UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN
CBITMUN’12
STUDY GUIDE Model United Nations
General Assembly
Distr.: General
A/CONF.CBITMUN/PC/INF.1
Original: English Report of the Committee Summary The following is the report by the Executive Board of the Chaitanya Bharathi Institute of Technology Model United Nations (CBIT-‐MUN) 2012, for the United Nations Convention against Corruption Committee (UN-‐CAC).
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN
Contents Welcome to the United Nation Convention against Corruption i.) Chair: Mr. Milind Sharma ii.) Vice-‐Chair: Miss. Missy Chareka iii.) Director: Mr. Riyaz Sundrani I) II) III) IV)
Agenda Council Report Concluding Remarks References
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN
CBIT MUN 2012
It gives me immense pleasure to welcome you all to the second edition of CBITMUN.
I am a second year mechanical engineering student but debate is something I enjoy doing the most.
Sreekar Reddy As students of engineering it took a tremendous effort for the team of the 2011 conference to Secretary General ensure that it was such a success.
Suraj Peri Deputy Secretary General Yaswant Adiraju
The number of MUNs are growing at a rapid rate in India with the whole nation embracing this concept with open arms and with more and more students involving themselves in MUNs we could initiate a revolution that would lead to young minds assuming greater responsibility. CBITMUN returns with 7 councils this year which shall ensure high quality debate and a very satisfactory council experience.
Under Secretary General
I take great pride in taking over as the Secretary General of CBITMUN and my team and I shall ensure that August – September 2012 is an experience each and everyone of you will cherish.
Thanmay Krishna
I thank all of you who participated in last year’s conference and I hope that we see your continued support this year as well.
Chargé d’affaires
Last year we promised an experience
Sharat Chander
This year we promise a phenomenon Sreekar Reddy Secretary General CBITMUN 2012 sreekar.reddy@cbitmun.com
Chargé d’affaires
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN
CBIT MUN 2012
Sreekar Reddy Dear Delegates, Welcome to the CBITMUN phenomenon! As the role of Deputy Secretary General, Secretary General Suraj Peri Deputy Secretary General Yashwant Adiraju
ensuring quality debate and MUNing satisfaction to all delegates present will be the highest priority and failure in achieving the said goals in not an option. The councils for this year have been planned, Keeping in mind the globalization and rapid changes in the geo-political scenario. I hope this encourages a dynamic and solution oriented debate in every council. I am active MUNner and MUN is an addiction which is hard to leave. Procedure is what i am and deviating from protocol is a rarity.
Representing such a phenomenon gives me great pride. This MUN is back by the best team that will ensure our delegates receive the best hospitality and service from our city and the CBIT family.
Under Secretary General
This is not just a competition, it’s an experience waiting to be encrypted into the hearts and mind of the delegates.
Thanmay Krishna
Reposting the words of our Secretary General
Chargé d’affaires
“Last year we promised an Experience,
Sharat Chander
This year, we promise a Phenomenon! ” “Pangea Le Reunion!”
Chargé d’affaires -Suraj Peri Deputy Secretary General CBITMUN 2012
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN
CBIT MUN 2012
Dear Delegates,
I would like to take this opportunity to formally welcome you to the CBIT Model United Nations
Sreekar Reddy Conference-‐ 2 012 a nd m ore s pecifically t o U nited N ations C onvention A gainst C orruption committee. Secretary General Suraj Peri
On my behalf, I assure you that I will try my best to make this conference an experience worth
Deputy Secretary General
will help me in giving you that experience. We will try and give you the best debate possible on the
remembering. I am assisted by Vice Chair Ms. Missy Chareka and Director Mr. Riyaz Sundrani who given agendas.
Yashwant Adiraju
I would like to give you few pointers beforehand which should help you in the coming days.
Under Secretary General
Firstly, never be intimidated by the executive board or any other delegate. We, the executive
Thanmay Krishna
forward and speak up if you have anything to contribute to debate.
Chargé d’affaires
Secondly, background guide is just the starting point of your research not the end. It is just the tip
Sharat Chander
you that coveted award and above all respect of the delegates.
board are to moderate the debate and other delegates are there to contribute to same. So come
of the iceberg. Research much more because at the end of the day it is the research which earns
Thirdly, maintain decorum at all times, follow Rules of Procedure and be diplomatic. It goes
Chargé d’affaires without s aying that we are the ambassadors of our respective countries, therefore be at your best during the whole time.
Fourthly, be honest during feedback sessions. I have a habit of having feedback sessions at the
end of the day and till I don’t know where I am going wrong, I cannot make the committee better than it already is. So speak up delegates.
At the end, loosen up. Relax. Trust me, it will be the one of best experiences of your lives. The secretariat have worked hard for this conference to come together and they won’t leave any stone unturned to make this conference worth it. May the force be with you.
Regards Milind Sharma
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN
CBIT MUN 2012
Greetings Delegates,
Sreekar Reddy It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the 2 annual CBIT-‐MUN! I commend you all, for being selected to take part in this experience. Secretary General nd
Suraj Peri
As a Canadian coming to India for the first time, I am extremely excited to venture into a country filled with history, culture and a nation that is currently making its mark on the world stage. As for what to expect in Hyderabad, I have been told that while there is the “hustle and bustle of New Delhi” and the “glitz and glam of Mumbai”. . . Hyderabad is “the deep soul” of India!
