse, the Danish socialist. In conversation, 18 Pism a Axelroda i M artova , Berlin, 1924. Martov to Semkovski, 10 Ju ly 1915, p. 344. 19 cf. Lenin’s letter to the Bolshevik central committee, 12 December 1917, in Leninskii Sbornik, Moscow, 1959, vol. X X X V I, p. 19.

162

The M erchant o f Revolution

U ritsk y always expressed his approval o f H e lp h a n d ’ s activities; o n a n u m ber o f occasions he d efen d ed H e lp h a n d as an h o n o u r able, tru stw orth y, and h elp fu l com rad e.20

Jakob Fiirstenberg was Helphand’s most valuable acquisition. Better known by his cover names Hanecki or Kuba, Fiirstenberg was a Polish socialist who became one o f Lenin’ s most trusted friends. He was born in Warsaw in 1879, the son o f a wealthy family; after some years spent as a student in Berlin, Heidelberg, and Zurich, he gave all his time and energy to party work, distinguishing himself as a specialist in illegal transportation. For two years before the war Fiirstenberg had lived with Lenin in Poronino, a village near Cracow; after a short stay in Switzer land, he arrived in Scandinavia in the summer o f 1915, about the same time as Helphand. Fiirstenberg was a reticent and completely reliable conspirator; he was versatile, capable o f acting in two or more roles simul taneously. In his personality, the qualities o f a dray-horse were combined with those o f a fox. He often undertook, at Lenin’ s request, delicate missions without appearing to bother much with their purpose and, still less, their justification. Since Lenin must have wanted to place one o f his own men in Helphand’ s organization, Fiirstenberg would be the obvious choice. W e have, in fact, every reason to assume that Fiirstenberg joined Helphand with Lenin’ s consent. T he Bolshevik leader had an accurate eye for the characters o f his comrades, and an infinite patience with the details o f organization. W e have seen that he advised Bukharin against joining Helphand’ s institute: he knew that an intellectual like Bukharin would be useless for the purpose o f keeping a check on Helphand’ s activities. Lenin then forbade his other agent in Scandinavia, Alexander Shlyapnikov, to enter into any contact with Fiirstenberg. Shlyapnikov was an honourable, in corruptible party worker who disapproved even o f the little he knew o f Fiirstenberg’ s activities. ‘ Lenin’ , Shlyapnikov wrote in his memoirs, ‘ warned me against relations with Hanecki and others, who were mixing business with politics.’ 21 It was, however, the same Hanecki whom Lenin called, in the spring o f 1917, a 20 Z. Hoglund, Fran Branting till Lenin, Stockholm, 1953, p. 157. 21 A. Shlyapnikov, Kanun Semnadtsatovo Goda, Moscow, 1923, Part II, vol. 4, pp. 297-8.

Between the Socialists and the Diplomats

‘ reliable and clever chap’ .22 I f, in

163

1915, L e n in seconded H an eck i

to w ork in H e lp h a n d ’ s organization, b oth parties w ere w ell se rv e d : L en in cou ld b e kept in form ed about the progress o f w ork in Scandinavia, w hile H elp h a n d had in Fiirstenberg a m ost suitable con n exion w ith the B olshevik headquarters. F in ally, it is likely that K o zlo vsk y, a law yer from St. Peters burg and originally a m em ber o f the P olish Social D em ocrat party, was

also

w illing

co-operate

con n exion was revealed on ly in J u ly

w ith

H e lp h a n d .

T h is

1917, w h en K o zlo v sk y ,

together w ith L e n in and others, was charged b y the R u ssian provisional G overn m en t w ith diverting G erm an m on ey to the B olshevik party coffers. V e ry little, u n fortu n ately, is know n about K o zlo v sk y ’ s w artim e activities; one fact is, h ow ever, com m on to all the m em oirs b y his con tem p oraries: K ozlovsk y often travelled betw een Stockholm and St. Petersburg on u nexplained and secret m issions. T h e re w ere other p eop le w h o w orked for H e lp h a n d . T h e y w ere occasional revolutionaries, adventurers, and other representatives o f the w artim e

demi-monde, w hose undecipherable

pseudon ym s and C hristian nam es have com e d ow n to us in official records, bearing w itness to their ow ners’ obscurity. H elp h a n d kept away from the diplom ats w hile he w as b u ild in g u p his revolutionary organization. O n ly w hen it was w ell advanced on the w ay to operational order, d id he let them know m ore about his activities. A t the begin n in g o f A u g u st, his friend from C o n stantinople, D r . Z im m er, arrived in C op en h agen to make inquiries on b e h a lf o f the F oreign M in istry. H e was able to find ou t quite a lo t.23 W h e n Z im m er visited h im , H elp h a n d sh ow ed his concern w ith the press cam paign against h im in the as w ell as in the R u ssian

Entente countries

emigre circles. H e com plained that

because o f it, tw o o f his assistants had declined to go on w orking for him . H elp h a n d thou gh t that his visits to the B erlin m inistries m ight have b een

n oticed , or that the

security

tight

was

n ot

en ou gh .

G erm an

G overn m en t

recom m en ded

that

the

F oreign M in istry’ s reply to these rum ours sh ou ld be that he had m erely ‘ b een advising o n econom ic questions in T u r k e y ’ . 22 Lenin, Sochineniya, vol. X X , p. 55, letter to Hanecki 17/30 March 1917. 23 A A , ‘Bericht fiber den Stand der Arbeiten des Herrn Dr. Helphand*, 6 August 19 15. Akten der Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen, file ‘Helphand*.

164

The M erchant o f Revolution

Z im m er was able to find ou t for h im se lf that the speculations o f the R u ssian

emigre press on H e lp h a n d ’ s C op en h agen institute

— that it concealed the headquarters o f a conspiracy— w ere quite w ron g. H e lp h a n d had u sed it as a decoy during his recruitm ent d riv e ; alth ou gh the institute existed, it was m erely w hat it p u rp orted to b e : a research organization. R evolu tion ary co n spiracy was also bein g taken care o f, b u t under an entirely different front. F rom every p oin t o f view , a business com pany was m u ch m ore suitable

than

a research institute

for

H e lp h a n d ’ s p u rp oses.

D esp ite the w ar, trade betw een G erm an y and R u ssia was still going on — betw een A u g u st

1915 and J u ly 1916 it am ounted

to 1 1 ,2 2 0 ,0 0 0 rou bles— and it passed, legally or illegally, th rou gh Scandinavia. Since w artim e trade regulations in R u ssia w ere n ot very restrictive, and H e lp h a n d was able to obtain special im port and export licences from the G erm an authorities, he w as in a p osition to b u ild u p a trad in g-cu m -revolu tion ary organization in R u ssia. T h e com pan y H e lp h a n d set u p in C op en h agen ju d ic io u sly m ixed politics w ith b u sin e ss; it ran its ow n netw ork o f agents, w ho

travelled betw een R u ssia

and Scandinavia. A p a rt

from

lookin g after business interests, they m aintained contact w ith the various u n d ergrou n d cells and strike com m ittees, trying to co ordinate them in to a unitary m ovem en t. Z im m er described their activities in the follow in g m an n er: T h e organization created by Parvus is now employing 8 people in Copenhagen and about 10 who travel in Russia. This work serves the purpose o f contacting various personalities in Russia, as it is necessary to bring together the various disjointed movements. T h e centre in Copenhagen maintains an uninterrupted correspondence with the connexions made by the agents. Parvus has set aside a fund to cover the administrative costs o f the organization, which is used very thriftily. T ill now it has been possible to run the whole affair so discreetly, that not even the gentlemen who work for this organization have realized that our government is behind it all. It has already been noticed that Parvus spends much money on behalf o f the party. This can be dis guised when the export firm, connected with the bureau, does some

Between the Socialists and the Diplomats

165

business. In this respect I have discussed various suggestions with Dr. Helphand.24 It was the on ly com pany in the R u ssian revolutionary bu siness. L e n in , Z im m er knew , was still inactive and cou ld do very little because he h ad no m on ey. T h e re w as, h ow ever, n oth in g against supporting h im w h en the ‘ existing tension [i.e. w ith H elp h a n d ] has abated’ . In the m eantim e, how ever, H e lp h a n d was w ell ahead. H is business representatives w ere able to cover the w hole o f R u ssia, and the dealings o f the export-im port enterprise soon p rovid ed a channel for m on ey throu gh w h ich G erm an subsidies for the revolutionary m ovem ent cou ld b e p u m p ed . Su ch a channel was b ey o n d control b y the R u ssian authorities. H elp h a n d cou ld , for instance, use G erm an official m on ey to purchase goods in the W e s t for sale to R u s s ia : political m on ey was thus neutralized into current business

in com e,

w hich

was

used

the

spot

for

revolutionary activities. Im ports from R ussia for the G erm an war in du stry cou ld be h igh ly p ro fita b le; som e o f the profits w ere then distributed am ong the ‘ bu sin essm en ’ , and others p lo u g h ed back into purchasing goods for export in R u ssia, and so o n . A m em ber o f the A u stro -H u n g a ria n legation in Stockholm later sum m ed up the w h ole business in the follow in g m a n n er: It is quite certain that, during the war, Helphand and Fiirstenberg could, and did carry on, with German help, an export business through Scandinavia to Russia. . . . This import o f German goods to Russia was undertaken regularly and in considerable volume by the H elphand-Fiirstenberg enterprise, in the following manner: Helphand received from the Germans certain goods such as surgical instruments, medicines, and chemicals, needed in Russia, and then Fiirstenberg, as his Russian agent, shipped them to Russia. T he cost o f these goods was

not paid back to Germany, but, since the outbreak o f the Russian revolution, it was mainly used for Lenin’ s propaganda.25 It was u sefu l business experience w hich stood Jakob F iirstenberg in go o d stead w h en he becam e, after the B olsh evik revolu tion , the head o f the Soviet N ation al Bank. 24 ibid. 25 H. Grebing, ‘So macht man Revolution*, in Politische Studien, Munich, 1957, p. 234.

M.R.-M

166

The Merchant o f Revolution

Z im m er was very im pressed b y w hat he fo u n d in C op en h agen , and he su ggested that the G erm an legation sh ou ld from n ow on keep in tou ch w ith H e lp h a n d . In the follow in g years, C o u n t B rock d orff-R an tzau , the M inister to C op en h agen , becam e closely con n ected w ith H e lp h a n d ’ s revolutionary activities. T h e ir first m eeting took place at the en d o f J u ly

1915; a fortn igh t later

R antzau w r o te : T have n ow got to kn ow H e lp h a n d better, and I think that there can be n o qu estion that he is an extraordinarily im portant m an w hose unusual pow ers I feel w e

must em p loy

for the duration o f the war and sh ou ld , i f at all p o ssib le, co n tinue to use later on — w hether w e personally agree w ith his convictions or n o t.’ 26 O n the surface, the tw o m en d id n ot have m u ch in com m on . H e lp h a n d was a w andering Jew , a socialist w ith a taste for flam boyant g o o d livin g, a taste he had on ly recently b een able to in d u lge. B rock d orff-R an tzau , o n the other h an d , was an over civilized grand-seigneur icily reserved, self-co n trolled , elaborately p olite. H e lp h a n d ’ s retinue o f w om en w o u ld have appealed to h im n ot at all. H is career in the F oreign M in istry h ad progressed sw iftly and successfully. A fte r a n um ber o f appointm ents abroad— the stay in St. P etersburg betw een the years aw akened

his

keen

and

lasting

interest

ap poin ted M inister to C op en h agen in

1897 and 1901 had

R u ssia— he

w as

1912, w h en he was fo rty -

tw o years o ld . H e d id n o t, h ow ever, fit the accepted picture o f an Im perial G erm an diplom at. T h e R antzau fam ily was neither Prussian nor

Junker. T h e y w ere an old -estab lish ed H o lste in

com ital fam ily, con n ected w ith the D a n ish royal h ou se. H is politics w ere m arked b y a strong liberal streak; during the war he assum ed a b en evolen t attitude tow ards the G erm an Social D em ocrat party. B rockdorff-R an tzau knew n o prejudice w h en concrete political aims w ere at sta k e: he was quite able to set aside the predilections o f his class. H e was am bitious, for h im se lf and for his country, and it was this am bition that m ade it p ossible for h im to deal, w hen necessary, w ith the devil h im self. B u t he w as reserved, and he fo u n d it difficult to establish hum an contact. H e w ou ld receive visitors and discuss politics o n ly late at n ig h t; for then, he was 26 Zeman, op. cit., document No. 5.

Between the Socialists and the Diplomats

167

able to show a certain am ount o f ‘ b lu ff open ness’ , especially tow ards those m en w h o , b y day, usually did n ot m ove in the same social circles as he h im self. T o w a rd s H e lp h a n d , R antzau show ed no personal or political prejudice. T h e ir relationship grew out o f the form al fram ew ork o f political co -o p e ra tio n : obsession w ith R u ssia’ s defeat, and their conviction that a revolution in St. P etersburg was the surest w ay o f achieving it, created a com m unity o f interest betw een the tw o m en . R antzau saw H elp h a n d as an expert on revolu tion s, w hose advice he readily accepted. Y e t there existed betw een them an understanding, even sym pathy. H elp h a n d cou ld be a very pleasant and w itty co m p a n io n ; his

untram m elled

vigou r,

his

frivolous

B oh em ian

existence,

appealed to R antzau. N eith er o f the tw o m en cou ld b e m easured against a conventional yard stick; their m utual tolerance m ade the sm ooth developm en t o f their relationship p ossible. In B rockdorff-R antzau, H elp h a n d acquired a p ow erfu l ally am ong the diplom ats, the best liaison w ith the F oreign M inistry he cou ld have w ished for. In their first conversation at the beginning o f A u g u st, H e lp h a n d tried hard to safeguard his revolutionary p olicy against the threat o f a separate peace w ith R ussia. W ith uncanny perception, he felt that B erlin was still toying w ith the idea o f a separate p e a c e : his suspicions w ere in fact ju stified . H e told R antzau that he regarded a revolu tion in R ussia as ‘ in evitable’ . A cco rd in g to the latest inform ation at his disposal, he told the M inister, unrest had already affected the arm y and the arm am ents w orkers. T h e position o f the T sa r had been w eakened so far that he no longer com m anded sufficient authority to conclude a separate peace w ith G erm an y. A g a in , H elp h a n d tried to strengthen his argum ents b y draw ing R antzau’ s attention to the p roblem o f the lon g-term aims in the E a st: he knew that his view s o n the w eakening and decentralization o f R ussia cou ld make a strong im pression in official quarters. A t the same tim e, H e lp h a n d suggested that the over-all m ilitary strategy sh ou ld be co-ordinated w ith his revolutionary plans. G erm any had to make quite certain, he argued, that R ussia did not gain control over the Straits. Such a success, he knew fu ll w ell, w ou ld bring the T sa rist G overn m en t a trem endous am ount o f prestige at h om e. T h e war w ou ld b e ‘ lost politically, even i f a

168

The Merchant o f Revolution

m ilitary victory was w o n ’ . T h e G erm an armies sh ou ld therefore concentrate their striking p ow er in South R u ssia, and thus give T u rk e y a m ilitary re sp ite ; another line o f attack sh ou ld b e aim ed at the D o n e ts b a s in : the occu pation o f this industrial area w o u ld cut across R u ssia’ s m ain artery.27 C o-op era tion w ith the M inister to C op en h agen , as w ell as the establishm ent o f the revolutionary headquarters in the D a n ish capital, represented, for H e lp h a n d , an im portant advance. O n e thing o n ly rem ained to be d o n e : the p u b licity cam paign directed at the E u rop ean socialists. H e had placed great value on a gu id ed press cam paign, d esign ed to exploit their traditional aversion to T sa rism . W h e n D r . Z im m er called on h im in C op en h agen , H e lp h a n d m en tion ed to h im the fact that he still lacked the ‘ necessary basis’ for the p u b licity drive. H e to ld his visitor that he in ten d ed to fo u n d his ow n periodical, to b e called

Die Glocke. F or this p roject,

to o , R antzau gave his fu ll su p p ort. It was essential, he advised the U n d er State Secretary, that the F oreign M in istry sh ou ld rem ove all obstacles in the w ay o f the p rojected jo u rn a l. It was to b e u sed n ot o n ly for the purposes o f a revolu tion in R u ssia, b u t also to lead the G erm an w orkers to su pp ort the creating

stability

and

u n ity

w ithin

the

R e ich .

state,

thus

‘ O th erw ise’ ,

R antzau w rote, ‘ w e shall never achieve the great aim w h ich I have before m y eyes. I have the h ope that w e shall n ot o n ly em erge fro m this war as the external victors and the greatest pow er in the w o rld , b u t also that, after the trem endous test that the G erm an w orkers, in d eed — to avoid in vidiou s com parisons— “ the com m on m an ”

in particular , have n ow u n d ergon e, w e m ay b e able co n

fiden tly to try to brin g those elem ents to co-operate w h o , b efore the w ar, stood apart and seem ed u nreliable, and to grou p them around the th ro n e.’ 28 T h e day before R antzau dispatch ed his confidential letter, H e lp h a n d had left— on

13 A u g u st— for B erlin . R antzau had

sm ooth ed the w ay for h im , and he cou ld expect a g o o d reception in the F oreign M in istry. In ad d ition , recent political and m ilitary 27 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Foreign Ministry, telegram No. 1306 of 10 August 19 15, in W K Nr. 2; and a letter to Zimmermann of 13 August, in W K Nr. 1 ic sec. 28 Zeman, op. cit., document No. 5.

Between the Socialists and the Diplomats

169

developments had also gone in Helphand’ s favour. On 3 August, Germany’ s peace feelers to St. Petersburg had finally come to grief, and the possibility o f a separate peace appeared, once again, remote. On 11 August, Bethmann-Hollweg, the Reich Chancellor, reported to the Kaiser that the ‘pushing back o f the Muscovite Empire to the East by detaching its western territories’ was the central aim o f Germany’ s eastern policy.29 At the same time, the occupation o f Warsaw on 5 August revived the hopes in Germany o f Russia’ s early breakdown. O n ce in B erlin, H elp h a n d soon fo u n d out that neither the F oreign M inistry nor the G eneral Staff had any objections to the fou n dation o f his jo u rn a l. T h e reservations o f the M in istry o f the Interior against a socialist pu blication w ere easily disposed o f, and H elp h a n d was allow ed to address p u b lic op in ion direct. H is task n ow was to w arn E u ropean socialists against the T sa rist regim e, and to b egin preparations for a political mass strike in R u ssia. T h e date for the outbreak o f the strike— the fuse w h ich was to set o ff the revolution— H e lp h a n d had fixed for

22 January

1916. H e had on ly five m onths in w h ich to accom plish his selfim p osed and gigantic task. 29 F. Fischer, Griffnach der Weltmacht, Diisseldorf, 1961, p. 238.

8 Not by Money Alone T h e p u blication o f his ow n socialist new spaper was the dream o f H e lp h a n d ’ s life. E v er since the tim e o f the revisionist controversy in the eighteen-nineties H e lp h a n d had suffered, in one w ay or another, at the hands o f the editors o f the G erm an socialist p r e s s : he d evelop ed a desire to b e financially and p o liti cally in d ep en d en t o f them . N o w he was rich, and the dream was going to com e true, at w hatever price. F rom A u g u st

1915 H e lp h a n d concentrated on launching Die

Glocke— ‘ T h e B e ll’ , a nam e evocative o f A lexan d er H e rze n ’ s R u ssian radical m agazine Kolokol— as early as p ossib le. H e lp h a n d had g o o d reasons for speedy p u blication . Since N o v em b er 1914, L ieb k n ech t and the left w in g o f the party had b een exp ou n d in g the thesis that G erm an y had su ccessfu lly d efen d ed h e rse lf against the enem y attack, b u t that she was n ow carrying o n the war p u rely ou t o f a desire for territorial gain. H e lp h a n d th ou gh t this was a dangerously sentim ental view o f the situation, since it portrayed R u ssia as a defeated p ow er, and thus threatened to u nderm ine the fighting spirit o f the proletarian m asses. H e lp h a n d was also m otivated b y jou rn alistic as w ell as political considera tions. K a rl K au tsk y was o p p o sed to the w ar, and he took the

Neue Zeit w ith h im : there was n ow a vo id in the party p u b licity , w h ich H e lp h a n d in ten d ed to fill w ith his new m agazine. A m o n g the leading

dailies,

Vorwarts and the Leipziger Volkszeitung

follow ed the K au tsk y lin e, and the party leadership h ad to fall back on the support o f tw o sm all provincial new spapers, the

Hamburger Echo and the Chemnitzer Volkstimme. H e lp h a n d had em barked on the first technical preparations for

Die Glocke som e tim e b efore he officially in form ed the F oreign M in istry o f his intentions to start p u b lish in g it. H e was attracted to M u n ich as a p ossible location for the editorial offices: m ilitary

N ot by Money Alone

171

censorship in Bavaria was less severe than that im posed in the other federal states. H e cou ld also rely on the h elp there o f A d o lf M u ller, the e d ito r-in -ch ief o f the

Miinchener Post, w h o had been

a friend o f his since the turn o f the century. A d o lf M u ller, the son o f a m iddle-class C ath olic fam ily in the R h in elan d, jo in e d the Social D em ocrat party about the year having studied m edicine and political econom y. In

1890,

1893, partly

on the recom m endation o f C hristo R akovsky, he was entrusted w ith the editorship o f the

Miinchener Post. H is was an easy

going and conciliatory disposition, and he had little interest in the subtleties o f M arxist d o g m a : he was able to rem ain a lo o f from the theoretical discussions w hich, from tim e to tim e, threatened the unity o f the party. H is attitude to the war was that o f a patriotic politician, and he was able to give H e lp h a n d ’ s p u b lic stand his fu ll approval.

1915 H elp h a n d had got in tou ch , through M u ller’ s good services, w ith the printers o f the Miinchener Post, A s early as M ay

and he acquired a m ajority interest in the shares o f the com pany. H e also w anted to ow n the com pany that p u b lish ed his m agazine, and for this purpose he fou n d ed , at the begin n in g o f J u ly , the

Verlag fu r Sozialwissenschaft in M u n ich . H e then appointed L ou is C o h n , the business m anager o f the Post, to direct the new enterprise. It was som e tim e before C o h n acquired editorial and adm inistrative staff: at first, he had to do m ost o f the w ork for

Die Glocke him self. H elp h a n d w as, h ow ever, convinced that his strong financial backing w ou ld tide the m agazine over its teething tro u b le s: he cou ld afford costly im provisation in the p rod u ction o f the first num bers. H e d id n ot hesitate to w aive all financial considerations in order to have the m agazine exactly as he w anted it. O n business grou n d s, C o h n op p osed any m ention o f the political com m itm ent o f the m agazine on its title p a g e ; H elp h a n d

Die Glocke sh ou ld be ‘ A Socialist B i-M o n th ly ’— Sozialistische Halbmonatschrift. ‘ I am n ot afraid o f

insisted that the su b-title o f

b oy cott’ , H elp h a n d w rote to C o h n in the m iddle o f A u g u st. ‘ It w ill n ot be as b ad as y o u appear to think. In any case— I w ill not give w a y .’ 1 A fte r feverish activity, the first n um ber o f

Die Glocke finally

1 Nachlass Helphand, Rep. 92, letter from Helphand to Cohn, 12 August 1915.

172

The Merchant o f Revolution

appeared in Septem ber

1915. In a special in trod u ction , H e lp h a n d

explained the aims o f the n ew periodical. It w o u ld n o t, he w rote w ith self-con fid en ce, ‘ pander to the p u b lic ’ ; its task was to discuss the political and social problem s w h ich had b een raised b y the w ar, as w ell as to explore the w ays in w h ich a n ew political order cou ld be established after its con clu sion . A t the sam e tim e, it was in ten d ed to awake the intellectual interest o f the w orkers, and to integrate th em in to the cultural life o f the n ation. T h is co n sciousness o f having a cultural m ission to fulfil am ong the w orkers in fact set the tone o f

Die Glocke u ntil its dem ise in 1925: the

m agazine becam e popular especially am ong the party educational functionaries and am ong socialist schoolteachers. T h e first n u m ber o f Die

Glocke contained n oth in g b u t con trib u

tions from its p u b lish er. In addition to a len gth y essay on the h istory and the present p osition o f the G erm an socialist p arty, a shorter piece con cern ed its e lf w ith social conditions in R u ssia and the prospects o f the further develop m en t o f the w ar. H e lp h a n d had n ot d rop p ed his o ld habit o f w ritin g, and it was n o w clearly m arked w ith signs o f com prom ise w ith the pow ers that b e . H e o f course h ad g o o d reasons for w anting to retain the go o d w ill o f the F oreign M in istry, and he n eed ed the co-op eration o f the diplom ats in order to beat the m ilitary censorship. A n y w a y , he was n ot the kind o f m an w h o cou ld b e expected to forgo the privilege o f having his m anuscripts forw arded to M u n ich in diplom atic b ags. N everth eless, his lon g essay o n the Social D em ocrat party was an yth ing b u t a patriotic declaration or a renunciation o f the revolutionary struggle o f the proletariat. It glorified the party as a m o d el for the international w orkers’ m ovem en t, and was a critical survey o f the credit and debit side o f the w ork accom plish ed in G erm an y. It was in fact a m anifesto sim ilar to T r o ts k y ’ s stu d y

Itogy i perspektivy, a distillation o f the sum total o f H e lp h a n d ’ s theoretical w ork. It certainly contained sharp criticism o f the G erm an party, b u t n ot the k in d o f criticism a renegade w o u ld have m ade. W h e n H e lp h a n d rebu k ed the party, it was for its revolutionary barrenness. E arlier, his criticism had con cern ed in d ivid u al cases and n ot general th e m e s: n o w , the stones he h ad kept on throw ing at the party glass-h ou ses since the agrarian

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debate in 1895 were picked up, and used for laying the founda tions o f a neat little building. In H e lp h a n d ’ s op in ion , M arx’ s revolutionary teaching had been w atered

d ow n

G erm an y.

The

d u ll

arch-vulgarizer,

K a rl

K au tsk y, had achieved nothing bu t corruption o f M arx’ s doctrine. H a d the socialists listened to H elp h a n d , they w ou ld have w on one position after another in a continuous struggle against cap italism : B eb el’ s defensive tactics, based on nonsensical illusions about the autom atic breakdow n o f capitalism , had neither forced a revolu tion, nor prevented the w ar. G erm an Social D em ocracy therefore bore ‘ great political gu ilt’ . ‘ B u t it was n ot a tem porary gu ilt, nor one w h ich originated in a passing m o o d ; it was the outcom e o f w rong tactics, em ployed for

25 years, w h ich cou ld n ot be changed

at the critical m o m en t: a guilt w hich accum ulated throu gh the decad es.’ 2 In this criticism there was m u ch o f the ‘ o ld ’ pre-w ar H e lp h a n d : the active, trou ble-sh ootin g revolutionary, w h om T ro tsk y had already pron ou n ced dead in the spring o f

1915. B u t w hat was

the situation as far as the ‘ n ew ’ H elp h a n d was concerned— i f such a person existed at a ll? H e came ou t in defence o f those socialists w h o had given support to the G overn m en t w h en war was d eclared ; he regarded the G erm an G eneral S taff as the protector o f the interests o f the proletariat in the struggle against T s a r is m ; he vigorou sly d efen d ed the war p olicy o f the G overn m en t against the criticism o f the left-w in g party group around L ieb k n ech t and L u x em b u rg . B u t he did n ot for a m om ent lose sight o f the interests and the future o f socialism , and o f the G erm an m ovem ent in particular. H e thought o f it as the ‘ stron gh old ’ o f the E u ropean m ovem ent, w hich , i f it fell, w ou ld bring socialism everyw here crashing d ow n . If, h ow ever, it w ere victorious in G erm an y, then the battle in the w hole o f E u rop e w o u ld be w on . T h e w ay to socialist victory led , H elp h a n d never w earied o f stressing, throu gh G erm an y’ s defiance o f the T sa rist threat. In this situation, the proletariat w o u ld gain nothing i f it m aintained a negative and passive attitude. T h e

sacrifice o f

‘ b lo o d and suffering sh ou ld n ot be m ade for n oth in g’ . T h e party 2 D ie Glocke, 19 15, p. 41.

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m ust n ow free its e lf from the ‘lu n a cy’ o f m en like K au tsk y and B ernstein , w h o had dem onstrated for peace w ith ou t b ein g able to con clu de the w ar. T h e m iddle class, H e lp h a n d w arn ed, sh ou ld n ot entertain any illusions that the war w o u ld rid them o f the socialist threat. O n the contrary, the w orkers w o u ld return from the trenches w ith a n ew readiness to fight. T h e war was teaching them a ‘ n ew daring, a n ew initiative, and a n ew keenness o f resolu tion ’ , all the qualities they had n ot b een able to learn from parliam entary practice. T h e ‘ n e w ’ H e lp h a n d was in fact already announ cin g that the civil truce w ou ld en d , the day the peace was sig n e d ; there w ere m ore violen t struggles ahead. It was n ot the kind o f w riting the G erm an G overn m en t w o u ld have w elcom ed w ith ou t reservation s: no rebuke from the F oreign M in istry

w as,

h ow ever,

forth com in g.

The

h igh

governm ent

officials in fact p roved them selves quite b ro a d m in d e d ; they had accepted H e lp h a n d , they had taken the p oin t in his p lan s, and they refrained from irritating h im w ith p etty restrictions. A n y w ay, they w ere glad o f additional socialist propaganda in favour o f G erm an y’ s war p o licy , and in this respect H e lp h a n d never failed them . T h e w ar, he repeatedly ham m ered into his readers, was a defensive war against T sa rist absolutism . In the third issue o f

Die Glocke, H e lp h a n d concentrated on

countering the recent attacks and slanders o f his enem ies. T h e tw o articles3 w ere g o o d specim ens o f his m any personal polem ics to com e. H e d evelop ed a tech niqu e for dealing w ith such co n troversies. In this instance, he glossed over the gravest charge against h im se lf— that he was w orking as an agent o f the G erm an G overn m en t, and that his war policies w ere in com plete harm ony w ith those o f the G overn m en t. H e m ade n ot a single reference to his relations w ith the B erlin officials. In stead , H e lp h a n d closely exam ined the h alf-tru ths and faulty in form ation p rod u ced b y his o p p o n en ts, in order to dem olish , b y em ployin g sem i-p roofs and sem i-den ials, the w hole structure o f their accusations. H e did n ot tell the w hole tr u th : he evaded the core o f the con troversy, and he drew quite as m isleading a picture o f his activities as had his accusers. 3 ‘Offener Brief an die Zeitung Nasche Slow o\ and ‘Ein Verleumdungswerk’, D ie Glocke, 19 15, pp. 117 -3 2 and 155-62.

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H e lp h a n d

described

the

su ggestion

that he

had

175

officially

w orked for the Y o u n g T u rk s as a ‘ lo w -d o w n , filthy lib e l’ . In regard to the U krainian U n io n he adm itted his frien dsh ip w ith M arian M elenevski, b u t he insisted that he had ‘ n o co n n ex io n ’ w ith the U n io n itself. T h e assertion that he was attem pting to incite a revolu tion in R u ssia w hile in the pay o f the T u rk ish an d the A u strian

G overn m en ts

was quite

easy to deal w ith .

H e lp h a n d ’ s view , it h ad a farm yard quality abou t it, like the ‘ excrem ent o f a stinking beast’ . C ertainly, he was n ot in A u strian services. B u t w hat o f his co-operation w ith the G erm an G o v e rn m e n t? H e fo u n d a w ay rou n d this p o in t. H e took u p the challenge and op en ly stated his aim s, speaking o f his m ission w ith p a th o s: ‘ T h is m ission is— to create a spiritual link betw een the arm ed G erm an and the revolutionary R u ssian proletariat.’ T h e adjective ‘ spiritual’ w as, o f course, a w ild euphem ism , a propaganda device for draw ing a veil across the solid fact that he was m ediating betw een the G erm an G overn m en t and the revolutionary m ovem ent in R ussia. B u t it was far from im possible to understand the real m eaning o f the statem ent. H elp h a n d cou ld n ot have b een m ore ou tspoken w ithout severely endangering the success o f his w ork. O n ly after he had discharged his duties to the socialist m ove m ent and to h im self, as a w riter, was H elp h a n d ready to hand over the direction o f his paper to an in d ep en d en t editorial staff. F rom the beginn ing o f O cto b er

1915, K o n ra d H a en isch , w h o

had greeted H e lp h a n d ’ s first article w ith boundless enthusiasm , began to act as the ed itor-in -ch ief. A group o f patriotic com rades form ed around h im : am ong them , Paul L en sch , E d u ard D a v id , H ein rich C u n o w , E rn st H eilm a n n , and W ilh e lm Jansson w ere prom inent. W ith them , H elp h a n d acquired the co-operation o f the m ost effective publicists o f the p olicy o f the m ajority party. It was a m ixed grou p . L ik e H aen isch , Paul L en sch originally came from the radical w ing o f the party. A s a m em ber o f the editorial staff o f the

Leipziger Volkszeitung, he had established

h im se lf as an energetic and effective jou rn alist. A fte r som e hesi tation during the votin g on war credits in the R eichstag, he con fidently transferred his allegiance to those m en w ho u p h eld the thesis o f the revolutionary effects o f the w ar. E d u ard D a v id had

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taught German and history at a grammar school in the Rhineland; at the turn o f the century, he was to be found among the leading exponents o f socialist revisionism. His talent was dry and didac tic: his arguments were always considered and individual. He secured for himself an influential position on the editorial board o f Die Glocke, as well as in the party itself. Heinrich Cunow had enjoyed a high reputation in the party as an economist and ethnologist; for several decades he had been an important contributor to the Neue Zeit. He was a sober politician: after August 1914 he made an attempt to guide the JVeue Zeit on the lines set down by the party leadership, and against Karl Kautsky’ s wishes. After a time, he dropped the arguments with Kautsky and decided to use instead the new Helphand publication as an outlet for his writing. Heilmann and Jansson represented the more practical side o f socialist politics. As a radical in Saxony, Heilmann had earned the nickname Ruberrimus, but he grew, however, considerably paler after the outbreak o f the war. He became one o f the most extreme o f the socialist patriots, identifying himself completely and uncritically with the policies o f the German Imperial Government. Wilhelm Jansson provided a link between the editorial board o f Die Glocke and the trade union movement. A Swede by birth, he had become completely integrated into the German party, so much so that he became a partisan o f the idea o f a socialist Germany’s hegemony in Europe. Such company was not always to Helphand’ s liking. In the following years, the editorial board o f the magazine did not always pursue a policy o f which Helphand could wholeheartedly approve. Paul Lensch’ s anti-British campaign, and Haenisch’ s jingoist predilections sometimes occasioned the publisher o f Die Glocke to point at certain differences o f opinion. Shortly before the end o f the war, Helphand described his relations with these men in the following manner: I founded Die Glocke in 1915 as a free socialist platform. Its editorial board was and is directed entirely independently by Haenisch and a board of his assistants. I myself figured only as the publisher. When the newspaper was founded, I did not think that the war would go on for

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such a long time, and I intended to raise the major problems of economic transformation after the war. But the war went on, and it pushed our interest in its aftermath into the background. Pressure of circumstance made it necessary for us to occupy ourselves with the problems of the war. The general line of the newspaper corresponded to my views on the necessity of concluding the war victoriously: in this connexion it was impossible to avoid the confusion of arguments by individual authors, a confusion that arose in socialist circles under the influence of the war. . . . Had I been editing the newspaper myself, I should have tried to exercise a wholesome restraint on the too violently nationalist authors.4 Despite the differences, Helphand gave the editorial board a free rein: he was quite content to have at his disposal an indepen dent means o f communication with the public, which he could use when the need arose. He was rich enough to afford the luxury o f his own journal which, even i f it did not always correspond to his views, at least bore his name. He could console himself with the thought that he was doing better than Kautsky, whose journal appeared once a month only. Die Glocke filled an empty space in German socialist publicity, and it made some contribution to wards the consolidation o f the party after the rift caused by the war. It also served as a public front for Helphand’s activities in regard to Russia; it failed, however, to set o ff an international propaganda campaign against Tsarism. It was, essentially, a prestige undertaking: this may well have made the thought o f a large financial loss bearable for Helphand. T he sharpest criticism o f Die Glocke came, at its first appear ance, from the circles o f the socialist opponents o f the war. Karl Kautsky spoke contemptuously o f the Glockner (the bell-ringers) o f the ‘imperial Falstaff’ , Helphand; Franz Mehring made a scathing reference to ‘ the little bell o f the poor sinners, which Parvus-Helphand smelted, and which Parvulus-Haenisch is pulling’ . Rosa Luxemburg’ s reaction was more to the point. W ith remarkable insight, she recognized at once that the aim o f Die Glocke was to propagate the idea o f the revolution in Russia. She addressed Helphand directly on this p oin t: at no other time did her intelligence suffer so much by her aversion to Prussia, than 4 Im Kampf um die Wahrheit, p. 19.

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The Merchant o f Revolution

on this question o f the revolutionary effects o f a German victory over Tsarism. 5 6Any way,’ she wrote, ‘it is to be feared that the cause o f the revolution in Russia will be obstructed by the war.’ W hen she came to contrast Helphand’ s claim that, by establishing a spiritual link between the armed German and the revolutionary Russian workers he was fulfilling an important mission, with the fact that he was making a fortune in the security o f Denmark, Rosa Luxemburg could, she admitted, no longer understand anything at all.5 T he appearance o f Die Glocke finally moved Lenin to make a public pronouncement on the subject o f Helphand. In his Sotsial-D eurocrat he described Helphand’s periodical as an ‘ organ o f renegades and dirty lackeys’ , surrounding the ‘ cess pool o f German chauvinism’ , in which ‘not a single honest thought, not a single serious argument, not a single straight forward article’ could be found. Helphand’ s declaration that he had a mission to fulfil in connexion with the revolution in Russia, Lenin described as a ‘bad jok e’ .6 Lenin’ s article against Die Glocke has since been used by the Bolshevik publicists as the ultimate p roof that there existed no connexion between their party and Helphand. T hey should have known better. Lenin’ s characteristic use o f the abstract concept, tempered by bad language, was in the accepted socialist con vention o f full-blown journalistic invective; it was a part o f the game. What is more significant is that even on this occasion Lenin refrained from describing Helphand as an agent o f the German Government; the article did not contain a single refer ence to their meeting in May. It in fact did not eliminate the possibility, however remote it may have appeared at the time, o f using Helphand’ s services if the occasion should arise. Lenin may have thought it politically expedient to dissociate himself publicly from Helphand without making a clean break. T he tacit agreement about Jakob Fiirstenberg’s role as H elp hand’ s assistant and as Lenin’ s confidential agent, was in no way affected by Lenin’ s criticism o f Die Glocke. Finally, the Bolshevik 5 Spartakusblatter, No. io, reprinted in Spartakusbriefe, ed. by Dr. H. Kolbe, Berlin, 1958, p. 68. 6 No. 48, 20 November 1915.

