DRONE DELIVERY OF CBNRECy – DEW WEAPONS Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption ( WMDD)
DRONE DELIVERY OF CBNRECy – DEW WEAPONS Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption ( WMDD) RANDALL K. NICHOLS; DR SUZANNE SINCAVAGE; DR HANS C. MUMM; WAYNE LONSTEIN; CANDICE CARTER; CPT JOHN PAUL HOOD; RANDALL MAI; DR MARK JACKSON; MIKE MONNIK; DR ROBERT MCCREIGHT; AND WILLIAM SLOFER NEW PRAIRIE PRESS MANHATTAN, KS
DRONE DELIVERY OF CBNRECy – DEW WEAPONS Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption ( WMDD) by Randall K. Nichols is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial ShareAlike 4.0 International License, except where otherwise noted. Copyright © 2022 Nichols, R. K., Sincavage, S., Mumm, H.C., Lonstein, W.D., Carter, C., Hood, J.P, Mai, R., Jackson, M., Monnik, M., J., McCreight, R., Slofer, W. This book was produced with Pressbooks (https://pressbooks.com) and rendered with Prince.
Contents Books also by Professor Randall K. Nichols & the Wildcat Team ix Dedications xi Disclaimers xvi Foreword xviii Preface xx Acknowledgements xxv List of Series Contributors xxx Abbreviations and Acronyms lxi Table of Contents -Detailed 1 Table of Figures 19 Table of Tables xxix Table of Equations xxxii Part I. Section 1: Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE) Weapons and Payloads 1. Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD) 37 2. Chemical Weapons 58 3. Biological Weapons 80 4. Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues 93
5. Nuclear Weapons 127 6. Explosives Delivered by Drone 143 7. Deception 169 Part II. Section 2: Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) and Payloads 8. DEW Primer 211 9. DE Weapons, Projectiles, Damage 236 10. DE Weapons, MASERS/LASERS 279 11. DE Weapons & Microwaves 320 12. Hypersonic Drone Missiles 357 13. Acoustic Weapons 409 14. Satellite Killers 464 15. Cyber Weapons and CBRNE 484 Part III. Section 3 Risk Assessment and Policy Considerations 16. Assessing the Drone Delivery Future WMDD and DEW Threats/Risks 521 17. Unique Challenges of Responding to Bioterrorism & Chemical Threats & Attacks Delivered by Drones 546 18. Practical Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) Using Autonomous Systems 563 19. Navigation Spoofing and ECD 586 Part IV Section 4: Social Networks and Tools of the Trade 20. Social Network Implications for WMDD 631
21. Tools of the Trade 644
Books also by Professor Randall K. Nichols & the Wildcat Team M.;MDNichols,RandallK.;Sincavage,S.;Mumm,Hans.C.;Lonstein,Wayne.;Carter,CandiceM.;Hood,John-Paul;Mai,Randall;WJackson,onnik,M.;McCreight,R.&Slofer,W. DRONEDELIVERYOF MCBNRECy–DEWWEAPONSEmergingThreatsofMini-WeaponsofassDestructionandDisruption(WMDD) (2022)Copyright2022, Mai,RandallWWhAllRightsReserved.NPPeBooks.#46/ttps://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/46/Nichols,RandallK.;Sincavage,S.;Mumm,Hans.C.;Lonstein,ayneD.;Ryan,Carter,CandiceM.;Hood,John-Paul;Jackson,M.,.;&Shields,B. DisruptiveTechnologiesWith ApplicationsInAirline,Marine,DefenseIndustries (2021)Copyright Mai,RandallWJulieJh2021,AllRightsReserved.NPPeBooks.38.ttps://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/38/Nichols,RandallK.;Mumm,Hans.C.;Lonstein,WayneD.;Ryan,.C.H;Carter,CandiceM.;Hood,John-Paul;Shay,JeremyS.;.;andJackson,MarkJ., Unmanned VehicleSystems& OperationsonAir,Sea,Land (2020)Copyright2020-2021,AllRights Reserved.NPPeBooks.35. https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/ JulieJ35/Nichols,RandallK.;Mumm,HansC.;Lonstein,WayneD.;Ryan,.C.H;Carter,Candice;andHood,John-Paul, Counter UnmannedAircraftSystemsTechnologies,andOperations (2020). JhCopyright2019-2021,AllRightsReserved,NPPeBooks.31.ttps://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/31/R.K.Nichols,J.J.C.H.Ryan,H.C.Mumm,C.Carter,W.D.Lonstein,.P.Hood,(2019) UnmannedAircraftSystemsintheCyberDomain ProtectingUSA’sAdvancedAirAssets, 2ndEd. 26July2019, Books also by Professor Randall K. Nichols & the Wildcat Team | ix
(2018hPrCopyright2019-2021,AllRightsReserved,Manhattan:NewPrairieess(NPPeBooks31).ISBN:978-1-944548-15-5.ttps://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27R.K.Nichols,J.J.C.H.Ryan,H.C.Mumm,C.Carter,W.D.Lonstein.) UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)intheCyberDomain: ProtectingUSA’sAdvancedAirAssets,14September2018,Copyright ebookse2018-2021,AllRightsReserved,Manhattan:NewPrairiePress(NPPBooks21).ISBN:978-1-944548-14-8.https://newprairiepress.org//21R.K.Nichols,&P.Lekkas,(2002) WirelessSecurity:Models, Threats,Solutions. NewYork:McGraw-Hill.ISBN 13: 978-0071380386R.K.Nichols,D.J.Ryan,&J.J.C.H.Ryan(2000) DefendingYour DigitalAssetsAgainstHackers,Crackers,SpiesandThieves.New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 13: 978-0072122854 R.K.Nichols,(1998)the ICSAGuidetoCryptography.NewYork: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 13: 978-0079137593 R.K.Nichols, (1996) ClassicalCryptographyCourseVolumeII. underLagunaHills,California:AegeanParkPress.[OriginallydistributedNom-deGuerre,LANAKI]ISBN13:0-89412264-9R.K.Nichols,(1995) ClassicalCryptographyCourseVolumeI. underLagunaHills,California:AegeanParkPress.[OriginallydistributedNom-deGuerre,LANAKI]ISBN13:0-89412263-0R.K.Nichols,(1991) The CorporateAluminumModel,TexasA& N5184CMUniversity-KingsvillePress,Kingsville,TX.MAI:#2902,T378.24 x | Books also by Professor Randall K. Nichols & the Wildcat Team
From Dr. Suzanne Sincavage: unmannemenoarIwanttodedicatemyresearchtothemenandwomenwhoedevotedtobiodefenseintelligenceandthenon-proliferationfWMDs;ToProfessorRandallNicholsforhisleadership,torship,integrity,andsignificantcontributionstothefieldofdsystems,I’mhonoredtobeapartofyouramazing
Dedications | xi
runneisclosing,andIhawriinfigGodclosurcopinion,theUSNUSSFcandthefield)whoartoallmourneArmMforkeepingourblessedcountrysafe;tomyAngelwifeof38years,ontine,andchildrenRobin,Kent,Phillip(USAArmy),Diana(USAy),andMichellewhohavelivedwithaDragonandsurvived;towestfamilymemberKiraNichols(Phillip’swife);andfinally,ystudents(over50years~10,000Dragons/DragonessesinesecuringourblessedUnitedStatesfromterrorismevil.Inaddition,in2017,17sailorsdiedbecauseoftwoseparateollisionsinvolvingUSNavywarshipsintheSouthChinaSeas,theitzgeraldandtheUSSJohnS.McCain.Inmyprofessionalavy’sofficialresponsewasinsufficientastorealauses.Since2017,Ihavededicatedmyresearchtogivingpurpose,e,truth,andvoicetothefamiliesoftheseHonorablesailors.grantthempeace.IdedicatemywritingtotheUkrainianpeoplesufferingandhtingwithsuchbraveryagainstoverwhelmingRussiansavageryawartheydidnotchoose.Lastly,mydeepestgratitudetomywonderful,talentedWildcattingteam.IthasbeenarealHonor.Mychapteronthisearthvebeentrulyblessedtoworkwithyou.Mycupthover.
From Professor Randall K. Nichols: Idedicatethisbookto AllUSAservingandretiredmilitary personnel,USACoastGuard,andfederalandstatelawenforcement
Dedications
team; TomysonsTrevorMuehlfelder,ColeMuehlfelderandDavid trprrCarSSincavageIIIfortheirlovingencouragementandsupport;ToDr.teveHerrick,whochangedthetrajectoryofmylife,ToCandiceter,atruefriendandco-author,herdevotiontobiodefenseesearchareinvaluable;andBrendaA.Andrews,renownedartofessorandcolleagueforherinsightsandsupportinansformingthedigitizationofdataintovisualartforms. From Dr. Hans C. Mumm: humankind.willbringaboutposiimaganeinnoIdedicatethisworktomystudentsandcolleaguesandallthosevators,thosedreamerswhoraceagainsttimeastheycreatever-changingandevolvingfutureinwaysthatwecannoteveninetoday.Yourdedicationtothefieldofautonomoussystemstivechangetotheworldlandscapeand From Wayne D. Lonstein: IdedicatethisworktomywifeandbestfriendJulie,mysons peandsafourwemerhahafrEthan,Ari,Sam,extendedfamilyandco-workers,andco-authorsomwhomIhavelearnedsomuch.Toallthosebravesoulswhovemadetheultimatesacrificeservingthisnationandthosewhove,are,orwillserveinourarmedforces,police,fire,andothergencyfunctionsandtheirfamilieswhosilentlysacrifice.Mayorkinsomewayhelpyouperformyourdutiesmoreeffectivelyely,andthroughyourservice,maytheworldbecomeamoreacefulandharmoniousplaceforall. From Dr. Julie J. C. H. Ryan: haIdedicatethisworktomyhusband,Dan,andmystudents,whovetaughtmesomuch. From Candice Carter: Idedicatethisworktoanexceptionalleader,mentor,andmaster of Bushido,ProfessorRandallNichols.Hiscommitmenttotraining dragonstosucceedinasymmetricwarfareandlife xii | Dedications
Dedications | xiii
is unprecedented.Iamhonoredtobealifetimedragonesstrained by the master of Nito Ichi Ryu Ni To.
From CPT John-Paul Hood: Idedicatethisworktomylovingandsupportivewife,Katie,my yThetwodaughters,EvelynandGwendolyn,andmyextendedfamily.ycontinuetosupportmethroughthisjourney.Thankyouforourlove,encouragement,andpresenceinmylife.
From Randall W. Mai:
theirmindson.Minthemselarlifhammother’mIdedicatemyworktomylatemother,DorothyM.Thrasher,andytwodaughters,CourtneyJ.OswaldandKatherineM.Mai.Mysnever-endingsupportandcarekeptmegoing.Shewasybiggestcheerleader.Withoutherencouragement,mylifewouldvetakenamuchdifferenttrajectory.Mydaughtersimpactedmye,andnowmyheartwillforeverwalkaroundoutsideme.Theyemytruemarkonthisworld.Ihopetheywillalwaysbelievevesandknowtheycanaccomplishwhatevertheysetyfamilyhasgrown.Tomyblessedgroupcomes
From Mark J. Jackson: childrIacharIVlocbcointheRtherEngArmCorpsomIdedicatemychaptertomywife,Deborah,andthememoryofygreat-uncle,CaptainGeorgeRichards,afoundingofficerofthefRoyalElectricalandMechanicalEngineersoftheBritishy.AfterinitiallyservingintheBritishExpeditionaryForce(Royalineers)inFrancefrom1940–to1941,hequicklyrosethroughanks,promotedtocaptainin1942,initiallyservingasanofficeroyalEngineers,thentransferredtothenewlyformedCorpsfRoyalElectricalandMechanicalEngineersspecializingintheonstructionofBaileybridgesinNorthAfrica.CapturedinLibyaytheGermanAfrikaCorps,hebecameaprisoner-of-waratOflagatedinColditz,Germany.Afterdemobilization,hebecameteredmechanicalengineerworkingforImperialChemicalndustriesbutcontinuedtobuildmodelBaileybridgeswithhisenandnephews.
Nichols.acfriend.agranddaughter,OliviaJeannineOswald.Mycuprunnethover.Andlastly,ProfessorNicholshasbecomeavaluedmentorandtrueHehashelpedmeestablishbalanceandpulledfrommecomplishmentsIneverthoughtpossible.Thankyou,Professor From Bart Shields: Idedicatethisbooktomyfivechildren,Kyle,Tiffany,Taylor, trthem.IhopetheacalloTerra,andMarysia,andmywife,Hanna,andmymother,Pam,forwingmetopursuemydreamsandthesacrificetheyallmadeasonsequenceofthat.Theyareallincrediblyimportanttome,andyknowthat.IcouldnothavedoneanyofthiswithoutIthasbeenlonganddifficult,andunfortunately,Iamstillinansition,butthankfully,itwillbeendingsoon. From Robert McCreight: gwlineomembersosacrefmilifamiliesforsupporIdedicatemychaptertoallUSservicepersonnelwhofoughtin,ted,combatoperationswithunflaggingthankstotheirorthesacrificethatcannotbemeasured.Honorabletaryservicemustbeacknowledgedandrespectedasatirelessforttokeepournationsafeandsecuretomorrow’speaceasaedduty.Therearesincerethankstoseriousprofessionalanddedicatedflawenforcementwhosedailyroutineinvolvesourfirstfdomesticsecurityandsocietalstability.Theseunselfisharriorsandpolicenevergetthefullthanksandgratitudetheyenuinelydeserve.Thanks,andasalutefromagratefulnation. From Mike Monnik: utmostapprstarLeiPfulfillmenIdedicatethisworktomyteam,whogivemepurposeandt.IthankmywifeFedoraforherinfinitetrustandDranforhisguidanceandwisdom.Thecomingyearswillbeakreminderofourworkinthisfieldandforthat,IhavetheeciationforProfessorNicholsandhisvision.Finally,to xiv | Dedications
dailallDroneSeccustomerswholiveandbreathethisproblemsetonaybasis–youarewritingthefuture. From William Slofer: difthickandthin.lecanswtofindanswwisdomanddiscIwouldliketogivethankstoGodforgivingmyparentstheernmenttoconsistentlysendmetothelibraryerstomyendlessparadeofquestionstheycouldnoter.Ialsowanttogiveaspecialthankstomydaughterwhoontinuedtoencouragemethroughmyjourneyasalife-longarnerandthefewfriendsthathavebeenbymysidethroughThatsupportandencouragementhastrulymadetheference.Thankyouoneandall. Dedications | xv
interalia technical,legal,andethical
Disclaimers
errparguar/Author/PublisherNfrTheauthorshaveobtainedtheinformationcontainedinthisworkomsourcesbelievedtobeaccurateandreliable.However,neitherewPrairiePress,ProfessorRandallK.Nichols(ManagingEditor),KansasStateUniversity,noritsauthorsanteetheinformation’saccuracyorcompleteness.Neitherthetiesmentionedabovenoritsauthorsshallberesponsibleforanyors,omissions,ordamagesarisingfromusingthisinformation.Thisworkexamines sourtakthaandjurisdictheserpraocodiscussepilots,oranteturninUcwwagunderdimensionsofbehaviorregardingunmannedvehiclesintheairandwater/dronedeliveryofchemicalthreats,biologicalthreatents,radiationthreats,nuclearthreats,cyberwar,informationarfare,electronicwarfare,cybersecurity,directedenergyeapons,acousticalcountermeasures,UUVs,maritimeybersecurity,UASandCounterUnmannedAircraftSystems(CAS),emerginganddisturbingtechnologies.Itisnotintendedtotelligenceanalysts,counter-terrorism,informationchnology,engineers,forensicsinvestigators,droneoperator/yrelatedprofessionalsintolawyers.Manyofthetopicsdwillbeconcernedwiththelawandlegalimplicationsfcertainbehaviors.Everyeffortismadetoprovideaccurateandompleteinformation.However,atnotimewilllegaladvicebeffered.Thisworkispublishedwiththeunderstandingthattheuthorsaresupplyinginformationbutarenotattemptingtorenderofessionalservices.Anyreaderrequiringlegaladviceshouldseekvicesofalawyerauthorizedtopracticeintheappropriatetion.Allscenariosdiscussedinthisworkarehypotheticalnottobetakenorconstruedasactualoccurrences.Theauthors,publishers,andassociatedinstitutionsrepresenttallreasonablestepsandspecialreviewprotocolshavebeenentoensurethatallinformationcontainedhereinisOPENcedfromthepublicdomain.Tothegreatestextentpossible,
xvi | Disclaimers
anManagmissetorsoursuchceallthiranparinstigrherrhernoinformationofaconfidentialorclassifiednatureissetforthein.Additionally,thismisuse,re-engineering,retransmission,orepublicationofanycontent,information,orconceptcontainedeinshallnotbepermittedunlessexpresswrittenpermissionisantedbytheManagingEditor,authors,publishers,andassociatedtutions.Additionally,anyuseoftheinformationabovebyanytyorintentionallydisseminatedtoanythirdpartyorpartiesforyillegalorimproperpurposeisexpresslyforbidden.Theauthorsandpublisherhavealsostrivedtoattributeandcited-partysourcesofinformationandcontenttothegreatestxtentpossiblewhereavailablepermissionhasbeensoughtforallontent,includingfigures,data,andtables.Inmanyinstances,cesfromwhichtheauthorsseekpermissionhavenotrepliedequestsornolongerhavecontactinformation.Shouldwehavedcitinganysource,wewelcomethemcontactingtheingEditor,ProfessorRandallK.Nichols,whowillensurethatysuchoversightiscorrected. Disclaimers | xvii
Foreword delivurbanlandscofascinatheimaginrtime.AsytheirchapterstoincbeovieccdemonstrRandallNicholsandhistetefRandallNicholshasestablishemeseeKbuiltastroneoUnivaPrUWhenIfirstmetRandallNicholsin2014,hehadjustretiredfromticaCollegeasaProfessorinCybersecurity.Atthetime,IwasofessorinComputerSystemsTechnologyontheKansasStateersitySalinacampus.K-StateSalinahadalreadyestablishedfthefirstUASdegreeprogramsintheUnitedStatesandhadongUASresearchprogram.ProfessorNicholsapproached-StateSalinatodiscusstheneedtointegratecybersecurityducationintoourUASprogramsandraiseawarenessofthecurityimplicationsofUAStechnology.Shortlyafterourfirsteting,K-StatehiredProfessorNicholstodojustashesuggested.dhimselfasoneoftheworld’soremostcybersecurityexpertsinUAS/CUAS/UUVandrelatedchnologies.ThistextbookisthesixthinaseriescoveringUASs&UUVsfromamofexperts.Itisanambitiousprojectatingjusthowfardronetechnologyanditsuseshaveome.Ihavebeenfortunateenoughtobeontheteam’sommunicationchannelastheysharethelatestnewsandwpointsanddiscusschaptercontent.The2022RussianinvasionfUkrainebeganmidwaythroughthewritingofthisbook.Ithasenamazingtoseehowthisdedicatedteamofauthorsreworkedorporatethelatestusecaseshappeninginreal-oureadthebook,Ihopeyouappreciatetheamountofesearchbehinditandtheteam’sabilitytodistillthatinformationtoadigestibleformat.Thoughtheideaofusingdronestodeliverweaponsmaynotbeethattheindustrywantstocultivate,itisneverthelessatingandessentialsubject.TheauthorsdoanexcellentjobfdescribinghowthesamedronetechnologythatcannavigateapestodeliverpackagestoourhousescanpotentiallyerDEWandCBRNEweapons.Thesamedronetechnologythat xviii | Foreword
AerKansasIDeparfascinaprbackagainstamorwrneorprascsaonemerpeandapplicteincludesthehistorbook.ThertheirnadeOfcmigswsprprovidesanefficientmeansofsprayinganagriculturalfieldcouldayadeadlychemicalorbiologicalweapon.Artistsmayusedronearmtechnologytocreatebeautifullightshows,whileterroristshtuseittodeliveramultiprong,multiweaponattackonatarget.ourse,thisbookwouldnotbecompletewithoutdiscussingthetectionandmitigationofsuchattacks.Youwilllearnaboutdronevigation,sensor,communication,andsoftwaretechnologiesandvulnerabilities.Sofar,Ihaveonlygivenyouaglimpseofthetruescopeoftheeissomuchmorehereforyoutodiscover.Thebookyofthedifferentweaponanddronechnologies,descriptionsofhowtheywork,andvarioususecasesations.Youwilldelveintopolicyconsiderationsandevenekintothetoolsofthetrade.Furthermore,therearechaptersgingtechnologiessuchashypersonicdronemissilesandtellitekillers.Tofullyunderstandanytechnology,youneedtoknowthefullopeofhowpeoplemightapplyit.Itisnotenoughtoonlylookthowasetoftechnologiesmightmakeourlivesmoreconvenientofitable.Weneedtounderstandtheothersideofthecoin.Weedtoknowhowpeoplemightusethosesametechnologiestoeakhavocanddestroylivesor,ontheflipside,usethemtofightepowerfulinvader.Iexpectthatthisbookwillovideanexcellentresourceforyourjourneyintothiscriticalandtingarena.Bestwishes,TroyHardingtmentHeadandProfessorntegratedStudiesStateUniversitySalinaospaceandTechnologyCampus Foreword | xix
Preface ofMDroneDeliveryofCBNRECy–DEWWeapons:EmergingThreatsini-WeaponsofMassDestructionandDisruption(WMDD) is OtherteoursixthtextbookinaseriescoveringtheworldofUASs&UUVs.xtbooksinourseriesare DisruptiveTechnologieswith DomainPr2ndedition;andUSAVapplicationsinAirline,Marine,DefenseIndustries;UnmannedehicleSystems&OperationsOnAir,Sea,Land;CounterUnmannedircraftSystemsTechnologiesandOperations;UnmannedAircraftystemsintheCyberDomain:ProtectingUSA’sAdvancedAirAssets,nmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)intheCyberotectingUSA’sAdvancedAirAssets,1stedition. Our ethefield.(Nicholsepreviousfivetitleshavereceivedconsiderableglobalrecognitionintal.,2021)(NicholsR.K.etal.,2020)(NicholsR.tal.,2020)(NicholsR.etal.,2019)(NicholsR.K.,2018) [1] delivunderrorAcoUkrf2016themf500underPrwandtheiraWOursixthtitleisanewpurviewforUAS/CUAS/UUV(drones).eareconcernedwiththefutureuseoftheseinexpensivedevicesvailabilitytomaleficentactors.AsIwritethisPreface,eareonthe56thdayofthesavageinvasionofUkrainebyRussiaesidentPutin.TheRussiandronefleetnumbersareabove.Theyhavehadfiveyearstogrowtheirfleet.Itcurrentlyusesordomesticsecurity,Syrianoperations,anddefense.(Facon,)Intheconflict,RussiantroopsseriouslyoutnumberUkrainianorces.However,onFebruary8,2022,aForbesreportstatedthataineused20TurkishTB-2dronestohitRussiantargetsandffsetsomeofRussia’senormousmilitaryadvantages.(Malsin,2022)cordingtoFoxNews,onFebruary27,2022,PresidentPutinderednucleardeterrentforcesstatusraisedto“specialcombateadiness”(Colton,2022)NewslikethisinjustoneconflictsuggeststhatUASsinairandwaterwillbethefutureofmilitaryoperations.Theycanerahugepunchforalowinvestmentandminimizehuman xx | Preface
casualties. OurteambelievesthatChinaiswatchingboththe muchincDSeandchemicfdrccprSeDemassdestructepaBdividefutur[otheUShasthemostdrwiiEGulfstaNUnfThisporaggrUnitedStates’NevilleChamberlainappeasementstrategyandtheessivenatureofRussiainitsfull-scaleinvasionofitsneighbor.tendsthatTaiwanisthenextmealontheglobalplate.ortunately,twootherstateactorshaveseasontickets:IranandorthKorea.Iran’sdronefleetisimpressiveandhascausedothertes’inventoriestoescalate(UAE,KingdomofSaudiArabia,gypt,Iraq,Jordan,Israel)(Barrie,2021).NorthKorea(NK)liesabouttsairpower.However,onereportstatesthatNKwillhavedronesthstealthcapability.(Choi,2021)Maybe.AccordingtoDatablog,onesandisbestequippedforwarfare.China,fcourse,mightdisputethesestatistics.(DATABLOG,2012)[2]3]However,carryingabigstickdoesn’tcountanymoreintheUAS’semilitaryplaywithoutthewilltouseit.OurWildcatteamiscomposedofsomeimpressiveSMEs.Wedtheworkintofoursections.Section1coversChemical,iological,Radiation,Nuclear,Explosive(CBRNE)weaponsandyloadsdeliveredbyunmannedvehicles.Herewelookatthechnologiesanddamagedeliveredbydronesasminiweaponsoftionanddisruption.Chapter7concentratesonceptionandhowdronescanbeusedinPSYOPSandINFOWAR.ction2concentratesonDirectedEnergyWeapons(DEW),ojectilespayloads,satellitekillers,portdisrupters,andyberweaponsagainstCBRNassets.Section3looksatpolicyonsiderations,riskassessmentsofthreatsandvulnerabilitiesofone-basedWMDD/DEW,practicalcrimesceneinvestigationsorhotzones,anduniquechallengesofrespondingtobioterrorismalthreatsandattacksdeliveredbydrones.Ourfinalction4concludeswithsocialnetworkingimplicationsandRONESECsecurityandtrackingtoolsofthetrade.OvertwoyearsofsolidresearchbyateamofelevenSMEsisorporatedintoourbook.Wetrustyouwillenjoyreadingitasaswehaveinitswriting.Therearenightmaresaplenty. Preface | xxi
Professor Emeritus Cybersecurity, Utica College
Retrievedfromhttps://thediplomat.com/: adhttps://thediplomat.com/2021/03/could-north-korea-soon-field-vanced-stealth-drones/Colton,E.(2022,February27).
putin-orders-nuclear-deterrentforces-be-put-on-high-alert. Retrievedfrom alerwhttps://www.foxnews.com/world/:https://www.foxnews.com/orld/putin-orders-nuclear-deterrent-forces-be-put-on-high-tDATABLOG.(2012,August3).
LinkedIn Profile: “www.linkedin.com/in/randall-nichols-2222a691Illinunquamcedunt.WeNeverYield”BibliographyBarrie,D.(2021,July1).
–
K Nichols, DTM Professor of Practice Director, Unmanned Aircraft Systems –Cybersecurity Certificate Program UAS / CUAS / UUV Series Managing Editor / Co-Author Kansas
drone-stocks-by-country. Retrieved drhfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/:ttps://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/aug/03/one-stocks-by-countryFacon,I.(2016,May). A-Perspective-on-Russia-ProliferatedDrones. Retrievedfromhttp://drones.cnas.org/: xxii | Preface
RandallBest State University
Iran’s-drone-fleet. Retrievedfrom blog/20https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog:https://iranprimer.usip.org/20/aug/20/irans-drone-fleetChoi,D.(2021,March).
could-north-korea-soon-field-advancedstealth-drones/.
Polytechnic Campus &
Emerging_technologiesdefinition. 20or%20obscurie%20teEmerEmerRetrievedfromhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ging_technologies#:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ging_technologies#:~:text=Emerging%20technologies%20archnologies%20whose,background%20of%20nonexistence%ty. [1] addiNPPmetricsasof04/22/2022:36,627downloads(withtionalfiles)forcommercial,military,educational,government,
DisruptiveTechnologiesWith ApplicationsInAirline,Marine,DefenseIndustries.
UnmannedVehicleSystems&Operations on Air, Sea, Land. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press #35. Nichols,R.K.,Sincavage,S.,Mumm,H.,Lonstein,W.,Carter,C., Hood,J.,...&Shields,B.(2021).
ukraines-use-of-armed-dronescould-offset-some-of-russias-enormous-military-advantage.
adchRetrievedfromhttps://www.wsj.com/articles/:ttps://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-use-of-armed-drones-ould-offset-some-of-russias-enormous-military-vantage-11644676305Nichols,R.K.(2018).
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Manhattan,KS: New Prairie Press, #TBA. Nichols,R.,Ryan,J.,Mumm,H.,Carter,C.,Lonstein,W.,&Hood, J.(2020). CounterUnmannedAircraftSystemsTechnologiesand Operations. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press, #31. Nichols,R.,Ryan,J.,Mumm,H.,Lonstein,W.,Carter,C.,&Hood, J.(2019). UnmannedAircraftSystemsinCyberDomain:Protecting USA’sAdvancedAirAssets,2ndedition.
UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)Inthe CyberDomain:ProtectingUSA’sAdvancedAirAssets.1stEd. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press. Nichols,R.K.,Ryan,J.,Mumm,H.,Lonstein,W.,Carter,C.,Hood, J.,...&Jackson,M.(2020).
Phttp://drones.cnas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Aerspective-on-Russia-Proliferated-Drones.pdfMalsin,B.F.(2022,February12).
Manhattan,KS: https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27/.Wiki.(2021,January4).
operdisceusesdrSouthChinaSeSeinallusesinourte[c[Kindle,dousag10andsmallbusinessorganizations,1,362institutions,163countries,,143metadatapages,7,641abstractviews,48socialmedia,28,019e,and337referrers!Ourbooksareaveraging1,000+wnloads/month.ThesefiguresdonotincludeAmazonsales,orTabletversions.2]DATABLOGdataisinterestingbutdated.AccuratenumbersbyertaincountriesarenotgenerouslyreportedorareCLASSIFIED.3]WehaveissuedclearwarningsaboutChina’sdronecapabilitiesxtbooks.TheChineseNewSilkRoadLandandaStrategyemploysUASsintheairandUUVsunderwaterintheas.PLAN’ssuccesshasbeendocumented.ChinaalsoonestoenforceitssocialpoliciesandISRcapabilities.Theyxportmoredronesthananyothercounty.ItwouldbefoolishtoountChinaasasecondaryplayersupportingRussiainitsillegalationsinUkraine. xxiv | Preface
Acknowledgements peBookssuchasthisaretheproductsofcontributionsbymanyople,notjusttheauthors’musings. DronedeliveryofCBNRECY DestructionA–DEWWeaponsEmergingThreatsOfMini-WeaponsOfMassndDisruption(WMDD ) (R.K.Nichols&etal.,2022) NKaKhan,PrDirDirGrSPrDrLDeMTKansasSyadcWinfceinthetnamewhogahasbenefitedfromthereviewofnumerousexpertsinthefield,vegenerouslyoftheirtimeandexpertise.Inadditiontodsubjectmatterexperts,thisbookwasreviewedbysourceswofederalagencieswhomustremainanonymousandbyxport/procedural/security/OVRPcommitteesatKSU.Theirontributionswereespeciallyhelpfulinnotreleasingprotectedormation,CLASSIFIED,or“DEEMEDEXPORTABLE”categories.ewillnameonlyafewandmisssomespecialfriendswhoseontributionswerenoteworthy.Forthis,wesincerelyapologizeinvanceandbegtheirforgiveness.Therearemanypeoplewewouldliketoshoutoutaspecialthankouforyourguidance,continuedsupportandexperiencefromtateUniversity/KansasStateUniversityAerospaceandechnologyCampus(AT)–Salina,Kansas(KSU-AT):Dr.Richardyers,retiringPresidentKSU;Dr.KurtC.Barnhart,priorAssociateanofResearchandExecutiveDirectoroftheUASResearchaboratoryKSU-AT;Dr.AlysiaStarkey,Dean&CEOofKSU-AT;.TerriGaeddert,AssociateDeanforAcademics&Success(AT);ofessorTroyHarding,DirectorofAcademics,SchoolofIntegratedtudies(SIS)KSU-AT;Dr.DonaldV.Bergen,priorDirectorofaduateStudiesKSU-AT;FredGuzek,ProfessorandcurrentectorofGraduateStudiesKSU-AT;Dr.KurtCaraway,ExecutiveectorUAS,Dr.MarkJ.Jackson,Professor,SISKSU-AT;Dr.Saeedofessor,SISKSU-AT;Dr.MarkJ.Pritchard,Sr.,Dr.therineJones,KSU-ATResearchandLibrary;Dr.EmilyFinchatewPrairiePressandPressbooks,JoelAnderson,KSUOVPRand Acknowledgements | xxv
crandDrSMEinISales&marTFUUPrEmerigSResearchDirector;andBrendaAndrews,VisualCommunicationspecialist.WehadsomewonderfuloutsideSMEstobounceideasoffandetourheadsstraight.TheyincludeDr.DonaldRebovich,Professortus,andSMEinFraudandIdentityTheft,UticaCollege;ofessorofPracticeandCybersecurityDirector,JoeGiordano,ticaCollege;ProfessorHaroldB.Massey,ExecutiveDirectorofASDronePort,UASPilot,Dr.AmitKMaitra,ChairmanandounderofBordersandBeyond,Inc.;Dr.JeffBardin,Presidentofreadstone71,asuperiorintelligencefirm;RichardLescalleet,VPketing,AirshipTechnologiesGroup;Dr.JulieJ.C.H.Ryan,ntelligenceandINFOSECpluspreviousWildcatauthor;.DanJ.Ryan,experiencedSME/lawyerinintelligence,yptography,andglobaldefenses.WeoweagratitudetoPhillipE.Nielsen,authorof Effectsof DirectedEnergyWeapons,forguidanceinChapters8&9.(Nielsen, tesolutionstospoo1994).Similarly,wethankDr.ManualEichelbergerforhisbrilliantfingattacksonGPSandaircraftsignalsinhisxtbook RobustGlobalLocalizationUsingGPSandAircraft Signals. (Eichelberger, 2019) teNoonecouldbeprouderofthetextbooksthatmyKSUWildcatamhasproducedbetween2018-and2022.(Nichols&Mumm, UnmannedAircraftSystemsintheCyberDomain,2ndEdition., 2019) (Nichols&Sincavage, DisruptiveTechnologieswith ApplicationsinAirline,Marine,andDefenseIndustries,2021) Counter UnmannedAircraftSystemsTechnologies&Operations.2020) (UnmannedVehicleSystems&OperationsonAir,Sea&Land.2021) (Nichols,R.K.,&Mumm,H.C.(2019) UnmannedAircraftSystems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain 2018) NextcomesourexpandedWildcatwritingteam:Dr.Suzanne orcinwhichisdeSincavage,Co-ChairoftheFoundationforBiodefenseResearch,votedanddedicatedtopromotingthebiodefensetelligencetradecraftanddevelopingastrongerbiodefenseommunitywithgovernment,industry,academiaprofessionalganizations;Dr.JulieJ.C.H.Ryan,CEO,WyndroseTechnical xxvi | Acknowledgements
UnivFsixmaster’aonFthisincrPrBinrbiologSeMMLLAerenanoteMarcapplicunderstandthein(brUnivwhoisthecrhe(licEsq.,aprandUIGroup,ishandsdownthebestsubjectmatterexpert(SME)inthenformationSecurityfield;Dr.HansC.MummisaleadershipexpertASweapons–alethalcombination;Dr.WayneC.Lonstein,eviousDragon(Nichols’student)hasgainedrecognitionensesandcertifications)inbothlawandcybersecurityaswellasadsuphislegalfirm;ProfessorCandiceC.Carter,aDragonesseatorofacybersecurityprogramatWilmingtonersityandtravelsgloballyclosingspecializedcybersecurityeachesinmajorcorporations.Capt.JohnPaulHood,USArmy,ourmilitaryadviserandpreviousDragon)joinedustohelpustricaciesofmilitaryC-UAS(non-classified)ations;RandallMai,ResearchTechnologistforKSU,aDragononvertwithyearsofexperienceintheUASfieldoperations;Dr.kJackson,SMEinUUV,navalarchitecture,andchnologies,MSgtJeremyShay,Dragonstudent,COVID-19xpert,RETUSAF,FabricationProductionManager,SpiritoSystems;JoelCoulter,President,MobileSciencesConsortium,C;BartShields,InventorandCTOofOlympusSky,Inc;Mikeonnik,CEOofDRONESECandhisXOArisonNeo;RobertcCreight,aspecialistinUSArmySpecialOperationsandNationalcurityExpertinDefenseprogramsassociatedwithnuclearandicaldefensematters;andWilliamSlofer,DragonandSMEadarandHypersonictechnologies.WewerefortunatetohaverendaAndrewsbuildourcoverimagewithDr.SincavageandofessorCarter.BrendaisCEOofIkonologyStudiosandanediblytalentedartist.Manyothershavehelpedourteamwriteimportantbook.Weappreciatealloftheircontributions.TheWildcatteamespeciallythanksAssistantProfessorDr.Emilyinch,ScholarlyCommunicationLibrarian,forherexpertguidancetheNewPrairiePressandPressbookspublishingjourney.ProfessorRandallK.NicholsisManagingEditor/author/co-uthorwithhisWildcatTeamoftwelvetextbooksanddeveloperofsandCertificateprogramsinCybersecurity,Intelligence,orensics,andUAS/CUAS/UUVatUticaCollegeandKansasStateersity.Hehasfivedecadesofexperience. Acknowledgements | xxvii
CollegPrKSKansasSTManagGrDirASSURE44NISTPrDredeserFinally,Mrs.MontineNichols,myGod-givenAngelof38years,vesacommendationforherhelponthefinaldraftsandcopyditworkforourbookandaliving(surviving)thislongwitharealagonwhohardlysleeps.RandallKNichols,DTMofessorofPracticePSCRUAS3.0TechnicalLead–CyberChallengeKSUUAS–CybersecurityTechnicalLeadector,UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)–CybersecurityaduateCertificateProgramingEditor/Author/Co-AuthorofUAS/CUAS/UUVextbookSeriestateUniversityAerospace&TechnologyCampus,Salina,&ofessorEmeritus–GraduateCybersecurity&Forensics,UticaeBibliographyEichelberger,M.(2019). RobustGlobalLocalizationUsingGPSand AircraftSignals. ETHZurich:FreeSpacePublishing–DISSETH 26089.Nichols,R.K.(2020). CounterUnmannedAircraftSystems Technologies&Operations. Manhattan,KS: www.newprairiepress.org/ebooks/31.Nichols,R.K.(2022).DRONEDELIVERYOFCBNRECy–DEW andWEAPONS,EmergingThreatsofMini-WeaponsofMassDestructionDisruption(WMDD). Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press #TBA. Nichols,R.K.,&Mumm,H.C.(2019). intheCyberDomain,2ndEdition.UnmannedAircraftSystems Manhattan,KS: www.newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27.Nichols,R.K.,&Sincavage,S.M.(2021). DisruptiveTechnologies xxviii | Acknowledgements
withApplicationsinAirline,Marine,andDefenseIndustries.
Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press #38. Nichols,R.,&Ryan,J.M.(2020).
EffectsofDirectedEnergyWeapons. Dayton, OH: USAF.
Acknowledgements | xxix
UnmannedVehicleSystems& OperationsonAir,Sea&Land. Manhattan,KS:NewPrairiePress #35.Nielsen,P.E.(1994).
List of Series Contributors
Nichols
Editor* / Author)
RandallK.NicholsisaProfessorofPracticeinUnmannedAircraft
Professor Randall K. (Managing
cINFeKSUPasDirAerSystems(UAS)–CybersecurityatKansasStateUniversityospaceandTechnologyCampusinSalina,Kansas.Nicholsservesector,graduateUAS-CybersecurityCertificateprogramat.Nicholsisinternationallyrespected,with50yearsofxperienceinleadershiprolesincryptography,counterintelligence,OSEC,andsensitivecomputerapplications.Throughouthisareer,Nicholshaspublished eleven best-sellingtextbooks.Nichols xxx | List of Series Contributors
Christi,TKAssocia(IBCrc/AncliensupporCouncSCollegmastersandcandcchasprovidedcounseltotheUnitedStatesgovernmentandisertifiedasafederalsubjectmatterexpert(SME)incryptographyomputerforensics.Hismostrecentworkinvolvescreatingertificategraduate-levelprogramsforKSUandUticae.Towit:Author/Developer:MPT/MS/CertificateinUnmannedAerialystems(UAS)-Cybersecurity•Author/Developer:BSUnmannedAerialSystems(UAS)-Cybersecurity•RetiredChairandProgramDeveloper:MS–CybersecurityIntelligenceandForensics•RetiredChairandProgramDirector:BS–CybersecurityandInformationAssurance•Co-Author/Developer:MPS–RiskAssessmentandCybersecurityPolicy•Author/Developer:MSCyberSurveillanceandWarfarePreviously,NicholswasCOOofINFOSECTechnologies,LLC,aonsultingfirmspecializinginCounterterrorism,terespionage,andInformationSecurityCountermeasurestotits1700commercial,educational,andU.S.government,ts.NicholsservedasCEOofCOMSECSolutions,aCryptographicti-virus/BiometricsCountermeasuresCompany,apublicompanyacquiredin2000.HeservedasVicePresidentofyptographyandDirectorofResearchoftheacquiringfirm.NicholsservedasTechnologyDirectorofCryptographyandiometricsfortheInternationalComputerSecurityAssociationCSA),President,andVicePresidentoftheAmericanCryptogramtion(ACA).Nicholsholdsa3rdDanBlackBelt(R)inMooDucKwanTaewonDoandapermanentrankof2ndDanBlackBelt(D).InCorpusX,hetaughtself-defensecoursesforwomen.In1994, List of Series Contributors | xxxi
ChampionshipsNicholswaselevatedtoRingJudgefortheNationalTaeKwonDoheldinSanAntonio,TX.ManagingEditor/Co-author: DefDisruptiveTechnologieswithApplicationsinAirline,Marine,enseIndustries(2021) AvailableasafreeeBookat: https://newprairiepress.org/ ebooks/38/ Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations on Air, Sea, Land (2020) AvailableasafreeeBookat: https://www.newprairiepress.org/ ebooks/35/ (2020CounterUnmannedAircraftSystemsTechnologiesandOperations) AvailableasafreeeBookat: https://www.newprairiepress.org/ ebooks/31/ Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition (2019) AvailableasafreeeBookat: https://www.newprairiepress.org/ ebooks/27Areasof Expertise / Research Interests • Counterterrorism / Counter- Intelligence /Counterespionage / Computer Security • Countermeasures Asymmetric Warfare and Attack / Defense Scenarios against National Critical Infrastructure • Computer Forensics and Cryptography SME & Federal Expert Witness (Federal Criminal Cases: Treason / Espionage) • Risk Assessment / Threat Analysis / Vulnerabilities Analysis / Countermeasures xxxii | List of Series Contributors
• Cybersecurity / Surveillance Technologies: Aerial, Infrared, Visual, Ultraviolet, Radio, Radar & Sonar • SCADA – Advanced Cyber-weapons Creation / Deployment / Deployment / Defense • UAS- Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into National Airspace System • Designing Acoustic Countermeasures against hostile-actor UAS SWARMS & developing dual-purpose IFF sound libraries. ContactProf.RandallKNicholsat717 329-9836or prprofrknichols@ksu.edu.*DirectallinquiriesaboutthisbooktoProf.RandallK.Nicholsatofrknichols@ksu.edu Dr. Hans C. Mumm (Co-Author) Dr.HansC.MummholdsaDoctorofManagementwitha IMiliUnivconcentrationinHomelandSecurityfromColoradoTechnicalersity(CTU)andanMSinStrategicIntelligencefromAmericantaryUniversity(AMU).HegainednotorietyduringOperationraqiFreedomastheofficerinchargeofthe“IraqiRegimePlaying List of Series Contributors | xxxiii
phsupporsuchtestudermissionssupporinseparoperrrandesciencAirspacin2015ti“Lig““AmericMummwChangTDistincAincludingsixmiliMummhase(SeAgItheDefCards;CENTCOM’STop55MostWantedList,”whichwastoutedbyenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA)asoneofthemostsuccessfulnformationOperations(IO)inthehistoryofDefenseIntelligenceency(DIA).Dr.MummistheformerDivisionChiefforCybercurityattheOfficeofTheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceODNI),programmingandexecutingabudgetofover$140M.Dr.arnedtwenty-threepersonalmilitaryribbons/medals,taryunitmedals/citationsandtwoDirectorswards,fromtheDIA.In2016hewasawardedthePeopleoftionHumanitarianAward.HewasgrantedaUSPatentandrademarkforHowtoHarmonizetheSpeedofInnovationandewiththeHumanSpirit’sNeedforLeadership.In2005,Dr.asrecognizedasoneofthe“TenOutstandingYoungans.”In2003,hewasawardedtheNationalDefensePACAmericanPatriotIngenuityAward”forhisserviceduringOperationIraqiFreedom.”Heco-authoredaninternationalbest-sellingbooktitledhtningGrowth”whichisafollow-uptohisbest-sellingbooktled“ApplyingComplexityLeadershipTheorytoDroneeIntegration.”Heisapublishedresearcherinboththescientificandsocialearenasandhaswongrantsandcontractstofurthertestvaluatehisoriginalresearch.Hehasnotableexperienceinesearchandsystemsengineering,includingcontractsforUAVesearchandcreatinganadvancedmultiplefuelsystemthatatedtheworld’sfirstandonlyhelicopterthatcanflyonfiveatefuelswithoutenginemodifications.HisresearchextendstoemerginganddisruptivetechnologyforoffensiveanddefensivetingUSandcoalitionoperations.HisUAVandoboticsexpertisehasfocusedondeterminingthespecificuses,xceptions,andallowancesforroboticsoperations,includingyingtheunintendedconsequences,futureuse,andmisuseofchnologies.Dr.Mumm’spresentationsandpublicationsthisresearchintoautonomoussystemsinthevirtualandysicalworlds.Additionally,heservesasanadjunctprofessorat xxxiv | List of Series Contributors
Wayne D. Lonstein, Esq. CISSP (Co-Author)
List of Series Contributors | xxxv
CirbaroCourbeingadmiNPSchooloSwi–UCyberFSciencWayneLonsteinholdsaBachelorofArtsDegreeinPoliticalefromWilkesUniversity,aBachelorofScienceDegreeinorensicsandInformationSecurityfromSyracuseUniversityticaCollege,AMasterofScienceDegreeinHomelandSecuritythaconcentrationinInformationSecurityfromThePennsylvaniatateUniversityandaJurisDoctorDegreefromPaceUniversityfLaw.Additionally,heholdsaCISSPCertificationfromTheennsylvaniaStateUniversity.HeisamemberofthestatebarsofewYork,NewJersey,Massachusetts,andPennsylvania,aswellasttedtoover30UnitedStatesDistrictCourtBars,ThetofVeteransAppeals,theUnitedStatesTaxCourt,andtheftheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsofthe2nd,3rd,and5thcuits.
hans@hansmumm.cHtheCaliforniaUniversityofPennsylvania(CALU),instructingomelandSecuritycoursesintheCriminalJusticeDepartment.ContactInformation:Dr.HansC.Mumm,703-303-1752,om.www.HansMumm.com
(Co-Author/ForewordDisruptive Technologies Book 5) xxxvi | List of Series Contributors
F2017;and“DrTheCurF“F“WGohasaVFTSolutions,amemberoinShasliinteInaddition,Mr.Lonsteinhaspracticedlawnationallysince1987chnology,intellectualproperty,sports,andentertainmentandtigatedover2000cases.HeisalsoamemberoftheNewYorktateMagistratesAssociationandhasservedasaMagistrateJudgetheTownofWawarsing,NewYork,since1989.HeisamemberofSignallawPC,theCo-Founder,andCEOofftheForbesTechnologyCouncil.Heuthorednumerousarticles,including:“WhyIndustryandvernmentLeadersNeedtoRealizeVulnerabilitiesoftheCloud.”PublishedonJune16,2017,onLinkedIn;‘IdentifyingTheLoneolfUsingTechnology,”onLinkedIn,PublishedonJuly3,2015;AreSocialMediaCompaniesUsingToSAndSafeHarborToProfitromInfringement,CrimeAndTerror?,”Forbes.com,April28,2017;WeaponizingSocialMedia:NewTechnologyBringsNewThreat,”orbes.com,July7,2017;‘PayNoAttentionToThatManBehindtain’:Technologyvs.Transparency,”Forbes.com,October17,oneTechnology:TheGood,TheBadAndTheHorrible,”orbes.com,January10,2018.