Deputy Secretary General
rd
Yashwant Adiraju Under Secretary General Thanmay Krishna Chargé d’affaires Sharat Chander
Last year, I was chosen by the United Nations to help assist in the implementation the 3 Global Model United Nations (GMUN). They sent me to the United Nations Headquarters in New York, USA and after that, to Incheon-‐Seoul, South Korea. There, I had the utmost pleasure of meeting the Honourable Secretary-‐General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban Ki-‐Moon. Ban Ki-‐Moon said to the youth delegates: “Your interest in international affairs comes at a time when young people are playing a growing role in shaping our world. The revolutions sweeping the Middle East have been led largely by youth, who have made up for their lack of political power and military might with dedication, creativity and courage. The results have left a remarkable imprint. These youth and others around the world are re-‐making the way we achieve social and political change. They are confounding dictators and authoritarians who stand in the way of progress. . . Today, position in society matters less than how much energy and principled action a person brings to a cause. This new paradigm offers expansive opportunities for young people to make their mark” (Ban Ki-‐Moon, August 2011) I would like to reiterate the words of the Secretary-‐General. Do not take this conference and experience in a casual manner. Rather see it as an avenue of educating yourself, debating, negotiating, understanding the views of nations, the power of conflict, the need for solution and the complexities of all of this.
Chargé d’affaires
Make new friends, step out of your comfort zone, be seen and heard and, trust me…you will be a better person because whether you realize it or not, you are actually are making a difference in this world.
Thank you! I look forward to meeting each and every one of you!
Missy Chareka
Vice-‐Chairwoman (United Nations Convention against Corruption – UNCAC)
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II) Agenda Agenda 1: Illegal drugs and weapon trafficking in Latin American States The illegal drugs and weapons trade poses a significant and growing threat to national and international security with due implications on public safety, health, democratic institutions and economic stability across the globe.
Agenda 2: Conflict Diamonds in Africa For generations diamonds have been marketed around the world as tokens of power and love. Easily concealed, immensely valuable and largely untraceable, stones from rebel held mines have raised billions of dollars in world markets to finance insurgency. For years, these conflict diamonds have allowed rebel leaders to arm and equip their armies in violation of UN sanctions.
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN
III) Council Report
United
Nations
Convention
against
Corruption (UN-‐CAC) Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish. This unfortunate phenomenon is found in all countries—big and small, rich and poor—but it is in the developing world that its effects are most destructive. The UNCAC deals with forms of corruption that had not been covered by many of the earlier international instruments, such as trading in official influence, general abuses of power, and various acts of corruption in the private sector. The Convention requires countries to establish criminal and other offences to cover a wide range of acts of corruption, if these are not already crimes under domestic law. A great deal of International cooperation is necessary with countries agreeing to cooperate with one another in every aspect of the fight against corruption, including prevention, investigation, and the prosecution of offenders. A further significant development of the Convention is with dealing with the recovery of assets, a major concern for countries that pursue the assets of former leaders and other officials accused or found to have engaged in corruption.
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I.
Introduction
It is currently estimated that approximately 230 million people (~5% of the world’s adult population), have used an illicit drug at least once in 2010. “Problem drug users” number about 27 million and throughout the world, illicit drug use appears to be generally stable, however it continues to be rising in several developing countries. Heroin, cocaine and other drugs kill around 0.2 million people each year, shattering families and bringing misery to thousands of other people. Illicit drugs also undermine economic and social development and contribute to crime, instability, insecurity and the spread of HIV. (United Nations World Drug Report: 2012 – Preface) One of the key impacts of illicit drug use on society is the negative health consequences experienced by its members. Drug use also puts a heavy financial burden on society. Expressed in monetary terms, some US$ 200 billion-‐250 billion (0.3-‐0.4 per cent of global GDP) would be needed to cover all costs related to drug treatment worldwide (United Nations World Drug Report: 2012 – Page 4) The costs associated with drug-‐related crime are also substantial. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, a study suggested that the costs associated with drug-‐related crime (fraud, burglary, robbery and shoplifting) in England and Wales were equivalent to 1.6 per cent of GDP, or 90 per cent of all the economic and social costs related to drug abuse (United Nations World Drug Report: 2012 – Page 4) The evolution of the complex global illicit drug problem is clearly driven by a range of factors. Socio demographic trends, such as the population’s gender and age balance and the rate of urbanization, are influential. If the demographic profile of a given society changes, drug use behaviour changes as well. What can be said for sure is that governments and societies will continue to face different policy choices when tackling drug-‐related and crime-‐related problems while securing international peace and development and upholding human rights.
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II. Topic A: Illegal drugs and weapon trafficking in Latin American States A. Historical Perspective The alliance between drug traffickers and guerrillas in Latin America arose during the 1970s in response to the reciprocal needs of such groups due to the great pressure exerted on them by the regional security forces.In the initial agreements, the role of the guerrillas was to protect crops,laboratories and access roads, with a view to diverting the operations of the security forces. Drug traffickers, in turn, committed themselves to funding the former and supporting them logistically, especially through weapons supply.1 Within this context, the 1990s were characterized by the following circumstances: •
New links between international criminal organizations;
•
The need for terrorist organizations to maintain their operational levels, by resorting to self-‐funding of their activities.
