Autumn 2017

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Poltik : Perspektive @poltikperspective

VOL : 1 - HERBST

CONTRIBUTORS ANJA FRENCH

is a third-year Bachelors student in German. She is currently based in Munich for her year abroad, interning at a chain manufacturing company for engine systems. Anja feels enthralled towards chains, often googling new chain components. When freed from these shackles, Anja enjoys probing Bavarians over a Weißbier.

BEN CRAWFORD is the cartoonist, illustrator and photographer at Politik:Perspektive

and a final year Bachelors student in Fine Art. He enjoys satirising the political classes and kann kein Deutsch.

CHANTHAN SULLIVAN-THOMSETT

is a PhD researcher in German and POLIS at Leeds. Her project, titled 'Professionalised Protest?' centres on the gentrification of Protest within the German Green Party, aiming to establish what happens to grassroots activism when a protest party has professionalised. She has spent time abroad in Berlin and Marsberg pre- and post graduation.

CHLOÉ ELLIOTT

is a third-year Bachelors student in French and German. She is currently based in Düsseldorf as a foreign language assistant. She spends her time travelling and learning about the cultural depth of her new Erasmus chums

EMILY LODGE

is the illustrator at Politik:Perspektive and a final year Bachelors student in Fine Art. She brings her talent for visualart and drawing to the journal's fore.

GEORGE BAINES is the co-founder and chief editor at Politik:Perspektive and a third year Bachelors student in French and German. He is currently spending his year abroad in Angers and Paris as an intern. He is also fixated on international relations with a focus on Europe.

GEORGE DUNLEAVY is a third-year Bachelors student in

French and German. He is currently spending his year abroad in Cologne as a foreign language assistant. He is keenly interested in the dcinematic iconography and of Berlin in Weimar cinema.

JAMIE RICHARDSON is the cofounder and outreach coordinator at

Politik:Perspektive and a final year Bachelors student in German and Russian. He is particularly interested in identities in a European context.

JULIA CONSTABLE is a third-year Bachelors student in German and Management. She is currently stationed in Mainz as an intern for Boehringer Ingerlheim Pharmaceuticals. She enjoys binging on pretzels and can boast having sung for Angela Merkel.

LUKE BRYAN is the designer at Politik:Perspektive and a final year Bachelors student in Digital Media. He is especially interested in the role the media plays in politics.

TIM VAN GARDINGEN is a final year Bachelors student of German and

Chinese. He has previously studied in Beijing and Leipzig. Current interests include the New Silk Road and International relations between Europe and Asia.

TOM STINCHCOMB is a third year Bachelors student in French and German. He is currently based in Wesseling as a language assistant.

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NO 1 / AUTUMN 2017

FEATURES p. 3

p. 4

WELCOME TO OUR HEIMAT

LESSONS IN IDENTITY AT A GERMAN HOCHSCHULE

Chloé Elliott

Tom Stinchcomb

p. 7

p. 10

JAMAIKA ENDURING EAST-WEST DIVIDE?

SHOCK FACTOR SUCCESS

Chanthal Sullivan-Thomsett

Anja French

p. 12

p. 14

PUPILS VS. PENSIONERS GERMANY'S NEW VOTERS

MALI AND THE EUROPEAN PROJECT

George Dunleavy

George Baines

p. 17

p. 19

LIFESTYLE: A GUIDE FOR MANAGING CAPITAISM

BRI - CHINESE IMPERIALISM OR GERMAN PROTECTIONISM

Jamie Richardson

Tim van Gardingen

p. 21

p. 23

UK REPLICATION OF MITTELSTAND SUCCESS

VW AND TRUST IN BIG BUSINESS

Julia Constable

Julia Constable

EDITORIAL Wilkommen! Welcome to the German departmentʼs resident journal, Politik:Perspektive. This is the physical product of German at Leeds studentsʼ opinions and experiences on the politics and society of the German-speaking space. As you can see from the Contributors and Journal Crew list on the opposite [/previous] page, this journalʼs debut has had an unfathomable amount of enthusiastic support thrown its way. Jamie and myself are incredibly humbled by peoplesʼ contributions, and we hope after reading this edition, you feel inspired to explore the German-speaking world and express your ideas and opinions by channelling them through Politik:Perspektive.

But now for the journal itself. Beginning with Chloeʼs summary overview of the socio-political backdrop to the recent German parliamentary elections, this edition starts by progressing smoothly from Germanyʼs altruism and vibrant, yet problematic multicultural make-up, through to the election and the chasms it left in its wake. Indeed, if the fresh wounds on the East-West German division and the souring political discourse are too much to stomach, George Dunleavy adopts a more optimistic tone on the youthʼs political engagement.

Jamie epitomises this with his account on his term abroad in Leipzig before Tim and I look beyond Germanyʼs domestic affairs and focus on its international dealings with Asia and Africa, respectively. Finally, Julia brings the economy into focus, pondering whether Brits have anything to learn from the German business culture, before leaving us with some food for thought on the now infamous Made in Germany cover-up.

So thereʼs something for everyone! Take a Platz, grab yourself some Kaffee und Kuchen, and los gehtʼs!

Alles gut, George and Jamie

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WELCOME TO OUR HEIMAT

By Chloé Elliott

R

ich with tradition, culture and history, Germany is a country that has risen from the ashes and has been born anew. She cannot escape her past but she can dictate her future and rebrand as a modern refugee haven.

The incredible influx of displaced people into Germany came as a result of civil wars, economic crises and the breakdown of political order in countries such as Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan; desperate and dire situations to which Germany can relate. Since the fall of the Wall, Germany has received 30 percent of all asylum applications and in 2015 she opened her doors to 1.1 million refugees, resulting in the largest population increase in more than twenty years. Germany’s generosity amounted to more than 2 billion euros at a donor conference held in humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees, and came with the promise that individuals would be reunited with their family members in Germany. The refugee crisis is a complex issue with no quick fix, but these actions have undoubtedly lubricated the situation for many neighbouring EU countries, as well as the hundreds of thousands of people who no longer have to fear for their lives.

With Germany’s new image come a set of new values, new principals and new a sense of duty. She has made a gallant effort to alleviate the suffering of more than a million people and make a difference. But it’s not enough.

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Although the task has been met with great enthusiasm and endeavour, the reality is that these asylum seekers still have little prospects. They are faced with new challenges that no longer take the form of famine, war or strife but rather unemployment, isolation and homelessness. About 60 percent of refugees spend around 6 months in collective accommodation before they are allocated a home to call their own and can start their lives afresh. A Financial Times analysis shows that these refugees are disproportionately placed in areas of high unemployment and worse job prospects, which is a breeding ground for social tension between German citizens and the new arrivals, hindering integration.

Nonetheless, this does not measure up to the worlds the refugees left behind. Germany can only do so much; when housing demands rise quicker than needs can be accommodated, prioritising the neediest and paying off the others to return to their country seems like a reasonable solution. More than 20 billion euros have already been plunged into the cause and a difference has been made in the lives of those who take pride in Germany’s new persona. A promising and more tolerant future has been dictated in response to a notorious past.

But acceptance is key in today’s reality. Accepting the influence that 1.1 million could have on the traditions, culture and history of the country and acknowledging the approaching diversity of the population is priceless and far more significant than tolerance alone.

NO 1 / AUTUMN 2017

LESSONS IN IDENTITY AT A GERMAN HOCHSCHULE

By Tom Stinchcomb

T

he school in which I’m currently working as a language assistant certainly could not be understood as the most typical of German schools. Indeed, teachers themselves have often reminded me of the unique nature of our school.

Nearly all the students have parents that come from foreign backgrounds, as the town where the school is situated functions almost as the migrant satellite town between Cologne and Bonn, and the families often live in homes specially built for those newly migrated here.

While there are students who come from perfectly standard or “expected” backgrounds much like our own, there are large numbers who come from broken families, who have fled or left their countries due to war, or even who have been born and raised here in Germany, yet do not or cannot feel like they fit into society. Stories of students who have inconsistently-present parents or who experience abuse contrast starkly with the images my fellow assistant friends paint of their Gymnasiums.