Dr.JulieJ.C.H.Ryan,D.Sc.
vAllen&HcshewtheDefOftheUbeganwhenshecthefacultUwhaJulieJ.C.H.Ryan,D.Sc.,istheCEOofWyndroseTechnicalGroup,vingretiredfromacademiain2017.HerlastpositioninacademiaasProfessorofCybersecurityandInformationAssuranceatthe.S.NationalDefenseUniversity.Beforethat,shewastenuredyatGeorgeWashingtonUniversityandavisitingscholaratNationalInstituteforStandardsandTechnology(NIST).Dr.Ryancametoacademiafromacareerinanindustrythatompletedmilitaryservice.Upongraduatingfrom.S.AirForceAcademy,Dr.RyanservedasaSignalsIntelligenceficerintheAirForceandthenaMilitaryIntelligenceOfficerwithenseIntelligenceAgency.Uponleavinggovernmentservice,orkedinvariouspositions,includingsystemsengineer,onsultant,andseniorstaffscientistwithSterlingSoftware,Boozamilton,WelkinAssociates,andTRW/ESL,supportingariousprojectsandclients.Sheistheauthor/co-authorofseveralbooks,including ofForensicSciences(AAFS).
ThievesDefendingYourDigitalAssetsAgainstHackers,Crackers,Spies,and (McGrawHill2000),andaFellowoftheAmericanAcademy
AtWyndroseTechnicalGroup,she List of Series Contributors | xxxvii
tefocusesonfuturesforecastingandstrategicplanning,focusingonchnologysurpriseanddisruption. Professor Candice M. Carter (Co-Author) IIandAMs.CarMbriefingsinthearchands-oneMs.CandiceCarterisacybersecurityexpertwithover15yearsofxperienceincounterterrorism,counterintelligence,andybercriminalinvestigations.SheconductsClassified/UnclassifiedeasofTerroristicCyberCapabilitiesusingSocialediaandCounterterrorismfortheIntelligenceCommunity(IC).terconductsresearchandconstructsAsymmetricWarfarettack/DefenseScenariosagainstNationalCriticalnfrastructure.SheistheTeamLeadforNASAAeronauticsResearchnstitutefor CityOn-DemandVTransformativeVerticalFlight(TVF)CommercialIntra-TOL group.Ms.Carterisaninvitedspeakerfor NYCyberseprCongrkeyorganizations,includingBSidesLondonand(ISC)2Securityess.SheisanAssistantProfessor/ChairMScCybersecurityogramatWilmingtonUniversity.Ms.CarterholdsanMScincurityForensicsandIntelligencefromUticaCollege,Utica,,andaPMTCybersecurityUASfromKansasStateUniversity. xxxviii | List of Series Contributors
& Foreword to 1st Edition) List of Series Contributors | xxxix
frules.RHhasprCyberseArishas30+yearsofITexperienceandearnedaBSincurityfromUticaCollege,Utica,NY,workingfulltime.HeovidededitingskillsforProfessorNicholsfortenyearsnow.isapproachisall-encompassing,asopposedtostrictgrammareadingease,topicflow,clarity,andbeingsuccinctaretheocus.
Kurt Barnhart, Ph.D. (Associate Dean
Aris Theocharis (Co-Editor)
Dr.BarnhartisProfessorandcurrentlytheAssociateDeanof AssociafdeHwtheNHadministrEmbrinaAairfrfliginstrumeniseminenoSAestablisheResearchatKansasStateUniversitySalina.Inaddition,hedandservesastheexecutivedirectoroftheAppliedviationResearchCenter.HeoverseestheUnmannedAerialystemsprogramoffice.Dr.BarnhartpreviouslyservedastheHeadftheAviationDepartmentatKansasStateUniversity.Dr.BarnhartisamemberofthegraduatefacultyatK-State.Hetlyqualifiedwith1)acommercialpilotcertificatewitht,multi-engine,seaplane,andgliderratings;2)acertifiedhtinstructorwithinstrumentandmulti-engineratings;3)anameandpowerplantcertificatewithinspectionauthorization.Dr.Barnhart’seducationalpedigreeisoutstanding:anA.S.inviationMaintenanceTechnologyfromVincennesUniversity,aB.S.viationadministrationfromPurdueUniversity,andMBAAfromy-RiddleAeronauticalUniversity,andaPh.D.ineducationalationfromIndianaStateUniversity.Dr.Barnhart’sResearchplanfocusesonaviationpsychologyandumanFactorsandonintegratingUnmannedAircraftSystemsintoationalAirspaceSystem.HisindustryexperienceincludesorkingasanR&DinspectorwithRollsRoyceEngineCompany.eworkedontheRQ-4UnmannedReconnaissanceAircraftvelopmentprogramandservedasanaircraftsystemsinstructororAmericanTrans-Airairlines.Formerly,Dr.BarnhartwasanteProfessorandActingDepartmentChairoftheAerospace
xl | List of Series Contributors
GrKingAir200FligtateTechnologyatIndianaStateUniversity.Hewasresponsibleforachingflightandupper-divisionadministrativeclasses.CoursesughtincludeAviationRiskAnalysis,CitationIIGroundSchool,ht,AirNavigation,AirTransportation,InstrumentoundSchool,etc. CPT John-Paul Hood USA (Co-Author) CPTJohn-PaulHoodisaresearcherfocusedondevelopingfuture KansasPIlemunispecprcounterunmannedaircrafttechnologies,theories,andbestacticesforgovernmentandcivilianapplications.CPTHoodhasommandedintheUSArmyFieldArtillerywithabackgroundcializingincoordinatinganddeliveringconventional/smarttionsandachievingdesiredbattlefieldeffectsbyintegratingthalandnon-lethalassets.CPTHoodholdsaBSinGeospatialnformationSystemsfromtheUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,Westoint,NY,andaProfessionalMastersinTechnologyUASfromStateUniversity. Dr.AlysiaStarkey(CEO&DeanKansasStateUniversity Polytechnic; 2nd Ed. Foreword) List of Series Contributors | xli
ctheaddioanddistancprSteSNfrinSocialWprsheoDeDr.StarkeyisaProfessorandcurrentlyservesastheCEOandanoftheKansasStateUniversityPolytechnicCampus.AsDean,verseestheCollegeofTechnologyandAviationacademicogramsandcampusresearchcenters.Dr.StarkeyholdsanA.A.orkfromColbyCommunityCollege,aB.S.inPsychologyomFortHaysStateUniversity,anM.L.S.fromtheUniversityoforthTexas,andaPh.D.inCurriculumandInstructionfromKansastateUniversity.JoiningKansasStatePolytechnicinJune2002asachnicalservices/automationcoordinatorandassistantprofessor,tarkeywaspromotedtothelibrarydirectorandassociateofessorin2007andassistantdeanofcontinuousimprovementeeducationin2010.Shewasnamedassociatedeanfacademicsandpromotedtofullprofessorin2014.ShegainedtionaldutiesofinterimCEOandDeaninJune2018andontinuesinthatcapacitytoday D.
Joel
Anderson Colonel USMC (Ret), OVPR, C-UAS Foreword xlii | List of Series Contributors
Imemberoe(GrheheldmiliwhercCorps,wherBeastheDir(TENDeparfDirDeDirindustrMr.Andersonhasover30yearsofexperienceinthemilitary,y,andacademia.HecurrentlyservesasDevelopmentectorforKansasStateUniversitywithintheOfficeofResearchvelopment(ORD).BeforejoiningKSU,heservedasaTechnicalector,InnovationEvangelist,andSeniorSubjectMatterExpertorManTechInternationalinsupportofHQMCIntelligencetmentanditsTacticalExploitationofNationalCapabilitiesCAP)officeandTechnologyandInnovationDirectorate;andectorforMosaicATM,Inc.’sAutonomousSystemsGroup.tween1984-and2010,heservedintheUnitedStatesMarineeheroseinrankfromPrivatetoColonel.Duringhisareer,heservedasan(0231)intelligenceanalystwhileenlisted,ehewasmeritoriouslypromotedtoCorporal.Asanofficer,taryoccupationaldesignationsasan(0202)MarineAiroundTaskForceIntelligenceOfficer,(0240)ImageryOfficer,0540)SpaceOperationsOfficer,and(8058)AcquisitionProfessionalarningDAIWIALevelIIICertificationasProgramManagerandftheacquisitioncommunitywhilePM-MarinentelligenceSystemsfortheMarineCorpsSystemsCommand.He
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LiGuarOvDeploaSouthinsteExpeMMarineCorpsAchie5thaSenmaking,talencsupporandontheOMEF;wiMarineCorpsfrFSeDefIPHser(DastheMarineCorpsSeniorDeparMarineSeIPheldcommandpositionsasaSurveillanceandTargetAcquisitionlatoonCommander,Commanderofthe2ndForceImagerynterpretationUnit(FIIU),andCommandingOfficerCompanyE.curityGuardBattalion(DepartmentofState).HeservedtmentalRequirementsOfficerRO)andastheImageryandCollectionsSectionHeadwhilevingwiththeMarineCorpsIntelligenceActivity;astheBrancheadforHQMCIntelligenceDepartmentsImageryandGeospatiallansandPolicyBranch,andconcludedhiscareerasaStrategicntelligencePlannerfortheOfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofenseforIntelligence(OUSD-I)andastheChiefofStaffforcretaryGatesIntelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissanceTaskorce(ISRTF).HehasservedateveryoperationalleveloftheomBattalion,Regiment,Division,Wing,MEU,andthintheMarineCorpssupportingestablishment,HQMC,USD-Istaff.Mr.Andersonhasspentacareertingeffortstoaddressthecomplexitiesoftheintelligenceommunityandinteragencyinformationmanagement,decisiontacquisition,andeducationalandoperationalvironments.HisawardsincludetheDefenseSuperiorServiceMedal;Bronzetar;MeritoriousServiceMedalwithfourgoldstarsinsteadoftheward;NavyandMarineCorpsCommendationMedal;NavyandvementMedal;JointMeritoriousUnitCitation;eritoriousUnitCitation;NavyUnitCitation;MarineCorpsditionaryMedal;NationalDefenseMedalwithonedeviceadofthesecondaward;ArmedForcesExpeditionaryMedal;westAsiaServiceMedalwiththreestarsinsteadofadditionalwards;GlobalWaronTerrorismServiceMedal;SeaServiceymentRibbonwiththreestarsinsteadofadditionalawards;erseasDeploymentRibbonwithonedevice;MarineSecuritydRibbon;KuwaitiLiberationMedal(SaudiArabia);KuwaitiberationMedal(Kuwait). xliv | List of Series Contributors
ObseroUniEngManagFManagAssociawhichisABTSacCybersercmodificJeremyisanexpertinaerospacemaintenance,manufacturing,ation,andmaintainability.Hespecializesinadvancedompositestructuralmaintenanceandadvancedcoatings.HeecentlycompletedtherequirementstoearnhisPMTcurityUASfromKansasStateUniversity.HisotherademicholdingsareaGraduateCertificateinUnmannedAircraftystemsInformationAssuranceandaBachelorofScienceDegreeinechnologyManagementwithafocusonEngineeringTechnologyET-accreditedfromKansasStateUniversity,anteofScienceinAviationMaintenanceandProfessionalers’CertificationfromtheCommunityCollegeoftheAirorce,andProjectManagerProfessionalcertificationfromProjectementInstitute.JeremycurrentlyservesasaSeniorPrincipalManufacturingineeratNorthropGrumman.HerecentlyretiredfromthetedStatesAirForceasaSeniorMasterSergeantwith26yearsfservice.HeservedasaStructuralMaintenanceandLowvablesmechaniconF111,F15,F16,andB-2aircraft.
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Jeremy S. Shay, PMP (Co-Author) USAF SMSGT (Ret)
xlvi | List of Series Contributors
Dr. Mark J. Jackson (Co-Author)
micrLivcoEngGobainCorporIperiodsintheindustrmanufacfNcOJUnivEndoDoctorMarkJamesJacksonistheMcCuneandMiddlekauffwedProfessorandUniversityFacultyFellowatKansasStateersity.BorninWidnes,Lancashire,England,in1967,Doctoracksonbeganhisengineeringcareerin1983whenhestudied.N.C.partIexaminationsandfirst-yearapprenticeship-trainingourseinmechanicalengineering.AftergaininganOrdinaryationalDiplomainEngineeringwithdistinctionsandanI.C.I.prizeorachievement,hestudiedforadegreeinmechanicalandturingengineeringatLiverpoolPolytechnic.HespentyworkingforI.C.I.Pharmaceuticals,Unileverndustries,AngloBlackwells,UnicornInternational,andSaint-ation.AftergraduatingwiththeMasterofineering(M.Eng.)degreewithDistinctionunderthesupervisionfProfessorJackSchofield,M.B.E.,DoctorJacksonsubsequentlyonductedresearchfortheDoctorofPhilosophy(Ph.D.)degreeaterpoolinthefieldofmaterialsengineeringfocusingprimarilyonostructure-propertyrelationshipsinvitreous-bondedabrasive
prThemeon‘NtheDeandCulturappoinNJTKrJGeTSAETLNTCenCenprCouncilinNCenwrUnivtriPrCambridgrabrdete(bH.PmaterialsunderthesupervisionofProfessorsBenjaminMillsandeterJost,C.B.E.,Hon.F.R.Eng.Subsequently,hewasemployedyUnicornAbrasives’CentralResearch&DevelopmentLaboratorySaint-GobainAbrasives’Group)asamaterialstechnologist,thenchnicalmanager,responsibleforproductandnewbusinessvelopmentinEuropeuniversityliaisonprojectsconcernedwithasiveprocessdevelopment.DoctorJacksonthenbecameaesearchfellowattheCavendishLaboratory,Universityofe,workingwithProfessorJohnField,O.B.E.,F.R.S.,andofessorDavidTabor,F.R.S.,oncondensedmatterphysicsandbologybeforebecomingalecturerinengineeringattheersityofLiverpoolin1998.AtLiverpool,heattractedseveralesearchgrantstodevelopinnovativemanufacturingprocesses.HeasjointlyawardedanInnovativeManufacturingTechnologytrefromtheEngineeringandPhysicalSciencesResearchovember2001.In2002,hebecameanassociateofessorofmechanicalengineeringandfacultyassociateinthetreforManufacturingResearch,CentreforElectricPower,andtreforWaterResourcesandUtilizationatTennesseeechnologicalUniversity(anassociateduniversityofOakRidgeationalLaboratory)andafacultyassociateatOakRidgeNationalaboratory.Dr.JacksonwastheacademicadvisertotheFormulaeamatTennesseeTechnologicalUniversityAtTennesseeechnologicalUniversity,Dr.JacksonestablishedtheNSFometricDesignandManufacturingIntegrationLaboratory.Dr.acksoncollaboratedwithNobelLaureateProfessorSirHaroldoto,F.R.S.,editingabookon‘SurfaceEngineeringofSurgicaloolsandMedicalDevices’andaspecialissueoftheInternationalournalofNanomanufacturingon‘NanofabricationofNovelCarbonanostructuresandNanocompositeFilms.’Dr.JacksonwastedamemberoftheUnitedNationsEducation,Scientific,alOrganization’s(UNESCO)InternationalCommissionforvelopmentofthe‘EncyclopediaofLifeSupportSystems’anoscienceandNanotechnologies’(http://m-ess.ru/English/nano/index.html),andstillservesinthiscapacity. List of Series Contributors | xlvii
manufaccuponDrDocseTheencyclopedia’sfirsteditionwaspublishedin2009,andthecondeditionwaspublishedin2018.InMarch2017,thedegreeoftorofScience(D.Sc.)inmechanicalengineeringwasconferred.Jacksoninabsentiabythecongregationforsustainedontributionsmadeinmechanicalengineeringandadvancedturingovertwentyyears. Research Technologist – Randall W. Mai (Co-Author) RandallgrewuponthefamilyfarminruralKansasnearTribune. currAnalinagriculturGrEngandSenaandMschool,RandallwhisgrHespentalargesumofhissummershelpingonthefamilyfarmthateat-grandfatherestablishedin1929.BeforegraduatinghighasnominatedtotheUnitedStatesNaval,Military,erchantMarineAcademiesbyCongressmanKeithG.SibeliustorBobDole.RandallearnedanA.S.degreeinMechanicalineeringTechnologyandaB.S.inBiology/Chemistryminor.aduatingMagnacumLaud.Randallhasworkedasanengineereequipmentmfg.,anAnalyticalChemist/Validationysisofcomputer/softwarevalidationforAbbottLabs,andentlyworksasaResearchTechnologistforKansasState xlviii | List of Series Contributors
List of Series Contributors | xlix
University. aUnivenctheLfacilireashestandsonhisknoHeisnowestablishinghimselfintheCybersecurityfieldwledgeofComputer/SoftwareValidationxperiencegainedwithinthePharmaceuticalfield.Hewasesponsibleforleadingthe21CFRpart11programattheAbbottLabstyinMcPherson,Ks.HewasalsoresponsibleforvalidatingaboratoryLIMSandMillenium32software.ThevalidationompassednetworksecurityanddisasterrecoveryRandallwillcompleteaMaster’sprogramatKansasStateersityinMay2020inProfessionalMastersofTechnologywithconcentrationinUASandCybersecurity.
RDeparColonelKAfterserving25yearswiththeUnitedStatesAirForce,retiredurtJ.CarrawayistheUnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)tmentHeadandExecutiveDirectoroftheAppliedAviationesearchCenter(AARC)atKansasStateUniversity’sPolytechnic
Kurt J. Carraway, Col, USAF (Ret) (Foreword)
ArWSDuringhisserSciencSciencmanualsestablishebeGlobalHbothfOperstatoacfligyskilledirdethrglethecprAunivCampus.AsDepartmentHead,CarrawayleadsUASfacultyintheersity’sUASprogram,includingaBachelorofScienceinviationTechnologyprogram,aUASMinor,andaUASCertificateogram.Healsoservesasamemberofthegraduatefacultyonampus.AsExecutiveDirector,CarrawayprovidesstrategicadershipinadvancingKansasStateUniversity’sUASprogramoals.HedirectstheexecutionofresearchactivitiesinvolvingUASoughtheAARC.CarrawayalsodirectsflightoperationsvelopmentandmaturationoftheUAStrainingprogramthroughectsupervisionoftheFlightOperationsstaff.HemanageshighlydUASprofessionalsthatperformhundredsofUASflightsperearincivilairspace.Hesetspoliciesandproceduresforunmannedhtoperations.HeservesasPrincipalInvestigator(PI)onUAStivitiesthroughtheAARCandistheUniversityPIrepresentativeASSURE,theFAA’sUASCenterofExcellence.BeforearrivingatKansasStatePolytechnic,CarrawaywastionedatCampSmithinOahu,Hawaii.HeservedfirstasJointationsDirectorandthenDivisionChiefofCurrentOperations,ortheU.S.PacificCommand.CarrawayworkedwiththeawkUASasanevaluatorandinstructorpilotandlatercamecommanderoftheGlobalHawksquadron.Carrawaydstandardoperatingproceduresandcomposedtechnicalforthemilitary’suseoftheGlobalHawk.AnativeofSt.Louis,Missouri,CarrawayreceivedaBachelorofeinMechanicalEngineeringattheUniversityofMissourieandTechnologyinRollabeforeenteringtheAirForce.vice,CarrawayalsocompletedaMasterofScienceinystemsEngineeringattheAirForceInstituteofTechnologyontheright-PattersonAirForceBaseinDayton,Ohio,andaMasteroftsinManagementfromWebsterUniversitySt.Louis,Missouri. Bart Shields (Co-Author) l | List of Series Contributors
frsystem,rWDistrimorimplemenmultipleMArprondatodeploengteIComputerSciencBartShields,BSinComputerScience-ScientificOption,MSine-ThesisOption,ChiefTechnologyOfficer,nventor,Co-founderBartShieldsisaserialentrepreneur,long-timeinnovator,deeplychnicalproductarchitect,andhasover25+yearsoftechnicalandineeringmanagement.Hehasdesignedsystemsfromconceptymentforvariousverticals.Still,Hehasfocusedmainlytacommunication,withmultiplewirelesscommunicationoductstohiscreditrangingfromcommercialwirelessbroadbandouterstotacticalradiosfortheU.S.government.Bartisahighlyinnovativetechnologyexpert,havingdesignedClayerprotocols,includingdesigningandtingaWi-Max-likeprotocol(WCOPP)inthelate90sand,erecently,aSensorNodeMESHnetworkMACbaseduponbutedQueuing.Barthasfivepatentstohiscredit,twoforirelessMACsbasedonDistributedQueuingandthreeforhisecentcybersecurityprotocolandcryptographickeymanagementAutonomousKeyManagement(AKM).Barthasbuiltmultipleengineeringteamsandentiredepartmentsomscratchandoverseenallengineeringaspects,includingfabless
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arplaguingsepastsixyincludingmissionandsafenRFASICdesign,communicationsystemsalgorithmdevelopment,andtransceiverdesignanddevelopment.Bartisanexpertinembeddeddevelopmentandhasspenthistirecareerdesigninganddevelopingembeddedsystems,ety-criticalsystems.Barthasfocusedtheearsentirelyoncybersecurityandsolvingmanyissuescuritytoday,withsimpleandelegantsolutionsbuiltoundhishighlyinnovativetechnology,AKM. Dr. Suzanne Sincavage, (Co-Author) Executive theOnApril20Summary,2021,Dr.SuzanneSincavagefoundedandCo-Chairs FoundationforBiodefenseResearch,anon-profit501(c)(3) gtrdevotedanddedicatedtopromotingthebiodefenseintelligenceadecraftanddevelopingastrongerbiodefensecommunitywithovernment,industry,academiaprofessionalorganizations,and lii | List of Series Contributors
theHLDeparhasheldseniormanagIandTurarrindustr16yUnionIEandMaconbiologdeDirrindividualswhoassess,develop,andapplybiodefenseintelligenceesearchtoaddressnationalsecuritychallenges.From2020-2021,Dr.SuzanneSincavageservedastheExecutiveectorfortheInstituteforBiodefenseResearch(IBR).Anonprofitvotedtoadvancingthescienceofmicrobialforensics.Dr.Sincavage,aPh.D.inpublichealthepidemiologywithafocusicalterrorismpreparednessandresponse,hasledheronsultancy,IDIQInc.,since2008,focusingonCBRNESubjecttterExpertiseinfacilitatingandintegratinginnovativeemergingconvergingtechnologiesthatcounterbiologicalterrorism.Dr.SincavagereceivedherPh.D.inPublicHealthandpidemiologywithaspecializationinBiologicalTerrorismfromnstitute&University.Dr.Sincavage’scareerencompassesearsofexperienceinthebiotechnologyandpharmaceuticaly,servingasafieldscientistsupportingR&D,medicalandegulatoryaffairs,andcommercialoperationscoveringtherapeuticeasofinfectiousdisease,virology,andoncology,hematology,ology,andimmunology.Dr.SincavageisanSMEfortheNationalInstituteofScienceechnology(NIST),theNationalReconnaissanceOffice(NRO),ntelligenceandNationalSecurityAlliance(INSA),andDHS.SheementpositionsinWatsonPharmaceuticals,tmentofMedical&RegulatoryAffairs;Wyeth-Ayerstaboratories,G.D.Searle;Hoffman-LaRocheLaboratories;SacredeartMedicalCenter,andforfun,servedasExecutiveDirectorofLaJollaSymphony&Chorus.Dr.Sincavageholdscertifications:SAM(CCR);SBA8(m)DD2345MilitaryCriticalTechnicalDataAgreementDDTICSTINFOManagerCounterterrorismInfraGuard–InfrastructureLiaisonOfficerONR–Counterterrorism List of Series Contributors | liii
NDCommittees:IALegislative Committee NDIA National Small Business Conference NRO ASP Industry Working Group INSA Acquisition Management Council USGIF Small Business Working Group WOSB 8(m) Working Group, SPAWAR HQ, San Diego Troy Harding Associate Dean (Foreword) UnivCollegPrTtheUnivfreSalinaAerDeparTroyHardingisaProfessorincomputersystemstechnologyandtmentHeadofIntegratedStudiesatKansasStateUniversityospaceandTechnologyCampus.ProfessorHardingarnedabachelor’sdegreeinChemistryandComputerScienceomBethanyCollegeandamaster’sdegreeinChemistryfromersityofVirginia.BeforejoiningK-State,heworkedasechnicalDirectoratAquarianSystemsinOrange,VA,ogrammer/AnalystandNetworkCoordinatoratAssociatedesofCentralKansas,andDirectorofI.S.atKansasWesleyanersity.AtK-State,hehasreceivedtheMarchbanksAwardfor liv | List of Series Contributors
endoTeachingExcellence,theMcArthurFacultyFellowAward,andthewedMcCune&MiddlekauffFellowship. Robert McCreight (Co-Author) Dr.McCreightspent27yearsinfederalserviceand23years policalsoserhelpeenablingsaduringacWsupporwinaconcurrentlyinUSArmySpecialOperations,workingonvarioustionalsecurityprojectsandspecialdefenseprogramsassociatedthnuclear,chemical,andbiologicaldefensematters.HehastedandservedasaperiodicadvisorontheChemicaleaponsTreatyandBiologicalandToxinWeaponsConventionareerattheStateDepartment,alongwithprogramstelliteverificationofarmscontroltreatycompliance.HeddraftHSPD-10andcontributedtotheissuanceofHSPD-21,vingasacontributingWhiteHouseassistantonnuclearyandstrategyexercises.Uponretirement,hehaspublished List of Series Contributors | lv
issues,CBlast15ytahehasbeemeronadvancedweaponssystems,WMDissues,crisismanagement,gencyresponseissues,andneurosciencetopics.PeriodicallyenaguestlectureratNDUonfutureweaponssystemsandughtgraduateschoolatsevendifferentuniversitiesduringtheearsinhisdesignatedareasofinterest,onnationalsecurityRNmatters,andemergingconvergenttechnologythreats.
Brenda
Alexandra Andrews (Visual Communications Specialist) vDeoArVisualCommunicationsSpecialist/InternationalExhibitiontistLedartisticdirection,exhibitionspaceplanning,constructionversight,academicprogramming,andcross-functionalteams.velopedprograms,symposiums,lectures,andphilanthropicentures.Shesecurededucationaladvancementandscholarships.•Re-Envisioning,AWorldBeyondBorders(SanDiego).ShowcaseInstallationfeaturingreal-timecellphoneand lvi | List of Series Contributors
• Exhibition driven programming for OCMA, Orange County Museum of Art; SDMA: LACMA; Delaware Contemporary Museum, and numerous University Museum spaces. Focused on fundraising and grant support.
digital photo imagery from participants worldwide- over 5,000 entries. Images were transmitted wirelessly, uploaded to a global website, and showcased as an Art & Technology Installation at International Art Fair. Partners: QUALCOMM, SDUSD, UCSD, KPBS, Worldwide Community.
• International Exhibition Artist Mike Monnik (Co-Author) List of Series Contributors | lvii
• Art of the Book (Orange County | San Diego Founder of Artist in Residence Teaching Program for OCMA and Orange County high schools. Lectures and in-studio art projects. Culminating in Museum Exhibition practices, awards, and scholarship programs. Partners: OCMA, Dana Hills High School, Ryman Arts (Walt Disney Imagineering), various established Artists. Repeated in San Diego County- SDMA.
• Mapping Rockwell’s World (Orange County). International project using Conextent technologies brings Rockwell International Family together in real-time video lectures. Culminated in the large-scale installation of painted map abstractions displayed a globally interconnected world. Installation became a corporate holiday card and annual report cover. Partners: Rockwell, Conextant, OCMA, and Visionaries.
lviii | List of Series Contributors
AirtheteGames.HastheTprGodrchallengOpen-SourhasleoMikFandBsepeAsCEOatDroneSec,Mikeenablesorganizationstoprotectopleanddronesfrommaliciousdronesandpeople.NationalcurityroleshaveincludedtheAustralianDepartmentofDefenseAESystems.HehaslecturedonComputerCrime&DigitalorensicsatDeakinUniversityandsitsontheITAdvisoryboard.ecrystallizedhisknowledgeasaconsultantconductingffensivetechnicalcyberandphysicalsecurityengagements.Mikedhigh-performingteamsinRedTeam,PenetrationTesting,ceIntelligence,andDroneengagementsinavarietyofingenvironments.Mikeisalong-timeglobalconferencespeakerandadvocateforonesecurityandhaspresentedtotheFBI,INTERPOL,NSWvernment,andEuropeanCommissionatclosed-dooresentations.Mikehasexperiencecoordinatinglargeteams,suchable-TopThreatexerciseforthe2018Commonwealthehasseveralhall-of-famecontributionsforprotectingchnologyandcustomersoforganizationssuchasDJI,Parrot,Data,Aloft,andFortemTechnologies.SpecializinginRedTeamoperations,Mikehasuseddronesin
soDrandUanddeftheirrandprivsimulationsagainstcriticalinfrastructure,governmentbuildings,atefacilitiestohighlightthepotentialthreatsandevaluateesponse.Mikehastrainedhundredsofstudentsinoffensiveensivedronesecuritymeasures,counter-droneoperations,ASThreatIntelligencegathering.MikecontinuestoleadoneSecinbuildingdronethreatintelligenceanddronesecurityftwaretoprotectthefutureofmobility,delivery,andtransport. William Slofer (Co-Author) BillisanITProjectManagementandsecurityprofessionalwith over30yearsofITandmanagementexperience. HeholdsPMP, DwidefhascSouthenablestrlocmanagvidedeScrum,andScaledagilecertificationswithexpertiseinapplicationvelopment,systems/infrastructureintegration,high-speedo/datacommunications,andITsecurity.Histechnicalandementexpertisehasbeenemployedbyfederal,state,andalgovernmentsandvariousindustriesintheprivatesector.Bill’songmanagement,interpersonal,andcommunicationsskillshavedhimtoleadhigh-impactteamsnationallyandinEurope,/CentralAmerica,andAsia.BillisamemberofInfragardandareeraccomplishmentsinvolvingimplementingcorporate-ortificationsforperimeterdefense,LateralSegmentation,andataLossPreventionmeasurestoprotectsensitivedataassets.Formaleducationincludes: List of Series Contributors | lix
• MS, Cybersecurity / Cyber Terrorism • MS, Management, Management Information Systems BS, Business Administration / Computer Science lx | List of Series Contributors
Abbreviations and Acronyms AtoAcsciencsystemsprsystems.gThefollowingtermsarecommontotheUAS/UUVindustries,eneralliterature,orconferencesonUAS/UAV/Drone/UUVABMAnti-ballisticmissileA/CAircraft(Pilotedorunmanned)alsoA/CACOUSTICDetectsdronesbyrecognizinguniquesoundsoducedbytheirmotors.A/DAttack/DefenseScenarioAnalysisADSAirDefenseSystem(USA)/AreaDenialSystemADS-BAutomaticDependentSurveillance-BroadcastA/CFDAircraftflooddenialAFRLAirForceResearchLabA-GPSAssistedGPSAGLAbovegroundlevelAHIAnomalousHealthIncidentsAIArtificialintelligence:“1.abranchofcomputeredealingwiththesimulationofintelligentbehaviorincomputers,and2:theapabilityofamachinetoimitateintelligenthumanbehavior.”(Merriam-Webster,2020)AISAutomatedIdentificationSystemforCollisionvoidanceAMSAutonomousMobileSword(SCREAMER)usessounddisruptthebrainbeforecuttingtheenemytopieces.AOAreaofOperationsAOAAngleofArrivalofsignalstoGPSreceivers/AngleofttackAPCArmoredpersonnelcarrierAPDSArmor-piercingdiscardingsabotprojectile Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxi
APFSDS Armor-piercingfin-stabilizeddiscardingsabot projectileAR Augmented reality ARW Anti-radiation weapons ATC Air Traffic Control / Air traffic Control Signals ATSAW Air Traffic Situational Awareness AUV Autonomous underwater vehicle B&B Branch & bound Bandwidth isDefinedastheRangewithinabandofwavelengths, frequencies, or energy. VimpacceelecmodulaThinkofitasarangeofradiofrequenciesoccupiedbyatedcarrierwave,assignedtoaserviceoverwhichadeviceanoperate.Bandwidthisalsoacapacityfordatatransferofctricalcommunicationssystems.BCBallisticCoefficientBEARBattlefieldExtraction-AssistRobotBlackSwanBlackSwanEvent-Ablackswanisanunpredictableventbeyondwhatis.Normallyexpectedofasituationandhaspotentiallysevereonsequences.Blackswaneventsarecharacterizedbytheirextremerarity,severet,andthewidespreadinsistencetheywereobviousinhindsight.(BlackSwanDefinition,2020)BLOSBeyondline-of-sightBPAUVBattlespacePreparationAutonomousUnderwaterehicleBSL-4BiosafetyLevel#BTWCBiological&ToxinWeaponsConventionBVLOSBeyondVisualLine-of-SightoperationsBVRBeyondvisualrangeBWBiologicalweaponsBYODBringyourdevicecSpeedoflight~(3x108m/s)[186,000milespersec] lxii | Abbreviations and Acronyms
invacuumnamedafter Celeritas, theLatinwordforspeedor velocity.C-CLAW Combat Laser assault weapon cs speed of sound (344 m/s) in air C2/C2W Commandandcontrol/CommandandControl WarfareC3 Command, control, communications C3I Command,control,communications,and IntelligenceC4 Command,control,communications,and computersC4I Command,control,communicationsand computers, intelligence C4ISR Command,control,communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance C4ISTAR Command,control,communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance C5I Command,control,communications,computers, Collaboration & Intelligence CA CollisionAvoidance/ClearAcquisition(GPS)/ Cyber Assault (aka CyA) C/A Civilian acquisition code for GPS CAA Control Acquisition cyber attack CAS Close Air Support / Common situational awareness CBRN Chemical,Biological,Radiation&Nuclearcritical infrastructure facilities CBRNE Chemical,Biological,Radiation,Nuclear&Explosives attacks critical infrastructure facilities or assets CBRNECy Chemical,Biological,Radiation,Nuclear,Explosives & Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure facilities or assets CBW Chemical, Biological Weapons CC&D Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception CCTV Closed Circuit Television CD Charge diameters Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxiii
Cd Drag coefficient CDC Center for Disease Control CDMA Code division multiple access CD Collectivedetectionmaximumlikelihoodlocalization approach (Eichelberger, 2019) CEA Cyber-electromagnetic activities CEP Circular error probable CETC ChineseElectronicsTechnologyGroupCorporation CEW Cyberelectronicwarfare/Communications electronic warfare CGA Coast Guard Administration – Singapore CHAMP Counter-ElectronicsHighPowerMicrowave Advanced Missile Project CIA Confidentiality,Integrity&Availability(standard INFOSEC paradigm) CI / CyI Critical Infrastructure / Cyber Infiltration CIA Confidentiality,Integrity,Availability/Central Intelligence Agency CIS Critical Infrastructure Sector CJNG Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación CM / CyM Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation CMADS China’s Microwave Active Denial System C/NA Communication / Navigation Aid CNA Computer network attack CND Computer network deception CNE Computer network exploitation CNO Computer network operations CNS Central nervous system COMINT Communications intelligence COMJAM Communications Jamming COMINT Communications Intelligence COMSEC Communications Security CONOP(S) Concepts of Operations CONV Convergent Technology Dynamics lxiv | Abbreviations and Acronyms
CONV-CBRNConvergentTechnologyDynamics–Chemical, Biological, Radiation & Nuclear COP Common operating picture COTS Commercial off-the-shelf CPS Cyber-physical systems CR ConflictResolution/Closerange/CyberRaid(aka CyR)CSI Crime scene investigation CT Counter-Terrorism / Counter-Terrorism Mission CTN Course time navigation C-UAS CounterUnmannedAircraftSystems(defenses/ underneinfthrCommuniccountermeasures)CUAVCounterUnmannedAircraftVehicle(defenses/ountermeasures)CUESCodeforunplannedencountersatseaCW/CyWCyberWarfareCWCChemicalWeaponsConventionCWMDCounteringWeaponsofMassDestructiontyCYBERWEAPON–MaliciousSoftwareandITsystemsthat,oughICTSnetworks,manipulate,deny,disrupt,degrade,ordestroytargetedormationsystemsornetworks.Itmaybedeployedviacomputer,communications,tworks,rogueaccesspoints,USBs,acoustically,electronically,andairborne/waterunmannedsystems&SWARMS.Alternatively,cyberweapons:1.Acampaignthatmaycombinemultiplemaliciousprogramsforespionage,datatheft,orsabotage.2.Astealthcapabilitythatenablesundetectedoperationwithinthetargetedsystemoveranextendedtime.3.Anattackerwithapparentintimateknowledgeofdetailsfortheworkingsofthetargetedsystem. Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxv
4. A special type of computer code to bypass protective cybersecurity technology. DangerDefiniClosetion www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/ 2013/May-June/Myer.html Nov14,2013– 1) dangerclose is ar2)Definidangdistanc…rincludedinthe“method-of-engagement”lineofacall-for-fireequesttoindicatethatfriendlyforcesareclosetothetarget.Dangercloseisatermthatisexclusivefromriskestimatee(RED)althoughtheREDfor0.1percentPIisusedtodefineercloseforaircraftdelivery.Pi=Probabilityofincapacitation.tionof“dangerclose”(USDoD)Incloseairsupport,tillery,mortar,andnavalgunfiresupport fires,itistheterm includedinthemethodofengagementsegmentofacallfor fires whichindicatesthatfriendlyforcesarewithin close proximityof theDtarget.ARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Dazzle Cause temporary blindness with Laser DCPA Distance between vessels approaching CPA D&D Denial & deception DDD Dull, dangerous, and dirty D/D/D Destruction, Disruption, Deception DDOS Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack DEFCON Defense condition DEW Directed energy weapons (also, DE) DF Direction-finding DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency DUST Dual-use Science & Technology threat EA Electronic Attack EBO Effects-based operations ECCM/EP Electroniccounter-countermeasures/Electronic ProtectionECD Dr.Manuel Eichelberger’sadvancedimplementation lxvi | Abbreviations and Acronyms
(EichelofCDtodetect&mitigatespoofingattacksonGPSorADS-Bsignalsberger,2019)ECMElectroniccountermeasuresELINTElectronicIntelligenceEMElectromagneticwavesEMCElectromagneticcompatibilityEMDElectromagneticdeceptionEMFElectromagneticfieldEMIElectromagneticinterferenceEMPElectromagneticpulse–electromagneticenergy.EMRElectromagneticradiationEMSElectromagneticspectrumEOElectro-opticalsystemEWElectronicwarfare[LegacyEWdefinitions : EWwas (NEleclassicallydividedinto(AdamyD.,EW101AFirstCourseinctronicWarfare,2001):•ESM–ElectromagneticSupportMeasures–thereceivingpartofEW;•ECM–ElectromagneticCountermeasures–jamming,chaff,flaresusedtointerferewithoperationsofradars,militarycommunications,andheat-seekingweapons;•ECCM-ElectronicCounter-CounterMeasures–measuresaretakentodesignoroperateradarsorcommunicationssystemstocountertheeffectsofECM.[1]otincludedintheEWdefinitionswereAnti-radiationWeaponsARW)andDirectedEnergyWeapons(DEW).USAandNATOhaveupdatedthesecategories:•ES–ElectronicwarfareSupport(oldESM)tomonitortheR.F.environment;•EA–ElectronicAttack–theoldECMincludesASWandD.E.weapons;todeny,disrupt,deceive,exploit,anddestroyadversaryelectronicsystems. Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxvii
• EP – Electronic Protection – (old ECCM) (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001) to guard friendly systems from hostile attacks.[2] ESisdifferentfromSignalIntelligence (SIGINT). SIGINTcomprises CommunicationsIntelligence (COMINT) andElectronicIntelligence (ELINT). Allthesefieldsinvolvethereceivingofenemy cappliesasolutionfrGalilesystemsWtransmissions.(AdamyD.,EW101AFirstCourseinElectronicarfare,2001)FAAFederalAviationAgencyFHSSfrequency-hoppingspreadspectrumFIRESdefinition(USDoD–JP3-0)istheuseofweapontocreateaspecificlethalornonlethaleffectonatarget.FPSFeetPerSecondGSGroundStationGCSGroundcontrolstationGPSGlobalPositioningSystem(US)[3](USGPO,2021)GNSSGlobalNavigationSatelliteSystem(GPS,GLONASS,o,Beidou&otherregionalsystems)GNUGNU/LinuxOperatingsystemGPSGlobalPositioningSystem/Geo-FencingGPS/INSusesGPSsatellitesignalstocorrectorcalibrateomaninertialnavigationsystem(INS).ThemethodtoanyGNSS/INSsystemGRURussianmilitaryintelligencebranchGSFDGroundstationflooddenialGSMGlobalsystemformobilecommunicationsGTAGround-to-AirDefenseHarddamageDEWcompletevaporizationofatargetHAPSHighAltitudePlatforms(generallyforwirelessommunicationsenhancements)HCMHypersoniccruisemissileHGVHypersonicglidevehicleHEATHigh-explosiveanti-tankwarheadHELHighenergyLaser lxviii | Abbreviations and Acronyms
HOW Hand-over-wordsatellitedatatimestampdefined in (IS-GPS-200G, 2013) HTV Hypersonic test vehicle HUMINT Human Intelligence HVM Hostile vehicle mitigation IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IC Intelligence community ~ 17 different agencies ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile ICS InternetConnectionSharing/Industrialcontrol systemsICT Information & Communications Technology ICTS Information&CommunicationsTechnology ServicesID InformationDominance/Inspectionand Identification /Identification IDEX International Defense Exhibition and Conference IDS Intrusion detection system IED Improvised Explosive Device IFF Identify Friend or Foe IIIM International,Impartial,andIndependent MechanismIMU Inertial Measurement Unit IND Improvised nuclear device INS Inertial navigation system INFOSEC Information Security IO /I.O. Information Operations IoT Internet of things IIoT Industrial Internet of things IP Internet protocol IR Infrared IS Information security / Islamic State ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) ISR Intelligence,ReconnaissanceandSurveillanceUAS Platform Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxix
ISTAR Intelligence,surveillance,targetacquisition,and reconnaissanceITInformation Technology IT/OT Information Technology/ Operational Technology ITE Installation, Training, Expense IW Information Warfare JIM Joint Investigative Mechanism JSR Jamming-to-signal ratio KE Kinetic energy KEW Kinetic energy weapon K’IHAP Short Shout in Tae Kwon Do LASER “A laser isadevicethatemits light throughaprocess of opticalamplification basedonthe stimulated emission of electromagneticradiation.Theterm“laser”originated asan acronym for“lightamplificationbystimulatedemissionof speenfligsingtoemiLdistancclialasertobefligradiation.”Alaserdiffersfromotherlightsourcesinthatitemitshtcoherently,spatially,andtemporally.Spatialcoherenceallowsocusedonatightspot,enablinglasercuttingandthographyapplicationslasercuttingandlithography.Spatialoherencealsoallowsalaserbeamtostaynarrowovergreates(collimation),enablingapplicationssuchaslaserpointers.aserscanalsohavehightemporalcoherence,whichallowsthemtlightwithaverynarrowspectrum,i.e.,theycanemitalecoloroflight.Temporalcoherencecanproducepulsesofhtasshortasafemtosecond.Used:formilitaryandlaworcementdevicesformarkingtargetsandmeasuringrangeanded.”(Wiki-L,2018)LaWSLaserweaponsystemLLTRLow-leveltransitrouteLMorL.M.LoiteringmunitionsLMMLightweightMulti-roleMissilesLOSLineofsightLPILowProbabilityofIntercept LRAD LongRangeAcousticDevice /Long-Range Area Denial [4] lxx | Abbreviations and Acronyms
Mach 1 Speed of sound, 761.2 mph MAD Mutually assured destruction M-ATV Mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle MAME Medium altitude medium endurance MASER MicrowaveAmplificationStimulatedEmissionof RadiationMAST Micro Autonomous Systems & Technology MEDUSA (Mob Excess Deterrent Using Silent Audio) MEMS micro-electro-mechanical systems MIM Man-in-middle attack MIRV Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles ML Machine learning MLAT Multilateration System MND Ministry of National Defense MOA Minute of angle in degrees MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) Gear MRVs Multiple Re-entry Vehicles mTBI mild Traumatic Brain Injury MTI Moving target indicator MUM-T Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) NAS National Academy Of Sciences NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEB New Economic Block soldier NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation NDM Navigation data modification spoofing attack NGO Nongovernmental organization NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences NKW non-kinetic warfare NV Neurological vulnerability OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act decision loops OPCW OrganizationfortheProhibitionofChemical WeaponsOPSEC Operational Security OSINT Open-source intelligence OTH Over-the-horizon Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxxi