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leader was right not to underestimate the steps Helphand had taken towards the revolution. Although in August and in September the work connected with the publication o f Die Glocke proved to be time-consuming, Helphand did not neglect the developments in Russia. Through the regular consultations with Brockdorlf-Rantzau, his views reached the Chancellor, or at least the highest officials in the Foreign Ministry. And as soon as Die Glocke was securely estab lished, Helphand returned to the final preparations for the strike in Russia. He anticipated that it would take place in January 1916. The following weeks were decisive for the success o f Helphand’ s project. He was working with his revolutionary-business organization in Copenhagen, completely absorbed by the formid able task. He even neglected Brockdorff-Rantzau: he made no appearance at the German Legation for several weeks. Towards the end o f November, one o f Helphand’s agents returned from St. Petersburg; on 2 November, Helphand told Rantzau the news he had had from Russia. He reported on the low state o f the Russian Army’ s morale, which remained unrelieved when the Tsar himself took over the high command. T he situation in the hinterland was also on the down grade: starvation was expected to hit St. Petersburg and Moscow during the winter. One piece o f information did, how ever, disturb the Minister. Helphand told him that the Russian Army would not be ready for revolution until the war was con cluded. Helphand tried to allay the Minister’ s concern by hinting at the various local mutinies that had affected the army, and by saying that the ‘ revolutionary organizations’ o f the proletariat were much more important. They were now so strong that he ‘ stuck to his view and regarded revolution as inevitable’ .7 Nevertheless, the Minister’ s doubts prompted Helphand to describe the ‘ revolutionary organizations’ in some detail. He dis liked doing this, but he trusted Rantzau more than the other diplomats, and in any case he now needed their support more than ever. After pointing out that the information was ‘ strictly secret’ , he told Rantzau that ‘ certainly 100,000 men’ could be called out 7 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Foreign Ministry, telegram No. 1932, 21 November 1915, W K 11 c sec.

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The Merchant o f Revolution

on strike in St. Petersburg at twenty-four hours’ notice. Only eight days before, a meeting o f all the organized workers had taken place and a three-day strike had been decided upon in order to assess the forces which would be available for a general strike. Helphand once again stressed his conviction that it would take place on 22 January, the anniversary o f the ‘ Bloody Sunday’ o f 1905. He added, however, that better co-ordination o f the various organizations, and the establishment o f connexions be tween them and the army, still remained to be accomplished.8 Helphand told Rantzau this much and no m ore: it was a very brief account o f the arrangements he was then making. W e have already seen that in Copenhagen, Helphand had succeeded in securing the co-operation o f Fiirstenberg, Uritsky, and Kozlov sky; he was now also in touch with Zurabov, a contributor to the newspaper Nashe Slovo. All these men were experienced underground workers; they had a variety o f contacts in Russia, with local strike committees, independent revolutionary cells, or simply with like-minded individual revolutionaries. In addition, it is possible that Helphand was in touch, through Uritsky, with the Mezhrayontsy, a socialist group in St. Petersburg. Uritsky and another friend o f Helphand’ s, Ryazanov, were among its leading members; it was the same group which Trotsky, after his return to Russia from America in 1917, joined and then later in the same year took with him into the Bolshevik party. Helphand did not tell Rantzau o f his reverses. Another attempt to secure the co-operation o f Bukharin failed; so did an offer, backed ‘by a few hundred thousand roubles’ , to persuade Gurevich-Smirnov, a revolutionary journalist who lived in St. Petersburg, to found a newspaper. It was Kozlovsky who, during one o f his frequent trips to the Russian capital, made the proposal to Smirnov. T he journalist was, however, puzzled by the strange form in which the offer was made, as well as by the high subsidy which accompanied it. Smirnov’ s suspicion that the proposal involved political money from Germany was aroused. He declined the offer, adding that he was rather short o f time.9 Another 8 Telegram No. 1943, continuation of telegram No. 1932, in W K 1 ic sec. 9 Cf. Smirnov’s report of the incident in Z °lo t°i nemetskii klyuch, by P. S. Melgunov, Paris, 1940, p. 137.

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attempt to establish a connexion in St. Petersburg was made by Helphand together with Uritsky and Kruse, the Danish journal ist. On his trip to Russia, Kruse was to get in touch with a certain Buchspan, a high official in the Russian Ministry o f T rade; according to Kruse, the attempt failed.10 T he Bolshevik groups in Russia took no part in Helphand’ s activities. Their co-operation depended on Lenin’ s consent, and their leader had never given this. Anyway, the Bolshevik under ground organization was so weakened by the war that it was hardly in a position to take effective action. Their St. Petersburg committee, for instance, never had more than eight to ten mem bers, and its influence was severely limited. Apart from police supervision, they had to struggle against the enmity o f those Mensheviks who approved o f the war.11 Alexander Shlyapnikov, who supervised the Bolshevik organization on Lenin’ s behalf, has emphatically denied the suspicions that the Bolsheviks co operated with Helphand at this point o f the war. It is impossible to doubt his statement. Had they agreed to co-operate, the Bolsheviks would have been much better o ff than they were. Neither their central committee in Switzerland, nor the bureau in St. Petersburg, had even the most basic financial means at their disposal: at the time o f Helphand’ s briskest activity in Russia, in the middle o f December 1915, Lenin wrote to Alexandra Kollontay in Scandinavia: 4No money. There is no money here. That is the main trouble.’ 12 Such cares Helphand did not have. T he Foreign Ministry and, if need be, he himself, were good providers. He did, however, have to keep an eye on the diplomats, to maintain their interest in the revolution in Russia, and to convince them that attempts at achieving a separate peace with the Tsar were futile. Especially then, when the strikes in Russia were imminent, Helphand wanted to make quite sure that no unexpected agreement be tween the German Government and the Tsar would ruin his plans. On 30 November 1915, Helphand gave Rantzau a memoran dum which examined the problem o f peace, while making 10 Gf. M. Futrell, Northern Underground, London, 1963, pp. 173-4. 11 A. Shlyapnikov, Kanun Semnadtsatovo Goda, vol. 2, p. 100. 12 Gankin and Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War, London, 1940, p. 280.

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The Merchant o f Revolution

additional suggestions as to the ways in which a revolutionary situation in Russia could be precipitated. He warned the German Government against a deal with the Tsarist regime. He claimed that it no longer commanded the necessary authority: i f the Tsar concluded a peace with Germany, it could then be expected that a reactionary government would come into power. It would have a ‘heavy nationalist coat o f paint’ , and it would not feel itself bound by the Tsar’ s undertakings. W ith financial backing by the Entente, it would attempt, Helphand argued, to circumvent the contract made by the T sa r: Germany would thus be deprived o f the ‘political results o f her own achievements on the battlefield’ .13 An agreement with the Tsar might therefore conclude the war, but it could not establish a peace. ‘Russia has already reached such a stage o f political development that a secure peace with this country is impossible as long as the contracting government does not enjoy the confidence o f the people.’ If, on the other hand, Germany did not conclude peace with the Tsar, peace would then become the general slogan o f the revolutionary movement. Helphand added that the desire for peace, combined with extreme material privations, would give the impetus to revolution. For a government which achieved power in this way, the first problem would be to put an end to the hostilities and to offer immediate peace. And since the leaders o f the revolution could place the whole blame for the war squarely on the shoulders o f the late government, it should be much easier for them to make considerable concessions to Germany in the peace treaty. Peace would then be the fulfilment o f the wishes o f the whole nation, and it would have strong popular backing. Helphand was convinced that the situation was quite ripe for the emergence o f the government he had in mind. ‘ T he revolu tionary organizations are now stronger in Russia and more resolute than they were before the outbreak o f the general strike in 1905. T he bitterness which has spread among the masses cannot be compared with that in the year 1905, and the army has taken up an anti-government position. Only the last inclinations towards inertia and apathy remain to be overcome, as always is the case with great mass movements.’ Helphand believed that in 13 Vber die M oglichkeit der Revolutionierung Russtands, W K 11 c sec.

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the stormy atmosphere o f Russia, highly susceptible to influence from abroad, the developments on the eastern front were o f firstrate importance: he was certain that the capture o f Riga and o f Diinaburg would make a profound impression in Russia, destroy ing her last faint hopes o f victory. He then proposed certain financial measures which would open up another way for effective intervention from the outside. This was an inexpensive measure against the Russian money market, a measure which would push the value o f the rouble still lower, and which would undermine the confidence o f the Russian people in their currency. Should it be possible to demonstrate, Helphand wrote, that two sets o f notes with the same serial numbers were in circulation, a panic would be created in Russia which would have the most harmful effect on the country’ s credit position abroad. It would not be difficult, Helphand implied, to introduce forged currency into the Russian market. Finally, he recommended a concentrated propaganda campaign in the Rus sian Army. It would have to take a form tailored to fit the circum stances, and not just that o f anonymous leaflets. Helphand thought the German Social Democrat party and the trade unions were the most suitable organizations for the conduct o f such a campaign, which should respect national feelings and avoid making a direct appeal to the troops to lay down their arms. ‘ The main thing’ , Helphand concluded, ‘is to stimulate the revolu tionary mood. All this will have to be tackled vigorously, as according to every expectation, the revolutionary events will be concentrated around 22 January.’ Brockdorff-Rantzau sent Helphand’ s memorandum to Chan cellor Bethmann-Hollweg, together with his own covering letter, noting that the memorandum was written on ‘ the basis o f the secret reports o f his confidential agent who has arrived here from St. Petersburg’ .14 He went on to say that ‘ although, as with all such projects, we have no means o f knowing that this plan will definitely succeed, Helphand’s political past and especially the role he played in the revolution o f 1905, give us a certain guaran tee that his suggestions have some prospect o f success; at any 14 The Minister to Copenhagen to the Chancellor, Report No. 43, of 30 November 19 15, in W K 11 c sec.

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rate they are— compared with the vague views about the Russian revolutionary problem commonly in circulation—positive, and perhaps promise to bring about a solution o f the question, which in favourable circumstances would be more radical than any solution we have contemplated. . . .’ T he Foreign Ministry’ s immediate decision to invite Helphand to Berlin was doubtless made on the basis o f Rantzau’ s recom mendations. T he Minister to Copenhagen did everything to move the Foreign Ministry from its reserve, and to get its full support for Helphand’s plans. Through his cousin, Counsellor Langwerth von Simmern, he even tried to arrange an audience for Helphand with the Reich Chancellor. For some members o f the Foreign Ministry, this was going too far: Diego von Bergen, the reticent influential Minister in the Wilhelmstrasse, who dealt mainly with subversion in Russia, thought that people like Helphand were not fit to be admitted to the highest councils o f the state. Between 16 and 20 December, Helphand spent a few days in Berlin where he discussed his plans in the Foreign Ministry and in the Treasury. A few difficulties emerged. Whereas the Foreign Ministry promised support, State Secretary Helfferich in the Treasury did not bother to conceal his disapproval o f Helphand’ s monetary schemes. In 1915, no European government could be expected to take up that kind o f suggestion; anyway, Helfferich was doubtful as to the technical plausibility o f the measures against the rouble, and o f the possibility o f carrying them out successfully in haste and in absolute secrecy. Helphand did, however, take away with him from Berlin the promise that the German Government would allocate another one million roubles for propaganda directed against the Russian army.15 Although Helphand did not meet the Chancellor, Rantzau was doing more than his official duty on Helphand’ s behalf. On the day o f his departure for Berlin, the Minister to Copenhagen wrote to Bethmann-Hollweg: at no other time did he make so determined a bid to influence Germany’ s eastern policy.16 T he Russian Tsar, Brockdorff-Rantzau pointed out, had 15 Helfferich to Zimmermann, 12 December and 26 December 1915, in W K 1 ic sec. 16 Report No. 470 of 16 December 19 15, W K 1 ic sec.

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‘ assumed a frightful historical guilt and forfeited the right to any leniency from us’ : the traditional friendship with the Romanovs should therefore be given no weight whatever. Rantzau thought it necessary to attempt the destruction o f the remaining feelings o f solidarity between the German and the Russian ruling houses. The Tsar was a ‘weak and insincere ruler’ , who, ‘ under the influence o f mystic flagellants dreams o f victory over an enemy who never wanted to start hostilities against him’ . The political proposals put forward by Rantzau revealed the extent o f the influence Helphand exercised over the Minister’ s thinking. Separate peace with the Romanovs was out o f the question, because Russia’ s dynasty was on its way out: only a revolution could solve the eastern question. The Minister thought every means justified that secured Germany’ s position as a great power, that protected her from exhaustion, that would simply save her from ‘ accepting conditions dictated by the Entente’ at the peace negotiations in the future. Victory and its reward, the first place in the world, will be ours if we succeed in instigating a revolution in Russia at the right time, thereby breaking up the Entente. After the conclusion o f peace the internal collapse o f Russia would be o f little value to us, perhaps even un desirable. It is certainly true that Dr. Helphand is neither a saint nor a welcome guest; he believes in his mission, however, and his competence was tested during the revolution after the Russo-Japanese war. I think we ought, therefore, to make use o f him before it is too late. W e should prepare ourselves for a policy with Russia which our grandchildren will, one day, call traditional, when, under the leadership o f the House o f Hohenzollern, the German nation has established a lasting friendship with the Russian people. This goal will not be achieved until the Tsarist Empire is shocked out o f its present condition. D r. Helphand believes he can show the way, and he has made positive proposals which are based on twenty years’ experience. In view o f the present situation, I believe we must take the chance. T h e stakes are certainly high, and success not neces sarily certain. Nor do I misjudge the repercussions on our internal political scene which this step can bring in its wake. I f we are able to

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bring about a final military decision in our favour, this would be by all means preferable. Otherwise, I am convinced that all that remains is the attempt at this solution, because our existence as a Great Power is at stake—perhaps even more. Brockdorff-Rantzau’ s striking communication to the Reich Chancellor clearly defined the scope and the problems o f Ger many’ s eastern policy. He was aware o f the risks his country was running, and he did not neglect the possible consequences for Germany’ s internal policy o f the measures he recommended so highly. T he consequences Helphand was hoping for Rantzau accepted, perhaps even feared: this was the only important dif ference between them. Rantzau accepted the risks because, at the end o f 1915, he was certain that victory could no longer be achieved by conventional military means: he made it quite plain what kind o f a victory he would have preferred. He welcomed Helphand’ s co-operation because he saw no other way out. There can, on the other hand, be no doubt that Rantzau’ s willingness to oblige had a profound effect on Helphand. He was certainly glad o f the Minister’ s benevolence; he may even have been flattered. It caused him to abandon the caution he had shown before. W hen Helphand had written his original March memorandum for the Foreign Ministry, he had confined himself to discussing the preparations for a mass strike; with Rantzau he had talked, during the previous few weeks, about preparations for a revolution. T he two men gave each other far too much en couragement. T h e fact that the German Government had shown itself un willing to give their plans as much support as they demanded, did not dampen Helphand’ s enthusiasm. Immediately after his return to Copenhagen from Berlin, Helphand again requested, through the Minister, the promised one million roubles.17 He pointed out that it was absolutely essential that an agent travelling to Petrograd in the next few days should be given the money in order to organize, in the last remaining weeks before 22 January, the connexions between the various revolutionary centres. So that he should forestall objections, Rantzau added that Helphand 17 Report No. 489 of 21 December 19 15, W K 1 ic sec.

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did not appear ‘ to be twisting my arm; his suggestion appears to have arisen out o f the political situation rather than personal considerations. . . It was in the same conversation that Helphand indicated, for the first time, that a successful outcome in January was not an absolute certainty. He indicated that an additional twenty million roubles were necessary to complete the organization o f the revolution: he was clearly toning down the high expectations that had recently marked his conversations with the Minister. Although Helphand still maintained his belief that the revolu tionary movement would be set in motion by the events in January, he added that it would not embrace 4the whole country at once’ . And although he was convinced that, after the initial revolutionary success, Russia would be unable to regain her internal peace and stability, he advised the German Government to prepare itself for another winter campaign, and to put the measures he had suggested into immediate operation. Now, at the end o f December, Helphand tried to retreat to the position he had originally held, before he had started talking about a revolution instead o f a general strike. But his attempt to bring the Foreign Ministry down to earth and to dispel, at the last moment, any illusions about the great event which was about to occur in St. Petersburg was doomed to failure. It was he himself who had nurtured these illusions in the first place. He was now fighting against his own shadow: Parvus, the revolutionary, was in danger o f being outplayed by Dr. Helphand, the diplomatic adviser. He received the million roubles ‘ for the support o f the revolu tionary movement in Russia’ on 29 December,18 and early in January 1916 he took it with him to Stockholm. He was more accessible there to his agents in Russia, and better placed to observe the development o f the strike. On 3 January 1916, he telegraphed Brockdorff-Rantzau: ‘All is going as desired. Expecting reports from St. Petersburg.’ 19 The strike movement in Russia in January 1916 made a vigor ous start. On 11 January, more than 10,000 workers at the ‘Naval’ 18 The Akten der Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen, ‘Helphand’, contain his handwritten receipt. 19 loc. cit., telegram No. 24.

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factory in Nikolaev came out on strike. Although it was ostensibly motivated by economic grievances, the local police was in no doubt as to its political motives. T he wage demands were pitched so high that the management could not possibly have satisfied them. In a police report signed by Rear-Admiral Muraviev and sent to the Government, it was left an open question â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;whether this political strike is the work o f the enemy o f the established order, that is, o f the left-wing parties, or whether the enemy o f the state [Germany] had a hand in itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; .20 Since every attempt to bring the strike to an end failed, the Admiralty ordered the closure o f the factory on 23 February. Eleven days after the Nikolaev workers had downed tools, another 45,000 workers came out on strike in St. Petersburg, in memory o f the events o f the Bloody Sunday in 1905. T he January strikes started unexpectedly and briskly: they were taken note o f by diplomatic observers in the capital, who regarded them as an early danger signal. There can be no doubt that Helphand thought them his own achievement. He had put a special stress on the development o f the revolutionary movement in the harbour towns o f South Russia, Odessa and Nikolaev: his first revolutionary contacts in the war were with these towns; the date and the course o f the strike in the capital also pointed to Helphandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; s influence. T he workers everywhere were able to stay away from their factories for a considerable length o f tim e: Helphand had taken special care that the strike committees should have sufficient sums at their disposal for the payment o f the rouble equivalent o f about 3s. (1916 value) to a worker every day. T he strikes did not, however, spark o ff a revolution. In the capital, fewer men were involved than Helphand had anticipated; the workers in Moscow and in the provinces did not follow their lead. Helphand was wrong in assuming that he could, in the course o f a few months, convert the volatile m ood o f discontent into a revolution; he overestimated the effectiveness o f the means at his disposal. Organization had never been his strong p oin t: he thought improvisation sufficient i f enough money, imagination, and energy, were used in the process. He fell far short o f creating a comprehensive and disciplined organization capable o f leading 20 N. G. Fleer, Rabocheie dvizhenie v gody voiny, Moscow, 1923, p. 247.

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a mass movement; he had perhaps failed to see through the contrived optimism o f his paid agents. He did not, however, consciously mislead the Foreign Ministry. The diplomats’ trust in him, and his reputation as an expert, would have been too high a price to pay for a confidence trick. He was not under any pressure to produce tangible results so soon. He himself was the original source o f the high expectations and hopes, but he made an error o f judgement, for which he alone was responsible. W hen Helphand returned to Copenhagen after three weeks’ stay in Stockholm, he tried hard to save his face. In a conversation with Brockdorff-Rantzau on 23 January, he told the Minister that they had not really suffered a defeat. He said that his confidential agents in St. Petersburg had opposed— and this sounds quite possible— his directive to launch the strike on 22 January. The situation in the capital had changed considerably: some leading revolutionaries had been appointed to official positions; the supply crisis had been temporarily overcome. The leaders o f the organization had therefore decided to postpone the beginning o f the general strike. The organization was, however, still ready for action: its leaders hoped that they would later be able to bring ‘ enough people’ into the streets, and to maintain control over their actions.21 Helphand was right in one respect: preparations for a strike were being made in St. Petersburg at the time. At the beginning o f February the workers at the Putilov factory came out, and the course o f the strike closely resembled the concurrent develop ments in Nikolaev.22 It is nevertheless doubtful whether there existed an organization behind the strike capable o f bringing, as Helphand had maintained, 100,000 men into the streets at twenty-four hours’ notice. Helphand himself had come to doubt its strength. He referred to the organization in order to explain the failure o f the movement; after his talk with BrockdorffRantzau in January, he never mentioned it again. T he Minister transmitted Helphand’ s explanation to the Chancellor on the same day, without making his customary com ments. The report had a depressing effect in Berlin. The trump 21 Report No. 19 of 23 January 1916, W K 1 ic sec.

22 N. G. Fleer, op. cit., p. 255.

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card o f the revolution had proved a dud. After the disappoint ment in January the question whether such a dubious and danger ous weapon was worth toying with had to be re-examined. It was not surprising that the critics o f the revolutionary policy now found a wider response in Government circles. State Secretary von Jagow in particular, who, from the outset, had regarded the revolutionary adventure with the greatest misgivings, now felt himself vindicated in his political and moral objections. A descendant o f a noble Prussian family, he had succeeded Kiderlen-Wachter as the head o f the Foreign Ministry at the beginning o f 1913. In the company o f self-confident politi cians and diplomats who never expressed their doubts as to the certainty o f Germany’ s victory in the war, the sensitive and critical State Secretary appeared, in the words o f a contemporary, an ‘ intellectual inclined to scepticism’ . His bad health and limited energy made it difficult for him to assert himself against the more robust war lords. Jagow was an aristocrat and diplomat o f the traditional school who had no liking for the paraphernalia o f political warfare. He despised all agents, mediators, and political schemers, whose methods and personalities offended his sense o f propriety and order. He had observed the unfolding o f the revolutionary policy towards Russia with a great deal o f reserve. Helphand he trusted neither personally nor politically, and, when he had to speak o f him, he did so only in a derisive and sarcastic tone. In Rantzau’ s view, the State Secretary used Helphand only to ‘ sharpen his tongue on him’ . After the January debacle, Jagow’ s distrust increased further: he expressed the suspicion that Helphand let the funds for the revolution flow into his own pocket. It was mainly due to Jagow’ s influence that the Foreign Ministry let itself be discouraged by the initial failure. After January 1916, the diplomats cut back their revolutionary activi ties to a minimum. Neither the Minister to Copenhagen nor Helphand were asked, throughout the year, to organize any major enterprise o f subversion in Russia. Only propaganda work and the smuggling o f defeatist leaflets were carried on, though without any considerable official subventions. These activities were assigned no greater importance than the isolated operations

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o f a handful o f Russian and Baltic revolutionaries, which received occasional support from Gisbert Freiherr von Romberg, the German Minister to Berne. As far as the diplomats were concerned, Helphand was ban ished into a political limbo. Rantzau kept in touch, but he was incapable o f reviving their project on his own. None the less, Helphand’s belief in the inevitability o f the revolution made it possible for him to weather the crisis, and to wait for his rehabi litation by the events in Russia. Only time would show whether his work had been as pointless as the Foreign Ministry was inclined to assume. He kept up both his revolutionary headquarters in Copen hagen, and his interest in the work o f subversion in the Tsarist Empire. He is very likely to have received further support for his activities in Russia from the Political Section o f the General Staff.23 When the Foreign Ministry’ s interest in the revolution in Russia and in Helphand again revived in March 1917, we catch a glimpse o f Helphand swiftly transferring his activities, carried out under the auspices o f the General Staff, back under the protection o f the diplomats. Nevertheless, during the year 1916, his Copenhagen export and import business in fact extended its scope. Its trans actions seldom lacked political purpose. 23 The papers of the General Staff were destroyed by fire in World War II.

Business and Politics Early in 1916, Helphand decided to bring a personal matter to a conclusion. For more than twenty years he had been tolerated in Germany as an alien: he had suffered expulsion from a number o f federal states, including Prussia; he had been put into custody, on a number o f occasions, for ‘breach o f banish ment’ . Apart from the threat o f being extradited to Russia, he had been unable to participate fully in Germany’ s politics. He remained a homeless, vagabond revolutionary; the Social Dem o crat party was his ‘new fatherland’ , and he regarded such terms as ‘people’ and ‘nation’ as the relics o f a dying age. He may have detested Prussia and everything the term stood for, and he may have suffered an acute aversion from the ways o f the German lower middle class. Yet he acquired, over the years, respect for Germany’ s civilization, which he thought ‘ more complex and more profound’ than that o f other countries he knew well. Originally, German language and literature had been for him the gateway out o f the east European spiritual ghetto. In 1891 he had written to Liebknecht that he was looking for a new country, but one for a reasonable price: the consideration hardly applied in 1916. Helphand could now afford the best. He demanded it, in abrupt terms. He had suffered too long at the hands o f the bureaucrats, and he was going to stand no more nonsense from them. He had mentioned his request to Zimmermann in the Foreign Ministry in December; on 2 January 1916 he requested ‘as speedy a settlement o f this question as possible’ . He wanted to become a German, not a Prussian, citizen (naturali zation was usually granted by one o f the federal states; only foreigners who were employed in official positions could receive Reich German citizenship): Helphand agreed to accept Prussian citizenship only after the Minister o f the Interior had expressed

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‘ grave misgivings’ . In the curriculum vitae which accompanied his application, Helphand made it clear that he saw himself as a bearer o f German civilization, as a socialist who had enjoyed, for many years, ‘ a world-wide reputation as a German scholar and a representative o f the ideas o f German Social Democracy’ .1 ‘I am renewing my application for German citizenship’ , Helphand added, ‘ for personal reasons— because I wish the intellectual bond between the German people and myself to be formally recognized— but above all for political reasons. It is important that in the great struggle between the nations, which the war has brought about, everyone should perform his part with all the strength he can muster. This is possible in my case only i f I become a fully recognized German citizen.’ During the preliminary negotiations for his naturalization, Helphand behaved in a self-confident, even arrogant, manner. He knew he was applying from a position o f strength; it was merely the purchase o f another bourgeois convenience. In this respect he had made a considerable advance in the last few months. Soon after his arrival in Copenhagen, he had acquired a large house in the Vodrovsvej, the fashionable quarter o f the town, which he furnished lavishly and without taste. He then bought one o f the biggest cars on the market, a large Adler limousine; several thoroughbred dogs kept guard over his pro perty. He had another residence at his disposal in Berlin, which he used very rarely: he preferred to impress his German com rades with a suite in the Hotel Kaiserhof. He even made an experiment in conventional family life. He lived with a Frau Maria Schillinger: their son— Helphand’ s third— born in the middle o f 1917, bore the surname o f his mother and the Christian name o f his father. Helphand always spoke with great pride o f the child, regarding him as a guarantee o f the continuity o f the family tradition. Like the rest o f Helphand’ s children, Alexander Schillinger also disappeared into the whirlpool which Europe was later to become. Helphand’s generous hospitality as well as his efforts to make concessions to the bourgeois way o f life, made it possible for him to establish, very slowly, personal contacts with the leaders o f the 1 11 February 1 91 6, in W K 11 c sec.

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right wing o f the socialist party. Whereas previously Helphand had had to be content with meeting them in private, now, in the spring o f 1916, he started to make occasional visits to a number o f coffee-houses, especially the Cafe Victoria, where Siidekum, Cunow, Baake, Haenisch, Lensch, and others were usually to be found. Most o f them were contributing to Die Glocke, which was then paying unusually high fees. With their help, he was soon able to start expanding his publishing activities. He was still thinking, as he had done at the turn o f the century, in terms o f a socialist publishing company, through which he could exert a direct influence on party politics, and which would become a rallying point for his personal supporters. He had no need to fear the difficulties into which he had run in the case o f Gorki’ s contract. In his own words, Helphand was suffering from a ‘ surfeit o f mammon’ : he could afford to carry even a continuous and substantial loss. In the summer o f 1916, Helphand had his Verlag fu r Sozialwissenschaft transferred from Munich to Berlin; under Heinrich Cunow as the new director, it soon embarked on the publication o f its own pamphlets and book series. A year later, Helphand bought the paper Internationale Korrespondenz, which had been established by Albert Baumeister at the beginning o f the war. Through its translations o f foreign press commentaries, the new Internationale Korrespondenz exercised a considerable influence on the provincial socialist newspapers. At the same time, Helphand’s publishing house extended its activities to the army: 20,000 copies o f its Sozialdemokratische Feldpost were sent fort nightly to the front, free o f charge. Helphand was building for the future, regardless o f the price. The political purpose behind his publishing activities was easy to detect: he was a German subject, and political office would no longer be closed to him. He was patiently assembling a group o f followers and establishing a direct means o f communication with the rank-and-file party members. Apart from his Berlin enterprise, Helphand’ s ‘ Institute for the Study o f the Social Consequences o f the War’ in Copenhagen was now also in good running order. He had first used it as a decoy for the recruitment o f the Russian exiles, but it soon settled down

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to the pursuit o f legitimate research. He succeeded in attracting local Scandinavian talent to the Institute: Professor Karl Larsen, who entertained pro-German sympathies in the war, looked after its interests; Sven Trier, the Danish socialist, became its secre tary. At the Institute’ s headquarters on the Osterbrogade, a unique library grew up in the course o f the war, which Helphand subsidized at the monthly rate o f 40,000 kroner. It also published, from March 1916, a special bulletin containing statistical material and articles on the political and social impact o f the war. Helphand himself made use o f this material in a study o f the social consequences o f the war, published by his Berlin firm in the summer o f 1917.2 Helphand told Brockdorff-Rantzau nothing about the activities o f the Institute. Only in December 1915 did the Minister discover, by the aid o f a confidential agent, that the Institute in fact existed, and that it kept ‘ a number o f young Jews’ only mildly busy.3 Since Helphand was the President o f the organization, Rantzau could not help suspecting the existence o f ‘political aims’ behind it; it was not until January 1916 that he dared ‘ most humbly to observe that the work o f the Institute for the Study o f the Social Consequences o f the War has increased considerably, and that we cannot deny it a certain academic value’ .4 Helphand was unusually sensitive to any doubts as to the genuine scholarly purpose o f the undertaking. In the French newspaper Humanite in October 1915, the Russian publicist Alexinski— formerly a Bolshevik— described Helphand as an agent provocateur and his Copenhagen Institute as an organization o f spies, hiding behind ‘ the name o f knowledge’ . Through one o f the Institute’s employees named Zurabov, Helphand sent a sharp denial to Humanite, threatening an action against the author o f the article.5 The Foreign Ministry in Berlin was o f the opinion, however, that there was no point in stirring up the affair: on its advice, Helphand let the matter drop. Helphand’s extreme sensitivity was largely due to the fact that he wanted to be seen in the role o f a patron o f learning. Alexinski’ s Die soziale Bilanz des Krieges, Berlin, 1 9 1 7 . 3 Report by Herr Otto, in Akten der Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen, 124 a. 4 Report No. 6 of 14 January 1916, loc. cit. 5 Humanity 19 October 1915. ‘Le Cas Parvus. Une Protestation et une Replique.’ 2

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insinuations were in fact wrong. Helphand was spending a lot o f his own money on the Institute and he maintained, quite rightly, that it was a scholarly enterprise. As to its international reputation— Helphand thought that the Institute had achieved this— its accomplishments were not very impressive. After the war, a few writers made use o f the material assembled in Copenhagen: they were neither numerous nor well known enough to hand down the name o f Helphand, with the reputation he so much desired, to posterity. All this multifarious academic and publishing activity was made possible by Helphand’ s amazing success in business. It touched a dominant instinct in him : its results were much more tangible than those o f his writing on the problems o f economic theory. He had always wanted financial success, but now he wanted it more than anything else. He had a good eye for the deficiencies in the economic structure o f capitalism, and he avoided competition with the established financial interests. Instead, he concentrated on the neglected areas o f economy and international trade. After his arrival in Denmark he continued to make money on an even larger scale than he had done in Constantinople. In Copenhagen, Helphand soon made a promising start. First, he obtained a licence for a poster company, which was to turn the customary German system o f ‘ advertising columns’ into a profitable sinecure. Then, late in the summer o f 1915, he founded the ‘ Trading and Export Company’— Handels og-Eksportkompagniet— which, apart from serving as a front-organization for Helphand’ s revolutionary activities, soon became a profitable business enterprise. Jakob Fiirstenberg was its managing direc tor; his connexions in Russia and Poland proved useful in both o f the company’ s functions. In April 1916, Georg Sklarz joined the Eksportkompagniet. He had worked for the Admiralty and for Military Intelligence; apart from a capital o f 40,000 marks and the goodwill o f the General Staff, he brought with him into Helphand’ s company the assistance o f his two brothers, Waldemar and Heinrich. Georg was the eldest o f the three Sklarzes; he was a small man with an ascetic face and very deep-set eyes. He was a resourceful, versa

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tile businessman, unscrupulous and tough. Brockdorff-Rantzau himself was much impressed by the little man with the suffering face: he kept on recommending Georg Sklarz ‘ most warmly’ to his cousin Langwerth von Simmern. Waldemar Sklarz worked for Georg as his secretary, while Heinrich was engaged in carrying out secret commissions in the field o f economic espionage. He had been sent to Copenhagen at the end o f 1915, by the General Staff: he was to report regularly on the influence exercised by the Allied countries on Danish economic life. Heinrich Sklarz ran, under the cover name ‘Pundyk’ , a small intelligence agency in Copenhagen; it employed a few agents, double agents, ladies o f doubtful virtue, and a female artiste called Amatis. Apart from his main field o f investi gation, Sklarz specialized in collecting information on the passage o f embargoed German goods through Denmark on the way to the Allied countries. T he German Naval Staff* paid 4,000 kroner a month towards the running expenses o f Heinrich Sklarz’ s agency: the money was passed on through Helphand and Georg Sklarz. Their trading company made use o f the information gathered by Heinrich Sklarz’ s agency; the official co-operation and protection certainly did not have an adverse effect on the size o f the profits made by the Eksportkompagniet. It satisfied all the interested parties: trading profits could be regarded as a reward for the political services rendered by Helphand and his friends. Although the range o f their company’ s business was wide— it extended as far as the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States— it concentrated largely on trade with Russia. It dealt in a variety o f goods, from stockings and contraceptives to raw materials and machinery: Helphand procured copper, rubber, tin, and corn for Germany’ s war economy, while exporting chemicals and machinery to Russia. Some o f the goods were covered by export licences, others were smuggled; they were taken over, as soon as they crossed the Russian frontier, by the Petrograd firm o f Fabian Klingsland. A woman called Evgeniya Sumenson acted as an agent for this firm; it was she who kept in touch with Fiirstenberg. T he Klingsland firm was authorized, by an agreement in April 1916, to sell medical supplies from M .R .-O

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Copenhagen, and then to deposit the profit on a special account at a Petrogradbank.6 After the failure o f the strike movement in January 1916, Helphand’ s firm either continued to finance current revolutionary expenditure in Russia, or— and this alternative sounds more probable— was accumulating capital in Russia to be used for similar purposes in the future. Whatever the case may have been, the business proved a profitable undertaking: it could stand on its own feet, without drawing on official subsidies. Helphand himself had extended his business interests across the whole o f Europe. In 1916 he paid taxes to the Danish internal revenue on a capital o f 540,000 kroner, and on an income o f 41,000 kroner; it represented only a small part o f his fortune. In July, Helphand invested a ‘ considerable sum ’in a firm in Bulgaria and Turkey, which was to reorganize the agrarian production in these countries with the help o f the German Government; he had other sums o f money invested in almost all the neutral countries. He had, however, not yet exhausted the business opportunities offered by the Scandinavian countries. The strength o f Den mark’ s economic ties with Britain caused concern among the German diplomats, for they feared that the country might come under an even stronger Allied influence. In an attempt to counter this development, the Danish socialist movement was to prove useful. In the circles o f the Danish socialists and trade unionists, Germany could count on a more cordial atmosphere: the socialist ties between the two countries were not completely cut off by the outbreak o f the war. Although Helphand’ s welcome by the local socialists had been rather cool, he succeeded, by the end o f 1915, in establishing close contacts with the leaders o f the trade unions. T he Danish unions were practical and undogmatic organizations which had become, through their various co-operative and trading offshoots, deeply embedded in the economic life o f the country. It was this aspect o f their activities that brought Helphand into contact with Karl Kiefer, the influential and shrewd trade union leader. Helphand was favourably impressed by the enterprise shown by the Danish trade unions: he realized that their trading com6 Nachlass Helphand, Rep. 92.

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panies could be supported by Germany in an unobtrusive, purely commercial way. There existed, at the time, an opening through which Germany’ s influence could make itself felt. Britain was the main exporter o f coal to Denmark; its price rose sharply owing to the war until, in the winter o f 1915-16, severe shortages o f coal hit the Danish economy, and especially the private consumer. In the spring o f 1916, Helphand told Brockdorff-Rantzau o f his plan for making Denmark less dependent on coal supplies from Britain. He proposed that coal, imported from Germany, could be sold to the private consumer direct through a special trade union sales organization. Helphand was convinced that, by cutting out all intermediate trading, the price o f English coal could be undercut. Again, the Minister to Copenhagen gave his unqualified sup port to Helphand’ s plans; in the middle o f June 1916 he went once more to Berlin, with the Minister’ s recommendation, in order to discuss the project with Baron Langwerth von Simmern, and with the official ‘ export bureau’ .78After some initial difficul ties, which were soon removed with the help o f Dr. Topffer, the commercial attache in Copenhagen, Helphand swiftly brought the negotiations to the point where the Danish trade unions were made a concrete offer o f supplies o f German coal. They founded their own distribution company called the Arbejdernes Faellesorganisations Braendselfortning A/S:s the German authorities agreed to supply it with a minimum o f 90,000 tons o f coal a month. Helphand held no official position on the board o f the distribu tion company: its chairman was Karl Madsen, the president o f the Danish trade union movement, who was assisted by Karl Kiefer and V. G. A. Walther; two Germans— a Herr Albrecht and Georg Sklarz— looked after the technical side o f the organi zation. Nevertheless, there remained an important part for Helphand to play: it is very likely that, without his assistance, the whole transaction would have broken down. He kept the shipment o f coal from Germany to Denmark in his 7 Helphand to the Minister to Copenhagen, 27 June 1916, in Nachlass BrockdorffRantzau, H 231402-H 231407. 8 P. G. Chesnais, Parvus et le parti socialiste danois, Paris, 1918, p. 16.

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own hands* In October 1916, he founded his own freight com pany, the Kobenhavns Befragtnings-og Transport-Kompagniet, a share in which he gave to the Danish trade unions; the company declared itself ready to look after the entire transportation o f coal. At this point, however, Helphand ran into a variety o f vested interests. Hugo Stinnes, the powerful industrialist who had hitherto controlled the export o f coal to Denmark, as well as Herr Huldermann, a representative o f the Hamburg-Amerika shipping line, raised objections; the insurance companies were unwilling to commit themselves to a quotation o f a fixed rate o f premium. There came a point when the whole project appeared in danger o f running into insuperable difficulties. No one con nected with Germany’ s coal trade showed the slightest sympathy for a competitive undertaking, by which the Danish trade unions were largely to benefit. The difficulties did not put Helphand off. On the contrary. He found himself, once again, in a situation he was used t o : he had to build up a large-scale organization from scratch, and as fast as he could. And once again he was able to take advantage o f an inconsistency in the existing arrangements. The union o f the German shipping-lines and the independent shipowners in Stettin were then locked in fierce competition, and Helphand made good use o f this. He was able to offer steady employment for the freighters; in return, he received special terms. He also bought a number o f freighters and went into business himself as an independent operator. T he arrangements for the shipment o f coal from Germany worked far too well. Towards the end o f the autumn, the Danish docks came under a veritable bombardment from Helphand’ s coal. The agreed monthly minimum was easily exceeded; the dockside warehouses were soon full to capacity; there was neither enough space nor labour for unloading the freighters. Because o f the delays in unloading, Helphand ran into difficulties with the shipowners; in the end, the saturation o f the docks became so severe that some 200,000 tons o f coal had to be put on a pit heap outside Copenhagen. At the same time, the trade-union-owned distribution com pany was unable to sell, and therefore to buy, the agreed quota.