It is in this school, however, that I believe I have learned a powerful lesson about identity and fitting in in modern Germany.

Such schools as mine often appear under scrutiny, as.......

‘...the modern world is one where identity goes hand in hand with politics’ and nationality, something which the students themselves appear innately aware of. Here political beliefs also appear innately tied with personal experience; many students’ lives would be directly affected by potential actions the AfD may take if they one day came into power – I have often wondered how some of the hijabis at my school felt about the “Islamisierung stoppen” (stop islamisation) billboards visible around Germany during the election campaign, for example. I myself was taken by surprise once during an English class, as I was questioned on how we refer to “Kopftücher” (headscarves) in the UK. When I replied that, at least in my experience, I tend to hear and use the use the Arabic word, hijab, I appeared, within the course of around five seconds, to view a semi-microcosm of some Muslim and non-Muslim relations common within Germany: both student and teacher were s urprised, but the teacher (whether because she knew of

POLITIK : PERSPEKTIVE

or used the word herself but wouldn’t expect it to be used in English , I’m not too sure) quickly progressed with the lesson and didn’t develop the matter further.

The hijab-wearing student turned back to her textbook and gave both a half smile and seemingly impressed little nod: I infer she was pleasantly surprised that we use the authentic word in English. It left me wondering about much or little a Muslim in Germany can expect from non-Muslims with regards to treatment or knowledge of them and their culture; I would have thought at least knowing a hijab’s name would be commonplace.

Perhaps I was wrong.

Politics further shows itself in the rhetoric of students themselves, although the personal experiences often appear to come from parents. During the week of the election, I am quite sure that the young boy sitting in the front of one of my classes, who is no older than ten, who, when the teacher questioned the class about political parties, erupted in fist-clenched chants of “AfD! AfD! AfD!” hadn’t been following the campaign intensely in the newspapers or on television. Something which I can certainly claim with some confidence is that, whether the students support them or not, the AfD provokes a reaction within the school, and certainly not one as steadfastly negative as we may

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expect from under eighteens. Many teachers see the students’ eastern European parents as responsible for some students’ warily positive attitudes towards the far right, but, of course, this raises questions about native Germans’ assumptions about their eastern neighbours (something which affects nearly all of us here in Western Europe), regardless of their being correct or not. Indeed, I was told about (the few) children of native German parents themselves in the school who’ve espoused some views on Hitler’s policies as “not as bad” as history makes them out to have been; the person who informed me of this feels like the problem is actually one of poverty, not of nationality. My town, Wesseling, it should be known, is both a poor and majority AfD-voting area.

However, that isn’t to say that my school is a bastion of far-right extremism or discrimination. In fact, far from it.

Among the students themselves, there is next to no discrimination or bullying, at least not in relation to what one may assume. Once, a teacher asked a class I was attending if any of the children spoke another language besides German (and English, which they learn at school). I think only two students didn’t raise their hands. For the rest of the class who did, every child spoke a different language to their neighbour: Polish, Albanian, some Arabic, Pashto, et cetera.

This diversification means that discriminative bullying becomes pointless: no child can be bullied for where they come from or for not being German, because the person bullying them probably has foreign parents or was born in another country. Everyone can understand the alienated perspective of everyone else, at least when they first start school or move to Germany.

Of course, there are rivalries among these parent nations: the Turkish/ Kurdish conflict seems

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the most likely to manifest itself in my school. Yet such rivalries themselves tend to become heated only during events like football matches, when the oldest students can laugh it off with their friends that their country will win and is, naturally, better.

The semi-serious nature of nationhood conflict becomes the subject of ridicule: it is very much the common case of

“When the football’s not on, I’m German; when it is, I’m Albanian” “(or Kosovan, Polish, etc.).” It is fascinating to see the macrocosm of real world conflicts reduced to something as easy to joke about as football rivalry, but it creates a peace and a space where these students can recognise where they come from, but also co-exist. This is also telling about their attitudes towards their own dual nationhood: German language (and therefore, identity) is the professional and daily language used in school, among their friends, and in the city. Their parents’ home countries speak the language of the family, and of the personal. What is more personal than two fifteenyear-old stereotypical teenage boys play-fighting over their parents’ countries’ football team being better? Such is the nature of adaptation to Germany. By doing so, they appear to have hit the balance right, and, at least for the fifteen and sixteen-year olds, they feel as though this balance works for them (although, it must be noted, this is within the confines of school and students’ friendships; some German-born Turkish girls I asked said that they do not feel either German or Turkish enough for either

NO 1 / AUTUMN 2017

country to respect them – they therefore feel like both and neither simultaneously, and I ask myself if Germans themselves would see the girls as “qualifying” for nationhood).

‘the crux of the school’s philosophy ... seems to me like ‘Wir schaffen das’ in action’ ‘

The school provides a place where the students can, eventually, all understand each other, while being integrated into German society and culture, hopefully retaining their own personal experiences and their parents’ identities at the same time. Here, the “crisis” of immigration seems like it is being met head on, and quite successfully; with regards to interaction and treatment of others, at least, if not with regards to the best grades.

Some days there may be a knock on a classroom door, there stands a young child, parents and a teacher, and hey presto! We have a new student, who may not speak a word of English or German and who may have only been in the country three weeks. But, so espouse my teaching colleagues, we have to get on with it. It’s very inspirational to see, and I can understand the frustration of trying to simultaneously lead a class, cater for the new or non-understanding student and normalise them as a fellow classmate, all simultaneously. But if there’s any democracy to be found, it’s there.

One last thing I found was that this related to me also, upon my arrival: I had been so nervous about being announced into a classroom and suddenly being expected to teach, lead or help, especially as someone not fluent. Yet I found that the students were just like me in that

regard, and the process of integrating into the school life came fairly easily, as I was just like they had been. The students who arrive tend to have a knowledge of either only German or English, or neither; by the time I came, they’d already met people who spoke better English than German (much like the students from fellow European countries or the Middle East, where English is the first foreign language taught), and were used to accommodating for such. When I started to speak in German as well they were surprised and quite easily won over. The most affirming part was that they were ready to accept me, albeit slowly, whether I could have communicated with them in German or not. In that regard I can see the aims of modern Germany at play in my school. Every student must learn German, and if they can pick up English skills or arrive with some, all the better. But one finishes the school with both a native language and a lingua franca through which they can all communicate and live, including myself.

For some students, this means that they identify as both German and their parents’ nationality; for some, it doesn’t. In either case no student feels unworthy of living, studying or communicating here. This, I believe, is down to the school’s welcoming insular bubble, yet it is my hope that this will eventually spread to those unaccommodating or unwelcoming in wider German society. But this is nevertheless a vision of what a future Germany could look like, for good or for bad - a common language alongside a deeply personal, self-appointed meaning and culture; a democratic identity.

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JAMAIKA SIGN OF AN ENDURNG EAST/WEST DIVIDE?

By Chantal Sullivan-Thomsett

T

he recent Bundestagswahl (federal election) threw up some surprising results and will no doubt mark a crucial point in German political history. In this piece, I will draw connections between the election results and the long-term impact of German unification, and what this could mean for the new Jamaika coalition.

WHAT WAS SO DIFFERENT ABOUT #BTW17?

On 24th September 2017, Germans across the country went to the polls to elect their new national parliament.

The focus in the weeks and months leading up to the election, was the right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and the prospect that they would enter national parliament for the first time. They are currently present in 13 Landtage (state parliaments) and the polls indicated that they would surpass the 5% hurdle required to enter parliament, which they had narrowly missed in 2013. Media coverage on the three governing parties, Angela Merkel’s Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) and their Bavarian sisters the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU), alongside the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), highlighted the great amount of consensus and agreement between the CDU and SPD, and described the boring nature of their election campaigns. Die Linke (The Left) were snapping at the heels of disappointed SPD supporters. The German Liberals, the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), were campaigning hard to re-enter the Bundestag after four years outside it, whilst the party I research, the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), looked like they could do quite badly compared to previous performances, and could potentially fail to meet the 5% hurdle.