Both circumstances gave rise to: (a) the strengthening of regional drug trafficking groups, due to the expansion of their areas of influence; (b) the strengthening and updating of the alliances of these groups with terrorist organizations which received logistical and economic support in return for their guaranteeing the security of illegal crops. Two “cases” have been selected, as examples, in which we can observe the 1
http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-‐art917.pdf
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN interrelation between arms trafficking groups and other international criminal organizations. 1) The EPICON Case (Bolivia 1993) The EPICON case clearly shows the link between a group made up of Bolivian citizens, that forged documents, and an international arms trafficking group, most of whose members were European citizens, and which in December 1991 opened a branch office of the London firm of EPICON in Bolivia. They smuggled weapons mostly came from Portugal, Russia, Bulgaria and former Czechoslovakia. They were sold to States that were under a United Nations embargo, and also to irregular groups, terrorist groups, drug trafficking groups, mercenaries and common criminals.The weapons smuggling group was headed by Gunter Pausch, a German citizen married to Tania Isele Torrico Zuazo. Taking advantage of his wife’s contacts, Gunter Pausch and his group obtained forged Bolivian passports,courtesy visas and even faked end-‐use certificates with seals of the Bolivian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior. These documents were offered in Europe not only through the EPICON company, but also through KINTEX(Bulgaria) and ETEM (Portugal).The group that operated in Bolivia and supplied fake documents was made up mainly of members of the chancellery of the neighbouring country. 2 Early in 1993, the German police warned the Bolivian authorities about the activities of an international arms trafficking group which was operating from La Paz and which intended to deliver arms to Croatia and Iraq. The Bolivian authorities began a thorough investigation with the help not only of the German authorities but also that of interpol.The investigation led to the discovery of the members of the network, its modus operandi and finally, to the arrest of the main persons involved. 2
http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-‐art917.pdf
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN 2. The Brazilian Case (The Vermelho Commando and Arms Trafficking) Around August 1995, the Brazilian authorities discovered that the Vermelho Commando had engaged in a combination of arms smuggling and drug trafficking. The deliveries were made from Bolivia and Paraguay to São Paulo and from there to Rio de Janeiro. Within two months, the São Paulo police intercepted two combined cargoes of drugs and AR-‐15 rifles and 223 mm Ruger guns (USA) for military use. The weapons were transported together with cocaine or basic paste in small planes that landed in clandestine strips near towns of the interior of São Paulo State, such as Piracicaba, Catanduva and Marilia, and were then distributed locally or sent to Rio de Janeiro.
B. Current Situation According to the most recent data from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), increases in cocaine use have been reported in Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, and Haiti.3 These countries are notably located along major cocaine transit routes. The primary pathway today for illegal drugs entering the United States from abroad is through the Central America-‐Mexico corridor. According to 2008 estimates, 90% of all cocaine entering the United States flowed through Mexico or its territorial waters, with at least 42% of that cocaine having first stopped in Central America. A large, but unknown proportion of opiates, as well as foreign-‐produced marijuana and methamphetamine also flow through the same pathways. 4 The overwhelming use of the Central America-‐Mexico corridor as a transit zone in recent years represents a major shift in trafficking routes. In the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, drugs primarily transited through the Caribbean into South Florida. Venezuela has become a major transit point for drug flights through the Caribbean— 3
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-‐and-‐analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf
4
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN particularly Haiti and the Dominican Republic—into the United States as well as to Europe. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, the Bahamas continues to serve as a major transit country for both Jamaican marijuana and South American cocaine.Besides going to the United States, Latin American drugs, particularly cocaine, are also shipped to Europe. An increasing percentage of drug shipments from Latin America to Europe now transit West Africa. Drugs destined for Europe mainly depart Latin America via Venezuela through the Caribbean or via the eastern coast of Brazil. Latin America’s central role in the illicit drug market stems largely from the Andean region’s unique position as the world’s only source region for coca and cocaine. Another major factor contributing to the region’s prominence in today’s drug trade is its proximity to the United States, a major drug consumption market. Underlying factors that have allowed drug trafficking to flourish include poverty and a lack of viable alternative livelihoods for farmers; corruption;weaknesses in law enforcement and justice-‐sector capacity to deter drug traffickers; the presence of insurgent groups involved in drug production and trafficking in some countries; and the geographical impediments to interdiction, including difficult-‐to-‐monitor political borders and maritime terrain. Uneven political support for counterdrug efforts may also fuel drug trafficking. The Latin America and the Caribbean region has among the highest crime rates, including violent crime rates, of any region in the world. Recent studies have shown that, while other factors like income inequality are still contributing factors, criminality, particularly related to drug trafficking, has replaced political and regional conflicts as a major source of violence in many Latin America and Caribbean countries. Some violence is directly associated with the protection of drug trafficking routes and syndicate power struggles. Criminality directly associated with the illegal drug trade increases the prevalence of related crimes, including kidnapping, murder, money laundering, and firearms
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN trafficking. Involvement in the drug trade alsonegatively affects licit economic development. Drug trafficking has also contributed to high levels of violence in several other countries in the region, including Belize, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Venezuela.