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Sklarz’ s efforts to find new storage space were frustrated by the Danish coal dealers as well as— according to Sklarz— by English agents; they all had good reasons for wanting the venture to fail. Helphand was the only person who could save it. At the most critical moment he gave the distribution company a credit o f one million kroner, which tided it over the temporary difficulties. T he failure on the distribution side aroused the German opponents o f the project once again. Brockdorff-Rantzau received reports from the Hamburg-Amerika line stating that ‘ the whole affair was handled in an unbusinesslike manner’ , and that, because o f the fines resulting from delays in unloading, the price o f coal would be considerably increased. T he Minister was advised to withdraw from this ‘ great bankruptcy’ while there was still time, so as not ‘ to sink into the abyss o f political oblivion’ .9 Dr. Topffer, the commercial attache, also expressed grave mis givings. He suggested, in the middle o f November, that the enterprise was, in its present form, a complete failure and that it would do more harm than good. According to the information at his disposal, Topffer told the Minister, only a small part o f the German coal was helping the Danish workers. T he company had sold most o f the coal to industry and to the Government: it had in fact developed a coal business— in order to overcome the temporary crisis— which in no way corresponded to the original intentions. In addition, he considered Helphand’ s freightage profits— two kroner a ton— too high. Topffer was very pessimis tic as to the future o f the business, and he regarded intervention from the Berlin Ministry o f War as most likely.10 Before taking any steps one way or the other, Rantzau waited to hear the opinion o f Eric Scavenius, the Danish Foreign Minis ter. T hey met on 18 November, the day Dr. Topffer submitted his report. Scavenius implored Rantzau straight away ‘not to be discouraged by the unfortunate experiences which, perhaps, cannot be avoided in such a great undertaking’ .11 W hen Rantzau pointed out that Hugo Stinnes would try to turn every difficulty to his own advantage, Scavenius said that because o f this and 9 B. Huldermann to Brockdorff-Rantzau, 11 October 1916, Nachlass Brockdorff-Rantzau H 2 31400-H 231401. 10 Memorandum from Dr. Topffer, 18 November 1916, Nachlass Brockdorff-Rantzau. 11 loc. cit., Brockdorff-Rantzau’s memorandum of 19 November 1916.

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because o f the threat o f English intervention, every measure must be taken to enable the unions to carry on with their coal imports. The Foreign Minister declared himself ‘against giving up the coal business in any circumstances’ because— he could not have given a better reason— ‘ the most important means o f taking up an independent attitude in regard to England would be taken out o f our hands’ . After the talk with Scavenius, BrockdorfF-Rantzau could no longer entertain any doubts as to the political importance o f the coal business. Apart from continuing to give it his full protection, Rantzau helped to put it back on its feet. On Dr. T opffer’ s suggestion, deliveries o f coal were temporarily stopped, to give the transport and distribution companies enough breathing space to reduce their reserves and sort out their organization. T hey used the opportunity successfully. The distribution company purchased, in the course o f the year 1917, a large number o f wharves and warehouses, which employed about 1,000 people. At the same time, Helphand converted his freightage agency into a regular shipping firm, which could guarantee fixed rates on long-term contracts. The Danes wanted the security o f long-term agreements: this, however, the German authorities refused, preferring to regulate the supply o f coal on a monthly basis. In this way they could also regulate the amount o f food and the number o f horses imported from Denmark, as well as keeping the Danes— as the Foreign Ministry in Berlin saw it— under control. Otherwise, Helphand had it all his own way. He even succeeded, with the support o f Brockdorif-Rantzau, and after lengthy negotiations in Berlin, in coming directly to terms with the mining companies in the Ruhr area. The German authorities continued to regard the coal trade as being o f first-rate political importance. When, for instance, diffi culties arose after the declaration o f unrestricted U-boat warfare, they were soon ironed out by Rantzau’ s intervention with Ludendorff. T he German Minister to Copenhagen certainly had every reason to stand by the coal agreements, as their political results exceeded all expectations. As early as August 1916, Rant zau was able to report that the deliveries had had ‘ such a favour

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able effect on the Socialist Party that they are prepared to use their parliamentary influence in any way I might suggest’ .12 On the same day Scavenius, the Foreign Minister, told Rantzau that to his delight he found enthusiastic support among the socialists for his policies. W hen the anti-German newspapers in Denmark published disclosures about the bribery o f the Danish trade unions by the German Government, Rantzau emphatically re peated that, without the coal business, it would have been im possible ‘ to win the Social Democrat trade unions, and the party, over to our side’ .13 Success in Denmark led Helphand to consider applying the same methods in other neutral countries. The German Minister to Stockholm, Lucius von Stodten, was enthusiastic when Jansson, the German trade unionist o f Swedish origin, put the idea before him, on Helphand’ s request. ‘ Quite regardless o f whether or not it suits German industry’ , Lucius wrote to the State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, ‘ the thing must go through.’ 14 Helphand’s coal business in Sweden was not, however, as successful as his deal in Denmark; from Norway, Jansson brought with him a flat refusal by the local socialists. A similar rejection came from Switzerland after Robert Grimm, the in fluential socialist editor o f the Berner Tagwacht, had put H elp hand’ s proposal before the Swiss trade unions. Although Helphand soon found out that the same formula could not be applied in every case, he had scored a great success in Denmark. He needed this, especially after the debacle in Russia in January 1916. He was now at least partially rehabili tated in the eyes o f the German Government. He was able to prove that Helfferich, the State Secretary in the Treasury, had been wrong when he described Helphand as a utopian and revolutionary dreamer. In this penumbral region between politics and business, Helphand was in his element. He had a lot to offer, to a variety o f men. He made the coal market safe for the Danish socialists: they 12 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Foreign Ministry, telegram No. 1190 of 12 August 1916, in Europa Generalia. 13 BrockdorfF-Rantzau to the Chancellor, Report No. 76 of 6 March 1917, in Akten der Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen, 124. 14 Lucius to Zimmermann, letter of 12 June 1917, in W K 2 geh.

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gained a great deal o f money and influence for their organizations during the war, and they repaid Helphand by remaining loyal to him until his death. T o Rantzau, Helphand handed over the political laurels. The achievement o f Denmark’s ‘benevolent neutrality’ was credited to the Minister; his reputation was made in Copenhagen. It was a repayment for the disappointment in Russia. Helphand himself mainly made m oney: his gains from the coal business ran into millions o f kroner. He never denied the profits he was making: he even was, in his way, rather off-hand about them. ‘ Be it far from me’ , he wrote in 1918, ‘ to justify capitalist gain by personal qualities. But I do not see why I should not bring some o f the surplus value, hoarded by the capitalist class, over to my side.’ 15 He was, he admitted, a ‘businessman, indus trialist, capitalist’ , but he was not using his money any more selfishly than was customary at the time. He might have claimed that a considerable part o f his income was used for the support o f scholarship, in the form o f the Institute in Copenhagen, and that, in addition, he was financing a holiday home for German children in Denmark. That he did not do so is another point in his favour. He felt no need to justify his wealth, and to counter the envy o f his less fortunate enemies by drawing their attention to his generosity. Nor did he have any scruples about enjoying his good fortune, and letting his friends share in the enjoyment. In relation to money, Helphand did not feel himself bound by the conventional socialist code. It is possible that his business methods would have been some what out o f place in the City o f L on don : neither he nor his part ner Sklarz corresponded exactly to the accepted picture o f the ‘ city gent’ . Helphand knew that he was on his own, that he had nothing but his wits to rely on; he may well have reflected that the embellishments on the old firm’ s coat-of-arms are usually added by the second or third generations who can also afford to take a more leisurely approach to the problems o f accumulation o f capital. Anyway, in comparison with most business magnates o f his time, Helphand was by no means as unscrupulous and as 15 Im K am pf urn die Wakrkeit, p. 4 3 .

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grasping as he was later described. He was an opportunist in business, and a passionate businessman: he had no scruples in exploiting the weaknesses o f a system for which he had no liking whatever. For this reason he was unable to treat his financial success with the respect that was its due. T he money he made was less imporÂ tant for him personally than for his political plans. He was a Marxist millionaire: a nouveau riche with a mission. There existed certain basic similarities between his coal plan for Denmark and the revolutionary memorandum o f March 1915 for Russia. On both occasions, Helphand showed that he believed that any political aim could be realized with sufficient money, that the elite o f the socialist leaders could resist the lure o f mammon no more than any other social group, that friendship, as much as political support, had to be bought. Such a view informed his political strategy: it was the essence o f his political and human experience.

10 Revolution in Russia Within a few weeks, in the spring o f 1917, the revolu tion in Russia tore down the structure o f the Tsarist State. Early in March, starvation and fury forced the workers in Petrograd into the streets. Soon the political leaders emerged to make demands on behalf o f the revolution. It was spontaneous, and therefore unexpected: it surprised the Russian exiles even more than the belligerent governments. T w o and a half years’ battering along a front-line which stretched hundreds o f miles between the Baltic and the Black Seas, accompanied by economic and administrative dislocation on a vast scale, such was the necessary setting for the collapse o f the Tsarist regime. It opened up new perspectives for the con tinuation o f war, or for the conclusion o f peace. It justified Helphand’ s expectations. His public acknowledgement o f the revolution in Russia was decisive. ‘Your victory is our victory’ , he wrote in Die Glocke on 24 March 1917. ‘Democratic Germany must offer democratic Russia a helping hand for the achievement o f peace and for effective co-operation in the field o f social and cultural progress.’ He saw the collapse o f Tsarism as the result o f Germany’ s military victory; the revolution was a mass movement, which concluded the ‘ momentous development which started in 1905’ . Russia now had to complete her internal organization: Helphand described an immediate peace as the first task o f the revolution. But public pronouncements were, as far as Helphand was con cerned, no more than a means o f expressing his sympathy for the revolution. He was more explicit in his correspondence with the German party leaders. On 22 March he wrote to A d olf Muller that he would like to see the introduction o f the following measures: arming o f the Russian proletariat, public prosecution

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o f the Tsar, redistribution o f the landed estates, introduction o f the eight-hour working day in industry, the summoning o f the constituent assembly, and the conclusion o f peace: a programme which came close to Bolshevik ideas.1 He knew that he would need help, now more than ever, from the German authorities. As soon as the first reports on the success o f the revolution reached Copenhagen, Helphand visited Brockdorff-Rantzau and asked him to transmit the following telegram to Berlin: ‘ Revolution is victorious, Russia is politically incapaci tated, constituent assembly means peace.’ 2 On this occasion, the Minister received Helphand’ s optimism in a more reserved manner. He thought that Helphand expressed his opinions with an ‘ apodictic certainty’ : it was not, after all, the first time that Rantzau had heard Helphand passing judgements on Russia with the same self-assurance. Despite his caution, the Minister thought that ‘ these events are a great stroke o f luck for us’ . Once again, Rantzau showed himself ready to take careful note o f what Helphand had to say. On 1 April, a detailed exchange o f views took place between the two men.3 Helphand developed the view that Russia was tired o f the war, and that a desire for peace should soon sweep over the whole country. For this reason, Germany had to abstain from a military offensive: Helphand feared that it might create a patriotic m ood ‘ for the defence o f liberties now achieved’ . T he Russian revolution had to be left alone in order to ‘ develop logically the consequences o f the clash o f interests which it had created’ . T he effect o f the clash o f class interests, Helphand went on, would shatter the very foundations o f Russia. The peasants would expropriate, by force, the land o f the nobility; the troops would desert the trenches and shoot their upper-class officers. The Ukrainians, the Caucasians, and other minority nationalities, would free themselves from Petrograd and break up the centralized organization o f the Russian State. And starvation would continue to tax the patience o f the masses: in 1 Parvus to Adolf Muller, in Akten der Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen (Russtand). 2BrockdorfF-Rantzau to Langwerth von Simmern, telegram of 1 7 March 1917, in Akten der Gesandtschaft Kopenhagen, 123. 3 Shorthand minutes of the conversation are in Nachlass Brockdorjf-Rantzau, H232307-

H232325.

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Helphand’ s words, the ‘ worst anarchy’ would occur in two or three months. He pointed out that Germany’ s policy towards revolutionary Russia could follow one o f two paths: the Berlin Government could decide on a large-scale occupation o f Russia, and on breaking up the centralized Empire; or it could conclude an early peace with the provisional Government. For the realization o f the first alternative Helphand recom mended a powerful military offensive, to be launched in three months’ time, which would, at the height o f anarchy, conquer South Russia and render the country defenceless. In this case, however, the German Government ‘would have to be determined to exploit ruthlessly the victory in the political field. This would involve the disarmament o f the Russian army, the demolition o f her fortresses, the destruction o f her navy, prohibition o f the manufacture o f armaments and munitions, and an extensive occupation o f Russia. I f this did not happen, there is no doubt that the Russian Empire would rapidly grow into a new and aggressive military power, and its enmity would be all the more dangerous to Germany, the greater the wounds inflicted on it now .’ In order to prepare the ground for this radical solution o f the Russian question, the ‘ extreme revolutionary movement will have to be supported, in order to intensify anarchy’ . If, however, the German Government was not prepared, as Helphand put it to Rantzau, to ‘ clear the decks in regard to Russia’ , or if it regarded the enterprise as impracticable, then it would have to make an effort to ‘ conclude peace with Russia, but a peace which would leave no bitterness on either side’ . Other wise Helphand feared a repetition o f ‘what happened to our relations with France in 1870, only with the difference that France had not outgrown us economically or politically, whereas Russia would doubtless develop an economic and political power that would surpass that o f the territorially limited Germany’ . For the achievement o f this second aim, there was no point in trying to intensify the condition o f anarchy in Russia: a stable situation would have to be brought about, and then negotiations opened with the government that could guarantee peace. O f the two choices, Helphand o f course had his own pre

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ference. As he saw it, his revolutionary programme had advanced, but not m uch: an early peace with the provisional Government might even slow down further developments in this direction. Anyway, at the time o f his conversation with Rantzau, the possi bility o f peace with the new government in Petrograd appeared to be remote. T he revolution, it was calculated in Petrograd and in other Allied capitals, would release fresh energies for the successful continuation o f Russia’ s war effort. Helphand’ s own sympathies therefore lay with the first solution, which meant lending full support to the ‘ extreme revolutionary movement’ , that is, o f Lenin and his Bolshevik party. Helphand found himself in a situation similar to that o f May 1915. Then, it may be remembered, Lenin refused to co-operate: after the revolution in Russia, however, new factors had come into play which would— according to Helphand’s calculations— force Lenin to adopt a different attitude towards a deal with Helphand and with the Imperial German Government. T he circumstances were indeed different. In Switzerland, Lenin was cut o ff from Russia and ‘ corked up, as if in a bottle’ ; he was desperately looking for a way out. Even a deal with the devil, Lenin had declared, would suit him, if it made his return to Petrograd possible.4 There was really no need for Lenin to have been so agitated. T he ground for a request to cross Germany had been prepared, and there were a number o f influential men in Berlin ready to help. It was not the first time the German authorities had faced such a request: as early as the summer o f 1915, the Russian exiles who were about to start working at Helphand’ s Institute had travelled through Germany on their way to Copenhagen. Again and again, Helphand had told the German diplomats what to think about the effectiveness, as a subversive force in Russia, o f Lenin and his party. Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, recognized the momentous importance for Germany o f the revo lution in Russia; early in April he instructed the Minister to Berne to establish contacts with the Russian exiles and to offer them transit through Germany. Helphand did not wait as long before taking action as the poli4 N. Krupskaya, Vospominaniya o Lenine, Moscow, 1957, pp. 273-6.

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ticians in Berlin. While technical and legal means o f transport were still being discussed in the Foreign Ministry, he had already taken the first practical steps. Since the transport o f large num bers o f Russian revolutionaries was complicated to arrange, he thought that an immediate transit across Germany o f Lenin and Zinoviev, the two leading Bolsheviks, should be aimed at. It was at this point that the Fiirstenberg link between Helphand and Lenin proved its value. Helphand first obtained the consent o f the General Staff—not the Foreign Ministry— for his plan, and then asked Fiirstenberg to let Lenin know that the transit for him and Zinoviev had been fixed, without, however, making it clear from which quarter the help had come. Georg Sklarz at once travelled to Zurich to ac company the two Bolshevik leaders on their journey across Germany.5 Helphand was wrong to assume that Lenin would accept the offer at once. On 24 March, the Bolshevik leader asked Zinoviev to send the following telegrams to Fiirstenberg: ‘Letter dis patched. Uncle [i.e. Lenin] wants to know more. Official transit for individuals unacceptable. Write express to Warschawski, Klusweg 8.’ Georg Sklarz had left Copenhagen before the arrival o f Zinoviev’ s telegram, and he further complicated matters in Zurich, by offering to pay the two Bolsheviks’ fares. Lenin abruptly broke off the negotiations. Helphand had made a grave mistake. Without meaning to, he had built a trap for the two Bolshevik leaders: had Lenin accepted the offer, he would have compromisedhimself so much in the eyes o f his compatriots that he would have been o f use neither to the Bolsheviks nor to the Germans. And the tactlessness o f Helphand’s offer was matched by the clumsiness with which Georg Sklarz approached the Bolsheviks in Zurich. T he provisional Government in Petrograd was still at war with Germany, and despite the amnesty it had recently declared for political offen ders, there were risks Lenin knew he could not afford to take. A free trip on his own across Germany, was definitely one o f them. 5 Fiirstenberg’s communication to Lenin is not available; Lenin’s reply, through Zinoviev, has been published in Leninskii Sbornik, vol. X I II, p. 259; cf. also, telegram No. 353 of 27 March 1917, the Foreign Ministry to the Minister in Berne, in W K 2 geh.

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W hen Helphand talked to Brockdorff-Rantzau on 1 April, he knew that his proposal to Lenin had run into difficulties. He decided to visit Berlin in order to discuss the developments in Russia— which were now again absorbing all his attention— with both the diplomats and the socialists. His reputation as an expert on Russia had greatly im proved: Rantzau’ s activities on 2 April, while Helphand was on the way to Berlin, bore witness to this. First o f all, the Minister drafted a long telegram to the Foreign Ministry, summing up the views Helphand had expressed, and making them his own. Either we are both militarily and economically in a position to continue the war effectively until the autumn. In that case it is essential that we try now to create the greatest possible degree o f chaos in Russia. T o this end, any patently apparent interference in the course o f the Russian revolution should be avoided. In my opinion, we should, on the other hand, make every effort surreptitiously to deepen the differences be tween the moderate and the extremist parties, for it is greatly in our interests that the latter should gain the upper hand, since a drastic change would then be inevitable and would take forms which would necessarily shake the very existence o f the Russian Empire. . . .

In all

probability, we should, in about three months’ time, be able to count on the disintegration having reached the stage where we could break the power o f the Russians by military action. I f we were now to launch a premature offensive, we should only give all the various centrifugal forces a motive for uniting and even, perhaps, lead the army to rally in its fight against Germany.6

On the same day, Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote a personal letter to Zimmermann, Jagow’ s successor as Secretary o f State in the Foreign Ministry. In every respect, Zimmermann was a much tougher person than the former State Secretary, and he had no scruples about the methods employed in the pursuit o f his policies. Separate peace with Russia was one o f them: but peace with a country so weakened that she would be dependent on Germany’ s goodwill. He was therefore convinced o f the necessity o f Russia’ s complete political and military breakdown: he under stood that this, as well as separate peace, could be achieved only 6 Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia , document No. 22.

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with the aid o f the most radical wing o f the Russian revolution aries. Rantzau had been on friendly terms with Zimmermann for many years, and now, in the letter he wrote on 2 April, he asked the State Secretary to 4be kind enough personally to receive Dr. Helphand’ .7 I am well aware that his character and reputation are not equally highly esteemed by all his contemporaries, and that your predecessor was especially fond o f whetting his sharp tongue on him. In answer to this, I can only assert that Helphand has realized some extremely positive political achievements, and that, in Russia, he was, quite unobtrusively, one o f the first to work for the result that is now our aim. Certain things, perhaps even everything, would be different now if Jagow had not totally ignored his suggestions two years ago! T he connexions which Helphand has in Russia could now, in my opinion, be decisive to the development o f the whole situation. More over, he is also in such close contact with the Social Democrats in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia that he could influence them at any time. H e is genuinely grateful to Your Excellency, as he knows that he has your intercession to thank for his acceptance into the German state at a time when his position was more than precarious, and he now feels himself to be a German, not a Russian, in spite o f the Russian revolu tion, which should have brought about his rehabilitation. I therefore ask you to give him a hearing, since I am convinced that, properly handled, he could be extremely useful, not only in the decision o f questions o f international politics, but also in the internal politics o f the Empire.

By the time the Foreign Ministry issued a formal invitation to an audience with the State Secretary, Helphand had already left Berlin; he had, however, discussed the technical details o f the scheduled transport o f the Russian exiles with von Bergen in the Foreign Ministry, arranging for Wilhelm Jansson, his trade unionist friend, to be included among the officials who were to accompany the Russian party. Helphand did not wait for the State Secretary’ s invitation 7 Zeman, op. cit., document No. 23.

SIS

F rom

IX . Brockdorff-Rantzau

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People o f O ur Tim e

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Ullstein Bilderdienst

X. Bethmann-Hollweg, Reich Chancellor, von Jagow, State Secretary, and Karl Helflerich, State Secretary in the Treasury, 1915

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because he had more important business on hand. He had to win over the executive o f the ‘majority socialists’ for his plans. So far their leaders, Philipp Scheidemann and Friedrich Ebert, had appeared unable to grasp the significance o f the political changes in Petrograd. T hey knew little about Russia, and they were quite lost in regard to the problems o f eastern policy. Their acknow ledgement o f the revolution had been rather off-hand: the tele grams to the chairmen o f the Duma and the Soviet, drafted by Scheidemann, had been dispatched in the teeth o f Ebert’ s op po sition. In the evening o f 4 April, Helphand, together with Jansson, addressed the party executive. T hey announced that within a few days Borbjerg, the Danish socialist deputy and editor o f the Copenhagen Socialdemokrat, would travel to Petrograd. He intended to meet the leaders o f the Soviet and discuss with them the possibilities o f peace; both Helphand and Jansson suggested that a representative o f the German party executive should travel to Copenhagen as soon as possible, in order to provide Borbjerg with instructions for his mission. Speed, Helphand insisted, was essential: Borbjerg was to leave within a few days, as he was determined to reach Petrograd before Hjalmar Branting, the Swedish socialist leader whose sympathies lay with the other side, the Allies. T he executive were impressed, and they at once decided to send Scheidemann, Ebert, and Gustav Bauer, the trade union secretary, to Copenhagen. None o f the party leaders had a pass port o f his own, and they applied for them to the Foreign Ministry. W hen Scheidemann recalled, in his memoirs, that Zimmermann directed his Ministry to issue the necessary docu ments ‘overnight’ , he did so with a good deal o f pride.8 Zimmer mann was glad that the socialists had concurred with Helphand’ s suggestion, and he asked them especially to impress on Borbjerg Germany’ s desire for peace, and the fact that Poland should not prove an obstacle to a settlement. On 6 April, the German party leaders set out on their journey. Helphand travelled with them; he had made all the arrangements for the trip. Seats on the train were reserved; rooms had been 8 P. Scheidemann, Memoiren eines Sozialdemokraten, Dresden, 1928, vol. 1, p. 421.

M.R.—P

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booked at the expensive Hotel Central in Copenhagen; a recep tion was waiting for the party leaders at Helphand’ s house on the Vodrovsvej. The German socialists were not accustomed to this kind o f treatment and they were very impressed. Quite apart from his political usefulness— his connexions, in this case, with the Danish socialists— Helphand was a considerate and lavish host. He had not known Ebert and Scheidemann at all well before their trip to Copenhagen; he succeeded in establishing, during the expedition, a relationship o f trust and friendship with them, which later survived much adversity. After dinner on their first day in Copenhagen, Helphand intro duced Borbjerg to his friends. They liked their Danish comrade, who made it clear that his sympathies lay on the side o f Germany. In what they told Borbjerg, Ebert and Scheidemann were carrying out Zimmermann’ s and Helphand’ s instructions. They said that Germany wanted a negotiated peace without annexations; it would be easy, they declared, to come to an understanding about some frontier rectifications. In the Balkans, however, the formula o f 4no annexations’ was not generally applicable: but given goodwill, even these problems could be settled. They added that Borbjerg might assure the Russians that Germany did not intend to launch an offensive on the Russian front.9 The German party leaders were so much absorbed by their new role as participants in high-level politics that they entirely lost sight o f the interests o f international socialism. They made not a single reference to the possibility o f direct co-operation between the Russian and the German parties. It was left to Helphand to stress, in the conversation with Borbjerg, the socialist aspect o f the new situation in Russia, and to draw the attention o f his comrades to the future development o f socialism in Europe. Helphand told Borbjerg that it was nonsensical to draw analogies from the events in Petrograd to the situation in Germany, and he asked the Danish comrade to make it clear to the Russian party leaders that, as long as the war lasted, no revolution could occur in Germany. The tasks o f the German revolution were different: it did not have to remove, as in Russia, 9 P. Scheidemann, op. cit., vol. i , p. 424.

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an obsolete state structure only, but the whole o f the capitalist system. Russia was going through a bourgeois revolution, Germany would go through a socialist one. Helphand therefore advised the Russians not to worry about ‘ how freedom could be established in Germany’, but to strive for the achievement o f peace, which would bring the socialist workers out o f the trenches and back into the party organization.10 All this was rather vague and unsatisfactory: apart from the assurance that the military would not launch an offensive on the eastern front, Borbjerg took with him nothing for the Russians worth having. It was, however, one way o f establishing contact with the Russian revolutionaries, and there were others that might prove more effective. On 9 April Helphand inquired, through Brockdorff-Rantzau, about the date o f the departure o f the Russian emigres from Zurich; he told the Foreign Ministry, at the same time, that he intended to meet the Russians as soon as they arrived at Malmo in Sweden. Only now did he let the German party leaders know that Lenin and Karl Radek, together with some forty other exiles, were on their way from Switzerland to Stockholm. He tried hard to convince Ebert, Scheidemann, and Bauer, who were then about to start on their return journey to Berlin, that at least one o f them should stay in Copenhagen. There existed the possibility, he told them, that the Russians might want to discuss the situation with them, in which case a representative o f the party should be available to travel to Malmo at once. T he German party leaders were rather taken aback by H elphand’ s announcement about the return o f the Russian exiles. T hey o f course knew nothing about Helphand’ s connexions with the Foreign Ministry, nor o f its activities for the promotion o f chaos in Russia. In this particular case, they jum ped to the wrong conclusions: they thought o f the transport o f the emigres as an ‘ arrangement o f Dr. Helphand’ , who had carried it out with out the knowledge o f the German socialists in order to absolve the party, should the plan misfire, from future incriminations.11 W hen Helphand suggested that one o f them should stand by, they behaved just as naively. Ebert said that he feared he 10 Scheidemann, op. cit., p. 425.

11 ibid., p. 427.

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had no time to stay on in Copenhagen and that, anyway, the Russians probably would not negotiate with their German com rades. Scheidemann, who was at first inclined to stay, was over ruled. The German delegation found it impossible to wait for the arrival o f the Russians. The party leaders did, however, provide Helphand with a letter giving him full powers to negotiate on behalf o f the executive. For the first time in his fife, he was able to act as the representative o f the German party: his main purpose was to get in touch with Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and he may well have been glad that there would be no witnesses about. Jakob Fiirstenberg had instructions to arrange a meeting with L enin: the company director met the Bolshevik leader in Malmo, and then travelled with him to Stockholm. They had enough time to discuss the case o f comrade Helphand on the train. W ould it be wise for Lenin to meet Helphand personally? The answer was no, it certainly would not. Lenin knew that, especially after his journey across Germany, he had to tread carefully and do nothing to compromise himself. W hen the Russian exiles arrived in Stockholm on 13 April, Helphand was already waiting there. He understood that Lenin’ s security precautions did not exclude the possibility o f a con fidential exchange o f opinions through their mutual friend, Jakob Fiirstenberg. Helphand therefore asked him to request informa tion from Lenin about his political plans; ‘peace was needed; what did he want to do’ . Lenin replied that ‘ he was not concerned with diplomacy; his task was social-revolutionary agitation’ .12 This reply did not satisfy Helphand: according to his own testimony, he then asked Fiirstenberg to warn Lenin that‘ . . . he may go on agitating; but if he is not interested in statesmanship, then he will become a tool in my hands’ . Helphand was the proud owner o f a letter giving him full powers to negotiate on behalf o f the German party, but it was o f no use to him. He may well have been disappointed when he found out that Lenin was not inclined to risk a personal m eeting: hence the bitterness o f his last message to the Bolshevik leader. Lenin emerged as a much shrewder man than Helphand: there 12 Im K am p f um die Wahrheit, p. 51 .

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was really no point in a high-level meeting. Whatever Helphand may have thought about it, the two men were not in a position to conclude peace between Germany and Russia, and Lenin’s own views on the necessity o f peace were by no means secret. T he Bolshevik leader needed help but, above all, he had to be cautious. Anything Helphand and the Germans could do for him would have to be done in a roundabout way: in refusing him a personal meeting, Lenin made precisely this hint. Fiirstenberg was still available as a go-between, and now Karl Radek arrived on the scene. He was, it should be remembered, officially an Austro-Hungarian subject; it was with him that Helphand spent most o f the day on 13 April. It was a crucial and entirely secret encounter: we shall never know exactly what the two men had to say to each other. It is unlikely that they spent much time discussing Marxist theories. Helphand was in a position to promise massive support for the Bolsheviks in the forthcoming struggle for political power in Russia: Radek was empowered to accept the offer. T he events o f the following months provide sufficient evidence that this was precisely what happened in Stockholm on 13 April. After the conversation with Helphand, Radek, because o f his Austro-Hungarian passport, was unable to continue the trip with Lenin’ s party to Petrograd. He stayed on in Stockholm. Helphand returned to Copenhagen three days later, and he went to see Brockdorff-Rantzau at once. T he Minister’ s telegram to Berlin was brief and reticent, stating simply that Helphand was back from Stockholm, where he had had talks with the Russian exiles, and that he would arrive in Berlin on 18 April, to await an invitation to an audience with Zimmermann and to report to the executive committee o f the Social Democrat party.13 T he first meeting between Helphand and the party leaders took place late at night, an hour after his arrival in Berlin; another meeting was then arranged for the following day, 19 April. There was no need to tell the socialists everything he had discussed in Stockholm: their function, from Helphand’ s point o f view, was different from that o f the diplomats. First o f all, he wanted his comrades to adopt what he regarded as the right attitude towards 13 Zeman, op. cit., document No. 50.

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the revolution in Russia, and to bear in mind the international socialist connexions; to opt for, in case general peace should prove impossible to achieve (Helphand thought it would), a separate peace with Russia. He succeeded on all these counts. The party’ s enlarged committee (erweiterter Parteiausschuss) passed a resolution at the meeting on 19 April, which was a reply to the declaration o f the Petrograd Soviet, published on 14 April. It was drafted by Scheidemann and carried unani mously; it accepted the Russian formula o f peace without annexations and indemnities. W hen the party press published the resolution the following day, the similarity to the idea o f the Soviet was emphasized. T he crucial passage o f the declaration read:— ‘W e greet with passionate sympathy the victory o f the Russian revolution, and the reawakening o f the international desire for peace which the revolution has sparked off. W e pro claim our agreement with the resolution o f the Russian Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, to pave the way for a general peace, with out annexations, and indemnities, on the basis o f the free develop ment o f all nations.’ 14 W hile the German socialists agitated for a peace which would more or less correspond to the Russian views on the subject, the most important task o f Germany’ s eastern policy was to make it impossible for the provisional Government in Petrograd to carry on the war. It was this second objective which came to exercise the ingenuity o f the Imperial Government. After his recent consultations with the socialists, Helphand was received at the Foreign Ministry. An audience was arranged for him with Zimmermann, the State Secretary; it had the highest security rating. There were no witnesses, and no record o f the conversa tion was taken. There can be no doubt that Helphand drew the State Secretary’ s attention to the advantages o f supporting the Bolshevik party. Lenin was the only Russian party leader whose stand on the question o f peace was firm, and whose organization was dis ciplined and effective. It could be supported in a variety o f ways: the Bolsheviks needed money for extensive pacifist propaganda 14 Protokoll der Sitzung des erweiterten Parteiausschusses am 18 und ig A p ril i g i y , im Reich stagsgeboude zu B erlin , 1 917, p. 74.

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in the Russian hinterland; the agitation among the front-line troops, which had been going on for many months, w ould now have to be intensified and geared more closely to the Bolshevik cause. There still existed the danger that a German offensive on the eastern front would rally the patriotic forces in Russia, and thus cancel the effect o f pacifist propaganda. It would have hit the Bolsheviks hardest: Helphand therefore must have insisted, once again, that no offensive should be undertaken within the next few months. A nd finally, earlier on in the month, the Foreign Ministry had asked the Treasury for a further grant o f five million marks for political purposes in Russia: it was the highest sum o f money requested so far, and it was approved on 3 April.15 T he ways in which it was going to be used may also have given Zimmermann and Helphand another subject for conÂ versation. Helphand was the only man in contact with the Foreign Ministry who dealt in sums o f that order. H e was much more cautious now : he signed no receipts, as he had done two years before. After concluding the business in Berlin, Helphand travelled to Copenhagen, and then to Stockholm : he spent the following weeks commuting between the two Scandinavian capitals. In Stockholm, he spent most o f his time with the members o f the Bolshevik Foreign Mission: indeed, it looked as if he himself was one o f them. It was the only foreign branch o f the Bolshevik central committee in Petrograd; it also served as a propaganda office, which publicized Bolshevik policy through two German-language periodicals, the Bote der russiscken Revolution and Korrespondenz Prawda. It was run by Karl Radek, Jakob Fiirstenberg, and another Bolshevik o f Polish origin, V. V. Vorovski, also known as Orlovsky. T he last man in this conspiratorial trio, and, for us, the only unknown quantity, was an engineer by profession, who had been active as a Bolshevik party worker and journalist in Odessa in the years 1913 and 1914. W hen he returned to M oscow he join ed the local branch o f the Siemens-Schuckert firm which sent him, in January 1916, as its representative to Stockholm. He had started to work with Fiirstenberg immediately after the March revolution 15 Zeman, op. cit., editorial note, p. 24.

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in Russia; it is very probable that the two men had been in touch for some time before the revolution.16 Vorovski may have known Helphand from the time he spent studying, soon after the turn o f the century, at the Polytechnic in Munich. O f the three men in the Bolshevik bureau, Radek was the most active and dominant. He was now in a position to estab lish the connexions he had always prized so highly. Apart from Helphand, he got to know Gustav Mayer, who had come to Stockholm on an official mission for the German Government; a ubiquitous character called Goldberg, who was acting as an agent for Erzberger, the Reichstag deputy; and Karl Moor, a Swiss socialist who was concurrently working for the Swiss, the Austrian, and the German Governments. Through his contacts, Radek let the German Government know that the victory o f the Bolsheviks over the provisional Government was only a question o f time. And he told everybody who cared to listen that he was not looking for a flat in Stockholm for the winter, as he wanted to return to Petrograd immediately after the Bolshevik victory.17 Apart from propaganda and intelligence activities, this care fully selected, all-Polish Bolshevik team served another function. It was used for the purposes o f channelling money into the Bolshevik party coffers in Russia. Helphand was the main— if not the only— source o f this munificence; if the Bolsheviks thought that Helphand still owed them money from the Gorki royalties, it was now being repaid to them, and in the most generous manner. All the three Poles in Stockholm were experienced under ground workers, who continued to combat the provisional Government with the means they had employed against the Tsarist regime. T hey were now in a favoured position. The Germans put their diplomatic communications system at their disposal; the Bolshevik mission also occasionally used the official Russian diplomatic bag for communications with Petrograd. In addition, there existed the well-tried connexions between Russia 16 In the introduction to Vorovski’s collected works, based on an essay by Fiirstenberg, there is no mention of Vorovski’s activities during the year 19 16 : cf. V . V. Vorovski, Sochineniya, Moscow, 1933. cf. also N. Piashev, Vorovski, Moscow, 1959, pp. 184-5. 17 G. Mayer, Vom Journalisten zum Historiker der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Zurich, 1949, p p .276-9.

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and Scandinavia which had been established by Helphand’ s Copenhagen export company, o f which Fiirstenberg was the managing director. Radek and his friends commanded an impres sive variety o f means o f communication: i f these failed, the Bolshevik mission was quite capable o f establishing connexions o f its own with Petrograd. Lenin trusted his political bureau in Stockholm implicitly. A large number o f messages were exchanged between Petrograd and Stockholm; from the very beginning, the question o f money for the Bolshevik party occupied a prominent place in the corre spondence. In his first letter to Fiirstenberg, written a few days after his arrival in Petrograd, Lenin complained that ‘ until now . . . we have received no money from you’ , and he asked the Foreign Mission to exercise ‘ every care and caution in your relationships’ . In the second letter, Lenin was able to acknowledge the receipt o f 2,000 roubles from Kozlovsky, the Polish lawyer and socialist, and one o f Helphand’ s contact men.18 Early in May, the mission o f Borbjerg to Petrograd imposed itself, once again, on Helphand’ s attention: it appeared to have somewhat complicated matters. Helphand had organized it before his talk with Radek, and now he behaved as if he wished he had not done so. After successfully overcoming certain difficulties at the Rus sian frontier, Borbjerg reached Petrograd towards the end o f April. He met Cheidse, Kerensky, and Skobelev, the leaders o f the Soviet, and then was invited by its executive committee to a general discussion which took place on 6 May. T w o points were discussed: the message from the German party, and the possi bility o f a general socialist conference.19 Borbjerg was unable to do much more than stress the goodwill o f the German party. T he Russians raised the question o f Germany’ s readiness to apply the right o f self-determination to Alsace-Lorraine; they asked the Danish emissary whether the German socialists were acting on behalf o f the majority o f the Reichstag or only for themselves. Borbjerg gave a satisfactory answer to neither o f these questions. 18 Proletarskaya revolyutsiya, Moscow, 1923, No. 9, pp. 227-8. 19 N. Avdeev, Revolutsiya ig ijg o d a , Moscow, 1923, vol. 2, p. 64.

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After a few days’ wait, Borbjerg was told that the Soviet favoured the idea o f a socialist peace conference, which should, however, be summoned by the Petrograd Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council itself. This announcement produced a difficult situation: since the end o f April, the Dutch and the Scandinavian socialists had themselves been preparing such a conference, which was to take place in Stockholm in the summer. Nor did Borbjerg succeed in getting the Bolsheviks to agree to take part in the Stockholm conference. During the Dane’ s stay in Petrograd, the all-Russian conference o f the Bolshevik party passed a resolution which op posed participation; for good measure, the resolution denounced Borbjerg as an ‘ agent’ o f the Imperial German Government and o f the German and Scandinavian ‘ socialist chauvinists’ .20 On 10 May Borbjerg returned to Copenhagen, where Helphand met him soon after his arrival. Although the Dane was in a more optimistic m ood than his performance in Petrograd war ranted, Helphand was unable to be either impressed or interested. He was too deeply committed to the support o f the Bolshevik line. He observed the preparations, which the Dutch-Scandinavian committee were making for a socialist conference in Stockholm, with growing displeasure. They had advanced so far that, on 21 May, several preliminary conferences with a number o f national delegations were opened; their organizers hoped that they would be able to come to an agreement with the Petrograd Soviet on its participation. After discussions with the Bulgarian, Finnish, Austrian, Czech, and Hungarian delegations, the DutchScandinavian committee were to receive the representatives o f the German majority party on 4 June. Helphand kept his distance from all this activity. He did nothing to give the conference public support: Die Glocke, which usually contained a comment by its publisher on every important development in the socialist movement, was silent. The failure o f the Borbjerg mission had brought home to him the deep divisions on this problem inside the Soviet itself: he knew well o f the patriotic disposition o f many o f the Russian socialists, who supported the policy o f the continuation o f the war. It was not a socialist conference, but the achievement o f political power by 20 ibid., p. 258.