When the actual results came through, the polls had mostly got it right: the AfD were the third

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Image edited by Ben Crawford

largest party; the Volksparteien (catch-all parties CDU/ CSU and SPD all had historically-low vote share; and the other small parties had made gains, which was especially the case for the FDP, who had enough votes to bring them back into the Bundestag (Federal Parliament). Talk in the immediate aftermath of the election was of a ‘Zäsur für Deutschland’; in other words, the 2017 Bundestagswahl (federal election) marked a defining moment in the relatively young political history of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Volksparteien had had their vote share eroded by a fragmented party landscape, where the four small parties had achieved the highest cumulative vote share of small parties in post-war German politics.

Once again, election night in unified Germany was another occasion at which to discuss the differences in voting preference between western and eastern Germany. Commentary turned to the apparent distinctions in voting patterns between the alte Bundesländer (federal states which were a part of West Germany) and neue Bundesländer (federal states which were a part of the former East Germany). Apparently, far more people in the neue Bundesländer had voted for the AfD, than in the alte Bundesländer. Once the SPD announced their intention not to coalesce with Merkel again, that left just one coalition constellation possible: CDU/CSU, FDP and Greens, known as a ‘Jamaica’ coalition since the colours of the parties involved are those of the Jamaican flag (black, yellow and original unification in 1871, which is why they green). In contrast to the prevalence of the AfD in

NO 1 / AUTUMN 2017

SHOCK FACTOR SUCCESS

eastern and western re-alignment, mostly in economic and infrastructural terms, became a central political topic, and one that does not seem to have worn itself out just yet. Once the constitutional unity of the two Germanies had been achieved on 3rd October 1990, the next job was to achieve innere Einheit (inner unity), which includes economic, political and cultural unity.

HOW DO YOU GO ABOUT ACHIEVING INERE EINHEIT? When the wall fell, Helmut Kohl, the then chancellor of West Germany, keenly put forward his 10-point-plan for German unity and promised East Germans that as part of a united Germany, they would have ‘blühende Landschaften’ or flourishing landscapes, like those experienced by post-war West Germans.To do this, Kohl imported Modell Deutschland (the model of economic, labour market, and political systems that created a stable and prosperous Bonn Republic) into the East. This was politically successful for Kohl because of the promise of prosperity for the neue Bundesländer, but did not deliver for the eastern Germans who had voted for him.

in eastern states, Jamaika has a majority of votes in most of western Germany, except in areas of Bavaria, North-Rhine Westphalia and Hesse. So, why is there this apparent difference in voting behaviour between the alte Bundesländer and neue Bundesländer 27 years after unification?

WHY IS EAST VS. WEST STILL A THING? East-West comparisons linger in German political culture due to the very recent history of division after the Second World War, represented by the Two Germanies, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Some people argue that the distinctions between eastern and western Germans originate from earlier European power struggles well before the German unification of 1871, dating back to Charlemagne, and possibly even earlier. This is the argument of James Hawes in The Shortest History of Germany, published this year. Hawes argues that two distinct eastern and western identities were not really overcome by original unification in 1871, which is why they continue to endure despite the most recent reunification.

The German reunification of 1990 saw the former East Germany unified with the then West German FRG. Since the FRG continued to exist, albeit in a larger form with the neue Bundesländer of the former East Germany, it was more of an absorption than a unification. At this moment, issues around

At the same time, Kohl had to sell unification to existing citizens who had benefited from the same Modell Deutschland in West Germany. The heavily-industrial alte Bundesländer obviously did not want unity at a high cost for them; they had something to lose. So, Modell Deutschland was imported in its entirety, including trade unions and collective wage bargaining processes, into an area with consistently low productivity and a lack of research and innovation. This hindered the potential for neue Bundesländer to undercut their new Bundesrepublik-peers. In fact, the import of trade unions fulfilled Kohl’s political promise and the appearance of higher wages for citizens in the neue Bundesländer, but actually protected the jobs of those in the alte Bundesländer. Following the de-industrialisation of eastern German states post-unification, united Germany had what Roland Czada defined as a ‘split economy’, with different needs for its more and less industrial halves. Therefore, each half of the economy required different politics in an environment where politicians strived to create a political, economic and cultural German unity. A split economy will produce a split electorate, and if elections are won in the more populous west, then protecting the western German economy is equally as crucial as creating growth and jobs in eastern Germany.

THE PRIMACY OF ECONOMIC UNITY Because of the influence of economic factors in voting behaviour, economic unity is very much the

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focus of German governments. This can be found in the amount of economic data and analysis conducted in the annual Bericht zum Stand der deutschen Einheit (Report on the Status of German Unity), and which are used to monitor the process of achieving ‘innere Einheit’. Economic detail in the latest edition of these reports demonstrate that the eastern states have still not ‘caught up’ with their western counterparts, but the gap has closed and there are positive developments in economic growth in the region. Since the continued emphasis is to unite the two halves, i.e. bring the neue Bundesländer into line with the alte Bundesländer, there is no acknowledgement of the inherent differences that may exist between eastern and western states, and regional economic differences present across the alte Bundesländer are also ignored through the focus on east/west comparisons. If the different strengths of regions were acknowledged, they could be exploited for economic and social gain. However, this is unlikely to happen due to electoral pressures in the alte Bundesländer, who could stand to lose more than just the solidarity payments they have paid for over 25 years.

Indeed, one of the few negotiated points in the Jamaika negotiations – so named due to the parties’ colours thus far has been to stop these solidarity payments and transfer of wealth from western to eastern regions.

WHAT ABOUT CULTURL UNITY? Surely after more than 25 years since unification, people born and raised in the Berlin Republic share the same culture? State broadcaster Deutsche Welle’s project, Generation 25, created a dossier of information on Germans born after the fall of the wall and unification to examine how young Germans from across united Germany perceived their compatriots and their own futures. It was particularly interested to see whether they seemed to have a ‘Mauer im Kopf’ (wall in the mind), and therefore if ‘Ossis’ (East Germans) still had certain presumptions of ‘Wessis’ (West Germans) and vice versa. Just under half of those surveyed by Deutsche Welle still saw differences in mentalities between those in eastern and western Germany.

One reason why this may still be the case, could be due to what Thomas Ahbe called an Ost-Diskurs. His term describes a particular media construction of eastern Germans, which creates a distinct ‘east German’ identity, in turn reinforcing a distinct ‘west German’ identity. If the media world is dominated by western Germany, then a monotonous western German voice is created on eastern German issues, including their history, culture and how successful they have been at using the western Modell Deutschland to rebuild the eastern federal states following unification. This is a voice that eastern Germans themselves

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do not recognise as a depiction of their reality. For example, the Heute Show, a satirical German current affairs show, recently did a skit where they asked people in Halle, located in the neue Bundesland Saxony-Anhalt, why they voted for the AfD. The footage they used was of people who could not explain why, and the studio audience were laughing at their expense and perceived ignorance. However, I know a Dresden native who finds these depictions frustrating, since he does not identify with them at all, and is sick of people equating Ausländerfeindlichkeit (xenophobia) with his Bundesland Saxony, and, by extension, all of the neue Bundesländer. Such a lack of self-recognisable ‘East German’ media discourse could be assisting the distrust of mainstream media, encapsulated by the term Lügenpresse, and the fake-news phenomenon on social media. This trend of not accepting media discourses on issues is growing across other west liberal democracies, where populism is on the rise and even Merkel has spoken of recognising the ‘losers of globalisation’, amongst them those who are voting AfD, and aims to bring thier support back to mainstream political parties.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR JAMAIKA? Jamaika is a new coalition at the federal level. The negotiations are still ongoing and there are multiple points that could create an impasse between the four parties. However, should the parties unite and form a coalition, they will need to navigate the split economy and split electorate, well aware that their main support-base exists in the alte Bundesländer in the west. Like previous governments before them, they will have to work to complete German unity, which is primarily measured as economic unity. This could be made more difficult by the more prominent presence of the AfD in political culture following their entry into the Bundestag.