PETMAN HumanoidrobotdevelopedforUSArmy-Protection Ensemble Test Mannequin Phigital Digitalandhumancharacteristics&patterns overlapPII Private identifying information and credentials PLA Peoples Liberation Army ( Chinese) PLAN Peoples Liberation Army & Navy (Chinese) POV Point of view PRN Pseudo-Random Noise PSYOPS Psychological warfare operations RC Radio communications signals RCS Radar cross-section RDD Radiological dispersion device RF Radio Frequency RF-EMF Radiofrequency – Electromagnetic field RFID Radio-frequency identification (tags) RID Remote identification of ID RIMPAC Tim of the Pacific RN Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment RNRA Ryan–NicholsAttack/DefenseScenarioRisk Assessment for Cyber cases ROA Remotely operated aircraft ROC Republic of China ROV/ROUV Remoteoperatingvehicle/Remotelyoperated underwater vehicle RPA Remotely piloted aircraft RPAS Remotely piloted system RPV Remotely piloted vehicle RSS Received signal strength RV Re-entry vehicle SA Situational Awareness SAA Sense and Avoid SAM Surface to Air missile SAR Synthetic aperture radar SATCOM Satellite communications lxxii | Abbreviations and Acronyms
SBLM Submarine-launched ballistic missile SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems SCS Shipboardcontrolsystem(orstation)/Stereo Camera System / South China Seas SDR Software-defined radio SEAD Suppression of enemy defenses SECDEF Secretary of Defense (USA) SIC Successive Signal Interference Cancellation SIGINT Signals Intelligence Signature UASdetectionbyacoustic,optical,thermal,and radioSMART/radar Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty S/N S/N=isonepulsereceivedsignaltonoiseratio, dB: Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver (also, SNR) Soft damage DEW disruption to a UAS computer SOCOM U.S. Army Special Operations Command SOLAS SafetyofLifeatSea(InternationalMaritime Convention) [safety conventions] rrGPSsignalcaptursimilartotheoriginftorSpoofingisACyber-weaponattackthatgeneratesfalsesignalseplacevalidones.GPSSpoofingisanattacktoprovidefalseormationtoGPSreceiversbybroadcastingcounterfeitsignalsinalGPSsignalorbyrecordingtheoriginaledsomewhereelseatsomeothertimeandthenetransmittingthesignal.TheSpoofingAttackcausesGPSeceiverstoprovidethewronginformationaboutpositionandtime. (T.E. Humphrees, 2008) (Tippenhauer & et.al, 2011) Spoofing AltDef:ACyber-weaponattackgeneratesfalse signals to replace valid ones. SSBN Strategicnuclear-poweredballisticmissile submarineSSLT Seamless satellite-lock takeover spoofing attack sUAS Small Unmanned Aircraft System SWARM Highlevel,adangerouscollaborationofUAS,UUV,or unmanned boats Taiwan ROC Taiwan is officially the Republic of China Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxxiii
TCAS Traffic collision avoidance system ToF Time of flight TTFF Time to first fix (latency) TDOA time difference of arrival vintheLeorunmanneTEAM(UAS)High-level,adangerouscollaborationofUAS,UUV,dboats;differsfromSWARMinthatithasaUASTeamader(TL)whereSWARMdoesnot.TLdirectstheUASteamandisprimarycounterUAStargettodisrupt.TDOATimedifferenceofarrivalTNTTrinitrotolueneTOTheaterofOperationsTOATimeofarrivalTRANSECTransmissionsecurityTTPsTactic,Technique,andProceduresTxTransmitsignalUAUnmannedAircraft(non-cooperativeandpotentialtruder)UAMUrbanAirMobile(vehicle)UASUnmannedaircraftsystemUAS-pUASpilotUAVUnmannedaerialvehicle/Unmannedautonomousehicle.UAV-pUAVpilotUCARUnmannedcombatarmedrotorcraftUCARSUAVcommonautomatedrecoverysystemUCWA/UAUnintentionalcyberwarfareattackUGCSUnmannedGroundControlStationUGSUnmannedground-basedstationUGTUnmannedgroundtransportUGVUnmannedgroundvehicleUHFUltra-highfrequencyUSVUnmannedSurfaceVesselUUVUnmannedunderwatervehicleVRVirtualrealityVLOSvisuallineofsight lxxiv | Abbreviations and Acronyms
VTOL Vertical take-off and landing VX Deadly nerve agent WFOV Wide field of view WFUL Wake Forrest University Laboratory WLAN Wide Local area network WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WMDD Mini-WeaponsofMassDestructionandDisruption Special Definitions Asymmetricwarfare candescribeaconflictinwhichthe nefusestrowinresourcesoftwobelligerentsdifferinessenceand,inthestruggle,teractandattempttoexploiteachother’scharacteristiceaknesses.Suchstrugglesofteninvolvestrategiesandtacticsfunconventionalwarfare,theweakercombatantsattemptingtoategytooffsetdeficienciesinquantityorqualityoftheirorcesandequipment.(Thomas,2010)Suchstrategiesmaynotcessarilybemilitarized.(Steponova,2016)Thiscontrastswith symmetricwarfare,wheretwopowershave taccomparablemilitarypowerandresourcesandrelyonsimilartics,differingonlyindetailsandexecution.(Thomas,2010) Definitions [5] vthecirsefindsthevisiAcquisition–AcquisitionistheprocessinaGPSreceiverthatblesatellitesignalsanddetectsthedelaysofthePRNquencesandtheDopplershiftsofthesignals.CircularCross-Correlation(CCC)–InaGPSclassicalreceiver,cularcross-correlationisasimilaritymeasurebetweentwoectorsoflengthN,circularlyshiftedbyagivendisplacementd:N1Cxcorr( a, b , d) = ∑ ai dot bI + d mod N I=0 Thetwovectorsaremostsimilaratthedisplacementd,where Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxxv
tandmeridianlong[Examples:terrpoinThemeospooteinftimefr[ctetrallNdisplacthesum(CCCvalue)ismaximum.ThevectorofCCCvalueswithementscanbeefficientlycomputedbyafastFourieransform(FFT)inỚ(NlogN)time.[6](Eichelberger,2019)Coarse-TimeNavigation(CTN)isasnapshotreceiverlocalizationchniquemeasuringsub-millisecondsatelliterangesfromorrelationpeaks,likeclassicalGPSreceivers.(IS-GPS-200G,2013)Seealsoexpandeddefinitionabove.]CollectiveDetection(CD)isamaximumlikelihoodsnapshoteceiverlocalizationmethod,whichdoesnotdeterminethearrivaloreachsatellite,butrathercombinesalltheavailableormationanddecidesonlyattheendofthecomputation.Thischniqueiscriticaltothe(Eichelberger,2019)inventiontomitigatefingattacksonGPSorADS-B.CoordinateSystem–Acoordinatesystemusesanorderedlistfcoordinatestouniquelydescribethelocationofpointsinspace.aningofthecoordinatesisdefinedconcerningsomeanchorts.Thepointwithallcoordinatesbeingzeroiscalledtheorigin.estrial,Earth-centered,Earth-fixed,equator,itude,latitude,geodeticlatitude,geocentriclatitude,geoid.[7]DEWEnergySPREADandLossinPropagation–Therearetwoypesofenergylossesinpropagation :thespreadingofenergysuch whichitpassestodestrinterthatitdoesnotinteractwiththetargetandthewastingofenergyinactionswithaphysicalmedium,suchastheatmosphere,throughoythetarget .Typeoneoccurswhetherthe duringpraTypetweaponortargetislocatedonearthorinthevacuumofspace.wooccursprimarilywhenaweaponortargetlieswithinthetmosphere.(Nielsen,2012)DEWPropagationloss–Thereisalwayssomelossofenergyopagation.TheDEWmust todamagethetargettocompensatefdelivermoreenergythanneededorthelossalongtheway. DE (enerweapondesigndependsontheanticipatedtarget,determiningthegyrequiredfordamage.Second,theanticipatedscenariorange,environment,time,etc.Thisdetermineshowmuchenergy lxxvi | Abbreviations and Acronyms
timemustbeproducedtoensurethatadequateenergyisdeliveredintheavailable.(Nielsen,2012) Fluence istheenergyperareaor(Joules/cm2)necessaryto damage a target. (Nielsen, 2012) Intensity isthepowerperarea(Watt/cm2)necessarytodamage a target. (Nielsen, 2012) Localization–Processofdetermininganobject’splace loctha2013thelengthostrings.EachGPSsaacandstatimestampsoincludingorbi(MfPconcerningsomereference,usuallycoordinatesystems.[akaositioningorPositionFix]MicrowaveWeapon–Adevicethatdamagesatargetbyemittingocusedmicrowaves.Thecriticalwordinthedefinitionis“damage.”onte,2021)NavigationDataisthedatatransmittedfromsatellites,tparameterstodeterminethesatellitelocations,fsignaltransmission,atmosphericdelayestimations,tusinformationofthesatellitesandGPS,suchasthecuracyandvalidityofthedata.(IS-GPS-200G,2013)[8]Pseudo-RandomNoise(PRN)sequencesarepseudo-randombittelliteusesauniquePRNsequencewithaf1023bitsforitssignaltransmissions.akaasGoldcodes,yhavealowcross-correlationwitheachother.(IS-GPS-200G,)Propagation–deliveryofenergytoaDEWtarget.SnapshotGPSReceiverAsnapshotreceiverisaGPSreceivertcapturesoneorafewmillisecondsofrawGPSsignalforaationfix.(Diggelen,2009) DEWWeapon–ofweaponemployedachieveagivenlevelofdamageisrdepositenergyontargets.TWeaponsmaybeunderstoodasdevicesthatheenergythatmustbedepositedtoelativelyinsensitivetothetype .Nuclearweaponsmaybecharacterizedby intermsomegatons,bulletsintermsofmuzzlevelocity,andparticlebeamsfamperesofcurrent.Still,when reducedtocommon arunitsfortheenergyabsorbedbythetarget,similarlevelsofdamageeachievedatsimilarlevelsofenergydeposited . (Nielsen, 2012) otherthanamanRadiologicalWeapon–aradiologicalweaponmeansanydeviceufacturednuclearexplosive,specifically Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxxvii
decaemitocausehcrudeexpdesignedtoemployradioactivematerialbydisseminatingitvialosion,aerosol,injection,dispersion,oraerialsprayingumandestruction,damage,orinjury,employingthettedgammaorbetaradiationovertheyearsproducedbytheyofsuchmaterial. (McCreightR.,ConvergentTechnologyand Future Strategic Threat, 2013) (McCreight M. S., 2020) FalseFlagOperation– organizedspreadingofmisinformationor disinformation. Specific to Chapter 14, Satellite Killers Classification of Satellites ftime;meandrlocenablemobilerspacprmiliotherggalaxies;asSatellitesareclassifiedintermsoftheirpurposeandareclassifiedfollows:Astronomicalsatellites–observationofdistantplanetsandBiosatellites–carrylivingorganismstoaidscientificexperiments;Communicationsatellites–communicationssatellitesuseeosynchronousorLowEarthorbitstocommunicatewitheachandothersystems;Earthobservationsatellitesaresatellitesintendedfornon-taryusessuchasenvironmentalmonitoring,meteorology,andoducingmaps;Killersatellitesaredesignedtodestroywarheads,satellites,ande-basedobjects;Navigationalsatellitesuseradiotimesignalstransmittedtoeceiversonthegroundtodeterminetheirexactation.Therelativelyclearlineofsightbetweenthesatelliteseceiversonthegroundallowssatellitenavigationsystemstoasurelocationtoaccuraciesontheorderofafewmetersinreal-Reconnaissancesatellitesarecommunicationssatellitesdeployedormilitaryorintelligenceapplications;Recoverysatellitesprovidearecoveryofreconnaissance, lxxviii | Abbreviations and Acronyms
climacstaspactolivEarbiological,space-production,andotherpayloadsfromorbittoth;Spacestationsareorbitalstructuresdesignedforhumanbeingseinspace.Aspacestationisdistinguishedfromothercrewedecraftbyitslackofmajorpropulsionorlandingfacilities.Spacetionsaredesignedformedium-termlivinginorbit;Tethersatellitesareconnectedtoanothersatellitebyathincablealledatether;andWeathersatellitesareusedtomonitorEarth’sweatherandte. Satellite Orbits Themostcommontypeoforbitisageocentricorbit,withover thanorbiEarGeorbiema3,000activeartificialsatellitesorbitingtheEarth.Geocentricorbitsybefurtherclassifiedbytheiraltitude,inclination,andccentricity.ThecommonlyusedaltitudeclassificationsofthegeocentrictareLowEarthOrbit(LEO),MediumEarthOrbit(MEO),osynchronousOrbit(GEO),andHighEarthOrbit(HEO).LowthOrbitisanyorbitbelow2,000km,MediumEarthOrbitisanytbetween2,000and36,000km,andHighEarthOrbitisgreater36,000km(Figure14.2). Centric classifications A galactocentric orbit is an orbit around the center of a galaxy. AheliocentricorbitisanorbitaroundtheSun.InourSolar saarmanSystem,allplanets,comets,andasteroidsareinsuchorbits,asareyartificialsatellitesandpiecesofspacedebris.GeocentricorbitisanorbitaroundEarth,suchastheMoonortificialsatellites.Currently,thereareover2,500activeartificialtellitesorbitingtheEarth. Altitude classifications 180LowEarthOrbit(LEO):Geocentricorbitsranginginaltitudefromkm–to2,000km; Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxxix
MediumEarthOrbit(MEO):Geocentricorbitsranginginaltitude from 2,000 km – to 20,000 km; gmwhichcaltiGeosynchronousOrbit(GEO):Geocentriccircularorbitwithantudeof36,000km.Theorbitperiodequalsonesiderealday,oincideswiththeEarth’srotationperiod.Thespeedis3,075/s(10,090ft/s).HighEarthorbit(HEO):Geocentricorbitsabovethealtitudeofaeosynchronousorbit(GEO)>36,000km(~40,000km). SOURCES plusBibliographybelow:(NicholsR.K.,Unmanned (NicholsandOper(NicholsR.eAirAsseAircraftSystemsIntheCyberDomain:ProtectingUSA’sAdvancedts.2ndEd.Manhattan,KS:NewPrairiePress.,2019)andtal.,CounterUnmannedAircraftSystemsTechnologies,ations,2020)(Nichols&etal.,2020)(Nichols&etal.,2020)&etal.,2020)Austin,R,(2010) Development,andDeployment,UnmannedAircraftSystems:UAVSDesign, WestSussex,UK:Wiley,[Condensed WdePp.ixwithadditionsfromeleven-page“UnitsandAbbreviationsTable.”-xxix]Additionalsourcesgeneratedfrom/specifictoChaptervelopment/discussion.Afewdefinitionsaretakenfromikipedia.CyberterminologyfromNichols,R.K.(Sept.5,2008) Cyber Counterintelligence &SensitiveCompartmentedInformationFacility (SCIF) Needs–TalkingPoints& (RandallK.NicholsJ.J.,2018) & Coun(NicholsR.K.,HardeningUSUnmannedSystemsAgainstEnemyterMeasures,2019) & (RandallK.NicholsD.,Chapter20 AcousticCM&IFFLibrariesVSWARMSRev105142019,2018) & (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas, 2002)& (NIST, September 2012) MiliAlford,L.D.,Jr.,USAF,Lt.Col.(2000)CyberWarfare:ProtectingtarySystems AcquisitionReview Quarterly,spring2000,V.7,No. 2, P, 105, (Nielsen, AirJulieJNichols,RandallK.;Mumm,H2012)ansC.;Lonstein,WayneD.;Ryan,.C.H.;Carter,Candice;andHood,John-Paul,“UnmannedcraftSystemsintheCyberDomain”(2019). NPPeBooks.27. https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27 lxxx | Abbreviations and Acronyms
OperIT14:MariUSAUnmanneandOper(NicholsR.e(EnAppendix1:SHttp://Www.Dtic.Mil/Dtic/Tr/Fulltext/U2/A487951.PdftandardAcousticPrincipalPhysicalPropertiestokey,2019)and(Gelfand,2009)Amajorityofthetechnicalabbreviationscomefrom(NicholsR.K.tal.,UnmannedAircraftSystemsintheCyberDomain,2019)andal.,CounterUnmannedAircraftSystemsTechnologies,ations,2020)(Nichols&etal.,2020)(NicholsR.etal.,dAircraftSystems(UAS)inCyberDomain:Protecting’sAdvancedAirAssets,2ndEdition,2019)(NicholsR.K.,ChaptertimeCybersecurity,2021)(Nichols&Sincavage,DisruptiveechnologieswithApplicationsinAirline,Marine,andDefensendustries,2021)(Nichols&Ryan,UnmannedVehicleSystems&ationsonAir,Sea&Land,2020)Otherdefinitionsfromthefollowingreferences:Bibliography(Seoul),B.T.(2018,November27). RF-EMFExposure. Retrieved biomoltherfromPublishedonline2018Nov27.DOI:10.4062/.2018.152:doi:10.4062/biomolther.2018.152AARL.(2022,March18). RFRadiationandElectromagneticField Safety. Retrievedfromhttps://www.arrl.org/: safhttps://www.arrl.org/rf-radiation-and-electromagnetic-field-ety/Adamy,D.-0.(2015).EW104EWAgainstaNewGenerationof Threats. Boston: Artech House. Adamy,D.(2001). EW101AFirstCourseinElectronicWarfare. Boston, MA: Artech House. Adamy,D.(2001). EW101:AFirstCourseinElectronicWarfare. Boston: Artech House. Abbreviations and Acronyms | lxxxi
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McCreight,R.(2013,October).ConvergentTechnologyandFuture Strategic Threat Strategic Studies Quarterly, pp. 10-18. McCreight,R.(2013,March).ConvergentTechnologyThreats. Strategic Studies Quarterly, USAF Air University. DomainMcCreight,R.(2021).NeuroStrikeWeaponsandtheStrategicafter2020:Caution Academia Letters, 2021. ThrMcCreight,T.-F.-C.T.(2020,February24).Twenty-First-CenturyeatsinaComplexWorld:DealingwithDUSTintheWind. Wild Blue Yonder / Maxwell. Monte,L.(2021). WarattheSpeedofLight. Lincoln:Potomac Books.NATO.(n.d.). NATOHAHANDBOOKNTHEMEDICALASPECTSOF NBCDEFENSIVE. Retrievedfromhttp://large.stanford.edu/ Sfm8-9hcourses/2019/ph241/abbate2/docs/fm8-9.pdf:ttp://large.stanford.edu/courses/2019/ph241/abbate2/docs/.pdfNelson,K.(2022,February20).WhatCouldbeCausingHavanayndromeCasesonUSSoil? CBS News. NERC.(2019,November5). nerc_emp_task_force_report.pdf. Arneremp%20task%20fRetrievedfromnerc.com/pa/:https://nerc.com/pa/stand/orce%20posting%20dl/c_emp_task_force_report.pdfNews,B.(2022,February5).NuclearPlantUnderAttackbytillery. BBC News Nichols,R.K.(1999.). ICSAGuidetoCryptography. NewYorkCity: McGraw SensiNichols,R.K.(2008,September05).CounHill.terintelligence&tiveCompartmentedInformationFacility SCIF)Needs–Talking Points Nichols,R.K.(2018). UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)Inthe CyberDomain:ProtectingUSA’sAdvancedAirAssets.1stEd. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press. AgainstEnemNichols,R.K.(2019,March14).HardeningUSUnmannedSystemsyCounterMeasures. 7thAnnualUnmannedSystems Summit. Alexandria, VA, USA: PPTX presentation, self. lxxxvi | Abbreviations and Acronyms
UnmannedVehicleSystems&OperationsonAir, Sea, Land (pp. 330-356). Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press #35. M.R.K.BarnharUnmanneNichols,R.K.(2022).Chapter18:CybersecurityCounterdAircraftSystems(C-UAS)andArtificialIntelligence.InD.t,
UnmannedVehicleSystems& Operations on Air, Sea, Land. Manhattan, KS: NPP #35. Nichols,R.K.,&Mumm,H.C.(2019).
UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)intheCyber
UnmannedAircraftSystemsintheCyber Domain. Manhattan, KS: NPP eBooks. C.,&andHNichols,R.K.,Mumm,H.C.,Lonstein,W27..D.,Ryan,J.J.,Carter,ood,J.-P.(2019).
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Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press. Nichols,R.K.(2020).
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intheCyberDomain,2ndEdition.UnmannedAircraftSystems
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WirelessSecurity;Threats,Models
lxxxviii | Abbreviations and Acronyms
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EmployeesandTheirFamiliesatOverseasEmbassies. Washington: National Academy of Sciences. Scientists,B.o.(2009,May19). IraqFFCDreport–what-we-foundat-al-tuwaitha. Retrievedfromhttps://thebulletin.org: https://thebulletin.org/2009/05/what-we-found-at-al-tuwaithaScoles,S.(2022,March11).RadioactiveMaterialIseverywhere. Scientific American. SOCOM.(2015). SOCOMLeadersattributeriskstocognitive warfare. Ft Bragg NC: SOCOM Unclassified brief. Steponova,E.(2016).2008TerrorisminAsymmetricalConflict. SIPRI Report 23. Straussfogel,C.v.(2009). InternationalEncyclopediaofHuman Geography Amsterdam: Elsevier willchangSYSTEMS,G.A.(2022,March3).HowAIandsupervisedautonomyecombat. GENERALATOMICSAERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS DeT.E.Humphrees,e.(2008).AssessingtheSpoofingThreat:velopmentofaportableGPSSpoofingCivilianSpoofer ION (pp. Sept 16-19). Savana, GA: ION. Thomas,R.(2010).RelearningCounterinsurgencyWarfare. Parameters, PDF. spooTippenhauer,N.,&et.al.(2011).Ontherequirementsforsuccessfulfingattacks. Proc.ofthe18thACMConf.onComputingand communications security (CCS), 75-86. Turnquist,C.(2020).Radiation-inducedbraininjury:current conceptsandtherapeuticstrategiestargetingneuroinflammation. Neuro-Oncology Advances, Volume 2, Issue 1, January-December. Tzu,S.(475–221B.C.E.). TheArtofWar. Retrievedfrom http://classics.mit.edu: http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html USAF.(January4,2002). AirForceDoctrineDocumentAFDD2-5, Information Operations. Washington: USAF. USGPO.(2021,June14). WhatisGPS? RetrievedfromGps.gov: www.gps.gov/sysytems/gpsWiki-L.(2018,August27). Laser. RetrievedfromWikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laser xc | Abbreviations and Acronyms
[1] curr[2019[7[other[5]Ar[placnumberoOrbir64and8rftimeinfLocta[w101AF[andECCMwasconsideredT.S.classifiedwithmostsecretprotocolsdesignalgorithms.TS=TopSecret2]EW,E.S.,E.P.,E.A.definitionswereadjustedvia(AdamyD.,EWirstCourseinElectronicWarfare,2001)toalignwithourUASeaponsdeploymenttheme.3]GPSconsistsofatleast24satellitesorbitingaroundtheEarthtapproximately20,000kmabovethesurface,circlingtheEarthwiceaday,continuouslytransmittingitslocationandtimecode.alizationisdoneinspaceandtime.GPSprovideslocationandormationtoreceiversanywhereonEarthwhereatleastoursatellitesignalscanbereceived.Lineofsight(LOS)betweeneceiverandsatelliteisadvantageous.GPSsignalstakebetween9mstoreachEarth.GPSworkspoorlyindoors,witheflections,closetothickobstructions,andbelowtreesincanyons.tsarepreciselydeterminedbyGCS,optimizedforahighfconcurrentlyvisiblesatellitesabovethehorizonatanyeonEarth.4]LRAD=LongRangeAcousticDevice(Chapter13)/Long-RangeeaDenial(Chapter11)AllDefinitionsaretakenfrom(Eichelberger2019)unlesswisenoted.6]Ớ=Orderofmagnitude;dot=dotproductforvectors]AllthesesystemsarediscussedinChapter2of(Eichelberger,)8]Eachsatellitehasaunique1023-bitPRNsequence,plussomeentnavigationdata,D.Eachbitisrepeated20timesforbetter Abbreviations and Acronyms | xci
caf30separalsolimirobustness.Thenavigationdatarateislimitedto50bit/s.Thistssendingtimestampsevery6secondsandsatelliteorbitameters(functionofthesatellitelocationovertime)onlyeveryconds.Asaresult,thelatencyofthefirstlocationestimatesterturningonaclassicreceiver,calledthetimetofirstfix(TTFF),anbehigh.
xcii | Abbreviations and Acronyms
Table of Contents -Detailed TitleCoPageverArt (Brenda Andrews, Suzanne Sincavage, Candice Carter) Copyright / Publication Page Books also by Professor Randall K. Nichols and the Wildcat Team DisclaimersDedications (Lonstein) Foreword (Harding) Preface (Nichols) AbbrListAcknowledgmentsofContributorseviationsandAcronyms (Reduced to only Book 6) Table of Contents Table of Figures Table of Tables Table of ChaptersEquations Section1:Chemical,Biological,Radiation,Nuclear,Explosive (CBRNE) Weapons / Payloads 1. Drone’s Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD) – a Global Perspective (Slofer) Learning goals Weaponization Brief history Major types of Drones/Robots Aquatic drones Surface vessels UnmanneRSubmergibleobots/dronesdAerial Vehicle (UAV), Table of Contents -Detailed | 1
2.BConclusionsibliography Chemical Weapons (Hood) Student Objectives OrUkrCaseSIntroductiontudy1:ThePotentialforChemicalWeaponsReleaseinaineCaseStudy2:ChemicalWeaponsReleaseinSyriaandtheganizationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeaponsGhouta:TheIeperofthe21stCenturyFalseDeclarationandChemicalWeaponsAttacksDeepeningChemicalWeaponsCrisisOPCWResponsetoWideningChemicalWeaponsUseTheFightforaFutureFreeofChemicalWeaponsTheintersectionofDronesandChemicalWeaponsAPartingNightmareBibliography3. Biological Weapons (Sincavage & Carter) Student Objectives EarIntroductionlyUnmanned Biological Weapon TAttackerrorist Groups Democratic People’s Republic Of Korea (DPRK) (North Korea) Drone Swarms ConclusionsDetection 2 | Table of Contents -Detailed
4.BibliographyRadiological,Electromagnetic,Drone&MetaverseRisksand Issues (McCreight) Introductio 2n Radiological Threats—Everything Old is New Again TheNatureofRadiological,Electromagnetic,andDroneRisk Inside the ScF20WRadiologMetaverseicalandElectromagneticRisksandtheEraofCognitivearfareThreatDynamics—RadiologicalandElectromagneticIssuesPost21GraspingtheNon-KineticAspectsofCONV-CBRNSpecialDeliveryofDeathandDestruction:AddingDroneRiskactorsPost2021CONV-CBRNDroneAugmentedThreatandRiskPossibleenariosCONV-CBRN–OnwardSecurityandRiskChallengesPost2021Conclusions5. Nuclear Weapons (Carter) Student Objectives ChinaNucleПRussianSoRussiaSIntroductiontateActorsvietUnionFederationосейдонAndБелгородarAlertStatus Table of Contents -Detailed | 3
Other 6.EndnotesBConclusionsCountriesibliography Explosives Delivered by Drone (Hood) Student Objectives ExplosivCaseSCaseIntroductionstudy6.1:tudy2:UkraineAdaptingDronestoDropImprovisedesCaseStudy3:Anti-PersonnelMunitionsPointshootingwithadroneCaseStudy6.4:LoiteringMunitionsConclusionsBibliography7. Deception (Nichols) Student objectives VIntroductionulnerabilities of modern societies to UAS attack Basic terminology Perspectives of deception Deception maxims FSurpriseourFundamental Principles ThreeexamplesofUASAttacksthatcouldbe Destruction, Disruption, or Deception (D/D/D) Taxonomy of Technical Methods of Deception 4 | Table of Contents -Detailed
TechnicalSensorCamouflage,Concealment,andDeception (CC&D)CEAInformation Operations (IO) Signal and Information Systems (IS) Denial and Deception Electronic Warfare (EW) EW EichelSSLegacGeneralitiesyEWdefinitionspoofing–GPSSpoofingpoofingtechniquesberger’sCD–CollectiveDetectionMaximumLikelihood Localization Approach (ECD) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) EndnotesBConclusionsibliography Section 2: Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) / Payloads 8. DEW Primer (Nichols) Student Objectives EfCommonIntroductionFrameworkfectsOfDirectedEnergy Weapons (Dew) The Beloved Btu Gives Way To Joules Energy Required For Damage Ice Cube 10,000 Joules Energy Alone Sufficient For Hard Damage? Energy Delivery Rate Thermal Conduction Constant Surface Temperature Case Table of Contents -Detailed | 5
WConvectionindVTemperature Convection Heat Vacuum Black Body Radiation FluencImplicationseAnd Intensity All-Purpose Damage Criteria Energy Spread And Loss In Propagation Energy 9EndnotesBConclusionsSpreadibliography. DE Weapons, Projectiles, Damage (Nichols) Student Objectives CommonIntroductionFramework (Chapter 8 Recap) Fundamentals Of Kew Hunting Wild Boars At The Boar Skin SacrificialDamage Drones Propagation In An Atmosphere Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727) Newton’s First Law Newton’s Second Law Newton’s Third Law Shooting In The Air Drone Vs. Drone In Air – Complexity Flight Equations With Forces VThrustertical Location Vertical Descent 6 | Table of Contents -Detailed
SHVAcVelocitycelerationerticalAscentorizontalLocationummary:Propagation In The Atmosphere Interaction With Targets – Damage Pressure And Impulse Angle Of Attack (AoA) Target Material And Shape What Is Damage? Sabot Projectile Design Shaped Charges Modern Military Shape Charge Functions Summary: Target Interaction 10:Bibliography DE Weapons, MASERS/LASERS (Mai) Student Objectives Laser Pointer Can A Laser Pointer Be Used To Bring Down A Drone? Infrared Interference Bright Lights Heat Damage Is Taking A Drone Down With A Laser Illegal? Rafael Drone Dome Raytheon Drone-Killing Laser EAthenavasive Measures Used By Drones Which Laser Colors Are The Most Dangerous And Why? Hy Are Blue Laser Pointers More Dangerous? What Laser Pointer Color Is The Most Powerful? Classes Of Laser Pointers Class 1 Laser Pointers Table of Contents -Detailed | 7
Class 2 Laser Pointers Class 3 Laser Pointers Class 4 Laser Pointers Laser Pointer Summary A Little History Military Interests Weaponizing The Laser Moore’s Law Implications ANFPFNanotechnologyair-WeatherLasersowerIssuesorTheGeeksewThreatsSolutionWaitingFor A Conflict Laser Weapons Of Potential Adversaries Other 11.EndnotesBConclusionConsiderationsibliography DE Weapons, Microwaves (Mai) Student Objectives Back to Microwave Ovens Microwave Weapon U.S. Microwave Weapons Antipersonnel Microwave Weapons Neurological Microwave Weapons Hello, Goodbye, and Goodnight The PANDORA Project Biological Microwave Weapons Skin Irritation Frey Effect Weapons CHAMP 8 | Table of Contents -Detailed
Russian Microwave Weapons Chinese Microwave Weapons Detecting And Disabling Drones Drone Detection Radar Detecting Drones Using RC Detection and Jamming Ranges Deploying CUAV Systems ManagConclusionsingEditor’s Opinion 12.BibliographyHypersonic Drone Missiles (Slofer) Student Objectives The Speed spectrum TypesSHSSubsonicupersonicypersonicpeedandDistanceofHypersonic missiles Types of Launch Platforms Stationary Land Based Sea/ocean based Power Plants/ Propulsion systems Supersonic-combination ramjet aka scramjet Technology considerations for hypersonic Navigation, guidance, and control systems Other considerations Military application and threats Time is everything Doctrines,Policies,andStrategiesinaneraofhypersonic weaponsSummary Table of Contents -Detailed | 9
13.Bibliography Acoustic Weapons (Nichols, Carter, McCreight) Student Learning Objectives DeDisclaimertectionSignatures Review Essentials of Audiology Audiology Fundamentals The intensity and Inverse Square Law TheDecibelsNature of Sound Other Parameters of Sound waves Complex waves Standing Waves and Resonance sesonicimporIntermsofUAS.Countermeasures,whyareAcousticssotant?WhataretheAcousticDetectionIssues?CanUASacousticsignaturesbereduced?IsAcousticQuietingpossible?WhatisanAcousticalattackontheUAS’sGyroscope?HowhastheLong-RangeAcousticDevice(LRAD)beenusedasaweapon?LRADNATOAutonomousMineSweepers(ATM)MEMSResonanceEffectsonMEMS–wehavearrivedattheNUBofthisctionWhatisResonanceTuning?Whatisthe“sowhat”forAcoustics?ArethereCountermeasuresforAcousticattacksongyroscope?SouthKoreanExperimentNOISE 10 | Table of Contents -Detailed
UAS Collaboration – SWARM 14.NVtheDrbookRemembertheProblemtheWildcatteamhasaddressedineveryofourseries.AProblemSolutionNotTheONLYProblemSolution:SwitchingtoADangerousTheaterofOperations(TO)–ChineseonesintheSpratlyIslands,andChineseThreatstoUSAforcesinPacificLocationoftheSpratlyIslandsandTheirStrategicImportanceTargetDronesSharkSwarmandWanshanMarineTestFieldFastDroneShipLong-RangeUUVCrisisWatchRedDronesoverDisputedSeasBZK-005DRONESECReportApril2022AcousticDynamics:HavanaSyndromeandNeurologicalulnerabilityAcousticsandHavanaSyndromeIllustrateourCollectiveeurologicalVulnerabilityAcousticTechnologiesSCREAMERSBibliography Satellite Killers [Jackson] Student Learning Objectives ClassificISatellitesntroductionation of Satellites Satellite Orbits Centric classifications Altitude classifications Inclination classifications Table of Contents -Detailed | 11
Eccentricity classifications Synchronous classifications Satellite Killers SaDenIntroductionyingspacetelliteKillers: China Satellite Killers: Russia Space Awareness and Space-Based Weapons IBQuestionsibliographynformativeReadings and Additional Bibliography Satellite Killing and Denying Space Space Awareness and Space-based Weapons Space Breakthroughs and Inventions 15. Cyber Weapons and CBRNE (Nichols) Student Objectives VDeploorProblem–TheRiskofTerroristAttackvs.U.S.AirDefenseSystemCBRNFacilitiesCBRNInfrastructureAttacksContributingTechnologiesAttack/DefenseScenariosDescriptionofthesUAS/UASLandscape–What’savailableforymentagainstCBRNEAssets?AutonomyvAutomationLevelsUASCollaborationCyberRelatedCBRNEAttacksDronesasRogueAccessPointsCBRNEAttackScenariosWhatIstheCounter-UASProblem?OperationalProtectionfromHostileUASAttacks–AHelicopteriew 12 | Table of Contents -Detailed
Countering UAS Air Threats Vulnerabilities Perspective ConventionalVulnerabilitiesofAirDefenseSystems(ADS), Attacks By sUAS, and Countermeasures Conventional Countermeasures Against sUAS / UAS Passive EndnotesBDiscussionTheUSDiscussionConclusionsMeasuresTopicsNavyOfficialResponseCaseforaCyberWeaponQuestionibliography Section 3: Policy Considerations 16. Assessing the Drone Delivery Future WMDD / DEW Threats and Risks (Mumm / Lonstein) Student Learning Objectives A Look Back at the Traditional Delivery Systems StackIntegration-EmergingTechnologiesOffersNewTactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) Assessment of Emerging Threats of Mini-WMD Does the World Have an Answer to These Emerging Threats? Airspace-Freedom of Movement of Autonomous Systems spacPrDelivCapabiliRiskstoAccessinTimeandSpace?HowOverTheHorizontyLimitstheUsefulnessofFreedomofMovementPoliciesLegalConsiderationsforAutonomousSystemsasWMD/DEWeryPlatformsAssessmentoftheStateofReadinessfortheLegalCommunitytoosecuteCaseswithAutonomousSystemsUseintheWMD/DEWe Table of Contents -Detailed | 13
LegalandCyberConsiderationsWhileBuildingtheLegal SFrameworkTowardsPeacefulContainment/UseofAutonomousystemsintheFutureConclusionsQuestionsReferences17. Unique Challenges of Responding to Bioterrorism and Chemical Threats and Attacks delivered by Drones (Sincavage & Carter) Student Objectives RAdIntroductionvancedRoboticsobotics:Technology Overview 3D Printing 18.BConclusionsTheTheBioprintersRisksOpportunitiesibliography Practical Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) Using Autonomous Systems (Mumm / Lonstein) Student Learning Objectives A Look Back at the Science of Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) Challenges of CSI in Hot Zones-Why Not Use Robots? Autonomous Systems Technology to Augment Human CSIs ScLegalConsiderationsforAutonomousSystemsUseataCrimeene 14 | Table of Contents -Detailed
19CSIConsiderSAlloAutonomousEvidence:IfYouCan’tExplainIt,CourtsWillNotwItProsecutorialEvidenceCollectionbyHumanCSIVS.AutonomousystemsEvidencePreservationViaChainofCustody-TechnicalandCyberationsAugmentingandIntegratingArtificialEmployees/Autonomouss-TheChanging-HorizonofSceneCollectionandJusticeforAll?ConclusionsQuestions. Navigation Spoofing and ECD (Nichols) Student Objectives DefiniSummarytion: Spoofing AClassicGPSSIntroductionpoofingSignalReceivers-GPS–Reducing The Start-Up Time Course – Time Navigation Snapshot Receivers Collective Detection DefCounRECDesearchTo2016:SurveyOfEffectiveGPSSpoofingtermeasuresSpoofingTechniquesA-FAnalysisGPSSpoofingResearch:OutOfTheBoxBrillianceToECDenseMaximumLikelihoodLocalizationSpoofingMitigation Table of Contents -Detailed | 15
Successive Signal Interference Cancellation GPS Signal Jamming Two Robust GPS Signal Spoofing Attacks and ECD Seamless Satellite-Lock Takeover Navigation Data Modification ECD Algorithm Design Branch And Bound ADS-B Security ADS-B Standards ADS-B Security Requirements Vulnerabilities In ADS-B System Broadcast Nature of RF Communications No Cryptographic Mechanisms ADS-B Cots Shared Data Asterix Data Format Dependency On The On-Board Transponder ComplexSystemArchitectureAndPassthroughOfGNSS VulnerabilitiesThreatsToADS-B System TwDEavesdroppingata-LinkJammingoTypesOfJamming Threats For ADS-B Ground Station Flood Denial Aircraft Flood Denial ADS-B Signal Spoofing Ground Station Target Ghost Injection / Flooding Aircraft Target Ghost Injection / Flooding ADS-B Message Deletion ADS-B Message Modification Circling Back To ECD CompeIndoorLocalizationWithAircraftSignalsUsingECDVs.titiveTechnologiesECDVs.MinimumUsGovernmentGPSStandardsRelatedWork 16 | Table of Contents -Detailed
WiFi [T] Ultrasound [I] Light [T,E] Bluetooth [T, I] RFID EndnotesBDefiniConclusionsSeHAPSSensor[I]FusioncurityOfGNSStionsibliography Section 4: Tools of the Trade 20. Social Network implications for WMDD (Lonstein) Student Learning Objectives 21.EspionagDistrSocialMediaNetworksasaWeaponofMassDestruction,action,andDivisionConsumerandCommercialDroneTechnologyasaToolofe,Command,andKineticattacksQuestionsforStudentstoConsiderBibliography Tools of The Trade (Monnik & Neo) Student Objectives AcIntroductioncuracy Table of Contents -Detailed | 17
TTimelinessReliabilityoolsforUAS Threat Intelligence Open-Source Tools Closed-Source Tools Collection data types Tools for historical and current UAS threat intelligence Configuring Google (Open-Source, free) Configuring LiveUAMap (Open-Source, paid) Tools for current and future UAS threat intelligence Configuring Slack (Closed-Source, free) DroneSec Notify (Open/Closed-Source, free/paid) Stolen Drone Info (Open/Closed-Source, free/paid) EndnotesBConclusionsibliography 18 | Table of Contents -Detailed
Table of Figures 1. Drone Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD) -Global Perspective Figure 1.1 Armed Unmanned Surface Vehicle from BAE Systems IbleGeFmadeagainstandDynamicsmuniFigure1.2Dumpsitesofreportedchemicalandexplosivetionsfrom1918-to-1980Figure1.3RobotdroneFigure1.4RobotdroneFigure1.5RobotdroneFigure1.6DARPAfundedAtlasrobotdevelopedbyBostonFigure1.7AerialdroneusedinmoviescenefilmingFigure1.8ImageofPredatorBdroneFigure1.9UseofsynchronizedswarmingdronesinanightdisplayFigure1.10Fieldassemblyofadronecapableofthermalimagingdeliveryof1.5kgbombsFigure1.11DronesarebeingusedtodropMolotovcocktailsRussiantroopsinUkraine.Figure1.12DJIdronecaringgrenadeinanimprovisedcarrierfromaplasticjug2.ChemicalWeaponsigure2.1SoldiersinMissionOrientedProtectivePosture(MOPP)arFigure2.2CivilDefensemembercarriesadamagedcanisterinenvillage.Figure2.3SoldierinMOPPGearReadyFigure2.4MustardgasartilleryshellsFigure2.5AgricultureDroneissprayingpesticidesoncropsFigure2.6DJIAgri’sT30 Table of Figures | 19
3. Biological Weapons Figure 3.1 Early Unmanned Bioweapons Figure 3.2 Spraying Drone Figure 3.3 African Swine Fever Across Asia Figure3.4DemocraticPeople’sRepublicOfKorea(DPRK)(North Korea) Drone Figure 3.5 Swarm Of Mass Destruction 4. Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues Figure 4.1 Common Sources of Radiation Figure 4.2 Cognitive Key Terrain Figure 4.3 Radiological Spectrum Figure 4.4 Anechoic Chamber[large vs. small] example Figure 4.5 CONV-CBRN Threat Dynamics Figure 4.6 Setting the Stage for NV 5. Nuclear Weapons TheFFigure5.1RussianPresidentVladimirPutinAddressesTheRussianederalAssemblyFigure5.2RussianPoseidon2m39TorpedoFigure5.3A&BBelgorod–RussianUnmannedNuclearSubmarineFigure5.4Belgorod–RussianUnmannedNuclearSubmarineFigure5.5ChinaNuclearExpansionFigure5.6ChinaDroneLineupSharpSwordStealthDroneAndWingLoongReaper6.ExplosivesDeliveredbyDrone 20 | Table of Figures
FFtubeMuniT60-81mmTMCocktailsTFigure6.1:APictureTakenByADroneFromAboveItsIntendedarget.Figure6.2:UkrainiansDevelopDroneThatDropsMolotovFigure6.3:Close-Up–UkrainiansDevelopDroneThatDropsolotovCocktailsFigure6.4:MolotovCocktailReleasedFigure6.5:HeavyModificationsToCivilDronePlatformsEnabledoCarryVeryLowCostYetPowerfulMunitionsSuchAsMortarsRounds.Figure6.6:PointShootingwithaDroneFigure6.7:RussianKUB-BLA“SuicideDrone”Figure6.8:KUB-BLARussianLoiteringMunitionFigure6.9:RussianSuicideDroneUsedinUkraineThatPicksitsargetsThoughAdvanceAIFigure6.10:TheWreckageofAnotherRussianKUB-BLALoiteringtionFigure6.11:USMarinefiringSwitchbladefromapneumaticlaunchFigure6.12:Switchblade600Figure6.13:Artistrenditionofaswitchbladelaunch7.Deceptionigure7.1OperatingNuclearPowerPlantswithintheU.S.Figure7.2CyberElectromagneticActivitiesFigure7.3CEA/CEWintheviewofTotalWar8.DEWPrimerigure8.1EnergyDepositionfromBombsandDEWFigure8.2EnergyFlowandResultingChangeinTemperatureFigure8.3SpecialCase:ConstantSurfaceTemperatureFigure8.4EffectofWindvTemperatureFigure8.5BlackBodyRadiation Table of Figures | 21
Figure 8.6 Fluence and Intensity 10BAFluencFigure8.7DepthVaporizedby104JoulesvAreaEngagedandeFigure8.8DivergenceandJitter9:DEWeapons,Projectiles,DamageFigure9.1Coyoteunmannedaircraftsystem.Figure9.2CoyoteunmannedaircraftsystemonthetarmacofvonParkAirForceRangeinFlorida.Figure9.3IAIIsraeliHaropFigure9.4NewtonsSecondLawofMotionRelationshipsFigure9.5ProjectileDistanceandVelocityCoordinatesFigure9.6EffectOfElevationAngleOnVelocityComponentsFigure9.7FlightEquationswithDragFigure9.8ThrustFigure9.9SmashingtwoBrickswithoutspacersfor2ndDegreelackBeltTestFigure9.10PossibleEffectsOfKineticEnergyProjectilesFigure9.11SABOTAPFSDSProjectileFigure9.12HEATProjectileFigure9.13ChargeProjectileDetailDEWeapons,MASERS/LASERSFigures10.01&10.02LaserPointers–PilotViewFigure10.00LaserPointer(small)Figure10.1:CharlesTownes(Left)AndJimGordonWithABeamTypeMaser.Figure10.2:TheodoreMaimanFigure10.3:LaserCoherenceFigure10.4:LaserDazzlerForM-4RifleFigure10.5:LaserDazzlerInOperationFigure10.6:AtmosphericInfluencesFigure10.7:LaserPlatformMountedOnBoeing747 22 | Table of Figures
Figures 10.8 & 10.9: Laser Testing Figure 10.10: Laser Weapon Destroying UAV Figure 10.11: Hel (High Energy Laser) USS Ponce Figure 10.12: Drone Being Destroyed 11: DE Weapons, Microwaves Figure 11.1: Microwave Portion of the Electromagnetic Spectrum Figure 11.2: Kitchen Microwave Figure 11.3: Inside of ordinary kitchen microwave oven Figure 11.4: Magnetron and Set-up Transformer Figure11.5 ADS(ActiveDenialSystem)/LRAD(LongRangeActive Denial)Figure 11.6: US embassy in Havana, Cuba Figure11.6ATwostylesofUSMarineCorpstrucksareseen 12.operUrbanAnalprMarineCorpsBaseQuancarryingtheActiveDenialSystem,March9th,2012,attheUStico,Virginia.Thenon-lethalweaponojectsastrongelectromagneticbeamupto1000-metersFigure11.7:FreyEffectFigure11.8:CHAMPFigure11.9DJIPhantom4Figure11.10:AnalyzingaRadarPulseUsinganR&SSpectrumyzerFigure11.11:TheoreticalDetectionRangeWithoutNoiseFigure11.12:TheoreticalDetectionRangeWithNoise,e.g.,InAnEnvironment.Figure11.13:TheoreticaljammingrangeFigure11.14:JammingrationforCE-compliantremotecontrolatinginthe2.4GHzISMbandHypersonicDroneMissilesFigure12.1ComparisonofspeedsforvariousaircraftandvehiclesFigure12.2CommercialflighttimefromNewYorkCitytoOrlandoFlorida Table of Figures | 23