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the Bolsheviks, that promised to fulfil everything he expected the Russian revolution to accomplish. He would do nothing to jeopardize his policy o f maximum support for the Bolsheviks. He therefore faced the enthusiasm o f the German delegation to Stockholm— it consisted o f such pillars o f the party as Ebert, Scheidemann, David, Hermann Muller, Carl Legien, and Gustav Bauer— with misgivings. T he delegates broke o ff their journey in Copenhagen on 30 May; there were conversations with Stauning, the chairman o f the Danish party, and with Borbjerg; Helphand gave a very good party for his comrades and singing and dancing went on until late at night. But when the delega tion resumed its journey two days later, Helphand showed no desire to accompany it to Stockholm. Instead o f going to the conference, he left for Marienbad, to nurse his rheumatism for a few weeks. His interest in the conference was aroused only when the arrival in Stockholm o f the Soviet representatives was announced. It was a mixed delegation, consisting o f J. P. Goldenberg, a former Bolshevik, Smirnov and Ehrlich, two right-wing Mensheviks, and Rusanov, the Social Revolutionary. T hey came to Sweden early in July, about the same time as Helphand returned to Denmark from Marienbad. He then went over to Stockholm, where he had confidential talks with the Russians on 13 and 14 July. T w o days later, Helphand reported on the conversation to the party executive in Berlin. T he Russians, he confided to his comrades, had talked Very sensibly’ , and they were determined to prevent any ‘useless discussion about war guilt’ . T hey had, however, stressed the fact that the decision o f the coming conference should be binding for all parties, including the German.21 Helphand knew that the Germans were disinclined to accept this condition and he may have intended to warn them o f the futility o f the conference. Nevertheless, for the time being, the party executive and Helphand had no interests in common. T he majority o f socialists were too deeply committed to a vague con cept o f peace: their interest in the Stockholm conference, and their participation in the Reichstag peace resolution— published the day after their talks with Helphand— were sufficient proofs 21 E. David, D iary , entry for 1 6 Ju ly 1917. Bundesarchiv Koblenz •

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o f this. Helphand knew that they would have no understanding o f the practical implications o f his Bolshevik policy. He told them nothing about it. Instead, he visited the Foreign Ministry on 17 July. The diplomats were more understanding than his socialist comrades, and Helphand, in return, was more informative. The influence o f Lenin, Helphand said, continued to increase; the present Russian military offensive was carried out under British and American pressure, as it had been made the condition o f further supplies o f money and goods. Nevertheless Helphand said, as reported in the memorandum, ‘ disappointment had already set in, and would result in a further softening-up o f the army. This had already reached such a degree, even before the offensive, that the army, through the person o f Brusilov, had said that the collapse o f the armed forces could only be prevented by an immediate offensive. In addition to this, there was the poor harvest. The Russians living in Stockholm had claimed that only 30 per cent o f the area being farmed before the war was under cultivation now. Helphand regards this as an exaggeration, but thinks that the total could hardly, in fact, be more than 50 per cent.’ 22 Helphand had good reasons for his optimism. In Russia, increase in anarchy and material privations went hand in hand; at the front, where German propaganda was run on the same lines as Bolshevik agitation— this fact was commented on by a number o f independent witnesses who visited the front in the summer o f 1917— the army was melting away under the eyes o f its commanders. Helphand had told Brockdorff-Rantzau in April that it would take a few months to reach the peak o f anarchy in Russia. He was convinced that no power in Petrograd could prevent the Bolsheviks in their work o f destruction. He was now more cautious than in 1915, and he committed himself to no precise dates: but he knew full well that sooner or later the Bolsheviks would grasp at supreme power in the state. After the consultations in the Foreign Ministry, Helphand made an unpredictable move. Instead o f returning to Scandinavia, he left for Switzerland on 22 July. He said he had some business to do there, and that the country would be better for his health; 22 Zeman, op. cit., document No. 66.

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in Scandinavia too many spies, agents, and hangers-on were pestering the socialists who had assembled in Stockholm for the conference. Helphand, however, had better reasons than that for wishing to be out o f the way. During the past few days, a storm had been gathering over his head. On 16 and 17 July, while Helphand was assuring the diplo mats in Berlin o f the eventual victory o f the Bolsheviks, Lenin and his party organized a rising against the provisional Govern ment in Petrograd. It was suppressed with some difficulty, and Kerensky’ s Government decided to settle accounts with the Bolsheviks once and for all. On 18 July, the Ministry o f Justice published a series o f documents which were intended to prove that Lenin and the Bolshevik party were guilty o f high treason. They were produced as evidence that the Bolsheviks had received money from the German Government; the whole operation was aimed at discrediting the Bolsheviks in the eyes o f the public. Business telegrams to and from Fiirstenberg, Kozlovsky, and Sumenson, the Petrograd representative o f the Nestle firm, and Lenin’ s telegrams to Fiirstenberg and Kollontay, a Russian lady socialist who later served for fifteen years as the Soviet Ambas sador to Sweden, were published. T he curtain was rung up on a major political scandal. On the following day— 19 July— the headlines o f the Russian patriotic press proclaimed Lenin’ s treason to the nation. T he campaign was led by two journalists, Alexinski and Burtsev, who had accused the Bolsheviks o f treasonable activities as early as 1914; Burtsev had known and hated Helphand for a long time. A nd it was Helphand who now appeared as the central figure in the drama, as the man who organized this treasonable co-opera tion between the Bolsheviks and the German Government. He appeared as a sinister background figure, who had used his business relations with Jakob Fiirstenberg to the benefit o f the Bolshevik party coffers. ‘ Parvus is not an agent provocateur\ Burtsev wrote on 20 July in Milyukov’ s newspaper Rech, ‘ he is more than that: he is an agent o f Wilhelm II.’ Lenin, for very good reasons, had always managed to avoid the use o f this term in his public pronounce ments on Helphand.

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The press campaign was followed by legal proceedings against the Bolsheviks. The case for the prosecution was that Fiirstenberg and Alexandra Kollontay had transferred the money received from Helphand from the Nye Bank in Stockholm to a special account o f Sumenson’ s at the Siberian Bank in Petrograd, an account to which the Bolsheviks had access.23 The main charges against the accused were contained in the following passage: The investigation established that Yakov (cover-name ‘ Kuba’) HaneckiFiirstenberg, while residing in Copenhagen during the war, had close financial connexions with Parvus, an agent o f the German government. Moreover the activity o f Parvus as a German and Austrian agent was directed towards the defeat o f Russia and the separation o f the Ukraine. . . . From numerous telegrams in the hands o f the legal authorities it is established that a constant and extensive correspondence was carried on between Sumenson, Ulyanov (Lenin), Kollontay, and Kozlovsky residing in Petrograd, on the one hand, and Fiirstenberg (Hanecki) and Helphand (Parvus), on the other. Although this correspondence refers to commercial deals, shipment o f all sorts o f goods, and money transac tions, it offers sufficient reasons to conclude that this correspondence was a cover-up for relations o f an espionage character.24

On the basis o f the available evidence, the prosecutor regarded the charge— that the accused co-operated with Germany in order to diminish Russia’ s fighting power— as proven. For this purpose and with the money received . . . they organized propaganda among the civilian population and in the army, appealing to them to refuse immediately to continue military operations against the enemy; also, towards the same end, to organize in Petrograd, from

16 to

18 July 1917, an armed insurrection against the existing order. . . ,25 Thanks to the inevitable leak from the Ministry o f Justice, Lenin and Zinoviev were able to go into hiding in time. Kozlovsky, Sumenson, and later, Trotsky, were arrested. It was like old times; the whole Bolshevik party went underground. Its very existence was now at stake, and a determined effort was made to clear its name. In Listok Pravda, which was then published instead 23 R . P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky (editors), The Provisional Government 1 9 1 7 , Stan ford, 1962, vol. 3, pp. 1464-5. 24 ibid., pp. 1375-6. 25 ibid., p. 1376.

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o f Pravda proper, the Bolshevik central committee nervously defended itself, on 19 July, against the ‘ unheard-of accusations’ against Lenin, and against the ‘monstrous libel’ from the ranks o f the counter-revolution. T he central committee demanded that the provisional Government and the Soviet should immediately order an investigation which would clear up ‘ all the circumstances o f the foul conspiracy by the pogromists and hired slanderers against the honour and life o f the leaders o f the working class’ .26 Trotsky, who was suspect because o f his friendship with Helphand, dissociated himself from his erstwhile comrade in a newspaper article as early as 21 Ju ly:27 his previous attacks on Helphand— the ‘ obituary’ in JVashe Slovo, and the warning against the Copenhagen Institute in Humanite— could now be used as valuable alibis. T he most interesting denial, however, came from the Bolshevik Foreign Mission in Stockholm. It appeared in Korrespondenz Prawda on 31 July, and it had the Radek touch. T he charges against the Bolsheviks were described as a plot, cooked up with the help both o f documents o f the old Okhrana — the Tsarist secret service— and the forgeries perpetrated by the ‘ Alexinsky canaille\ T he flat denial and the vitriolic abuse were, o f course, to be expected: the line Radek took on Helphand, the central figure in the affair, was unique. Radek pointed out that, throughout the war, there had existed political differences between Helphand, the socialist-chauvinist, and the Bolsheviks. T hey had also kept out o f his Copenhagen Institute, because they did not want to be tarred with the same brush as Helphand. Nevertheless, the close relationship between Helphand and Fiirstenberg was known in socialist circles, and it had to be explained away. Even for Radek, this was a difficult task. W hen Fiirstenberg arrived in Copenhagen, Radek wrote, he wanted to avoid joining the Copenhagen Institute for political reasons, and he grasped the opportunity o f working in Helphand’ s business: 1. Because he then regarded Parvus as a personally honest man (and he still does so now). 2. Because he could then not only support his family, but also because he could give powerful financial help to the Polish party organization in Russian Poland. . . . Hanecki was not 26 cf. Browder and Kerensky, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1366.

27 Novaya TJiizn.

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bound to Helphand by any political ties, but through the support o f the Polish party press and organization, which was conducting a sharp struggle against the German forces o f occupation, and which publicly declared itself in agreement with Liebknecht: he was actually working against the policy o f Parvus.

Despite his determined attempt at obfuscation, Radek revealed a point o f extreme relevance: that money had been siphoned o ff from Helphand’s business for political purposes. Radek was, o f course, unable to add that the Polish party was a creation o f Lenin, and that it stood in such close connexion with the Russian Bolsheviks that it was difficult to tell the two organiza tions apart. The members o f the Bolshevik Foreign Mission regarded Helphand in a more favourable light than was customary among their comrades. The Korrespondenz Prawda stated that Helphand could be described neither as an Austrian nor as a German agent, and then it went on publicly to correct Lenin’ s verdict that Helphand was a socialist chauvinist. Lenin, it was pointed out, had been convinced that Helphand’s business activity had con ditioned his war policy. There were, however, many Bolsheviks who regarded Helphand as a man unable to sell himself. Furs tenberg in particular, it was said, thought that Helphand’ s attitude to the war was based on his socialist ideology, and that the revolutionary theory he had developed before 1914 was the key to the understanding o f his ideas during the war. Only history would show, Radek wrote, ‘ who was right in his verdict on Parvus as a man: Lenin or Hanecki’ . This was a rhetorical question. Neither Lenin nor the members o f the Stockholm Mission were inclined to reveal the true facts. T he Bolsheviks had to defend themselves against the accusations o f the provisional Government, and they had to make a decision as to the degree o f whitewashing o f Helphand they could safely risk. They were fighting for the existence o f their party. From his hiding-place in Finland, Lenin proceeded with great caution. His declaration, also published in Stockholm, contained no comment on Helphand’ s personality.28 The Bolshevik leader was 28 Bote der russischen Revolution, No. 2 , 22 September 1917.

O s te r r e ic h is c h e N a t i o n a l b i b l i o t h e k ,

V ie n n a

XI. von Kiihlmann, State Secretary m the Foreign Ministry, and Count Czernin, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1917

Radio Tim es Hulton Picture Library

X II. Philipp Scheidemann speaking outside the Reichstag, 1919

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content to refer to his review o f the first issue o f Die Glocke in 1915, and to deny the accusation that he had received money from Helphand. He was not yet ready to pass the final verdict. T he time was certainly as inopportune for Helphand’ s rehabilita tion as a socialist and revolutionary, as for his denunciation as an agent o f the German Government. There existed a momentary community o f interest between the two men, and Lenin decided to postpone the final settlement o f accounts, one way or the other, with Helphand. W hen the blow fell upon the Bolshevik organization, Helphand was being rather elusive in Switzerland. There were a lot o f people looking for him. W hen Fiirstenberg and Vorovski asked him, in telegrams o f 25 July (the Bolshevik Mission was using the German diplomatic network o f communications) to return to Stockholm at once, and to send a declaration on oath that he had not let the Bolsheviks have any money through Fiirstenberg or anyone else, Romberg, the German Minister to Berne, had to report that he had been unable to run Helphand to ground. Only two valuable days later, on 27 July, Helphand was discovered staying at a luxury hotel, and the telegrams from Stockholm were handed over to him. Helphand’ s reply did not go through diplomatic channels, but there is no reason to assume that he did not comply with his friends’ request. He knew that the Bolshevik party would have to prepare itself for the eventual court proceedings in Petrograd, and he did as much for it as he possibly could. As early as 8 August, his publishing house in Berlin issued a pamphlet by Helphand, entitled 6My Reply to Kerensky and C o.’ . It read like a Bolshevik propaganda tract: Helphand avoided dealing with the main charge— that he had acted as an intermediary between the Bolsheviks and the Imperial German Government— putting his defence in still more general terms than the Russian defendants had done. He wrote: T have always supported, and will go on doing so, the Russian revolutionary movement in so far as it is socialist, with every means at my disposal. Y ou lunatics, why do you worry whether I have given money to Lenin? Lenin and others, whose names you give, have never demanded or received any money from me either as a loan or as a present. But I have M .R .-Q

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given them, and many others, something more effective than m oney or dynamite. I am one o f those men who have given spiritual nourishment to the revolutionary determination o f the Russian proletariat, which you are now trying, in vain, to destroy.’ In the circumstances, neither the Bolsheviks nor H elphand could do more than issue flat denials o f the charges by the pro visional Government. Passions aroused by the war were running high, and neither Lenin nor H elphand could expect the prosecu tion to take into account the subtleties o f the situation: that Lenin had used German help for his own purposes, that there existed no agreement between him and the German Governm ent, and that both he and H elphand were pursuing independent policies o f their ow n. In L ondon, after all, Roger Casement had been sentenced to death on less weighty evidence. N or could the Russian provisional Governm ent know anything about the messages the German diplomats were exchanging at the time. O n 29 September, Kiihlm ann, who had succeeded Zim m ermann in August as State Secretary in the Foreign M inistry, telegraphed the M inistry’ s Liaison Officer at the General H ead quarters on the subject o f subversive activities in Russia. ‘ O ur first interest, in these activities, was to further nationalist and separatist endeavours as far as possible and to give strong support to the revolutionary elements. W e have now been engaged in these activities for some time, and in complete agreement with the Political Section o f the General Staff in Berlin (Capt. von Hiilsen). O ur work together has shown tangible results. T h e Bolshevik movement could never have attained the scale or the influence which it has today without our continual support. T here is every indication that the movement will continue to grow, and the same is true also o f the Finnish and Ukrainian independence m ove m ents.’ 29 T w o months later, Kiihlm ann spelled out the effects o f the policy in more detail, again for the benefit o f the General H ead quarters : ‘ Russia appeared to be the weakest link in the enemy chain. T h e task therefore was gradually to loosen it, and, when possible, to remove it. T h is was the purpose o f the subversive activity we caused to be carried out in Russia behind the 29 Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia , document No. 71.

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front— in the first place prom otion o f separatist tendencies and support o f the Bolsheviks. It was not until the Bolsheviks had received from us a steady flow o f funds through various channels and under different labels that they were in a position to be able to build up their main organ, Pravda , to conduct energetic propaganda and appreciably to extend the originally narrow basis o f their party.’ 30

Kiihlmann was quite right in his forecast that the influence o f the Bolsheviks would continue to grow. T he provisional Govern ment proved itself unable to destroy the party’ s underground network; the published evidence against the Bolsheviks was too sketchy, and the prosecution did not press the case beyond the preliminary charges. Although Helphand was acting as the main link between the Bolsheviks and the Imperial German Govern ment, this was not the only connexion available to Berlin in the summer o f 1917. A part o f the funds allocated for subversion in Russia— Eduard Bernstein later estimated the total sum at the rate o f fifty million gold marks: an estimate o f thirty million appears to be nearer the truth— may well have been handed over direct to the Bolshevik Foreign Mission by the German Legation in Stockholm; the Swiss socialist Karl Moor, who was working for the German Government under the cover name Baier, had his own contacts in Russia among the Bolsheviks, and he could also have been helpful in this respect. T h e only man w ho knew the whole story was Minister D iego von Bergen, w ho dealt with subversion in Russia in the political section o f the Foreign M inistry. Bergen was free o f the political enthusiasms so dear to Brockdorlf-R antzau; he was a reliable civil servant w ho served, after the war, both the W eim ar and the H itler regimes as the Am bassador to the H o ly See. H e com bined efficiency with reticence: the draft o f the above-quoted D ecem ber telegram from Kiihlm ann to the General Headquarters, for which Bergen was responsible, was the only minor indiscretion he ever committed. D espite the manner in which the charges o f the provisional Governm ent against the Bolsheviks petered out, their aftermath was disastrous

for

Russia’ s politics.

30 Zeman, op. cit., document No. 94.

The

rift

between

the

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Bolsheviks and the moderate socialist groups deepened, and the hostility between the Bolsheviks and the provisional Government became clearly irreconcilable. Early in 1918, the charges against the Bolsheviks were again taken up in the forged documents assembled by Edgar Sisson, a gullible Am erican journalist in R u ssia: an incident which marred the relations between W ash in g ton and the Soviets in their formative stage. T h e affair o f the German subsidies proved the conspiratorial efficiency o f the Bolsheviks on the one hand, and, on the other, the inability o f the provisional Government to rule the country: its unfinished, inconclusive nature affected political behaviour as much as historical writing. In the summer o f 1917, the only outside assistance the B ol sheviks had received had come from H elp h an d : the logic o f the situation demanded that he should give support to Lenin and his party. H e replied to Kerensky’ s charges in a tone reminiscent o f his early controversies, when he was editing the Sachsische

Arbeiterzeitung. H is attacks were directed against the majority o f the Soviet, and against the socialist ministers in the provisional Governm ent in particular: they had not summoned the C on stituent Assem bly, they had proved incapable o f solving the land question, they had not achieved peace: ‘ Instead o f peace— a new mass o f victims, instead o f land— taxes, instead o f dem o cracy— autocracy! Instead o f one T sar— many small ones.’ 31 H elphand was now gambling va banque. A fter vacillating for many years in his attitudes to Lenin, he now staked everything on the trump card o f Bolshevism . It was in this sense that the Bolsheviks themselves understood H elphand’ s actions. T h e y expressed the wish that H elphand’ s answer to Kerensky should be given wide pu blicity: Brockdorff-Rantzau was, as usual, ready to oblige. O n 16 A ugust, he requested the Foreign M inistry to publicize H elphand’ s leaflet through the Wolffsche Telegraphen

Bureau , the official news agency.32 T h ere was, however, a limit beyond which the Foreign Ministry w ould not go in assisting the spread o f Bolshevik propaganda. Bergen thought the comment in

Vorwdrts on 14 A ugust sufficient; he was, however, willing to 31 Parvus, M eine Antwort an Kerenski u n d C o Berlin, 1917, p. 3. 32 Telegram No. 1060, in W K 2 geh.

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organize further publicity for H elphand’ s leaflet in Switzerland and Sw eden.33

Although the sympathetic leading article in Vorwarts stressed the fact that Helphand had turned the tables on the provisional Government, and put it ‘in the dock’ , the German party was by no means united on this issue. On 20 August Cohen-Reuss wrote, in the same newspaper, that Helphand’s views were ‘ unintelligible and dangerous’ . Helphand’s reply to Kerensky contained, in Reuss’ s opinion, ‘ senseless suspicions against the leading figures o f the Russian revolution’ , and it therefore made no real con tribution to the cause o f understanding between Russia and Germany. T he German party, Reuss thought, had every reason to disagree with Helphand, who had made an ‘ill-disguised attempt to broadcast Bolshevik propaganda’ . But Cohen-Reuss’ s was an isolated voice: no other German socialist hinted at the deeper implications o f Helphand’s policy. Early in the autumn, Helphand was still lying low. It would have been very unwise for him to surface in Scandinavia. His presence there w ould only have nourished the rumours o f his secret connexions with the Bolsheviks; in addition, he had been getting too much undesirable publicity there, for yet another reason: because o f Helphand’ s coal business, the Danish trade unions had also become the target o f vigorous attacks. In the middle o f October he therefore quietly returned to Switzerland after a brief stay in Berlin. He appeared unconcerned with the commotion he had caused, patiently biding his time. This state o f suspended activity was unusual for Helphand. H e o f course knew that he must do nothing to jeopardize the position o f the Bolsheviks still further; there was, however, another reason why he was letting events take their course. He had done everything he could to influence Germany’s policy towards Russia. He had even secured the services o f a man whom he could trust to act as a high-level public relations officer. Victor Naumann had been introduced to Helphand by A d o lf Muller, early in 1917: without an official position, he exercised considerable influence. T he son o f a Protestant middle-class family in Berlin, he had sought success as a dramatist after his 33 Telegram No. 6o6 of 18 August 1 917, in W K 2 geh.

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studies in Freiburg and Leipzig. A s a dramatist, Naum ann was a failure; at the turn o f the century he became a Catholic convert and settled in M unich. H e wrote a variety o f Catholic apologia and through them he gained access to the court circles in the Bavarian capital. H e also was a close friend o f Count H erding, who was soon to become the Reich Chancellor. H elphand regarded these connexions as highly valuable and he started paying Naum ann, in the summer o f 1917, a retaining fee for his services as a lobbyist and inform ant.34 Naum ann came to Marienbad in June, while H elphand was staying there: he was instructed to make H elphandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; s policies towards Russia known in the right quarters. Naumann passed them on to Count Czernin, the Austro-H ungarian Foreign M inister; he talked about them to the German and the Bavarian Crow n Princes, as well as to General Ludendorff.35 A t the end o f O ctober, Naumann then accompanied his employer to Vienna in order to arrange a meeting there with Count Czernin. Before a date could be fixed for the audience, the first news reached the H absburg capital o f the successful Bolshevik coup d'etat. 34 JVachlassHelphand, Rep. 92, No. 7. 35 V. Naumann, Dokumente und Argumente, Berlin, 1928, pp. 257-60.

Dirty Hands In Vienna, H elphand witnessed the great enthusiasm w ith w hich the workers greeted the news o f the Bolshevik revolu tion. T h e socialist newspapers celebrated the ‘ revolution o f peace’ in Petrograd, and a mass meeting on the follow ing Sunday, 11 N ovem ber, acclaimed the events in Russia as ‘ a new epoch in

the

struggle for

the

liberation

o f the international p ro

letariat’ . O n 14 N ovem ber H elphand was received by C ount C zernin: on the same day, soon after the audience at Ballhausplatz, he received an important communication from the Bolshevik M ission in Stockholm. Radek and Fiirstenberg asked H elphand to return to Sweden at on ce: it was said in their telegram that the B ol shevik Governm ent urgently needed support from the socialist parties in Germ any and Austria-H ungary. ‘ Great demonstrations and strikes’ , the Bolsheviks in Stockholm telegraphed H elphand, were highly desirable.1 H elphand left Vienna at once and broke o ff his jou rn ey in B erlin: he was expected in the Foreign M inistry. T h e diplomats were highly gratified by the turn o f events in Russia. T h e Bolsheviks, though victorious, were by no means securely en trenched in their positions o f p o w er: they still needed support, and the Imperial Germ an Governm ent was b y no means averse to giving it. O n 9 N ovem ber the Treasury allowed a further fifteen m illion marks for political purposes in R ussia: Bergen in the Foreign M inistry knew that the Bolshevik Governm ent had to struggle ‘ with great financial difficulties’ , and that it was therefore desirable to supply it w ith m oney. For the same reason, ‘ a further two m illion for known purposes’ were transferred to 1 P. Scheidemann,

M e m o ir e n ein es S ozia ld em ok ra ten ,

vol. 2, p. 122.

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the Legation in Stockholm, immediately after the Bolshevik coup d'etat in Petrograd.2 In his conversations with the Foreign Ministry officials, Helphand drew an optimistic picture o f future developments in Russia. He urged the German Government to respond warmly to the Bolshevik peace declaration o f 9 November: Germany must adhere to the formula o f ‘no annexations and indemnities’ in order to strengthen the peace movement in Russia, and to bring about peace negotiations. He pointed out that a favourable reply from Berlin would strongly influence public opinion, and that it was very likely to result in the complete collapse o f the Russian Army. The Russian front was held together only by the fear o f a German offensive. And, most important, Germany’s readiness to conclude peace would necessarily strengthen the position o f the Bolsheviks, the most outspoken partisans o f peace. Helphand made quite clear his opinion that, according to available information, the position o f the Bolsheviks was far from secure. Their Government was not supported by the majority o f the people: ‘it was the victory o f one minority over another minority’ ; there existed the threat o f Kerensky’s armies as well as a crisis in food supplies; the land problem was also entirely beyond the control o f the Bolsheviks: ‘ they simply let events take their course’ . In addition, during the struggles o f the past months, the party had to carry with it the ‘ dark masses’— Helphand avoided the pertinent Marxist term Lumpenproletariat— which were now threatening the stability o f the new order.3 Because o f the weakness o f its position, the Bolshevik Govern ment was forced to pursue, in Helphand’ s words, a ‘ simple policy’ . Only by concluding peace could it consolidate and win the national assembly, which was to meet soon, over to its side. T he reason why Lenin’ s Government had so far maintained a reserved attitude towards peace negotiations was, according to Helphand, that the Bolsheviks were still awaiting revolutionary developments in Austria-Hungary and in Germany. Never theless, the Bolsheviks entertained ‘no particular enmity, 2 Zeman, op. cit., documents Nos. 75, 92, 72, etal. 3 Helphand’s memorandum for Bussche, the Under State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, in W K 2.

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especially towards the German government’ . Helphand pointed to the fact that the Bolshevik leaders had gone through the school o f German Social Democracy— he did not think it necessary to spell out the useful services the German Government had per formed— and ‘ when they have renounced the adventurous elements in their plans, then they will have to rediscover their bonds with German Social Democracy and with German civiliza tion’ . Indeed, after the successful putsch the large pro-German group inside the Bolshevik party had dared to come into the open again. ‘ In the ranks o f the leaders themselves, in the closest proximity o f Lenin and Trotsky, there are people who kept up their contacts with German Social Democracy throughout the war.’ As far as the concrete conditions o f peace between the Soviets and Germany were concerned, Helphand was very reserved. Although he encouraged the diplomats to regard ‘ cessions o f territory as not impossible’ , he suggested that they would be o f value to Germany only if they were carried out with the ‘ un conditional approval’ o f the Bolshevik Government. He regarded economic relations and preferential trade treatment as much more valuable than carving o ff slices o f Russia: ‘ The Russian market and participation in the industrialization o f Russia are more important to us than any transfers o f territory.’ Helphand’ s proposals on the political treatment o f the Bolshevik regime were cautious: as far as he was concerned, the diplomats had fulfilled their function. He was now moving away from them. His second appointment in Berlin was with Ebert and Scheidemann. Now that the Bolsheviks were in power, the co operation o f the socialists, Helphand thought, would prove more useful than that o f the diplomats. But neither o f the leaders o f the majority socialists showed enthusiasm for the Bolshevik request for ‘ great demonstrations and strikes’ in Germany. T hey main tained that the party could not, at the present moment, stab the Imperial Government in the back. Scheidemann and Ebert agreed, however, that they were ready to agitate for a negotiated peace during their forthcoming propaganda tour through Germany.4 4 P. Scheidemann, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 123.

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T he party leaders then reached agreement with Helphand on the following procedure: Helphand should travel to Stockholm, in order to transmit the congratulations o f the German party to the Bolshevik Foreign Mission. He should inform the Bolshevik representatives o f the intention o f the executive to pass, at mass meetings at Dresden and Barmen, a resolution o f sympathy with the Bolshevik victory. Helphand was to put the draft o f the resolution before the Bolshevik bureau for approval; in addition, he was to ask the Bolsheviks for an immediate reply, so that it could be read to the Dresden and Barmen meetings. T h e greatest possible speed was essential, and, after breaking his journey at Copenhagen for a hurried consultation with Brockdorff-Rantzau,

H elphand

arrived in

Stockholm

N ovem ber. H e met the members o f the Bolshevik M ission on the same day.

He found them in high spirits. For weeks they had been under constant fire from their political opponents, and the news o f the Bolshevik victory came as a great release to them. Fiirstenberg’ s position was the most exposed, and he had suffered more than his comrades; he had left for Russia shortly before Helphand’ s arrival. It was therefore Radek and Vorovski whom Helphand congratulated, going on to ask them to approve the resolution that was to be put before the mass meetings in Germany. It read: ‘ The meeting congratulates the workers on their achievements in the Russian revolution, and wishes them continued success in their difficult task. It assures the Russian comrades o f its soli darity, and agrees with the demand for an immediate armistice to pave the way for a democratic peace which will insure free economic development for Germany and all other coun tries.’ 5 Apart from one minor correction— Radek asked Helphand to insert after the word ‘ solidarity’ , the phrase ‘promises them energetic support’— there was no objection, as far as the Bol sheviks were concerned, against the resolution. As to their reply, Helphand agreed that it should be addressed to both factions o f the German socialist party, the U.S.P.D. as well as the S.P.D ., and that it should read: 5

V orw a rts ,

19 November 1917.

Dirty H ands

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T he revolutionary movement in Russia has entered a new phase. T he Russian workers and soldiers have seized power from the hands o f those who abandoned the peace aims and the social goals o f the revolution. They have themselves assumed power, and they propose immediate negotiations for a peace without annexations or indemnities, and on the basis o f the self-determination o f nations. In Russia and abroad, how ever, this peace o f the peoples will be opposed by capitalist forces. Before us, there is still a long struggle, which can be concluded vic toriously only by international action o f the proletariat. T he Bol shevik representatives abroad have received the assurance o f the French, the Austrian and the German Social Democrat workers that the Russian proletariat can rely on their vigorous support. T hey have transmitted this news to the Russian workers, and they send brotherly greetings to all Social Democratic workers who are fighting for a peoples’ peace. They hope that the fratricide will be stopped by the united struggle o f the international proletariat, and that this will lay the foundations for the realization o f socialism.6

This much Helphand had agreed to do for Ebert and Scheidemann. But he wanted to talk to Radek privately, and he had an unexpected request to make. T o Radek’ s astonishment, Helphand offered his services to the Soviet Government, and expressed the wish to ask for Lenin’ s permission to return to Russia. He was quite aware o f the fact, Helphand said, that his war policy was suspect in Russian party circles. He was therefore prepared to defend his actions before a workers’ court whose verdict he would accept. He then asked Radek to put his request personally before Lenin, and to tell him o f Lenin’ s decision.7 Radek was profoundly impressed, and at once set out on a trip to Petrograd. On the way he caught up with Furstenberg: as soon as they reached the Finnish frontier on 18 November, they sent the following telegram to Lenin: 6W e are travelling by special train to Petrograd. W e have a very important message. Request immediate consultation.’ 8 W ith equal alacrity, Helphand set about the transmission o f 6 Vorwarts, 20 November 1917. 7 Pravda, 14 December 1924. 8 D ela Naroda , No. 219, quoted in P. S. Melgunov, ^ o l°t°i nemetskii klyuch, p. 150.

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the Bolshevik message to Berlin. Immediately after his conversa tion with Radek, he visited the German Legation in Stockholm. He was received by Counsellor Kurt Riezler: he had met Riezler for the first time in March 1915, when Helphand presented his revolutionary programme to the Foreign Ministry. The two men were not on the best o f terms. Dr. Kurt Riezler had been appointed to Stockholm in July 1917, where he assisted the Minister in all matters concerning socialist peace efforts and subversion in Russia. He regarded Helphand as no more than a valuable agent: he wanted to use Helphand but without allowing him any freedom o f action. In Riezler’ s view— which differed from that o f Brockdorff-Rantzau — Helphand should confine himself to carrying out the instruc tions o f the Foreign Ministry. He strongly disapproved o f Helphand’ s recent mission o f mediation between the Bolsheviks and the German Social Democrats. Since the mass meetings at Dresden and Barmen were to take place on the folio wing day, 18 November, Helphand asked Riezler to transmit the Bolshevik declaration to Berlin at once. He stressed the need that the message should reach both factions o f the party, Haase’ s U.S.P.D. as well as Ebert’ s and Scheidemann’ s S.P.D. Riezler promised to comply with Helphand’ s request. He made, however, an important alteration. Since the U.S.P.D. stood in opposition to the Government, Riezler abbreviated the address so that the message should reach the majority socialists only. Nevertheless, when the telegram arrived at the Foreign Ministry, the diplomats thought that the Bolshevik reply con tained more explosive material than was good for the mass meetings at Dresden and Barmen. Bergen therefore made arrange ments that it should be passed on to Scheidemann and Ebert only after the meetings on 18 November. The interests o f the diplomats and those o f Helphand no longer tallied. The leaders o f both the socialist parties, Scheidemann and Haase, made representations to the Foreign Ministry. Kiihlmann simply ignored them, and proceeded to rebuke Riezler for having agreed to send the telegram through diplomatic channels at all. There was no point in having a code, Kiihlmann telegraphed

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Stockholm, i f it were used for transmitting messages o f ‘private, especially non-German origin’ .9 As a result o f this episode, Helphand became the target o f criticism for the second time in the same year. In diplomatic circles in Stockholm his mission was regarded as the result o f his megalomania, o f his desire to play an important role at any price. In the Reichstag in Berlin, the leader o f the minority socialists, Hugo Haase, sharply attacked the choice o f Helphand for so delicate a mission. Haase thought it suspicious that the S.P.D. approached the Bolsheviks in this manner: it was objectionable to the German proletariat, Haase told the deputies, that a man like Helphand, who had made a fortune by war speculation, and who had become a German citizen in the most curious circum stances in the middle o f the war, should be sent to negotiate with the Bolsheviks.10 There was nothing much Scheidemann could say in his defence. He was content to declare that Helphand had undertaken the mission at the request o f the Bolsheviks. In the meanwhile, immediately after the incident o f the ex change o f telegrams, the German Government made arrangements to keep a close watch on Helphand’ s activities. T he day after his conversation with Radek, the Deputy General Staff in Berlin ordered the Abwehrstelle— the army intelligence— and the T ele graph Supervisory Office to observe every step Helphand took, and to register every telegram he dispatched: the order was suspended only on 23 May 1918.11 T he German Government was now clearly determined to prevent Helphand from pursuing an independent policy. For his own part, Helphand had received a clear hint that the German Government was intending to exploit the revolution in Russia for its own ends. In a report o f the Counsellor in the Austro-Hungarian Legation to Stockholm, Prince Emil von Fiirstenberg, Helphand’ s position was described with astonishing clarity. He wrote to Czernin on 18 November that Helphand’ s views would ‘ hardly fall into the same category as those o f the 9 The State Secretary to Riezler, telegram No. 1562 of 18 November 1917, in Akten der Gesandtschaft Stockholm, 72 a. Other diplomatic exchanges concerning this episode can be found in the same file. 10 Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstags, X I I I , vol. 3 1 1 , p. 3961. 11 The order of the General Staff can be found in W K 2 c.

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The Merchant o f Revolution

Wilhelmstrasse. His tactics are based on entirely different pre misses, and his aims are not entirely the same. Helphand is an old Russian revolutionary, who has been working vigorously on the preparations for the revolution in Russia during the past two years, and who now wants to crown his endeavour by bringing about, so to speak, a peace o f brotherliness, under his own own auspices. . . . Helphand is working, if I may say so, one third for the Central Powers, one third for Social Democracy, and one third for Russia, whose proletariat he wants to bind to himself by offering favourable conditions. In these circumstances, it is desirable to keep a sharp eye on his moves, and not let him get above himself.’12 Helphand now had the diplomatic resources o f the Central Powers ranged against him. He could not expect the diplomats to accept the socialists as partners in the peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks. I f the war was to be exploited in the interests o f socialism, then the socialist parties would have to be brought into play as independent factors. An international socialist meeting— like the conference which had run into difficulties in August— now appeared to him a suitable counterbalance to the policy o f Berlin. The socialist parties, Helphand thought, would come to an understanding more easily than the diplomatic representatives. It was clear, in Helphand’s words, that ‘if a congress o f socialist parties o f the states concerned should meet at the same time as the official peace conference, the work o f this congress would exert a strong influence on public opinion in favour o f a democratic peace’ .13 It was Thorvald Stauning, the leader o f the Danish party, whom Helphand regarded as the most suitable person to organize the socialist peace conference. Helphand found it easy to get Stauning’ s support for the idea, especially when he suggested that the conference should take place in the Danish capital and not in Stockholm.14 Helphand o f course did not mention to Stauning his secret hope that he himself would be able to exercise a stronger influence on the work o f the conference in Copenhagen, 12 Fiirstenberg to Czernin, 18 December 1917, H H uStA, PA. X X V I, 33. 13 Im Kam pfum die Wahrheit, p. 54. 14 Stauning to Helphand, 22 November 1917, Bundesarchiv Koblenz •

Dirty H ands

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and that he could thus consolidate his position. As Stauning did not want to suggest Copenhagen himself, Helphand exerted all his powers o f persuasion to win over Ebert and Scheidemann for his choice o f the meeting place. They met Helphand’ s request half-way. T hey let Stauning know that ‘ both places [i.e. Copen hagen or Stockholm] were equally agreeable’ to them. Helphand’ s endeavours for socialist peace negotiations seriously alarmed the Governments o f the Central Powers. T o his utter dismay, Riezler found that Helphand’ s ideas were supported by Vorovski, the only remaining Bolshevik representa tive in Stockholm. There was also a threat from another direction: Matthias Erzberger had plans o f his own in regard to Russia. As a leading Reichstag deputy o f the Centre Party, Erzberger was now pursuing aims similar to those o f Helphand. But Erzberger’ s idea was that representatives o f the Reichstag, rather than o f the socialist parties, should take part in the main peace negotiations. Riezler did his best to discredit both Helphand and Erzberger in the eyes o f the Bolsheviks. He consulted Vorovski about the progress o f the negotiations almost daily: he told the Bolshevik representative, again and again, that only direct talks with the German Government were in the Soviet’ s own interest. W ith Kiihlmann’ s approval, he even let the Bolshevik Government know that, immediately after the conclusion o f peace, Germany would be prepared to grant it a substantial loan.15 Nevertheless, time was running out fast for Helphand. By the beginning o f December, he had not made much progress in improving his position in regard to the Foreign Ministry. His plan for a socialist conference was now widely known and discussed, but that was all. T he German Government was doing much better: within a few days, official armistice negotiations were about to start at Brest-Litovsk, the fortress town on the PolishRussian frontier, and the seat o f the German Eastern Command. Faced with this situation, Helphand decided on a desperate step. He made an attempt to bring the leaders o f the German party together with the Bolsheviks, in order to prove to the Soviet Government that the Germans were prepared to negotiate on a socialist level. He tried to get Ebert and Scheidemann to come to 15 Telegram No. 1571 of 22 November 1917, in A k ten

der G esan d tsch a ft S tockh olm ,

72 a.