C. The United States factor The U.S. tends to attribute Central America’s drug problems to the region’s weaknesses: small size, limited resources, corruption, poverty, lack of integration, weak governments, ineffective law enforcement, and unstable economies. According to the 2011 UN World Drug Report, the largest hemispheric and global cocaine market “continues to be that of the United States, with an estimated consumption of 157 mt [metric tons] of cocaine, equivalent to 36% of global consumption.” 5 As long as a demand exists, drugs will be produced and transported, thereby exacerbating drug violence problems in Central America. Washington’s solution has been to pour billions into counter-‐narcotic efforts, such as the costly and criticized Mérida Initiative, which provides “equipment and training in support of law enforcement operations and technical assistance to promote the long-‐term reform, oversight and professionalization of [Latin America’s] security agencies.” Without proper policy adjustments, corruption, violence, and organized crime will continue to flourish in Central America.
D: Interrelationship between Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Arms Trade 5
http://www.coha.org/drug-‐trafficking-‐central-‐americas-‐dark-‐shadow/
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN The problems of drug trafficking and the illicit arms trade are phenomena that exhibit their own specific features and their own particular set of dynamics;they are, however, essentially related, and it is practically impossible to deal with each issue separately. Both of these issues have a very important place on the current international agenda, yet, paradoxically, the information and knowledge concerning them are highly inadequate given the complexity and extent of the problems they create. Drugs and arms are inoffensive phenomena in themselves, but, depending on the context in which they are used, they can be either beneficial or harmful to societies and individuals.In some areas, access both to drugs and arms is considerably restricted or prohibited; and in other areas it is commonly accepted and even encouraged. In both cases, it is generally considered that certain drugs and arms (heroin and assault weapons) are more lethal than others and that they should therefore not be available; the less lethal ones are, however, more tolerated and their distribution is extensive and widespread. As legitimate trades, drugs and arms generate considerable profits, as illicit trades, they account for the largest sectors of the black market. Both of these illegal trades, are often linked to drug smuggling,terrorist activities, guerrilla warfare and organized crime, as well as other types of low intensity conflict. In some cases, illicit trafficking in drugs and small arms is a precursor to trafficking in sensitive technologies, creating a spiral of corruption and other felonies of national and international proportions. Illicit trafficking therefore affects both the stability of States and the safety of their populations. There are no national or regional boundaries hindering this type of traffic: the problem is truly global with multifaceted ramifications.Curbing its development and proliferation requires a better assessment of the phenomenon and a new way of looking at problems and identifying solutions. In a world of growing interdependence, the greatest challenge today seems to be
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN that of making bold decisions establishing new priorities and agreeing to start innovative cooperative ventures, while changing old ways of thinking and working. This attitude constitutes a particular vision, which is an integral part of the quest for a new world order: seeking structural changes to the fabric of international security alone will not be enough to reach this goal; one must also dare to undertake profound transformations of fundamental values. Coping with the issue of illicit trafficking from a new perspective is therefore the sine quanon for success in this fight both on a national and an international level.
E: Understanding the Problem There is a real need today to address the issue of illicit trafficking in small arms and sensitive technologies from a variety of angles, taking into consideration their interrelationship and implications for other areas of social and State security. It is important that an effort be made to assess the illicit trafficking problem in different regions of the world. This has been the challenge that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has faced over the last several years. In an attempt to clarify the problem of illicit trafficking, it has organized different meetings and supported the publication of books describing, for example, what are small arms, what constitutes their illicit trafficking, and the kind of conflicts in which these weapons are being used.In addition, though it is a fact that some manufacturers and dealers have been involved in illegal transactions, the role of manufacturers and dealers in illegal trafficking in small arms is rarely addressed. The debate promoted by UNIDIR helps to fill that gap.There is also a need to understand illicit trafficking better because it is generally carried out in secret.
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN •
What are the schemes used to transfer weapons,substances and technologies?
•
What factors influence manufacturers and dealers to engage in illicit trafficking?
•
What are the different interrelationships between arms manufacturers and traffickers?
•
How and why is it so difficult to control illicit trafficking in a changing supply and demand environment?
Illegal trafficking in nuclear/radioactive substances has been a subject of growing concern since the late 1980s. In common with other problems involving the smuggling of illegal substances and equipment, curbing this type of trafficking is as much a problem of controlling national supplies of nuclear/radioactive material, as it is a matter of coordination of knowledge and information on an international level. While law enforcement, intelligence services and related institutions constitute the first counter-‐trafficking obstacles within national boundaries,several organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and others are also sensitive to the issue. As in the case of small arms and drugs, it is well known that efforts are being made to ferret out the specific sources of supply and the flow of demand of material related to the production of weapons of mass destruction. Efforts are also being made in many countries to improve the physical safety of installations which contain sensitive material and substances or where their transport takes place. 1. Yet what other kinds of cooperative measures exist on the national and international levels?