Figure 12.3 Categories of Hypersonic missiles Figure12.4HGVtrajectoriescomparedtoaBallisticReentry VehicleFigure 12.5 Detection avoidance Figure 12.6 Russia’s land-based silo launch Figure 12.7 India Mobile Launcher Figure 12.8 Zircon Hypersonic missile ship launch Figure 12.9 Aircraft launched a hypersonic missile Figure 12.10 Cutaway diagram of a basic jet engine Figure 12.11 Cutaway diagram of scram engine Figure 12.12 General thrust equation Figure12.13TileweightspercubicfootfortheThermalProtection System tiles used on the STS Orbiter Figure 12.14 Cutaway diagram of the X-51A HCM with subsystems Figure 12.15 Countries pursuing hypersonic weapon technology 13.VtarPChinesemissilelatarBalticFigure12.16Attackscenarioagainst3NATOcountriesfromabasedlaunchFigure12.17DistancesbetweenpossibleChineselaunchsitesandgetsinKorea,Japan,andTaiwanFigure12.18VariousRangesforballisticcoveragefromeasternunchfacilitiesprovidingcoverageinthesouthacificFigure12.19IllustrationofChina’shypersonictestsFigure12.20TheObserve.Orient.Decide.Act-LoopFigure12.21Cruisemissiles’launchfootprintsandtraveltimestogetFigure12.22PossibletargetcoveragerangesofaHypersonicGlideehicleAcousticWeaponsFigure13.1:InverseSquareLaw,SoundIntensityFigure13.2showscommondecibelandIntensitylevelswithinthehearingrange. 24 | Table of Figures
Figure 13.3: Tuning for Oscillations Figure 13.4: Tuning fork oscillations over time Figure 13.5: Standing wave Figure 13.6 LRAD Figure 13.7 NATO OTAM ATM Figure 13.8 LRAD Ship Defense on USS ESSEX Figure 13.9: MEMS Gyroscope Figure 13.10 Location of Dongsha Island and Taiwan Figure 13.11 Spratly Islands Figure 13.12 Spratly Islands Figure 13.13 S-100 Chinese Drone Figure 13.14 S-100 Drone Trajectories in the Spratly Islands Figure 13.15 BZK -005 Chinese Drone 15.14.inFigure13.16ChineseUAS.ChineseIntelligenceAssetsDeploymentSpratlysFigure13.17MaliciousDroneActivitiesinSCSnearTaiwanFigure13.18ATS–SCREAMERSatelliteKillersFigure14.1.AsatelliteinLowEarthOrbit(LEO)aroundEarthFigure14.2.ClassificationofaltitudeorbitsandusesFigure14.3.NumberofRussian(left)andChinese(right)satellitesinorbitbetween2019and2021Figure14.4.Thecounter-spacecontinuumshowstherangeofthreatstospace-basedsatelliteservicesFigure14.5.ComputersimulationoftrackedobjectsinEarth’sorbit.Red,yellow,andgreenobjectsarerepresentationsofactivesatellitesanddebrisintheGEOandMEO.Figure14.6.Space-basedweaponsCyberWeaponsandCBRNE Table of Figures | 25
Figure 15.1 CIS Shared Threats Figure 15.2 Infrastructure Interdependencies 16. Assessing the Drone Delivery Future WMD / DEW Threats and Risks Figure 16.1 Picture of a Sea-Air Integrated Drone FtogdrFigure16.2Diagramshowingcommunicationsbetweensea-aironeandremoteoperatorFigure16.3IllustrationofUMVs,UGVs,andUAVsswarmsworkingetherFigure16.4:ImageofasoldierandaBlackHornetUAVFigure16.5TimelineofIndustrialRevolutions,Figure16.6Futurecapabilitiesofautonomous/AIsystemsFigure16.7ImageofIndustrialRevolutionandthenextrevolutionFigure16.8WWIIRedCrossPrisonerofWarGiftPackageFigure16.9UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFigure16.10MITTechnologyReview17.UniqueChallengesofRespondingtoBioterrorismandChemicalThreatsandAttacksDeliveredByDronesigure17.1 Chemputer Drones Figure 17.2 3D Printed Drone Figure 17.3 ISIS 3D Printed Bomb Figure 17.4 3D Bioprinter 18. Practical Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) Using Autonomous Systems Figure 18.1 A Timeline of the History of Forensic Science Figure 18.2 Law enforcement humanoid in Dubai shopping mall Figure 18.3. Law enforcement humanoid in a public space Figure 18.4 UGV assisting at an IED site 26 | Table of Figures
Figure18.5InvestigatorusingaUAVatacrimesceneExamining UAV use in CSI-Crash Scene Photo Royal Canadian Mounted Police Figure 18.6. Side by Side Comparison of DS-1A and DS-1B UAVs Figure 18.7 A Timeline of Fingerprint Firsts Figure 18.8 Dr. Henry Lee, examining evidence Figure18.9GlovedemonstrationfromtheSimpsontrial.The gloves did not fit. Figure 18.10 Automated Speed Enforcement Technology Figure 18.11 Scenes from the Rittenhouse courtroom 20. Social Network implications for WMDD 21.SafFigure20.1AthirdofUSTikTokUsersmaybe14orunder,RaisingetyConcerns.Figure20.2DroneoperatorflyingoverrooftopsFigure20.3GrenadelaunchedfromDJIPhantomFigure20.4DJIOperatorToolsofTheTradeFigure21.1AtypicalUASThreatCOPoveronemonth.Figure21.2Usingsearchenginestolistincidenteventsinthepastsevendays.Figure21.3Google.comau/alertsFigure21.4AglobalviewoftweeteddroneincidentsFigure21.5Acollectionofwordsforslack.Figure21.6Thefree,weeklyUASThreatIntelligencebriefSourceFigure21.7TheUASTIPprovidesglobalincidenttrackingandanalysiscapabilities.Figure21.8TheDroneSecNotifyUASTIPDashboardFigure21.9PerformingasearchforaspecificprisonSourceFigure21.10Viewingarunninglistofrecenthigh-priorityreportsFigure21.11ViewingarunninglistofUASartifactsFigure21.12AsearchforC-UASrelatedcontentintheKnowledgeBase Table of Figures | 27
Figure 21.13 The Stolen Drone Info tool dashboard Figure 21.14 Example of a stolen drone reported on the SDI. 28 | Table of Figures
Table of Tables 1. Drone Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD) -Global Perspective Table 1.1 Timeline of drones and their uses 3. Biological Weapons Table 3.1 Biological Agents That Can Be Used In Biological Warfare 5. Nuclear Weapons Table 5.1 Limits On Start, Moscow Treaty, And New Start 7. Deception Table 7.1 characteristics of emergency behavior Table 7.2 three perspectives on deception Table 7.3 Deception maxims Table 7.4 Deception Table 7.5 Categories of Deception Channels and Methods Table 7.6 Representative CNO Deceptive Operations T(EM)Table7.7StandardTaxonomyofRepresentativeElectromagneticDeceptionTechniques8.DEWPrimerable8.1BattlespaceDimensionsTable8.2ThermalPropertiesofCommonMaterialsTable8.3EnergylossesinPropagation9.DEWeapons,Projectiles,DamageTable9.1ParametersaffectingTargetResponseandDamage Table of Tables | 29
Table9.2KineticEnergyRequiredfora7.62mmProjectileto Penetrate Targets 11. DE Weapons, Microwaves 18.13.12.theTable11.1showsseveralenvironmentsandthetypicalrangesinARDRONISsystem.Table11.2TypicalJammingRangesHypersonicDroneMissiles12.1Comparisonofthevariousaircraftandspeedrangesinthesoundspectrum12.2Speed,time,anddistancecomparisonsatvariousMachspeedsfrom130andtimestocover1000miles12.3Meltingtemperaturesof10commonmetals.12.4MeltingPointsforCriticalElectronicComponents12.5Listingofcountrieswiththeirhypersonicdevicesandassociatedspeedsanddistances12.6StepsandtimesfromobservationtolaunchdecisionforincomingballisticmissileAcousticWeaponsTable13.1:PrincipalPhysicalProperties15.CyberWeaponsandCBRNETable15.1AutomationLevelsTable15.2UASCollaborationTable15.3Cyber-attacksbyareaofCBRNETable15.4CyberAttackScenariosbyAreainCBRNEPracticalCrimeSceneInvestigation(CSI)UsingAutonomousSystemsTable18.1.ProsandConsofUGVssupportingCSIenvironmentsTable18.2.ProsandConsofUASinaCSIenvironment 30 | Table of Tables
19. Navigation Spoofing and ECD Table 19.1 & 19.2 Effectiveness Criteria 21. Tools of The Trade Table 21.1 Important Data Points for Collection Table of Tables | 31
Table of Equations 8. DEW Primer 8.1 Thermal Conduction 8.2 Thermal Diffusivity 8.3 Constant Surface Temperature Case 8.4 Convection 8.5 Vacuum Black Body Radiation 9. DE Weapons, Projectiles, Damage 9.1 Kinetic energy of an object 9.2 Newton’s law times9.3Ratioofdragforcetotheforceproducedbydynamicpressurethearea.9.4NetForce9.5Deltavelocityin–out9.6UniversalGravitationLaw9.7Forceduringflightasafunctionofvelocityandtime9.8Constantmassm,Newton’ssecondlaw9.9Newton’ssecondlaw9.10Newton’ssecondlawforbulletlocation(group)9.11Drag9.12Terminalvelocity9.13Accelerationchangeswithtime9.14Verticalascentwithtime9.15VerticalAscentsolved9.16MaximumVerticalascent9.17Fnet(drag)9.18Horizontaldecentfix 32 | Table of Equations
12. Hypersonic Drone Missiles 12.1 Speed of sound or Mach 1 12.2 Speed and Distance 12.3 General Thrust equation 13. Acoustic Weapons 13.1 Decibel formula in terms of Power Level (PL) 13.2 Decibel formula in terms of Power Intensity Level (IL) 13.2 Decibel formula in terms of Sound Power Level (SPL) AmpliAmpliLe13.4CommonformatforDecibelformulaintermsofSoundPowervel(SPL)13.5String’sresonantfrequency(Fo)13.6DecibelformulafortherelationshipbetweenSPLandSoundtude13.7DecibelformulafortherelationshipbetweenSPLandSoundtudereference Table of Equations | 33
PART I SECTION 1: P(CBRNE)NUCLEAR,BIOLOGICAL,CHEMICAL,RADIATION,EXPLOSIVEWEAPONSANDAYLOADS Section 1: Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE)
1. Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD) by William Slofer, JR, Wilmington University Learning goals • History of drones • Weaponization of technology • Various types of drones and their weaponization Weaponization Weaponize “:toadaptforuseasaweaponofwar”(MerriamWebster,n.d.). Throughouthistory,humanshavebecomewellothers.adindividualsinpohastridesthrwdefmeturnedranddoingipracticedinconvertingeverydaydevicesintoinstrumentsofwartwiththetechnologyavailable.Wehaveseenhorse-awncarts,originallyusedinagricultureandtransportation,dintowarchariots;blackpower,developedinChinafordicinalpurposes,ironicallylivesininfamyasthebuildingblockorbullets,rockets,artillery,andanendlessarrayofexplosiveviceswithalistofvirtuallyendlessbi-productsthathavebeeneaponized.Ashumanscontinuedtomakemajortechnologicaloughthecenturies,therehavebeencolossalleapsthatveimprovedthehumancondition.Unfortunately,afewwerhavealwaysbeenwhowouldusesuchvancementstosatisfytheirgreed,lust,anddesirestosubjugateLikewise,throughnecessity,othershaveutilized Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction /
tharwbefocitrdelivandepoandspewiScradelivgdeffmeoneutrwhasthewthedecbacbtechnologicaladvancementstoprotectandensuretheirsurvivalydevelopingmechanismsorcountermeasurestodefendagainsttsofaggression.Inthepast,thenumberofpeopleimpactedyaparticularapparatuswaslimitedinscopebyitsdestructiveapabilitiesandmoresobytheabilityoftheassailant(s)todelivervicestothedesiredtarget.Astechnologyhasevolved,soant,need,anddesiretocreatebetterandmoreefficienteaponsandassociateddeliverysystemsthatcanbreachoralizeanopponent’sdefensesandperformlarge-scaleattritionfenemypersonnel.Withnumerousadvancementsinchemistry,dicine,aviation,aerodynamics,andnuclearscience,tonameaew,ithasbecomepossibleforanadversarytopenetratealmostanyenseandeliminatealmosteverylivingthingonacontinentalorlobalscale.Anyweaponorweaponsystem’seffectivenessdependsonaviableeryplatform.Inancienttimes,fireweaponswereoftenttachedtoanimals,whichbecamethedeliverymethodtodestroyopsorflushoutenemiesthatmaybehidinginthebrush.imilarly,horsesandchariotswereaplatformtoforearmarchersthspeedandmobilitytodelivertheirdeadlyarsenalofarrowsars.Similarly,thesmallcountryofBritainbecameaworldwer,inlargepartbecauseitdevelopedamassivewell-disciplined,quippednavy.ThisnavyprovidedBritainwithasuperioreryplatformbasedonships.Shipsallowedfortheefficientansportoftroops,munitions,andsuppliestodistantlands.Astcontinuedtoimproveitstechnologysurroundingcannonsandean-faringvessels,itgainedgreaterseasuperiorityviaitsfloatingortresses.Itisimportanttounderstandtherecanandoftenaredifferencestweenweaponsandadeliveryplatformthathasbeeneaponized.Thisdistinctionwillhelpexplainhowthingscanbeepurposedforusesoutsidetheiroriginalintent.Asadexampletprovesthisoutiscommercialairliners.Suchaircraftarenot 38 | Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD)
builtordesignedtobeaweaponofmassdestruction. However, 1944,VessenAnotherooappliciplaisvpossimiscprmanagrthaadandcwarplaandhoorUnmannelimibe2018TterronSeptember11,2001,twoBoeing767jetswerehighjackedbyoristsandusedtocrashintoNewYorkCity’sWorldTradeowers,killinganestimated3,000people(History.comEditors,).Thisisanimportantpointfromasecurityperspectivecausetheknowledge,accessibility,andimaginationaretheonlytingfactors.TheupcomingchapterswilldiscusshowdronesdAerialVehicles(UAV)havebeenusedinthepastwothertechnologiesarebeingusedasdeliverysystemsortformsforvarioustypesofweaponsandweaponsystemsintheeasofsurveillance,chemical,biological,andnuclearwarfare,as-ell-asotherdisruptivetechnologies.Therolestheyhaveplayedontinueplayinginweaponsdeliveryandcountermeasurevancements.Toobtainabetterperspectiveofdrones,itisessentialtoknowtadroneisessentiallyanunmannedvehicleordevice,includingobots,thatcanberemotelycontrolled,inertiallyguided,oredviaautomaticsystemsthatcanbedynamicallyupdated,e-programmed,orboth.Itisalsoimportanttonotethatonceptionsshouldbedebunkedtoappreciatethistechnology’sbleimpactondeliverysystems.Althoughtoday’stechnologyastlyimproved,dronesarenotnew,andtheiruseasadeliverytformiscertainlynotanewconcept.Ifwelookthroughhistory,tbecomesapparentthatdroneshavebeenusedinmilitaryationsdatingbacktoanAustrianattackonthebesiegedcityfVenicein1849withballoonscarryingexplosives(Holman,2009).fmanyexamplesistheuseoftheV1rocket,whichwastiallyanon-guidedcruisemissilebutstillanUnmannedAerialehicle(UAV),deployedbyNaziGermanyandstartinginJuneofrainedhavoconGreatBritain(Wikipedia,n.d.). Brief history o(UAlthoughmediaattentionisgiventoUnmannedAerialVehiclesAVs),otherdronetypesanddeliveryplatformsshouldnotbeverlooked.InadditiontoUAVs.RemoteOperatedVehicles(ROV) Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|39
drporocandautonomousvehiclesareremovedfromaviationandmustbeonsideredwhendiscussingpossibledeliverysystemsforWeaponsfMassDestruction/Disruption.AlthoughthebelowtimelinetraysahistoryofUAVs,itspurposeistoshowthehistoryofonesasageneralcategory. Table 1.1 Timeline of drones and their uses Year Activity Year Activity 1783 The first-ever UAV 1973 Israel has begun using UAVs for surveillance and scouting purposes. 1849 Shift to the military use of UAVs 1985 The production of drones in the US has increased drastically. 1858 The first Aerial Photograph with a UAV 1986 The introduction of the RQ2 Pioneer Drone 1898 The Radio-Confirsttrolled craft 1996 The introduction of the Predator Drone 1917 The first UAV, known as the Kettering Bug 2006 The US Civilian Airspace used UAVs for the first time. 1935 The development of the first modern drone 2010 Parrot Controls a drone with a Smartphone 1936 The drone arrived in the US 2013 Companies tested drone use as a delivery platform 1937 The US Navy developed the first radio-controlled UAV 2014 The beginning of commercial drone use 1941 The Radio Plane was invented 2020 Drone use for the Covid-19 pandemic 1943 The Beginnings of First-Person View (FPV) Flight Source: (WAcademy Editors, 2021) Major types of Drones/Robots wiAspreviouslymentioned,thereonmoredronetypesthanaerial,theachhavingitsownsetofoperationalcapacities,operating 40 | Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD)
addrranges,andcapabilitiesthatcanbeweaponizedinamannertoessthetheaterofuseormissionprofile: Aquatic drones submersidecairandland-baseHavesomeuniquecharacteristicsandcapabilitiesnotfoundindsystems.Forexample,theymustprotecttheiromponentsfromwaterandwaterunderextremepressures.Thesevicestypicallycomeintwoflavors,surfacevesselsorbles. Surfacevessels,alsoknownasUnmannedSurfaceVehicles(USV), bewreaCommand,andConprhaveacompleterangeofcommunicationsoptionsthatcouldovidenearreal-timenavigationandcompleteCommunication,trol(C3)facilitiesforbothautonomoussemi-utonomousvesselmanagement.Suchadevicecouldbeusedasanxplosivedeliverysystemagainstmilitaryorcivilianships.Intheonghands,aproperlyoutfittedUSV,suchastheonebelow,canamajorthreattoanysurfacevessel. Figure 1.1 Armed Unmanned Surface Vehicle from BAE Systems Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|41
Source: (BAE Systems, 2019)
TacticalUSVsofthistypecouldjamship-to-shore cronacruiseshipcaspeChinahasrsuchdeWappr5,wiThepotensuchasthiscambush.belineoperiods.ivarcommunicationsandship-to-ship,leadingtoincreasedangstineaswithheightenedtensions.Onthebackdropofanocean,theehicle’ssmalldimensionsprovidealevelofbuilt-instealth,givingtthecapabilitytoloiterintheoceanundetectedforextendedItcouldalsobefittedwithanaerialsystemtoextenditsfsight,enhancingitsabilitytodetectapproachingvesselsyondthehorizontogainanadvantageforasea-basedraidorIfperformingahostelactonacivilianvessel,AsmallUSVouldcauselargedestructionandmanycasualties.tialoccupancyofaQuantum-ultraclasscruisevesselthdoubleoccupancywouldbe4,246guestsand1,551crewfor797souls(Thakka,2022).Iftherewerea50%mortalityrate,oximately2,900soulswouldbelost.ItshouldbenotedthattheorldTradeTowerslostapproximately3,000people.Alternately,vicescancauseship-widechaosandpanic.Forexample,eporteddevelopingandisreadytodeployasetofhigh-edUSVsthatcanintercept,besiege,andexpeltargetedvesselstsea(Tang,2021).Suchdevicescirclingorsimulatinganattackouldcausesignificantchaosandmayhemthattheewmaynotbeabletocontainthefearandensuingpanic.
Submergible, orUnmannedUnderwaterVehicles(UUV),unlike wlimicthertrctheUSVs,don’ttypicallyhaveasextensivearangeofommunicationoptionstoobtainandmaintainnavigationalandeal-timecommandandcontroldirectives.Whilesubmerged,theyypicallyhaveverylimitedcommunicationswiththesurfaceandeforehavelimitedorreducedaccesstosatelliteorland-basedommunicationaidssuchasGPS.However,despitesuchtations,thesevehiclescouldpotentiallybethemoreinsidiouseapondeliveryplatformduetotheirabilitytolurkorloiter
42 | Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD)
humanNote:Navycompletedtrialswiththissystemthatcansupersedeendurancebarriers.
beneaththewater’ssurface,awaitingastrikingopportunity. The shipscgas,plusonelandminecembeandweo19inwincludingtheUniaewUUVtechnologycanbeusedasadeliveryandrecoveryplatformforeaponscreatedandabandonedbypreviousgenerations.Aperfectxampleofthisscenariocouldberetrievingweaponsdiscardedtthebottomoftheocean.From1918to1970,manycountries,tedStates,participatedinocean-dumpinglethaleaponsasadisposaltechnique.OnesuchexampleisthetentionalsinkingoftheSSLeBaronRussellBriggsonAugust14th,70,withacargoofweaponstobedisposedof.Althoughmuchfitscontentsarenotpublished,fewdetailsareavailable.Forxample,itisreportedtohavebeensunkin16,000feetofoceanasscuttledwith“418steelandconcretecoffinsinwhichareddedtwelveandahalfthousandrocketscontainingGBnerveontainingthemoredeadlyVXgaswhoseontentsarestilltopsecret.”(Downs,2017).Thisisoneofmanylyingatthebottomoftheoceanwithsuchcargo. Figure 1.2 Dumpsites of reported chemical and explosive munitions from 1918-to-1980 Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|43
Source: (Wilkinson, 2017) desirwteOoocfloorsafc7depths.time.HbemuniAtthetime,manynationsconsideredocean-dumpingoftionsaspeedymethodofdisposalandsafefromadversariescausethepressurewouldcrushanythinginexistenceatthatowever,somearebottomedatlesserandothersatgreaterForexample,thepressureat16,000feetisapproximately,169poundspersquareinch,andnovehicleatthetimewouldbeapableofexploringsuchdepths,letaloneperformneededworkorextendedperiods.However,todaydronescanmaptheoceantsuchdepthsandprovide3dimagesofanyvesselontheeanbottom.Also,ROVsliketheSuBastiancanworkatdepthsf4,500meters(14,764feet)andforextendedperiods(SchmidtceanInstitute,2020).Theadvancementsinunderwaterdronechnologyhaveputretrievalofoncebelievedtobedeposedeaponrywithinreachofanyonewhomayhavethemeansandetoretrievethem. Robots/drones rmanufacttermrpeContrarytopopularbelief,dronesarerobots,althoughmanyoplenolongerconsiderthemassuch.Fordiscussion,thegenericobotswilldescribedevicesotherthanUAV,USV,andUUVypes.Manypeoplehaveseenrobotsinsuchrolesasturing,autonomouscars,warehousetransport,andetrieval: Figure 1.3 Robots – Manufacturing 44 | Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD)
Source: (Rupnar, 2019) Figure 1.4 Robots – Autonomous Cars Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|45
Source: (Safda, 2015) Figure 1.5 Robots – Warehouse Transport, and Retrieval Source: (Wohlsen, 2016) Inadditiontothesenowcommonplacerobots/dronesarethose ofthehumanoidvariety. Thetechnologicaladvancementsin asBostonDynamics.Thiseng2017).estimamarprwihasinwhamechanics,computers,andArtificialIntelligencehavetransformedtwasoncesciencefictionintocurrent-dayreality.Themilitaryvestedbillionsofdollarsintechnologyresearchassociatedthrobotics.TheBostonConsultingGroup(BCG)hasbeenojectingtrendspending,and“In2014,BCGprojectedthattheketwouldreach$67billionby2025.In2017,weincreasedthatteto$87billion.”(Wolfgang,Lukic,Sander,Martin,&Kupper,Someofthisfundinghasbeenspentwithsuchcompaniesineeringandroboticsdesigncompany 46 | Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD)
perfhasdevelopeditsAtlasroboticlinetomimiccombatsoldiers’ormance. Figure 1.6 DARPA funded Atlas robot developed by Boston Dynamics Source: (Ungureanu, 2015) Inthecaseofanautonomousautomobile,itwouldbevery feasibleforaterroristtotransportacarbombviasuchadelivery Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|47
emasspaniconsigthehandso(UngurthecimethodorcausedisruptionbyalteringitsprogramminganddrivingtintoacrowdofpeopleinTimesSquareonNewYear’sEve.Inaseofthishumanoidrobot,anarmyofthese6’2”,345-poundeanu,2015)deviceswillmakeforaformableadvisory.Infabadactororanopposingforce,theycouldcausehtand,ifequippedwithproperweaponry,couldxtirpatemanypeople’slivesifunleashedinapopulatedarea. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), surinthepipelineandelerunprUAVengineeringinthe21stcenturyhasdemonstratedecedentedcapabilitiesforthistechnology.UAVshaveevolutionizedaerialshotsincinematographyandbecomeessentialctricaltowerinspections,perimeterveillance,andthelist. Figure 1.7 Aerial drone used in movie scene filming Source: (Italdron, n.d.) Asdiscussedearlierinthechapter,mosttoolsandtechnology 48 | Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD)
canbeweaponized,whichhasoccurredwithdrones. Although orHclassificwrsomehavebeendesignedfromthebottom-upforwarandwarelatedactivities,recreationalandcommercialdroneshavebeeneaponized.AdronedoesnotneedtobeofaReaperorPredatorationwiththeabilitytocarry2,000pluspoundsofbombsellfiremissilestobeaWeaponofMassDestruction/Disruption. Figure 1.8 Image of Predator B drone Source: (Gupta, 2020) cwtheseswhawrAsmallerdevicewithlesscomplexityandalowerpricetagcaneakhavocandmassivedestruction.Forexample,smalldronesvedemonstratedtheabilitytoflyinswarms.Thecapabilitiesofarmshavebeendemonstratedinlightshowsaroundtheorldtocelebratefestivals,openingceremonies,andevenJuly4thelebrations. Figure 1.9 Use of synchronized swarming drones in a night display Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|49
Source: (Poliak, 2022) sufIdeunimagw10minutes.swcpamphlesacrlartheengthesesw$300Manydronesofrespectablequalitycanbepurchasedforunder.00US.Abadactorcouldsynchronizeasmallnumberofarmingdronestotargetapassengeraircraft.Flyingintoineintakewouldcauseenginedamageandcauseanuntoldge-scaledevastation.Asimilarexampleofusingswarmstoeatedisruptionmaybeascenariowherethereisalargegathering,y,theSuperBowl,whereaswarmofdronescouldairdroptsaroundthestadiumandflyoff.ThepamphletscouldontainasimpleprintedwarningannouncingthecomingofanotherarmcarryingapoisonousorexplosivepayloadthatwillarriveinTenminuteslater,theappearanceofanotherswarmouldmostlikelycausestadium-widepanic,andsomeinablenumberofpeoplewouldbetrampledorcrushedtoathbythestampedeofpeopleattemptingtovacatethevicinity.nthiscase,themereappearanceofthesecondswarmwouldbeficienttocausedisruptionanddeath. Note:R.K.NicholstoW.Slofer(February18,2022)Private 50 | Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD)
communicationregardingDisinformationdroppedfromdrones. (Nichols, trteposiWtankandarAsthebaz2022)ookaandLAWrocketgaveindividualfootsoldiersanti-tillerycapabilities,thedronehasaddedaerialsupport.ithdrones,afootsoldiercansurveyanareatodetermineenemytionsanddeliverordinancetoreal-timeidentifiedtargets.ThischnologyhasbeendemonstratedinUkraine,wheresoldierscanansportandassembleaerialplatformsinthefield. Figure 1.10 Field assembly of a drone capable of thermal imaging and delivery of 1.5kg bombs Source: (Borger, 2022) Orlaunchakamikazedroneagainsttanksorotherarmored vehicles. apprbackpackabledrWithtechnologysuchasSwitchbladedrones,a2.5kgonewitha10kmrangeandtheabilitytoloiterforoximately15minutes(AeroVironment,n.d.),agroupofsoldiers Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|51
couldholdoffaconvey. Inadditiontoextendingtheversability rpopulaofthesoldier,theUAVtechnologyhasalsoarmedtheciviliantion.Reportshaveshownweaponizedadaptationsofecreationalandcommercialdronesforexplosivedelivery. Figure 1.11 Drones are being used to drop Molotov cocktails against Russian troops in Ukraine. Source: (Kesslen, 2022) Figure 1.12 DJI drone caring grenade in an improvised carrier made from a plastic jug 52 | Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / Disruption (WMDD)
Source: (McCarthy, 2021) Conclusions
candchewicUnfdistancthecrandcrdeadlimideharalloArmeThecontinuedevolutionofvariousdisciplinessuchaschemistry,dicine,construction,engineering,aviation,microprocessors,tificialIntelligence,andbatterytechnology,amongstothers,haswedhumanstoheat/coolhomes,travelintospace,andplant/vestfoodinquantitiestofeedtheworld.Thehumanracehasvelopedtechnologiesthatextendtherangeofhumanphysicaltations,andtheimaginationonlylimitsthatcontinuedvancement.Oneoutgrowthofthisimagehasbeenthevelopmentofweaponplatformssuchasdrones,robots,andemoteorunmannedvehiclesthatcantravelviaair,land,orseasausedestructionwithoutapersononthefrontline.Also,eationofweaponsystemsthatcandestroyobjectsfromvasteswithabeamoflightorhigh/low-pitchedacoustics.ortunately,thedarksideofthisimaginationandingenuityannotbeignoredbecause,inthewronghands,itcankillmillionsththepushofabutton.Astechnologyhasgottenfaster,smaller,aper,thereismoreofitavailableforrecreationalandommercialeverydayuse.Thishasmadeitpossibletoweaponize
Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|53
cShorizisbstaacasimpletoolsebadacparthingsthatwerenotpreviouslyconceivedofbeingaweaponortofaweapondeliveryplatform.IthasalsomadeitpossiblefortorstoobtainorcreateWeaponsofMassDestructionwitht.Therefore,itisessentialtoutilizetechnologyasountermeasurefortechnologythatsomeindividualsornation-tesmayabuse.Onewaytocountersuchindividualsorentitiesyunderstandingtheavailabletechnologiesandthoseontheonandanticipatingpossiblewaystheycanbeweaponized.uchknowledgewillprovideabasisfordevelopingdefensesandountermeasuresthatcanaidinmaintainingabalanceofpower. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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dighttps://www.bcg.com/publications/2017/strategy-technology-ital-gaining-robotics-advantage Drones Capabilities to Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction / (WMDDisruptionD)|57
2. Chemical Weapons By Captain John-Paul Hood, US Army Student Objectives
cchemicThestudentwillbeintroducedtorecentemploymentsofalweaponswithinthelasttenyearsanddiscoverhowtheyanberetrofittedfordeliverybydrone. UkrCaseSIntroduction:tudy1:ThePotentialforChemicalWeaponsReleaseinaine
neCouncilandhaRussianoallegaSonchemic(FBUkrThereisa“realthreat”ofRussiausingchemicalweaponsinaine,PresidentJoeBidensaidWednesdaybeforeflyingtorusselstomeetwithleadersaboutstoppingMoscow’swar.eldscher,2022)RussiahasspentweeksfalselyclaimingthatUkraineisworkingalandbiologicalweaponsprogramsfundedbytheUnitedtates.EventhoughtheSovietUnionhasbeenmakingunfoundedtionsabouttheAmericanuseofbiologicalweaponssince1949,fficialsrecentlybroughttheclaimstotheUNSecurityveattemptedtojustifytheinvasionofUkraineascessarytostopthisallegedresearch.(Feldscher,2022)
Figure 2.1 Soldiers in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) Gear 58 | Chemical Weapons
Chemical Weapons | 59
Source: (Inform Napalm, 2022)
ininOnWmarc(FRussiamoabriefing.HwthadrumbebefpaorchemicThatrhetoricfromRussiamakesofficialsworrythatabiologicalalweaponsattackcouldbeonthewaybecauseitfitsatterninwhichMoscowblamesUkraineortheWestforsomethingoretakingthatsameactionitself.(Feldscher,2022)“Themainthingwe’relookingatrightnowisthedeliberateatofmisinformationandpropagandaandliesonthissubjectthasallthemarkersofaprecursortothemusingtheseeapons,”NationalSecurityAdvisorJakeSullivansaidWednesdayatedeclinedtocommentonwhetherintelligenceshowedvingchemicalorbiologicalweaponsintopositiontouse.eldscher,2022)Evenifitdoesnotusechemicalweapons,RussiahasalreadyommittedbrutalattacksinUkraine,includingtargetingashelterkedashavingchildreninsideandbombingamaternityhospital.ednesday,SecretaryofStateAntonyBlinkensaidanvestigationfoundthatRussia’stroopshavecommittedwarcrimesUkraine.(Feldscher,2022)
stawSweapprlabsSRussiaisspr(FwCouncilepermanenmoristheiUkrcr(Fbe30thelosses.ANAmakingtrRussiaisalsosufferingsignificantcasualtiesintheconflict,oopsmoredesperatetouseallpossibletoolstostopTOmilitaryofficersaidWednesdaythatbetween,000and40,000Russiantroopshadbeenharmed,includingtween7,000and15,000killed,theAssociatedPressreported.eldscher,2022)BeforeMoscow’sinvasionbeganonFeb.24,theadministrationepeatedlyhighlightedhowRussia’splaybookoftenincludesso-alled“falseflag”operations,spreadingmisinformationaboutaineandtheUnitedStatestoarguethatRussiahadtodefendtselfandattackUkraine.“Whatworriesusaboutthosetypesofstatementsoraccusationsymaybeagainlaying…apretextforthemtodosomethingeormuchworseinsideUkraine,”JulianneSmith,theU.S.trepresentativetoNATO,saidWednesdayatanAtlanticvent.“We’vebeenwarningalliesaboutthis.We’vebeenarningtheUkrainians.We’veissuedwarningstoRussia.”eldscher,2022)NedPrice,theStateDepartmentspokesman,saidonMarch9thateading“outrightlies”andconfirmedthattheUnitedtatesdoesnotownoroperateanychemicalorbiologicalweaponsinUkraine.(Feldscher,2022)AttheNATOSummitonThursday,leadersareexpectedtooveadditionalmilitaryassistanceforUkraine,includingquipmenttoprotectUkrainiansagainstchemicalandbiologicaleapons,NATOleaderJensStoltenbergsaidWednesday.toltenbergalsostronglyurgedRussianottousethesetypesofeaponsinthefight,sayingheis“concerned”byRussia’stementsonchemicalweaponsuse.(Feldscher,2022)“Anyuseofchemicalweaponswouldtotallychangethenatureof 60 | Chemical Weapons
(FthaanaraNAWAneigrchemicpric(FuseIaoCivilWoagarhatheconflictandbeablatantviolationofinternationallawandwillvefar-reachingconsequences,”hesaidatapressconference.“WeealsoconcernedbecauseweknowthatRussiahasusedchemicalentsbefore,andtheyhavesupportedAssadandfacilitatedtheusefchemicalweaponsinSyria.”Morethan300chemicalattackswerelaunchedduringtheSyrianar,NPRreportedin2019.AmericanofficialsaccusedRussiafhelpingSyrianPresidentBasharal-Assad’sregimecoverupthesettacks,butRussianofficialsdeniedusingchemicalweapons.nstead,Russiansclaimedthattheeventwasstaged,andtheWestdthefindingstojustifytakingmilitaryaction,Reutersreported.eldscher,2022)OnMarch11,BidenalsopromisedRussiawouldpaya“severee”ifitdeployedchemicalweaponsinUkraine.Abiological,al,ornuclearweaponsattackinUkrainecouldtriggeraesponsefromNATOifthefalloutfromtheattackdriftedintoahboringmemberoftheallianceandimpactedpeoplethere.taDefenseWritersGroupevent,Sen.JackReed,D-R.I.,saidednesday.(Feldscher,2022)“Itwouldallbeviewedthroughthelensof,isthisanattackagainstTOcountry?”hesaid.“Ifanucleardeviceisdetonatedandtheadiationgoesintoanadjacentcountry,thatcouldbeperceivedasttackagainstNATO….Itwillbeaverydifficultcall,butit’sacalltthepresidentandtheentireNATOcouncilwillhavetomake.”eldscher,2022) OrCaseStudy2:ChemicalWeaponsReleaseinSyriaandtheganizationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons Formuchofitsearlyhistory,theOrganizationfortheProhibition stockpilesrorofChemicalWeapons(OPCW)wasalittle-knowninternationalganizationquietlyverifyingthedestructionofColdWar-eraequiredbytheChemicalWeaponsConvention(CWC). Chemical Weapons | 61
andrchemicPrindispensableinstrumensolelwknifparundersiegIvthaandcrisisandafrToday,theOPCWistheepicenterofaglobalchemicalweaponsontlineinabroaderconfrontationbetweentheWestRussia.(Ward,2021)WhentheCWCenteredintoforcein1997,itseemedthatalltremainedtoachieveaworldfreeofchemicalweaponswastoerifiablydestroydeclaredstockpilesanduniversalizemembership.nstead,theinternationalnormagainstchemicalweaponsuseise,mostprominentlybySyriaandRussia,twostates-tiestothattreaty.Theworldisnowprecariouslyperchedonthee’sedgeofaneweraofchemicalweaponsuse.(Ward,2021)OncethechemicalweaponscrisiseruptedinSyria,theOPCWasforcedtomakeahistorictransformation,movingfrombeingyastandardarmscontrolmonitoringbodytobecomingantofinternationalpeaceandsecurity,asecognizedwhentheorganizationwasawardedthe2013NobeleacePrize.ThisnewrolemustbestrengthenedtoaddressthealweaponsthreatthathasmetastasizedgloballyduetoecentchemicalweaponsuseintheUnitedKingdom,Russia,Iraq,Malaysia.(Ward,2021) Ghouta: The Ieper of the 21st Century
againstHwhumaniowDsarinagainsttheopposimili20thcThehopethatchemicalweaponsusehadbeenconsignedtotheenturywasshatteredonAugust21,2013,whentheSyriantarylaunchedabarrageofrocketsfilledwiththenerveagenttion-controlledtownofGhouta,asuburbofamascus.Soonafterward,aUNinvestigationteamconfirmedtheorst:1,400peoplewerekilledfromexposuretosarin.TheimagesftheGhoutavictimsweresearedintothecollectiveconscienceoftyalongsideIeper,thesiteofthefirstmajoruseofchemicaleaponsinWorldWarI,andHalabja,whereIraqiPresidentSaddamusseinin1988perpetratedadevastatingnerveagentattacktheKurds.(Ward,2021)
62 | Chemical Weapons
Westernpowersconsideredmilitaryinterventiontodeterfurther thecrtheOlegallWnotundertheGhoutaaownotusechemicrberonlWtheJSeptember14,theMinisterSerwhenUcarnageastheworldreeledinhorrorfromtheGhoutaattack.Still,.S.SecretaryofStateJohnKerryandRussianForeigngeyLavrovmetinGenevatodiscussthecrisisonyachievedadiplomaticbreakthroughknownasointFrameworkfortheEliminationofSyrianChemicaleapons.TheUnitedStatesandRussiafoundcommongroundonyonepoint:theSyrianchemicalweaponsstockpileneededtoemovedanddestroyed.Tothisend,Russiatacitlyassumedesponsibilityastheguarantor,ensuringthatitsSyrianallywouldalweaponsandwouldfullydeclareitschemicaleaponsstockpilesoitcouldbedestroyedunderinternationalversight.SyriainitiatedformallyjoiningtheCWCjust24daysafterttack.Duringthatbriefperiod,theAssadregimehadgoneamoralconversionbutbowedtopressurefromtheesternpowersandRussia.(Ward,2021)BytheendofSeptember2013,theinternationalcommunityhadyanchoredtheU.S.-RussianjointframeworkinadecisionofPCWExecutiveCouncilandinaUNSecurityCouncilesolution,whichincludedmeasurestoaddressanySyrianfailuretoomplywiththeresolution’sprovisionsorwiththeprohibitionsofCWC.(Ward,2021) False Declaration and Chemical Weapons Attacks claimspropposiinunrwifirstsignsappestockswInthespringof2014,whileSyria’sdeclaredchemicalweaponserebeingremovedfromitsterritoryfordestruction,thearedthatDamascusdidnotintendtocomplyfullythitscommitmentsundertheCWCandtheUNresolution.Theavelingofthehistoricjointframeworkhadbegun.(Ward,2021)Widespreadreportsemergedofchemicalweaponsattacksvolvingchlorinegasbarrelbombsdroppedbyhelicoptersontion-controlledtowns,resultingininjuriesandfatalities.TheomptedtheOPCWdirector-generaltoestablishafactChemical Weapons | 63
Augustasawfindingmission,whichlaterdeterminedthatchlorinehadbeenusedeaponinSyriarepeatedlyandsystematicallyfromAprilto2014.(Ward,2021) Figure 2.2 Civil Defense member carries a damaged canister in Ibleen village. 2015.Kansafrvillag2018Source:REUTERS/AbedKontar/FilePhoto(AnthonyDeutsch,)ACivilDefensemembercarriesadamagedcanisterinIbleenefromwhatactivistssaidwasachlorinegasattackona,Ibleen,andJosefvillages,Idlibcountryside,Syria,May3,Duringthatsameperiod,therewereindicationsthatSyriahad 64 | Chemical Weapons
theAssadrclaimingtheopposifloodeclawtheJIMwendorseNandtheSeS20(thause.IidenoclimiMCouncilunanimousltheadoptiono20candcaDeorSaf2013denotfullydiscloseditschemicalweaponsprograminitsOctoberclarationtotheOPCW.TheOPCWTechnicalSecretariat,teradetailedexaminationofthedeclarationandsitevisitsinyria,identifiedtroublingdiscrepancies,promptingtheganization’sdirector-generaltoestablishadedicatedgroup,theclarationAssessmentTeam,tocontinueengagementwithSyrianuthoritiesuntilthedeclarationcouldbefullyverifiedasaccurateomplete.Thatgrouphasconductedmorethan20roundsofonsultationswithSyria,yet19issuesremainunresolved.(Ward,21)RenewedconcernoverchemicalweaponsusesinSyriapromptedfanotherUNresolutioninwhichtheSecurityyestablishedtheOPCW-UNJointInvestigativeechanism(JIM).Sincethefact-findingmissionmandatewastedtodeterminingonlywhetherchemicalweaponsusecurredinSyria,theJIMwasestablishedasapanelofexpertstotifythoseindividuals,groups,orgovernmentsinvolvedintheirnthefallof2016,theJIMreporteditsfindings,concludingttheSyrianmilitaryhadbeeninvolvedinusingtoxicchemicalschlorinegas)asweaponsinthreeattacksin2014and2015.(Ward,21)AlthoughMoscowrefusedtoaccepttheJIM’sfindingsthatitsyrianallywasusingchemicalweaponsinviolationoftheCWCcurityCouncilresolution,itbegrudginglyagreedinovember2016torenewtheJIM’smandateforanotheryearanddanewpanelofexpertstoleadtheeffort.Withinmonths,ouldbecomeseizedwiththemostdevastatingchemicaleaponsattacksinceGhouta.OnApril4,2017,theAssadregimeunchedasarinnerveagentattackagainsttheopposition-ontrolledtownofKhanShaykhun.DamascusandMoscowquicklydthemediawithdisinformationandoutrightfabrications,tionitselfhadlaunchedtheattacktoaccuseegimefalsely.TheUnitedStateslaunchedcruisemissiles Chemical Weapons | 65
andctheeinUnimilihappenedeagainsttheSyrianairfieldwheretheattackingaircraftoriginatedtoterfurtherchemicalweaponsuse.(Ward,2021)DespiteRussianandSyrianeffortstoburythetruthofwhatdinKhanShaykhun,theJIMdeterminedthattheSyriantaryhadusedsarinintheattack.However,itwasevidentatthetedNationsandtheOPCWthatRussiawouldseektoblockanyternationalactionagainstitsSyrianally,nomatterhowdamningvidence.Indeed,itwasindirectreactiontotheJIM’sompetencethatRussiavetoedthreerenewalresolutionsattheUN,theJIMendedinNovember2017.(Ward,2021) Figure 2.3 Soldier in MOPP Gear Ready Source: (Stein, 2018) Deepening Chemical Weapons Crisis thethrTwochemicalweaponsattacksinthespringof2018escalatedeattotheinternationalnormagainsttheuseofchemical 66 | Chemical Weapons
chlorine-fillecadjacoperdeporagadMpossesseiwRussiawcrisis,therinWcescbewassistanctoposeunderscUnion.TheUKblameNciweapons.InMarch,formerRussianspySergeiSkripal,nowaUKtizenlivinginSalisbury,andhisdaughterwerepoisonedbyaovichoknerveagentknowntohavebeendevelopedbytheSovietdRussiafortheassassinationattempt,oringtheterriblerisktheuseofsuchanerveagenthaddtothelocalcommunity.Indeed,aresidentoftheadjacentwnofAmesburylaterdied.TheUKrequestedatechnicalevisitbyOPCWexperts,whoconfirmedthatanerveagentasusedintheattack.(Ward,2021)OnApril18,2018,theOPCWExecutiveCouncilmettoaddressthexperts’findings.InthewakeoftheexpulsionofRussiandiplomatsytheUK,theUnitedStates,andothers,themeetingimmediatelyalatedintohighpolitics,withRussiaunleashingabsurdounteraccusationsandprotestingthatitwasthevictimofaesternsmearcampaign.(Ward,2021)Beforethedaywasover,itwasclearthatafrontlineinabroaderternationalconfrontationhadopened.InadditiontotheSyrianewasnowanevenmoreominousRussianproblem.asnolongerjustanenablerofSyria’suseofchemicaleapons,protectingitattheOPCWandtheUNSecurityCouncil;twasitselfaperpetrator,signalingtotheworldthatitstillillicitlyditsowndangerouschemicalweaponsagent.Moreover,oscownowviewedtheOPCWTechnicalSecretariatasanversary.Justaweekearlier,asreportedbytheDutchgovernment,entsfromtheRussianmilitaryintelligencebranch,theGRU,weretedfromtheNetherlandsforattemptingtoconductcyberationsagainstOPCWheadquartersinTheHaguefromanenthotel.(Ward,2021)AsthechemicalweaponsthreatwidenedtotheEuropeanontinent,thecrisisinSyriadeepened.OnApril7,multipledbarrelbombsweredroppedontheDamascussuburb Chemical Weapons | 67
JwalthougchemicandRussiantrusetoDoumatofurtrieorDoumachlorineafalselfacilijusttmeofDouma,killingdozensofcivilians.Again,ahighlychargedspecialetingoftheOPCWExecutiveCouncilwasconvenedonApril16,wodaysafterjointmilitarystrikesagainstSyriangovernmenttiesbyFrance,theUK,andUnitedStates.RussiaandSyriayclaimedthattheUKandtheUnitedStates“staged”thettackswiththehelpoftheWhiteHelmets,anganizationofvolunteerfirstrespondersinSyriathatRussiahasdtolabelasterrorists.Withinweeks,OPCWfactfinderswenttheritsinvestigation,concludingthatchlorinewasd.(Ward,2021)TheOPCWalsofacedagrimnewrealityextendingbeyondSyrianansgressions.TheIslamicStategrouphadusedalweaponsinSyriaandIraq.Moreover,NorthKorea,hnotapartytotheCWC,wasadvertisingitschemicaleaponscapabilitiesbyassassinatingthestepbrotherofleaderKimongUnwithaVXnerveagentinaMalaysianairport.