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The Merchant o f Revolution

Stockholm: in the end he succeeded in talking only Scheidemann into making the trip. Again, the Foreign Ministry exerted power ful pressure on the socialist leader: Rantzau had talked to him persuasively in Copenhagen, and when Scheidemann arrived at Helphand’s Stockholm flat on 11 December, Kurt Riezler was already waiting for him there. The diplomats were successful. Scheidemann was so lacking in political resolution that he com pletely abandoned the idea o f a socialist peace conference. When Scheidemann at last met Vorovski and Helphand, the German socialist leader behaved as a well-briefed emissary o f the Wilhelmstrasse. T o Vorovski’ s objection against Brest-Litovsk as the location o f the forthcoming official negotiations, Scheide mann replied that it did not matter where, but how, the negotia tions would be conducted. He also told Vorovski the news he had received from Riezler— that, if the Bolsheviks were represented by Lenin or Trotsky, Kiihlmann himself was prepared to come to Brest-Litovsk. As far as the question o f the socialist peace conference was concerned, nothing could move Scheidemann to take up a decisive position. He listened to the arguments Helphand presented at the three-hour conference without comment, without giving any indication as to how far the German party identified itself with Helphand’ s views. Only towards the end o f the conversation, when Helphand assured Vorovski that no revolution would occur in Germany at least until the end o f the war, did Scheidemann express his agreement. Scheidemann’s visit to Stockholm meant a political fiasco for Helphand. As the German Legation reported, with much satis faction, to Berlin, the socialist leader had ‘ done nothing for the socialist conference, in spite o f Parvus’ .16 T o make the situation still worse for Helphand, the Stockholm newspaper Socialdemocrat published an article on the same day, 15 December, which was highly critical o f the Bolshevik ‘ secret diplomacy’ con ducted by Helphand and Vorovski. The article revealed that Scheidemann was in Stockholm on a secret visit, and it expressed the suspicion that the Bolsheviks had begun to negotiate with the German majority socialists. The German Legation thought the article, from the point o f view o f official policy, very useful. It 16 Telegram No. 2037 of 15 December 1917, in W K 2 geh.

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would make private relations between Helphand and Vorovski more difficult, and it would put the Bolsheviks o ff the idea o f a socialist conference. Helphand could do no more than remain in touch with Vorovski. He thought he held the one last trump card. I f Radek came back with a positive reply from Lenin, the idea o f a socialist conference might still be salvaged. This was the reason why Helphand stayed on in Stockholm: he was waiting for Radek to return, and to bring back clear instructions for the Bolshevik external bureau. In addition, Lenin’s decision about Helphand’s return to Russia was still pending. T he Foreign Ministry con tinued to regard Helphand’ s activities as extremely dangerous. There still existed the possibility that, through his relations with the Bolshevik Mission, Helphand might have an adverse effect on the official negotiations, which were about to begin at BrestLitovsk. T he Ministry employed a transparent ruse when it asked Helphand to come to Berlin immediately, for important business negotiations. Helphand treated the request in a dilatory manner, finally producing an equally silly excuse, that he was unable to get a booking for the train journey. Even the diplomats knew that he would not leave Stockholm before Radek’ s return: they were ignorant, however, o f the personal side o f the story. Above all, Helphand wanted to know whether Lenin would allow him to come back to Russia. It was, o f course, an unusual request for Helphand to have made. Nevertheless, Karl Radek— the only first-hand witness o f these events in December 1917, to which Helphand himself never made a single reference— was wrong when he maintained, after Helphand’s death in 1924, that his late friend had decided to turn over a new leaf, to set out on the straight and narrow path o f personal and political reform. Radek committed a gross act o f sentimentality in the columns o f Pravda when he maintained that, after the November revolution in Russia, Helphand wanted to pull himself out o f the ‘ morass’ o f his past, and to begin a new life in the services o f the Russian revolution. Helphand was too calculating and intelligent for that. He would hesitate to betray himself by a single dramatic gesture, to

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dismiss his whole past as a dismal catalogue o f errors. H e was too sceptical to entertain the illusion that, through naive and un critical co-operation in the construction o f the Soviet State, he could begin a new life as a paragon o f socialist honour. N or was H elphand likely to have been moved by a desire to return to the country o f his birth.

Helphand’s thoughts were moving on different lines. He had, after all, made a considerable contribution to the victory o f the Bolsheviks: was it unreasonable to expect that they would now acknowledge him as an ally? And even without public acknow ledgement, could the Bolsheviks not continue to make use o f his advice and financial skills ? There also may have existed political considerations in Helphand’s mind. He had long distrusted Lenin’s autocratic tendencies in matters o f party organization, and he may well have believed that he could influence develop ments in Russia in the direction o f a workers’ democracy. It is, however, clear that Helphand’ s request to return to Russia was, above all, a bold political move designed to maintain his in dependence o f action, and a defensive device against the out flanking manoeuvres o f the diplomats. Then at last, on 17 December, Radek returned to Stockholm. According to Radek’ s recollections, Lenin’ s reply was not only disappointing for Helphand: it was offensive. Radek told Helphand that the Bolshevik leader could not allow him to return to Russia, and that, in the words o f Lenin, ‘ the cause o f the revolu tion should not be touched by dirty hands’ . Helphand’ s last hope for support disappeared: his political plans collapsed. He now had time to reflect on the self-righteous tone o f Lenin’ s reply. Helphand knew that there was a strong ‘pro-German’ group in the Bolshevik party, which consisted o f his friends: Radek, Fiirstenberg, and Rakovsky were the most prominent in the faction. What he did not know— and this would have softened the blow o f Lenin’ s decision— was that, since August, a forceful campaign against Fiirstenberg had been going on inside the central committee. In August and September 1917, while Lenin was still in hiding in Finland, the ‘ controversial affairs’ o f Fiirstenberg and Kozlovsky, that is, their connexions with Helphand, were discussed no less than eight times at the sessions

Dirty H ands

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o f the com m ittee.17 Early in D ecem ber, while Radek was waiting for L en in ’ s decision, the controversy about Fiirstenberg flared up once more on the Bolshevik central committee. A gain, L enin was unable to attend the m eeting, which decided to rescind Furstenberg’ s nomination as the Soviet diplomatic representative to Scandinavia. O n 12 D ecem ber, L en in wrote a letter o f protest to the central committee, in which it was made plain that some o f the party leaders regarded the shady relations between Fiirstenberg and H elphand as a sufficient reason for not entrusting L en in ’ s and H elph an d’ s mutual friend with the mission to Scandinavia. In his letter to the central committee, L enin endeavoured to present the co-operation between Fiirstenberg and H elphand as having been o f a purely business, unpolitical nature, and to dismiss all the accusations as the ‘ chatter o f irresponsible gossips’ . Lenin w rote: ‘ W h a t evidence does one have against H an ecki? Hanecki earned his bread and butter as an employee o f a firm in which Parvus had shares. T h a t is how Hanecki told me the story. . . . A re there not others among us w ho have worked for

Russian, English or other capitalist trading com panies? T h e whole business is nothing more than “ fear” o f chatter b y irres ponsible

gossips. . . . Such

attitude

towards

absent

comrade w ho has worked for the party for over ten years is the peak o f unfairness.’ 18 Lenin was unable to change the decision o f the central com mittee, and alternative em ploym ent had to be found for K u ba Fiirstenberg. (H e was rewarded for political services rendered, b y becom ing the head o f the Soviet State Bank.) Nevertheless, the affair sufficed to show L enin the risks connected with H e lp hand’ s return to Russia. Lenin liked neither H elphand nor his politics enough to tax the patience o f his central committee further: it was not difficult for L enin to jettison H elphand, as w ell as his political plans. L en in ’ s refusal must have deeply affected H elphand. H e knew better than to expect gratitude, but he could not help feeling especially embittered b y the behaviour o f his friends among the 17 Protokoly tsentralnovo komiteta R S D R P (b), Avgust ig i7 — Fevral ig i8 ) Moscow, 1958, p. 250. 18 Leninskii Sbornik , X X X V I, Moscow, 1959, pp. 18 -19 .

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The Merchant o f Revolution

Bolsheviks. A ll o f them appeared to him to have sacrificed their friendship for the sake o f their political careers. H elphand came to despise Radek most o f all: from now on he was to refer to him, only when he had to, as the ‘ political harlequin’ . W ith ou t the support o f the Bolsheviks, without a socialist conference, H elphand was forced to capitulate to the Foreign Ministry. T h e German diplomats were still in business, and he could try to influence them by giving them advice: but he had no fulcrum for the leverage he had wished to operate indepen dently. O n Christmas Eve 1917, H elphand let the Stockholm Legation know that he was now ready to comply with the Foreign M inistry’ s earlier request, and come to Berlin. T h e diplomats bore him no grudge. In a letter to Bergen, K urt Riezler announced H elphand’ s impending arrival in Berlin. A t this moment, when his interests and ours are running parallel again, he is once more very important, and I would strongly recommend you to ask him, in confidence and quite intimately, for his advice in Ber lin. . . . H e really is a very considerable man and he has excellent ideas. It may well be that we shall soon feel that it would be an advan tage to base our position in Russia on wider circles than those around Lenin, and in that event he will be essential to us. He must not be allowed to suspect that we simply wanted to get him away from here. I have nothing against his return, especially if things go well at Brest. However, I think that we could now use him better somewhere else, as Stockholm will soon cease to be o f any importance as regards Russia because o f the poor communications with Petrograd— that is, if nothing goes wrong at Brest. Let us hope that all goes well.19

On the surface, Helphand’ s toughness was indeed amazing. He returned to his old haunts as if nothing had ever happened. Only in the following months did his actions betray some o f the scars, some o f the deep sense o f personal loss, that had been inflicted on him in the days in the middle o f December 1917. On 28 December he was back at the Foreign Ministry; two days later he called on his old friend, Brockdorff-Rantzau, in Copenhagen. 19 Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia , document No.

h i.

D irty H ands

249

H e told Rantzau o f his low estimate o f the stability o f the Soviet regime, o f his b elief that conditions in Russia w ould return to normal only a few years after the conclusion o f peace. H e thought o f Bolshevism as an anomalous period o f transition, which w ould give way to a more democratic form o f governm ent. O n the question o f war aims, the personal affront recently adminis tered b y Lenin brought H elphand nearer the position o f the Foreign M inistry: he now regarded annexation plans with great sympathy. In this respect, the conversation between the two m en fol low ed a w idely meandering course. H elphand was desperately trying to re-establish his position w ith the diplomats and he did his best to please them. A lth ou gh he thought that the G erm anRussian negotiations had opened, on 22 D ecem ber, in a prom ising way, he agreed w ith Rantzau that i f the Bolsheviks behaved badly at Brest-Litovsk military pressure w ould have to be em ployed against them . H e thought that Russia could easily be finished o ff by h alf a m illion troops, that she could be partitioned and her power com pletely destroyed. But what i f Germ any achieved a military break-through in the W e s t? In such a case, H elphand told Brockdorff-Rantzau, there could be no more talk o f a negotiated peace with Russia. I f Russia were eliminated and France defeated, then Germ any could, in H elp h an d’ s w ords, ‘ establish a gigantic army . . . w hich w ould dominate the whole o f E urope’ .20 T h ere could then be no limit to G erm any’ s territorial claims. In the follow ing m onths, H elphand developed his vision o f Germ any’ s military and political hegem ony in

Europe

still

further. H is position corresponded exactly to that o f A d o lf H itler in 1941, after the National Socialist assault on the Soviet U nion. G erm any’ s hegem ony

appeared preferable

a Continental

balance shared in by Russia. O n 30 D ecem ber 1917, however, w hen H elphand talked to Rantzau, he may have realized that he had allowed him self to go too far. H e again warned Rantzau o f the danger o f Russia’ s desire for revenge, and then he steered the conversation to a different problem . H e said that independent 20 ‘Geheime Aufzeichnung,J 30 December H 232334-H 232345.

1917, in Nachlass Brockdorff-Rantzau,

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The Merchant o f Revolution

states such as Finland, Poland, and the Ukraine, w ould always gravitate to Russia, and that they w ould offer only a limited protection for Germany. A s he had done before, he again stressed economic considerations; that it was more important for G er many to secure her share in Russia’ s industrial development than to annex a few provinces. H elphand’s description o f the relations between Germany and Russia was pure music to the ears o f the German diplomats. T h e y put no obstacles in his way when he decided, early in January, to return to Stockholm. H e had convinced him self o f L en in ’ s hostility, and he had made his peace with the diplom ats: H elphand was now ready to take up the Bolshevik leader’ s challenge. H e had never thought very highly o f the intellectual qualities o f his Bolshevik friends, and he fondly regarded him self as one o f their leading mentors. In the few weeks o f its existence, the new Government in Petrograd had made so many mistakes that, in H elphand’ s opinion, they could be fatal to its standing at home and abroad. O n 20 Decem ber the central committee had ordered the estab lishment o f a political police force, the Cheka; on 26 Decem ber the Soviet Government appropriated two million roubles for the support o f revolution in western E u rop e; on the following day, banking in Russia became a state m onopoly. H elphand was con vinced that these measures w ould find no support among the majority o f the Russians, and he came to regard it as his duty to attack the Bolsheviks for these mistakes, and to encourage the socialist opposition groups. H e planned a press campaign inside and outside Russia, which was to effect the isolation o f the Bolshevik party from the majority o f the nation; he intended to convince the local organizations and the middle ranks o f the party hierarchy that the Bolsheviks were leading Russia into dangerous waters. H e wanted to make use o f the m ood o f opposition which existed in Russia at the tim e: he intended to mobilize and encourage the enemies o f the Bolsheviks, and thus put their government under severe pressure. A fter his return to Stockholm at the beginning o f January 1918, H elphand lost no time in launching his anti-Bolshevik campaign. H e had already founded, at the beginning o f D ecem ber, a

Dirty Hands

251

Russian new s-sheet called Izvne— ‘ From O utside’ . H e could now use it for this cam paign; it was being delivered to Russia in several thousands o f copies, and distributed free o f charge. A s H elphand told Prince Fiirstenberg o f the Austrian Legation, on 28 January, he wanted ‘ through this publication . . .

exercise influence on the soldiers’ and workers’ councils in the cities and in the provinces, . . .

to teach them their lessons,

and to rub the governm ent’ s nose in all the serious mistakes which it had committed in the last weeks, against its ow n best interests’ .21 In Izvne, H elphand ran through the lessons which his former, unfortunately rather thick-skulled pupils had forgotten. Russia was not yet ripe for socialism w hich, in any case, was not to be achieved by ‘ official decrees’ , but by a ‘ social process’ . Nationali zation o f banking made sense only in the countries which had reached a high degree o f industrial developm ent. Indeed, the whole social programme o f the Bolsheviks revealed their ‘ terrible, boundless ignorance and lack o f perception’ . H e was highly critical o f the Bolshevik advance towards dictatorship: this was undemocratic, and Russia was not yet ready for the dictatorship o f the proletariat. A t long last, H elphand was now standing on the same side o f the barricade as his former friend, Rosa Luxem burg. T h e y were united in their condemnation o f L en in ’ s party, and they furiously disputed its claim to be a revolutionary elite, which could deputize for the working class in revolutionary matters. A minority could not terrorize the majority o f the nation indefinitely, H elphand pointed o u t; \ . . it will not be possible for a workers’ govern ment to survive for ever with the aid o f machine guns. . . ,’ 22 H elphand described what the Bolsheviks had so far done in Russia as ‘ an insult to the splendid history o f European revolu tions’ ; the Soviets rem inded him more o f a ‘Jewish cabal than o f a m odern democracy’ . T h e Bolsheviks maintained themselves in power only b y the force o f arm s: in the R ed A rm y, they had created hirelings

for

their ow n protection,

‘like

millionaires o f Am erica’ . 21 Fiirstenberg to Czernin, 28 January 1918, H H uStA , P.A.Kreig 3, 836. 22 Im K a m p f um die Wahrheit, p. 66.

the m ulti

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The Merchant o f Revolution

H elphand’ s criticism o f the Bolsheviks became still sharper soon after the conclusion, on 3 March, o f the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. It was only in private conversations with the German and Austrian diplomats that H elphand distributed the blame for the treaty between the two contracting parties. B y her desire for annexations, H elphand feared that Germany had de prived herself o f the chance o f running an economic m onopoly in th e E a st.T h e ‘ blemishes’ — Helphandwas stating his case cautiously — o f the treaty dictated by the German Governm ent, would have disastrous effects on future relations between the two states.23 In public, however, he put the whole blame for the treaty squarely on the Bolsheviks. By their renunciation o f the socialist conference, they had made it possible for the German Imperialists to turn the screw. H elphand believed that a compromise had been possible in regard to the original German demands which, he thought, were quite realistic. But the ‘ revolutionism’ o f the B ol sheviks committed them to a policy o f ‘ all or nothing’ . T h e y had discredited the German Social Democrats and strengthened the German military party in its conviction that a negotiated peace with Russia was not possible. T h e ‘ huckster’ Trotsky, and the ‘ w indbag’ Radek, bore the main responsibility, according to H elphand, for the ‘ revolutionary chauvinism’ which led to the peace o f Brest-Litovsk.24 There were certain tragic undertones in H elphand’ s position after the Brest-Litovsk treaty. T h e ideas he regarded as his own had turned against him. H is former friend Trotsky had used the theoretical foundations o f H elphand’ s conception o f a workers’ democracy in support o f his own view that Russia could venture the step into socialism at a time when the workers constituted a minority o f the population. T h e German Government, on the other hand, had converted H elphand’ s idea o f a separate peace with the Bolsheviks into a dictated peace which required military force to ensure its fulfilment. Both sides had used H elphand, and then suddenly dropped him. H e had helped to clear the way for momentous

historical developments, without having

influence to control their direction. 23 Fiirstenberg to Czernin, 23 April 1918, H H uStA, P.A. X X V I, 33. 24 Im K am pf urn die Wahrheit, p. 57.

enough

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H e m ight have consoled him self w ith the thought that both the Imperial Governm ent in Germ any and the Bolshevik regime w ould shortly collapse. A revolution in Germ any might sweep the present system aw ay; as for Russia, H elphand regarded the over throw o f the Bolshevik Governm ent as being, to a high degree, his own personal mission. A gain, H elphand needed a front organization, but this time for operations against the Bolsheviks: it should be able to work inside Russia, without giving the appearance o f a political oppo sition centre. H elphand was inventive and skilled at producing such organizations: a few days after Radek had returned from Petrograd with L en in ’ s message, H elphand had a blue-print ready. T o Brockdorff-Rantzau he outlined a plan to create a ‘ large-scale press organization’ , which w ould disseminate and collect news in Russia. T h e diplomats were quite im pressed, and soon after H elphand arrived in Stockholm , early in January 1918, he was certain o f official financial support for his plans.25 H elphand very likely regarded the distribution network o f his

Izvne new s-sheet as the nucleus o f the future press organization; although he did not inform the diplomats o f its anti-Bolshevik purpose, they w ould have raised no objections. Since the opening o f the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, the Germ an Governm ent had been greatly concerned with the effects o f Bolshevik propa ganda at h om e: there was nothing objectionable in repaying the Bolsheviks in their own coin. D espite the undesirable revolutionary agitation generated b y the Soviets, the peace o f Brest-Litovsk brought ample rewards for Berlin. A t long last Germ any’ s rulers could breathe more freely: they had achieved the aim they had been pursuing since N ovem ber 1914. T h e war was reduced to a one-front engagem ent: as a result, a pow erful Germ an offensive was launched, on 10 M arch, on the western front. T h e relief engendered a m ood o f high optim ism in B erlin: it survived surprisingly long, until m id summer 1918. In these circumstances, and under heavy pressure from the great industrialists, the Germ an Governm ent endea voured to ‘ keep Russia under control’ , and to penetrate the country economically. T h is policy was summed up by State 25 Bergen to Lucius, telegram No. 27 of 2 January 1918, in W K 2 geh.

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The Merchant o f Revolution

Secretary Hintze— he

succeeded Kiihlm ann in July— in

the

following m anner: 4W h at do we want in the East ? T h e military paralysis o f Russia. T h e Bolsheviks are taking care o f this better than any other Russian party, without our contributing a single man or a single penny. W e cannot demand that they or other Russians should love us for the fact that we are squeezing their country like an orange. . . . T h at is exactly what we are d oin g: we are not co-operating with the Bolsheviks, we are exploiting them. T h at is what politics is about.’ 26 H elphand sensed this policy when it was in the making, and, with his intuitive understanding o f the shifting goals o f German diplomacy, he managed to ride its wave. T here was real virtuosity in his skill in harnessing the desires o f the Reich Government to his own political and commercial schemes. Tow ards the end o f M ay, H elphand came to regard his Russian propaganda operations as inadequate: early in the follow ing month he submitted a detailed memorandum to the Foreign Ministry, which elaborated on the expansion o f the enterprise. H e was thinking in terms o f a vast publicity empire which would Tar exceed the achievements o f L ord Northcliffe’ . H e assured the diplomats that ‘ i f we employ the necessary tact and sufficient means . . .

we should be able to bring the whole o f the Russian

press under our control’ .27 H elphand envisaged the foundation o f some 200 new dailies all over Russia, which would be kept supplied with news by an agency covering China, Japan, A fgh a nistan, and Persia. Each o f these newspapers w ould be technically independent, but ‘ the connexion w ould be established by the concentration o f shares in a holding company in Berlin, o f which the public should know nothing. T h e centre would issue instruc tions through its agents. . . . A ll this w ould be made possible by a capital o f 200 million marks.’ H elphand then proposed that his already established publish ing house in Berlin should produce a million almanacks— the annual publication, designed to entertain and edify, which was popular especially among the literate peasantry in Russia— to be 26 F. Fischer, Griffnach der Weltmacht, pp. 764-5. 27 Memorandum by Helphand on ‘Das Verhaltnis Deutschlands zu Russland’, un dated, in Deutschland Nr. 31 geh.

Dirty H ands

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charged to the Germ an Governm ent at four marks a copy. T h eir sale w ould have two advantages for G erm an y: first, it offered the possibility

o f ‘ creating

a permanent

organization

extending

throughout Russia. Branch offices w ould be set up in the various capitals and provincial tow ns, and they w ould em ploy personnel w ho could later take over the newspapers. . . . Altogether, the branches w ould have 1,000 permanent em ployees, and together with agents and salesmen, the operation w ould require about 10,000 m en .’ A n d secondly, Germ any could use the almanacks for political as well as economic advertisements. ‘ W e shall say what should be said about England. Briefly, we shall exploit our propaganda opportunities to the fu ll.’ O n 17 June, the Foreign M inistry received a notification that a ‘ further 40 million marks’ had been made available, and H elphand received the commission to begin at once with the production o f the almanacks. T h e fact that the Foreign M inistry was taken in b y H elphand’ s fantastic project is explicable b y the m ood, so fittingly described b y State Secretary H intze, that prevailed in Berlin at the tim e: it reflects on the diplomats rather than on the author o f the plan. It came to a grotesque end. T h e production o f the almanack was com pleted only after G erm any’ s defeat, at the end o f the year. In order to save the invested capital, the almanacks— some 600,000 copies were ready— had to be somehow got to Russia and sold there. B y special permission from his old com rades, Ebert and Scheidemann— the President and the Prime Minister respectively in the new Governm ent— military transport carrying the almanacks, set out for Russia. It did not get beyond the Soviet frontier. In Berlin, revelations in the opposition new s papers built up the affair into a dangerous political scandal, in which Ebert and Scheidemann were accused o f favouritism, and H elphand o f bribery and corruption.28 But to return to the early summer o f 1918. H elphand h im self was clearly affected by the same m ood o f hysterical optimism as prevailed in the Berlin Governm ent circles. H e also had his own vendetta against the Bolsheviks to carry o n : the vast newspaper enterprise was intended to fulfil the same political function as the more m odest new s-sheet, Izvne. T h e scale o f the new enterprise

28 M. Harden, D ie

Z ukunft> 6 December 1919.

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The Merchant o f Revolution

was conceived in the dimensions in which H elphand had become accustomed to think during these years; it was no less character istic o f his thinking that political and business interests were interwoven in the enterprise. H e did not see w hy his feud with the Bolsheviks should affect his business interests adversely: there was perhaps a profit to be made out o f the situation. It was therefore not surprising that H elphand was available in Berlin when economic negotiations were opened, at the end o f June, between the German Government and the new Bolshevik mission. A s a businessman, H elphand was not unreasonable. T h e price for his help in getting 100,000 tons o f coal from Germany to Russia was a mere 5 per cent o f the total sum .29 Despite the continued ‘ surfeit o f mammon’ , H elphand now appeared to be losing his touch. O ften afflicted by rheumatism and past his fiftieth year, he was ageing fast. In his newspaper project, fantasy merged with reality: he was finding it more and more difficult to tell business and politics apart. N or did he perceive that the growing criticism o f his person and o f his acti vities during the war had isolated him from the German Social Democrat party. There had been the publicity connected with the financing o f the Bolshevik party in the summer o f 1917. T h e n there appeared the highly critical series o f articles in the Danish daily Kobenhaven, which ran from 24 Novem ber until

5 January 1918: different versions o f it later appeared in many European newspapers, including Le Temps, Matin, Gazette de Lausanne, and the Daily Mail. It firmly established the image o f H elphand as a crook and a war profiteer. H e defended him self as best he could. H is apologia pro vita sua, issued by his own publishing house in Berlin in the spring o f

1918, carried, despite its impassioned tone, little conviction.30 T h e accounts o f his Danish coal business, o f his war transactions, and o f his relations with the Bolsheviks, were such a hopeless mixture o f truths, half-truths, and deliberate omissions, that the pamphlet only fed the various rumours already in circulation. Its tone o f moral indignation fell flat: T he slanderers have been given a hearing, they have been believed and 29 G. A. Solomon, Sredi krasnykh vozhdei, Paris, 1930, vol. 1, p. 100. 3° Parvus, Im K am pf um die Wahrheit.

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encouraged, they have even been helped to achieve a certain renown. And yet I have been taking part in public life for more than thirty years, my writing stretches back more than a quarter o f a century. One would suppose that I had earned the right to be judged according to my views, without the imputation o f low motives. My life is punctuated by my writings as by mile-stones; from year to year, one can establish what formed the centre o f my thinking, what filled my life at the time. . . . A nd when I look down at the puny creatures crawling far below and trying to throw dirt at me, I feel that between me and this people there lies the whole history o f civilization. . . .

I am going on my way

— to new, to old tasks.31

‘ T h e new , the old tasks’ had now contracted for H elphand to one thing only— Germ any’ s military victory. A fter all his other plans foundered, H elphand felt that the fate o f Germ any w ould be his own fate. ‘ T h e victory o f Germ any and her allies’ , he wrote, ‘ can no longer be delayed.’ 32 T h e material resources o f the Ukraine, o f Rumania and Bulgaria, appeared to him sufficient to hold o ff the Entente Allies for an unlim ited length o f time. H e was convinced that Germ any w ould be able to dictate the peace in the W e st as she had done in the E ast: he dreamt o f a united Europe under the military and political leadership o f Berlin. H e gravely overestimated the strength and endurance o f the Reich. H e did so largely because his personal experience was confined to Continental Europe and to R ussia: he had left the Continent only once in his life, to attend the congress o f the Second International in L on don in 1896. D espite his theoretical studies o f the w orld market and other global phenom ena, his picture o f the w orld centred on Europe, and in it Am erica was a name without any economic or strategic significance. Like so many other European politicians, he was not perspicacious enough to include her in his calculations o f the developm ent o f the war. T h e year 1918 extended his imaginative powers to their lim its; events were m oving too fast for him. N o t until September 1918 did H elphand recognize that the war was lost. T h e collapse o f his w orld was hard enough for him to take, but it had a certain sobering effect. H e had been intoxicated 31 Im K a m p f um die Wahrheit, pp. 45-47.

32 ibid., p. 60.

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b y the prospect o f Germ any’ s victory for too lo n g : in the cold light o f morning, he made a quick return to reality. N ow that the military decision had been made, every additional day o f the war seemed to him a senseless increase in human sacrifice. Per severance, H elphand was convinced, w ould only worsen the coming chaos, and w ould facilitate the same development in Germ any as that experienced by Russia during the period o f the Bolsheviks’ ascent to power. H e at once decided to switch over his own organs o f publicity to the policy o f peace. W h e n he failed to wean Ernst Heilm ann, the editor o f his Internationale Korrespondenz, away from the policy o f blind perseverance, he simply killed the whole news paper. H e offered to pay H eilm ann 20,000 marks for breach o f his editorial contract: it was worth this much to him to bring the war to an end, at least in his own newspapers.33 A lthough he was uncertain as to what forms the new, post-war order w ould take, he clearly foresaw the dangers o f the near future. Before Germ any’ s final collapse in O ctober 1918, H elp hand warned the readers o f Die Glocke o f the perils o f a ‘ dem o cracy o f defeat’ . Using the new Governm ent o f Prince M ax von Baden to illustrate his point, he showed how the rulers o f the Reich had decided to give way to democracy only in order to improve their political position. T h e y were doing no more than offering democracy in Germany as a concession to the Entente Powers for a negotiated peace. H elphand appealed to the German socialists to assist democracy in making a break-through out o f conviction, and not as the present Governm ent was doing, out o f dubious political considerations.34 H elphand’ s reference to a democracy o f defeat contained an im plied hint at the birth o f a revolution from the military break down. T h is w ould not be his kind o f a revolution. H e had not wanted it, and he had done everything to prevent it. H e had never tired o f arguing, with his Bolshevik comrades in Stockholm, that a revolution in Germany could not be expected for the time being, and not even immediately after the end o f the war. W h e n defeat and revolution came in N ovem ber 1918, H elphand was unable to 33 Heilmann in D as Freie Wort> io April 1931. 34 Parvus, ‘Notizen zur Kanzlerkrise*, D ie Glocke, 1918, p. 904.

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sum m on enough energy to take an interest in the new course o f events. H e sim ply stood aside, isolated and passive. Instead o f staying in Berlin to put his services at the disposal o f the Social Dem ocrat party, H elphand was to be found in the M unich Chancellery talking to D andl, the Bavarian Prime M inis ter, about measures to be taken for the prevention o f civil war. H e recom m ended immediate elections to a national assembly. T h e nation must be given a chance, H elphand argued, to express its opinion through elections and to send new m en to parliament. H e must have known that he could not be among these new m en. H e had brought upon him self, during the war, too m uch public disapproval. D espite his political com m itm ent, he had made a fortune out o f the war, and it was assumed that he w ould use the military breakdown in a similar manner. It w ould have been out o f character had he done anything else. H e at once began buying up war surplus material: he exported military vehicles to Denm ark where the factory Aurora, ow ned b y the metal workers’ union, provided them with new bodies, and dis tributed them on the Scandinavian market. A ccording to H e lp hand’ s ow n account, the business proved ‘ not unprofitable’ . T h e outbreak o f the revolution in Berlin on 9 N ovem ber, marked the end o f a period o f H elph an d’ s life. B y his collabora tion with the Foreign M inistry, H elphand had becom e, con sciously or not, a part o f the order w hich now collapsed. W h ile the future o f the new state was being decided, H elphand travelled to Switzerland, into voluntary exile. H e had come to Germ any from Switzerland in 1891 as a militant and radical socialist. A fter tw enty-seven years he made the return trip, resigned and disenchanted, but rich enough to enjoy what Switzerland had to offer.

Schwanenwerder O n 20 N ovem ber 1918, after a long jou rn ey through defeated, post-war Germany and Austria, H elphand arrived in Zurich. H e had seen, from the window o f his first-class compart ment, a fair sample o f the grim realities o f life in the defeated countries; war invalids, railway stations crowded with ragged troops returning home and civilians with no homes to return to. H elphand wanted no reminders o f poverty and privation. A t this point, he wanted what Switzerland had to offer— security and material abundance. H elphand thought o f his journey to Switzerland as a one-way trip. H e intended to settle at a place where he w ould be undis turbed, where he could live out his old age. T h e village W adensw il on the Lake o f Zurich offered the ideal retreat, and it was here that H elphand bought his house. It was on a small, expensive estate; the chauffeur and the chambermaids, the cook and the two Swiss farmers soon m oved in to look after their master and his property. T h e arrival o f the ‘ well-known comrade Parvus’ caused a local sensation. But the excitement soon died down, and H elp hand and his establishment became an accepted, though notable, landmark on the lake. H is wealth impressed the cautious and realistic local farmers and shopkeepers: a man as wealthy as H elphand could hardly be a cheap adventurer. H ad they known the true size o f H elphand’s fortune, they w ould have been still more impressed. In the years 1919 and 1920, his capital de posited in Switzerland amounted to 2 ,2 2 2 ,0 0 0 francs, producing a yearly income o f 123,000 francs. It was only a fragment o f his wealth, which was invested in almost all European countries, from Sweden to Turkey. But H elphand was not left undisturbed for long. T h e circum

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stances and the timing o f his arrival in Switzerland were all w ron g; he had been too m uch o f a controversial figure to be allowed a quiet exit from the political stage. A s early as the end o f N ovem ber, the first press reports appeared about his partici pation in the Swiss general strike, and then about the Bolshevik agitation he had conducted, at the request o f Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign M inister, during the international socialist con ference in Berne at the end o f January.1 T h e suspicion that H elphand was a Bolshevik agent was nourished b y a profound nervousness in Switzerland about the possibility o f a Bolshevik conspiracy against the state. In H elphand, the Swiss press be lieved they had discovered the arch-plotter o f a fast-approaching

coup d’etat. Bickel, the Zurich public prosecutor, had started to collect press-cuttings on the subject o f Alexander H elphand in N ovem ber ; his financial transactions were closely follow ed by the Swiss authorities, w ho suspected that H elphand was engaged in distri buting Bolshevik subsidies. B y 30 January 1919 Bickel was convinced that he had an open-and-shut case against the alleged Bolshevik agent, and he had H elphand arrested.2 In the course o f his interrogation it became apparent that the case against H elphand rested mainly on the evidence supplied by a large collection o f press-cuttings. H elphand had little difficulty in exposing the central weakness o f the case for the prosecution, and, to make quite sure o f his safety, he appealed to his old friend, A d o lf M uller, now the new Germ an Minister to Berne. O n the day after the arrest, M uller lodged a strong protest with the Swiss G overnm ent: D r. H elphand, the Minister pointed out, was a member o f the German socialist majority party, and a politician w ho

‘ fought

vigorously

the

Spartakists

and

especially

the

Bolsheviks’ .3 H elphand was released at once, even though on bail o f 2 0 ,0 0 0 francs: it was paid back to him soon, and the Swiss authorities politely inform ed him that no further action w ould be taken. A lthough the press campaign showed no signs o f abating, it did 1 D aily Telegraph , 26 January 1919. 2 ‘ Meine Entfernung aus der Schweiz’, D ie Glocke, 1920, pp. 1484 et seq. 3 Telegram No. 223 of 31 January 1919, in Deutschland 141 Nr. 7 geh., ‘Agenten’. M .R.-S

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not greatly disturb H elphand’ s peace o f m ind. A s long as he was allowed to enjoy his idyllic life at W adensw il, he could endure the journalists’ shafts quite easily. H e was unable to desert politics for long. W h ile his comrades in Berlin were busy defending themselves and their Government against assaults from the left by the Spartakists, H elphand wrote his ‘Letters to the German W orkers’ . T h e y were considered, didactic essays, written with insight, but without passion. H e showed how the institution o f the Soviets was entirely out o f place in Germany, where there existed a parliamentary tradition; he ran through the problems and tasks faced by the German socialists at home and abroad. H e again pointed at the threat presented by R ussia: he believed that the Bolsheviks w ould transform the country into a military power which could be confronted, on equal terms, by no other European state. H e per ceived that ‘ Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia and Poland will all be done away with, they all are creations— as soon as Russia develops her military power— which will not survive one generation’ .4 N or was H elphand able to get away from his old political friends. Philipp Scheidemann, the first Prime Minister o f the W eim ar R epublic, visited him at W adensw il in the summer o f

1919. Scheidemann had ju st resigned, after refusing to sign the peace treaty: he was an embittered, depressed, sick man. H e personified the tragedy o f the German revolution o f Novem ber

1918. H e had been attacked from the extreme right as a saboteur o f Germ any’ s victory; he had been accused by the extreme left as the murderer o f the Spartakist leaders. Even his own party had declared itself, at the crucial m om ent, for the acceptance o f the peace conditions, thus leaving him high and dry, in an untenable position. Scheidemann told his host o f the insuperable political difficul ties that lay in the path o f the W eim ar R epublic. But in his W adensw il retreat, H elphand had been out o f touch with the developments in G erm any; he ascribed his friend’s pessimism to overwork, and he provided him with every kind o f luxury and distraction. A t the end o f September, however, when he accom panied Schiedemann on the trip back to Berlin, he saw for him self 4 D er Arbeitersozialismusunddie Weltrevolution, Berlin, 1919, IV , p. 12.

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that the situation was as bad as the socialist leader had depicted. N either the extremists nor the sentimentalists— the national ists, the com m unists, the monarchists— had becom e reconciled to the W eim ar R epublic and the dominant position, in the G overn m ent, o f the Social Dem ocrats. U nder assault from every side, the socialists were concerned with the means o f defence o f the R ep u b lic: could they trust the old officers’ corp s? It m ight be highly skilled; it m ight even be useful in the struggle against the Spartakists; but was it reliable from the point o f view o f the G overnm ent? M any instances o f disloyalty indicated that the answer was a negative one. T h e controversy divided the socialist leadership and occasioned a sharp clash betw een Ebert and Scheidemann. H elphand was present at one o f their conversations on the subject, where Scheidemann took the line that the officers could not be trusted with the defence o f the state, nor with the creation o f the new army. H elphand had never seen his friend so resolute as on the ques tion o f the officers’ corps, and he gave Scheidemann all the support he could. H e published a large edition o f Scheidemann’ s speech, ‘ T h e Enem y is on the R ig h t!’ , and he expressed his agreement in Die Glocke. But H elphand knew that there was no more for him to do in Berlin. H e left it as unobtrusively as he had arrived. In Switzerland, the affairs o f H elphand were still providing the journalists with scandalous copy. A t the end o f N ovem ber, their campaign received fresh impetus from Germ any. M axim ilian H arden, the w ell-established retailer o f political gossip, had becom e interested in Georg Sklarz, H elph an d’ s Copenhagen business partner: one thing led to another, and H arden went on to give the readers o f Die Zukunft a detailed account o f H e lp hand’ s Russian almanack venture. T h e n an unfortunate alter cation between H elphand and his former friend, K arl K autsky, provided H arden w ith new am m unition.5 Kautsky attacked H elphand on personal grounds, using in formation w hich only a long and intimate friendship could have 5 Parvus, ‘Der Fall Kaustky’, D ie Glocke, 1919, pp. 12 13 -2 0 ; Kautsky’s reply was published in Welt am M ontag , on 22 December 19 19 ; Harden’s article appeared in D ie Zukunft, January 1920.

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given him. H elphand’ s reply was less than convincing: he put too m uch o f him self into the defence. H e showed his hatred o f the German philistines, and o f the qualities and institutions they held in high regard. H e dismissed the family as a ‘robbers’ nest’ , selfseeking and deceitful to the outside w orld ; he expressed his abhorrence o f everything orderly and mediocre, as well as his disregard for moral values. H e w rote: ‘ A m I merely morally degenerate, or without any morals w hatsoever? I do not know, such has been m y life. Such I was and such I am, ju d ge me as you will, I know no other w ay.’ 6 In H elphand’ s defence, his most hidden thoughts lay revealed. H is German comrades reacted as i f they had caught a glimpse o f the dark side o f the m oon. Konrad H aenisch alone resolutely came to H elphand’ s defence. H e wrote a warm and loving defence o f his friend in the Berlin Achtuhrabendblatt; without trying to diminish H elphand’ s human weaknesses and faults, he expressed his belief in his basic goodwill and honesty: I believe that Parvus would be out o f place as an honorary member o f a society o f protestant maidens. His is an unusually strong nature, and after all the decades o f a poverty-stricken existence as a refugee, this natural vigour is evident in every field, in the pleasures o f the table as much as those o f love. . . .