In addition, the national government does not reflect voting patterns in the neue Bundesländer, meaning this may be as potentially unidentifiable as the media can be for eastern Germans. This new government will therefore have a lot to prove that it can listen to and respond to the concerns and needs of those Germans in the neue Bundesländer who do vote differently from their western counterparts. Otherwise, Jamaika could be the sign of increasing the divide between the winners and losers of unification and globalisation. Of course, it remains to be seen whether Jamaika would even last for the whole four years. We will have to wait and see.

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SHOCK FACTOR SUCCESS

By Anja French

O

n 24th September 2017, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) became the first radical right wing party to enter the Bundestag since the 1960s. Not only did the AfD achieve 13% of the votes, they also became the third largest party in Germany, despite the party only being formed in 2013.

From my own experience of being in Munich during the election period, I felt overwhelmed by the blatantly accessible anti-immigration, Islamophobic and misogynistic ideologies present within the AfD’s advertising campaign. I could not help but think that the AfD’s provocative advertisement campaign helped to send a wave of nationalism across Germany.

In comparison to the UK, campaign posters appeared to be an important advertising tool for all parties during the time of the election. In Munich, the most shocking and memorable posters undoubtedly belonged to the AfD. The strong emphasis on posters as opposed to television advertisements facilitated the infiltration into the German mainstream. Through their outreach to a mass daily audience, posters became a very democratic campaign tool during the German election.

Furthermore, through the use of a medium as conventional as the poster, it heightened the AfD’s “credibility” as people were encountering right-wing extremism on an everyday basis through something as commonplace as a poster. A clear aim of the AfD’s provocative advertising

campaign was to normalise the identification with the extreme right.

Due to the perpetual indoctrination of the AfD advertising campaign, I felt that people could easily become desensitised to their aggressive ideologies, which would perhaps provide people with the social acceptance and normalisation that they felt they needed to vote for the far right.

The advertisement which appeared to be the most frequently used, and in my opinion, the most offensive, combined both blatant misogyny with Islamophobia by featuring two women in bikinis walking down a beach. The slogan read “Burkas? Wir steh’n auf Bikinis” (“Burqas? We’re into bikinis”), which promoted both the isolation of Muslims and the oppression of women. It is important to add that the image of the two women was captured from behind, contributing further to the overt sexualisation of women within this advertisement campaign. It is apparent that the AfD’s demographic is a populist audience, hence why the AfD attempt to target people’s frustrated emotions regarding immigration. This specific advertisement also suggests that they are mainly targeting a heterosexual male audience through the overt sexualisation of women.

Furthermore, through eliciting Islamophobia within a mainstream advertisement campaign by claiming that a key part of Islam, such as the burqa, is unacceptable within German culture, it gives right-wing

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extremism “legitimacy”. Through the legitimate platform of a political poster campaign, this could again provide people with the social acceptance that they require to vote for the AfD. And finally, the slogan used in all of their poster campaigns, “Trau dich Deutschland” (“Believe in yourself, Germany”), again attempts to fill the mainstream audience with a confidence in the far right, which highlights the emotive aspect of the campaign.

Source: https://qz.com/1067764

The AfD also specifically targeted Muslims through their campaign poster, which depicted a piglet with the caption “Der Islam?

Passt nicht zu unserer Küche” (“Islam? It doesn’t suit our kitchen”). This suggests that Muslims who choose not to eat pork are not adhering to the norms of German cuisine and consequently not to German culture. The advertisement attempts to alienate Muslims by implying that fundamental aspects within German culture

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such as cuisine are not compatible with Islam. Again, by isolating Muslims and portraying them as the “other” to a mainstream audience, it gives people an excuse to discriminate against them. In addition to this, the use of the possessive pronoun “unserer” targets a German audience as a collective and implies togetherness and commonality amongst all Germans. This collectivist nationalism could be worryingly reminiscent of the “Ein Volk”(“One people”) ideology used in Nazi propaganda, used to unite the Germans as one race.

Another campaign poster, which contained ideologies reminiscent of the Nazi era, depicted a pregnant woman smiling with the caption “Neue Deutsche?

Machen wir selber” (“New Germans? We make them ourselves”). The belief that Germans can make “new Germans” by themselves is worryingly similar to the Aryan race ideologies during the Nazi era, which also encouraged Germans to maintain “racial purity”.

The imagery of the smiling woman on the poster could be seen as glorification of childbirth, which can in turn seen to mirror the Nazi propaganda of women being persuaded to produce multiple children for the Fatherland, Germany. This advertisement contains apparent connotations of anti-immigration ideologies by suggesting they do not need non-Germans to create “new Germans”. This implies that immigrants are not necessary within Germany’s future.

To conclude, I believe that the AfD’s provocative and aggressive advertising campaign undoubtedly contributed to their success in the recent German election. Through the infiltration of the mainstream, the AfD’s advertising campaign gave rightwing extremism a political platform to be heard. Through the democratic campaign tool

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Source: https://goo.gl/images/a6dQ8C

of something as ubiquitous as campaign posters, the AfD were able to indoctrinate a wide audience on a daily basis with xenophobia, Islamophobia and misogyny in their new aggressive method of provocative advertising. As such, I believe that the AfD’s offensive poster campaign was successful in somewhat normalising these prejudices and therefore gave people the social acceptance they previously sought after to vote for the far right.

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PUPILS VS. PENSIONERS GERMANY'S NEW VOTERS

By George Dunleavy

O

ver the past few weeks, a political furore has gripped Germany, as the nation braced itself for die Wahl - the election of a new government on 24th September. Unsurprisingly, Angela Merkel (leader of the Christian Democratic Union) won her fourth term as Chancellor. This didn’t surprise the press, it didn’t surprise the Germans, and it didn’t surprise the polls, which correctly predicted that the SDP would follow in second, with the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland coming third. Taking place on a swelteringly hot Sunday, when many Germans would much rather have been at home instead of patiently lining up outside polling stations, it was a vote tempered by fears of terrorism, the immigration crisis, and the looming problems faced by a strained European Union. These are issues at the national level, yet, was the whole of Germany represented in the voter turnout?

Simply put, young Germans aren’t voting. As with everything German, this trend can be summarised by one useful word - Politikverdrossenheit.

Translated as “disenchantment with politics” , it is a feeling commonly seen in the younger generation. For example, 80% of 60-70 year olds voted in the 2013 Bundestagswahl (the lower-house election), whilst only 60% of 21-25 year olds voted . This may not sound like a huge difference, but when taken into consideration that

‘...less than 10 million people under the age of 30 had the chance to vote [in the Bundestagswahl]’

the vote since 1949. In summary, too many young people feel as if their voices are unheard, that they alone will make no difference, and that Merkel’s win was inevitable. A clear trend amongst many of the parties’ mandates was a call for greater help for pensioners, while policies concerning younger people were notably absent – the clear reason being that while pensioners can vote, pupils cannot. or pensioners, while policies concerning younger people were notably absent – the clear reason being that while pensioners can vote, pupils cannot.

Yet, there is some evidence that this trend is beginning to reverse with the next generation of voters.

Undoubtedly, the best way to rouse an interest in politics is the most obvious - by starting early. This is the case in Erich-Kästner Gymnasium, Cologne, the secondary school where I work as a foreign language assistant. Here, the school gave a voice to the unheard, the unrepresented, and those unable to vote: the under 18s. It was an enormous success, with 86.3% of the pupils taking part, and an article appearing on the Tagesschau online website.

Although this vote mirrored the real one quite similarly, with the CDU coming first (27.5%) followed by the SDP (22.6%), it came as no surprise to many that the third most popular party was the liberal Bündnis90/Die Grünen party (21.4%), whose policies focusing on climate change, equality and immigration are much more important to young people. Meanwhile, the AfD came sixth.

By starting to practice voting at an earlier age, it makes the process altogether less daunting and foreign, and invites pupils to have conversations about politics outside of the classroom. Holding an underage vote may not be a revolutionary idea – in fact,

whilst for those over 60 this figure was more than double, it’s a significant number. This lack of interest in politics among younger people is one possible reason why the AfD is the first overtly nationalist party to sit in the Reichstag since the 1960s, and why the CDU won their lowest share of

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‘... under 18 votes have been held across Germany since 1996’ and campaigners have fought to lower the voting age to 16 for years, nevertheless, it shows that schools in Germany are becoming ever more willing to try and promote political discussion in the new generation. At a time when many first-time voters cannot even remember who came before Merkel, and with many simply referring to the familiar and reliable matriarch as ‘Mutter’ (mother) it becomes ever more important to remind pupils that they have the power to choose, and that soon, they too will have the power to decide who governs them.