ThrthecrisisbbrotoblocktheadoptionointheUKiniterrihadwCWWiththeincreasinguseofchemicalweaponsunderminingtheC,seriouslyerodingtheinternationalnorm,andputtingtheorldatriskofaneweraofchemicalweaponsthreats,theOPCWtoactorsuccumbtoirrelevance.(Ward,2021)DeeplyaggrievedbyRussia’suseofchemicalweaponsonitstoryandconcernedwithaworseningchemicalweaponscrisis,tiatedaspecialsessionofCWCstatespartiestoforgeanternationalresponse.AfterRussiaandSyriatriedunsuccessfullyftheagenda,thefourthspecialsessionftheconferenceofCWCstates-partiesonJune27,2018,withoadinternationalsupport,tookunprecedentedstepstoaddressyadoptingthehistoricdecisiontitled“AddressingtheeatFromChemicalWeaponsUse.”(Ward,2021)Mostimportantly,thedecisiondealtwithSyria’scontinued
68 | Chemical Weapons
OPCW Response to Widening Chemical Weapons Use
(WIcintheinIinchemicanaethedirinSe(WparMarchemicftheIGenerperpeTterminapossessionanduseofchemicalweapons.ToremedythetionoftheJIM,theconferencedirectedtheOPCWechnicalSecretariatto“putinplacearrangementstoidentifythetratorsoftheuseofchemicalweapons”inSyria.DirectoralFernandoAriasimplementedthatdirectivebyestablishingnvestigationandIdentificationTeam,which,inApril2020,oundreasonablegroundstoconcludethatSyriaconductedthreealweaponsattacksagainstopposition-controlledareasinch2017.Inresponsetothesefindings,theconferenceofstates-tiesinApril2021suspendedSyria’svotingrightsattheOPCW.ard,2021)ThedecisionfurtherclarifiedthemandateoftheOPCWTechnicalcretariatinthecontextoftheCWC.Ifrequestedbyastatepartyvestigatingthepossibleuseofchemicalweaponsonitsterritory,ector-generalwasexpresslyauthorizedtoprovidetechnicalxpertisetohelpidentifytheperpetratorsofanychemicalweaponsttack.(Ward,2021)ThedecisionalsoauthorizedthereleaseofOPCWinformationtoyentitiesestablishedundertheauspicesoftheUNinvestigatingalweaponsuseinSyria.Thisprovisionwouldaidtheongoingvestigationeffortsoftwosuchentities:(1)theInternational,mpartial,andIndependentMechanism(IIIM)establishedtoassistvestigationandprosecutionofpersonsresponsibleforommittingwarcrimesinSyria,and(2)theIndependentnternationalCommissionofInquiryontheSyrianArabRepublic.ard,2021) The Fight for a Future Free of Chemical Weapons ThreatstotheCWCandtheinternationalnormagainstchemical Naweaponsremainominousandunabated,asevidencedbyRussia’sttemptedassassinationofoppositionleaderAlexeiNavalnywithaovichoknerveagentinAugust2020.(Ward,2021) Chemical Weapons | 69
(WchemicRawillfinallcchemicandtheintheisnotanisolafuturthawagmainacopposingacallappallingRussia’scontemptforandrepeatedviolationoftheconventionarelyevident.MoscowhasenabledandprotecteditsSyrianybyrelentlesslywieldingitsvetoattheUNSecurityCouncil,tionbytheOPCW,andengaginginacalculatedglobalampaignofdisinformationanddistortion.Intwoassassinationttemptsagainstopponents,Russiahasadvertisedthatitillicitlytainsachemicalweaponsprogram,possessesNovichoknerveents,andhasnocompunctionaboutusingsuchoutlawedeaponsagainstitsadversaries.ThereshouldbenoexpectationtRussia’scontemptfortheconventionwillebbintheforeseeablee.Indeed,Moscow’scontinuedembraceofchemicalweaponstedinsultbutratherpartofamuchlargerchallengetoWest.(Ward,2021)TheAssadregimeremainsalong-termthreattotheconventionternationalnormagainstchemicalweaponsuse.ItviewsalweaponsasavitalsurvivaltoolandastrategicounterweighttoIsrael.ThereshouldbenoexpectationthatSyriaycomplywithitsCWCobligationsoncetheconflictisover.ther,SyriashouldbeexpectedtoseektoproduceanddeployalweaponsaslongastheAssadregimeremainsinpower.ard,2021) Figure 2.4 Mustard gas artillery shells 70 | Chemical Weapons
Source: (Details, 2012)
Chemical Weapons | 71
andUNGenerIwrcurrarKfinterm20thcthrparInthefourthspecialsessionoftheconferenceofCWCstates,tiesinJune2018begananefforttopushbackagainsttheseeatsandavoidareturnofthechemicalweaponshorrorsoftheentury.Thismustcontinueandintensifyasitwillbealong-struggle.(Ward,2021)TheUnitedStatesmustprioritizedefendingtheCWCandleadanternationalefforttoholdperpetratorsaccountableinallrelevantorums.Whatwouldthisentail?ChemicalweaponsusedbyNorthoreaandtheIslamicStategrouparesureofconcern,buttheyenotpartiestothetreatyandthusnotaprimaryfactorintheentcrisis,whichislargelyaRussianproblem.ItisimportanttoecognizethatdeterringMoscowfrompossessingorusingchemicaleaponsorenablingtheirusebyothersisachallengingtask.ncreasedpressurethroughsanctionsandinitiativesattheOPCWalAssemblywillcontinuetoplayarole.Importantly,
sharAgainstIlawinArIbutaindividualswhoorthecsymptomahelpeprtheKrchemicRussiachosetoabeScdependonthebrtheWwchemicckisolaMmessagtheUnitedStatesanditsalliesmustmountadiplomaticandpublicingcampaigntocounterRussiandisinformationanddepriveoscowofcredibilityorsupport.ThiswouldincludefurthertingRussiafromtheinternationalcommunitybyencouragingeystatesinAfricaandAsiasittingonthesidelinestojoineffortstoondemnchemicalweaponsusebySyriaandRussia.(Ward,2021)Tobeclear,thenear-termprospectsfordeterringfurtherRussianalweaponsaffrontsarenotfavorable.TheRussianchemicaleaponsproblemisrootedinMoscow’sbroaderconfrontationwithest.Itshouldbeexpectedthatanyprogresswouldultimatelyoaderpoliticallandscape.In2013,RussiaworkedonstructivelywiththeUnitedStatestodiplomaticallyaddresstheyrianchemicalweaponscrisis.However,intheyearsthatfollowed,tratherthandissuadeitsSyrianallyfromalweaponsuseandthenwentbeyondthatbytargetingemlin’sopponentsforassassinationwithchemicalagentsohibitedbyitstreatyobligations.AllthesepremeditateddecisionsdtoprecipitatethewiderstrainedsituationandareticofMoscow’sintractability.(Ward,2021)Justiceanddeterrencerequirethatadiplomaticstrategydefendonventionalsoensurepersonalaccountabilityforthosedered,enabled,orcarriedoutchemicalweaponsttacks.Muchofthegroundworkforsuchanefforthasbeenlaid,itspromisemaynotberealizedforyears.(Ward,2021)Internationally,twoUN-establishedentities—theIIIMandthendependentInternationalCommissionofInquiryontheSyrianabRepublic—aremandatedtoinvestigateviolationsofternationallawandhavereportedonincidentsinvolvingchemicaleaponsuse.Francehasspearheadedamultilateralinitiative,unchinginJanuary2018,calledtheInternationalPartnershipmpunityfortheUseofChemicalWeapons,togatherandeinformationtofacilitatenationalandinternational 72 | Chemical Weapons
Otomaininiocprlesspuror$85million.MhasrincrincrtheindependenthesetedesetheOthecinnorm,diplomacjusticwccsupporandprosecutionofchemicalweaponsperpetrators.Currently,40statestheEuropeanUnionaremembers.(Ward,2021)TheUnitedStatesanditsalliesshouldintensifyeffortstoexpandtforthepartnershipsubstantially.Althoughprosecutionsouldtakeyears,thesecooperativeeffortssignaltheinternationalommunity’sdeterminationtoensurethatthosewhousechemicaleaponswillsomedayfaceareckoningandtheirvictimswillseeedone.(Ward,2021)TosuccessfullyweathertheassaultontheconventionandtheymustbepairedwithconcertedinternationalvestmentintheOPCW.TheTechnicalSecretariatmustremainalmeyeofthepoliticalstorm.TheconventiondoesnotendowPCWwithenforcementauthority.Still,itdoesprovidethecretariatwiththeabilitytoassesstheaccuracyofstatepartyclarations,investigatechemicalweaponsuse,andprovidechnicalassistancetostatesparties.Indeed,intheSyriancase,cretariat’sreportsunderscoredthatobjectiveanalysisfromantorganizationisthebestantidotetofalseclaimsfromperpetratorofachemicalweaponsattack.(Ward,2021)TheTechnicalSecretariatmustremainfitforitsmissioninaneasinglychallengingenvironment.Thatwillrequireannuallyeasingthebudgettoadjustforinflation.TheOPCWbudgetemainedvirtuallyunchangedforalmostadecadeatabouteanwhile,theinternationalcommunityhasaskedtheganizationtodomorewheninflationhasleftitwith25percentchasingpowerthanin2009.States-partieshaveresponsiblyovidedthesecretariatwithmanymillionsinvoluntaryontributionstofundSyria-relatedoperations,the2016removalfchemicalweaponsprecursorsfromLibya,andotherimportanttiatives.Yet,suchdonationsarenotareliableorsustainablewaytaintheorganization’scoreactivitiesandstaffing.ThePCWisthebestbargainintheinternationalsystem.Itshould Chemical Weapons | 73
hastakfigfhumaniacchemic20chatheOSewbudgrrinitheorsophistictochemicneproperinflaheldtorbetreatedthesameastheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,oughlyzerorealgrowth,withanannualincreasereflectingtion.(Ward,2021)KeepingtheTechnicalSecretariathighlycapableandationallyagilewillalsorequireestablishingalong-termtrainingogramandadedicatedtrainingdirectoratetoensurethatthextgenerationofinspectors,investigators,laboratorytechnicians,alweaponsexperts,andanalystsarefullytrainedpreparedfacefuturechallenges.(Ward,2021)GiventhattheOPCWisregularlydetectingincreasinglyatedhackingattempts,anotherprioritymustbesecuringganization’scomputernetwork.TheTechnicalSecretariathastiatedremedialmeasurestoenhancesecurity,butabroaderevampofthecomputernetwork,andadditionalcybersecurityesourcesareneeded.Theseshouldbefundedthroughtheregularetandvoluntarycontributionsbystatesparties.(Ward,2021)ThefinalrequirementistoensuretheOPCWcontinuestobeell-led.Thedirector-generalshouldalwaysbeahighly-skilled,xperienceddiplomatwithexpertiseinchemistrybeingoptional.incethebeginningoftheSyrianchemicalweaponscrisisin2013,PCWhasbeenablyledbysuccessivedirectors-generalwhoveexemplifiedtheseattributesandfaithfullyimplementedtheonventionwhiledeftlynavigatingthediplomaticlandscape.(Ward,21)ToparaphraseEdmundBurke,allthatisneededfortheevilofalweaponstotriumphisforresponsiblenationstoquiesce.TheCWCisaremarkableachievementintheprogressofty,andtheinternationalcommunitymustcontinuetofightoritorrisklosingit.TheOPCWisanindispensablepartnerinthisht.Withthebroadsupportofitsmembership,theorganizationenunprecedentedactiontoexposeall 74 | Chemical Weapons
(Wbefinisheacwwperpetrators—countries,groups,andindividuals—whousechemicaleapons.Theworldmustredoubleitseffortstoensurechemicaleaponsremainreviledandthosewhousethemareheldcountable.Whatstartedwiththesigningoftheconventionmustd,finallyturningthepageonanuglychapterinhistory.ard,2021) The intersection of Drones and Chemical Weapons Figure 2.5 Agriculture Drone is spraying pesticides on crops. Source: (Staff, 2020) befordefdeTheprevailingtrendfordronesisconstantinnovationandvelopmentforaspecificpurpose(s),whetherforaspecificjob,ense,ornefariouspurposes.Successfulcriminalsandterroristganizationstypicallydaretodosomethingnew,neverseenore,tothwartorpenetratecurrentdefenses/security Chemical Weapons | 75
20cacrAgri’fldrrsprtankswiaeradcadaptcurrcountermeasures.Nothingsaysanindividualorgroupcouldnotentdronetechnologiestoconductactsofterrorandoordinatedoffensiveattacksoncriticalinfrastructureorversarialpopulations.Examplesofthiscouldbecombininganoff-the-shelfdroneosoldeliverysystemsuchasanagriculturaldroneandfillingitsthhomemadechemicalweaponslikeanthraxandricintoaylow-yieldtoxinsthroughoutaresidentialarea.Anothermoreecentmilitarydevelopmentwouldbethroughtheuseof‘suicideone’technologytoengageapointtargetorsinglebuildingbyyingintoitwithachemicalpayloadonboard.Currentmodelsofoff-the-shelfagriculturedronesliketheDJIsT30cancarryaneight-gallonpayload.Theycancover40esperhourwithobstacleavoidanceandterrainfollowingapabilitiesandarangeof3.1milesfromtheoperator.(Drones,22) Figure 2.6 DJI Agri’s T30 76 | Chemical Weapons
Source: (Drones, 2022) A Parting Nightmare chemicdustersandwDidyourealizethat“Dronesarenothingmorethansmallcroporksilently,effectivelyasadeploymentvehicleforalweapons?Thinkofitovereveryagriculturalfield–suicide drones avionics and programming in a crop-dusting platform! Bibliography AnthonyDeutsch,R.(2018,April16). Insider.RetrievedfromtheUS tampering-wiSAccusesRussiaofpossiblytamperingwithgasattacksevidenceinyria:https://www.businessinsider.com/us-says-russia-possibly-th-gas-attack-evidence-in-syria-2018-4.Bowman,R.B.(2022,March18). BreakingDefense.Retrievedfrom UkraineisgettingSwitchblade.Itshouldbejustthefirstwaveof Chemical Weapons | 77
FactsandDetails.Retrievedfrom
whThreats:ChemicalWeaponsa‘RealThreat’inUkraine,BidenSaysttps://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/chemical-eapons-real-threat-ukraine-biden-says/363523/.Front,S.(2020,August12).
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InformNapalm.(2022,March03).RetrievedfromRussiaPrepares entouseChemicalWeaponsinUkraine:https://informnapalm.org//russia-prepares-to-use-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine/Kesslen,B.(2022,March10).
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DefenseOne.Retrievedfrom
kamikazhConfirmsUsageofKalashnikovKamikazeDrone‘KUB-BLA’inSyria:ttps://southfront.org/russia-confirms-usage-of-kalashnikove-drone-kub-bla-in-syria/. HaberDergilik/Kara-birliklernin-silahi-havan-dronla-havlandi Hbaer(2022,March20).Retrievedfromssdergilik.com:ssdergilik.com/tr/Dergilik/Kara-birliklernin-silahi-havan-dronla-havanlandi
wrwireportedlyadaptssmalldronestodropMolotovcocktailsinwarthRussians:https://dronedj.com/2022/03/11/ukraine-eportedly-adapts-small-drones-to-drop-molotov-cocktails-in-ar-with-russians/.Details,F.a.(2012,July). sub384ChemicalWeapons:https://factsanddetails.com/world/cat58//item2385.htmlDrones,T.(2022,April). agrAgriculturalDrones:https://talosdrones.com/product/buy-dji-as-t30-sprayer-drone/Emir,C.(2022,January13). on-theirthe-most-brutal-meinterestingengineering.com:https://interestingengineering.com/xican-cartel-used-drones-to-drop-bombs--rivalFeldscher,J.(2022,March23).
w03loiteringmunitionsforKyiv:https://breakingdefense.com/2022//ukraine-is-getting-switchblade-it-should-be-just-the-first-ave-of-loitering-munitions-for-kyiv/.Crumley,B.(2022,March11).
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hKillerDroneinUkraineRaisesFearsAboutAIinWarfare:ttps://www.wired.com/story/ai-drones-russia-ukraine/.Lee,R.(2022,March14).
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swiLoiteringMunition:https://www.edrmagazine.eu/tchblade-600-the-new-medium-range-loitering-munitionWard,K.D.(2021,September). russia-ghfromSyria,Russia.andtheGlobalChemicalweaponsCrisis:ttps://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-09/features/syria-lobal-chemical-weapons-crisisWolfe,F.(2019,February21).
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bla-kamikazhUnveilsKUB-BLAKamikazeDroneatIDEX2019:ttps://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/02/21/russia-unveils-kub-e-drone-idex2019/.
ukrcom.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/nypost.com/2022/03/10/ainians-develop-drone-that-drops-molotov-cocktails/amp/Knight,W.(2022,March2017).
04AcreDroneSprayingUnlikely:https://agairupdate.com/2020/02//broad-acre-drone-spraying-unlikely/Stein,L.O.(2018,June15). assads-use-ohTheMilitaryLogicBehindAssad’sUseofChemicalWeapons:ttps://warontherocks.com/2018/06/the-military-logic-behind-f-chemical-weapons/Valpolini,P.(2020,February2).
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80 | Biological Weapons
3. Biological Weapons By Dr. Suzanne Sincavage & Professor Candice M. Carter STUDENT OBJECTIVES • To further understand the role of unmanned systems in the biological agent realm. • To study advances in using biological agents with unmanned aerial systems. • To develop an understanding of how the proliferation of biological attacks via drones is becoming an advanced threat. INTRODUCTION
(Thathe14th-cthewmakingthechallengcmevieinanartodisebacgrtheenhancpalabscspr(BSLGlobally,therearewellover50highcontainment(BiosafetyLevel)-4)laboratories,eitherinoperationorunderconstruction,eadthroughoutAsia,Africa,Europe,Russia,andtheUS.Thesearryoutsomeofthemostdangerousmanipulationsofthogenswithpandemicpotential.(Lentos&Goodman,2020)Asementsofpathogensriseindanger,deliverymethodsowwithadvancementsintechnology.Biologicalwarfareagentsaremicroorganismslikeviruses,teria,fungi,protozoa,ortoxinsproducedbythemthatgiveriseasesinman,animals,orplantswhendeliberatelydispersedea.(Thavaselvam&Vijayaraghavan,2010)Thecontinuedxplorationofdetectionplatformsanddetectionofbioweaponsistal.Thethreatofbiologicalwarfareagents,theiruse,andtheirthodofattackdeliveryareaglobalconcern.Biologicalattacksancauseawidescaleofcasualtiesandcontaminatepublicareaseofcleaningupunscalable.Inancienthistory,ell-knownattempttousebiologicalwarfareagentswasduringenturymedievalsiegeofKaffa,Feodosiya,Ukraine.vaselvam&Vijayaraghavan,2010)Inthisincident,theTartars
ausebiologtothosewiewdetothistanomissileorlarunfooCondetofacprimporsmallpopopulatrdocumenin(Mongols)whoattackedKaffatosseddeadanddyingplaguevictimstothecityinanattempttospreadthedisease.Inanotherwell-tedincidentatFortPitt,OhioRiverValley,theBritishoopsdeliberatelyspreadsmallpoxamongthenativeIndiantionbypresentingthemwithblanketsandlinensusedbyxvictims.(Thavaselvam&Vijayaraghavan,2010)Thetanceofbiologicalweaponswassignificantlyadvancedintheesentcenturyduetoseveralwarsandmultiplethreats.ThecidentalreleaseofanthraxfromamilitarytestingfacilityintheormerSovietUnionin1979andpossessionofanthrax,botulinumxin,andaflatoxininIraqin1995pointouttoresearchandvelopmentoftheseagentsdespitethe1972BiologicalWeaponsvention.(Thavaselvam&Vijayaraghavan,2010)Thecombinationfbiologicalweaponsandunmannedtechnologymakesthescopefattacklimitless.Thedeliveryofabiologicalagentis,ortunately,versatile.TheagentcanbedeliveredviaunmannedgeaerialsystemataNation-statelevelordeliveredbyff-the-shelfdronebyaterrorist(s)(homegrownorforeign).Dueypeofvariedattack,multipledefenseoptionsneedtobevelopedtodetect,prevent,orassistincleaningupabiologicaleaponattack.Whentechnologybecomeswidelyavailableandlessxpensive,nottomentionremotelyoperable,itbecomesattractivethnefariousintent.Addthecapabilitytodeliverical,chemical,andnuclearpayloads,andthepotentialtobedasaWeaponofMassDestructionbynon-stateactorsbecomesfrighteningreality.(Nichols,2020) TABLE 3.1 Biological Agents that can be used in Biological Warfare Biological Weapons | 81
Source: (Thavaselvam & Vijayaraghavan, 2010) EARLY UNMANNED BIOLOGICAL WEAPON orunmanne20useWS-aseriesoaairfinepartherbiologtesting).(samplestotestfTheseballoonscfirststepwperMills,theccdeparAmericancompanieswereexpectedtohelpwiththeU.S.defensetmentduringWorldWarII.Severalcompaniesansweredtheallandhelpedthemilitarywheretheycould.However,Generalerealcompany,reallytooktheideaastepfurther,hapsforeshadowingtheabilitiesofthefuture.GeneralMills’asthecreationofhigh-altitudereconnaissanceballoons.ouldtakephotosoftheSovietUnionandcollectairorradioactiveisotopes(indicatingnuclearweaponsGreenewald,2020)GeneralMillssuggestedreleasingicalagentsfromtheballoondeepinenemyterritoryduringefiningofballoonoperations.Thecerealcompanycouldgrindticlesfromtheircerealdevelopment.Unliketheuseofancraft,theballoonwouldbeabletogodeepintoatargetedarea,voidingblowbackontoU.S.troops.Theprogramwentthroughfnamesastheprogramevolved,eventuallyretiredas124A,listedasaWeatherReconnaissanceProject,acoverstorydtoshieldtheaerialbiologicalweaponsprogram.(Greenewald,20)Thisexampledemonstratestheearlyexplorationofandaerialsystemthatcangoundetectednotonlyforeconnaissancebutasamechanismforthedeliveryanddetectionfbiologicalagents. FIGURE 3.1 Early Unmanned BIOWEAPONS 82 | Biological Weapons
delivplandonotrcwdozobtaindraorcfaciliAlso,thedrsetheirtarcarTerroristgroupsusedronestogatherintelligenceonhighsecureeas;dronesareidealforcircumventingdefenses.Theyuseameraswiththevisual,thermal,andinfraredcapabilitytoexamineget.Forexample,terroristsoftenuseconsumerdronestoethelayoutofasecuredarea(i.e.,nuclearplant,militarybase).oneallowsthemtoobservethesecuritypracticesofthety.Thisgivesanadvantagefortheattackonfacility,personnel,ontentsthatarebeingprotected.Weaponizingcommerciallyvailableorbuildingtheirowntohittargets,terroristscaneasilyonesthatcancarryasmallpayloadofafewkilogramstoensofkilogramsonboard.Whiletheabilitytocarryabiologicaleaponneedsaspecializeddisseminationdevice,itisavailableandanbeattachedbymodifyingthedrone.Somebiologicalproductsequirecrystallizationfordissemination,suchasanimalandtpathogensthatanunmodifiedcommercialdronecouldeasilyer.“Ifaterroristgroupwereabletocarryoutthecomplextasks
Biological Weapons | 83
Source: (Airvector, 2021) TATTACKerrorist Groups
(DeohumaniwthemostadgtheterrDuksaidDrabiologofcreatingandusingbiologicalweapons,anintentionalreleaseoficalweaponcouldbeevenmoredeadlythanCOVID-19”,.Goldring,whoisalsoVisitingProfessorofthePracticeineUniversity’sWashingtonDCprogram.(Deen,2020)“Itisnotoristgroupsthataretheproblemhere.ItistheterroristovernmentsliketheUSA,China,Russia,UK,Israel,etc.thathavevancedbiologicalwarfarefacilitiesandbiologicaleaponsintheworldthatthreatentheveryexistenceofalltyasCovid-19isnowdoing,saidProfessorBoyleprofessorfinternationallawattheUniversityofIllinoisCollegeofLaw.en,2020) FIGURE 3.2 Spraying Drone Source: (Lambert C. A., 2020) frsprpigpopulaInChina,gangsusedronestospreadAfricanSwinefevertothetion.Thebiologicalweaponhasinfected,killed,andeadthediseaseacrossAsia.Thegangbytheinfectedpigsatcostomthefarmersthensellsthemeatashealthymeatandmakes 84 | Biological Weapons
cinfusingcIafarmerstoselltheirpigsamealargeprofit.Thegangsarealsousingmisinformationonsocialdiatodrivefurtherfearoftheirbiologicalweapon,forcingthetacosteveniftheyarenotinfected.Thisttackhascaughttheeyeofal-Qaedaandotherterrornetworks.nJanuary2017,theIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS)startedommercialUAStoprovidereconnaissanceandtargetingormationagainstcoalitionforces5.ItbeganshowinginterestinonductingUAS-basedCBWattacks.(LambertC.A.,2020) FIGURE 3.3 African Swine Fever Across Asia Source: (DeFranco & Giordano, 2020) theriskophaseoutnucleForNation-states,couldtheadvancementsinbiologicalweaponsarweapons?AsCOVID-19hasvividlydemonstrated,facatastrophicbiologicaleventismagnifiedbyan Biological Weapons | 85
imagoutdoorarSifthisUonefligAgrdetheleadpandemicpagainsfunc(Nuclemakinstabiliincreasinglyinterconnectedworld,challengedbypoliticalty,urbanization,climatechange,andnewtechnologiesthateiteasier,cheaper,andfastertocreateengineerpathogens.arThreatInitiative,2022)Thedevelopmentofgeneeditingtionscapabilitiesbydeliberatelycreatingpotentialthogensinthelab.Itemslikethisandthesignificantvancementofagriculturaldronesshouldcausealarm.ChinaisaderincommercialUAS.(LambertL.A.,2020).China’slatestvelopment,AgrasMG1S,isanagricultureoctocopterUAS.TheasMG1Scancarryupto10kgoffluidspreadacross10acreswithht.Itcanspray60xfasterthanamanualsprayer.ImagineASwasusedforusewithabiologicalweapon?SincethepanishEmergencyUnitusedtheoctocoptertodisinfectlargeeasduringtheCovid-19pandemic,wecanalmostinethat.(Silview”Costinescu,2021) Republic of Korea (DPRK) (North Korea)
Democratic People’s
TheDPRKissuspectedofnotcomplyingwiththeBiologicaland IthetestingobiologthrobserinsmalldrbiologwSKdespibelieToxinWeaponsConvention(BTWC)andtheGenevaProtocol.ItisvedthattheDPRKhascontinuedtodevelopbiologicalweaponstecommittingtotheworldthattheywouldnot.In2016,Southorea’sMinistryofNationalDefense(MND)reportedtotheUnitedtatesthatDPRKiscultivatinganthraxandsmallpoxasbiologicaleapons.ByDPRKdefectoraccounts,itisbelievedDPRKhas13icalweaponsinplay.TheMNDhasreportedaDPRKuptickonesinfiltratingthesharedborder.Frominitialvations,thedronesappeartobesurveillancedrones.However,oughthevoicesofdefectors,thedroneshavebeenarmedwithicalandchemicalweapons.Thedefectorshavealsowitnessedftheseweaponsonanimalpopulations.(NuclearThreatnitiative,2022) FIGURE 3.4 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (North Korea) Drone 86 | Biological Weapons
aliginbdispersebiologapprandpositarSensordrtosignificoneanotheraac“multipleunmannedplatformsand/orweaponsdeployedtocomplishasharedobjective,withtheplatformsand/orweaponsutonomouslyalteringtheirbehaviorbasedoncommunicationwith.”(Kallenborn&Bleek,2019)Swarmshavethepotentialantlyimprovechemicalandbiologicalweaponsdelivery.onescouldcollectenvironmentaldatatoimprovegeting,andattackdronescouldusethisinformationinthetimingtioningforrelease,targetselection,andoach.(Kallenborn&Bleek,2019)Swarmsmakeiteasiertoicalweaponsthatcanhangintheairtobebreathedyhumansoranimals.Also,pathogensandtoxinspayloadishter,andthememberofadroneswarmisidealforthistypeofttack(i.e.,cropdustingdrones).Theswarmsareeasiertoadjustto
Biological Weapons | 87
Source: (Choi, 2017) DRONE SWARMS AsmentionedinChapter5,droneswarmscanbedefinedas
cweatherconditionssuchasrainandwindspeed.Droneswarmsalsoancombineabiologicalandaconventionalweaponattack. FIGURE 3.5 Swarm of Mass Destruction Source: (Kallenborn & Bleek, 2019) DETECTION listWMDpa2)CoundefuseneTheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseprogramThunderstormreviewswandemergingtechnologiesandbrainstormshowtheycanbedinwarfare(defenseandoffense).InFY15,Thunderstormocusedontwoareasofinterest:1)ChemicalandbiologicaltectioncapabilitiesdeployedonUnmannedAerialSystems(UAS);teringthethreatofUASwithchemicaland/orbiologicalyloads.(GlobalBiodefenseStaff,2014)ThefollowingwasaofrequirementsfromtheU.S.DepartmentofDefense:•Asystemthatiscarriedinonebackpackuptosystemscarried/deployedfromaHUMVEE-sizedvehicle•UASpayloadsthatcanremotelydetectand/orcollectandtransmitchemicaland/orbiologicaldatatoareceivingunitat 88 | Biological Weapons
Biological Weapons | 89
least 1 kilometer from the sensing location.
• UAS can operate between 0 and 1000 feet above ground level (AGL) and should have a flight time of at least 30 minutes.
• Positional accuracy of UAS should be +/- 10 meters and altitude accuracy within 1 meter.
• Electronic systems that can interdict, defeat, or deny hostile use of UAS.
• Ground stations may utilize autonomous operation (takeoff, navigation, sample detection/collection, and landing) of the UAS utilizing standard geo-referenced satellite imagery that is either pre-loaded or downloaded on-demand from cellular or Wi-Fi networks. The autonomy interface should be simple enough to be learned in one day or less.
• Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Collaboration, and Intelligence (C5I) and sensor systems that facilitate rapid detection, identification, and classification of UAS targets;
• UAS operable by organic Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) unit personnel with minimal training and should be able to hover and land at or near the desired survey locations.
• Ground station capability to provide visual displays of the sensing data received from the mobile detection systems.
• Systems are providing the capability to intercept and neutralize the UAS. Both kinetic and non-kinetic solutions are encouraged and should cover both CONUS and OCONUS applications.
• Modular payload(s) capable of detecting: Standard G, H, and V series chemical agents in the vapor phase and/or liquid phase on surfaces or aerosolized particles; Chemical agent precursors or degradation products, priority toxic industrial compounds and materials; Biological Warfare Agents (vegetative cells, spores, and toxins); Persistent and natural flora (providing biological surveillance on current and emerging flora).
(GlobalBiodefenseStaff,2014) InJanuary2020,theU.S.Armywas 20ccwi52Nucleodoesnotinclude,amongotherifindjoinaerialsystems)CselectedastheDepartmentofDefensecountersmallunmanned-sUAS)executiveagent.TheU.S.ArmywillnowtsolutionstocounterthethreatsofsmalldroneshowevertemscounteringthebiologicalusefUAS.TheU.S.ArmyChemicalCorpsandtheFunctionalAreaarandCounterproliferationOfficerBranch,inconjunctionththejointCWMDcommunity,shouldupdatetheirtrainingonceptsandscenariostobetterpreparethejointforceforounteringanddefendingagainstaUASCBWthreat.(LambertC.A.,20) CONCLUSIONS 20undesystem(UnothaunderstandinghowbeignorUacineeteogrTheevolutionofpotentialbiologicalagentsisexponentiallyowingbythemonth.Advancementswithgenesandmodificationsfpastlife-threateningdiseasesarealreadyhappening.Dronechnologyisgrowingrapidlyandbecomingatimelyissueforveryone.Theseeasy-to-obtainunmannedaerialsystemsarexpensive,thereforeopeningtheuseofdronestoanythreattor,anygroup,andanymilitary.ThecombinationofbiologyandASiseasierthanonemightthink.ThethreatisrealandcannotedbyanyNation-state.Understandinghowthisbiologicaleaponcanbedeveloped,produced,andexecutediskeytowtodefendagainstsuchanattack.TheU.S.doesveacomprehensivenationalcounterunmannedaircraftAS)strategytodealwiththeproliferationofintrusive,tectable,andpotentiallylethalcommercialUAS.(LambertC.A.,20) BIBLIOGRAPHY Airvector.(2021,August1). [3.0]ColdWarBalloonFlights1945:1965. hRetrievedApril11,2022,fromAirVectors:ttp://www.airvectors.net/avbloon_3.html.Choi,D.(2017,March30). NorthKoreaReportedlyHasaFleetof 90 | Biological Weapons
Thunderstorm: DronesinCBRNDetectionandTerrorism.
DronesofMass andBiologicalWDestruction:DroneSwarmsandtheFutureofNuclear,Chemical,eapons.
DarkSideof DrDelivery:TheGrowingThreatofBioweaponDisseminationbyones.
RetrievedApril11,2022,fromTheBlackVault: and-biologhttps://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/general-mills-ical-weapons/.Kallenborn,Z.,&Bleek,P.C.(2019,February14).
MillionWorldwide–WithoutaSingleShotBeingFired. Retrieved neApril11,2022,fromGlobalIssues:https://www.globalissues.org/ws/2020/11/20/27042.DeFranco,J.,&Giordano,J.(2020,January24).
RetrievedApril11,2022,fromWaronthe and-biologdestrucRocks:https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-tion-drone-swarms-and-the-future-of-nuclear-chemical-ical-weapons/.Lambert,C.A.(2020,September29).
TheChemicalandBiologicalAttack ThreatofCommercialUnmannedAircraftSystems.
APotentialWeaponKillsOver1.5
RetrievedApril 11,2022,fromAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmy: Biological Weapons | 91
1,000DronesforAttacks.
RetrievedApril11,2022,fromBusiness
aInsider:https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-drone-ttack20173.Deen,T.(2020,November20).
RetrievedApril11,2022,fromDefenseIQ: bioarhttps://www.defenceiq.com/cyber-defence-and-security/ticles/the-dark-side-of-delivery-the-growing-threat-ofweapon-dissemination-by-drones.GlobalBiodefenseStaff.(2014,November3).
TheChemicalandBiological AttackThreatofCommercialUnmannedAircraftSystems. Retrieved ahApril11,2022,fromAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmy:ttps://www.ausa.org/publications/chemical-and-biological-ttack-threat-commercial-unmanned-aircraft-systems.Lambert,L.A.(2020,October).
RetrievedApril11,2022, 03fromGlobalBiodefense:https://globalbiodefense.com/2014/11//thunderstorm-drones-cbrn-detection-terrorism/.Greenewald,J.(2020,March31).
GeneralMillsandBiological Weapons.
Goodman,KevidencesubmittedbyDr.FilippaLentzosandProfessorMichaelS.ing’sCollegeLondonKing’sColl.
RetrievedApril11,2022, hfromUKParliamentCommittees:ttps://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/12902/pdf/.Nichols,R.K.(2020).
92 | Biological
RetrievedApril11,2022,fromNCBI: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3148622/. Weapons
Biological–TheNuclearThreat Initiative. RetrievedApril11,2022,fromNuclearThreatInitiative: https://www.nti.org/area/biological/Silview”Costinescu,S.`.(2021,June3).The
CounterUnmannedAircraftSystems Technologies&Operations.
USrangruesome iceberg.bioweaponresearchinover25countries.Wuhanisthetipofan
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Manhattan,KS: www.newprairiepress.org/ebooks/31.NuclearThreatInitiative.(2022).
BNS0025Written
CommerSLhttps://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/publications/20-5-The-Chemical-and-Biological-Attack-Threat-ofcial-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems.pdf.Lentos,D.,&Goodman,M.S.(2020,October16).