A church leader might perhaps disapprove

o f certain details o f Parvus’ s way o f life. . . .

As far as Parvus’ s

business transactions, the details o f which I do not know, areconcerned, please do not forget that Parvus is not a conforming German petit bourgeois, and that, after his kind o f development, he cannot become one. He is a true son o f Russia, o f a European country o f— also spiritu ally— unlimited possibilities, and in his veins there doubtless flows a remarkable mixture o f Jewish, Russian, and Tartar blood. Such a man has the right to be judged according to the laws o f his own nature. One should not hurriedly measure him by current standards, which, in Germany, have become a part o f our flesh and blood, or apply to him our own attitudes, however much proved they may be.’ 7

H aenisch’ s plea for tolerance and understanding completely failed to achieve its purpose. H is high official position— H aenisch 6 Parvus, ‘Philister iiber mich’, Die Glocke, 1919, p. 1339. 7 Quoted after the Preussische fittin g , 5 December 1919.

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was the Prussian M inister o f Education— and his close personal relationship with H elphand only provided the opposition press w ith a new line o f attack. Should a Prussian Minister have a friend like that? H a d not Scheidemann him self accepted H e lp hand’ s hospitality, proving his dependence on the m an ? H ad not the socialist Governm ent made special arrangements for H e lp hand’ s Russian almanacks ? T h e scandal fast developed into a crisis o f confidence in the Governm ent.

Maximilian

H arden

demanded

the

immediate

formation o f a parliamentary commission o f inquiry, w hich should examine the misuse, by the ministers, o f their official powers in connexion w ith H elph an d’ s business activities. A lth ou gh H a r den’ s suggestion did not materialize, the violent public debate delivered valuable propaganda material into the hands o f the enemies o f the W eim ar R epublic. T h e Nazis, in particular, continued to make political capital out o f it until January 1933. According to their propaganda, H elphand was one o f the leading ‘ N ovem ber criminals’ : m en responsible for a diversity o f crimes— defeat in the war, foundation o f the R epublic, the humiliating peace treaties, and m uch else besides. A lfred R osenberg, the leading Nazi ideologist, never tired o f using H elphand as an example o f the detestable, corrupting influence o f the Eastern Jews on Germ any’ s national life. T h e storm in Berlin reached Switzerland, and it destroyed H elp h an d’ s rural idyll on the Lake o f Zurich. T h e first reports about the alleged intimate relations between H elphand and the Zurich C h ief o f Police appeared, accompanied by descriptions o f H elp h an d’ s ‘ harem’ at W adensw il. Details about constant supplies o f young ladies, and w ild orgies at H elph an d’ s house, were punctuated b y accusations o f hugely successful political corrup tion, which had made H elphand into ‘le roi de Zurich’ . T h e inevitable demand for H elph an d’ s expulsion from Switzer land was raised. T h e Swiss Legation in Berlin received an order to collect further evidence against H elp h an d ; A d o lf M iiller, the Germ an M inister to Berne, found it increasingly difficult to protect his friend against the Swiss authorities. Finally on 3 January, the highly respected Neue Zurcher Zeitung hinted at the ‘ unsavoury spectacle o f the way H elphand conducted his private

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life’ : at the end o f the m onth, H elphand was officially inform ed that his permission to reside in Switzerland could not be ex tended. H e was asked to leave the country before 11 February

1920. T h e Swiss journalists succeeded in hounding H elphand out o f the country. A lthough he may well have sought the consolations o f a life o f pleasure to compensate him for the deep political disappointments o f the recent past, most o f the political charges against him were without foundation. T h e Swiss deportation order was a bitter blow to H elphand. In his ow n newspaper, he passionately disputed the decision o f the Swiss G overnm ent.8 H is b elief in the protective powers o f wealth had received a b lo w ; he now spoke o f his fortune w ith contem pt. It follow ed him like a curse, he w rote; he felt, he told a friend o f his, like an ‘inverted M idas. T h e gold I touch turns into d u n g.’ H elphand, the ageing and tired M idas, returned to Berlin in February 1920. H e m oved into a suite at the H otel K aiserhof: he was not sure whether he wanted to stay in Berlin. H e toyed w ith the idea o f settling dow n somewhere in South Germ any, or in the neighbourhood o f Bodensee, but this was too m uch trouble. In the end, he decided to set up house on the Schwanenwerder estate, outside Berlin. It was on the W ann see, the lake on the River H a v e l; H elphand saw it as a poor substitute for Switzer land, Italy, and the sea. A lth ou gh he could live there without having to make yet another involuntary m ove, it had been a hard decision for him to make. Berlin was too evocative o f his past, and H elphand had never really liked the tow n. A personal letter to young Bruno Schonlank, the son o f H elp h an d’ s former em ployer, the editor o f the Leipziger Volkszeitung, revealed how desolate H elphand fe lt: It has been a difficult decision for me, to come to Berlin. I have the feel ing that, this time, I shall go under here. I hate these piles o f masonry, I cannot bear the oppressive atmosphere, and I cannot stand the Berliners— the city scepticism and cynicism, without the French esprit, but with a coarse, upstart brashness. Talk is all that is left. A nd the world is brimming over with hate. 8 ‘Meine Entfernung aus der Schweiz’, D ie Glocke, 1920, p. 1482.

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This is terrible. But how can one withdraw without abasing oneself? T o join the starving masses, put on sackcloth and ashes, playing poor Job, all o f one’s own accord, merely in order to be like the others? . . . But the whole dunghill depresses me only because I fell out o f touch with current intellectual life. Am I unable to see it, or does it not exist? . . .

I need change and life, and all I see is decay, slime, disso

lution. I hear only the sound o f footsteps and the clamour o f the market place. . . .

I long to get away from the cries o f the hungry, I long for

them to stop, I cannot endure them any longer. But I would like to drink deep again, I would like to return to the world where people create and strive— I do not want to have to listen any longer to shouts o f murder and lamentations. I want intellectual creativeness, the joy o f hope, the triumph o f spiritual achievement, the joy o f new discoveries— I would like to feel again the heartbeat o f civilization.9

Berlin reminded H elphand o f too many past disappointments. A s the winter o f 1920 was drawing to its close, their memory set o ff in him a deep personal crisis. W h e n he was at last established at his splendid residence at Schwanenwerder, he felt deceived: this was not, after all, what he very m uch wanted. H is dedicated work for the Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung , his passionate friendships with Schonlank, T rotsky, Rosa Luxem burg, were things o f the past. M ost o f his old friends were either dead, or manning the other side o f the barricades. T h ere was nothing in his life that could take their places. T h e revolutions in Russia and in Germ any— in one way or another H elphand had predicted them and worked for them— had also run their course. In both countries the revolutions were the outcome o f national disaster, and their results now appeared to H elphand drab and uninspiring. T h e stupidity o f the bureau crats had rubbed the bloom from the fruits o f the revolution, the political

upheavals

remained

unaccompanied

spiritual

renaissance. W h e n H elphand’ s thinking reached this point, it appeared that there was still more hope for him . T h e younger generation o f socialists w ould have to find a new inspiration, they w ould have 9 Helphand to Bruno Schonlank, 25 April 1920. Quoted with the kind permission of Herr Bruno Schonlank of Zurich.

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to prevent the vulgar debasement o f the revolutionary spirit. It was precisely on this point that Helphand addressed his young friend Schonlank in M ay: N o new ideas! T h at m eans: no life, no movement, no art, no science, the sun is standing still, until the last satiated proletarian wife folds her hands in her lap, and, yawning, declares that now all is well. . . . D o you then not understand that this standstill o f culture, until socialism is realized, is basically the whole damned ignorance and enmity to culture o f an enslaved class, and that it is the outcome o f the Bolshevik pogromist policy? T his is precisely what has always set me against vulgar socialism, and is still doing so nowadays: it is that I have always seen socialism and the struggle for socialism as work and more work, the exertion o f all the powers o f the collective, the most highly ideal striving, a spiritual revolutionization o f all human relations, the striving o f new spiritual forces!10

Helphand’ s fit o f depression passed, and he was soon ready to come to terms with the outside world. By the time he had written to Schonlank, the house on the Wannsee was ready to receive its first guests. It greatly differed from Wadenswil. Schwanenwerder was not intended to be a quiet country retreat, a comfortable and isolated fortress, which would invite the spinning o f outrageous rumours. On the Wannsee, Helphand kept open house on a grand scale. There were liveried footmen and butlers in white cotton gloves, who conformed— as did their master— to a rather elaborate etiquette. Lavish parties alternated with more intimate evenings, and with discussions arranged for the benefit o f the younger socialist set. It was all very impressive and tame. The formal receptions at Schwanenwerder were attended by socialist ministers and State secretaries; by Scheidemann, who was now under a lucrative contract to Helphand’ s publishing house, by Haenisch, who remained a loyal friend, by Otto Weis, the chairman o f the socialist party, by Gradnauer, the Saxon Minister to Berlin, by Ullrich Rauscher, the first press chief in the Chancellery, who later became the Minister to Warsaw, and by many other dignitaries o f the Weimar Republic. Although Help10 Letter to Bruno Schonlank of 6 M ay 1 920.

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hand knew that he could not aspire to high political office, he remained, in this way, in close touch with the leadership o f the party as well as with the government o f the Weimar R epublic; his advice was, when needed, still available. In spite o f the best food and drink Berlin could provide, there often hung an air o f unreality over these formal gatherings at Schwanenwerder. For most o f Helphand’ s friends, these were unfamiliar surroundings. T h e men— those who had risen highest above their original social starting-point— were usually selfassured enough to take the splendour and formality in their stride. It was their poor wives, according to a frequent visitor to Schwa nenwerder, who suffered most. T hey had been unable to keep up with their husbands’ rapid rise to prominence, they were intimidated, and they showed it.11 Fortunately for Helphand, formal receptions were not a daily occurrence at Schwanenwerder. He was now giving much o f his attention to the younger generation o f German socialists. He expected a lot from them. He often invited them to informal discussion evenings, and he was fond o f lecturing to them on the theory and practice o f socialism. Arno Scholz, the present editor o f the largest Berlin daily, the Telegraph, and Bruno Schonlank, were among the young socialists who attended Helphand’ s gatherings. Scholz was introduced to socialist journalism by Robert Breuer, then editor o f Die Glocke; the young man also acted, in the last years o f Helphand’ s life, as his private secretary. Bruno Schonlank had made a name for himself, during the war, as a poet: he knew a side o f Helphand’ s personality which remained completely hidden from the jaundiced view o f hostile journalists. In one o f his letters to Schonlank, Helphand wrote: 6I take it that your poetry has not yet earned you any palaces, and I am therefore enclosing a cheque for 5,000 marks.’ 12 Apart from the prominent men and the young generation, there were o f course the various supplicants who came to Schwanen werder: provincial journalists who asked for credits and grants for their newspapers, or local socialist functionaries who wanted to acquire printing-presses or buildings to house the secretariats II cf. M. J . Bonn, Wandering Scholar, London, 1949, p. 263. 12 Helphand to Schonlank, 19 March 1920.

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o f their organizations. T hey rarely left Helphand empty-handed. In the spring o f 1920, after he had overcome the depression following his deportation from Switzerland, Helphand once again returned to journalism. It had been the favourite occupation o f his youth, and he now gladly resumed his duties as the publisher o f Die Glocke. It was badly in need o f attention. Over the years, the periodical had become the domain o f the socialist intelligentsia: more often than was good for Die Glocke, opinion ated university lecturers, inspectors o f schools, and other frustrated pedagogues were given an opportunity in its pages to dispute their favourite themes, such as drunkenness, abortion, or school reform. At the end o f 1919, Konrad Haenisch resigned the editorship o f Die Glocke in order to devote himself to his official duties as Minister o f Education in Prussia; Max Beer, the former London correspondent o f Vorwdrts, took over the editorship. He made an effort to widen the circle o f contributors: Die Glocke now started printing occasional pieces by such well-known socialists as Bernstein and Scheidemann, as well as by the younger men— Ernst Niekisch, Erich Ollenhauer, Theodor Heuss, and Ernst Reuter. Helphand himself started to write regular articles for Die Glocke, mainly on problems o f financial policy and o f reparations. He appealed to reason and for sober, business-like thinking; he demanded that international trade be freed from political restric tions. He believed that extortionate reparation payments were the surest way to bankruptcy for all concerned: 6T he point is not that the heaviest possible load should be placed upon Germany, but that France should be able to secure for herself the highest participation in the development o f Germany’ s industry.’ 13 Helphand was convinced that the problem o f reparations should be solved within the framework o f European reconstruc tion; his optimism did not desert him even after the publication o f the London ultimatum on 5 June 1921, which demanded a payment by Germany o f an astronomic sum. Helphand clearly perceived the dangers o f a harsh treatment o f the Weimar Republic. Addressing France at the end o f 1921, he wrote: 13 The most important of these articles were published in a book entitled Aufbau und Wiedergutmachung, Berlin, 1 921 , p. 179.

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I f you destroy Germany then you will make the German nation the organizer o f the next W o rld W ar. T h ere exist two possibilities o n ly : either the unification o f western Europe, or Russia’ s domination. T h e whole game with the buffer states will end in their annexation by Russia, unless they are united with central Europe in an economic community, which w ould provide a counter-balance to Russia. Either western Europe retains its industrial leadership, and for this purpose it has to be politically cohesive, or it will become subordinate economically, politically, and culturally to a great Russia, the frontiers o f which will extend from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean. . . . T h is w ould mean the fall o f French as well as o f German culture. In such a case we should start to teach Russian to our children at school, and introduce them to Russian history, so that they would not be help less when they came under Russian rule.14

Helphand’s conviction o f the necessity o f a close European co-operation came to dominate his political activities. H e had been moving in this direction for some time. In the autumn o f 1 9 1 9 , a select audience o f diplomats and journalists had been treated to an unusual spectacle at a dinner party at the Hotel Kaiserhof, when Helphand lectured to them, in stiff but correct French, on Russian politics.15 After his move to Schwanenwerder, two well-known French professors, Hesnard and Haguenin, who were then working in Berlin for the improvement o f relations between France and Germany, became regular visitors at the house on the Wannsee. Helphand’ s new conception needed a broad political basis: it could not be carried out in the socialist context alone, which was too specialized and parochial. Problems o f European reconstruc tion and o f the closer co-operation between western European states required an international publicity organ. H e set out to explore the possibility o f publishing a newspaper concerned mainly with economics, which would be supported by the repub lican parties in Germany and which, apart from German, would be printed in English, French, Italian, and Spanish. T he men to whom Helphand now turned, and who assisted 14 Parvus, A ufbauund Weidergutmachung, pp. 195-8. 15 Count Harry Kessler, Tagebuch , Frankfurt am Main, 1962, p. 203.

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him in the early stages o f the project, were the leading Berlin liberals, who were well connected in political as well as in busi ness circles. Ernst Jackh was one o f them: he was a talented writer and publicist who had acted, before the war, as an adviser on the Far East to the Foreign Ministry, and who had since undertaken numerous missions as a special emissary to the European ruling houses. He was learned, sophisticated, and dis creet: the foundation o f the Berlin School o f Politics belongs among his many achievements. Helphand’s plans, and especially the suggestion that the newspaper should aim at the support o f the German republican parties, appealed to Jackh. He declared himself ready to take part in preparing the publication. On Jackh’ s advice, Helphand offered the editorship o f the newspaper to Moritz Bonn. Like Jackh, Bonn was a liberal publicist and scholar; he had worked, shortly before the turn o f the century, at the London School o f E conom ics: after assisting Count Bernstorff at the German Embassy in Washington, he acted as the economic adviser to Brockdorff-Rantzau— then Foreign Minister— at the peace negotiations at Versailles. W hen he first met Helphand, Bonn was deeply impressed. He was reminded o f characters in Balzac’ s novels: he at once recog nized that there was a vital power in Helphand, an impressive intelligence accompanied by keen practical sense. Bonn accepted Helphand’ s offer, and the first number o f Wiederaufbau— ‘ R econ struction’— appeared on 4 May 1922, in five European languages. It was an impressive publication. T he exertions o f Jackh and Bonn had not been in vain: after a few months o f its existence, Wiederaufbau counted among its authors some o f the leading German politicians and industrialists. Cunow, a director o f the Hamburg-Amerika shipping-line who later became the Reich Chancellor, Carl Friedrich von Siemens, the young Theodor Heuss, as well as the foremost German socialists, were among the newspaper’ s contributors. Helphand himself wrote a lot for Wiederaufbau, on similar subjects to those he dealt with in Die Glocke and in an equally penetrating manner. T he newspaper commanded an impressive list o f advertisers: the large Mercedes and A E G firms, Banco di Roma, and many others, contributed to the running costs o f Helphand’s publication.

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The editorial policy set the paper firmly on a western course, on the path that led to Germany’ s understanding with the western powers rather than with Russia, to Locarno rather than to Rapallo. The treaty with Russia at Rapallo had been concluded at Easter, shortly before the appearance o f the first number o f Wiederaufbau: its editor regarded the treaty as a serious political mistake, which would shatter the confidence o f the western powers in Germany. This policy, to which Helphand now gave his full support, was again inspired by his considerations on the future development o f Russia: ‘ One has to bear in mind what comes later: the great Russia.’ 16 T he war had not, after all, done away with the Russian colossus: the problem was still facing Germany. The Wiederaufbau project, like all Helphand’ s ventures, was conceived on a grand scale. It was an unusual product o f Weimar journalism; although its conception, as a whole, may have been over-ambitious, it left its mark on the political climate o f the period. By treating the reparations as a rational problem it paved the way for the Locarno treaty, and it prepared the Germans for the reparation plans offered by Dawes and Young. In the columns o f the Wiederaufbau, the idea o f a powerful coalition o f the centre parties— President Ebert became one o f its strongest partisans— found unequivocal support; currency reform was also discussed and concrete proposals made. Helphand himself argued convincingly in favour o f the reform; it later took the shape o f the Rentenmark.11 But behind the sober pages o f the newspaper there existed, in editorial and financial matters, a highly complex situation. Helphand was the official publisher; Moritz Bonn, the editor, remained anonymous, according to the provision he had made when he accepted the jo b . But there was another anonymous person connected with Wiederaufbau. This was Hugo Stinnes, the Ruhr industrialist, and one o f the richest men in Germany. During the war Stinnes had skilfully combined his coal mines and transport companies with a number o f steel works into a self-contained empire. Apart from their wealth and political 16 Parvus, ‘Das russische Problem’, Wiederaufbau, No. i, M ay 1922. 17 Parvus, ‘Die Sanierung der deutschen Staatsfinanzen, Wiederaufbau, No. 23.

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ambition, Stinnes and Helphand had little in common. Stinnes was an unassuming, modest man, deeply nationally conscious: as a Reichstag deputy o f the nationalist Volkspartei, and as a leading Ruhr industrialist, he exercised a powerful influence on Ger many’ s reparation policies. His views on this problem were at first sharply opposed to those o f Helphand. Stinnes had made a name for himself as a critic o f the Versailles treaty, who had lashed Rathenau’ s and W irth’ s ‘policy o f fulfilment’ o f Germany’ s financial obligations. In April 1 9 2 2 , however, the attitude o f Stinnes to reparations and, with it, to Germany’ s relations with France, began to change. In that month he concluded an agreement with Marquis de Lubersac, the President o f the Confederation Generate des Co operatives de Reconstruction des Regions Devastees. The agree ment gave an opportunity to German industry to participate in the reconstruction o f France, by-passing the two governments. The next step in the same direction was Stinnes’ partnership in Helphand’ s goodwill publication. Both men treated the matter with the utmost discretion: neither Bonn nor Jackh knew about Stinnes’ interest in the newspaper. It is possible that Helphand saw himself as a socialist counterpart o f Stinnes; he may have made his last attempt to expropriate the expropriators. Despite the generous support o f Stinnes, the Wiederaufbau soon ran into financial difficulties. T he costs o f the five-language edition surprised the publisher himself; technical organization was also lacking. There were difficulties and delays connected with translating and then with editing the text: when a copy o f Wiederaufbau eventually appeared, it was not quite up to date. Helphand asked for additional subsidies: when, instead o f en thusiasm, he encountered hesitation on the part o f Stinnes, he threatened to make a public statement on the financing o f the newspaper up to date. T he Wiederaufbau received its final subsidy from the Ruhr. Nevertheless, half-way through the year 1 9 2 3 , Bonn resigned the editorship and the whole project was mercifully killed. After the appearance o f fifty-one issues, the last Wiederaufbau was published on 17 September 1 9 2 3 . The closure o f the newspaper completed Helphand’ s gradual

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withdrawal from public life. His health had been failing since the end o f the w ar; the sparks o f his tremendous vitality were now fast dying out. H e suffered severe rheumatic pains, and his heart beat was not as regular as it should have been. He spent much o f his time taking the waters at Marienbad; his friends in Berlin noticed that he was increasingly relying on Schwanenwerder to provide him with the peace he needed. Nevertheless, hostile press reports on orgies at Helphand’ s house continued to appear. T h e enemies o f the Weimar Republic needed Helphand for their agitation: he had received from them, in the summer o f 1922, an unwanted p ro o f o f his political stature. His name appeared on a list circulating in the Femekreis— a right-wing terrorist organization o f discharged officers— o f persons who were to be liquidated. In September 1922, two former officers called Krull and Bracht began to prepare H elphand’ s assassination. T hey chose a rather complicated way o f carrying out their plan: they intended to blow up the house at Schwanenwerder. T hey were arrested before they could strike.18 Had Krull and Bracht succeeded in assassinating Helphand, they would have killed a man who was fast approaching the end o f his physical reserves. His former mode o f life did not make for longevity. After the collapse o f the Wiederaufbau project, there still remained Die Glocke: although its front page now bore Helphand’s name, he no longer bothered to write for it. There remained two things for him to do. He married his secretary, a young Bavarian girl who, many years later, preferred not to be reminded o f this brief episode in her life. A nd finally, he saw to the destruction o f his private papers: it is likely that a bonfire in the garden o f Schwanenwerder took care o f that. On 12 December 1924, a heart attack put an end to Helphand’ s fife. 18 Ernst von Salomon, D er Fragebogen, Hamburg, 1951, p. 128. Vorwarts, 22 September 1922.

Epilogue It was on 17 December 1924 that a small party assem bled at the W ilm ersdorf crematorium in Berlin. Helphand’ s funeral was neither a family nor a religious occasion: it was a socialist ceremony. There was a magnificent wreath from the Danish comrades; the principal speakers were Georg Gradnauer and Otto Weis, who represented the German party executive. As they had no liking for the ritual formulas o f religion, they expressed their grief in mundane terms; they were clearly moved by a desire to do well by their departed comrade, but, above all, to do so quickly. It seemed that Helphand’ s name and his diverse achievements would soon be forgotten, and that no one would care much i f they were. Die Glocke reported on the memorial service for its founder and, six weeks later, itself ceased publication. Helphand’ s pub lishing house, the Verlag fiir Sozialwissenschaft, was wound up at the same time, and the late owner’ s assets in Berlin were sufficient to cover the firm’ s deficit. His friends and relatives who searched the house at Schwanenwerder found neither any political papers, nor a last will. It was improbable that Helphand’ s great fortune could have disappeared, and rumours started to circulate that money had been deposited in numbered accounts in Switzerland. There was, however, no concrete p roof; the search continues. In political pamphleteering alone, Helphand’ s name retained a certain evil significance. The enemies o f the Weimar Republic used it often and effectively, and their usages resulted in some bizarre distortions o f the dead man’ s memory. T he majority o f German socialists themselves preferred to forget Helphand altogether. In the large German socialist family o f well-behaved and mediocre children, he was obviously the black sheep. And on

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the few occasions when they remembered him, they did so with out sympathy. One o f them came to regard Helphand’ s activities as a ‘mixture o f opinionation and business’ , a mixture o f which he disapproved; another remembered a grand dinner at Schwanenwerder, which irritated him and left him spiritually hungry. T he world Helphand inhabited had, in this socialist’ s view, nothing to do with socialism. In his speech at Helphand’ s funeral, Georg Gradnauer re called how Helphand had once said: ‘ W e love the high tide o f life.’ His few friends in Germany remembered him as someone with an immense will to live, as a massive figure, larger than life. Gradnauer’ s recollection was kindly and perceptive: it indicated the perplexity that Helphand had caused among the German socialists. It meant, moreover, that somehow he had surpassed their understanding. There can be no doubt that Helphand’s untrammelled vitality, his personal and political independence, the range and keenness o f his intellect, had placed him head and shoulders above his contemporaries in the socialist movement. But they distrusted his volatile, unbounded character, and Helphand himself gave them too many occasions on which to be contemptuous. In the fullness o f time, his comrades grasped every single one. By 1 9 1 4 he had broken all the unwritten rules o f German socialism. Helphand showed too much interest in women, in money, and there existed doubts as to his financial probity. In addition, the company he kept was not always exclusively socialist. There was the dilemma o f Helphand’ s character. T he German socialists had never been able to comprehend it in its entirety, and their suspicions made them, after his death, not reluctant to accept a conspiracy o f silence. In fact, they knew less than they thought they knew. In December 1 9 2 4 , the funeral orators were sentimental about a life in which sentiment had played only a small part. Had they known all, they would have said that this had been a life o f extreme complexity, and that many o f its aspects had at the time remained entirely hidden from their view. Only Helphand’ s activities as a writer had been entirely p u b lic; it was by them alone that he had wanted to be judged, in his late middle age. In the last instance, Helphand was an intellectual. As M.R.-T

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a young man, he had believed in the power o f the printed word to resolve his problems and doubts. He had gone abroad for the first time when he was nineteen years old, not because o f a desire to see the world outside Russia, but because he wanted to read the revolutionary writings that were banned by the Tsarist authorities. He had a writer’s temperament but a politician’s interests. Like Karl Marx, he did not want only to describe and understand the w orld: he wanted to change it. Helphand was personally ambitious, and when he became a socialist journalist in Germany, he thought o f writing as a means o f emerging from obscurity into prominence, even as a means o f achieving political power. Neither the rewards o f writing, nor the power o f writing to in fluence the actions o f men, matched up to Helphand’s expecta tions. Despite the sustained effort to disengage himself from his Russian background, there remained in him too much o f the uncompromising Russian intelligent. He had no feelings for the ties o f loyalty that bound together the German party leadership, and he remained a revolutionary in a movement which was about to reject revolution as a means o f social advancement. The excellence o f Helphand’s theoretical writing was never properly acknowledged. He had not produced the Marxist magnum opus that was expected o f him; his ideas were scattered over too many newspaper articles and pamphlets. The Russian socialists understood his revolutionary fervour better than had the German socialists, and it was among his compatriots that Helphand’s views found their most receptive audience. But again, they were either misunderstood or misapplied. In one notable instance, Lev Trotsky, one o f the best friends Helphand had ever had, parted company with him and struck out in a direction where Helphand could not follow. Helphand broke off the ‘intellectual partnership’ with Trotsky because he fully shared in the dominant tradition o f nineteenth-century socialism: a socialist democratic tradition, in the liberal meaning o f the word. Helphand’s writing was meant to be a guide to political action; the advance o f socialism was his aim, and revolu tion one o f its most important means. In this regard, Helphand’ s attitude was all-embracing, or, as his enemies would have put it,

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indiscriminate. In order to advance the cause o f socialism, Helphand was ready to employ any means at his disposal: revolution in Russia, elections in Prussia, the diplomats in Berlin. In this sense, there was a continuity between his writing and political action. Many o f Helphand’ s former friends denied that continuity existed in his life. Both Lev Trotsky and Karl Radek pointed at a sudden break: it was supposed to have occurred in the summer o f 1914, when Helphand apparently became a ‘ socialist chauvinist’ , and gave support to the war policy o f the German Government. They were quite wrong. Helphand was neither a simpleton nor a monomaniac: in 1914, his life was not dedicated to one single pursuit, or governed by one all-pervading habit that could be suddenly broken o ff and replaced by another. The change in Helphand— it did not take place in full view o f either his Russian or his German comrades— occurred for different reasons and at a different time. Soon after the turn o f the century Helphand appeared to be working like a powerful dynamo, but without any machinery to drive. And then, in his early middle age, everything started to go wrong for him. His friendships were ruined; his ideas misunder stood or unnoticed; he had failed dismally as a leader o f men, and finally, a web o f rumour and scandal started to collect around his name. Had he stayed on in Germany, he would have paid a high price for his characteristic blend o f ambition and carelessness. At best, he would have disappeared among the faceless supporters o f a lost cause. He went to Constantinople instead, and his stay there was o f decisive importance. He was able to cut o ff the ties that bound him to past failures and disappointments, and estab lish the pattern that was to dominate his activities until the end o f his life. He learned to convert information and ideas into hard cash — die klingende Miinze, pure music to his ear, and so long denied him— rather than into the monotonous, black and white columns o f a newspaper; he explored the exclusive avenues that con nected the world o f money with the world o f politics. He became interested in political influence rather than in the exercise o f direct political pow er: he was the stage manager, and not an actor, in the drama that was about to begin. When the

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Great War finally broke out, Helphand was in a better position to advance the cause o f his choice than ever before. It was still the cause o f socialism, and, closely connected, the downfall o f the Tsarist regime he so much abhorred. W hen, early in 1 9 1 5 , h e came to see the German Ambassador to Constantinople, he had a splendid offer to make. Russia’ s defeat and war on one front only was the prospect he held out to the German Government. But o f this partnership, Helphand expected even more himself. T he armed might o f Germany would accomplish what decades o f peaceful develop ment had left undone— the destruction o f Tsarism and subse quent socialist victory. It was under Helphand’ s guidance that Imperial Germany launched a campaign o f unrestricted political warfare on Russia. But there was a third party to the game— Lenin and the Bolsheviks— and when it ended, the winnings were unevenly distributed. In the middle game, the Imperial German Government had a remarkable run o f luck. T he German war lords concluded peace with the Bolsheviks and then, for a few glorious weeks in the spring o f 1 9 1 8 , victory in the west appeared to lie within their grasp. Ultimately, however, the Bolsheviks took all. W hen the German Empire was swept away by defeat at the front and by revolution in Berlin, Lenin’ s party was established in power in Petrograd. There was no reason why the Bolsheviks should have acknowledged any other assistance in their rise to political prominence— apart from the desire o f the Russian nation to be ruled by them and no one else. Helphand, who had brought the original party together, was the principal loser. He had in tended to use Imperial Germany for his purposes: he was used himself, and, in the process, he became too much a part o f this Germany. Lenin shed his undesirable ally as soon as he could conveniently do so. There was no bond o f sympathy between Helphand and the newly-established regime in Russia. Although Helphand’ s grand strategy brought him no political rewards, there was nothing tragic in its failure. H e had always found it difficult to serve one cause, stay in one place, or with one woman. All along, he had been playing for high financial stakes and, in this regard, he was entirely successful. His trade interests

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spanned Europe from Copenhagen to Constantinople, and by the the end o f the war he was one o f the richest men in Germany. In a way, Helphand’ s success as a businessman jeopardized his political activities. It appeared to many socialists that it would be easier for a camel to pass through the eye o f a needle than for a rich man to remain one o f them. It was an attitude which was succinctly summed up in the words o f a German comrade about Vandervelde, the Belgian party leader: ‘ He cannot be a socialist, he likes champagne.’ In this view, Helphand had done worse than to like champagne; he could even buy his own. In addition, he took far too literally the lesson he had learned in Turkey: that money could be made through political power, and that political power could be reached through money. He never seemed to appreciate the intricate patterns into which the two basic strands could be woven, especially in the industrially advanced, or politically sophisticated, societies. It is possible that, after the war, Helphand wished for a dif ferent kind o f reward. By then, however, he was ageing rapidly, the world he had loved and o f which he had become a part had disappeared. T he master plan had somehow failed, probably because o f the human element involved: the historicist had been deceived by history. The excitement o f revolutions had died down, and the drab, impoverished present had to be administered by new bureaucrats, perhaps even duller than the old ones. Helphand’ s personal tragedy lay in the failure o f a movement. The disastrous developments, for European socialism, in the summer o f 1 9 1 4 have been generally recognized. But there was a worse shock to come. A few months after the Bolshevik seizure o f power in 1 9 1 7 , it became clear that a socialist dictatorship had been introduced in Russia: until then, the possibility o f such a development had eluded the imaginative grasp o f most European socialists. At the same time, while the new Russian rulers staked their claim to the Marxist inheritance o f European socialism, many socialists farther west were turning from this inheritance. In the end they renounced the great fortune o f Helphand’ s youth completely, and with it they renounced Helphand himself. This would have disappointed him; the reasons for the present revival o f interest in his person would have pleased him even less.

Bibliography A.

Unpublished Material

Documents from the German Foreign Ministry deposited in Bonn, and their copies at the Public Record Office, London, and St. Antony’ s College, Oxford. Documents o f the Austrian Foreign Ministry at the H aus-, H o f- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. T h e diary o f Eduard D avid; Siidekum Nachlass; W olfgang H eine’ s

Politische Aufzeichnungen, at Bundesarchiv Koblenz. T h e diary o f Bruno Schonlank at the Archives o f the German Social Democrat Party, Bonn. Nachlass Kautsky at the International Institute o f Social History, Amsterdam. Helphand’s letters in the private collection o f Bruno Schonlank, ju n ., Zurich. Nachlass Helphand at the Hauptarchiv, Berlin.

Published Documents

Balabanov, M .,

Ot 1905 k 1917g. .*massovoye rabocheie dvizhenie, Moscow,

1927.

Browder, R . P. and Kerensky, A . F. (editors),

ment 1917,

The Provisional Govern

3 vols., Stanford, 1962.

Bunyan, J. and Fisher, H . H .,

The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918,

Documents and Materials, Stanford, 1934. Fleer, N . G ., Rabocheie dvizhenie vgody voiny, Moscow, 1923. Gankin, O . H . and Fisher, H . H ., The Bolsheviks and the World War. The Origins of the Third International, London, 1940. Grebing, H ., ‘So macht man Revolution’ , Politische Studien, Munich, 1957, pp. 2 2 1 -3 4 .

Greve, B. B ., 1927.

Burzhuaziya na kanune Fevralskoi Revolyutsii, Moscow,

Bibliography Hahlweg, W .,

283

Lenins Ruckkekr nach Russland 1917. Die deutschen

Akten, Leiden,

1957.

Katkov, G ., 6German Foreign Office documents on financial support to the Bolsheviks in 1917’ ,

International Affairs,

X X X I I , 1956, pp.

1 8 1 -9 .

Protokoll der Sitzung des erweiterten Parteiausschusses am 1 8 und 1 9 April 1 9 1 7 im Reichstagsgebaude zu Berlin, Berlin, 1917. Protokoll des Parteitags der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Stuttgart, Berlin, 18 9 8 . Protokoll des Parteitags der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Wurzburg, Berlin, 1917. Protokoly tsentralnovo komiteta RSDRP(b), Avgust 1 9 1 7 — Fevral 1 9 1 8 , Moscow, 1958.

Revolyutsiya

1 9 0 5 -1 9 0 7

gg. v Rossii, Dokumenty i Materialy,

vol. 1,

M oscow, 1957.

Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstags,

X III . Legislaturperiode, II,

Session, vol. 311, Berlin, 1917. Zechlin, E ., ‘ Friedensbestrebungen und Revolutionierungsversuche’ ,

Das Parlament,

17 May 1961, 14 June 1961, 21 June 1961, 15 May

1963, 22 May 1963. Zeman, Z . A . B .,

Germany and the Revolution in Russia

1 9 1 5 -1 9 1 8 ,

London, 1958.

C. Published Correspondence Adler, V .,

Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky,

edited by

Friedrich Adler, Vienna, 1954.

Materialy po istorii russkovo revolyutsionnovo dvizheniI : Pisma Axelroda i Martova, 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 1 6 , Berlin, 1924. N . K ., Correspondence in Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 19 6 0 , vol. 3 ,

Axelrod, P. B .,

ya,

Tom

Krupskaya,

pp . 10 6 -2 5 . Lenin, V . I., Correspondence in

Leninskii Sbornik,

vols. X III, X X X V I .

— The Letters of Lenin, ed. by E . H ill and D . M udie, London, 1936. Luxemburg, R ., ‘ Einige Briefe Rosa Luxemburgs und andere D okumente’ ,

Bulletin of the International Institute of Social History,

Amsterdam, 1952, N o . 1. Plekhanov, G . V .,

Perepiska G. V. Plekhanova i P. B . Axelroda, Moscow,

19 2 5 . Potresov, A . N . and Nikolaevski, B. I. (editors),

dvizhenie v Rossii, materialy, Moscow, 19 2 8 .

Sotsial-demokraticheskoe

284

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Selected Articles and Books by Helphand

Unus, ‘Die preussischen Landtagswahlen’, JVZ, 1 8 9 3 -4 , vol. 1, pp. 3 7 -4 6 .

Parvus, ‘ Keinen Mann und keinen Groschen’ , JVZ, 1 8 9 4 -5 , vol. 2, pp. 8 0 -8 7 . —

‘Staatsstreich und politischer Massenstreik’ , JVZ, 1 8 9 5 -6 , vol. 2, pp. 1 9 9 -2 0 6 .

— Die Gewerkschaften und die Sozialdemokratie, Dresden, 1896. — Marineforderungen, Kolonialpolitik und Arbeiterinteressen, Dresden, 1898.

Das hungernde Russland, Reiseeindrucke, Beobachtungen, Untersuchungen, Stuttgart, 1900. Parvus, Handelskrisis und Gewerkschaften, Munich, 1901. C. Lehmann and Parvus:

—

‘Der Opportunismus in der Praxis’ , jVZ, 1 9 0 0 -1 , vol. 2, pp. 6 0 9 -1 5 , 7 8 6 -9 4 .

Pismo k N. Leninu, Geneva, 1904. — V chem my raskhodimsya, Geneva, 1905. L . D . Trotsky: Do devyatovo Yanvarya, (with an introduction by —

Parvus), Geneva, 1905.

Rossiya i revolyutsiya, St. Petersburg, 1906. — Die Reichstagwahlen und die Arbeiterschaft, Dresden, 1907. — Die Kolonialpolitik und der Zusammenbruch, Berlin, 1907. — In der russischen Bastille wahrend der Revolution, Dresden, 1907. — Die Banken, der Staat und die Industrie, Dresden, 1910. — Der Staat, die Industrie und der Sozialismus, Dresden, 1910. — Der Klassenkampfdes Proletariats, Berlin, 1911. — The Results o f the Great War. I f Germany Wins, Constantinople, Parvus,

1915 (Turkish).

—

The Results o f the Great War. I f England Wins, Constantinople, 1914 (Turkish).

— The Arteries of Turkey and the Debts of the Empire, Constantinople, 1914 (Turkish). — Na oboronu demokratii— proti tzarismu, Constantinople, 1914. — ‘Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie. Die Hochburg des Sozialismus’ , Die

Glocke,

1915, pp. 4 -5 2 .

— ‘Fur die Demokratie— gegen den Zarismus’ , Glocke, 1915, pp. 7 7 -8 5 . — ‘Der Freiheit eine Gasse’,

Glocke,

1915, pp. 1 1 7 -2 2 .

— ‘ Die internationale sozialistische Bewegung’ ,

Glocke,

1 9 1 5 , pp. 1 4 4 -7 .

— ‘Meine Stellungnahme zum Krieg. I. Vorrede zu der ukrainischen Ausgabe der Schrift: Fiir die Demokratie— gegen den Zarismus.

Bibliography

285

Glocke,

1915,

II. Offener Brief an die Zeitung “ Nasche Slowo” in Paris’ , pp. 1 4 8 -6 2 .

— ‘Das neue Russland’ ,

Glocke,

1915, pp. 1 7 3 -8 1 .