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN 2. Are those cooperation efforts sufficient? Is there room for improving individual and/or collective actions? The UNIDIR also addresses the role of terrorism in illicit trafficking. 1. How and when did drug cartels start supporting terrorist groups? 2. Are present trends in such support the s ame today as in the 1970s and 1990s? 3. Are there similarities in such trends from country to country or region to region? 4. How can national counter-‐terrorist measures cope with increasingly rich and heavily armed groups? 5. How could human and material resources bebetter managed to respond more appropriately to the mounting requirements of law enforcement and to strengthen information-‐ gathering institutions? The UNIDIR initiative is also stimulating thoughts on how institutions and Governments can be better prepared to counter illicit trafficking. There is a quest to highlight perspectives for new and improved synergies and international cooperation. In the area of small arms, for example, intensive efforts are under way at global and regional levels to reach agreement on curbing illicit trafficking in certain categories of small arms, ammunitions, and explosives. Yet, given the nature and status of the problem today, any such agreement would not have great practical effect if the responsible authorities are not given adequate means to enforce the law; not only on the national level, but also as regards region-‐wide strategies of surveillance, tracking and intervention.Moreover, it is not easy to organize multilateral action; the motivations and the manner whereby cooperation could be fostered depend on whether one is dealing with small arms, drugs or sensitive technologies. For example, cooperative efforts in the field of sensitive technologies must be seen against the background of the growing difficulties in controlling the export of such technologies while not hampering present or future development opportunities.An
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN additional obstacle is that, at the national level, few countries have a coherent legal regime that can make provision for preventive deterrent initiatives, law enforcement and punitive actions in all areas of illegal trafficking. Therefore:the international community must agree on a new agenda to combat illicit trafficking. Having acknowledged this basic premise, one should question how the strengthening of international cooperation can contribute to the creation of a new agenda to combat illicit trafficking. Should there be a call for new tactical and strategic approaches? Is there a need to have more encompassing multilateral actions? The answer to both of these questions is “yes”. What is needed today is an increase in the level of cooperation between and among those institutions and communities that could together, more effectively than alone, take action to combat illicit trafficking, be it in small arms, substances related to the production of weapons of mass destruction, or terrorism.There have been calls, for instance, to stimulate cooperation among intelligence services on a worldwide basis.
F: Issues to Address 1. Cascading. While States have played a direct and indirect role in promoting the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, their further diffusion has also resulted significantly from the cascading phenomenon,both among other States as well as within the State itself. In most cases,the initial supplies have been controlled or funnelled through State(mostly intelligence) agencies. But since the primary goal of such supplies has been to arm non-‐State actors and groups, the process does not remain confined within the original framework, and thus a “boomerang” effect is witnessed. The diffusion of weapons in Pakistan’ssociety following transfers to non-‐State actors by State agencies, is one of the
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN many examples. 2. Loose National Controls. A large amount of illicit drugs and spread of small arms is made possible by loose national controls. In fact, there is gross variation in the legislation on the subject varying from the belief that no controls should apply (as with arms in the United States) to Japan (where no weapon is allowed). Loose controls in the territories of the former Soviet Union are a special area of concern. 3. Retrenchment of Military Power. Availability, traffic, and proliferation of small arms have also received a boost from the effects of retrenchment of military power. A substantive draw down of military power has taken place since the Cold War started to wind down in the late 1980s, later coming to an end. The processes of disarmament and demobilization, wherever they have taken place, have increased the potential for proliferation, especially where controls have been lax or incentives for proliferation been high. 4. Transnational Ethnic and Ideological (including religious) factors, in conjunction with the communications revolution in all its facets, providing support for internal conflicts, raise the demand for small arms, including by sub-‐State and non-‐State actors. This is particularly acute in some aspects. 5. Narcotics Linkage. Drug trafficking is as mentioned, inevitably linked to the spread of small arms in the producing countries and transit territories. Transnational criminal activity, especially narcotics trafficking, is a major factor sustaining illicit transfers of small arms around the world. The focus on drug trafficking so far has been confined to tackling it as a social problem because of the direct impact on society and its physical and psychological health. Attention has also been paid to the factor of drug money laundering. But the relationship between drug trafficking/money laundering with the illicit transfers and spread of small arms and their financing, needs greater attention.
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN 6. Commercial Motive. The profit motive, especially since the linkage with narcotics trafficking provides very high dividends, is an important factor promoting illicit traffic in small arms. The manufacturing of such weapons outside State control has increased and will pose serious challenges in the future and this is the same for illegal drugs.