4. EleRadiological,ctromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues By Dr. Robert McCreight STUDENT OBJECTIVES Students will discuss, analyze and study: • n the nature of intermingled radiological and electromagnetic risk today • n the impact of drone technology and metaverse factors in shaping future risk • n the significance of technology convergence and the emergence of CONV-CBRN • n Indicators of threat CONV-CBRN dynamics and cognitive warfare threats after 2021 • n Radiological, electromagnetic security, CONV-CBRN, and drone risk scenarios • n Unique future security risks and challenges BACKGROUND appliemustbeecchallenglessthanspetheimpaceleWhenexaminedsidebyside,thenatureofradiologicalriskandctromagneticsecuritymayappeardiscontinuous.Atfirstglance,tandreciprocaleffectsofoneupontheothermayseemctacular.However,theysignalatrajectoryofsecurityesandrisksnotreadilygraspedseparatelyandinombination.Radiologicalemanationsdeemedharmfultohumansvaluatedindependentlyfromthesameconsiderationsdtoelectromagnetics.Whenoperatingtogetherandin Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 93
TheneLoiviaswseoutcoasrtesidetothetelogtebrigsawpotentheapplicchallengneimplicthrthefuturtheenneurapplicilegIgthacombination,wecanfindauniquesetofrisksandsecurityissuestmayeludeconventionalanalysisbutposeadifficulteostrategicarrayofthreatdynamicsdeservinggreaterattention.nmanyways,itdepictsamassivelycomplexandbrand-neweostrategicthreatpuzzlethatdefiesfacilesolutions.Itistrulythaltomisunderstandit,incorrectlydiagnoseit,orunderestimatet.Radiologicalfactorsareonething,butourimaginationandtheationofsteadilyimprovingtechnologydovetailedwithoscience,electromagnetic,drones,andthemetaversechangetiredynamicofhowwemustreckonwithandunderstande.Eachareaisarguablydistinct,buttheymustbeforcedoughthelensofconvergencetoappreciatetheirstrategications.Therearetechnologiestodayandemergingoverthextfewyears;fewcancomprehend;however,theyrepresentaetosociety,security,andstrategicstability.Ineverycase,ationofdual-usetechnologythathaseverybitoftialtobringdeath,destruction,disruption,anddecaytoourorldhasalwaysshownabenignfacewherecures,fixes,energyvings,andfantasticproblem-solvingtechnologiesbecomethehtshinyobjectthatdistractsusfromtheevilsideofscienceandch.ConvergentstrategicrealityadmitsthatinalmostNewtonianic,thereisanequalandveryoppositenefariousanddangerouschnologythatwowsusforeverygoodthingthatchnologyprovides.Worstofall,wheneachlinertechnologysuchobotics,nanotech,neurotech,proteomics,lasers,andhundredsfotherfuturistictechnologiesareextrapolated,yougetoneome.However,whenyoudeliberatelyoraccidentallyblendveral,yougetsomethingentirelydifferent.(McCreightR.,2013)Whentheissueofdronesisadded,whetherair,sea,space,orarmsdirectedbyhostilepersonnel,theequationchanges.teringdroneswithadvancedconvergencetechnologiesusherinwimmersivecapabilitiesthatdefinenewoperationalrealities.yopenPandora’sboxofemergentbehavioralinfluences,which 94 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
hiddenAgain,edelivthaskywoassemblthealeaerequireaninnovativetacticalresponse,quickadaptation,andvidence-basedadjustmentstoanascentthreat.Supposeutonomouskillerdronesareassignedtodevastateatargetbythalubiquity,theoverallthreatequationchanges.Dronesenableutonomousorindirectlymanagedcontrolledandfocusedyofindependentlyequippedaerialvehiclesaboutthesizefamicrowaveoven,whichcandelivermedicalsupplies,pizzas,onderfulnaturephotos,orraindowndeathandmayhemfromthe.Dozensofdronescanswarmcollectivelyandcreatealegiontdefieseasydefenseornullifieshaphazardprotectionbyeringharmfulorlethalpackagesagainstitsintendedtarget.verythingwesuspectisfriendlyandhelpfulisasubtlymonsterwhenre-engineeredfordestructivepurposes.When
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prinsidiousrisks.Theirinherneurnanotebrtomorrisuponus.thruninbundlingbinwalloarrGealtersthespetewhichthethrfacwithdronesandcombinedwiththeradiologyandelectromagnetictors,wehavetouchedupontheentireanalyticallensthrougheatisseen.Thatnefariousblendofvariouschnologiesrepresentsaconglomerationofrisksthatdramaticallyctrumofpotentialthreatswemustaddress.opoliticalrivalswillexploititsallegedpotential,unveilinganewayofthreatscapableofshiftingtheglobalbalanceofpowertowsomeinsidiousandevilentitytoharnessitslatentcapabilitiesayswedon’texpect,planfor,orforesee.Myriadconvergenceyitselfunleashesdeployedmayhemladenwithtendedconsequencesrequiringadaptivehuman-machineeatanalyticswecanonlyimagine.WemustreconsiderourunderstandingofCBRNnowthat2022OldertraditionalviewsofCBRNareinsufficientforow’srisks.Thedeliberateblendingofheraldedeakthroughsthatquantumcomputingoffers,alongsiderobotics,ch,5thgenerationchemical/biologicalweaponry,oscience,andothercutting-edgescientificfields,suggestsentconvergentrisksmagnifytheesumptivethreatequationandoverallstrategicterrainafter2022.ThescopeandscaleofCBRNafterthe9-11attackswere
convergenttechnologydynamics[CONV] areincluded
ridenhaandciunderstoodtomeanonethinglargelyaccurateforitstime.Todaytlooksmuchdifferentandislikelytomorphfurtherincharacteromplexityby2030.Worseofall,complexinterveningvariablesvemadeCBRN,asweonceunderstoodit,toughertograsp,tifyanddefeat.WefindourselvesamidtheConvergentCBRNevolutionorwhattheauthorcalls— CONV-CBRN.Theeraof wiprthadiscboggsedrCBWanothergfuturprandperpeuseunivstrCanwtosubdueiapplicfuturconvergentCBRN[CONV-CBRN]vastlycomplicatesourgraspofethreatandriskequations,theories,andgeostrategications.Worstofall,welackthemetricsandtechnologiest.WhatisthescopeandtrajectoryofCONV-CBRN?eposititinrevolutionarytermsasaforcemultiplierandategicgame-changerafter2022,especiallyinadangerousdual-erseofillegalarmstransfers,rampanttechnologytheft,tuallycontendingpoliticalactorsandinterests?Canitbeedicted?Controlled?Redirected?Curtailed?Managed?OnesalientinsightfrominfusingAIandcyberelementsintotheethreatscenariosinvolvingCONV-CBRNistofactorinyeteostrategicvariable–theevolvingissueofthemetaverse.efocusondeliberate,engineered,anddirectedblendsofCONV-RN,radiologicalandelectromagneticfactors,andadvancedonetechnologyintosomethingentirelynewandneverbeforeen.Addinginthemetaverseanditsvariablesmakesitmind-lingandblendingwhatisrealwithwhatisvirtualtaxesourerningskillsandsensestoadegreeofuncertaintyandcautiontcreatesastrategicgapusingA/RplusV/Rplusreality.Themetaverseislargelyundefinedwithanyprecision.Yet,itesumptivelysuggestsacomputer-generatedworldinparallelthrealitywhichfeaturestechnologiesenabling augmentedreality [AR]andvirtualreality[VR]. Futuresponsorsandarchitectsofthe Ballclaimerdiscbemetaversecanexpanditscapabilitieswithoutlimitsandboundariestweenwhatisrealandwhatisvirtual,becominghardertoern.Somerefertoitasaplaceoraspacewherereplicasofeallifecanbecreated,sustained,andinteract.ITexpertMatthewdin2020thatthemetaverseis“ anexpansivenetwork ofpersistent,real-timerendered3Dworldsandsimulationsthat[…] 96 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
ofusercanbeexperiencedsynchronouslybyaneffectivelyunlimitednumbers,eachwithanindividualsenseofpresence ”Accordingtohis ourrcutimmeCOthediagnosticstrcrgTanddoaggrwccHoperelein20drissues—CBpoinshifaaradefinition,themetaverseisaproductorservicewithsevencorettributes:persistence,synchronicity,andinteroperabilitywiththeguablelayerof3Daspects.(Ball,2020)Ineffect,themetaversecompriseswhatevercanbeinsertedorttachedtoitfromgenuinerealityorthesphereofAR/VRevertingandchameleon-likecharacter.HerewemustaddtothetsalreadymadetoemphasizethattheexistenceofCONVRN,mixedwithradiologicalandelectromagnetictechwhileinsertingthepossibilitiesderivedfromones—suggestsanewandstaggeringthreatandrisksetofissues22.Assuch,thenetimplicationsofwhichradiologicalandctromagnetictechnologiesinform,support,orguidetheationaldefinitionofthemetaversearelargelyunknown.owever,itisarguablyastrategicarenaforbattleasitsIoT,AI,yber,nanotech,neurotech,biotech,androboticaspectsareonfiguredtocompetefordominanceinanundefinedspace.Areeevenequippedtoconductanobjectiveriskanalysisofthisegation?Canwedealcomprehensivelywithitsconsequenceswnstreameffects?Likelynot.(McCreightR.,ConvergentechnologyandFutureStrategicThreat,2013)Thisaggregatearrayofthreatsandriskswilltransformtheglobaleostrategiclandscapeforatleastanotherdecadeorlonger.ThiseatesageostrategicpuzzleofgiganticproportionswhereneitherategiesnortechnologiesdesignedtofittheNV-CBRNthreatadequatelyaddressitsevolvingnatureanddiateemergence.PuzzleingredientsmixCONV-CBRNwithting-edgedual-usescienceandtechnologymixinginadiological,electromagnetic,anddroneaspects,akeystrokefromlessinsulatedreality. RADIOLOGICAL THREATS—EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN endoWhenthespectrumofradiologicalthreatsisexaminedatthef2021,wefindamixofoldtraditionalandsomenewissues Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 97
terr[nuclenucleparrenrinlikincludeothrrrtedeservingofattention.Thiswouldnecessarilyincludemeasuresandchnologiesdesignedtomitigateanythingresemblinganascentadiologicalthreat.Butthespectrumofradiologicalthreats—bothealandimagined—islargerandmorecomplex.CDCsaysradiologiceatagentscanissuefromintentionalorunintentionalreleasesfdangerousradioactivematerials.UnintentionalemergenciesNuclearReactorAccidentsandTransportationAccidentseaspillofradioactivematerialfromatruckortrain.However,tentionalactscaninclude:[1]Contaminatingfoodandwaterwithadioactivematerial;[2]Spreadingradioactivematerialintothevironment;[3]Usingconventionalexplosivesmixedwithhighlyadioactivesubstances–thisiscalledadirtybomb;[4]dispersingadioactiveelementsviawindcurrentsornaturalweathertraffictterns;[5]bombingordestroyinganuclearreactor;[6]causingarmaterialtospillwhileintransitaswasteproductsfromarplants;[7]theftofradioactivematerialsandcourse8]explodinganuclearweapon.(CDC,2022)Aftertheinfamous9-11attacks,therewereprofoundfearsthatoristscouldeithercreatean improvisednucleardevice[IND] or metheImeinbomb.enougterrodisablingitonsograDispersionDemasomehowmatch-highexplosiveswithradioactivematerialorfissileterial.ThecentralfearwasrootedintherisksofRadiologicalvices[RDD]andtheparallelconcernaboutdirectttacksonnuclearpowerplantswheresurpriseassaultsbyterroroupscouldtrigger.ChornobylorFukushimatragediesreleasefradioactivesteamviapenetrationoftheprocessingcore,tssafetycontrolsorotherwiseenflamingoutdoorpoolsfspentnuclearfuelpointstootherrisks.Itwasalsoassumedthatorgroupsafter9-11wereinclinedtoacquire,purchase,orstealhradiologicalornuclearmaterialtofabricatearealor‘dirty’(Bunn,2021)(DHS,RadiologicalAttackFactSheet,2022)Apolitically-chargedchameleontypeaphorismlikethemetaversevitesscrutiny.Ontheonehand,peoplewouldliketoconfinethetaversetoanextrapolationoftheinternetandpraiseitassimplyoTandnothingmore.However,otherlegitimateaspectsofthetaverse,suchasits3-Dpropertiesexploitingneuromechanics 98 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
aradiological
premployingtheemittedgammaorbetaroraerialsprdisseminatingitviacreweaponmeansanydevice,otherthanamanufacturednuclearxplosive,specificallydesignedtoemployradioactivematerialbyudeexplosion,aerosol,injection,dispersion,ayingtocausehumandestruction,damage,orinjury,adiationovertheyearsoducedbythedecayofsuchmaterial.
obopaspecbecalgusingengincandbiomechanics,arenotwellunderstood.Itblendsspatialomputingcapabilities,gameenginecapabilities,brain-computerterfaceoptions,digitaltwinpotential,andparallelreplicautilityineeredvirtualreality.Itstendencytoemployadvancedorithmstoexcludehumansfromcontrollingormonitoringtheirovertactivities—ormakingthemvirtuallyundetectable—isnotyondcomprehension.So,sortingoutaspectsofhiddenonnectivitybetweenRF,radiological,andtheelectromagneticctrumremainspuzzlingexactlybecausetheirrelationshipsarequeanddiffuse.Noteasytoidentify,decodeordiscern.Theirviousandunintendedoutcomeslingertohauntus.Radiologicalmustbeunderstoodinthisway–
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testing,girrosacratestesophisticinfrmistakreletriggandseaspossidistriThistermencompassesmostobjectscreatedexpresslytobuteharmfulradioactivematerialsasbroadlyandextensivelyblebyvariousmeans.ThisisquitedifferentfromtheriskscurityimplicationsofEMPattacks.ElectromagneticPulseeredbyahigh-altitudenuclearblastinflictswidespreadctronicfailureandchaosonorganizedsocietywithminimaladiationeffects.(Reports,2018)Likewise,itisalsoimportanttovehementlydisprovethosewhoenlyclaimIraqhadnoWMD—thefactisIraq’stechnicalastructure.Itsresidentnuclearscienceexpertshadtheatedcapabilitytodosoeventuallywithouteverdevisingdweapon.Ineffect,thecapabilitytoproduceWMDisosanctandcannotbeseveredconvenientlyfromthepossessionfactualWMDweaponry.(Scientists,2009)Goodradiationcanplayapartincancertherapy,bloodadiation,medicalandfoodsterilization,structureandequipmenteologicexploration,andinstrumentcalibration.Gamma
errandFeacemermagnifiesthalinkdistrioasthehetoensurdivrensurseandthethefor(wctoRFchannels.Therapoptosis,changcEMFimpacrromeraysemittedbycesiumandcobaltcankillgermsmultiplyinginyouratandmakeyourappleslastlonger.Affirmingthepositivevaluefradiologicalisimportant.(Scoles,2022)Finally,therelatedissueinvolvingthepossibleeffectsofadiofrequency-electromagneticfield(RF-EMF)onthehumanbodyequiresanappreciationforseveralfactorswhichindicateharmfultonanimalmodels.RF-EMFcaninducechangesinentralnervoussystemnervecells,includingneuronalcellesinthefunctionofthenervemyelinandionefore,itisnecessarytostudythebiologicalresponse-EMFinconsiderationofthecomprehensiveexposureoncerningtheuseofvariousdevicesbyindividuals.Inthisreview,esummarizethepossiblebiologicaleffectsofRF-EMFexposure.(Seoul),2018)(JuHwanKim,2019)Securityandsafetyareparamountwithjustoverthe25researcheactorsoncollegecampuses.Thesereactorshavealimitedamountfradioactivematerialonsiteandposealowriskfromradiationtofnuclearmaterial.TheNRCinspectsthereactor’scurityandemergencyplansanditsoperationsanddesigntoepublichealthandsafetyprotectionwithincreasingequirementsformaterialthatislessattractivefortheftorersion.TheNRCcontinuestoinspectresearchandtestreactorsecompliancewithallNRCregulationstoprotecttpublicalthandsafety.(NRC,2017)Insum,therisksofradiologicalweaponstodayafter2022,justywereattheendofWWII,remainembeddedinthevarietyfmechanismsandinventionswhichenablethewidestpossiblebutionofharmfulradioactivityandwhichareinextricablyedtoevolvingtechnologythatmorepreciselyandreliablytdistribution.Whiletheoverallthreatofradiologicalgencyordeliberateattackseemsrelativelylow,theriskofcident,sabotage,terrorism,orsystemmalfunctioncannotbeasilydismissed.SinceeventslikeThreeMileIsland,Chornobyl,ukushima,wehavelearnedthatnaturaldisasters,operatoror,andsystemsmalfunctioncancauseaseriousradiological 100 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
chefurleFfemergencywithcontaminantradiationdwellingintheaffectedareaormanydecadesrenderingthecompromisedareauninhabitable.utureradiologicalweaponswillgrowincomplexityandresidualthalityasfutureenablingandsupportingadvancedtechnologiesthermagnifyanddirectlytargethumangroupsincitiesandavilypopulatedareasofindustrialactivitywhereradioactiveontaminationcanharmmany THENATUREOFRADIOLOGICAL,ELECTROMAGNETIC,AND DRONE RISK INSIDE THE METAVERSE prinaseandeivicvicbehallucinogStherhasnodiagnosticfrneurpulseceleVcblendoosupportheblendetootheremershouldbeunderstoodfseItisnowabroadandill-definedstrategicquestionconnectedtoveraltechnicalchallenges,askinghowtheriskterrainafter2022orCONV-CBRNeventsanditsconnectiongingtechnology?Noeasyanswercomestomindasdandre-engineeredmixofconvergenttechnologies,tedandenabledbyAI.Cyberenhancementscreateamilieufthreatdynamicsneverbeforeseen.Riskestimationbecomesafalchemy,science,technology,countermeasures,andonjecturesupplantedbytheimperfectionsofwarningintelligence.ictimsoftargetedepigeneticneuromodulationrootedinctromagnetic,nanopulsedRF[radiofrequency],andacousticombinationscannotfathomhowtheyhavebeenologicallycompromisedorwounded.Themedicalprofessionameworkortreatmentarchitectureandapeuticstrategytotreatthesevictimsofso-calledHavanayndromeandtendstowritethemoffaspsychoticorenic.Thekeyisthatapreciseneuro-cognitivestrikehaseninflicted.Nobodycanverifyithashappened—neitherthetimnortheso-calledmedicalprofessionalwhoexaminesthetim.So,wedwellinaneraofneurocognitivewarfare,ignorantoftseffects.Ifweabsorbtargetedneurologicalattackswhichgoundetectedvidenceofcovertneurologicalharmcannotbeverified,weareasonofstrategicjeopardy.Thisisgradualandinsidiousasopaganda,disinformation,deceit,informationwarfare,andsocial Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 101
analincrceleneurwananalWassembleandviablecneimpacdefini20thenethemeWvirrbedoneincursionsandatosignalandalerindicotheristefallvicdeimposelaOperthougmediamanipulationslowlyanddeliberatelychiselawayourrationalhtandanalysisfilters.WefallvictimtoPsychologicalations[PsyOp]withoutrealizingwehavebeendupeduntiltoote.DeepFaketechnologyusingPresidentObama’svoiceartificiallydonanother’sbodyandfaceexemplifiesthecalculatedceptionaimedatmassinfluence.Thefactthatmanymillionscantimtothis‘deepfake’schemeandbefalselymanipulatedchnologicallypossible.However,wewouldliketobelievewise.OnechiefissueinvolvesstrategicwarningandthespecificatorsandsensorswhichreflectarobusttechnologydesignedtfriendlynationsofimpendingCONV-CBRNttacksofanon-kineticnature.Howshouldthat?Howwouldfuturesocietiesdiscernwhentheyareundereal-timevs.virtualthreatsofimmediateattack?Howwouldthetualandtherealcomponentsofsuchathreatbesortedout?hatmergedversionsofradiology,electromagnetics,drones,andtaversecanbeablydiagnosedasathreatanddeterredgivenar-termavailabilityoftheirCONV-CBRNoptions222025??HowhastheexistenceofCONV-CBRNitselfchangedtheverytionofastrategicthreat?Whatisthenear-termvs.long-termtonsocietyandsecurity?Whatisinfrastructuregovernancecessarytocurtailandcontrolitsworsteffects?WhatoptionalountermeasuresanddeterrenttechnologiescanbedtothwarttheincipientCONV-CBRNthreatafter2022?hentheAI,cyber,andmetaverseaspectsareincludedinsuchysis,doesthissignifyanunboundedmixofvirtualandrealeaponsplatformsthatcanhavebothabiophysicalandaophysiologicaleffect?Ifcombinedradiological,ctromagnetic,anddronetechnologiesinflictwidespreadneuro-ognitiveharminundetectableways,whatdoesthatimplyforeserveuseofkineticfirepower?Ifatargetpopulationisrenderedapableofperformingbasichumanbehavioraltasksorrationalysisbysuchtechnologycan,wesaytheattackerhas‘ wonthe 102 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
battlewithoutfiringashot, asancientChinesephilosopherSunTzu arguedinthe6thcenturyBCessay ‘TheArtofWar.’ (Tzu,475–221 ConanobjemixbioteengestimacwiimmesuggandccefwhathisthrbegshoamongthewB.C.E.)GiventhepervasiveglobalexistenceofCONV-CBRNtechnologiesorld’sleadingmilitaryandeconomicsuperpowers,thiswgeostrategicriskshouldbeconstructedanddefined.Ifesholdthreatdynamicisanotherdecadedistant,wemayveenoughtimetocontendwithit.However,theCONV-CBRNarfareeraaugmentedbydronesisalreadyuponusthenourfortstodeflectormitigateitsworsteffectswillbeaperpetualatch-upgame.Therefore,riskanalysisitselfishampered,blinded,onstrainedbyamyopicvisionofwhatconvergenttechnologyestsispossible.Failuretoimaginethemostsweepingscopeofhigh-techthreatsdiatelyasderivedfromtheCONV-CBRNriskterraincoupledthAI,cyber,metaverseanddronetechnologyistomissthemostolossallydisruptivetidalwaveofthe21stcentury.Whocanreliablytethestrategicrisksandnuancedimplicationsofacarefullyineeredandconvergentblendofquantum,robotics,nanotech,ch,drones,AI,cyber,anditsoperationalsignificanceinaedmetaverse?Areweevenequippedtoconductandcalibratectiveriskanalysisofthisaggregation?(McCreightR.,vergentTechnologyandFutureStrategicThreat,2013) ERARADIOLOGICALANDELECTROMAGNETICRISKSANDTHEOFCOGNITIVEWARFARE bracdamagTechnologiesderivedfromtheelectromagneticspectrumcanethehumanbrain,especiallyiftargetednanopulsedRFandousticwavesareusedtoadverselyaffectcognitionandnormalainfunction. Neurologicalvulnerability[NV], thedawnofwhat aelementhesisisthahertheauthorterms“NeuroStrike’,andtheeraofcognitivewarfareareenow.Notdecadesawayassomewouldviewit.Thecentraltwehavebeenamidhostilebrainhackingandtaryformsofcognitivewarfareforatleast12years.NVttacksviathemastoidbone,vestibular,andotolithsystemsandour Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 103
influencingperneTanposiabrcandamisjudgwclePrdifRussiasociallaincludeaccivilainfacdefacprparkineinCrimecas‘Domainasecrucialtogrhaproprioceptivesystemsbyharmfulexternallybasedtechnologiesvebeentargetingpersonsforquitesometime.ThisisintegralandaspingfutureCONV-CBRNconflictratherthanseeingitxcessive.(McCreightR.,NeuroStrikeWeaponsandtheStrategicafter2020:Caution,2021)WhileIOandinfluenceoperationsin2014werenotseenstrictlycognitivewarfare,’theoverallintentwastosteerpopularonfusiontowardsanempatheticviewofRussia’sinvadingforcesa,offeringimportantcluesfortheinterplaybetweenIOsticactivity.Thecourseofevents–fromthetakeoverofliamentinSimferopolanddismantlingoftheUkrainianmilitaryesenceonthepeninsulatothedisputedreferendumandthetoannexationoftheareatotheRussianFederation–wascompaniedbyintenseactivityaimedatcontrollingtheflowoformationandinfluencepublicopinioninwaysdesignedtodivertttentionawayfromRussia’soperationalbattleaims.Thistivityextendedacrosstheentirespectrumofcommunicationanddkinetic,cyber,andIOstargetingthephysical,logical,andyersofcommunication.Thismustbeunderstoodaspartof’sInformationWarfare[IW]campaign.Theinterplaybetweenferentlevelsofinformation–fromthepoliticalleadershipofesidentPutinatthetip,viathetraditionalmediatothegrassrootsvelinsocialmedia–andpropagandaappearstobeanimportantoreelementofRussianIW.OneofthecorenarrativessurroundsRussia’spositionintheorld:amisunderstoodcounterweighttoWesternliberalvaluesedhistoricsuperpower.Thisnarrativeisslimandanbeeasilyabsorbedbythegeneralpopulationandevengroupsoad.Forexample,nationalistgroupsfocusonRussia’shistoricaltionofpower,whilecommunistgroupsdiscussRussiantagonismtocapitalismregardingtheSovietera.(Jaitner,2014)odaywewitnessitdailyinthebloodyUkraineconflictasacessarycompaniontooutrightmurder.Themoresophisticatedandthenon-kineticaspectsofstealthilyception,thinking,andnormalbrainfunctions 104 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
maknovefissurWfbadesirweleDouhippocinunderstandingoddbizarrtheminsmallgramiliIdefinibesttodiagnoseandtrwrprccurrhesymptomslikthouguseosystemacreatedaninvisibleandundetectabletechnologythatRussiausedticallyonourdiplomatsinHavana,Cuba-knownasAHI.Thefcoverttechnologydesignedtodisableanddegradehumanht,inducepsychomotordisruptionandavarietyofdiscernibleelossofbalance,speecherosion,tinnitus,frequentadaches,andotherdocumentedissuesmustbeviewedastheentgenerationofcognitivewarfaretechnologywhichontinuestopuzzleneuroscienceexpertsandseasonedmedicalofessionals.(Sciences,2020)(Haines,2022)Eventoday,weestlewiththebonafidesofthosecomplainingofAHIandhoweatthem.Theabsenceofaconsensuscasetionanddivergenttheoriesontherapeuticstrategiesloom.ntheinterim,thethreatcontinuestoourdiplomats,ICstaff,andtaryleadershippostedoverseasandafewdisturbingcasesherethome.Aslongastheenemytargetsourpersonnelandattacksoupsof12orless,wecansafelyrelegatetheseeeventstothebottomoftheprioritypack.(Nelson,2022)Radiation-inducedbraininjurycanresultincognitiveysfunction,includinghippocampal-relatedlearningandmemoryysfunctionthatcanescalatetodementia.Ourcurrentfthemechanismsbehindradiation-inducedbrainjury,focusingontheroleofneuroinflammationandreducedampalneurogenesis,remainsuseful.(Turnquist,2020)(Lindaw,2009)Riskassessmentsoftheradiologicalandctromagneticimpactonnormalbrainfunctionandneurologicalell-beingarenotasfurtherinresearchaswemightexpectore.Now2022findsusinanunrestrictedcognitivewarfarettlefieldwheremulti-domainoperationsmustsomehowaccountorthesefactorsblendedwithvariousnon-kinetictechnologies.herearewethen?Thearrayofradiologicalrisksarisingfromesinnuclearplantcontainmenttowers,mixinghighxplosiveswithradiologicalelements,andambientradiationfromariousmedicalandfoodprocessingsitesarereflectiveofwell-wnrisks.Dowegraspthefullarrayofradiologicalriskswhichyarise?Whatabouttheradiologicalrisksinourimmediate Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 105
environment,suchas radioactiveisotopesinpotablewater systemsorderivedcadmiumfromdisturbing sandygrounds, which may be more prevalent than imagined. (EPA, 2012) FIGURE 4.1 Where Do Mobile Phones Fit? Source: https://www.sciencemediacentre.co.nz/infographics/ (sciencemediacentre.co.nz, 2022) morcchostileandclandestinethrphenomenonin2015and2016asanambiguousyThefactthatUSmilitarybriefingsandreportsreferredtothisetburgeoningeatthatUSforcesandalliesmustontendwithdoesn’talterthefactthatsimpleawarenessofognitivewarfareinitsearlieststagestookabackseattosexierandesophisticatedweaponssystems.Hypersonics,cyber-attacks, 106 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
tegrc(SOCObriefingslidefrcwandothersystemscrowdedoutsustainedattentiontocognitivearfaresoconsistentlythattheinterimresponsewaslimited,autious,andlatebythetimewehadverifiablevictimsofit.Thisom2015illustratesthelimitedstrategicviewourMleadersattributedtotherisksofcognitivewarfare.SOCOM,2015)Ifthethreatisrecognizedasvalid,butnoountermeasuresareformedtoneutralizeit,thenetresultwillantabattlefieldadvantagetothosepossessingthisdisruptivechnology. Figure 4.2 Cognitive Key Terrain Within a Generational Struggle Source: (Ryan, 2014) ELECTRTHREATDYNAMICS—RADIOLOGICALANDOMAGNETICISSUESPOST2021 Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 107
rourtermsfandtheapplicwCesium-Chornobprwalsosedeasa‘beliebeThespectrumofradiologicalrisktosocietyandsecurityhascomeobscure,opaque,andotherworldly.Obscurethatmanyveradiologicalrisk,includingtheprospectofsuchweaponsdirtybomb,’isadistantworrydwarfedandstokedbysevencadesofapocalypticnuclearwarfears.Theradiologicalriskwasenasopaquebymany.Someexpertssawaradiologicaleapon’stechnicalrequirementsandinstrumentalrisksaslowobability,unlikelyandspeculative.However,eventslikeyl,Fukushima,andtheenvironmentalcalamityinvolving137atGoianiamadeusreckonwiththeradiologicalrisksetolerateinexchangeforameasureofreliablenuclearpowerationofnuclearmedicinetechnologies.Todefineorthispurpose,awidelyciteddescriptivedefinitionofaadiologicalweaponreads–rdestraeremployrotherthanamanufacturednuclearexplosive,specificallydesignedtoadioactivematerialbydisseminatingitviacrudeexplosion,osol,injection,dispersionoraerialsprayingtocausehumanuction,damage,orinjury,throughtheemittedgammaorbetaadiationovertheyearsproducedbythedecayofsuchmaterial.
108 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
cStodeso-crcrisiso2019bmordivdisc20bharmfulrThistermencompassesmostobjectscreatedexpresslytodistributeadioactivematerialsasbroadlyandextensivelyaspossibleyvariousmeans.(DHS,countering-weapons-mass-destruction,22)Congressional,press,andacademicdiscussionsweregraduallyountedinfavoroftheincreasinglycomplex,insidious,andergentfuturetechnologiesexpectedtodamageoursecurityereadilyoreffectively.ThiswasunderscoredingreatdetailytheNERCEMPtaskforcereporttoCongressin2019.(NERC,)Thisreportdrewattention,howevertemporary,totheimpliedfradiologicalrisksemanatingfromapoorlyunderstoodadiologicalthreat.(NERC,2019).Inaddition,weareawareofthealled‘dirtybomb’issuewherehighexplosivescanbeattachedtonatewithhighlyradioactivesubstanceslikeCobalt60ortrontium90andrenderanentireareaofmanysquaremilesontaminatedfordecades.Imaginewhereotherradiologicalrisks
aradiologicalweaponmeansanydevice,
efelefinspecberdiscprafirissuancrissueisthecleeRussiansclaimtheirparatheplaninUkr20mainrandcchangpoeeleanddangerscaneventuallybelinkedtoCONV-CBRN,ctromagnetic,drone,andmetaverseexploitation.Thatintentonviliswellawareofit.WesawthesignificanceandimpactofusingpassivenuclearwerplantsintheRusso-Ukrainewarin2022aspivotaliningthethreatdynamicsofthebattlefield.ThereareclaimsounterclaimsaboutwhoseweaponryandartillerytargetedtheeactorsatUkraine’slargestnuclearplant.OnFebruary5,22,RussiatookcontrolofEurope’slargestnuclearpowerstationaineafterashellinghitit.Bothsidesarguedtheotherputts’safetyinjeopardy.UkrainianofficialssaidafirestartedttheZaporizhianplantafterbeingshelledbyRussiantroops.Thet.Theydidnotshellthefacilityatall.Toveryone’srelief,theUN’snuclearwatchdogIAEAsaidradiationvelsandthesafetyofreactorswerenotaffected.Herethesterlingontendingandcontradictoryclaimswhichcannotbeeadilyverifiedandifcontainmentwasbreached.Sadly,theeofradioactivegasandfumesorsettingspentfuelpondsewouldhavetriggeredaradiologicaldisasterofinternationaloportions.Thatcrisiswouldhavethwartedseriousattemptstoernwhoattackedthesite.So,post-disasterattribution,whereesponsibilityisassignedtothoseheldliablefortheattack,comesanambiguousandill-definedmess.(News,2022)Zealforupgradinginterestinradiologicalissueswanedasexpertsoncentratedonthepowerofnuclearweaponsalone.Whenonectstheelectromagneticspectrumindetail,wefindtheollowingdistributionofphenomenawhichidentifywherecertainctromagnetictechnologiesexertaradiologicalseriesoffects—somelethalandharmful—othersmuchlessso. Figure 4.3 Radiological Spectrum//Earth, Sky, Net Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 109
Source: (EarthSky – Earth, 2019)
KstanuclerprstanuclewlarfneurrwelebearFromaquickscanofthischartFigure4.3,onecanreadilypointtoeasontheelectromagneticspectrumwheredivergentwavesandamscanaffecthumanlifeinaharmfulorbenignway.Whenthectromagneticsetofissuesisseenthroughradiologicalthreats,emustalsoaccepttheprovennegativeinfluenceofpulsedadiofrequency[RF]signalstoinflictbothbiophysicalandophysiologicalharm.A1950s-eraprogramknownas“AtomsorPeace”thatUSPresidentEisenhowerlaunchedtoencourageagerroleforprivateindustryindevelopingnuclear-powerplantsorldwideallowednationsbereftofnuclearweaponstopursuearpowerstillcovertlyandslowlyusetheirnuclearpowertions.Theycouldenrichuraniumandengageincovertocessingoffissilematerialoutsideconventionalinspectionandeviewsystems.Inaddition,thehistoryofintelligencetheftofartechnologycontributedtotheincreaseofnuclearweaponstestowellover12nations.[US,Russia,China,UK,France,Northorea,Iran,SouthAfrica,Brazil,India,Pakistan,andIsraelpossessed
110 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
(Lirobustnuclearinfrastructureswithotherundesignatednations.brary,2022)Inphysics, electromagnetic radiation(EMR)consistsof (gfroracpossithevastheoption.ydisinterrtheseponucletheirsoilnumber314acForrtelefrspantheriskinrmicreleelectromagnetic(EM)wavespropagatingthroughspace,carryingctromagneticradiantenergy.Itincludesradiowaves,owaves,infrared,(visible)light,ultraviolet,X-rays,andgammaays.Thesewavesformpartoftheelectromagneticspectrumandtensityfromserioustoharmless,includingequenciesusedforcommunicationssignals(asforradioandvisionbroadcastingandcellphoneandsatellitetransmissions)adarsystems.(Scarpati,2021)(AARL,2022)(FCC,2022)Seeigure4.1.(sciencemediacentre.co.NZ,2022)Non-nuclearweaponsstateswhichhavenuclearpowerplantsoncordingtotheIAEA,whichoverseesglobalarpowerreactors.(IAEA,2018)Heretherawsignificanceofwerreactorsistheinherentriskofoperationalaccident,orism,systemsafetybreachtriggeredbynaturaldisasters,andtegrationofsafetysystemsinagedreactorsapproaching50earsofusefullife.TheyalsoreflectapotentialnuclearweaponsInsum,therisksofradiologicalweaponstodayafter2021,justywereemergingattheendofWWII,remainsembeddedinarietyofmechanismsandinventionswhichenablethewidestbledistributionofharmfulradioactivityduetoterrorismcidents,operatorerror,ornaturaldisaster.Theoverallrisksfromesidualradiationafteranuclearblastaresignificantandverwhelming—sotooarethemanyotherradiationrisksarisingomthefocusedapplicationofemergingtechnologies.(FAS,1998)lobalsecurity.org,2022)(NATO) GRASPING THE NON-KINETIC ASPECTS OF CONV-CBRN suggtoassessthesignificCyberAddedtothescopeanddepthofCONV-CBRNwhendrones,AI,,andelectromagneticareinfusedintothethreatpictureisanceofnon-kineticsinthemilieu.Hereweestawidevarietyofnon-kineticbuttrulydisabling,disruptive, Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 111
eseanddebilitatingtechnologiesorchestratedbyadeterminedfoewhoekstoundermineandweakenhispoliticalcivilianandcorporatexecutiveranksviathesemeasures.Awidevarietyof effects-based operations[EBO],whichoftengounnoticedorignoredinprotracted emer‘ghostguerillawarfare’efforts,canoccuroutsidenotice.Thisisthegingdomainofnon-kineticwarfare[NKW]. Nonkineticwarfare [NKW] normalimagNisnotegeleviestrfrunsophisticdestrucinsurbastrerenNKWdisturbsandeifsepopulaenflame,discoptionsavailabletoanenemywhocaninfluence,persuade,ourage,overwhelm,weaken,orconfusetargetedtionsaspartofabroadergeopoliticaloffensiverunningoververalyearsexertsitsinsidiousandimpressiveeffectswheretheocusismorepsychological,moresociocultural,andmoresubtleaststealthilyunderminesthefabricofsocialcohesionandidentity.xploitsthepopularcivil-social-urbanvironmentbehindanunsuspectingmilitarytotheextentthatitodesthefoundationofcommunitysupportforitsforcesandtheirategicdisposition.NKWisnot‘asymmetricwarfare’asweoftendefineit,whereattlebetweenunequalbelligerentsisbalancedviaadeterminedgencyorresistancemovementcapableofequivalenttiveoutcomesinflictingharmonasuperiorforcewithatedtoolsandtechnologiesthatcanbeexercisedequentlyandcovertlytoacquireanunseenandundetectableategicedgeamongatargetpopulation.SomeexpertshavewedNKWasasmoothlyintegratedmixofinformation,ctromagnetic,andcyberwarfareinsideadigitalenvironmenttoenerateuniquebattlefieldcapabilities.(Henselmann,2022)ThechallengetoadvocatesofdeterrencetheoryisthatNKWasilythwarteduntilithasdoneitsintendeddamage.onkineticsystemsoperatewithinfrontiersofconflictbeyondination.Thisreflectstheso-called phigital worldwhere facinodigitalandhumancharacteristicspatternsandessentialingredientsverlapinindiscernibleways.ThedeceptivecurtainofA/RorV/Rtrudesonourlayeredperceptionimpedingourabilitytodiscerntfromillusion.Sciencehasrecentlydemonstratedalmostnobarrierslinking 112 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
soundabsorbelein(EMuseaneElecarengmabringsusclosertoagWbecgrneurThismebeofuncandcandionicsignals.ThemainpiebioctneurraimplanBcommonhumanfunctionalbiologytoartificiallycreatedneurons.rainimplants,advancedprosthetics,andawiderangeofmedicaltsandwearabledevicesrelyonlinksbetweenthebody’sutonomicnervoussystemandelectroniccircuits.Swedishesearchershavefoundabetteralternativetocreatingartificialonsandsynapses—thebasiclinkingstructuresthatconnectwoneurons—outoforganicsemiconductorsthatareompatible,biodegradable,soft,andcancarrybothelectroniccesofnaturalbiologycanbemergedoupledwithengineeredmaterialstocreateoperationalandtionallinks.ScientistsshowedthatthesynapseswerecapablefHebbianlearning,whichishowthestrengthoftheconnectiontweenanytwoneuronsincreasesordecreasesbasedonactivity.ansneuronsareactivatedandconnectedwithotherons,forminganeuralnetworkthatatfirststartsweakbutowsstrongerandstrongerwitheachstimulus.Thenewhybridellbecomesmoreintuitivewiththestrengthsofconnectionstweenneuronscontrollingthefunctionofdifferentbraincircuits.ehavefarbeyondtheideaofabrain-computerinterfacewhichenuinecyborgoptionindefensetters.(Gent,2022)AworldwhereRFradiationandelectromagneticsaremergedviaineeringcreatesauniquedefensivechallenge.Herethevalueof‘anechoic’chambers,whichmeans‘withoutecho,’createschambersespacesdesignedtohaveminimalwavereflectionfromthewalls,eiling,andfloor.UnderstandingAnechoicChambersforctromagneticandRFTesting(Arar,2022).ElectronicsengineerschoicchambersforelectromagneticcompatibilityC)orelectromagneticinterference(EMI)andRFtesting.Theteriorwallsofthesechambersaretreatedwithspecialmaterialtoctromagneticwavesandthwartemanationsthatabsorbwavesratherthanelectromagneticenergy.SeeFigure4.4. Figure 4.4 a&b Two different anechoic chambers—one large and one small. Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 113
Source: (Schwarz) (Okula) alsobecomeamajorsourrwirrpowerEMFradiationreferstolow-frequencymagneticfieldsemittedbylines,householdappliances,andpoweroutlets.RFradiationeferstohigh-frequencyelectromagneticradiationemittedbyelessequipmentlikecelltowers,cellphones,GPS,televisions,andadios.WirelessnetworksinsideourhomesandworkspaceshaveceofRFradiation. AlthoughbothEMF radiationandRFradiationhavemanysimilarities,theyalsohave 114 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
oNKWunchangCBimmeandswdimensional,inherfacrtherarandharmfulwpersonscsystemsandsemi-humanpaapplicineletodecstockmartinorininoysignifictoEMFrbeseComputers,Micrthaenerseveralkeydifferencesthataffecthowtheseelectromagneticgyforcesinteractwithourbodies.(NIEH,2022)OtherthingstemitEMFradiationmayincludeCellphones,Laptops,TV,owaveOvensWi-FiDevices;youcanseetheremayveralcommonhouseholdandworkplaceitemsexposingyouadiation.ConsistentexposuretoEMFradiationcanhaveanthealthconsequences.TestshaveshownthatthecloserouaretoanobjectemittingEMFradiation,thehighertheamountfEMFradiationyouwillbeexposedto.Chaostheorymaybehelpfulasittacklesapparentrandomnessvolvingcomplexsystemswithunderlyingpatterns,terconnectedness,constantfeedbackloops,repetition,andselfganization.AccordingtoChaosTheory,changesarisinginsideythingsoreventscanchangetheworld.Examplesincludetheket,weather,humanpsychology,andnaturaldisasterycles.ChaosTheorydoesnotprovideacomprehensiveansweralingwithacomplexthreatenvironmentwhereCONV-CBRN,ctromagnetic,NKW,drones,andradiologicalfactorstermingle.(Straussfogel,2009)]Thescopeandscaleofever-wideningavenuesformixedationsofdiversetechnologiesafter2022creatinghybridthwaystomagnifywhatordinaryanperformordemonstrateandutilizeitinbothhelpfulays,areeye-opening.Havingsaidalloftheseviewselegitimateandpersuasivetoadegree,weremainstuckwithealitiesofCONV-CBRNtoday,wheredrones,electromagnetic,adiological,andnon-kineticsappeartodominatethethreatsweeafter2022.Wefindourselvesinsideacomplex,multi-entlymultifaceteddilemma,requiringabroadeepingappreciationforunlimitedtechnologyconvergence’sdiateandlong-termimplications.TheevolutionofCONVRNasitsmorphsafter2022isunlikelytobestaticoring.AcrazycombinationofCONV-CBRN,electromagnetic,,andradiologicalphenomenaispossible.Theunknowneffectsfroutineandunrestrictedtechnologyconvergencearenotwell Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 115
incccwhenwbegwhaunderstood,andthematicstepsinvokedtogovernandregulatethappensinthatspacewilldefyeasysolutions.Arguably,itinswitharealisticvisionofthefullspectrum,themes,andissuesetrytodefinethatthreat.Ifseenincombinationwithascadinginfluenceandaffect,thepictureacquiresgreateromplexity;toassumewehaveenoughdataandinformationisorrect. Figure 4.5 CONV-CBRN Threat Dynamics Source: (McCreight R., 2013) aroncutdrIsitthespecialmixoflethalandnon-kinetictechnologieswhichawtheircollectiveandconvergentpowerfromeachotherbasedting-edgedual-usescience?Orinstead,canwepositthegumentthattheyconstituteathreatonlywhencombinedand 116 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
challengcthrengineeredinunison,unlikeanywehaveseenbefore?Graspingeatissuespost-2022requiresasharper,morefocused,andomprehensivelenstoknowwhatthissetofgeostrategicessignifies. SPECIALDELIVERYOFDEATHANDDESTRUCTION: —ADDING DRONE RISK FACTORS POST 2021 uneduringmindisvirandlewfarsimpldrcrandnedesignewdiligstricappeanddestrucnameenpocharOntheonehand,dronesappeartohavesomebenignacteristicsdeliveringpizzas,packagesforAmazon,snappingwerfulaerialnaturephotos,emergencyrescue,standoffvironmentalmonitoring,precisionagriculture,andmuch-neededdicationstoisolatedareas.However,theirinsidiousdual-usetureallowsthemtobeusedasspecialdeliveryvehiclesfordeathtionastheirinherentvalueinwartimeappearsbothalingandoverwhelming.Theprospectofusingdronesintlybeneficialandsociallypleasingwaysrunscountertotheirent,appealing,andexpansiveuseasexpedientinstrumentsofarfare.Expertswarnofdroneswarmsnumberinginhundreds,alldtodeliveradamagingpayloadpoweredbyremotesignalsarautonomyintheirdesignatedtargetoptions.Assuch,ecognizingthem,defendingagainstthem,andneutralizingtheirombinedeffectbecomestheartfulandscientificblendofanti-onewarfareandrelatedtechnology.Thisisbeingemphasizedybecauseallwehavesummarizedanddescribedthus—CONV-CBRN,NKW,electromagnetic,andconventionaleaponrycanbemountedondronestomaximizetheirharmfulthalcapabilities.Thelistofconceivabledrone-basedthreatstuallyunlimitedinscope.SeveralpersuasiveexamplescometohereasjustafewbattlefieldscenariosarecitedTurkishdronessuppliedtoUkrainetofendoffRussianattacksthe2022warindicatetheirutilityandlethality(Malsi,2022)Someexpertsclaimthatdroneuseleadstounlimitedandxpectedscenarioswhererepetitiveinternationaldronewarfare Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 117
droutfrseperspeTwiasensing,mite(haandctheirtarandplanesfrotheraspetrdependupon.Landtherfsouralongwichains.leairusingablendoperfwhichairgoopercontinuesrelentlesslysimplybasedontheirubiquityandeaseofation.(Martin,2016)–Avenger#UASwasrecentlyintegratedwithavirtualswarmfotherUAS,whichinunisonsearchedandtrackedanartificiallyeneratedadversarythroughtheuseofAI/MLalgorithms,decidingcraftwouldautonomously‘break’fromthepackandormclosed-loop,air-to-airtacticsdisplayingautonomybyfsimulatedthreats,real-worldsensors,andlivecraftwhererobustautonomywascombinedwithmachinearningtovalidateunmannedaircraftillustratingcomplexkill(Grinter,2021)UnintentionalordeliberateGPSinterferenceandjamming,ththecapabilitytodetectandgeolocateoriginsandcesofGPSinterference,enablestechnologicallyequippedorcestodetectandnullifyfrequentdisruptionstofriendlyUAVsebythwartthe‘globalcommons’thatallmoderneconomiesaunchingGPSsignalinterferencecandisruptairavel,logistics,finance,transportation,communication,andmanyctsofordinarylife,preventingpeople,vehicles,ships,omdeterminingtheiraccuratepositionorconfirminggetedlocations.Suchjammingcancripplethegovernmentommercialoperationsoverthousandsofsquaremiles.wkeye-360,2022)—Useofmultiplatformcounter-UASsystem(CUS),relyingonaamofmini-dronesactingasacooperativedefensivesystemfortigation,andC2controlsystemsthatgenerallycomprisecounter-dronenetwork.(Castrillo,2022)AFRLisbuildingasystemtozapsmallunmannedaerialsystemsthhigh-poweredmicrowavesanddisablethemcalledTHORforacticalHighPowerOperationalResponder.(Losey,2022)Unmanneddronesmonitoringtheskieswatchingfrommultiplectives,usingmultiplesensorscanloiterusingitsinfraredarch-and-tracksensortospotanyhostileaircraftastheyclimbomtheclouds.AI-enabledautonomoussystemsonboardtheonescanverifythelocationofthehostilejet’slaunch,itsspeed, 118 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
maximiztheMid-EastandAfsinchasbetheliminotindrathefriendlHdeinrandotherfeaturestoconfirmits‘friendorfoe’status.Datarelayedeal-timetohumancommandersseekingcombatresponsecisionsallowthehuman-occupiedaircraftcanstayintouch.ence,everyhumanpilotintheareagetsanalertimmediatelyafteryUAVsidentifythesuspectplaneandconcludewhetherttackconditionsareright.(SYSTEMS,2022)Asplatformsfordeliveringlethalityandrelatedstrikepackages,onesareanoptionwithrealtacticalleverageincombat.Theyarevincible,butthevarietyoftheirmilitaryapplicationisbeyondt.Theissueofarmeddronesandcombat-equippedUAVscometheprincipalinstrumentoftacticalbattlefieldleveragee2015,withextensiveuseofdronesinthetheatersofwaringhanistan.Therealquestionis,howdodronesecombatlethalityinspecificwaysafter2022? POSSIBCONV-CBRNDRONEAUGMENTEDTHREATANDRISKLESCENARIOS Certaindrone-enabledscenarioscanbeconsideredmechanisms safnuclewtruckeadimplicThesenotionalsceleforexecutingacombinedCONV-CBRNattackwheremixesofctromagnetic,radiological,andNKWelementscanbeadded.enariosseemplausibleandsurfacetheoverallationsfordefensivestrategiestooffsettheirinitialvantages.SeeFigure4.6.–droneborelaserattackonspentfuelpondsinvolvingtargetedxplosivesatanuclearplant–drone–bornelaserorprecisionexplosiveattackonspentfuelconvoys–drone-bornelaseroraugmentedkineticattacksonnuclearastestoragesites–drone-borneprecisionexplosiveattacksatUniversityresearcharlabs–drone-boreNKWElectromagneticattackonnuclearplantetyoperators Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 119
else.futurestimapersonnelnonkineRFpulseefacilise–drone-boreNKWattacksonspentfuelconvoydriversandcuritypersonnel—drone-bornetargetedCWattackonnuclear-reprocessingtiesandsecuritystaff.(McCreightM.S.,2020)Inaddition,onemoreterrifyingthought:SwarmingdronesquippedwithEWenhancedplatformstobeamsustainedhostiledwavescanpreparethebattlefieldinacomprehensiveticoperation,adverselyaffectingciviliansandmilitaryforwhichlimiteddefenseoptionsexist.Thetaskofdoctrinalwritersandstrategicmilitaryplannersistotewhatthisscenarioentailsandrequiresasweconfrontaebattlefieldwherethemindisapreferredtargetoveranything(McCreightR.,Anotherfuturescenario,2022) Figure 4.6 Setting the Stage for NV Source: (McCreight R., 2013) (McCreight M. S., 2020) 120 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
aandtefuturwwtorficviecmeMixingCONV-CBRN,electromagnetics,drones,NKW,andthetaversewouldcreateanimaginaryfabricationofthreatsonfrontingusafter2022totheextentthatmanyexpertswouldwthisriskashighlyregardedimprobableorevidenceofsciencetion.Thiswouldbeastrategicblunderofthefirstorder.Failingecognizeorcharacterizethesethreats—eveninspeculativeargameswhereriskscenariosaredeeplyexplored—isamust.Aorldwherethesemixedtechnologiesproliferateiscentraltoeconflictandbedrockforstrategicimagination.TheissueschnologiescoveredinthischapteraremeanttofostergreaterwarenessoftheDual-UseScienceandTechnologythreat[
DUST],
POSTCONV-CBRN–ONWARDSECURITYANDRISKCHALLENGES-2021
(Miandunedechallengprenoapparnarwhichisrelentlessasadvancesinscienceandtechnologyholdnoationalfilteragainstnefariousanddestructivepurposes.Astionalandsovereigndesignsongreatermilitarypowerwhereentdefensesorstrategicwarningsystemsexist,onecanxpectthisspacetobecomeincreasinglycrowded.Itisimportanttoobeanddefinetheentirethreatspectrumwheretheseissuesandesremainastrategicchallengeforthenextdecade.Expertsdicatedtodiscerningthescopeandscaleoftomorrow’sexpectedxpectedareasofdisruption,chaos,crisis,andcalamityowettothemselvestorigorouslyexaminethewarningsincludedhere.cCreightT.-F.-C.T.,2020)
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1 Whatisthestrategicsignificancethatcanbeassignedto eleiunderstandingCONV-CBRN?2Howdoelectromagneticandradiologicalissuesaffectourofstrategicthreats?3-WhyshouldwebeconcernedaboutNKWandthetechnologiestrepresents?4-Whataspectsofradiologicalthreatscombinedwithctromagneticwarrantfurtherresearch?5-Doesitmakesensetoincludeconsiderationsofthemetaverse Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 121
countering-weapons-mass-destruction. wRetrievedfromwww.dhs.gov/:https://www.dhs.gov/countering-eapons-mass-destruction-office & Metaverse
122 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone
Theevolvingglobalthreattonuclearand radiological. Retrievedfromhttps://scholar.harvard.edu: Coopertrhttps://scholar.harvard.edu/files/matthew_bunn/files/ansport-threat-brief2021.pdfCastrillo,V.(2022,Feb).AReviewofCounterUASTechnologiesforativeDefenseTeamsofDrones.