Glocke,

— ‘Die franzosische Offensive und die Arbeiter’ ,

1915, pp.

2 3 7 -4 1 .

— ‘Franz Mehring zum 70. Geburtstag’ , —

‘Ein Gespach zur Kriegszeit’ ,

—

‘Einheit der Partei’,

Glocke,

1915, p. 721.

1916, pp. 2 4 -3 5 .

1916, pp. 3 5 -4 0 .

— ‘Der Sieg der russischen Revolution’ ,

Glocke,

1916, pp. 9 6 1 -7 0 .

— ‘Die Bolschewiki. Vorrede zu der danischen Ausgabe der Schrift

Glocke,

“ Meine Antwort an Kerenski und C o.” ’ , — ‘ Die

Beschlagnahme

der

Privatbanken

1917, pp. 5 2 1 -3 3 .

durch

die

Bolschewiki

(Aus der russischen Zeitschrift “ Iswne” in Stockholm)’ , Glocke, 1917, pp. 6 8 9 -9 3 .

— ‘Das soziale Programm der Bolschewiki’ , — — —

— — — — —

Glocke,

1917, pp. 7 6 1 -6 .

Meine Antwort an Kerenski und Co., Berlin, 1917. Die soziale Bilanz des Krieges, Berlin, 1917. Im Kampf um die Wahrheit, Berlin, 1918. ‘Der bolschewistische Friede’ , Glocke, 1918, pp. 1 9 7 -2 0 9 . ‘ Notizen zur Kanzlerkrise’ , Glocke, 1918, pp. 9 0 1 -5 . ‘Die Entente und der Bolschewismus’, Glocke, 1919, pp. 8 9 7 -9 0 2 . ‘Der Fall Kautsky’ , Glocke, 1919, pp. 1 2 1 3 -2 0 . ‘Philister liber mich! Meine Antwort an Karl Kautsky’ , Glocke, 1919, pp. 1 3 3 1 -9 .

—

‘Meine Entfernung aus der Schweiz’ ,

Glocke,

1920, pp. 1 4 8 2 -9 ,

1 5 0 7 -1 4 .

—

Glocke, 1919, pp. 1 5 2 5 -8 . Briefe an die deutschen Arbeiter, Berlin, 1919. Aufbau und Wiedergutmachung, Berlin, 1921. Der wirtschaftliche Rettungsweg, Berlin, 1922. ‘Das russische Problem’ , Wiederaufbau, 1 9 2 2 -3 , pp. 1 -5 . ‘Die russische Frage in Genua’ , Wiederaufbau, 1 9 2 2 -3 , pp.

Collected Works

— — — — —

‘ Deutschland und Russland’ ,

1 0 -1 2 .

Izbrany Proizvedeniya v dva toma, Sofia, 1951. Gorki, M ., Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 7. Lenin, V . I., Sochineniya (2nd and 3rd editions), vols. X V I I -X X I V . Litwak, A ., Geklibene Schriftn, New York, 1945. Luxemburg, R ., Gesammelte Werke, vols. 3, 4 , and 6. Trotsky, L . D ., Sochineniya, vol. 3, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926. Vorovski, V . V ., Sochineniya, vol. 1, Moscow, 1933. Blagoev, D .,

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The Merchant o f Revolution

Secondary Works and Articles

Du Tsarisme au Communisme. La Revolution Russe, ses Causes—ses Effets, Paris, 1923. Avdeev, N ., Revolyutsiya 1 91 7 goda (Khronika Sobytii), Moscow, 1923. Alexinsky, G .,

Bernstein, E ., ‘Die preussischen Landtagswahlen und die Sozialdemokratie’ ,

NZ,

1 8 9 2 -3 , vol. 2, pp. 7 7 2 -8 .

— ‘Der Streik als politisches Kampfmittel’ ,

NZ,

1 8 9 3 -4 , vol. 2, pp.

6 8 7 -9 0 .

— ‘Die Zusammenbruchs-Theorie und die Kolonialpolitik’ ,

NZ,

1897-

98, vol. 1, pp. 5 4 8 -5 7 .

War Costs and their Financing, L o n d o n -N e w York, 1921. Chesnais, P. G ., Parvus et leparti socialiste danois, Paris, 1918. Cunow, H ., Parteizusammenbruch? Ein offenes Wort zum inneren Parteistreit, Berlin, 1915. David, E ., Die Sozialdemokratie im Weltkrieg, Berlin, 1915. Deutscher, I., The Prophet Armed—Trotsky 1 8 7 9 -1 9 2 1 , London, 1954. Epstein, K ., Mathias Erzberger and the Dilemma o f German Democracy, Bogart, E . L .,

Princeton, 1959.

Fainsod, M .,

International Socialism and the World War, Harvard

University Press, 1935.

Die politischen Kampfe um den Frieden 1 9 1 6 -1 9 1 8 und das Deutschtum, Berlin, 1938. Fischart, J., Das alte und das neue System. Die politischen Kopfe Deutschlands, Berlin, 1919. Fischer, F ., Griff nach der Weltmacht, Diisseldorf, 1961. Frank, V ., ‘ Russians and Germans. A n Ambivalent Heritage’ , Survey, Fester, R .,

N o. 4 4 -4 5 , 1962, pp. 6 6 -7 3 . Frohlich, P., Rosa Luxemburg. Gedankeund Tat, 2nd ed., Hamburg, 1949.

Northern Underground. Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland

Futrell, M .,

1 8 6 3 -1 9 1 7 , London, 1963.

Germany's Drive to the West {Drang nach Westeri). A Study in Germany's War Aims during the First World War, Baltimore, 1950. Gorin, P ., Ocherki po istorii sovetov rabotchikh delegatov v 1905 g ., Gatzke, H . W .,

2nd ed., Moscow, 1930.

Grebing, H ., ‘ Osterreich-Ungarn und die “ Ukrainische Aktion” 1 9 1 4 -

Jahrbucher fu r Geschichte Osteuropas, 1959, pp. 2 7 0 -8 3 . Haenisch, K ., Parvus, Ein Blatt der Erinnerung, Berlin, 1925. — Krieg und Sozialdemokratie, Berlin, 1915. — Brief an Radek, Berlin, 1914. 1918’ ,

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Der Diktatfrieden von Brest-Litovsk 1918 und die Bolschewistische Weltrevolution, Munster, 1960. Heidegger, H ., Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der nationale Staat Hahlweg, W .,

1 8 7 0 -1 9 2 0 , Gottingen, 1956.

Der Osten im ersten Weltkrieg, Leipzig, 1944. Kennan, G ., ‘T h e Sisson Documents’ , Journal of Modern History, vol.

Holzle, E .,

28, 1956, pp. 1 3 0 -5 4 .

— Russia leaves the London, 1956.

War. Soviet-American Relations

1 9 1 7 -1 9 2 0 ,

K Razoblacheniyam o Parvuse, Paris, 1915. Koszyk, K ., Zwischen Kaiserreich und Diktatur. Die sozialdemokratische Presse von 1 9 1 4 -1 9 3 3 , Heidelberg, 1958. Legters, L . H ., ‘Karl Radek als Sprachrohr des Bolschewismus’ , Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte, vol. 7, 1959, pp. 1 9 6 -3 2 2 . Lenach, F ., Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Weltkrieg, Leipzig, Kizelov, I.,

1915.

Sozialreform oder Revolution, Leipzig, 1899. — Die russische Revolution, edited by O . K . Flechtheim, Frankfurt, 1963. Matthias, E ., Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Osten, Tubingen, Luxemburg, R .,

1954.

— ‘ Kautsky und der Kautskyanismus. Die Funktion der Ideologic in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie vor dem ersten Weltkriege’ ,

Marxis-

musstudien, second series, edited by I. Fetscher, Tubingen,

1957,

pp. 1 5 1 -9 7 . Matthias, E. and Morsey, R .,

Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss

1 9 1 7 -1 8 ,

vol. I. Diisseldorf, 1959.

Melgunov, P. S.,

Zolotoi nemetskii klyuch k bolshevitskoi revolyutsii,

Paris, 1940.

The Fatal Years, London, 1938. Nolde, B. E ., Russia in the Economic War, New Haven, 1928. Osterroth, F ., Biographisches Lexikon des Sozialismus, vol. 1, Hanover, Nikitine, B. V .,

1960.

Vorovski, Moscow, 1959. Platten, F ., Die Reise Lenins durch Deutschland im plombierten Wagen, Piashev, N .,

Zurich, 1924.

JVashi Raznoglasiya, Geneva, 1884. Possony, St. T ., Jahrhundert des Aufruhrs, Munich, 1956. Prager, E ., Geschichte der USPD, Berlin, 1921. Ritter, G . A ., Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich. Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und die Freien Gewerkschaften, 1 8 9 0 -1 9 0 0 , Plekhanov, G .,

Berlin, 1959.

288

The Merchant o f Revolution

Deutscher Staat und deutsche Parteien, Friedrich Meinecke zum 60. Geburtstag, Munich

Rothfels, H ., ‘ Marxismus und auswartige Politik’ , and Berlin, 1922.

Scharlau, W ., ‘Parvus und T rockij: 1 9 0 4 -1 9 1 4 . Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der permanenten Revolution’ ,

Jahrbiicher fu r Geschichte Osteuropas,

vol. 10, 1962, pp. 3 4 9 -8 0 .

German Social Democracy 1905-1917. The Development o f the Great Schism, Harvard University Press, 1955.

Schorske, C. E .,

Schurer, H ., ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus— Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’ ,

Russian Review,

1959, pp. 3 1 3 -3 1 .

Shub, D . (Zhub), ‘Lenin i Vilgelm II. Novoe o germano-bolshevitskom

Novy Zhurnal, June 1959, pp. 2 2 6 -7 . — Lenin. Fine Biographie, 3rd edition, Wiesbaden, 1958. Siney, M . C ., The Allied Blockade o f Germany 1914-1916, University zagovore 1917’ ,

o f Michigan Press, 1957.

Sling,

Richter und Gerichtete, Berlin,

1929.

Snell, J., ‘ The Russian Revolution and the German Social Democratic Party in 1917’ ,

The Slavic Review, vol. X V ,

1956, pp. 3 3 8 -5 0 .

Spartakusbriefe, Herausgegeben vom Institut fur Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Berlin, 1958.

Die Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution auf Deutschland von 1905-1907, Berlin, 1956. Stern-Rubarth, E. von., Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau. Wanderer zwischen zwei Welten. Ein Lebensbild, Berlin, 1929. Strobel, H ., ‘Helphand-Parvus’, Die Weltbuhne, N o. 51, 11 December Stern, L . (ed.),

1919.

JVasha revolyutsiya, St. Petersburg, 1906. — Stalin, An Appraisal o f the Man and his Influence, New York and

Trotsky, L . D .,

London, 1941. Wheeler-Bennett, J. W .,

Brest-Litovsk. The Forgotten Peace, March 1918,

London, 1938. W olfe, B. D .,

Three Who Made a Revolution, London, New York, and

Toronto, 1948.

Gefesselte Justiz, Munich, 1930. Zetkin, CL, ‘ Helphand-Parvus’ , Die Kommunistische Internationale, Zarnow, G .,

N o. 1, 1925. Ziv, G . A .,

Trotsky— Kharakteristika—Po lichnym vospominaniyam,

N ew York, 1921.

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Memoirs

Abram ovich, R .,

Berlin, 1919 and 1921.

J., The Wandering Scholar, L ondon, 1949. D eutsch, L ., Viermal entflohen, Stuttgart, 1907. Gorki, M ., Lenin, M oscow , 1931. H oglu n d , Z ., Fran Branting till Lenin, Stockholm, 1953. Kerensky, A ., The Crucifixion of Liberty, L on don , 1934. Kessler, Count Harry, Tagebuch, Frankfurt am M ain, 1962. Krupskaya, N ., Vospominaniya o Lenine, M oscow , 1957. â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Lenin, Moscow, 1959. Kiihlmann, R . von, Erinnerungen, H eidelberg, 1948. Mayer, G ., Vom Journalisten zum Historiker der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Zurich, 1949. N adolny, R ., Mein Beitrag, W iesbaden, 1955. Naumann, V ., Dokumente und Argumente, M unich-Berlin, 1928. Paleologue, M ., An Ambassador's Memoirs, 2 vols., L on don , n.d. Plesch, J., The Story of a Doctor, L ondon, 1947. Prittwitz und Gaffron, F. von., Zwischen Petersburg und Washington. Ein Diplomatenleben, M unich, 1952. Radek, K ., Portrety i Pamflety, M oscow , 1927. Scheidemann, P h., Memoiren eines Sozialdemokraten, 2 vols., Dresden, Bonn, M .

1928.

Kanun Semnadtsatovo Goda, Moscow-Petrograd, 1923. Solomon, G . A ., Sredi krasnykh vozhdei, lichno perezhitoe i vidennoe na sovetskoi sluzhbe, 2 vols., Paris, 1930. T rotsky, L ., My Life, New Y ork, 1930. Shlyapnikov, A .,

Newspapers and Journals

Arbeiterzeitung, 1 9 1 4 -1 8 , Vienna. Aus der Weltpolitik, 1 9 0 0 -5 , Munich. Bakinskii Rabochii, 1925, Baku. Berliner Tageblatt, 1924, Berlin. Bote der russischen Revolution, 1917, Stockholm. Freie Wort, 1931, Berlin. Z)^r Angrijf\ 1934, Berlin. Glocke, 1 9 1 5 -2 5 , M unich, Berlin. ZhV

Z^7, 1 8 9 1 -1 9 2 5 , Stuttgart.

Die Welt, 1957, Hamburg. Die Weltbuhne, 1 9 1 8 -3 3 , Berlin.

2 90

The Merchant o f Revolution

Die Zukunft, 1 9 1 4 -2 5 , Berlin. Freie Presse, 1918, Elberfeld-Barmen. Hamburger Echo, 1 9 1 5 -1 8 , Hamburg. Humanite, 1 9 1 4 -1 8 , Paris. Internationale Korrespondenz, 1 9 1 5 -1 8 , Berlin. 1 9 0 0 -5 , Munich, London, Geneva.

Korrespondenz Prawda, 1917, Stockholm. Kreuzzeitung, 1925, Berlin. Leipziger Volkszeitung, 1 8 9 4 -1 9 2 5 , Leipzig. Munchener Post, 1 9 0 0 -2 5 , Munich. Nachalo, 1905, St. Petersburg. Nashe Slovo, 1915, Paris. Novaya Zhizn, 1905, Petrograd. Novaya Zhizn, ed. Maxim Gorki, 1 9 1 7 -1 8 , Petrograd. Pravda, 1 9 1 7 -2 5 , Moscow. Proletarskaya revolyutsiya, 1 9 2 1 -4 1 , Moscow. Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung, 1 8 9 6 -1 9 2 5 , Dresden. Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1 8 9 6 -1 9 2 5 , Berlin. Times Literary Supplement, 1958, London. Vorwarts, 1 8 9 1 -1 9 2 5 , Berlin. Wiederaufbau, 1 9 2 3 -4 , Berlin. Zarya, 1 9 0 1 -2 , Geneva-Stuttgart.

Index Abramovich, R ., cited, 129, 143 Absolutism, 21, 62, 85, 13 1, 140, 174 Achtuhrabendblatt, 264 Adler, Viktor, 26-27, 31 A E G (firm), 272 Afghanistan, 254 Africa, 41,10 5 Agent (German), H. as, 14 1, 154, 158, 178,228-9 Agent provocateur, H. described as, 195, 225 Albrecht, 199 Alexander II, Tsar, 5-6, 10 Alexander III, Tsar, 6, 53 Alexinski, G. A., 123, 195, 225, 227 Alien, H. as : see Citizenship Allied Powers {Entente), 13 1, 139, 163, 182, 185, 197-8, 209, 213, 258-8 Almanacks, propaganda, 254-6, 263-5 Alsace-Lorraine, 221 Amatis (female artiste), 197 America, 15, 4 1, 148, 197, 224, 232; and Europe, 24-25, 257; Trotsky in, 180 Amsterdam, 148 Anatolia, 132 Annexations and indemnities, peace without, 214, 218, 236, 249-50, 252 Annual Register, quoted, 51 Antisemitism: see Jews Arbeiterzeitung (Vienna), 26 Arbejdernes Faellesorganisations Braendselfortning AJS, 199 Armand, Inessa, 158 Armed uprising, H. on, 91-92, 97-98 Armenia and Armenians, 9, 128, 133-4, 146 Asia, 105 ‘Asiatic* and ‘Russian’, 54 Assassination plot against H., 275 Auer, Ignas, 40, 45, 153 Aufbau und Wiedergutmachung, 270-1 Aurora (factory), 259 Aus der Weltpolitik, 68-69, 107, 127; cited, 35, 37, 43, 47, 60 Austria and Austria-Hungary, 5, 132,

156, 217, 220, 234, 260; activities against Tsarist Empire, 133, 135, 142, 175; constitution, 6,; naturali zation attempt by H. in, 26-27; passports, 52-53, 95, 2 17 ; Russian revolution, effect, 10 1, 235-6; social ists, 26, 125, 14 1, 212, 222, 239; un published documents, cited, 133 Auswartiges Amt, see Germany: Foreign Ministry Autocracy, 6, 61 Avant-garde mission of Russian proletariat, 6 4 ,110 Avanti, 143 Avdeev, N., cited, 221 Axelrod, Pavel Borisovich, 14, 20, 55-56, 6 1-6 2,83, 161 Baake, K ., 194 Babel, Isaac, 10 Baden, Prince M ax von, 258 Baier: see Moor, K arl Baku, 147 Bakunin, M. A., 6, 96 Balabanoff, Angelica, 20 Balkans, 138, 140, 15 1, 2 14 ; federation proposed, 127; Helphand’s travels in, 128, 148, 15 5 ; Turkish influence declining, 5, 12 5 -7 ; Ukrainians’ mission, 133-4 ; wars, 128 Baltic Sea, 206 Baltic works, 147 Balzac, Honors de, 272 Banco di Roma, 272 Banishment to Siberia: see Siberia Banks, threatened withdrawal of deposits, 89-90; nationalization, 118-20, 250-1 ‘Barfuss, Dr.’ (nickname for H.), 34 Barmen, 238, 240 Basle University, 16-19, 21, 74 Basok-Melenevski, M arian: see Melenevski Bauer, Gustav, 213, 215, 223 Baumeister, Albert, 194

292

Index

Bavaria, 55-56, 58-59; agreement with Centre Party, 43-44; budget, 28-30; censorship, 17 0 -1; Crown Prince, 234; Helphand, and citizenship, 27; H .’s residence in (see also Munich), 48, 58; socialists, 22, 28-30, 43-44 Bebel, August, 39, 43-44, 74, 109, 115 , 12 1, i53> 17 3 ; quoted, 3 1, 36-37, 118 ; on H., 37, 40, 44, 46; at Lubeck congress, 46, 48; and Gorki affair, 124 Beer, Max, 270 Belinski, V. G., 14 Berchtold, Count von, 133 Berezino, H ’s birthplace, 7; family move to Odessa after fire, 7, 55 Bergen, Diego von, 184, 212, 2 31-2 , 235, 240, 248, 253 Berlin, H. moves to (1891), 23; expelled from (1893), 25-26; Trotsky leaves (1907), 109; expulsion order against H. withdrawn, 152-4; H .’s residence in, 193; publishing house transferred to (1916), 194; H .’s visits to, 2 11- 2 , 219, 233, 235, 248, 262-3, 266-7; police force chief, 32 Berlin School of Politics, 272 Berliner Tageblatt, 1 Berne, 16, 156, 209, 229, 261 Berne copyright convention (1886), 69 Berner Tagwacht, 203 Bernstein, Eduard, 35, 118 , 12 1, 231, 270; on participation in elections, 27-28; articles on ‘Problems of Socialism’, 37-38; H .’s attacks on, 38-43, 45, 48, 5 1, 154, 174; Kautsky’s alliance with, 153 Bernstorff, Count, 272 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 2, 143, 169, 183-4,209 Bickel (public prosecutor), 261 Bismarck, Prince, 5, 21, 28, 37 Black Hundreds organization, 98 Black Sea, 9-10, 15, 69, 134, 136, 147, 206 Blagoev, Dimitar, 140 ‘Bloody Sunday’ (1905), 75-76, 180, 188 Bodensee, 266 Bohemia, 108 Bohm-Bawerk, E., 23 Bolsheviks: Accused of treasonable activities after Ju ly 1917 rising, 225-32 Acquisition of power by proletariat, attitude to, 79-80 Dictatorship, and, 120

Helphand and, 79-81, 147-9, x57> 178, 18 1, 209, 216-20, 222-5, 249, 268, 28 0-1; his campaign against (1918), 250-6; relations with, 256; suspected Bolshevik agent, 261-2 K ey place in revolutionary plans, 148-8, 157 Leader: see Lenin Party funds, 163, 218-9, 2 3 1; Gorki royalties for: see under Gorki Policy, 79-81, 83-84, 88, 207 Pro-German group, 246 Provisional Government, and, 220, 225, 227-8, 230-3 Revolution (1905), and, 91, 122 Revolution (November 1917), seize power, 234-45 (see a^so under Revo lutions) Split with Mensheviks (1903), 59-62, 6 5 ,12 2 ,13 7 ,14 7 ,15 8 Stockholm Foreign Mission: see under Stockholm Underground organization, 159, 181, 226 Bonn, M. J ., 269, 272-4 Borbjerg, F., 2 13 -5 , 2 2 1-3 Bote der russischen Revolution, 219, 228 Bourgeoisie, H .’s attitude to, 17, 19, 21, 24, 44-45, 74, 76-79, 114 , 193; Trotsky’s attacks on, 68; clash with workers’ movement, 87-88; Haenisch and, 102 Bracht, 2 75 Branting, Hjalmar, 213 Breslau congress (1895), 32 Brest-Litovsk, treaty of, 243-4, 248-g, 252-3 Breuer, Robert, 269 Britain: see Great Britain Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count von, 19 0 -1, !95> 215, 224, 2 3 1-2 , 240, 244, 2489, 253, 272; biographical, 166; on H., 15 2 ,18 3 -4 ; meetings with H., 166-8, 179-81, 189, 199, 2 0 7 -11, 217, 238; H .’s memorandum to (1915), 181-4, memorandum to Chancellor, 183-7 > and Danish coal business, 199, 201-4; and peace with Russia, 207-9, 2 1 1 12 Bronstein, Lev Davidovich: see Trotsky Browder, R . P., cited, 226-7 Brupbacher, F., cited, 17 Brusilov, General A. A., 224 Bucharest, 137, 141 148, 152, 155 Bucher, Professor Karl, 16, 18 Buchspan, 181

Index

Budget, socialists and support for, 28-30 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich, 16 1-2 , 180 Bulgaria, 57, 130-3, 135, 148, 198, 257; socialists, 126-7, 13 1, 139-40, 222; H. visits, 139-41 Billow, Bernhard von, 10 1, 103, 112 Burckhardt, Jacob, 16 Bureaucracy, 6, 77, 119 Burtsev, V ., 123, 225 Bussche-Haddenhausen, von dem, 138-9,

Cafe Victoria, 194 Capital market, 118 Capitalist system, automatic ‘breakdown’ theory, 34, 38, 42, 114 , 17 3; Bern stein’s views, 38, 4 1; development of, 66, 75, 78, n o ; economic order, 104-5, I I 3~4> Helphand as capital ist, 204; international implications, 85, i n ; social revolution and, 45, 64, 85, 117 , 13 1, 2 15 ; socialists and, 19, 119 ; wars, and, 63, 104, 114 Cartels, 113 Casanova, 107 Casement, Roger, 230 Caucasus and Caucasians, 135, 140, 146, 207 Censorship, military, 17 1-2 Central Powers, 130, 132, 136, 149, 242-3 Chauvinism, German, 13 1, 150, 158, 178, 222; H. as chauvinist, 2, 140, 150, i 55~^ j 228, 279; ‘revolutionary’, 252; Scandinavian, 222 Cheidse, 221 Cheka, 250 Chemnitzer Volkstimme, 113 , 170 Chernyshevski, N. G., 10, 96 Chesnais, P. G., cited, 199 Chicherin, G., 261 China, 115 , 254 Chudnovski, Georgi, 160 Ciano, Count, 72 Citizenship, H .’s search for a ‘fatherland’, 26-27, 154, 19 2-3; becomes Prussian citizen (1916), 27, 192-4, 212, 241 Civil wars, 77, 91, 157, 259 Class struggle, 67, 77-80, 85, 88, 10 1, 1 1 2 ; H .’s views, 28, 36, 43-44, 63, 7 7 -8 0 ,8 5 ,114 Class Struggle o f the Proletariat, The (19 11), 113 - 16 , 118 Clever Mechanics, 12 Coal trade, with Denmark, 199-205, 233, 256; with Russia, 256 M .R .-U

293

Cohen-Reuss, 233 Cohn, Louis, 171 Colonial Policy and the Breakdown, 104-5 Colonialism, 1 o 1, 104-5, 113 Communist Manifesto (1848), 12-14 , 39 Communist parties, 1 1 5 Constantinople, H .’s stay in (19 10 -19 15 ), 15,126-44, 155,196, 279-80 Constitutional democracy, 67 Co-operatives, 1 1 1 Copenhagen, 4, 15, 152, 159, 222-3, 2 42“ 4, 248; H. moves to (1915), 160-5; research institute, 160-2, 164, 194-6, 204,209,227; company setup, 164-5, 2 2 1; H .’s revolutionary-business activities in, 178-80, 186, 189, 19 1, I 94- 9J 207. 2 1 4. 2 1 9. 226i H .’s residence, 193, 2 14 ; German party leaders’ visit, 2 13 -7 Copyright, 69, 127 Corn, H .’s dealings in, 128, 132 Cossacks, 98, 146 Coup d’Stat, possible reactionary, 35 Crimean War, 5 Cross Prison, 95-96 Cunow, Heinrich, 175-6, 194, 272 Currency, forged, 183; reform, 273 Customs barriers, 104-5, I!l3 Czech socialists, 222 Czecho-Slovakia, 262 Czernin, Count O., 234-5, 241, 251-2 Daily M ail, 256 Daily Telegraph, 261 Dandl, von, 259 Danielson, Nikolai, 12 David, Eduard, 3 1, 42, 154-5, 223 Dawes plan, 273 Denmark (see also Copenhagen), 196205, coal business, 199-205, 233, 256; economic espionage in, 197; economic ties with Britain, 198-9, 202; Helphand’s activities in: see under Copenhagen; neutrality, 204; socialists, 198, 203, 242; trade unions, 198-202, 233 Deutsch, Lev, 14, 20, 91, 94, 98-99 Deutscher, I., cited, 64 Dickstein, S., 12 Dictatorship, 2, 75, 79, 1 1 1 , 120, 251 Dietz, H. (publisher), 54. 57 ‘Dirty hands’ reference, 246 Dnieper region, 10 Do devyatovo Tanvarya (Trotsky), 66; H .’s introduction to, 76-79

294

Index

Dobrogeanu-Gherea: see Gherea Dobrudja, 57, 126 Donets basin, 147, 168 Dorpat University, 16 Dortmund, 102, 103, 112 Dortmunder Arbeiterzeitung, 102-3 Dresden, 26,32-40,51,68,107-8,238,240 Dresden congress (1903), 37, 44 Diinaburg, 183 Diisseldorf, 103 Dutch: see Netherlands Dvorak, Albrecht, 126 Dynamite invented, 5 Ebert, Friedrich, 153, 155, 2 13-5, 223, 237, 239-40, 243, 255,263, 273 Economics newspaper, 271-5 Economy, periodic crises, 38, 41, 63, 113 , 116 ; socialist programme, 118 -2 0 ; war and competition, 131 Ehrenburg, Ilya, 73 Ehrlich, 223 Eichhorn, Emil, 32 Eight-hour day, 36-37, 78, 84-85, 87, 93, 207 Elections, non-participation in, 27-28, 8b, 116 ‘Elefant, Dr.’ (nickname for H.), 23 Emancipation of Labour Group, 14, 25 Engels, Friedrich, 22, 24, 27, 31-32 , 39, 45>79,H7

England: see Great Britain Entente Powers; see Allied Powers Enver Pasha, 136 Erhardt, 46 Ermanski, 81 Erzberger, Matthias, 220, 243 Europe: America and, 24-25, 257 Germany, possible effect of victory, 249-50, 257-8; hegemony in, 176, 249-50 Position in 1867, 5-6 Proletariat, 1 1 0 - 1 1 Reconstruction, 270-1 Russia’s position in, 24-25; revolution and, 84-85,101 Russo-Japanese War, effect, 62-63 Socialists, 19-20, 34, 60, 88, 117 , 152-3, 159, 168-9, U 3 ,2 i4 , 281 Trading policy, 41 -42 Unification, 42, 105, 271 Western, 13, 19-20 Exhibitions, world, 54 Export-import enterprise, 164-5, I 9I, 221

Falkenhayn, General Erich von, 150 Family, H. on the, 7 3 - 7 4 Famines, Russian, 24-25,52, 54-55 Far East, 41 Feature-agency, 68, 113 , 127 Femekreis, 275 Finland, 81, 146-7, 222, 228, 230, 239, 246, 250 First World War (and mentioned passim): German documents on, 3 Germany’s position and policy, 230-41, 170, 190; possible effects of victory, 178, 249-50, 257-8; offensive (1918), 253; collapse, 257-9 Helphand, foretells, 13 0 -1; subversive activities, 128-69,179-91, 280 Peace offensive: see Peace Reduced to one-front engagement, 253 Russia and, 108, 170, 179, 18 1-3, 187, 206-7, 2 0 9 -11; military offensive, 224; separate peace: see under Peace Social consequences, 194-5 Fischer, F., cited, 169, 254 Fischer, Richard, 46 Fisher, H. H., cited, 181 Fleer, N. G., cited, 188 ‘For Democracy—Against Tsarism’, 130, r34

Foreign policy, socialist, 104-5, IQ8 France, 15, 136, 150, 208, 249, 2 70 -1; and Germany, 5, 274; loans to Rus sia, 54; socialists, 20, 239 Franco-German War, 208 Frankfurt congress (1894), 29, 31 Frankfurter Zeitung, 16 Free trade, 41-42, 105 Freightage agency, 200-1 Frenkel, Eugenii, 90 Frohme, 40 Fiirstenberg, Prince Emil von, 241-2, 251-2 Fiirstenberg, Jakob (Hanecki or Kuba), 17 8 ,18 0 ,2 10 ,2 16 -7 ,2 19 ,2 3 5 ,2 3 8 -9 , 246-7; biographical, 162-3; head of Soviet National Bank, 165; managing director of trading company, 196-7, 2 2 1; relationship with H., 225-9 Futrell, M., cited, 181 Galata bridge, 12 7 Gankin, O. H., cited, 181 Gatchina Castle, 53 Gazette de Lausanne, 256 Geneva, 19, 55,67, 76, 137 Georgia and Georgians, 133-4, J 4^

Index

Gera, 47 Gerasimovich, Arshak, 160 German language, 19 Germ any: Agrarian agitation, 3 1-3 2 , 34, 38, 56, 172-3 Army, newspaper, 194; creation of new, 263; officers’ corps, 263 Catholic Church, 21 Centre party, 10 1, 103, 243, 273 Citizenship for Helphand: see Citizen ship Coal trade, with Denmark, 199-205; with Sweden and other neutral countries, 203 Colonial policy, 10 1, 104-5 Constitution, 6 Currency reform, 2 73 Eastern policy, 2, 169, 184-6, 213, 218 Economy, 38, 41 Elections, 101-4, 259 Europe, position in : see under Europe First World War, and, 130-41, 170, 174, 178, 190, 249-50, 253, 257-9 Foreign Ministry, H. and, 2, 137, 14553; archives, 2-3, documents, 3, 132 France, and, 5, 274 General Staff, 191, 196-7, 210, 241 Helphand, his attitude to, 19-21, 1535, 192; moves to (1891), 2 1; activi ties in, 21 -48 ; expulsion from Berlin and Prussia (1893), 25-27, 7 1; ex pelled from Saxony (1898), 47, 51, 68, 7 1 ; from Gera, 47 ; in Munich, 54-59; illegal visits, 82, 102, 1 1 3 ; his return to, after escape from Russia (1906), 100, 102, 1 0 7 ,111—1 3 ; leaves (1910), 124; Prussian expul sion order withdrawn (1915), 152; issued with police pass, 152; returns to Berlin, 143, 145, 154-5, 168-9, 184; audience in Foreign Ministry, 137, 145-53; co-operation with diplomats, 145-53, 159, 163, 167, 172, 224, 237, 240, 248-50; adviser to German government, 152; Prus sian citizenship (1916), 27, 192-4, 212, 241; as propagandist for, 144; connexions with government, 2; later visits to Berlin: see under Berlin Naval Staff, 197 Parliament, 114, 259 Reichstag: see Reichstag Republican parties, 271, 272

295

Revolution (19 18 ): see under Revolu tions Rumania and, 138 Russia, relations with, 3, 137, 145-7, 15 0 - 1: suggested alliance with, 105; promised loan, 243; German econo mic penetration, 253-4, 256; treaty with (1922), 273; trade with, 164-5,

7 - 8

Russian revolution (1905), and, 10 1-2 , 112 Russian revolution (1917), and, 20815, 221, 224-6, 233, 235-45, 249-50 ‘Sealed train’ journey across: see under Lenin Social Democrat party: see Social Democrat party, German Unification under Bismarck, 5 Wars, and, 63 Weimar Republic: see that title Gherea, Dobrogeanu-, 137-8 Gleicheit, 23 Glocke, Die , founded (1915), 168-72, 176 9; Lenin’s criticism of, 178-9, 229; contributors, 194, 269; H. resumes as publisher (1920), 270, 272, 275; ceases publication (1925), 276; quot ed or cited, 33, 71, 73, 130, 132, 136, 206, 222, 258, 261, 263-4, 266 Gnedin, Ievgenii (alleged son of Helphand), 72-73 Goebbels, Josef, 1, 2 Gold, use for payments, 89-90 Goldberg, 220 Goldenberg, J . P., 223 Goldman, Boris, 90 Golos (later Nashe Slow, q.v.), 135, 148 Golos Sotsialdemokrata, 1 1 2 Gorin, P., cited, 90-91 Gorki, Maxim, 6 9 -71; H .’s agreement regarding royal ties on play The Lower Depths, 7 0 -7 1; scandal over unpaid royalties, 122-4, *53-4:9 *94? 220 Gotha congress (1875), 21, 74; (1896),

36-37

Gradnauer, Georg, 32, 268, 276-7 Grain trade, H .’s dealings in, 15, 132 Great Britain, 15, 63, 105, 197; and First World War, 15 0 -1, 224; anti-British campaign, 176; trade ties with Den mark, 198-9, 202 Great War :see First World War Grebing, H., cited, 165 Greeks, 9, 128 Greulich, Hermann, 160

296

Index

Grimm, Robert, 203 Groman, Ekaterina, 157, 160 Guarda, Lago di, 104, 106 Haase, Hugo, 153-4, 240-1 Habsburgs, 129, 132 Haenisch, Konrad, 82, 102-3, I2 Is I 54~5, 175-7, 194, 268, 270; biographical, 102; defence of H., 264-5; eulogy of H., 1 ; cited or quoted, 82, 124-5, 128, 132 Haguenin, Professor, 271 Hahlweg, W., cited, 3 Haidamaki, 10, 17 Halle, 29 Hamburg- Amerika line, 220-1, 272 Hamburger Echo, 170 Handels og-Eksportkompagniet, 196-8 Hanecki: see Fiirstenberg, Jakob Hankiewicz, Dr. Leo, 133, 135 Hanover congress (1899), 118 Harden, Maximilian, 128, 255, 263, 265 Havel, river, 1, 266 Hebrew language, 7 Heilmann, Ernst, 175-6, 258 Heine, Wolfgang, 40, 46-47 Heinze, Consul, cited, 133 Helfand, Leon (alleged son of Helphand),

72-73

Helfferich, Karl, 2, 184, 203 HELPHAND, Alexander Israel (Parvus) {see also subject headings throughout the index), birth at Berezino (1867), 5, 7-8; original names Israel Laza revich, 7; adopts name of Alexander, 8; descent and early life, 7—1 1 ; family moves to Odessa after fire, 9 -10 ; abroad for first time (1886), 1 1 - 1 2 ; leaves Russia (1887), 14; wandering life abroad, 14-26; re visits Russia after twelve years (1899), 14, 52-55, 7 1; first meeting with Lenin, 56; first meeting with Trot sky, 64; short illegal visit to Russia (1902), 69; in Russia (1905), 70-72, 81-83, 90-99; arrested and banished to Siberia (1906), 93-99, 103, 107; escapes from Russia, 94,99-100,107; returns to Germany (1906-1910), 102, 107, 1 1 1 —13 ; moves to Vienna (1910), 124-6; in Turkey (ig io 1915), 126-44, 155; returns to Berlin (1915)* j 43 j 145-53; meeting with Lenin, 157-9; in Copenhagen, 1608; offers services to Soviet govern

ment, 239; seeks Lenin’s permission to return to Russia, 239, 245-7; re quest refused, 246-7; voluntary exile in Switzerland (1918), 259-65; ex pelled from Switzerland (1920), 2666; returns to Berlin, 266-9; death (1924), 1, 245, 275; funeral, 276-7 Appearance, 23, 157 Assassination plot, 275 Business (see also Fortune, below), 15, 68-71, 196-205, 256, 259, 280-1; charges against his integrity, 70-71, 124, 277; Gorki royalties affair: see under Gorki Character, 66-67, 70-74, 86, 92, 155-7, 204-5, 259; sketch, 276-81 Children, 4, 71-73, 106, 193; H .’s atti tude to, 103 Citizenship: see that title Critical articles about him in European press, 256-7 ‘Dirty hands’ reference (Lenin), 246 Education, 1 0 - n , 16-19 Enigma of his life, 2-4 Family life, 68, 71-74, 193 Fortune, 127-9, 132, H 3, 178, i 93~4> 196-205, 259, 266, 280-1; early de sire for riches, 66, 68; German pay ment to, 152, 155; legendary, 153, 157; tax payments, 198; size, 260; position after his death, 276 Friends, attitude to his, 70-71, 12 1, 154,279

Germany, activities in: see under Ger many Health, rheumatism, 223, 256, 275; failing, 275 ‘Intellectual partnership’ with Trotsky, 64, 67, h i , 278 Jewish background, 8 - 11, 14 -15 , 65 Journalist, as: ^ Jo u rn alist Leader of men, failure as, 92, 12 1, 279 Marriages, 7 1,10 6 , 2 75 Munich police chief’s report on, 58-59 Nicknames, ‘The Seal’, 20; ‘Dr. Elefant’, 23; ‘The Russian’ and ‘Dr. Barfuss’, 34 Obituaries, 1-2 Papers, search for, 4; probable destruc tion, 4, 275-6 Parents, 8-9, 55, 117 Personal and political reformation, Radek’s statement refuted, 245-6 ‘Politically deceased’ (Trotsky, 1915)*

155-6.173

Index

Private life, 68, 71-74, 106, 156-7, 166, i93>265-6, 268-9, 275, 277 Pseudonyms, ‘Ignatieff’ and ‘I. H .’, 23; ‘Unus’, 28; ‘Parvus’, 29; ‘August Pen’, 52; ‘K arl Wawerk’, 95; ‘Peter Klein’, 102-3 Revolutionary faith, 1 1 - 1 3 , 19-20, 93, 107, 152 ; obsessed with idea of revo lution, 34-35, 39, 43> 48>74 Russia, and: see under Russia Russian identity, 15, 19, 2 1, 51 Secretiveness, desire for, 4 Self-confidence, 92, 129 Sons, 4, 7 1—73, 106, 193 Subversive activities (see also under countries concerned), 3, 130-69, 179, 18 1, 183-4, i 88_9i > 280; March (1915) memorandum, 145, 15 1, 159, 186, 205; adviser to German govern ment, 152 ; reply to charges, 174-5 Theorist, as, 41-42, 64, 92, 106, 113 , 1 1 7