V. References 1) World Drug Report 2012 http://www.unodc.org/documents/dataandanalysis/WDR2012/WDR_2012_web_sma ll.pdf 2) World Drug Report 2011 http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-‐and-‐analysis/WDR2011/WDR2011-‐web.pdf 3) UNODC's Action against Corruption and Economic Crime http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html?ref=menuside 4) United Nations Convention against Corruption Text http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-‐ 50026_E.pdf 5) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-‐art917.pdf 6) Congressional Research Service http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf
7) Council on Hemispheric Affairs
http://www.coha.org/drug-‐trafficking-‐central-‐americas-‐dark-‐shadow/
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN Further Reading
1) Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/CTOC-‐COP.html
2) Drug Trafficking – Global Perspective
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-‐trafficking/index.html
3) Organized Crime
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-‐crime/index.html
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TOPIC – II -‐ CONFLICT DIAMONDS IN AFRICA. "Diamonds are forever" it is often said. But lives are not. We must spare people the ordeal of war, mutilations and death for the sake of conflict diamonds." In the Western world we are used to associating the word “diamond” with elegance, happiness and beauty. Few Westerners know anything of the spectrum of meaning that the precious stone has for various people of the world. The diamond industry has always had the potential for greatness – a nation blessed with natural deposits of this rare gem could benefit greatly from selling the stones to the world market, and then use the profits to maintain peace, stability, and a more comfortable life for its people. But unfortunately the discovery of diamond deposits has not always led to instances of great happiness and success. On the contrary, regions of the world plagued by civil unrest and war have often used this resource to fund destructive endeavors. In particular, diamonds in West Africa have been used for the last 30 or so years to fund rebel groups and their desire to take control of their nations by violence and intimidation. In such conflicted regions of the world, diamonds lose their connotation of beauty and elegance and are in stead stained with blood. In this paper, I discuss the many ways in which “conflict diamond” has brought nothing but poverty, suffering and war to the West African people. I explain what world organizations such as the UN have done in order to counteract the adverse effects of the conflict diamond on the African community, and the extent to which such efforts have been successful. 6
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http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Conflict%20diamonds%20in%20West%20Africa.htm
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DEFINITION The United Nations has defined the term conflict diamond as follows: Conflict diamonds are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICT DIAMONDS Sierra Leone The decade-‐long civil war in Sierra Leone that began in 1991 caused 75,000 deaths,created some 500,000 refugees and displaced around 2.25 million people.16 The rebellion in Sierra Leone was in large measure financed by revenues from the sale of diamonds by the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) rebels. As a result, it became a well-‐equipped and deadly fighting force. The RUF rebels were known for exchanging diamonds for arms with Liberia making it possible to restock their munitions and to maintain a complex military operation in the region. During the ten years of war, the RUF raised an estimated $25 million to $125 million per year through the sale of diamonds, with a reported high of $200 million.17 Consequently, diamond trading nurtured the conflict in Sierra Leone while stealing its patrimony, leading to the country’s total destabilization, all of which was reflected in the country’s standing at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index in 2001.The RUF rebels sold their diamonds mainly through Liberia and the Ivory Coast. Liberia – which was known as a main criminal warehouse for diamonds, guns,money laundering, terror and other forms of organized crime – had diamond-‐export levels that surpassed its own diamond production capability. Annual Liberian diamond mining capacity was between 100,000 and 150,000 carats at the time,however the HRD recorded over 31 million carats of Liberian diamond imports into Belgium between 1994 and 1998 – an average of more than 6 million carats a year.It was believed that many of the so-‐called
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN “Liberian” diamonds were of Sierra Leone origin with others allegedly coming from as far as Angola. Like Liberian diamonds, most of the Ivory Coast diamonds were known to have originated from Sierra Leone.The Ivory Coast is not a big producer of diamonds, yet,according the HRD record, it apparently exported an average of more than 1.5 million carats to Belgium between 1995 and 1997. In addition, neither the Belgian government nor the HRD had good estimates of the quantity of diamonds imported by Belgium from any particular country. For instance, in 1998, while the HRD recorded imports of about 770,000 carats from Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone government recorded only 8,500 carats of diamond exports to Belgium during the same year.20 The implementation of a good tracking system became vital in determining the true origin of rough diamonds and in hindering the trade of conflict diamonds.In view of the role played by diamonds in the Sierra Leone civil war, the UNSC decided on 5 July 2000 through Resolution 1306 that all states should take necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone into their territory. In addition, the UNSC requested that an effective CO regime for trade in rough diamonds be urgently implemented in Sierra Leone and that international organizations assist the government of Sierra Leone in this matter. The objective of the CO regime was to distinguish official diamonds mined legitimately in Sierra Leone from unofficial ones so that those produced legitimately would be exempt from the UN embargo.Moreover, the UNSC asked that the International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA), the World Federation of Diamond Bourses (WFDB), the HRD and all other representatives of the diamond industry, work with the Sierra Leone government and the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997) to develop methods and working practices to facilitate the effective implementation of Resolution 1306.7 However, research conducted by Global Witness also showed a total lack of respect for the UNSC embargo on illicit trade in Sierra Leone diamonds by the international community and diamond-‐trading companies. Like in Angola, diamond-‐trading companies continued to deal in embargoed Sierra Leone diamonds in complete immunity. De Beers and its trading 7
http://africalawinstituteorg.web.siteprotect.net/ajls/vol1/no2/Koyame.pdf
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN company maintained that they no longer bought Sierra Leone diamonds as required by the UN embargo. However,since De Beers attempts to buy out all supplies of rough diamonds in the world in order to keep diamond prices high, it was virtually inconceivable that the company was not, in one way or another, purchasing diamonds smuggled out of Sierra Leone.8 In addition, De Beers had a diamond trading company in Liberia and a buying officein Conakry, Guinea, even though these two countries produce very few diamonds themselves.The UNSC review of the measures imposed by paragraph 1of Resolution 1306 led to Resolution 1385 of 19 December 2001. In the latter, the UNSC expressed its continued concern about the role played by the illicit diamond trade in the Sierra Leone conflict and decided to keep the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of Resolution 1306 in place for a new period of 11 months beginning 5 January 2002. In addition, the UNSC welcomed the establishment and implementation of a CO regime for the trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and the export of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone certified under that regime, thus limiting the flow of conflict diamonds out of the country. The UN also welcomed the ongoing efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) as well as individual West African countries towards developing a region-‐wide certification of origin. Moreover, due to the key role played by Liberia in the diamond-‐fuelled violence in Sierra Leone, the UNSC decided on 7 March 2001, through Resolution 1343, to impose a full embargo on Liberian diamonds. Angola The civil war in Angola started right after it gained independence from Portugal in1975 and continued until the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. Jonas Savimbi was the leader of UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola), one of the main rebel political parties that waged war against the post-‐colonial government of Angola. Savimbi founded UNITA in 1965 during Angola’s war for independence from Portugal.9 8