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ItalianAerospaceResearch Center. Drones, p. 6. CDC.(2022,March18). CDC,RadiologicalThreatAgents,2015. Retrieved from CDC: https://www.cdc.gov/ DHS.(2022,March18).
thrteindependenCBwhenassessinghowamixofadvancedtechnologiessuchasCONVRN,radiological,electromagnetics,andNKWcanbeseentlyasthreatsbythemselves?6-Whatthreatandriskscenariosinvolvingdronesandthechnologiesdiscussedinthischapterposeuniquestrategiceats? Bibliography (Seoul),B.T.(2018,November27). RF-EMFExposure. Retrieved biomoltherfromPublishedonline2018Nov27.doi:10.4062/.2018.152:doi:10.4062/biomolther.2018.152AARL.(2022,March18). RFRadiationandElectromagneticField Safety. Retrievedfromhttps://www.arrl.org/: safhttps://www.arrl.org/rf-radiation-and-electromagnetic-field-ety/Arar,S.(2022,Feb9). AllAboutCircuitsUnderstanding. Retrieved HTTPfromwww.allaboutcircuits.com/technical:s://www.allaboutcircuits.com/technicalBall,M.(2020,January13). TheMetaverse:WhatItIs,Whereto FindIt,andWhoWillGovernit. Retrievedfrom hhttps://www.matthewball.vc/all/themetaverse/:ttps://www.matthewball.vc/all/themetaverse/Jan 13, 2020 Bunn,M.(2021).
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ThreatsinaComplexWorld:DealingwithDUSTintheWind. Wild Blue Yonder / Maxwell NATO.(n.d.). NATOHANDBOOKONTHEMEDICALASPECTSOF NBCDEFENSIVE. Retrievedfromhttp://large.stanford.edu/ Sfm8-9hcourses/2019/ph241/abbate2/docs/fm8-9.pdf:ttp://large.stanford.edu/courses/2019/ph241/abbate2/docs/.pdfNelson,K.(2022,February20).WhatCouldbeCausingHavanayndromeCasesonUSSoil? CBS News. NERC.(2019,November5). nerc_emp_task_force_report.pdf. Arneremp%20task%20fRetrievedfromnerc.com/pa/:https://nerc.com/pa/stand/orce%20posting%20dl/c_emp_task_force_report.pdfNews,B.(2022,February5).NuclearPlantUnderAttackbytillery. BBC News. NIEH.(2022,March18). EMFRadiation? Retrievedfrom topicshttps://www.niehs.nih.gov/:https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health//agents/emf/index.cfmNRC.(2017). NRCBackgrounderonResearchandTestReactors. bg.hRetrievedfromhttps://www.nrc.gov/…/research-reactors-tml:www.nrc.gov/…/research-reactors-bg.html}Okula,C.(n.d.). Small anechoic chamber. Edwards Air Force Base. Reports,E.C.(2018,February27). EMPReportFebruary27,2018. fRetrievedfromhighfrontier.org:highfrontier.org/ebruary-272018-publish-emp-commission-reports].Ryan,S.(2014,November4). USASOC CognitiveJointForceEntry.pdf. Retrievedfrom USASOCinfo.publicintelligence.net/:https://info.publicintelligence.net/-CognitiveJointForceEntry.pdfScarpati,J.(2021,Feb25). Whatisaradiofrequency(RF)? Retrieved sefromhttps://techtarget.com:https://techtarget.com/archnetworking/definition/radio-frequencyFeb25,2021Schwarz,R.a.(n.d.). Twodifferentanechoicchambers—onelarge and one small. Image used courtesy of Rohde and Schwarz. sciencemediacentre.co.NZ.(2022,March18). SourcesofRadiation: Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues | 125
Wheredomobilephonesfitin? Retrievedfrom hhttps://www.sciencemediacentre.co.nz/infographics/:ttps://www.sciencemediacentre.co.nz/infographics/Sciences,N.A.(2020).AnAssessmentofIllnessinU.S.Government EmployeesandTheirFamiliesatOverseasEmbassies. Washington: National Academy of Sciences. Scientists,B.o.(2009,May19). IraqFFCDreport–what-we-foundat-al-tuwaitha. Retrievedfromhttps://thebulletin.org: https://thebulletin.org/2009/05/what-we-found-at-al-tuwaithaScoles,S.(2022,March11).RadioactiveMaterialIsEverywhere. Scientific American. SOCOM.(2015). SOCOMLeadersattributeriskstocognitive warfare. Ft Bragg NC: SOCOM Unclassified brief. Straussfogel,C.v.(2009). InternationalEncyclopediaofHuman Geography Amsterdam: Elsevier willchangSYSTEMS,G.A.(2022,March3).HowAIandsupervisedautonomyecombat. GENERALATOMICSAERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS Turnquist,C.(2020).Radiation-inducedbraininjury:current conceptsandtherapeuticstrategiestargetingneuroinflammation. Neuro-Oncology Advances, Volume 2, Issue 1, January-December. Tzu,S.(475–221B.C.E.). TheArtofWar Retrievedfrom http://classics.mit.edu: http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html 126 | Radiological, Electromagnetic, Drone & Metaverse Risks and Issues
5. Nuclear Weapons By Professor Candice M. Carter STUDENT OBJECTIVES • To further understand the role of unmanned systems in the nuclear realm • To study Nation-State advances with unmanned nuclear systems • To develop an understanding of the next generation of warfare INTRODUCTION eallounprwianaAddiandenableuniqueatheabiliwmissiles(IunmannewiThefuturebattlefieldlooksdifferentfromtraditionalwarfareththecontinuedadvancesinunmannedtechnology.NucleardsystemsarealternativesforintercontinentalballisticCBMs)andmannedbombersandsubmarinesfornucleareapondelivery.Theadvantagesofunmannednuclearweaponsaretytobedeployedtoreachfurthertargetsatsetperiodsttacksthatnormallywouldbechallenging.tionally,unmannedweaponsincreasetheprecisionoftargetingttack.However,theadvancedartificialintelligencerequiredthinthedesignofunmannedweaponscanmakethempotentiallyedictable.Thetechnologyisnotatthestagewhereitwouldwnuclear-armedstatestocrediblythreatenthesurvivabilityofachother’snuclearsecond-strikecapability.(Caves,2021) STATE ACTORS RUSSIA In2019,theUnitedStatesandRussiawithdrewfromthe Russiadiscussion,theUniIntermediate-RangeNuclearForces(INF)Treaty.AfteryearsoftedStates’withdrawalwasprecipitatedby’srefusaltoacknowledge,muchlessrectify,it’stestingof Nuclear Weapons | 127
andNestablishebeonFRTeoamong34croshartherAfRussianFSthederTUnipermithe9M729(SCC-8)ground-launchedcruisemissileovertherangesttedbythetreaty.(CavesJr.&Cares,2021)InMay2020,thetedStatesannounceditwouldwithdrawfromtheOpenSkiesreatyinresponsetoahistoryofRussianviolationsunlessRussiaeturnedtocompliance.(CavesJr.&Cares,2021)“ResponsibilityforteriorationoftheOpenSkiesregimeliesfullywiththeUnitedtatesasthecountrythatstartedthedestructionofthetreaty,”theoreignMinistrystatedinDecember2020.(Zherdin,2022)tertheU.S.withdrawal,Moscowsoughtwrittenguaranteesfromemainingstates-partiesthattheywouldneithercontinuetoedatacollectedunderthetreatywithWashingtonnorprohibitverflightsofU.S.basesinEurope,butstates-partiesdismissedtheequest.(Zherdin,2022)TheOpenSkiesTreatywasanagreementountriesregardingwhattypeoftechnologycouldflyvertheircountries.Thetreatyrequiredspecificcertificationsofquipment.TheUnitedStatesandRussiahaveagreedtoTheNewSTARTreaty(StrategicArmsReductionTreaty),activatedinJanuary2022.eplacingTheSMARTTreaty,originallysignedin2010andexpiredebruary5,2021.The2010StartTreatywasanagreementtweenthetwocountriesfornucleararmsreductionanddalimitofdeployedstrategicwarheads.AspartoftheewSTARTTreaty(whichisenforceduntil2026),intercontinentalsubmarineballisticmissilelaunchersandheavy Table 5.1 Limits on START, Moscow Treaty, and New Start 128 | Nuclear Weapons
modernizaBeijingmigcUnictheorigProreliminabombersarecountedunderthelimitsuntiltheyareconvertedtedaccordingtotheprovisionsdescribedinthetreaty’sotocol.(CongressionalResearchService,2022)ThisdiffersfrominalTreatybygivingbothcountriesgreaterflexibilitytoomplybyallowingthecountriestodecidehowtoreduceforces.DoesTheNewSTARTTreatygiveChinaanadvantageoverthetedStatesandRussia?HongKong-basedmilitaryaffairsommentatorandformerPLAinstructorSongZhongpingsaidhtusethefiveyearstonarrowthenucleartiongapwiththeUSandRussia.(Chan,2021) Union acsigningorandRussia,leThe1960shadthegrowthofnuclearweaponsintheUnitedStatesadingtoseveraldiscussionsbetweenthecountriesegardingtakingnuclearactionagainstoneanother.Withthefthe1972Anti-BallisticMissile(ABM)Treaty,bothsidesceptedlimitstoprotectthemselvesfromaretaliatorynuclear
Soviet
Nuclear Weapons | 129
Source: (Congressional Research Service, 2022)
Russian Federation AfterthefalloftheSovietUnion,theRussianFederationwas formedinitsplace.TheRussianFederationtook
130 | Nuclear Weapons
Russiafroma acpastfpublicstanc(WbormilioutinviolaARussiaw2010doc2010EfieliminaooSoleserwwpoliticalstatetoacountry.Theliberalthinkingandembracingofesternideologychangedin1999whenPresidentVladimirPutinassworntowhatwouldeventuallybecomeRussia’slongest-vingleaderandisinhisfourthtermaspresident.Overhisadership,RussiahasslowlyfallenbackintoareflectionofthepastvietUnion.PutinfelttheRussianFederationwasweakintheeyesftheworld.Oneoftheitemsthatcontributedtochangingthefbeingjustanothercountrywasin1997.TheRussianFederationtedtheno-first-usepledgeofnuclearweapons.ItreplacedtwiththeabilityoftheRussianFederationtousenuclearweaponsorprotectionagainstattacksfromotherattackscountries.ventually,thepolicyevolvedintotheRussianMilitaryDoctrineof,allowingforapreemptivenuclearstrike.(Woolf,2022)Thetrinestatedthatthemainexternalmilitarydangerstoere“thedesiretoendowtheforcepotentialoftheNorthtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)withglobalfunctionscarriedtionofthenormsofinternationallawandtomovethetaryinfrastructureofNATOmembercountriesclosertothedersoftheRussianFederation,includingbyexpandingthebloc.”oolf,2022)Sincethattime,RussianPresidentVladimirPutin’seonnuclearweaponshaswavereduntil2018.Overtheewyears,thedevelopmentoftheRussiannuclearprogramhascelerated.
diplomacstridestoturna(Wbelieacw(Wattack,thusreducingtheattractivenessofbeingthefirsttostrike.oolf,2022)Bytheendof1980,theSovietUniondeclaredtheyouldnotbethefirsttostrikeinanuclearconflict.AfterthecidentattheChornobylNuclearPowerPlant,MikhailGorbachevvedthattheuseofnuclearweaponswouldbecatastrophic.oolf,2022)TheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesmadegreatwayfromnuclearweaponsandfocusonpeaceandy.
Посейдон and Белгород cstrivballisticmissiles,under(Rwhich,hesaid,chigRussianFInMarch2018,RussianPresidentVladimirPutinunveiledtotheederalAssemblythemodernizednuclear-armedsystem,hlightingthedevelopmentoftwonewnucleardeliverysystems,ouldevadeUSanti-ballisticmissiledefenses.osenberg,2018)Thisincludedcruisemissiles,intercontinentalwaterdrones,andsupersonicjets.PutinesforRussiatobeaworldsuperpowerandreclaimformerountriespartoftheSovietUnion. Figure 5.1 Russian President Vladimir Putin Addresses the Russian Federal Assembly Source: (Rosenberg, 2018) Status–6(Статус-6) isanautonomous,nuclear-armed,and poweredunmannedunderwatervehicle.Knownnowas Poseidon( Посейдон) isoneofthesixstrategicweaponsannouncedinThe ‘IbelacProject09851Khabarovskspecial-purposenuclearsubmarine,apableofcarryinguptosixPoseidonstrategicdrones,whichwillunchedinthefirsthalfof2021.(Pike,2021)PoseidonisanntercontinentalNuclear-PoweredNuclear-ArmedAutonomous Nuclear Weapons | 131
nucle20wCothirtdeErourmutualnuclewPrincfuturwillctotr“thousandsomegawibebewunderdeTorpedo.’(SuttonH.I.,2022)ThePoseidon2M39torpedoisstillvelopment;however,itwillbeanunstoppablenucleareaponwhencomplete.Themodernnuclearweaponisbelievedtotween65to79feetlong,approximately6.5feetindiameter,thadirtybombwarhead.Themegaweaponwillhaveatwo-tonnuclearorconventionalpayloadthatcouldbedetonatedffeet”belowthesurface.(Woolf,2022)Withtheabilityavelunderwaterpastanti-defensesystemswithease,PoseidonausearadioactiveTsunamithatwilllastforyearsintothee.ProfessorFrankvonHippel,aseniorresearchphysicistatetonUniversity,believesthisnextgenerationofNucleareaponswillshowtheUnitedStatesthereisnowaytoescapearhostagerelationship.(Bergan,Papadopoulos,demir,&Ozdemir,2021)Poseidonisthelargesttorpedoevervelopedinanycountry.(SuttonH.,CovertShores,2016)Itiswicethesizeofsubmarine-launchedballisticmissiles(SLBMs)andtytimesthesizeofaregular‘heavyweight’torpedo.(SuttonH.,vertShores,2016)Theoriginalreleasedateofthedeadlytorpedoas2022.However,indicatorspointtotheactivationdatetargeting27.Thereisnoothercountrythatcanmatchthecreationofthisarweaponatthistime. Figure 5.2 Russian Poseidon 2M39 Torpedo 132 | Nuclear Weapons
Source: (Sutton H. I., 2022) WhenRussianPresidentVladimirPutinspoketotheRussian Putin,theunmannetorpeunderUninucleFederalAssemblyin2018,itwasclearthenextgenerationofRussianarsystemswouldbedesignedwiththeabilitytobypassanytedStatesmissiledefensesystem.Russiahasconstructionwaytobuildanewmilitarybasetohold30Poseidondoesandfourunmannednuclearsubmarines.PerPresidentdsubmarines, Belgorod(Белгород), are deAcintercontinental,thefastest,largest,andnoiselessintheworld.cordingtoPresidentPutin,unmannedvesselscanreachultra-eplevelsandcannotbedetectedbyanycurrentdefensesystem. Figure 5.3A Belgorod – Russian Unmanned Nuclear Submarine Nuclear Weapons | 133
Figure 5.3B Belgorod – Russian Unmanned Nuclear Submarine Source: (Sutton H. I., 2022) Figure 5.4 Belgorod – Russian Unmanned Nuclear Submarine Source: (Sutton H., Covert Shores, 2021) Nuclear Alert Status acfDefFebruary27,2022,Russia’sPresidentVladimirPutintoldhisenseMinisterandChiefofGeneralStafftoactivatenuclearorcesintocombatreadiness.Thereisspeculationabouthowthistionimpactedforces;wasitaninternalchangeoranexternal 134 | Nuclear Weapons
CHINA
&UNKneoolandscone?ThePentagondidnotseeanychangestoRussia’snuclearape.MostsignalsindicatetheannouncementofthechangefstatuswasretaliationforsanctionsagainstRussiafortheinvasionfUkraine.January2021,Russiaaccepteddeliveryofthefirstof10brand-wTu-160MstrategicbomberswithupdatedNV70Mradarand32-02engines,U.S.AdmiralCharlesRichardtestimonytothe.S.HouseDefenseAppropriationssubcommitteeApril2022.(TironMusk,2022) TheseUUVplanstodedeandRussiafsupporcothermembersodeIcChinasurpasstheUS’g1,Kinginnucle20lefrtheairThinkoftheChineseuseofswarmingdronesontheseas,in,floatingnuclearpowerplants,underwatermining,roboteighters,andanti-submarineUUVs.Intheauthor’sview,theyareapfroggingUStechnologyandantiquatingdefenses.(NicholsR.K.,20)Itisbelievedoverthenextsixyears,Chinawillincreaseitsarwarheadsbyatleast700.(Moore,2021),2021)ThecurrentventoryisclosertothenumbersofwarheadsoftheUniteddomandFrance.Beijing’snuclearstockpile,whichcouldtop000deliverablewarheadsby2030,isdesignedtomatchandevenlobalmilitary.(Moore,2021)Thiscontributesto’sgoalofbeingaglobalsuperpowerbybreakingotherountries’allianceswiththeU.S.andgainingpartnershipsinthendo-PacificRegionby2049.(Moore,2021),RussiaandChinaclaredaneweraofpartnershipagainsttheUnitedStatesandfNATO.Also,bothcountrieshavedecidedtoollaborateontheInternet,space,andclimatechange.Theyeachttheotherinthedesiretograbland,ChinaforTaiwan,orUkraine.Willthisnewpartnershipexpandtothevelopmentofnuclearweapons?ChinaiscloselyfollowingthedevelopmentsoftheU.S.Navy’svelopunmannedsystems,especiallyintheunderseas.sareusedinvariousdatacollectionrolesincoordination
Nuclear Weapons | 135
(theirSbelieEndosailingwiwiunmanneEndoomissiles.Chinaewithsatellitesandothersurveillancesystems.Evidencepointstoxploringnuclear-poweredunderwaterdronesandcruise(Standeford,2021)Chinaissubstantiallyupsettingtheffense-defensebalanceinunderwaterwarfare.(CarnegiewmentforInternationalPeace,2018)China’sgrowthinthedareaincludestheabilitytodetectstealthsubmarinesthoutexplodingtheirmothersurfaceshipsintothedangerofthinrangeofChineseanti-shipmissiles.(CarnegiewmentforInternationalPeace,2018)TheChinesestronglyvetheU.S.usesunmannedsystemstocollectintelligenceontrategicNuclear-PoweredBallisticMissilesubmarinesSSBN ). towtheUsoldiersandsoldadUniruleT2018rigUSouthChinaSepotenoutlinessafSePmanneroTheChinesehavewarnedofmistakingtheseUUVsinthefengagementthatcouldescalatetoconflict.In2014,theacificcountriesadoptedtheCodeforUnplannedEncountersata(CUES).WithanadditionalagreementwiththeU.S,CUESetyrulesforairandmaritimeencounterstopreventtialconflict.However,in2016therewasanincidentinthea,andChinafindsthistobeagrayarea;ifthe.S.darestosendunderwaterdrones,Chinabelievestheyhavethehttoseizethem.(CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,)China’sfocusonmaritimeweaponsreinforcesitsdesiretoaiwan.TaiwandoesnothaveguaranteedprotectionfromthetedStatesifChinashouldevadeit.However,theU.S.hastrainedvancedweaponstoTaiwan.Thepolicybetween.S.andTaiwanisvague.OnecannothelptothinkChinaisatchingtheU.S.reactiontoRussiainvadingUkraineverycloselyseewhattheycouldbeupagainst. Figure 5.5 China Nuclear Expansion 136 | Nuclear Weapons
Source: (Tiron & Musk, 2022)
aanthisspacnotfctarSomearsystemsflacconeothecWDisarmamenpossiUUVsareidealforNuclearpoweredweaponsandbringunlimitedbilitiesofarangeoftargets.AttheConferenceont,theUnitedStatesconferenceambassador,Robertood,statedthatChinahasbeenbuilding110newmissilesilosinountry’snortherndesertregion.(Standeford,2021)Chinaisftheleadersindroneswarmcapabilities;thisisanareaofoncernforChinaenteringtheunmannednuclearspace.Inthetionofadroneswarm,dozensofsmall,unmannedaircraftytogether,fillingthesky.Somearecollectinginformation.eidentifyinggroundtargets.Othersmightattackthesamegets.(EurAsianTimesGlobalDesk,2020)Adroneswarmcanontainupwardsof10,000drones,makingdefeatingaswarmattackeasibleforhumans.Chinahasdemonstrateditsdominanceineonnumerousoccasions,forcingothermilitariestocreateti-swarmdefensesystemswhileperfectingtheuseofaswarmttack.
Figure 5.6 China Drone Lineup Sharp Sword stealth drone and the Wing Loong Reaper Nuclear Weapons | 137
138 | Nuclear Weapons
Source: (EurAsian Times Global Desk, 2020) Duringthesummerof2021,Chinatestedtwonuclear-capable fUidemonstrtohypersonicmissilesinAugustthatcircledtheglobebeforespeedingwardtheirtarget.(Sevastopulo,2021).[1]ThenuclearweapontestatedtotheU.S.andtheworldthatChinahadacceleratedtsdevelopmentofnuclearweaponsthatcouldgoundetectedby.S.anti-ballisticmissiledefensesystems.China’snuclearweapondevelopmentproceedstobeadrivingorceforthecountrytobecomeacompetitiveglobalsuperpower. OTHER COUNTRIES
FKplantodebehind.therleintheneThecooperationamongNATOandnon-EUalliesisimportantxtgenerationofwarfare.GiventheindicationsbyglobaladingNation-statesthatthenucleararmsracehasbeenreignited,eisnodoubtthatothercountriesareanxiousnottobeleftOthercountries,suchasIsrael,NorthKorea,Turkey,etc.,velopdroneswithradioactiveimpacts.However,Northorea,Israel,Pakistan,andIndiahavenuclearweaponsarsenals.rancehasnuclearweapons,launchingsubmarinesandaircraft.
gdemilihobbwnuclealliancmilisubmarine.TheUnitedKingdomonlycanlaunchnuclearweaponsviaOverall,thecountriesofNATOwillcombinetheirtarypowerstodefeatthethreatfromothersoutsideoftheire.GiventherapiddevelopmentsfromRussiaandChinawitharwarheads,thepartnershipsindevelopingthenucleareaponsanddefensessystemsarecriticaltoNATO.Anitemtowatch:InthecurrentconflictinUkraine,droneyistsareinstructedhowtomodifyoff-the-shelfdronesfortaryactioninasimilarfashiontonon-stateactors.Thisvelopmentshouldbecloselystudiedforfutureconflictasnext-enerationwarfare. CONCLUSIONS enwcwillcpac(ingotermsoNucleotarWeaponsmaybeunderstoodasdevicesthatdepositenergyongets.Theenergythatmustbedepositedtoachieveagivenlevelfdamageisrelativelyinsensitivetothetypeofweaponemployed.arweaponsmaybecharacterizedbymegatons,bulletsinfmuzzlevelocity,andparticlebeamsintermsofamperesfcurrent.(Nichols,Mumm,Carter,&Hood,2020)Thenextenerationofthenucleararmsracereinforcestheneedtodevelopternationalagreementsandtreatiesforunmannedsystemsincludingdroneswarmadvances)topreventthethreatofnuclearonflict.Whileaerialdroneshavelimitationswiththenumberofyloadconstraints,especiallycommercial,unmannedtechnologyontinuetoexpandintheseaandspace.Unmannedsystemsanhittargetswithprecision,especiallyinareaswherenormaleaponswouldhavetoovercomeseveraltechnologicalandvironmentalchallenges. BIBLIOGRAPHY JulBergan,B.,Papadopoulos,L.,Erdemir,M.,&Ozdemir,D.(2021,y7). TheWeaponThatEradicatesCitiesbyCreating‘Radioactive Tsunamis’ RetrievedApril4,2022,fromInterestingEngineering: Nuclear Weapons | 139
rhttps://interestingengineering.com/poseidon-nuclear-weapon-adioactive-tsunamis-russiaCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace.(2018,October24). NuclearBallisticMTheImpactofFutureUnmannedSystems–TidesofChange:China’sissileSubmarinesandStrategicStability. FhRWfuturPRetrievedApril8,2022,fromCarnegieEndowmentforInternationaleace:https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/24/impact-ofe-unmanned-systems-pub-77497.CavesJr.,J.P.,&Cares,W.S.(2021,February).TheFutureofeaponsofMassDestruction.NationalIntelligencePress.etrievedApril2022fromNationalIntelligenceUniversity:ttps://ni-u.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/uture_of_WMD_Final.pdf.Caves,J.P.(2021,February). THEFUTUREOFWEAPONSOFMASS DESTRUCTION. RetrievedApril8,2022,fromNationalIntelligence FUniversity:https://ni-u.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/uture_of_WMD_Final.pdf.Chan,M.(2021,January31). Chinamayseektoclosethenuclear gapasUSandRussiaextendthetreaty. RetrievedApril3,2022,from afmiliSouthChinaMorningPost:https://www.scmp.com/news/china/tary/article/3119913/china-may-seek-close-nuclear-gap-ter-us-and-russia-agree.CongressionalResearchService.(2022,February2). TheNew STARTTreaty:CentralLimitsandKeyProvisions. RetrievedApril h3,2022,fromFASProjectonGovernmentSecrecy:ttps://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf.EurAsianTimesGlobalDesk.(2020,August28). US,China EquivalentTDeveloping“SuperSwarm”DronesWithDestructionPoweroNuclearWeapons. RetrievedApril5,2022,from MiddleburnuclesuperEurAsianTimes:https://eurasiantimes.com/us-china-developing--swarm-drones-with-destruction-power-equivalent-to-ar-weapons/.JamesMartinCenterforNonproliferationStudiesatMonterey’syInstituteofInternationalStudies.(2022,January1). New STARTTreaty. RetrievedApril3,2022,fromTheNuclearThreat 140 | Nuclear Weapons
RetrievedApril8,2022,fromFinancial a486e1f843fTimes:https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-b.Standeford,D.(2021,July12).
ChinaToObtainNuclearPowered UnderwaterDronesAndCruiseMissiles.
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Nuclear
Russia’sPutinunveils‘invincible’ nuclearweapons.
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RetrievedApril8,2022,fromNewPrairie chPressOpenBookPublishing:ttps://kstatelibraries.pressbooks.pub/ounterunmannedaircraft/.Pike,J.(2021,August25). System–RussianandSovietNuclearFStatus-6/Kanyon–OceanMultipurposeorces.
RetrievedApril3,2022,fromBBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43239331.Sevastopulo,D.(2021,October16).Chinatestsnewspacecapability withahypersonicmissile.
mirussian-frInitiative:https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-egimes/treaty-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-ederation-on-measures-for-the-further-reduction-and-litation-of-strategic-offensive-arms/.Janes.(2021). JANESALLTHEWORLD’SAIRCRAFT:In-Service. JANE’S INFORMATION GROUP. Moore,M.(2021,November3). Chinaisexpandingitsnuclear weaponsforcefasterthanpredicted. RetrievedApril8,2022,from nucleNewYorkPost:https://nypost.com/2021/11/03/china-expanding-ar-weapons-force-faster-than-predicted/.Nichols,R.K.(2020). Chapter14MaritimeCybersecurity[Nichols] L–UNMANNEDVEHICLESYSTEMS&OPERATIONSONAIR,SEA,AND. chapterPublishing:hRetrievedApril8,2022,fromNewPrairiePressOpenBookttps://kstatelibraries.pressbooks.pub/nicholsproject//chapter14-maritime-cybersecurity-nichols/.Nichols,R.,Mumm,H.,Carter,C.,&Hood,J.(2020,February1). SimpleBookPublishing.CounterUnmannedAircraftSystemsTechnologiesandOperations–
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RetrievedApril4,2022,fromFASProject on Government Secrecy: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf.
RussiaOfficiallyLeavesOpenSkies Treaty. RetrievedApril8,2022,fromArmsControlAssociation:
Russia’sNew‘Poseidon’Super Weapon:WhatYouNeedToKnow.
RetrievedApril4,2022,from russias-neNavalNews:https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/03/w-poseidon-super-weapon-what-you-need-to-know/Tiron,R.,&Musk,E.(2022,April4).The USSeesRisingRisk in‘Breathtaking’ChinaNuclearExpansion.
RetrievedApril8,2022, epolifromBloombergQuint:https://www.bloombergquint.com/tics/u-s-sees-rising-risk-in-breathtaking-china-nuclearxpansion.Woolf,A.F.(2022,March21).
Zherdin,D.(2022,January).
CovertShores. RetrievedApril4,2022, SfromHISutton:http://www.hisutton.com/Belgorod-Class-ubmarine.html.Sutton,H.I.(2022,March3).
2021-07 12/china-to-obtain-nuclear-powered-underwater drones-and-cruise-missiles.php.Sutton,H.(2016,June25).
in[ohttps://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-01/news-briefs/russia-fficially-leaves-open-skies-treaty.1]FurtherinformationregardinghypersonicmissilescanbefoundChapter12.
CovertShores. RetrievedApril4,2022, SfromHISutton:http://www.hisutton.com/py%20Subs%20-Project%2009852%20Belgorod.html.Sutton,H.(2021,June29).
Russia’sNuclearWeapons:Doctrine, Forces,andModernization.
6. Explosives Delivered by Drone By Captain John-Paul Hood US Army Student Objectives Thestudentwillbeintroducedtotheexplosivepayloadsdelivered by drones – especially in Ukraine – Russian conflict. Introduction iMsimplehomemadeeemploselesabotagwtacposeareflusebstriktoccpaineoUkrWiththerecentconflictsinSyria,Nagorno-Karabach,andaine,unmannedaerialsystems(drones)havebecomethetopicfconcernanddebateforagoodreason.Thesesmallandrelativelyxpensivesystemscontinuetogrowincomplexity,speed,andyloadcarryingcapacity.Citizenhobbyistsofwar-tornregionsontinuetofindwaystosuccessfullymilitarizegroup1UASseekingarryoutcovertaerialsurveillanceand,morerecently,precisionesusingmanufacturedsmallyieldordinancethatiscommonymilitariesaroundtheworld.Inmanycases,hobbyistdroneyersturnedmilitantcombatantshaveresortedtoimprovisedxplosivesdeliveredwithdevastatingeffectsonpointtargets.ThesenewtacticsandtechniqueshavebecomealarmingandealthreattotheU.S.homeland.Astheseconflictscontinue,ticsandtechniquesaresharedthroughsocialmedia,givingould-beinternaldissidentsoptionsforconductingterrorismandewithinourborders.Thefollowingchaptercontainsactionofrecentusecasesinwhichdroneshavebeensuccessfullyyedagainsttheirintendedtargets,usingeverythingfromxplosivestodroppingmortarroundandolotovcocktailstothedronebeingusedtoloiter,hunttargetsontsown,andstrikeswiftlyatwill. Explosives Delivered by Drone | 143
Casestudy6.1: MexicanCartelmembersusedronestotarget rivals and government officials. againstdrenfimprAttheoutsetof2022,Mexicancartelshavebegunemplacingovisedexplosivedevicesalongroadsidestoslow/deterlaworcement.Thecartelseventuallyescalatedtheireffortsbyusingonestodeliverexplosivesmorepreciselyintargetedattemptstheirrivals. Figure 6.1: A Picture Taken By A Drone From Above Its Intended Target. Source: (Emir, 2022) damagealtibombswihoThevideo,filmedwiththedrone’scamera,showsthedroneveringoveritstargetandthendroppingitspayloadofsmallthaparachute.Thefootageendswhenthedronelosestuderapidly,presumablyaftercausingatleastthreeseparatexplosions.Thestatusofpossiblecasualtiesandtheextentoftheeisunknown.(Emir,2022).Localnewschannelshavesharedthevideoandclaimedthat 144 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
the CárteldeJaliscoNuevaGeneración (CJNG),orJaliscoNew chief,trtotheSwiarmoroandeinillegaldrugsfrbebuteetheirviciaGenerationCartel,isbasedinJalisco,westernMexico,hasattackedtleasttwotowns,ElBejucoandLaRomera,withdrones.CJNG,themostdangerouscartelinthecountry,isknownfortsbrutality.Thecartelmembershavebeenreportedlyrippingouttims’hearts,dissolvingtheirbodiesinbarrelsofacid,andventargetingpregnantwomen.Theyseektodominatetheillegalxtremelylucrativenarcoticstrafficinthearea.TheCJNGhascomeresponsibleforsmugglingapproximately30percentofallomMexicointotheUnitedStatessinceitsinception2009.(Emir,2022)TheCJNGcancalluponawidevarietyofweapons,vehicles,quipment,includingcamotrucks,pickups,andSUVs,somefthemarmedwithmountedweaponsandequippedwithadd-on.Thecartelmembersarealsoheavilyarmedandprovidedthmilitary-styletacticalgear.Thoughthecartelwasonceloyalinaloacartel,CJNGsoughttodominateothercartelsinaffickingnarcoticsafterthecaptureandU.S.jailingofSinaloa’sJoaquín“ElChapo”Guzmán.(Emir,2022) ExpCaseStudy2:UkraineAdaptingDronestoDropImprovisedlosives SoonaftertheoutsetoftheRussianinvasionofUkraineon begFebruary24,2022,thedrone-owningcitizensofUkrainesetouttoinarmingtheirpersonaldronesformilitaryuse. Figure 6.2: Ukrainians Develop Drone That Drops Molotov Cocktails Explosives Delivered by Drone | 145
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Source: (Kesslen, 2022) LessthantwoweeksafterUkraineofficialscalledondrone-
UkrwoutwiUkrsaYincknoccrcowningcitizenstovolunteertheircraftforuseindefendingtheountryfrominvadingRussianforces,someofthosenon-militaryaftshavenowbeenreportedlyweaponizedtodropMolotovocktailsontargetsbelow.(Crumley,2022)Thefruitofinnovation,teamwork,aSoviet-erarepairtraditionwnas“snottingthingstogether,”inanywaythatworks,theendiaryaerialdeliverydevicewasfeaturedinphotosintheNeworkPost,whichfailedtocatchtheclearmarkingsontheUAVityswasdevelopedbytheUkrainianTerritorialDefenseForces.TheainecraftintheimagesisaDJIInspirecinematicdronetrickedthafasteningtoholdgas-filledbeerbottlesfordropping,oneouldsuspect,onRussianarmytargets.(Crumley,2022)TherepurposingofthedroneinvolvesthecollaborationofainianTerritorialDefenseForces–whichhasbeentraining
seradrpossibethecrdirstr20theadaptenofdonaprmakingMhathesmall,arPrcvolunteerstotheresistanceagainsthowtomakeanduseMolotovocktailseffectivelyinthebattleagainstRussianinvadersinLviv’savdaBrewery.However,anyoneseekingtoslaketheirthirstfromtsy,anddecidedlypatrioticmakerofcraftbeerswillvetowaitwhileitservesthenationalcause.(Crumley,2022)“OnFebruary24,ourbrewerystoppedbrewingbeerandstartedolotovcocktailstowinthewar!”Pravda’s“ForMolotov!”oductwebpageinformsbrowsingcustomers,“Youcanmakeationbypurchasingacocktail.”(Crumley,2022)EachbottleofflamingMolotovis100UkraineHryvnia($3.35),andorordersof$25.12ormore,PravdaBrewerywilldeliverforfree–w,quitepossibly,byadroneaboveRussianforces.AllbywayofdUAVsliketheoneshowninthePost’sphotos.(Crumley,22)Thefront-loadedDJIInspire’scameraappearstobeangledaightdownward,possiblytoofferaclearviewofintendedtargetsectlybelow.AnL-shapedbraceisaffixedtotherearundersideofaftandfeaturesadownward,rimmedapertureintowhichtheerbottle’smouthisslid.(Crumley,2022)Athinplasticbandisaffixedaroundthecontainer’scenterblyhowitisheldintoplacebecauseasubsequentpictureofoppedbottleshowsitfallingnearlyupright,indicatingarearelease.Alsofeasibleisthecameramountinghasbeenadaptedtocurethebottle’sbackend.(Crumley,2022) Figure 6.3: Close-Up – Ukrainians Develop Drone That Drops Molotov Cocktails Explosives Delivered by Drone | 147
Source: (Kesslen, 2022) MilitaryinstructorshavebeenteachingcivilianstouseMolotov rinstruccocktailsagainsttheheavilyarmedRussiantroops,andthetionstobuildthemreportedlyhavebeenairedonUkrainianadio.(Kesslen,2022) Figure 6.4: Molotov Cocktail Released 148 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
Source: (Kesslen, 2022)
Case Study 3: Anti-Personnel Munitions Figure 6.5: Heavy Modifications To Civil Drone Platforms Explosives Delivered by Drone | 149
20rrthegrmigfigRussianfUkrWhateverthecase,theuseofconsumerorenterprisedronesbyainianforcesfortheattack,ratherthanjustsurveillanceagainstorces,wouldbeanotherindicationofescalationinthehting–andmaynotbethelast.(Crumley,2022)Afterall,modificationofUAVstodropgasbombsonenemieshtlogicallyleadtothereleasesystembeingreworkedtoholdenadesorsmallbombsthatMexicancartels,MiddleEastadicalgroups,andfoesinthebattlesoverpro-MoscowseparatistegionsineastUkrainehavedeployedinthepastyear.(Crumley,22)
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Enabled To Carry Very Low Cost Yet Powerful Munitions Such As Mortars 60-81mm Rounds.
haecrdrenlaborandhisstudenymodifichaSource:(HaberDergilik/Kara-birliklernin-silahi-havan-dronla-vlandi,2022)TherecentfightinginUkrainehasalsoseentheheavyationstocivildroneplatformsenabledtocarryverylowcostetpowerfulmunitionssuchasmortars60-81mmrounds.OstimTechnicalUniversityFacultyMemberProf.Dr.SinanKivraktsdevelopedtheMortarReleaseSystemwiththeiratorywork.Afterthetestswerecarriedoutinthelaboratoryvironment,fieldtestsstartedwiththesystemintegratedintotheone.Threemortarsof60and81millimeterswereloadedintotheeleasesysteminthetest.Withthecommandgivenbytheremoteontrol,thedronefiredatthepointdeterminedwiththenon-xplosivetestammunition.(HaberDergilik/Kara-birliklernin-silahi-van-dronla-havlandi,2022)Afterthetest,KıvraktoldAnadoluAgency(A.A.)thatwhenan
andwwillmeTherrdr1500-yavthewiontheelemenTheradiantdronewillbesent,anditwilldropthreemortarshellstsvisually.Ifyoutrytodoitundernormalconditions,tisdifficultanddifficulttoshootthesecoordinatesandadjusteapon.Wewillhaveeliminatedtheterroristelementswitherysimpleandappropriatestructureinsuchasystem.Whenouconsiderthecost,suchasystemhasacostofapproximately2000T.L.(HaberDergilik/Kara-birliklernin-silahi-havan-onla-havlandi,2022)Wehaveverygoodworksrelatedtounmannedaerialvehiclesandeleasesystemsasacountry.Itisheardintheworldrightnowefore,ifweproduceaffordableandsustainableproducts,weettheneedsofourownarmedforcesassoonaspossible,ewillcuretheoppressednationsaswedo
Explosives Delivered by Drone | 151
hahardif25kilogrDefbirintheprourselfAvimorammunimorimageistakenfromanypointinthefield,thedroneloadedwithtarcanbedirectedtothedesiredcoordinateandleftthreetionswiththereleasesystem.Kivraksaid:“Wehavedevelopedasystemthatreleasesone81andtwo60tars.Therewasaneedinthisdirection,butwecouldnotmeett.Asauniversityandlaboratory,wedecidedtodoitourselves.eryaffordableMortarReleaseSystemwiththeequipmentweoundonthemarketandtheelectroniccontrolsystemwemadeves.“Wedidit,andwemadepatentapplications.Wetesteditocess.Oursystemworksverywell.”(HaberDergilik/Kara-liklernin-silahi-havan-dronla-havlandi,2022)ExpressingthattheycooperatedwiththedronemanufacturerArıenseintheproject,Kıvraknotedthatthedrone,whichcancarryams,stayintheairforabouthalfanhour,andconnectferentpayloads,isdomesticwithitssoftwareanddware.(HaberDergilik/Kara-birliklernin-silahi-havan-dronla-vlandi,2022) Point shooting with a drone
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Figure 6.6: Point Shooting with a Drone haSource:(HaberDergilik/Kara-birliklernin-silahi-havan-dronla-vlandi,2022)
Case Study 6.4: Loitering Munitions (LM or L.M.)