This desire to engage the next generation became the focus of the October edition of NEON, a popular monthly magazine in Germany whose target audience consists of well educated, liberal 18-30 year olds. Inside, it typically contains articles about pop culture, fashion and relationships, but in the run up to the Bundestagswahl it became more politically inclined, joining the campaign “MitMir90Prozent”, a campaign which aims to restore the voter turnout to 90% like in the 1970s. In typically millennial style, NEON encouraged readers to share, tweet, and post statuses of them having voted, using the hashtag #mitmir90prozent, and rewarding those with the most likes with an exclusive t-shirt. Capitalist intentions aside, this campaign arguably helped keep the vote a popular topic on social media, reminding others that it is important to stand up for your beliefs, to exercise your human rights and vote.

the party’s flyers, and some Germans even sported t-shirts with the slogan. Images were splashed across newspapers, demonstrators were interviewed on the news, and everybody had an opinion on the political climate. Out of all these deciding factors, it could be argued that perhaps the biggest incentive for young people to vote wasn’t an online campaign developed by media moguls, nor was it by inviting more political discussion into the classroom – rather, the most unifying movement came from the right-wing threatening what the youth value most: equality.

The 2017 Bundestagswahl had too many influences and is too large to simply sum up its results with one neat flourish – certainly, Germany’s aging population had a direct consequence on who gained power in Berlin. Yes, many of the country’s young people feel isolated by the main parties and yes, Germany’s politics are following the current trend of becoming more right-wing, but that is not the say that these trends must continue. With 3 million more Germans turning 18 every year and thus able to vote, it will only be a matter of time before more of the nation’s opinions are represented more equally and the shifts of power reflect Germany’s shifting society.

Despite these efforts, the issue of young people feeling disenfranchised by politics is not just specific to Germany, rather it is a growing trend in many Western nations, as more and more young people view politicians as dishonest, or leading lives completely different to their own. Indeed, a fitting comparison may be made to the European Referendum in the UK, where although 64% of people aged 18-24 went to the polls, a staggering 90% of over-65s also voted, with many of them voting to leave.

In light of these results, it is easy for some older Germans to claim that Germany’s youth are idle, preferring to lazily show their political leanings from behind a keyboard rather than with feet on the street. However, in the lead-up to the vote, demonstrations were seen across Germany as young, liberal Germans protested against the right-wing AfD party in an effort to keep racism out of the Reichstag. Indeed, in many cities stickers proclaiming “FCK AFD” could be seen covering up

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NO 1 / AUTUMN 2017

MALI AND THE EUROPEAN PROJECT

By George Baines

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ermany bears the burden of responsibility for contemporary Europe. We need to be reminded of this.

This isn’t a dogma founded in the post-World War pacification of Germany, but the belief of renowned German sociologist Ulrich Beck. He believes that Germany has taken on the role of the European vanguard because of its twice waging war in Europe during the first half of the 20th century . It is therefore now second nature for German politicians to carry out their political engagements within a greater European context. And whether intentional or not, Germany’s multi-faceted foreign policy preoccupations with the Eurozone crisis, the brokering of the Turkey-EU migrant deal, plus the containment of a revanchist Russia through the Minsk accords indicate that the ‘reluctant hegemon’ has long since established itself as a legitimate leader on the European continent. However, we have underestimated the scope of Germany’s foreign policy objectives, and the extent to which it will act in the interest of its European neighbours with greater ambition in mind. This brief explainer therefore occupies itself with the relationship between the German military foothold in Mali and its aims and repercussions for Mali, Germany, and the EU. But context is needed; we’re not talking about a naval deployment similar to the likes of operations off the coast of Libya – considered one of the most troublesome African neighbours as far as European cohesion’s now concerned – but rather feet on the ground in Mali, a former French colony formally regarded as fitting comfortably in the French sphere of influence.

Mali, a sub-Saharan French-speaking republic, has recently experienced a political upheaval. It underwent a Tuareg insurgency in 2012 when militia members returned from Libya after Gadaffi’s removal, establishing strongholds in the country’s northern Sahel region. The country consequently appears to be the latest westwards falling domino across the Maghreb national security pact, the Sahara G5. Consisting of these Salafist Tuareg militiamen, the militant Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in northern Mali and its destabilisation on the state subsequently triggered UN Security Council Resolution 2085 in April 2013,

granting the use of force under the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It has been renewed annually ever since, setting the stage for an international response reminiscent of the American-led coalition in Afghanistan. But while the USA, the UK, Russia and Iran play a long, tedious proxy war in Syria, they appear to be absent in Mali.

And consequently, there exists no bolder, more dominant international actors than France and Germany to fill the posts.

What formally began as an international coalition of 50 states alongside UN blue helmets has become a showcase for the extraordinary growing competency of the Franco-German alliance. There’s a somewhat good cop, bad cop dynamic playing out there. While the French head gun-ho to the battle grounds of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao in the Azawad region, Germany’s seemingly pacifist role has been anything but clear. So ambiguous is the role of the German Bundeswehr (national army) in Mali, that one journalist for the Frankfuter Allgemeine compared a 2015 statement from the German defence ministry as painting a bleak image more associated with Afghanistan than a Francophonie member. The news this July of a German helicopter crash in Mali, and two German fatalities along with it, finally brought the dangers and the consistency of the German role to the foreground of public debate.

So, what are the Germans up to? According to the Bundeswehr’s own website, it is serving as a member of the MINUSMA coalition. Germany’s presence does not extend to military confrontations, but instead serves to educate local forces and institutions as they continue to tackle the Islamic insurgencies . This is in line with the UN Security Council Resolution. But why is Germany involved in a region it has historically overlooked? There are three main reasons which I believe are most telling as to why Germany is again a part of an international military coalition.

The first reason regards geopolitics. Mali is bisected by the highly navigable River Senegal and River Niger, the former of which leads to the Atlantic coast, and the latter of which’s upper course

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carves out the populous spine of the country. Hence, there appear to be several international concerns regarding its waterways. With the Islamic occupations of Timbuktu and Gaol, the possibility of impacting the river traffic and water supply in the Niger river basin raises the stakes of regional economies’ dependence on the river. Such precedent as the Egyptian dispute with Ethiopia over building its Millennium Dam, potentially leading to Ethiopian leverage over the River Nile’s water scarcity downstream in Sudan and Egypt – in this instance Nigeria, and Africa’s most prosperous economy – suggests this to be a possible factor in the French and German military involvement.

Furthermore, with France holding key influence in Mali, one of its West African former colonies, notably, but not exclusively through the use of the CFA Franc currency, Germany has been able to exert its soft, diplomatic power to the benefit of its strong relationship with France. Beyond Mali, however, it is in fact Germany’s foot in the door that is invaluable as it seeks to secure its greater EU ambitions.

European stability. It is awfully difficult to strike the right balance, what the crumbling of the eastern Schengen Zone starkly illustrates. Germany’s concerted role against people smugglers in the Mediterranean off the coast of Libya, and its brokering of the Turkey-EU refugee deal, are just two examples of its concerted efforts to stem the flow of refugees. But Mali is a case where Germany intends to prevent the mass movement of African peoples at source through soft power, FDI, and assistance in establishing sound institutional groundwork for the volatile, weakly anchored democracy.

This military involvement is an indication of larger pan-European ambitions of independent EU battle groups and the notion of a European army.

Following awe-inspiring rapprochement between western Europe’s former Erzfeinde (arch enemies), France and Germany, and the development from the ECSC to EEC, to EU, a major indicator of the modern Franco-German alliance manifested itself through the creation of the French German Brigade in 1989. Now counting 5000 troops, and symbolically based in Müllheim, Germany, a town straddling the Franco-German border alongside the Corps’ Headquarters in Strasbourg, France, the Französisch-Deutsche Brigade is a testament to the neighbouring allies’ commitment to one another’s national interests.