‘Utopian and revolutionary dreamer’ (Helfferich), 203 Women, relations with, 106, 156-7, 16 6 ,19 3 ,2 6 5 ,2 7 5 ,2 7 7 Written works (see also their titles), 4; differences with publishers, 48; col lected editions, 86-87; completes two studies on ideology of socialism (1910), 113 , 117 , 12 0 - 1; as writer, 277-9 (see a fooJournalist, H. as) Helphand, Lazarus (‘Zhenya’) (son), 71-72 Helphand, Tanya (first wife), 71 Herding, Count von, 234 Herzen, Alexander, 6, 12 - 13 , 159, 170 Hesnard, Professor, 271 Hessen, Grossherzog von, 150 Heuss, Theodor, 270, 272 Hilferding, Rudolf, 104 Hill, E., cited, 57 Hindenburg, Field-Marshal Paul von, 3 Hintze, Admiral, 254-5 Historical development, and revolution, 79, 114 , 116 , 118 Hitler, Adolf, 1, 2, 2 31, 249 Hoglund, Zeth, 16 1-2 Holiday home for German children, 204 Holstein, 166 Holy War on Russia, 146 Hours of work, 36-37 (see also Eight-hour day) Huldermann, B., 200-1 Hiilsen, Captain von, 230

297

Humanity 195, 227 Hungary, 322 Hungernde Russland, Das, 9, 14, 52, 54-55,

57 ‘I. H .’ (pseudonym of H.), 23 ‘Ignatieff’ (pseudonym ofH .), 23 Im Kam pf um die Wahrheit (1918), 3-4, 256-7; cited or quoted, 4, 10 -15 , 2 1, passim Imperialism, 104-5, IJ4 In der russischen Bastille, 94-97, 107-8 Individual, rights of the, 119 -20 Institute for the Study of the Social Con sequences of the War (Copenhagen), 160-2, 164, 194-6, 204, 209, 227 Intelligentsia, Russian, 10 -13 , 19 ,2 1, 95; socialist, 22 International, Second, 1, 2, 129, 156; congresses (1889), 36; (1896), 50 -51, 257; (1903)? 65i collapse, 130 Internationale Korrespondenz, 139, 194, 258 Iskra, 56-59, 61-62, 64-65, 84, 87, 133 Italy, 5, 143; H .’s holidays in, 104, 106, 12 3; socialists, 20 Izvestia, 90 I zone, 2 5 1,2 5 3 ,2 5 5 Jackh, Ernst, 272, 274 Jagow , Gottlieb von, 145, 190, 2 1 1 - 1 2 Jansson, Wilhelm, 175-6, 203, 2 12 - 13 Japan, 62-63, 105,254 Jaures, Jean , 35 Jews, 128, 148, 195, 265; antisemitism, 7, 46; H .’s Jewish background, 8 - 1 1 , 14 -15 , 65; pogroms, 7, 14 ; in Rus sia, 6-10, 23; socialist Bund, 143, 147 Journalist, Helphand as, 23-40, 48, 8 384, 103, 107, 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 124, 126, 128, 130, 13 2 ; editorships, 30-32, 47, 5 1 ; writes for Russian press, 58; featureagency, 68; founds Die Glocke (19 15), 168-72, 176 -7; purchases Internation ale Korrespondenz (q.v.), 194; return to journalism (1920), 270; new economics newspaper, 2 7 1-5 Jugoslavia, 262 Kaden (publisher), 108 Kaiserhof, Hotel (Berlin), 193, 266, 271 Kam a, river, 54 Karakozov, D., 6 K arski: see Marchlewski, Julian Kasparov, 158 Katkov, G., cited, 3

298

Index

Kautsky, Karl, 28, 3 1, 35, 38-40, 74, 115 -16 , 124, 14 1, 153, 170, i73“ 4> 176; biographical, 22-23; H .’s re lations with, 22-23, 26-27, 45-48, 73, 107, 177, 263-4; and Lenin, 6 162; help for H .’s wife, 7 1; Rosa Luxemburg and, 98, 1 1 5 ; and 1 rotsky, 108-9 Kazan, 54 Kerensky, A. F., 221, 225-7, 229, 232-3, 236 Kessler, Count Harry, cited, 2 71 Khitraya Mekhanika , 12 Kiderlen-Wachter, A. von, 190 Kiefer, Karl, 198-9 Kiev, 14 ,8 1 Kievskaya M y si, 126 Kirkov, Georgi, 140 Klassenkampf des Proletariats, D er (19 11), 1 1 3 - 1 6 ,1 1 8 Klein, Peter (pseudonym of H.), 102-3 Klingsland, Fabian (Petrograd firm), 197-8 Kebenhaven, 256 Kebenhavns Befragtnings-og Trartsport-Kompagniet, 200 Kollontay, Alexandra, 1 8 1,2 2 5 -6

Koln congress (1893), 36 Kolokol, 170 Kon, Feliks, cited, 11 Korrespondenz Prawda, 219, 227-8 Kovno, 53 Kozak, Professor, 18 Kozlovsky, 163, 180, 221, 225-6, 246 Krasnoyarsk, 99 Kreuzzeitung , 1 Krull, 275 Krupp concern, 128 Krupskaya, N. K ., 57, 59, 71, 158, 209 Kruse, Alfred, 16 1,18 1 Krustalev-Nostar, G., 84, 89 K u b a : see Fiirstenberg, Jakob Kuban cossacks, 146 Kuhlmann, R . von, 2, 230-1, 240, 243-4,

254

Kundert, Fritz, 29 Labour, division of, H .’s thesis on, 18 Ladyzhnikov, I. P., 122-3 Land rents, 41 Languages, 7, 9 Langwerth von Simmern, Baron, 184, l 97> i 99>207 Larsen, Professor Karl, 195 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 44-45,67, 74

Lassallians, 21 Lavrov, P. L., 25 Legien, Carl, 223 Lehmann, Dr. C., 9, 1 4 , 52-55, 5 7 , 7 1 Leipzig, 26, 30-32, 56; H .’s illegal visit (1905), 82 Leifiziger Volkszeitung, 30-32, 38, 82, 102, 170, 175, 266; cited, 32, 36, 114 ‘Leman, Dr.’, 57 (see Lehmann, Dr. C.) Lenin, V . I., 55-62, 67, 71, 75, 79-80, 105, 150, 16 1-3 , 224; in Siberia, 48, 57, 94; and H .’s works, 48, 57; first meetings with H., 56-57; corres pondence from Russia sent to ad dresses of German socialists, 57; leader of Bolsheviks, 3, 122, 142, 147-8, 162, 216, 218 ; campaign to capture party control, 59-62; and Trotsky, 65, 108; returns to Russia (1905), 82-83, 86, 93-94; and Gorki affair, 122-4; H .’s meeting with (i9i5)> 157—9; lack of money, 165, 18 1, 2 2 1; criticism o f Die Glocke, 1789, 229; transit across Germany (‘sealed train’, 1917), 2, 20 9 -11, 2 16 ; in Stockholm, 2 15 -6 ; relations with H., 216 -7, 228-9, 232, 247, 280; journey to Petrograd, 2 17 ; treason charges after Ju ly rising (1917)? 225-30; goes into hiding, 226, 228; Soviet government, 236-8, 244-5, 2 5 0 -1; request from H. for permis sion to return to Russia, 239, 245-6; Lenin’s reply (‘dirty hands’ refer ence), 246-8,253 Leninskii Sbornik, cited, 16 1, 210, 247 Lensch, Paul, 82, 102, 155, 175-6, 194 ‘Letters to the German Workers’, 262 Liberals, 44-45, 60, 63, 67-68, 75, 83-85, 87-88 Liebknecht, Karl, 115 , 140, 154, 170, 173,228 Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 2 1, 25, 27, 33-34? 39-40, 192 Liman von Sanders, General, 136 Listok Pravda , 226 Lithuania and Lithuanians, 7, 147 Litwak, A., cited, 156 Locarno treaty, 2 73 London, H. in (1896), 50-51, 257; Jews, 7; Second International congresses, 5°~ 5i , 65,257 London School of Economics, 272 Liibeck congress (1901), 45-49, 68 Lubersac, Marquis de, 2 74

Index

Lucius von Stodten, 203, 253 Ludendorff, General Erich von, 2, 3, 202,

234

Ludwigshafen, 4.6 Lunacharsky, A. V ., 155 Luther, Martin, 47 Luxemburg, Rosa, 2 0 -2 1, 35, 46-47, 98, 10 2 ,10 4 , 115 - 16 , 126, 140, 156, 17 3; H .’s relations with, 26, 43, 47, 50, 106, 108, 12 0 -1, 126, 15 4 ,2 5 1,2 6 7 ; articles in press, 3 2 -3 3 ; and Lenin, 57, 62, 2 5 1; break with party, 15 3; quoted, 33-34, 98, 177-8 Lvov, 132 Madsen, K arl, 199 Mahno, 2 15 -16 Marchlewski, Dr. Julian (Karski), 20-21, 26, 32, 47, 58; biographical, 69; titular head of publishing house, 68-71, 82, 1 2 1 ,1 2 3 Marienbad, 223-34, 275 Marinescu, Dimitru, 137-8 Marne offensive, 150 Marriage, Russian students’ attitude to, 17 Martov, J . , 48, 55, 6 1, 82-84, 112 , 142, 15 5 ; cited, 5 7 ,16 0 - 1 M arx, K arl, 38, 45, 117 , 173, 278; Com munist M anifesto , 12 -14 , 39; D as K apital , 5, 12 ; forecast of periodic economic crises, 38 ,4 1 Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 8 1, 142 Marxism and Marxists, 28, 3 1, 34, 38, 4 1-4 2, 48, 74, 10 1, 109, 117 , 139, 17 1, 236; H. and, 16 -18 , 2 1, 25, 34, 43, 64, 278; publishing house for literature, 12 2 ; revisionism: see that title; revolutionary doctrine, 48, 64, 78-79; Russian Marxism, 12 -14 , 25, 50, 56; Trotsky and, 65 Mass strike, political: see Strike Matin^ 2 56 M ay Day parade, 59 Mayer, Gustav, 220 Mehring, Franz, 102, 140, 153, 177 M eine Antwort an Kerenski und Co., 229, 232-3 Melenevski, Marian Basok-, 13 3 -5 , 156, l 75

Melgunov, P. S., cited, 13 5 ,18 0 , 239 Mensheviks, 79-80, 83-84, 87-88, 143, 16 0 -1, 18 1, 223; H. and, 79, 80, 1 1 2 ; split with Bolsheviks, 59-62, 65, 122, 137, 147, 158; Trotsky and, 65, 6768, 76

299

Mercedes (firm), 272 M e zhrayontsy, 180 Michahelles, von, 141 Middle class, 67-68, 74, 7 7 - 7 9 , 85, 8788, 110 , 174; parties, 44-45, 101 Mikhailovski, N. K ., 10 Military vehicles, export of, 259 Mill, Jo h n S ., 10, 18 Milyukov, P. N., 225 Minsk province, 7 Mittag, Freiherr von, 133 Money, and political power, 128-9, 281 Monopolies, 113 , 117 Moor, K arl, 220, 231 Moscow, 139, 179, 188; police chief’s re port on strikes (1899), 5 1 ; H. in, 5 3 - 55; strikes and unrest (1905), 89, 91-92, 122 Moslems, 146 Motteler, G., 87 Mudie, D., cited, 57 Muller, Adolf, 17 1, 206-7, 233, 261, 265 Muller, Hermann, 223 Munchener Post, 171 Munich, 82, 12 3 ; H. in, 26, 48, 5 1-5 2 , 54- 59, 64-71, 76, n o , 113 , 17 0 -1, 194, 259; police chief’s report on H ., 58-59; Trotsky in, 64-68, 76, n o Munich Polytechnic, 220 Munich University, 58 Muraviev, Rear-Admiral, 188 Mursikha, 54 M u zh iki, 88, 99 ‘ M y Reply to Kerensky and Co.*, 229, 232-3 Nachalo, 84, 88, 90

Nadolny, R ., 2 Narodnaia Volya, 1 1 , 17, 20 N arodniki, 2 5 N ash Golos, 90 Nashe Slovo (earlier Golos, q.v.), 142, 148,

155, 180, 227 Nationalism, 134, 145-6 Nationalization, 118 -9 , 120, 251 Naturalization, H .’s search for: see Citi zenship Naumann, Victor, 233-4 Nazis, 1, 249, 265 Near East, 12 6 -7 ,14 3 Nestle firm, 225 Netherlands, 197, 222 Neue £ e it, 22-23, 26-29, 45-46, 48, 87, 107-8, 14 1, 170, 176; cited, 28-29, 3 1- 3 2 ,3 5 ,4 5 ,6 2 ,12 0

300

Index

Meue ^archer %eitung, 265

New York, Jews, 7 Nicholas II, Tsar, 75, 80, 82, 85, 89, 179, 184-5, 207; and separate peace, 1 5 1 2, 167, 18 1-2 , 185 Niekisch, Ernst, 270 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 16 Nicholas Nikolaevich, Grand Duke, 151 Nikolaev, 149, 188-9 Nikolaevski, B. I., cited, 44, 60-62, 112 Nizhni Novgorod, 54 Nobel, Alfred, 5 Northcliffe, Lord, 254 Norway, 203 Movaya Zhizn, 83, 90, 227 Move Vreme, 140 ‘November criminals’, 2, 265 Nye Bank, 226 Obukhov works, 147 Odessa, 9-10, 14 -15 , 65, 14 1, 148-9, 188, 219 Okhrana, 227 Ollenhauer, Erich, 270 ‘Opportunism in Practice’, 45,48-49 Opposition Parties, dissolution of, 120 Orenburg, 54 Orlovsky: see Vorovski, V . V. Otto, 195 ‘Pale’, The, 6-7, 9 Palestine, 7 Pallavicini, 133, 135-6 Paris, Russian exiles in, 155 ‘Parvulus’, 102, 177 (see Haenisch, Kon rad) Parvus (pseudonym of Alexander Israel HELPHAND, q.v.), 29 ‘Parvusists’, 81, 117 , 142 Passports, forged, 52-53, 55, 82, 95, 99, 2 17 ; Bulgarian, used by Lenin,

Peace, proposed separate peace with Russia, 150-2, 167-9, 18 1-2 , 185, 206-9, 2 1 1 , 2 13 -5 , 217-9, 236-9, 242-5; Reichstag resolution, 223; Brest-Litovsk negotiations and treaty (1918), 243-4, 248-9, 252-3, 280; H .’s publicity campaign to end the war, 258; Versailles treaty, 262, 272,

274

Peace conference, Socialist: see Socialist peace conference Peasants, 10 - 1 1 , 13 -14 , 24, 3 1, 34, 77, 89, 99> 207

Peasants’ Union, 89 ‘Pen, August’ (pseudonym of H.), 52 Perasich, Vladimir Davidovich, 160 Persia and Persians, 9, 254 Petrograd (earlier St. Petersburg, q.v.), 197-8, 248, 250, 253; revolution (19 1 7), 206-7, 209-10, 2 13 -14 , 2 17 22, 224-6, 229, 235-6, 239, 280 ‘Philistines About Me’, 71, 73 Piashev, N., cited, 220 Plekhanov, G. V ., 13 -15 , 20, 24-25, 48, 5°> 55"56>85,83, 140 Pobedonostsev, K ., 6 Pogroms, 7, 14 Poland and Poles, 7, 50, 69, 196, 213, 250, 262; exiles, 20-21, 16 1-3 ; independ ence, 140; social democrats, 147; students in Germany, 58; under ground workers, 220, 227-8 Political economy, 16, 18 Population, Minsk, 7 Populists, 12, 25,60 Possony, St. T., cited, 3 Poster company, 196 Potresov, A. N., 48, 50, 55-56; cited, 44, 6 0 -6 2 ,112 Pravda, 2 ,16 1,2 2 7 ,2 3 1,2 3 9 ,2 4 5 ‘Present Political Situation . . . ’, 92-93 Press (see also under names of news papers), relations with party, 33; publication of Russian socialist news paper abroad {Iskra> q.v.) (1900), 56-57; H .’s desire to found news paper, 68; feature-agency, 68-69, 127; first popular daily, 83; circula tions, 83; censorship dropped, 86; newspapers confiscated, 90; cam paign against Russia, 145, 147-8, 250—1 ; D ie Glocke (q.v.) founded (1915), 168-72; H .’s plan for ‘large scale organization’, 253-6; help from H., 269; newspaper on econo mics, 2 71-5 Preussische £ eitung, 264 Princip, Gavrilo, 129 Printing-press, illegal, 57 Prison life in Russia, 93-99, 107 Private ownership, 119 Progressive groups, 44 Proletariat, and acquisition of power, 65, 75~77j 79-8o, 87, n o , 2 5 1; arming, 206; avant-garde mission in world revolution, 64, n o ; class, and, 63, 79; international, 235, 239; organi zation, 36; position in state, 44, 66,

Index

1 1 9; social revolution, and, 45, 64, 67-68, 75-77, 84-85, 88, 102, h i , 114 - 15 , 172; voice of, 47 Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya , cited, 221 Protective tariffs, 104-5, 1 13 Provisional workers’ government, neces sity for, 76-80, 84, 117 Prussia (State), 2 1, 178; Helphand ex pelled from (1893), 25-27, 7 1; il legal visits to, 102, 1 1 3 ; expulsion order withdrawn (1915), 152 ; grant ed citizenship (1916), 27, 192-4, 212, 2 4 1; ‘Privy Councillors’, 37; Rakovsky expelled from, 126; suffrage issue and (1893), 27-28, 116 Pskov, 53 Publishing, H.'s publishing houses, 697 1, 82, 123, 17 1, 194, 256, 268, 276; attempts to set up house for Marxist literature in Berlin, 122; H .’s ex panding activities, 194-6; almanacks plan, 254-5,26 3-5 ‘Pundyk’ : see Sklarz, Heinrich Putilov works, 147, 189 Rabotnichesky Vestnik, 130

Radek, K arl, 20, 105, 2 15 , 2 17 , 252-3; biographical, 156; and H., 2, 156, 217, 227-8, 238-41, 245-8, 279; in Bolshevik bureau in Stockholm, 2 19 -2 1, 227-8, 235; puts H .’s re quest to return to Russia before Lenin, 239, 245-8, 253; ‘political harlequin’, 248 Rakovsky, Christo, 57, 126-7, 137-9, x55> 17 1, 246 Rantzau: see Brockdorff-Rantzau Rapallo treaty, 2 73 Rapaport, Charles, 20 Rathenau, Walter, 118 , 274 Rauscher, Ullrich, 268 Rech , 225 Reconstruction, 272-5 Red Cross, 52 ‘Red postmaster’, 87 Reichstag, 37, 4 1, 12 1, 17 5 ,2 4 1,2 4 3 ,2 7 4 ; peace resolution, 223; Social Demo crats in, 43-44, 112 , 2 2 1; vice-presi dency (1903), 43-44 Reichstag Elections and the Working Class,

103-4 Reinhardt, M ax, 70 Reparations, 270-1, 273-4 Reuss, Duchy of, 47 Reuter, Ernst, 270

301

Revisionism, 37-48, 57, 113 , 117 , 139, 170, 176 Revolution, H .’s views, 34-45, 48, 64-66, 76-81, iio- i i , 114 -19 , 132, 15 1- 3 , 157; historical process, as, 79, 114 , 116 , 118 ; offensive tactics, 37, 39, 116 ; permanent, 96, 1 1 0 - 1 1 ; Soviet appropriation for support in West ern Europe (1917), 250; Trotsky and, 65-68, 96, iio - i i ; war and, 62-64, 114 Revolutionary democracy, 80 Revolutions: European (1848), 44, 67, 77 German, not expected until end of war, 2i4-i5> 236, 244, 253, 258-9; out break (November 1918), 259, 262-3, 267, 280 Russian (1905), 70, 72, 75-100, 10 7-10 , 117 , 12 1, 146, 183 Russian (1917), 120, 206-28, 234-45, 249-50, 267, 281 Rheinland-Westfalen, 103 Rhine, 15 -16 , 31 Riezler, Dr. Kurt, 145, 240-1, 243-4, 248 Riga, 183 Roland-Holst, Henrietta, 35 Romberg, Gisbert Freiherr von, 19 1, 229 Rosenberg, Alfred, 2, 146, 265 Rossiya i revolyutsiya, 62-64, 67, 87, 92 Ruberrimus: see Heilmann, Ernst Ruhr, 102, 202, 273-4 Rumania, 126, 130-1, 137-9, 141, 148,

I55>257

Rus , 88

Rusanov, N. S., 25, 223 Ruskaya Gageta , 83 Russia {see also subject headings through out the index): Agriculture, area under cultivation, 224 Amnesty for political offenders (1905), 82 Anarchy, 208, 224 Army, low morale, 179-80, 224; propa ganda campaign in, 183-4, 219, 226; and revolution, 207-8; collapse likely, 236; Red Army, 251 Banking, threatened withdrawal of deposits, 89-90; State, 247, 250-1 Bolsheviks: see that title Coal, from Germany, 256 Constituent Assembly, 16 1, 207, 232 Constitutional system, 6, 75, 78, 80, 97 Europe, and, 24-25,84-85, 101

302

Index

Russia {continued): Exiles: see Russian exiles Famines, 24-25, 52, 54-55 Financial manifesto (1905), 89-90 French loans, 54 Germany, relations with, 3, 137, 145-7, 15 0 - 1; suggested alliance with, 105; promised loan, 243; German econo mic penetration, 253-4, 256; treaty with (1922), 273; trade with, 164-5, 1 9 7 - 8

Helphand, birth and early life in, 5, 714 ; leaves Russia (1887), 14; Rus sian identity, 15, 19, 2 1, 5 1 ; revisits after twelve years (1899), 14 > 52 -55> 7 1; short illegal visit (1902), 69; re turns to (1905), 70-72, 81-83, 90-99; fare paid from advance royalties, 82; leadership (with Trotsky) of workers’ movement, 83-93 » arrested and banished to Siberia (1906), 93-99, 103, 107; escapes from Russia, 94, 99-100, 107; possible later visits, 128; permission sought to return (1917)1 239, 245-7; request refused, 246-7 Je w ry : see Jews Land, 207, 232, 236 Military offensive against, possible, 207-8, 2 1 1 ,2 1 4 - 1 5 ,2 1 9 , 249 Money market, action against, 183-4 National Assembly, 236 Navy, 208 Occupation by Germans, proposed, 208 Parliament, 6, 77, 80, 85, 213 Press, H .’s plan, 254-6 Provisional government, 76-80, 84, 117 , 220, 225, 227-8, 230-3 Radicals, 6, 13 Reform, era of, 5-6 Revolutionary movement, 6-7, 25, 50-52, 56-60, 64-68, 137, 149, 1779 1; Germany and, 2, 167; H. ad viser to German Government, 152; money for, 180, 184, 186-7, i 9° j 198; organizations, 179-80, 182 Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 : see un der Revolutions Social Democrat party: see Social Democrat party, Russian Soviet Union, 2, 3 Soviets: see that title Strikes (1899), 5 1 ; (1905), 7<h 75> 81, 86-92, 182; planned for January 1916, 147, 149, 169, 179-81, 186;

failure described, 187-90, 198, 203 Students, in Switzerland, 16 -17 ; in Germany, 58-59 Subversive activities against, 3, 130-7, 1 45~89> l 75> l 77> i 79~9 }> 220, 226, 280; plan for direct military action against, 133-6 ; H .’s memorandum (March 1915), 145, 15 1, 159, 186, 205; H. adviser to German Govern ment, 152; money for, 152, 180, 1867, 220, 226, 229, 231-2, 235-6 Terrorism, 6, 53 Tsar: see Nicholas II Tsarism: see that title Underground agitators, 75, 86 University disturbances, 51-52, 59 World market and, 41 ‘Russia and the Revolution’ : see Rossiya i revolyutsiya

‘Russian, The’ (nickname for H.), 34 Russian exiles, 56-57, 64-65, 134, 155-6, 2 17 ; H. and, 19-20, 48-51, 55, 68, 112 , 14 1-2 , 16 0 -1, 164; some return to Russia, 52, 82-83, 86; differences among, 60-62, 80-81; attitude to revolution, 75, 206; extradition from Germany, 102, 1 1 2 ; in Siberia, 147; plans to facilitate flight to Euro pean Russia, 147; money for, 155, 157; recruitment of, 160-4, 194; transit through Germany, 2, 20912 ,2 15 - 16 Russian language, 7, 9 Russian Union of Sailors, 127, 148 Russian Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, 218, 222 Russo-Japanese War, 62-63, 149, 185 Ruthenes, 132 Ryazanov, D. B., 81, 14 1-3 ,18 0 Sachsische Arbeiterzeitung, 32-35,

38-40,

47~48>5 i >87> 232,267 St. Petersburg (later Petrograd, q.v.), 147, I 57? i 79_8 i j i 83> i 87-9; ‘bloody Sunday’ (1905), 75-76, 180, 188; Helphand in (1899), 53-54, (19056), 70-72, 81-83, 94-95, 98-99> 106; leadership (with Trotsky) of workers’ movement, 83-93; revolution (1905), 75~76> 83~95> io i> 1 4 2 ; strikes, 8586, 91, 147, 180, 188-9; student disturbances (1899), 5 l ~52> 59 Saints Peter and Paul Fortress, St. Peters burg, 53, 90, 96, 110 Salomon, Ernest von, cited, 2 75

Index

Saltykov, M. Y. (N. Schedrin), io- i i Samara province, 45 Sarajevo, 129 Saxony, 34; H. expelled from (1898), 47, 5 1, 7 1; breaches of expulsion, 82, 113 Scandinavia, 159-68, 18 1, 195, 19 8 ,2 12 , 219 -25, 233, 247, 259 Scavenius, Eric, 20 1-3 Schapiro, Leonard, cited, 60 Scharlau, Winfried, cited, 79 Schedrin, N .: see Saltykov, M. Y . Scheidemann, Philipp, 153, 155, 158, 218, 223, 237, 239-41, 262-3, 265, 268, 270; H. not mentioned in re miniscences, 4; journey to Copen hagen (19 17), 2 13 -6 ; Stockholm visit, 243-4; Prime Minister of Weimar Republic, 255, 262; cited, 213- 5; 235; 237 Schillinger, Alexander (son ofHelphand), 193 Schillinger, Frau Maria, 193 Scholz, Arno, 269 Schonlank, Bruno, 30-33, 83, 121 Schonlank, Bruno (junior), 266-9 Schwabing, Munich, H .’s residence, 57, 6 6

7 1 , 7 6

Schwanenwerder, Berlin, H .’s residence,

1,4,266-9,271,275,277 ‘Scientific’ socialist, 17 -18 , 39 Scutari, 127 ‘Seal, The’ (nickname for H.), 20 ‘ Sealed train’ journey: see under Lenin Second International: see International, Second Second World War, 3 Sedova, Natalia, 66, 76, 108 Semenon, Viktor, 90 Serbia, 126 Sergei, Grand Duke, 59 Serrati, Geaccinto, 143 Sevastopol, 69 Severnyi Golos, 90 Shevchenko, T ., 10 Shipping-lines, 200 Shlyapnikov, Alexander, 162, 181 Shop signs, pictorial, 54 Shub, David, cited, 155 Siberia, banishment to, 52, 56, 81, 93-94, 98, 102, 1 1 2 ; Lenin in, 48, 57, 94; Trotsky escapes from, 65, 108; H. escapes from (1906), 94, 98-99, 107; political exiles in, 147 Siberian Bank, 226 Siefeldt, A., 158

303

Siemens, Carl Friedrich von, 272 Siemens-Schuckert (firm) ,2 19 Simbirsk, 54 Simmern: see Langwerth von Simmern, Baron Singer, P., 109, 153 Sisson, Edgar, 232 Sklarz, Georg, 196-7, 199, 201, 204, 210, 263 Sklarz, Heinrich, 196-7 Sklarz, Waldemar, 196-7 Skobelev, M. I., 221 Slavery, 18 Slavs, 148, 151 Smirnov, Gurevich-, 180 Smirnov, Timofei, 90, 223 Smith, Adam, 18 Smuggling, 87, 197 Social Democrat party, German, 20-25, 27-48, 59; 63; 78; 10 3-10 , 117 , 137, 183, 263 Agrarian agitation, 3 1-3 2 , 34, 38 Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws, 2 1, 37 Budget support, and, 28-30 Committee, 218 Congresses, 34 -35; H. defends himself before, 4 0 -4 1; H. never a delegate, 121; (1875), 2 1, 74; (1893), 36; (1894), 2 9 , 3 1 ; (1895), 32; (1896), 36-37; (1897), 37; (1898), 40-41, 154; ( i 899). i i 8 ; 09O1 ). 45- 49. 68; (1903). 37.44 Elections, and, 27-28, 80, 10 1, 103-4 Executive, 27, 34, 36-37, 40-4 L* 45; 48 Helphand and, 2, 20, 25-27, 34-40, 46-48, 50, 106, 112 -4 , 12 1, 153-5; 212, 256, 259; essay on, 172 -4 ; acts as representative, 2 16 -8 ; and the younger generation, 269; party’s memory of, 2 76 Leaders, 22, 15 3 -4 ; of right wing, 19 34; in Copenhagen, 2 13-6 Newspapers and periodicals, 22-23, 2 5 Revisionism, and: see that title Russians, and, 25, 58-59, 108, 213-6 , 2 33; 2 37- 44; 252 Three-way split, 115 Two factions (S.P.D. and U .S.P.D .), 238,240-1 Social Democrat party, Russian, 3, 58, 7 5

8 3

1 3 5

1 4 7 - 8

Germans and, 25, 58-59, 108 Gorki royalties for funds: see under Gorki Helphand’s relations with, 48-49, 55,

304

Index

Social Democrat party (continued): Leaders return to Russia, 82-83, 86 Newspaper abroad, 55-57 (see Iskra) Split (1903) between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, 59—62, 65, 80-81, 122, 137, 14 1, 147, 158 Social Revolutionaries, 11,6 0 , 161 Socialdemocrat (Stockholm), 244 Socialdemokrat (Copenhagen), 213 Socialism, and world revolution, 85; H .’s attitude to, i n , 268, 278-9; ideology of, 113 -4 , 11 7 ; in practice after revolution, 117 - 2 1, 130; and war, 12 9 -3 1; collapse of pre-war, 130 (see also Europe: Socialists) Socialist conference, International (Berne, 1919), 261 Socialist congress of unity, proposed, 147, *49> I53 Socialist peace conference (Stockholm, 1917), 221-5 Socialist peace conference, proposed, 242-5, 248, 252 Sofia, 133, 135, 139-41, I 43> 148 Solomon, G. A., cited, 256 Sotsial-Democrat, 178 Soviet Encyclopedia, 3 Soviet National Bank, 165 Soviet Union, 2, 3 Soviets, (1905), 81, 83-98; (1917), 93, 213, 218, 2 2 1-3, 227, 232, 249-56; in Germany (1918), 262 So zialdemokratische Feldpost, 194 Soziale B ila n z des Krieges, D ie (1917), 195 Spartakists, 261-3 Spartakusbl alter, 178 Spilka, the, 147 Stoat, die Industrie, und der Sozialismus, D er (1910), 113 - 14 , 117 , 119-20 Stadthagen, 40 Stalin, J . V., 126, 139, 161 State, Industry, and Socialism, The (1910), 113 -4 , 117 , 119-20 Stauning, Thorvald, 223, 242-3 Stern, L., cited, 57, 59 Stettin, 200 Stinnes, Hugo, 200-1, 273-4 Stockholm, 139, 159, 16 1, 163, 165, 226, 229, 238-48, 258; H. in, 187, 189, 219, 238-48, 250, 253; Russian exiles in, 2 15 - 17 ; Bolshevik Foreign Mis sion, 2 19 -2 1, 227-9, 231, 235, 238,

245

Stockholm conference (1917), 22 1-5 Straits, 167

Strauss, Johann, 5 Strike, Political Mass, 35-36, 66, 68, 7576, 89, 113 , 115 -16 , 149, 169, 186 Strobel, Heinrich, 154 Struve, P., 79 Stuttgart, 22-23, 26-27, 54, 57, 113 Stuttgart congress (1898), 40-41, 154 Sublime Porte: see Turkey Subversive activities: see under Helphand; and under countries concerned Siidekum, A.O.W., 138, 154, 194 Sumenson, Evgeniya, 197, 225-6 Sweden (see also Stockholm), 139, 146, 16 1,2 0 3 ,2 15 ,2 3 3 ,2 3 5 ,2 6 0 Switzerland, 87, 147, 220, 233 Coal business, 203 General strike, 261 Helphand in, 8, (1886), 12, 14, 55; (1887-1891), 14 -2 1; (1915)* i5 6-6o; (1917), 224-5 ,229; (1918) voluntary exile, 259-65; arrested and released, 26 1; campaign against, 2 6 1-5 ; ex pelled from, 265-6; alleged deposit of money in, 276 Lenin in, 142, 209, 215 Russian exiles, 136, 14 1-2 , 148, 155-6, 18 1,2 15 Tarnowski, Count, 135 Tasviri E fk ar, 129, 133 Tatars, 9 Tax, strike, 89; H .’s payments, 198 Technische Organization . . . , 18 Technological Institute, St. Petersburg, 86 Telegraph (Berlin), 269 Temps, L e , 256 Terrorism and terrorists, 1 1 , 60, 275 Theatre tickets, H .’s purchase of, 86 Thun, Alphonse, 16 Tirpitz, Admiral von, 150 Topffer, Dr., 199, 201-2 T rade cycles, 117 Trade unions, 33, 58, 176; H .’s views on, 36, h i , 113 -4 , 117 , 119-20, 183; Danish, 198-202, 233 Trading and Export Company, 196-8 Trans-Siberian Railway, 54, 99 Trier, Sven, 195 Trotsky, Lev Davidovich Bronstein, 3,6468, 75-76, 108, 125-6, 142, 16 0-1, 227, 237, 244, 252; biographical, 6566; H .’s first meeting with (1904), 64; friendship with H., 57, 64-67, 83-84, 10 8 -11, 129, 267, 278-9; ‘intellectual partnership’ with H.,

Index

64, 67, h i , 278; D o devyatovo Tanvarya, 66, 76-79; returns to Russia (i9<>5)> 76> 81-84, 86-89, 92-93; imprisonment, 94, 96; escapes from Siberia, 108; ‘Prospects and Per spectives’, iio - i i , 172; ‘Epitaph for a Living Friend’ (on H.), 155-6, 173, 227; again returns to Russia (1917), 180,226 ‘Trotskyism’, 66 Tsarism, collapse of regime, 206; Euro pean socialists and, 168-9; financial abuses, 89; Germany and, 178, 182, 185; Helphand’s views on, 20, 63, 77> 82, 97, 108, 130-4, 140, 173-4, 182, 280; Lenin and, 157; middle class and, 77, 79, 88; subversion against, 132-4, 136-7, 145-52, 19 1, 280; Trotsky on, 94 Tschirschky, von, 143 Turk Turdu, 128 Turkey (Sublime Porte), 5, 9, 125, 136, 146, 163, 175; Capitulations, 126, 129; H .’s stay in (19 10 -19 15 ), 12644; H .’s investments in, 198, 260, 2 8 1; war, and, 132, 168; Young Turks, 128, 175 Turuchansk, 99 U-boat warfare, 202 Ukraine and Ukrainians, 7, 9-10, 140, 146-7, 207, 226, 230, 250; Union for Liberation, 132-6, 153, 156, 175 Ukrainian language, 9 Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine: see Ukraine United States of Am erica: see America United States of Europe, 42 Unus (pseudonym ofH .), 28 Urban, Consul, 135 Uritsky, Moisei, 16 1-2 , 180-1 Uspenski, G., 10 - 11 Vandervelde, E., 281 Verlag f u r

Sozialwissenschaft,

171,

194,

276 Verlag slawischer und nordischer Literatur ,

6 9 -71,8 2, 123 Versailles conference and treaty, 262, 272, 274 Vienna, 27, 126, 132 -3, 135, 148, 1 61 ; H. in, 124-6, 141 —3, 234-5; Trotsky in, 109,111 Vishinsky, A., 139 Vlachov, 127

305

Vodrovsvej (Copenhagen), H .’s resi dence, 1 93, 21 4 Volga, river, 54 Vollmar, Georg von, 22, 28, 30 -31, 4 345, 48 Vorovski, V . V ., 219-20, 229, 238, 243-5 Vorwdrts, 2, 3-5, 27-28, 32-33, 38, 52, 107-8, 154, 170, 232-3, 270; cited, 2 4 ,2 5 ,2 38 -9 ,2 7 5 Vperiod, 79, 81 Vriadakh germanskoe sotsial-demokratii, 87 Wadenswil (Zurich), H .’s residence, 260, 262,265, 268 Wakefield, E. G., 18 Walther, V . G. A., 199 Wangenheim, Freiherr von, 136-7 Wannsee lake, 1, 4, 266, 268, 271 War, and revolution, 62-64, 1 1 4; capita lism and, 63, 104, 1 1 4; colonial policy and, 104; socialists and, 129 3 1 ; H .’s views on, 130 -1 War, G reat: see First World War War credits, 153, 175 War surplus material, 72, 259 Warsaw, 54, 106, 169 Warszawski-Warski, Adolf, 21 ‘Wawerk, K arl’ (pseudonym of H.), 95 Weimar Republic, 2, 231, 262-3, 265, 268-70, 275-6 Weis, Otto, 268 Wiederaufbau, 272-5 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 3, 169, 225 Wilhelm, Grown Prince, 150, 234 Wilmersdorf, 276 Winter Palace, St. Petersburg, 75 Wirth, J ., 274 Witte, Count, 89 Wolffsche Telegraphen Bureau, 232 Women, H .’s relations with: see under Helphand Workers’ councils (see also Soviets), 90, 93 Workers’ democracy, 77-78, 84-85, 93, 110, 246, 252 Workers’ movement, international, 172 World market, 41-42, 63, 85, 104-5, 1 10> 113-4,257 World revolution, 20, 85, n o , 114 Wurttemberg, 27 Yenise province, 99 Yiddish, 7 Yogiches, Leo, 21, 106, 154 Young plan, 273 Young Turks, 128, 175

306

Index

Z ah aro ff, S ir Basil, 128 Zapta.) 130 Zarya^ 49 Zasulich, V e ra , 14 , 20, 50, 52, 82 Zechlin, E ., cited, 15 1 Zeiss cam era, 54 Z em an , Z . A . B ., cited, 3, 13 7 - 8 , 14 5 , 14 7 -9 passim Zetkin, C lara, 2, 2 2 -2 3 , 40, 12 4 , 154 Zhargorodski, 1 1 Z h e n y a : see H elphand, L azaru s (son)

Z h u b , D .: see Shub, D avid Zim m er, D r. M a x , 13 4 -6 , 14 5 , 16 3 -6 , 168 Zim m erm an, A ., 1 5 1 , 184, 19 2, 203, 2 1 1 4, 2 17 - 9 , 230 Zinoviev, G ., 2 1 0, 226 Pjianie , 70 Zukunft, D ie , 255, 263 Z u rab o v, 180, 19 5 Z u rich , 19, 2 1 , 1 5 3 , 160, 2 1 0 , 2 1 5 ; H . in, 1 2, 14 -15 * l 7 > 26, 15 6 - 7 , 2 6 0 - 1, 265 Zu rich Polytechnic, 18