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v7i3/sierraleone.htm
9
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/06/07/afraf.ads028.full
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN After the departure of the Portuguese, war quickly broke out between the Marxist MPLA (Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola), backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union and UNITA supported by the United States and South Africa’s white minority regime. The MPLA was installed in the capital as the legitimate government of Angola while UNITA fought in its rural areas.UNITA’s war against MPLA continued, however, even after a 1991 peace agreement between the two rival groups. It was only upon the assassination of Jonas Savimbi by the Angolan government’s troops, on 22 February 2002, that hostilities came to an end after 27 years of civil strife.The civil war in Angola cost the lives of at least 650,000 Angolans between 1974 and 1999 with thousands more disfigured by landmines along with millions internally displaced. The negative effects of the Angolan civil war were not only social but also economic. According to human rights advocates, during the past three decades, a tiny elite of Angolans had amassed enormous fortunes through oil,diamonds, weapons and other illicit business deals, while the rest of the population was left destitute. Data from the 2001 survey, published in May 2002, show among other things that 50 percent of rural children and 40 percent of urban children did not attend school. Two out of every 10 pregnant women did not see any healthcare provider at all and more than 50 percent of mothers gave birth without medical assistance.10 Malnutrition affected 30 percent of children with a child mortality rate around 250 deaths for every 1,000 live births, the third worst rate in the world. The survey also found a much higher number of orphans than expected. About 75,000 children aged 0-‐14 years lost one or both parents to the war and 100,000 children in the same age group lost parents to AIDS. In 2001, amid all the wealth from oil and diamond revenues, Angola ranked 161st out of 175 countries on the Human Development Index published by the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”). The Angolan civil war was mainly financed by revenues from UNITA’s illegal sale of rough diamonds. According to Global Witness, the diamond trade generated about $3.7 billion9 for UNITA between 1992 to 1997.10 Funds from the sales of 10
http://africalawinstituteorg.web.siteprotect.net/ajls/vol1/no2/Koyame.pdf
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN diamonds allowed UNITA to restock its munitions and to maintain a complex military operation in the region, making ever more difficult any progress towards peace in Angola. In fact, UNITA decided to ignore the 1992 election results and to avoid meeting its obligations under the Lusaka cease-‐fire protocol signed in 1994 between the MPLA and UNITA.In view of UNITA’s actions, the UNSC decided in 1998 through Resolutions 1173 and 1176 to put an embargo on the trade of unofficial Angolan diamonds, that is,diamonds not sold by the legitimate government of Angola and not accompanied by a CO.11 Unfortunately, preliminary research conducted by Global Witness showed a total lack of respect for the UNSC embargo by the international community mainly because diamond companies were not held accountable for their actions. Thus, these same companies continued their operations without fear of any reproach from consumers, governments or the UN. Some of the companies bought UNITA’s diamonds in open defiance of the UN sanctions. The UNSC reported that all evidence pointed to the fact that UNITA mainly traded with companies it trusted and with whom it had long-‐standing business relations. The UNSC Resolutions 1173 and 1176 did not, therefore, result in a major crackdown on illegal diamond trading in Angola.The trade of embargoed diamonds continued both by air and over land through neighbouring countries such as Zambia, the DRC, and the Republic of the Congo,providing UNITA with enough funds to keep feeding the war. The UNSC stated, in its 2001 supplemental report on the monitoring of sanctions against UNITA, that it was business as usual for the illegal Angolan diamond trade.Diamond-‐trading countries continued to deal in Angolan embargoed diamonds even after all states were required to take necessary measures to forbid the direct or indirect importation of Angolan diamonds not controlled by the CO regime. According to the UNSC, except for one diamond parcel in Belgium, not a single delivery of illegal Angolan gems was intercepted prior to June 1998. Angolan embargoed diamonds, with a value almost equivalent to the output of Australia or Namibia, seemed to disappear into thin air, despite the apparently enormous volume of trade. Moreover, diamond trading centres in Belgium, South Africa and Israel were still readily accepting illegal diamonds from Angola, including UNITA 11
http://www.questia.com/read/1P3-‐909039681/united-‐nations-‐resolutions-‐and-‐the-‐struggle-‐to-‐curb
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN diamonds. The UNSC also reported that, between 1999 and 2000, sixteen companies based in the same three countries along with traders from Cyprus, the DRC, Tanzania and Zambia were still trading Angolan embargoed diamonds. Antwerp (Belgium) andSouth African markets were identified as the two key points of sale or transit for embargoed diamonds, with Israel being used as a laundering route for some imports.The Angola Selling Corporation affirmed to the Chairman of the UNSC that every day, embargoed UNITA diamonds worth between $1 million and $1.2 million left Angola, which amounts to an annual value of $350 million to $420 million. Liberia Liberia started as a colony of African American slaves who wished to liberate themselves from slavery in the United States. From its independence in 1847 through the first half of the 20th century, it was supported by the United States, and served as an exemplar of peace, stability, democracy, and social equality in a developing nationss. This era of stability ended abruptly in 1979 when massive demonstration and riots over the increased price of rice allowed Liberian Army officer Samuel Doe to overthrow the government, execute all high-‐ranking officials, and proclaim himself dictator of Liberia. Doe’s regime lasted until 1990 when he was overthrown and executed by rebel groups. For the next 6 years, various rebel groups fought intensely for control until West African peacekeeping forces finally came in late 1996 to disarm the rebels and bring peace to the war-‐torn nation. Charles Taylor, leader of the strongest rebel group (the NPFL), was elected president. Meanwhile the RUF in neighboring Sierra Leone and their atrocities were attracting the attention of the rest of the world, causing the UN to ban the export of diamonds from Sierra Leone. The RUF, with Taylor’s support, then began channeling its diamonds through Liberia, in exchange for arms. When Liberia’s role in the illicit trade was discovered, the UN placed an embargo on the trade of guns-‐for-‐diamonds. Taylor was subsequently indicted for war crimes. Despite the embargo, however, illicit trade of arms and diamonds continued in Liberia. This illegal trade was recently linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist network, as it is believed that Liberia allowed the network to safely convert its funds to diamonds.