Although a certified NATO Response Force, the Franco-German brigade was later appropriated by the EU in 2014 and rehashed as the EU Battle Group Force HQ. So promising is the potential for the Franco-German Brigade to function as a potential military arm of the EU, that Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg had already been integrated into the Corps by 1996. With the exception of Spain, this counts four of the Inner Six of the EEC, who contestably remain just as loyal to the European project to this day. In the Trump Era, it’s worth reiterating the necessity of all European allies to explore alternative military arrangements - this is equally applicable to the alliance between the ‘pacifist’ German state and nuclear power France.

Lastly, especially in light of the refugee crisis Germany exacerbated through its virtually open door refugee policy, Germany now aims to balance its own national interests (an increase in its labour supply) with the EU’s longevity. This means

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illustration by Ben Crawford

Germany is operating in line with its modern day military deployments in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but with the notable exception of acting outside the remit of NATO. While Kosovo was a European-based conflict with ramifications for Baltic stability, and Afghanistan was an arguably fruitless effort to prevent the spread of radical Islamic terrorism in Europe, Germany’s growing confidence to act within its self-defined limits, and outside of traditionally NATO-dictated operations, while pursuing the same causes, demonstrates its growing strategic independence.

This marks a shift from its modern military pacifism and limited, US-defined participation, towards its establishment as a legitimate international actor. Considering the USA’s isolationism and growing disregard towards Europe under President Trump, Germany is picking up the reins as Europe’s shining star. Herein lies one of German Defence Minister, Ursula von der Leyen’s grounds for the EU’s Permenant Structured Cooperation (PESCO) joint Franco-German initiative, announced on the 13th November. With

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Germany, supported by the European Commission, spearheading the case for an Armee der Europäer (army of Europeans), there lie exciting times ahead for the ‘Koalition der Willigen’ (the willing coalition).

It is equally Germany’s intention for the EU and its member states to benefit from the stabilisation of the Maghreb. The refugee crisis was the event which tested the very fundamentals of the European project. There was no political will for its member states to redistribute refugees equally, and Brexit, the first member state departure from the European Union, was contestably secured through the misrepresentation of the refugee crisis. But while Brexit is now being negotiated, the prevention of further Africans fleeing to Europe serves to allay growing Euroscepticism from the Visegrád states, notably Poland and Hungary, the harshest critiques of the crisis, and whose populist Eurosceptic governments are now stirring discord in the EU’s east.

What remains to be seen is, however, plentiful. Will Germany have contributed to the stemming of the flow of refugees from central Africa? Will Germany have been able to avert a further blow to fragile internal EU social cohesion? And will the EU extend what it describes as a ‘European Training Mission in Mali’ beyond May 2018 in line with the Bundestag’s extension and expansion of the Bundeswehr’s missions’ scope? It remains to be seen. With Uncle Sam and NATO’s relevance dwindling, it’s time Germany and the EU put its money where its mouth is and give PESCO its unconditional backing.

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LEIPZIGER: A GUIDE FOR MANAGING CAPITALISM

By Jamie Richardson

N

early thirty years since reunification in 1989, the reaps of German East-West solidarity are at last coming to fruition, with Leipzig standing at the forefront of East German economic success. Nothing reflects this transformation from a Soviet industrial stronghold into a neoliberal success story more poignantly than Leipzig’s city centre skyline: the intrusive, yet, utterly bland concrete cuboid that is The Westin Hotel fittingly juxtaposes the unmissable Panorama Tower. Foreign investment has undoubtedly played a role in the city’s revitalisation. Yet there exists something more pertinent to this capitalist fairy-tale, a degree of social consciousness which I had never experienced previously. An air of alternativeness flows throughout Leipzig, and not the kind Jörg Meuthen’s AfD would boast about.

The trouble is when writing about a place you love is the ease with which you can slip into the “let’s sell this place to as many people as possible” kind of mind-set.

However, the essence that I desperately want to capture through my words is not one of senseless admiration for Leipzig, but rather that of a hopefulness for the future. The polarisation of British and U.S. politics in recent years has, in my opinion, skewered our perception of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’; the former adhering to liberal fascist political correctness, whilst the latter are condemned to the all too simplistic labels such as Nazis and Racists.

The constant bickering between both sides has left ideologically driven neoliberal economic policies free (TTIP nearly ruined the nation-state forever) to run rampant over the economy: no, I don’t like there being a St*rbucks on every street corner. How does the insurmountable number of Starbucks in Leeds actually relate to Leipzig? - where, by the way, there is only one Starbucks in the entire town. I believe the relationship is inherent.

The starting point for this journey towards hope begins in the most core and fundamental organ of city: the transport. Upon arrival in Leipzig, you will be greeted by an array of trams of all shapes and

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sizes, manufactured in both communist and capitalist systems. The Leipzig tram system is i mpressive. It far outshines any mode of motor transport available in Leeds, both in price and efficiency. The layout mimics that of the Moscow metro: a circle/central line dissected by other lines feeding out into the city’s other districts. Pietro Hammel, a Dutch city planning theorist, stresses the importance of a well-rounded public transport system for two reasons. Firstly, the encompassing nature of the circle ring means that within the city centre you have access to all tram lines. Thus, the need for cars, and more importantly taxis, within the city centre is massively reduced. Secondly, the reduced need for automobiles then strengthens the argument for pedestrianisation of the city centre, as is the case in Leipzig’s baroque core. In such a system it is the utilitarian functions of transport which is favoured, not the ego-centric ‘function’ of transport, where displaying your wealth through your car occupies the primacy. It begs the question as to why British councils and governments (who determine the budgets) have avoided introducing such projects themselves. If efficacy and utilitarianism of transport is not prioritised, we are left with a winding one-way road system where pedestrians and cyclists alike choke on the fumes of neoliberal transport policy and self-indulging consumerism.

Although installing a utilitarian transport system may serve as a resolution to clogged-up town centres, it does little to address another key aspect of city life - the dynamic relationship between its inhabitants. According to Hammel, it is this dynamism that defines the urban lifestyle. In densely populated areas all members of society are interlinked: the house husband who does the weekly shops at the market takes the tram. The same tram driver who takes a taxi to the theatre on the weekend, whilst students take note of Tchaikovsky’s intricate compositions. Money, acquaintances and knowledge are constantly changing hands. Indeed, these relationships, which at first glance appear intrinsic to, rather, inevitable

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in city life, are actually a result of city planning and extensive research. When developing, renovating or even constructing a new suburb it is not simply a question of cramming as many people into a square metre and hoping for the best. City planners have to take into account necessity of diversity of the landscape, offering a mix of private (housing), semi-private (restaurants) and public spaces (museums). Otherwise, one is at risk of creating sleeper regions, an issue typically associated with large post-Soviet cities.

The ideal result of meticulous city planning is as follows: a large urban area that consists of multiple socio-economic cores, each individual in nature, that not only allow dynamic urban relationships to flourish, but also prevent mono-centric city structures, like those of Leeds or Reading, to develop. In this respect, Leipzig has succeeded. To further explore the intricacies of city planning and the division of different spatial topographies, I’d like to employ the example of Lindenau, the district which I called home for a few months in 2017.

The core of this bustling region is the Lindenauer Markt (Lindenau Market). The square itself is a public space, which is encompassed by colourful baroque apartment buildings, i.e. the private space.

When the market traders of Middle Eastern origin are having their days off, Kaufland (a supermarket) – note, a semi-private space – is there to provide for late modern society’s consumerist needs. Allotments (semi-private) offer refreshing greenery to the yellowy tinge of the baroque, whilst the two theatres, public spaces, offer alternative creative outlets for adults and children alike.

The list could go on.

The diversity I’ve just outlined is paradoxical to the situation at home, however. Hyde Park unequivocally lacks any sort of spatial balance. Damp student housing, food and booze outlets – which are for the most part extortionately overpriced – and a primary school is the extent of our spatial diversity. I’m not suggesting we knock down our authentic red brick terraces to open a theatre, per say.

I do question, however, the short-sightedness of the council’s decision to give planning permission for new housing developments such as Victoria Gardens. These new-builds offer nothing to the spatial diversity. They are available to only the upper quartile of the student population.

In short, they represent the prioritisation of neoliberal interests over the needs of the local community, nothing short of typical for today’s Britain.

The next point I’d like to address is slightly more subjective in nature and steps away for Pietro Hammel’s theoretical approach. Aesthetics are everywhere. On a human level, our dress sense, hairstyle and body modifications convey an unshakeable impression of who we are. We match our aesthetic to who we perceive ourselves to be,

or rather, to how we want perceived. My frosted tips unconditionally pay tribute to my noughties nostalgia.

Yet, as a whole, it is difficult to define – let’s say – the aesthetics of Leeds. In Leipzig, for the most part, this is anything but the case.

Outside of the city’s lively baroque centre, there exists a paradoxical aesthetic which, despite its complex components, arrives as a whole; as a unified pluralistic palimpsest of then, today and tomorrow. Socialism, neoliberalism and ethical capitalism. A hochmodern tram stops in front of Westwerk – a converted soviet factory which puts on arts exhibition of all kinds. The tram stop itself is covered in graffiti and stickers advocating hard-left and anti-consumerist slogans: Hier steht Eure Werbung (Here’s your advert). In this visual metaphor, the soviet factory is the ‘then’, the tram the ‘today’ and postmodern slogan the ‘tomorrow’. From this multi-faceted aesthetic, I’d like to explore the ‘tomorrow’.

This tomorrow, perhaps better described as hopefulness is the essence of Leipzig. It takes many forms. The Wohnprojekt (house project) is one of these forms. A Wohnprojekt is, in my eyes, a means to self-sufficiency in late modern capitalist society. Its principals are ironically based on the ‘principles’ of capitalist economics; i.e. supply and demand. In a Wohnprojekt a community-based project is undertaken. Educating newly arrived refugees, promoting veganism within a district or creating alternative artistic spaces for the romanticised poor artist are all examples of potential projects. The project, in other words, constitutes the supply. The demand is the consumption of these projects, be it from people who rely on its services or from those supporting the project for ideological or moral reasons.

The donations – I stress these systems work fundamentally on a give-as-you-feel basis – fund the living quarters for those who run the project. The circle is thus complete. I see these projects as an imperative action, whose origin stems from the discontent with neoliberalism. People take unto themselves these challenges in order to fix and resolve issues that neoliberalism cannot, or perhaps will not. This pragmatic, imperative action is the essence of Leipzig. Whether it stems from the top-down city planning approach, or the neo-socialist grassroots organisations, the results are clear for all to see. The German youth are flocking to Hypezig – a legitimate pseudonym – to offer their contributions to this neo-Berlin paradise.

Yes, Leipzig is a capitalist city: its fundamentals are capitalist in nature and are sustained by an inherently neoliberal government that is Angela Merkel’s CDU. In Marxist terms, our overarching socio-economic conditions are indefinitely defined. Yet, and Leipzig is evidence of this, we are still able to manipulate these conditions on a microscale. In other words, we can define the length the chains that oppress us.

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BRI - CHINESE IMPERIALISM OR GERMAN PROTECTIONISM

By Tim van Gardingen

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he Silk Roads are returning. China’s largest and most ambitious international economic plan, the “One Belt One Road Initiative” (yidaiyilu), will see its influence tangibly spread over Asia, Africa and Europe. With newly planned trade corridors over much of the world, a vast number of countries will be affected by the initiative. Included in that number is Germany. The question arises: How will “One Belt One Road” impact on the country?

The “One Belt One Road” initiative has not appeared overnight. Xi Jinping first announced his masterwork in September 2013 and has developed it since then into an extremely ambitious vision. The Chinese leader pictures a better-connected world, held together by free trade and global cooperation. The proposed maritime ‘road’ would meander from Southeast Asia to Africa, where China has already been carrying out major infrastructure projects for a number of years. The ‘belt’ stretches across Central Asia and all the way to Western Europe.

“Inclusiveness” (baorongxing) is the central word to Xi’s rhetoric for the project. For many outside of China, this standpoint seems uncharacteristic of a country renowned for its history of closed borders and secrecy, but China has been gradually liberalising business since the start of

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its economic reforms in the late 70s.

China is now not only more open economically, but also confident in its business know-how. The “One Belt One Road” initiative signals China’s desire – and capability - to join the major players of the world economy.

A number of German media outlets are already expressing their fears over the new silk roads. Wary critics point to China’s track record for promoting their own form of ‘illiberal free trade’ which is at ends with the Western model of international trade, and expect its development to be damaging to German companies. The proximity of Putin to the Chinese leadership and his willingness to be part of the project scares the German media further.

This altogether raises concern towards China’s apparent desire to make economic in-roads into the Eurasian region on their own conditions.

Such behaviour is generally known as making trade agreements, and both Europe and America are quite used to doing it themselves.

Any bilateral agreement does of course have political implications, but Germany’s fear of working with China on predominantly Chinese terms is telling of previous agreements where Europe has been the instigator of negotiations. More justified would be a view of caution towards the kind of

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illustration by Emily Lodge

company, rather than Chinese FDI in general. Up to now, mainly only state-owned companies have been involved in the initiative. That could potentially lead to the Chinese Politburo assuming more political influence over international trade, usurping Chinese private companies.

Some German companies are, however, openly enthusiastic, with eyes fixed solidly on new business opportunities.

Duisburger Hafen in Nordrhein-Westfalen already considers itself a central point for trade relations not just between China and Germany, but also China and Europe. In October 2016, the port claimed in an announcement regarding expanding its China business that “when you are in Duisburg, you are in Europe”. Duisport already cooperates with Urumqi, China’s Far Western trade powerhouse; a city central

big ideas resolved with pragmatism. Deng Xiaoping’s infamous pragmatism brushed off on the nation, and has remained the culture ever since. As the new Silk Roads progresses, what Germany is likely to find even more challenging than China’s apparent lack of clear planning is the country’s special brand of pragmatism coupled with force.

But German critics’ fears of the “One Belt One Road” Initiative are focussed on the wrong concerns. The massive infrastructure project will not necessarily be bad for Germany and its businesses, but will change political and economic relations in ways which are as of yet hard to predict. What is certain: the “One Belt One Road” initiative will change both Sino-German and global relations massively.

to the new Silk Road’s expansion due to its strong position in Central Asia.

Some Chinese groups are meanwhile not entirely satisfied with current Sino-German trade relations.

The China International Investment Promotion Agency accused Germany of protectionism directed at China following changes in Germany’s regulation of foreign trade . Yet, as both countries are members of the WTO, it seems unlikely that Germany is actually able to target China unilaterally with trade restrictions. It is, however, noteworthy that Germany is the one being criticised for poor international trade practice.

The standpoint also parrots Xi Jinping’s ‘inclusiveness’ rhetoric.

Germany does not appreciate the very general sounding rhetoric China prefers to use when it talks about official plans.

Just like the extremely vague (and clearly related) Chinese Dream (zhongguomeng) back home in China, there is no exact, set in stone plan for the new Silk Roads.

Instead, China offers a lofty dream with networks of possible trade corridors on maps with a mysterious lack of national borders. Daniel Müller from the Ostasiatischen Verein believes that the new Silk Road is more of a conglomerate of many individual initiatives rather than one unified grand plan. From the Chinese perspective, this pragmatic approach is perfectly normal; indeed, it is part of modern Chinese culture. For Germany however, the uncertainty raises concern further.

Much of the misunderstanding between Germany and China stems from differences in political and business culture.

Germany favours clear, objectively measurable plans. China, on the other hand, prefers

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UK REPLICATION OF MITTELSTAND SUCCESS

By Julia Constable

G

ermany has fostered an industry-focused envi-

ronment by investing in the growth of small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs). As the third largest exporter in the world, Germany has an enviable trade-surplus which has enabled the German economy to recover faster from the global recession than any other world power. Ultimately, this rigorous investment has allowed the country to maintain the strength of their manufacturing industry which continues to drive long-term economic growth. In contrast, the service sector dominates the UK market, accounting for approximately 80% of economic output. Although the UK’s persistent trade deficit has been counterbalanced in previous years by the income generated from foreign investments and banking services, is it time for us to emulate the German Mittelstand model?