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN
THE KIMBERLY PROCESS The Kimberley Process – a series of intergovernmental meetings that focus on the issue of conflict diamonds – was initiated in May 2000 by the government of South Africa as a result of several consumer campaigns against the trade in conflict diamonds. 12The government of South Africa was concerned that these campaigns, while targeting conflict diamonds, might damage the legitimate diamond trade. One key campaign entitled “Fatal Transaction” was launched on 3 October 1999 by five human rights organizations: Global Witness of the United Kingdom, Medico International of Germany, Intermon of Spain, the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa and Novib of the Netherlands. The Fatal Transaction campaign was directed at the sale of diamonds originating from areas controlled by forces opposed to elected and internationally recognized governments and from countries having any connection with those rebel forces. The campaign’s focus was on the right of consumers to know whether their diamonds had financed the acquisition of weapons for rebel armies, thus contributing to countless deaths throughout Africa.The Fatal Transaction campaign also intended to get the diamond industry to confront the devastating effects that its inefficient diamond control systems had had on the African people and the need for an efficient system of control to make certain that traded diamonds were not conflict diamonds. Diamond control systems at the time lacked the capacity to fully identify the embargoed diamonds because of, among other things, the existence of large numbers of middlemen and transit-‐trading centres. The longer the chain of middlemen, the more difficult it is to track the country of origin of a diamond parcel. Identifying illicit trading and finding evidence of a violation of the UN embargo on diamonds from Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone was an international problem that required an international approach. Since conflict diamonds represented only 4% of global diamond production,diamond producing and 12
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/WPF-‐Tamm%20Diamond%20Report.pdf
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN trading countries were concerned that the consumer campaign could inflict damage to the diamond industry as a whole unless it took into account the positive effects that the diamond trade had had on the economies of legitimate diamond producing countries. Indeed, a number of countries depended heavily on the legitimate diamond industry for their economic and social development. For instance, the diamond trade was a large source of revenue and employment in countries such as Namibia, South Africa, India and Botswana. An effective consumer campaign had to consider how many lives these revenues and jobs were worth.
REASONS TO STOP THE TRADE OF CONFLICT DIAMONDS •
Conflict diamonds fuel civil wars
One of the main problems presented by conflict diamonds has been the use of conflict diamonds by rebel forces to purchase arms and facilitate other illegal activities. These forces will often smuggle their diamonds through and trade their diamonds in neighboring countries. In doing so, they make it quite difficult for others to trace the origin of these diamonds once they hit the market. And as the rough diamonds are polished, it is no longer possible to trace them back to their source, and they can therefore no longer be distinguished from legitimate diamonds. •
Conflict diamonds lead to human suffering
The civil wars that have spanned the last few decades in West Africa have taken their toll one the native peoples in this region. In the Angolan capital of Luanda, thousands of children have been forced onto the streets as a result of the war and poverty. An estimated 500 of them are homeless and live in the dangerous streets, struggling to stay alive through beggary and through the help of humanitarian organizations such as UNICEF. Others live in abandoned buildings or basements. By 1995, the number of such children reached a staggering number of 10,000 nation-‐wide, 4,000 of these in the capital city. •
Possible Role of Diamonds in Terrorist Financing
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UNITED NATIONS-‐CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. 2012 CBIT MUN A November 2, 2001, Washington Post report by Douglas Farah described a series of alleged Al Qaeda-‐related diamond purchasing activities that appear to be separate from those noted in the earlier court case.13 The report alleged that “diamond dealers working directly with men named by the FBI as key operatives in bin Laden’s al Qaeda network,” purchased diamonds from members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a Sierra Leone rebel group with links to the government of Liberian President Charles Taylor.
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER •
Whether a successor to Kimberly process is possible to arrest the situation even more?
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Whether present efforts are enough to make the countries stand up on its feet again?
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What is the way forward to completely stop the production of conflict diamonds?
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Why might members of the diamond industry not want to join? What are the benefits of joining KPCS
13
http://royce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/rl30751.pdf
References and further reading: United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/55/56: 2001. United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/57/302 2003. http://www.undemocracy.com/A-‐RES-‐57-‐ 302.pdf www.kimberleyprocess.com http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html
World Diamond Council, Background http://www.diamondfacts.org/conflict/background.html
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