FIRST OF ALL… WHAT EXATLY DOES ‘MITTELSTAND’ MEAN? The German Mittelstand is a term that refers to the large mixture of small to medium sized businesses which have been the driving force behind Germany’s success as an economic powerhouse since the late 1800s. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, more than 99% of companies operating in Germany are family-minded businesses belonging to the so-called Mittelstand, employing over 80% of the German workforce. Although small to medium enterprises are typically businesses with less than 500 employees, globally operating firms are also often referred to as part of the Mittelstand if they are still family-owned or are run with the same collective long-term focus, determined to deliver growth and sustainability for employees and employers alike. For example, as predominantly family owned businesses, well-known global giants such as Aldi, the discount supermarket chain, or

21

the worldwide engineering firm Bosch, are still considered as members of the Mittelstand.

Ultimately, German SMEs are the small but mighty pillars supporting Germany’s export-driven economy, making Germany the richest country in Europe.

HOW WAS THE MITTELSTAND ESTABLISHED? The foundations of the successful manufacturing-orientated Mittelstand were developed during the German Industrial Revolution of the 1850s. Although Great Britain had initially pioneered the innovations in heavy industry leading to global trade success far earlier, the Germans were able to gain a greater competitive advantage in the long-term through the establishment of favourable labour and employment laws which favoured employees and garnered the loyalty and productivity of the skilled labour force. Conversely, the British focused on the development of tertiary sector services, unable to match the manufacturing rigour of competitors such as Germany and the United States.

Furthermore, as a result of the loans afforded to Germany by the American Marshall Plan after the devastation of World War II, the German Chancellor Conrad Adenauer and then Finance Minister Ludwig Erhard were able to establish the social market economy: a new economic system which mixed the uncontrolled competition of free market capitalism with the safety net of government intervention. The combination of the capitalist principles of free foreign trade and exchange of goods with the strict government regulation of directives such as universal healthcare and pension insurance has fostered an environment which values small to medium family-minded busineses with a collectivist outlook.

Moreover, fiscal factors have had a large impact on the success of the Mittelstand. The

NO 1 / AUTUMN 2017

government-owned KfW Development Bank founded in 1948 has played a crucial role in funding and supporting SMEs, by providing short and long-term loans with relativelystatic borrowing costs, whilst Germany’s entry into the Eurozone in 2002 devalued the currency, subsequently making exports cheaper for overseas buers, increasing demand for products produced by German manufacturers.

HOW CAN THE UK REPLCATE THE MITTELSTANDMODEL? Ultimately, the success of German SMEs has been a result of decades of investment and planning. If the UK were to attempt to replicate the success of the Mittelstand, there would be several barriers which would need to be overcome. Firstly, Germany has the highest youth employment rate in Europe due to its strong focus on training the next generation of skilled labourers; the dual education system emphasises the importance of practical work experience from a young age by combining apprenticeships with vocational school courses to ensure that the Mittelstand has a sustainable pool of skilled workers to maintain growth. In contrast, the British education system is still academically focused, encouraging young people to work towards university degrees rather than promoting the value of vocational courses. Moreover, the historical foundation of the Mittelstand stems from the necessity to create an economic miracle from the rubble of postwar Germany in the late 1940s. This desperate need to collectively rebuild the economic foundations of a country decimated by war, combined with the necessity to reform and reshape the collective consciousness of a nation resulted in the development of a deep-rooted, specialist mind-set which differs from that of the British.

The main goal is to instil workers with the skills, passion and drive to painstakingly grow a business with a longterm view and a low risk strategy.

In contrast, the British favour high-risk high-reward strategies with a “stiff upper lip” attitude towards uncertainty and potential danger. The prevailing capitalist principles in Britain have promoted an individualistic attitude which is ingrained in the business culture; this tendency to “muddle through” combined with a desire to remain flexible and innovative often hinders long term planning and investment which can be seen as a hindrance when adapting to change. Furthermore, according to the Forum for Private Business, nearly two thirds of UK based entrepreneurs plan to sell their SMEs in order to fund their retirement, suggesting that most family-run businesses have no intention of retaining the company for further generations.

Although UK business owners should look to Germany as a successful competitor from whom we can learn, the extraordinary historical foundations of the economy are irreplicable. The development of the social market economy and the triumph of the post-war Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) helped to develop a stronger sense of society for the Germans who are invested in securing their long-term economic stability. The Mittelstand is truly proof that necessity is the mother of invention.

These differences are illustrated by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions; although his study regarding the cultural values of IBM employees worldwide during the 1960s and 1970s is now rather dated, his attempt to illustrate the effect of culture on the values held by its population still holds value. For example, when comparing the cultural values of Germany and the United Kingdom, Germans prioritise long-term, risk averse planning with a more collectivist mindset – something that had been fostered due to the stringent regulation of the social market economy. Whereas, their British counterparts are far more individualistic, risk-taking and short-term orientated, all factors which directly contradict the concepts of Mittelstand firms.

Culturally, this collectivist instinct means that Germans are more inclined to foster workers from a young age in a family-minded organisation in order to create loyal workers who are willing to dedicate themselves to a business for a lifetime.

POLITIK : PERSPEKTIVE

22

VW AND TRUST IN BIG BUSINESS

By Julia Constable

T

rusting the words and deeds of big business has taken a hammer blow to public confidence in the wake of the Volkswagen scandal. But all large multinationals have skeletons in their cupboards, whether it be fiddling pollution emissions; low employee pay; polluting and contaminating pristine environments; endangering wildlife, etc. As exposed with VW, hoodwinking the public has been widespread – and (apparently) without sanction, which would suggest that governmental authorities created to oversee standards and pollution control have either not been doing their job and/or have been complicit in allowing such grievous breeches to go undetected.

The German carmaker VW is a special case, because this company is part-owned by Lower Saxony, so in this respect politicians (in effect) are the company owners, and in this situation the German body politic is (uncomfortably) riding two horses, legislator and shareholder. That type of noxious mixture creates a lot of suffocating black smoke when it comes to enforcement!

Some multinationals prefer to be “voluntarily” audited by third parties to “prove” the value of their products in terms of purity; quality; fair trade; sustainability, etc. Others prefer to obtain accreditation through the ISO Marque (International Organization for Standardisation), a system of combining national standards from across the world into a unified World Recognised Standard. As it is clear some multinationals are not behaving ethically, it is probably about time all products were forced to comply with a recognised International Standard, which ensures the highest standards are being consistently and objectively met. What is needed is a strong independent International Standards Authority which would be able to (heavily) fine transgressors and would require manufacturers to police such a system. This would ensure compliance and improve the quality of all manufactured goods. Clearly, without tougher policing and harsher penalties big brands can continue to flout rules and standards in what will become a race to the bottom.

Image edited by Ben Crawford

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NO 1 / AUTUMN 2017

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ENOUGH IS ENOUGH, DIVEST! It is time for the University of Leeds to take our calls for divestment seriously and put the planet ahead of their vested interests in the fossil fuel industry which profits from climate crisis.

How much money does the University of Leeds have invested in Fossil Fuels?

The university currently has £6,988,254 invested in fossil fuels. Including: £800,869 in SSE, £544,852 in BP and £454,217 in Shell. Thats 10.7% of the total endowment fund.

Why is this significant?

Climate change poses an unprecedented ecological and humanitarian risk. By engaging with fossil fuel companies, The University of Leeds is damaging it's credibility and leadership role in shaping a fossil free future, and failing in their responsibilities to tackle climate change.

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What are we asking?

We ask that the University Council adopts, at least a partial divestment strategy and commits to: Divesting from companies that are involved in coal and tar sands operations A positive reinvestment strategy, focused upon shifting the divested capital into companies dedicated to achieving a low carbon transition Freezing new investment in the top 200 fossil fuel companies that control the majority of carbon reserves.

LUU People & Planet We have weekly meetings on Tuesday at 6pm in the Common Ground

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