Figure 6.7: Russian KUB-BLA “Suicide Drone” by Drone
now.” (HaberDergilik/Kara-birliklernin-silahi-havan-dronlahavlandi, 2022)
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usingtarargr30minutes,andaneamaximumspeinAbuD—adivisionoRussia’sZALAAeroGroup,theunmannedaircraftsystems(UAS)fKalashnikov,unveileda“kamikaze”drone—theKUB-BLAttheInternationalDefenseExhibitionandConference(IDEX)habionFebruary17.ThesmallUASisdesignedtohaveedofabout80milesperhour,anenduranceofxplosivepayloadof7poundsagainst“remoteoundtargets.”(Wolfe,2019)Loiteringmunitionscanhaveadwelltimeofuptosixhoursandeequippedwithsensorstoallowthedronestodetectandattackgetsindependently.“Themakerofthelethaldroneclaimsthatitcanidentifytargetsartificialintelligence.”ARUSSIAN“SUICIDEdrone”thatboaststheabilitytoidentify
Source: (Knight, 2022)
TsafuseA.I.farUkr(Knigdein2019crtrasmallpilotlessfig(KnigdamagonTsubsidiarleongtargetsusingartificialintelligencehasbeenspottedinimagesoftheoinginvasionofUkraine.(Knight,2022)PhotographsshowingwhatappearstobetheKUB-BLA,atypeofthaldroneknownasa“loiteringmunition”soldbyZALAAero,ayoftheRussianarmscompanyKalashnikov,haveappearedelegramandTwitterinrecentdays.Thepicturesshoweddronesthatappeartohavecrashedorbeenshotdown.ht,2022)Withawingspanof1.2meters,thesleekwhitedroneresembleshterjet.Itisfiredfromaportablelaunch,canavelupto130kilometersperhourfor30minutes,anddeliberatelyashesintoatarget,detonatinga3-kiloexplosive.(Knight,2022)ZALAAero,whichfirstdemoedtheKUB-BLAataRussianairshow,claimsinpromotionalmaterialthatitfeatures“intelligenttectionandrecognitionofobjectsbyclassandtypeinreal-time.”ht,2022)Thedroneitselfmaydolittletoalterthecourseofthewarinaine,asthereisnoevidencethatRussiaisusingthemwidelyso.Butitsappearancehassparkedconcernaboutthepotentialfortotakeagreaterroleinmakinglethaldecisions.(Knight,2022)“Thenotionofakillerrobot—whereyouhaveartificialintelligencedwithweapons—thattechnologyishere,andit’sbeingused,”ysZacharyKallenborn,aresearchaffiliatewiththeNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoerrorism(START).(Knight,2022) Figure 6.8: KUB-BLA Russian Loitering Munition 154 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
Source: (Front, 2020) AdvancesinA.I.havemadeiteasiertoincorporateautonomyinto rsystemscweaponssystemsandhaveraisedtheprospectthatmorecapableouldeventuallydecideforthemselveswhotokill.AUNeportpublishedlastyearconcludedthatalethaldronewiththis Explosives Delivered by Drone | 155
20capabilitymighthavebeenusedintheLibyancivilwar.(Knight,22) Figure 6.9: Russian Suicide Drone Used in Ukraine That Picks its Own Targets Though Advance A.I. Source: (Wolfe, 2019) ythershifmilibutthedrinprinUkrItisunclearifthedronemayhavebeenoperatedinthiswayaine.Oneofthechallengeswithautonomousweaponsmayovetobethedifficultyofdeterminingwhenfullautonomyisusedalethalcontext,Kallenbornsays.(Knight,2022)TheKUB-BLAimageshaveyettobeverifiedbyofficialsources,oneisknowntobearelativelynewpartofRussia’staryarsenal.ItsusewouldalsobeconsistentwithRussia’stingstrategyinthefaceoftheunexpectedlystrongUkrainianesistance,saysSamuelBendett,anexpertonRussia’smilitarywithdefensethinktankCNA.(Knight,2022)BennettsaysRussiahasbuiltupitsdronecapabilitiesinrecentears,usingtheminSyriaandacquiringmoreafterAzerbaijani 156 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
ocgathe[humancoenpopersonguideThissingsmallUS-madeloiairirmissilelaefrincmapsysaegrforcesdemonstratedtheireffectivenessagainsttheArmenianoundmilitaryinthe2020Nagorno-Karabakhwar.“Theyareanxtraordinarilycheapalternativetoflyingmannedmissions,”heys.“Theyareveryeffectivebothmilitarilyandofcoursechologically.”(Knight,2022)RussiaseemstohaveusedfewdronesinUkraineearlyon,whichybeduetomisjudgingtheresistanceoreffectiveUkrainianountermeasures.(Knight,2022)ButdroneshavealsohighlightedakeyvulnerabilityinRussia’svasion,enteringitsthirdweek.UkrainianforceshaveusedaemotelyoperatedTurkish-madedronecalledtheTB2togreatfectagainstRussianforces,shootingguidedmissilesatRussianunchersandvehicles.Theparaglider-sizeddrone,whicheliesonasmallcrewontheground,isslowandcannotdefendtself,butithasproveneffectiveagainstasurprisinglyweakRussiancampaign.(Knight,2022)TheBidenadministrationsaiditwouldsupplyUkrainewithateringmunitioncalledSwitchbladethisweek.le-usedrone,equippedwithexplosives,cameras,anddsystems,hassomeautonomouscapabilitiesbutreliesonatodecidewhichtargetstoengage.(Knight,2022)ButBennettquestionswhetherRussiawouldunleashanAIwereddronewithadvancedautonomyinsuchachaoticvironment,especiallygivenhowpoorlycoordinatedthecountry’sverallairstrategyseemstobe.“TheRussianmilitaryanditsapabilitiesarenowbeingseverelytestedinUkraine,”hesays.“If]groundforceswithalltheirsophisticatedinformationtheringcan’tunderstandwhat’shappeningontheground,howouldadrone?”SeveralothermilitaryexpertsquestionthepurportedcapabilitiesftheKUB-BLA.(Knight,2022) Explosives Delivered by Drone | 157
“Thecompaniesthatproducetheseloiteringdronestalkuptheir (KniggtodeplogCon(KnigshowFthem,weslipperdealinputfrihasbemiliprwopercautonomousfeatures,butoftentheautonomyinvolvesflightorrectionsandmaneuveringtohitatargetidentifiedbyahumanator,notautonomyinthewaytheinternationalcommunityoulddefineanautonomousweapon,”saysMichaelHorowitz,aofessorattheUniversityofPennsylvania,whokeepstrackoftarytechnology.(Knight,2022)Despitesuchuncertainties,theissueofA.I.inweaponssystemscomecontentiousbecausethetechnologyisrapidlyfindingtswayintomanymilitarysystems,forexample,tohelpinterpretomsensors.TheU.S.militarymaintainsthatapersonshouldwaysmakelethaldecisions,buttheU.S.alsoopposesabanonvelopingsuchsystems.Tosome,theappearanceoftheKUB-BLAshowsthatweareonayslopetowardincreasingtheuseofA.I.inweaponsthatwillventuallyremovehumansfromtheequation.(Knight,2022)“We’llseeevenmoreproliferationofsuchlethalautonomouseaponsunlessmoreWesternnationsstartsupportingabanon”saysMaxTegmark,aprofessoratMITandco-founderoftheutureofLifeInstitute,anorganizationthatcampaignsagainstsucheapons.(Knight,2022)Others,though,believethatthesituationunfoldinginUkrainewshowdifficultitwillbetouseadvancedA.I.andautonomy.ht,2022)WilliamAlbergue,DirectorofStrategy,Technology,andArmstrolattheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,saysthativenUkraine’ssuccesswiththeTB2,theRussiansarenotreadyymoresophisticatedtech.“We’reseeingRussianmoronsettingownedbyasystemthattheyshouldnotbevulnerableto.”ht,2022) 158 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
Figure 6.10: The Wreckage of Another Russian KUB-BLA Loitering Munition. Source: 3/ (Lee) (Lee, 2022) Figure 6.11: US Marine firing Switchblade from a pneumatic launch tube Explosives Delivered by Drone | 159
Source: (Bowman, Ontheotherside,Ukr2022)ainehasbeenthrustintotheforefront SmillioninaddiPranimpassionetoperfosystemmabeyowofusingloiteringmunitionsindefenseandisnowatestbedforesternobservers.Loiteringmunitions—essentiallysmallsuicidedronescapableftrackingatargetandthenstrikingit—havebeenaroundforears.Still,technologyemergedasakeyweaponinthe2021conflicttweenArmeniaandAzerbaijan.InUkraine’surbanwarfare,theybeevenmorevaluable.TwoFoundationforDefensefDemocraciesexpertsexplainwhyloiteringmunitionsaretheecttoolforUkraine’sresistanceandwhatsystemscouldbesentKyivinanewop-ed.(Bowman,2022)Hoursafter,UkrainianPresidentVolodymyrZelenskyydelivereddpleaforhelptotheU.S.CongressonMarch16.esidentJoeBidenannouncedthatWashingtonwillprovide$800tionalsecurityassistancetoUkraine,including100witchbladeloiteringmunitions(L.M.s),commonlyreferredtoas
160 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
rdiftarormilibesiztarindefandengagtarTheorcalliestourRussianarmorWSvulnercwisetoprioripoten“suicidedrones.”WhilemembersofCongresshavepushedforthetialtransfertoUkraineofPolishMiG-29s,theWhiteHouseistizeweaponsystemsthatcanquicklybolsterUkrainianombatcapabilitywhileminimizinglogisticalburdensandabilitytoRussianattack.(Bowman,2022)Theproblem,however,isUkrainewilllikelyexpendthose100witchbladesinmeredays,andthevariantoftheSwitchbladeashingtonismostlikelysendingisofnoserioususeagainst.Accordingly,WashingtonshouldworkwithNATOgentlyprovideUkrainewithadditionalshipmentsonsistingofgreaterquantitiesandvarietiesofloiteringmunitions,L.M.s.(Bowman,2022)L.M.sareacombinationofmissilesandaerialsurveillancedrones.yblendtheabilitytomaneuver,conductsurveillance,andstrikegetsintoasingleplatform,reducingthetimebetweendetectionementofatarget.ThatcouldprovedecisiveforUkrainianenderswhomayencountermoreclose-quartersurbancombatthecomingdays.(Bowman,2022)L.M.svaryinsizeandcapability.Loitertimeabovepotentialgetscanrangefromminutestohours,whiletheirmunitioncanedtotargettroops,equipment(withandwithoutarmor),taryinfrastructure.Thesystemscarrycamerastoidentifygetsandtransmitimagesbacktotheoperator.L.M.scanbeficultforadversariestodetectanddestroybecauseoftheirlowadar,visual,andthermalsignatures.(Bowman,2022) Figure 6.12: Switchblade 600 Explosives Delivered by Drone | 161
Source: (Valpolini, 2020) SomeL.M.scanbemountedonandlaunchedfromground
162 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
capprcUkrdemonstrwhicharccwhichwillhafmannethaprevehicles.Smallerversions,suchastheSwitchblade,canbecarriedveninbackpacksandemployedbyindividualsoldiers.ThiswillovideUkrainianinfantrysquadswithincreasedcombatpowertcanbeeasilytransported,concealed,andoperated.Andunlikedaircraftandlargerdrones,L.M.sdon’tdependonairfieldsoremployment.ThatwillcreaterealproblemsforRussianforces,vetoassumethatanyUkrainianinfantrymayhavethisapability.(Bowman,2022)Ukrainehasalreadyemployedsometypesofdronesduringtheonflict.TheUkrainianshaveusedtheirTurkishTB-2armeddrones,enotloiteringmunitions,todevastatingeffect,asatedinnumerousvideosonsocialmedia.Turkeyprovidedainewithamuch-neededresupplyofthesedronesduringtheonflict’sfirstweek.TB-2sarequitelarge,withawingspanofoximately12meters,andmustoperatefromfixedairbasesthatanandhavebeentargetedbyRussia.(Bowman,2022)Ukrainehasrecruiteddronehobbyistsoperatingcommercial
(BowduetoitheSvL.M.s.Andccefele(BocMmapurpose-builtL.M.s.Thisisespesystemaefmak(ginfrmorwhichPunisherdrdrrdrdronestohelpaddressurgentmilitaryrequirementsforsmalleronestoconductreconnaissance.Ukrainianshavesometimesesortedtojerry-riggingexplosivestothebottomofcommercialones.UkrainehasevencreatedabasicL.M.systembypairingtheonewithasmallerreconnaissancedronecalledSpectre,togetherhavereportedlyconductedstrikes.(Bowman,2022)TheUnitedStatesandlike-mindedalliesshouldimmediatelysendeinexpensivecommercialsystemsinsteadofforcingUkrainetoelyonChineseDJIdrones,whichmightcompromisetheoperator’sormationorberestrictedfromflyingincertainareasviaeofencing.ButL.M.scanfillanimportantgapbetweentheTB-2swhichrelyonairfieldsandincurasignificantlogisticalburden)andeshiftcommercialdronesthattaketimetoprepareandarelessfectivethanL.M.sintargetinggroundforces.(Bowman,2022)Accordingly,theUnitedStatesandlike-mindedalliesshouldticallyequiptheUkrainianmilitarywithalargearsenalofciallyimportantbecauseRussiaybestartingtojamthecommandandcontrolofTB-2drones.oscowhasalsobeguntointegratebetteritsreconnaissanceandombatdrones,includingtheZALAKYBloiteringmunition.wman,2022)ThereareseveraldifferentL.M.sthatcountrieswillingtoprovidethalaidtoUkrainehaveintheirarsenal.TheU.S.,asmentionedarlier,SwitchbladehasseenserviceinAfghanistan.Butwhileitisfectiveinshort-rangeurbancombatandambushesonunarmoredonvoys,theSwitchbladehaslimitedrangecomparedtosomeotherontrarytosomecurrentreporting,theSwitchblade300ariantWashingtonappearstobesendingUkraine(asopposedtowitchblade600variant)cannotdestroymostarmoredvehiclestssmallmunition.The100SwitchbladesannouncedthiseekareonlyafractionofthequantityofL.M.sthatUkraineneeds.wman,2022) Explosives Delivered by Drone | 163
munishipmenurbuti20operfraronrstrik(BotheHpermitohelpmeprhamperIaid,nec20disruptingRussiansuppl9km.TheWPDrwhichhassesoliciUkrSo,whileCongressshouldpresstheadministrationtosendainemoreAmerican-madeLMs,theUnitedStatesshouldalsothelpfromothercountries.TurkeyoperatestheKargu-2,encombatinLibya,andAustraliamanufacturestheone-40,bothofwhichcanbeusefulinanurbanenvironment.oland’sWarmate-seriesofL.M.scanstriketargetsouttoroughlyarmate’sportabilityandrangemakeitsuitableforyconvoysfromasafedistance.(Bowman,22)Notably,IsraeloperatessomeofthemostadvancedL.M.apabilities.Still,itthusfarhasnotprovidedUkrainewithlethaledingtotreadcarefullywithMoscowgiventhatRussiacouldsraelioperationsinSyriaagainsttheirarchenemy,Iran.NotovidingmilitarycapabilitiestoUkrainemayalsoenableJerusalemdiateanendtothewar.However,ifIsraeldecidestotthird-partytransfersofIsraeli-madeweaponstoUkraine,aropandOrbiterL.M.sshouldbeatthetopofthelist.wman,2022)L.M.scanprovideUkrainewitharobustadditionalcapabilitytoeRussianforcesfromtheair,especiallyasthoseforceslingeroads,consolidatearoundUkrainiancities,ormoveintourbaneas.L.M.scandeliverthiscapabilityinlargequantitiesataactionofthecostandlogisticalfootprintassociatedwithatingandmaintainingfighterjetsorlargedrones.(Bowman,22)TheU.S.armsshipmentannouncedWednesdayisapositivestep,tshouldnotbethelast.Workingwithallies,WashingtonshouldgentlysendanothertrancheofweaponstoUkraine,andthattshouldincludeagreaterquantityandvarietyofloiteringtions.(Bowman,2022) Figure 6.13: Artist rendition of a switchblade launch 164 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
Source: (Valpolini, 2020) Thecasecontinuestobemadefordevelopingeffective
Explosives Delivered by Drone | 165
classificcinandsethrjuggterriotohunindividualortesystemswillsoonfindtheirwgrwcountermeasuresagainstthisnewandever-evolvingkindofarfaremustbeapriority.Lawmakersmustbeawareofthisowingthreatthat,ifleftunchecked,thesedeadlyautonomousayintothehandsofadeterminedamwhowilluseadronewithA.I.-backedcapabilitiestdownanyonetheyopposeandwanttoeliminate.Thestufffsci-filoreisheretodayandwaitingtomakeamajorimpactbly.Commoncitizensusethistechnologytobringmilitaryernautstotheirkneesinfrustration.Thankfully,thetechnologydoesexisttocountertheseveryrealeats,andlawmakersmustcontinuetofundtheirdevelopmentektoacquirenotjustonesolutionbutmany.Artificialtelligenceandmachinelearning(AI/ML)isalsousedintheounter-dronefight,withexcellentresults.Identification,ation,andsharingofinformationarecriticalinthefight.It
cdrkineshapestheformationofsensornetworkslinkedtomanydifferentticandnon-kineticsystems.Thesesystemswillthenremoveonesfromtheskysafelyandeffectivelywithminimaltonoollateraldamage. dirdelivTheconclusionisstraightforward.Dronesarebothaperfecterypayloadforexplosives,andwiththeuseofA.I.,theycanbeectedatanytargetofopportunity. Bowman,R.B.(2022,March18).
on-theirthe-most-brutal-meinterestingengineering.com:https://interestingengineering.com/xican-cartel-used-drones-to-drop-bombs--rivalFront,S.(2020,August12).
InterestingEngineering.Retrievedfrom
Ukrainiansdevelopadronethatdrops
w03loiUkraineisgettingSwitchblade.ItshouldbejustthefirstwaveofteringmunitionsforKyiv:https://breakingdefense.com/2022//ukraine-is-getting-switchblade-it-should-be-just-the-first-ave-of-loitering-munitions-for-kyiv/.Crumley,B.(2022,March11).
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Explosives Delivered by Drone | 167
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168 | Explosives Delivered by Drone
7. Deception By Professor Randall K. Nichols, Kansas State University STUDENT OBJECTIVES[1] Students will understand and study: and(UdeploagainstThevariousdeceptionmethodsandtechnologiesemployedcriticalinfrastructureassetsandcomputertargets,Recognizethatunmannedaircraft(UAS)arereasonableymentagentsagainstcriticalinfrastructureandCBRNassets.ASareexpendable,quiet,hardtodetect,andcanactinnumbersSWARMS)inmanydeceptiondomains.Unmannedsystemspresentalethalriskofdeceptionoperationsshouldbeaccountedforinsecurityplans. INTRODUCTION PictureforamomentyouarewatchingyourchildplayingH.S. 2009Drpeacrstadiumdrsaf–thenethenlestarthethrYafootballinastatechampionshipgame.Thereareabout22,000inttendance.Thegameclockisabout10minutesafterhalftime.elling,cheering,andscreamingfortheirteams,theyhardlynoticeeemedium-sizeddronesflyingoverthestands.Thedronestdroppinghundredsofsmallpiecesofpaperoverthecrowdandavethearea.Thenotessay:”Youhave15minutestoevacuatextdronescarryfentanylandSemtexexplosives.Youarenote.Evacuate!”15minuteslater,nearly50dronesSWARMovertheoppingtalcumpowderandpowerfulfirecrackersontheowd.ThisisaterroristscenariothatreliesonDECEPTIONaimedtcausingPanicinacrowdandDISRUPTION.[2]Itsgoalistomakeoplefearandlosefaithintheirlocalgovernmenttoprotectthem.onescanbetheprecursor!TerroristsrelyonhowcrowdsbehaveinaPanicSituation.(Bade,)providedinsightintothetheoriesaboutcrowdbehaviorin Deception | 169
PindividualbehaduringapanicsiPanicSituations.Table7.1showsthatcrowdsdon’tactascrowdstuationbutasagroupofindividuals.Theyresorttoviorattheexpenseofallothers.TheyexhibitbothanicTheoryandUrgencyTheory. Panic Theory embraces four principles: • Deal primarily with the factors that may make the occurrence of Panic during emergencies, • The basic premise is that when people perceive danger, their usual conscious personalities are often replaced by the unconscious personalities, which lead them to act irrationally, • Hysterical flight, • Ignorance of the environment. (Bade, 2009) Urgency Theory embraces two main principles: • The occurrences of human blockages of exiting space depend on the levels of urgency to exit • Three crucial factors could lead to this situation: • the severity of the penalty and consequence for not exiting quickly,[3] • the time available to exit, and • the group size. epelarAproblemariseswhenthedistributionofurgencylevelscontainsagenumberwithahighurgencytoleave;forexample,toomanyopletrytoexitquicklyatthesametime(withlimitedxits).(Bade,2009) Table 7.1 Characteristics of Emergency Behavior 170 | Deception
Deception | 171
VULNERABILITIES OF MODERN SOCIETIES TO UAS ATTACK
quickPrAcinSmeSource:(Bade,2009)PhotobyAuthorfromoriginalmanuscripttoetPBguidelines.TwofamousPanicTheory/UrgencyTheoryexamplesare1)ThetationNightclubFireinRhodeIslandin2003,whichkilled~100andjured200more.(CBSNews,2021updated)[4]and2)May9,2001,craSportsStadiumDisaster[5](Chrockett,2014)TheauthorhascontributedtothescienceofPanicAttackesponseswithanarticleonhowtorespondbeforethefull-blownanicarrives.(NicholsR.K.,short-circuiting-simple-panic-attacks--guide-out,2018)
rPrUSSandUUS’acknoAccordingto(Dorn,2021),thefederalgovernmenthasyettowledgethethreatsposedbyUAS,anditbarelynoticedthescapabilitiesandthethreatplatformstheypose.esent-dayunmannedsystemsarefacedwithacontradictoryelationshipbetweentheirsmalldegreeandthelikelihoodof
andITagtheaasaSWbesubstisignificterrAirinSWociinthegterrthanafcsystemrdetectionandthesmalldegreeoflethalitythatasingleunmannedepresents.Ifanunmannedsystemsuccessfullyattacksaongestedtarget,suchasaballgame,itisunlikelytokillmoreewfans.Theattackcreatesasenseoffearinthecitizens;orismhasbeenbroughttotheirdoorsteps,andtheuncertaintyovernment’sabilitytopreventsuchattacksandprotectitstizens.(Dorn,2021)Aboostedcourseofactionusesacombinationfmannedandunmannedsystemsoperatingasateam(MUM-T)orARMmodetodeliverpayloads.(Nichols&Mumm,UnmannedcraftSystemsintheCyberDomain,2ndEdition.,2019)IftheoristhasaccesstoCBRNEagents/weapons,thiswillpresentaantlong-termthreattotheU.S.(Kallenborn&Bleck,2018)exposedthatUAShavethepotentialtotutedforCBRNagentsinanattack.TheUAScouldbeusedARMwithexplosives,orifCBRNagentsaretobeusedinttack,aUASSWARMwouldbeanidealplatformtodeliversuchentstoaspecifictargetorinawidelydispersedmanner.(Nichols&al.,2020)(Nichols&Sincavage,DisruptiveechnologieswithApplicationsinAirline,Marine,andDefensendustries,2021)suggestedthattheUAScanbeagentsofdeception,theirpayloadscanbeusedtocreatePanic.
BASIC TERMINOLOGY (Dprinciples,mehasiao200DeThestudyofdeceptionhasavarietyofroots.ThebesttextonceptionandCounterDeceptionprinciplesis(Bennett&Waltz,7).Itsusehasbeenwellresearchedandpublished.TheideafusingUASasadeploymentvehicleisnewandcreditedtotheuthors.(R.K.Nichols&etal.,2022)Theart/scienceofdeceptiontsownterminologytodistinguishdeceptionactivities’ans,andeffects.ThebasicDoDacceptedtermsare:aniel&Herbig,1982) Denial includesthosemeasuresdesignedtohinderordenythe oenemytheknowledgeofanobjectbyhidingordisruptingthemeansfobservationoftheobject.ThebasisforDenialis dissimulation, the concealing of truth. (Daniel & Herbig, 1982) 172 | Deception
Deception includesmeasuresdesignedtomisleadtheenemyby fwdetormanipulation,distortion,orfalsificationofevidencetoinducehimeactinamannerprejudicialtohisinterests.Thegoalofceptionistomakeanenemymorevulnerabletotheeffectsofeapons,maneuvers,andoperationsoffriendlyforces.Thebasisordeceptionisa simulation, thepresenceofthatwhichis false. (Daniel & Herbig, 1982) DenialandDeception (D&D)includeintegratingbothprocesses synontomisleadanenemy’sintelligencecapability.TheacronymC3D2isymouswithD&D;itrefersto cover,concealment,camouflage, Denial, and deception. (Daniel & Herbig, 1982) Deception means arethosemethods,resources,andtechniques charthatcanconveyinformationtothedeceptiontarget.DoDacterizesmeansas: Physicalmeans:activitiesandresourcesusedtoconveyordeny logoperselectedinformationtoaforeignpower.(Examplesaremilitaryations,reconnaissance,forcemovement,dummyequipment,isticalactions,test,andevaluationactivities.) Technicalmeans aredefinedas:Resourcesandoperating emissiontheemissionorsupprdelitechniquestoconveyordenyselectedinformationthroughberateradiation,alteration,absorption,reflectionsofenergy;essionofchemicalorbiologicalodors;andtheorsuppressionofnuclearparticles. Administrativemeans areresources,methods,andtechniquesto phconveyordenyanenemy’soral,pictorial,documentary,orotherysicalevidence.The Deceptiontarget istheadversarydecision-makerwiththe authoritytodecidewhatwillachievethe deceptionobjective –the desired result of the deception operation. Channels ofdeceptionaretheinformationpathsbywhich 1982)deceptionmeansareconveyedtotheirtargets.(Daniel&Herbig, PERSPECTIVES OF DECEPTION Deception | 173
Static: Deceptions that remain static regardless of state, activities, or histories of either the deceiver or target masking Masking: Concealing a signal. Ex: camouflage, concealment, and signature reductions.
Dynamic: Deceptions that become active under specific circumstances. The ruse itself and associated trigger do not change over time nor vary significantly by circumstance or activity
Behavioral: The part of the deception is primarily a matter of implementation or function, such as timing, location, or patterns of events or behavior
Morphological: The part of the deception is primarily a matter of orshape,substance,coloration,temperature.
Premeditative: Deception is designed and implemented based on andanddeknoexperience,wledgeoftheceiver’scapabilities,thetarget’ssensorssearchstrategies.
Confusing: Raising the noise level to create uncertainty or paralyze the target’s perceptual capabilities. Ex: cvoluminousommunication traffic, conditioning, and random signals or behavior. 174 | Deception
Adaptive are: Dynamic, and the trigger or ruse can be modified with experience. Deceptions that improve with trial and error.
enTher(Bennett&Waltz,2007)present60pagesofDeceptionresearch.earetwomodelsofdeceptionthatapplytotheUASvironment.(Gerwehr&Glenn,2002)presenttheir three perspectives on Deception in Table 7.2. Table 7.2 Three Perspectives on Deception
Level of Sophistication Effect Sought Means of Deception
Misdirecting: Transmitting disinfdummies,demonstrsignal.unambiguousanfalseEx:feints,ations,decoys,disguises,andormation.[6]
Source: (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2002) DECEPTION MAXIMS 7All10MaximsarPrOneoftheimportantresultsoftheCIA’sORDDeceptionResearchogramwasthepaperonDeceptionMaxims.(MathTech,Inc,1980)ecoveredindetailin(Bennett&Waltz,2007)Table.3showsteninterestingDeceptionMaxims. Table 7.3 Deception Maxims Deception | 175
Deception becomes more difficult as the number of channels available to the target increases. The greater the number the deceiver controls the deceiver, the greater the likelihood that the deception will be achieved! [8] #5 A amongchoicetypes of deceptions
The objective of the deception planner should be to reduce the ambiguity in the mind of the target to make the target more certain of a particular falsehood rather than less certain of the truth
It is easier for the target to maintain a preexisting belief even if presented with information expected to change that belief. Limitations to human prInformationocessing
#4 LemmaJones’
#9 The Monkeys Paw The deception may produce subtle and unwanted side effects. Deception planners should be sensitive to this possibility and attempt to minimize them
#10 Care madeplacplannedesigninginthedementofceptiveterial
#2
There are circumstances where deception assets should be husbanded, despite the costs of maintaining them and the risk of the exposure until they can be put to fruitful use #7 A rulesequencing
Great care must be taken when designing schemes to leak notional plans. Apparent windfalls are subject to close scrutiny and are often misbelieved.
Source: (MathTech, Inc, 1980) deploTakenoteofMaxims#1,#4,and#9.ThesearethekeytoUASymentforDeceptionobjectives.[9] 176 | Deception
Accurate feedback from the target increases the deceptions likelihood of success
MAXIM RESULT #1 PrincipMagruder’sle
#6 Axelrod’s othecontribution:husbandingfassets
#8
Deception activities should occur in a sequence that prolongs the target’s false perceptions of the situation for as long as possible Importance of feedback
Limitations to human information processing can be design deception schemes, including the law of small numbers and susceptibility to conditioning Multiplethe forms of surprise Surprise can be achieved in different forms: location, strength, intention, style, and timing. [7]
#3
SURPRISE JockHaswell,MichaelDewar,andJonLatimer(allformerBritish wriisasurprise.Fteofficers)havewrittenaboutpurpose,principles,anddeceptionchniques.Theyallemphasizethatthegoalofdeceptioninwarfareiveprinciplesarecommontoallthreeauthors’tings:•Preparation:Successfuldeceptionoperationsrequirecarefulintelligencepreparationtodevelopdetailedknowledgeofthetargetandthetarget’slikelyreactiontoeachpartofthedeception.•Centralizedcontrolandcoordination:Uncoordinateddeceptionoperationscanconfusefriendlyforces(orterrorists,dependingonPOV)andreduceornegatetheeffectivenessofthedeception.•Credibility:Thedeceptionshouldproducefalseandrealinformationandapatternofeventsthatalignwiththetarget’spreconceptionsandexpectations.•Multipleinformationchannels:Falseinformationmustbepresentedtothetargetthroughasmanychannelsaspossiblewithoutarousingthetarget’ssuspicionsthattheinformationistoogoodtobetrue.Thisisalsocalled confirmation bias. • Security: Access to the deception plan must be carefully restricted. Information released to the target must be revealed so that the absence of normal security precautions does not arouse the target’s suspicions. (Haswell, 1985)(Dewar, 1989)(Latimer, 2001) Four Fundamental Principles detheFourFundamentalPrinciplesformthefoundationofdeceptionoryingeneral.Theseprinciplesrelatetohowthetargetofceptionacquires,registers,processes,andultimatelyperceives Deception | 177
Dedataandinformationabouttheirworld.TheyareTruth,Denial,ceit,andMisdirection.(Bennett&Waltz,2007)SeeTable7.4.1.Truth:Alldeceptionworkswithinthecontextofwhatistrue.2.Denial: Denying the target access to the truth is the prerequisite to all deception. 3. Deceit: All deception requires deceit. 4. Misdirection: Deception depends on manipulating what the target registers. See Table 7.4. Table 7.4 Deception DECEPTION DECEPTION DECEPTION DECEPTION Truth Denial Deceit Misdirection All deception works within the context of what is true denying Denying the target access to the truth is the prerequisite to all deception. All deception requires deceit. prrwhamanipuladependsDeceptionontingtthetargetegistersovide Provides the target with real data and blocksinfaccurateormation Blocks the target’s access to real data and infaccurateormation. Provides the target with false data and wrong or infmisleadingormation. rfathewherDetermineseandwhentarget’sttentionisocused:whategisters It does.beliewhaand,andperprrhoinfluenceswthetargetegisters,ocesses,andceivesdatainformationultimately,tthetargetvesand It does.beliewhaand,andperprrhoinfluenceswthetargetegisters,ocesses,andceivesdatainformationultimately,tthetargetvesand It does.beliewhaand,andperprrhoinfluenceswthetargetegisters,ocesses,andceivesdatainformationultimately,tthetargetvesand It does.beliewhaand,andperprrhoinfluenceswthetargetegisters,ocesses,andceivesdatainformationultimately,tthetargetvesand perDeceptionisthedeliberateattempttomanipulatetheceptionsofthetarget.Ifdeceptionistowork,theremustbe 178 | Deception
strhonestdeafoundationofaccurateperceptionsthatcanbemanipulated.Allceptionworkswithinthecontextofwhatistrue(or).(Mitchell,1986,p358)Denialanddeception(D&D)istheuniversaldescriptionforategicdeception. Denial blocksthetarget’saccesstorealdata candaccurateinformationandcanbeconsideredastandaloneoncept;itisthelinchpintodeception.Denial’sothertermsare security,secrecy,cover,dissimulation,masking,orpassivedeception. toosisignalsthacinDenialprotectsthedeceiver’srealcapabilitiesandtentions.(Bennett&Waltz,2007)Alldeceptionrequiresdeceit.ThemethodsofDenial(secrecy,oncealment,andsignalreduction)reduceoreliminatetherealtthetargetneedstoformaccurateperceptionsofatuation.(Dewar,1989)Misdirectionisthemostfundamentalprincipleofallpracticiansfmagic.Inmagic,misdirectiondirectstheaudience’sattentionwardstheeffectandawayfromthemethodthatproducesit. ThreeexamplesofUASAttackscouldbe Destruction,Disruption, or Deception (D/D/D) (Dorn,2021)presentsthreeattacksoncriticalinfrastructurethat couldbedevelopedfor Destruction,Disruption,orDeception (D/D/ D). WthearobjeExposuracpersonnel.Thewpurposes.ThemoderdeobjestrucDependingontheterroristobjectives,theUASpayloadscouldbeturedtodeliverweaponsforanyofthethreeDs.Theeasiestctive(bestterroristcasefortheirinvestment)wouldbeceptionwhichwouldprovidetestingofdefensesforISRatecasewouldbeDisruptionofservicesandorst-caseandbestdefendedwouldbetousetualCBRNagents.Chancesoflethalsuccesswouldbeminimized.ewouldbemaximized.Italldependsontheattacker’sctiveandhowlethaltheplansaretoaccomplishtheirgoals.Attack1:RonaldReaganNationalAirport(RRNA).DHSdesignatedeaaroundRRNAa-defend-at-all-costsassetinmetropolitanashington,DC.MultiplelargeUAS(calledmotherships)carrying Deception | 179
ordestrarargrnuclemultiplenucleoutsidectplan99operwshutdoplanarpaobseroandowpoterrPlecWmothershipstodivandinactrestablishemultipletarmultiplesmallerUAS,allcapableofindependentactionagainstgets,presentthemselves.Themothershipsfollowwell-dlow-leveltransitroutes(LLTR)toblendinwithaircraftafficinandoutofRRNAandJointBaseAndrews.TheconfusiontionofFAAcontrollerswouldbelongenoughfortheertanddroptheirloadofsmallerUAS/drones.hatdistinguishestheD/D/Dcasesarethepayloads.PayloadsouldbeCBRNEagents,talcumpowderandfirecrackers,orpaperafletsforaPSYOPSdeception.Inallthree,thetargetwillsufferanic,andthemediacoveragewillguaranteeavictoryfortheorists.(Dorn,2021)Attack2:MultipleUASengageinattacksonmultiplenuclearwerplantsontheeastcoast.BylaunchingmultipleUASinaSWARMformation,terroristsouldconductoverflightsofessentialplantswithinagiverregionverwhelmthefirstresponderandLEOassets.ThedispersalfpowderorliquidswouldcausePaniconlyiftheplantworkersvedit.AssumingafixeddispersalunitandaCBRNagentsyload,plantworkerswouldwalkorrunthroughthecontaminatedea(parkinglot,facilitygrounds)andcarrytheagentsintothet.TheSOPfornuclearplantswouldbethattheplantwouldbewnoncearadiationleakalarmwastriggered.Allpersonnelouldbeevacuated.Figure7.1showstheapproximatelocationsofatingnuclearpowerplantswithintheU.S.These99nucleartsprovide19.7%oftheU.S.dailyelectricalrequirements.Thewoprimetargetswouldbethedome-shapedstructuresandtheoolingtowers.ItisprobablethataSWARMattackonarpowerplantswouldsucceed.(Dorn,2021)Thearreactorissafeandguardedbyten-foot-thicksteel-einforcedwalls,concrete,andadome.Theplant’sturbines,enerators,condensers,spentfuelrodfacilities,andcoolingtowersenotbuilttothesamestandard.(Dorn,2021)suggests“thatthereenotactics,techniques,andtechnologiestodeter,deny,disrupt,oythethreatthatUASposestothenuclearexplosive 180 | Deception
misdir20UUVlandoronthewtheterrpurses,orvUanopenstadiumfille(CBMultipleUDefDisruptivscfrR.K.,20infrbookbutcCBordinanceandmitigatingtheeffectsofaUASoverflightinwhichRNagentswerereleasedontheemployeesandcompound.”Theauthorsdisagree.Classifiedsystemsarenotcoveredinthisertainlyexist.Non-classifieddefensesforcriticalastructureattacksofthissortarecoveredindetailin(Nichols20).NewC-UASsystemsarecomingonstreameverydayommultiplevendorsandinterestsaswewritethischapter.Theenarioisinterestingbutnotsobleak.(Nichols&Sincavage,eTechnologieswithApplicationsinAirline,Marine,andenseIndustries,2021)(NicholsR.K.,2020)Attack3.Expansionofauthor’sintroductorystadiumattack.ASorSWARMequippedwithseveralgramsofexplosiveRNagentsorfentanyl,Trichloroisocyanuricacid,orcarfentanilextremelylethalinsmallamounts)coulddispersethemfromabovedwithspectatorsduringasportingevent.TheASscouldbelaunchedoutofmultiplebriefcases,backpacks,largeehiclesoutsidethestadium.Asafedistanceisaplusfororists.ThesameagentscouldbelaunchedfromaUSSoraterwhilepassingoutsidethestadium.(Dorn,21)AllthreeoftheaboveattackswouldinvolveD&Doperationstoectthedefendingforces. Taxonomy of Technical Methods of Deception TheTherearefourbasictoolsetstoimplementdeceptionobjectives.yare:1.Methodstoinfluencesensingchannels,eitherbyhumansensesdirectlyorthroughremotesensorsemployedtoextendthehumansenses.2.Methodsemployedtodeceivesignalandcomputerprocesses3.Deceptivemethodsemployedinthehumanintelligence(HUMINT)tradeexploitintelligenceorganizations’informationchannels.(Bennett&Waltz,2007) Deception | 181
See Table 7.5 for more detail. Figure 7.1 Operating Nuclear Power Plants within the U.S. Source: (EnergyJustice.net, 2022) Table 7.5 Categories of Deception Channels and Methods 182 | Deception
Tool Set MChannelsanipulated F/Truealse MIRevealnDeceptionatrix MIConcealnDeceptionatrix CC&DChannels DeceptionConcealment,Camouflage, human(sensorsPhysicaltechnical&sense) True Reveal limited real units & activities to show sensisensorinfluencstrength,erenemycoverage,tivities; facilidual-usaghiddensurtounderfaciliAcsupprrthermal,rpainCamouflaget&nets;adarnets,audio,adarsignatureessiontivitiesintiesgroundavoidveillanceoreties speelephenomena,phManipulaPprinciples:Governinghysics,teysicalctromagneticctra. True Reveal true wnoncmisdir“prdual-useccommercialapabilityoffacilities,ovidetruecover”toectfromommercialeapons.use DeConcCamouflagCC&DChannelse,ealment,ception False Thermal, radar, audio Psimulasignaturetion.hysicalvehicle & facility decoys cCC&DemeeOMaintainPSEConxistingthods&xtentofapabilities ( ECMneequipment,ts,decoys,support). Signals Channels/ / D & D orsymbolicAbstrChannels:actepresentationsfinformation True Reveal opercaserdehoneinfalluringlimitedormationonypots(ceptivenetworkvers)tolurettackersandonductstingations wdisguisedPmessaghidingsteganogr&Cryptographicaphices;olymorphic(ynamic)oformcodeor cyber Ryan,(Nicholsweapons&2000) Deception | 183
inftiminginfmanipulatheLogPrinciples:Governingic/gameory;teormation&oformation FTruealse IandAirApplicTDisruptivSUalsoagDeon/fRtrCommunicationafficsimulation.evealfalseflageedinformationhoneypots.coysoftwareents&traffic–applytodecoyAS(Nichols&incavage,eechnologieswithationsinline,Marine,Defensendustries,2021). humanc&vulneropponenknoOMaintainPSEConwntabilitiespenetrationapabilities Human & channelsMedia publicindividual&ininHChannels:umanterpersonalteraction; True Reveal valid sources of classified ( prinfnon-damagbuting)ormationtoovide Bona Fides to double agent Agent channel cover stories conceal the existence of oper&thechannels&orprCooperagentations;vert(black)opagandaganizationsmediahidetruesourcefundingofations. vemotioncperhumanmanipulapsyprinciples:Governingchology;tetrust,ception,ognition,&olition 184 | Deception
Human & channelsMedia False False reports, feeds, papers, plans, codes, False agent channels to cdistractounterintelligence acrprtomonioperagOMaintainPSEConentations;torassetsvalidateoductivity,eliability&curacy Source: (Bennett & Waltz, 2007) pp.114 modified from Table 4.1 sensorthauseacdeTable7.5exposesawidevarietyofChannelsandmethodsforception.UAScaninterfacewithmuchofthematrixtosupporttivedeploymentlogistics.Let’scontemplatehowUASmightbedwiththedeceptioncategories.TherearetwomaincategoriestUAScanbeusedtoachieveadeceptionobjective:CC&DychannelsandD&Dsignalchannels. TechnicalSensorCamouflage,Concealment,andDeception (CC&D) phmuniwb20Ele2015)((infrspeeha20Unmannechannels.UASsystemssyncwellwiththefirstcategoryofmanipulated(NicholsR.K.,Chapter18:CybersecurityCounterdAircraftSystems(C-UAS)andArtificialIntelligence,22)Technicalcamouflage,concealment,anddeception(CC&D)vealonghistoryinwarfare,hidingmilitarypersonnelandquipmentfromlong-rangehumanobservationwithinthevisiblectrum.ModernCC&Dincludesavarietyofelectro-optical,ared,andradarsensorsthatspantheelectromagneticspectrum.AdamyD.L.,EW104:EWagainstanewgenerationofthreats,AdamyD.L.,EW103:TacticalBattlefieldCommunicationsctronicWarfare,2009)(AdamyD.L.,SpaceElectronicWarfare,21)FromamilitaryPOV,UASmaybeusedtopreventdetectionysurveillancesensors,thentodeny/ordisrupttargetingbyeaponssystems,andultimatelytodisruptprecision-guidedtions.ThefocusofCC&Distousephysicallawstosuppressysicalphenomenaandobservablesignaturesthatenableremote Deception | 185
backgrdetectionbydiscriminationofthetarget’ssignaturefromanaturalound.(Bennett&Waltz,2007)(Bennett&Waltz,2007)definestheelementsofCC&Das: Camouflage usesnaturalorartificialmaterialonpersonnel, enemobjects,ortacticalpositionstoconfuse,mislead,orevadethey.Theprimaryphenomenasuppressedbycamouflageinclude:•Aspectralsignature,whichdistinguishesatargetbyitscontrastfrombackgroundspectraorshadows,•Aspatialsignature,whichdistinguishesthespatialextent,shape,andtextureoftheobjectfromthenaturalbackgroundobjects,•Spatiallocation,whichisrelativetobackgroundcontext,identifiesatarget,and•Movementdistinguishesanobjectfromthenaturalbackgroundandallowsdetectionbymovingtargetindicator(MTI)sensorsthatdiscriminatephaseshiftofreflectedradarorlaserenergy Concealment istheprotectionfromobservationorsurveillance.It caninclude blending,wherepartsofthescenearecombinedto renderthepartsindistinguishable.Itmayalsoinclude cover installameasurestoprotectaperson,plan,operation,formation,ortionfromenemyISRandinformationleakage. Deception:performsthefunctionofmisdirection,modifying assesignaturestopreventrecognitionoftrueidentityorcharacteroftoractivityandproviding spoofed(false) or decoy signatures 2019Unmannepenewactoattracttheattentionofsensorsawayfromtherealassetsortivities.Approachingfromaboveatnightwithoutlights,littlesound,onaaypointnavigationmode,andlethalpayloads,UASareasignificanttrationelementwithCC&Dinsitu.(Nichols&Mumm,dAircraftSystemsintheCyberDomain,2ndEdition.,) 186 | Deception
UASplaysaninterestingpartinsensordeception,suppression
Information
thedeploICounchawiTherearetwosidestothecoinwhendiscussingIO.anddeceptionthUAS/UUVasthedeploymentmechanisms.OnonesideUASvemanycybervulnerabilitiesthatcanbeexploited.Theseareoveredindetailin:(NicholsR.K.,Chapter18:CybersecurityterUnmannedAircraftSystems(C-UAS)andArtificialntelligence,2022).Ontheotherside,theUAScanbeconsideredymentagentfordeception’sbroadnetworkinformation
Deception | 187
CEA
&prprnasensorthaF(SencrEWTherAcloselyrelatedscienceintersectswithEW,andthatisCyber.earedistinctparallelsandintersectionsbetweenCyberand.Forinstance,thesisterofsignalspreadingtechniquesisyption.Figure7.2showstheintersectionofCyber,EW,andpectrumWarfaredesignatedasCyberElectromagneticActivitiesCEA)(Army,FM3-38CyberElectromagneticActivities,2014).igure7.3putsCEAintheperspectiveoftotalwar.(Askin,2015)NotetCEAischaracterizedbysignalandcommunications.Strategicydeceptionprotectslarge-scale,long-term,high-valuetionalassets(e.g.,WMDDprograms,advancedresearch,andoductionfacilities,relatedconstructionandtestingactivities,oliferationactivities)andlarge-scalemilitaryactivities.(BennettWaltz,2007) Operations (IO)
the(Bennewispoooperelebackgrofsignalsofgroundtargets,andblendingtheirsignaturesintooundclutter.UAScanuseactiveCC&Dtodeceiveradarctro-opticalsensorsintheair.Atsea,UAScandeceivesonarationsorinjectcyberweaponsintoshipnavigationsystemstoflocationfixes.(Nichols&Sincavage,DisruptiveTechnologiesthApplicationsinAirline,Marine,andDefenseIndustries,2021)tt&Waltz,2007)BeforewedetailtheSignalandISD&Drelationships,wereviewCyber-ElectromagneticActivitiesenvironment.(CEA)
nechannel.Mostofthemethodsandattacktoolscanexploitthetworkchannels.DeceptioninIO.includes:(DoD-02,2018) Communicationselectronicwarfare (CEW)CEWprotectsand signalinattackscommunicationnetworks.Signaldeceptionisemployedtotercept,capture,andmanipulatefree-spacecommunications’envelopesandinternalcontents.(Poisel,2002) Computernetworkexploitation (CNE).CNEemploysintelligence operations to: • Obtain information resident in files of threat automated information systems (AIS) • Gain information about potential vulnerabilities, • Access critical information resident within foreign AIS that benefits friendly forces. tarCNEoperationsemploydeceittosurvey,penetrate,andaccessgetednetworksandsystems.(CJCSI,2022) Computernetworkattack (CNA)CNAemploysoperationsusing 20aCyberDomain,2ndEdisystems(Nichols&Mumm,Unmannecinfinformationsystemstodisrupt,deny,degrade,ordestroyormationresidentincomputersandcomputernetworksoromputersandnetworksthemselves.(USAF,January4,2002)CNAalsobroadlycoversSCADAattacksonUAS,GPS,andGNSSdAircraftSystemsinthetion.,2019).CNAisalsousedinSpoofingttacksonvesselsatsea.(Humphreys&al.,2008)(Nichols&al.,20)InCEW,CNE,andCNAdomains,deceptionisappliedto exploita vulnerability such as 188 | Deception
• 1) Spoof an I.P. address by direct exploitation of the protocol’s lack of authentication or • 2) Exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability to insert code to enable subsequent access; Or induceavulnerability inasystemtocauseanetworkfirewall terminologneandCNA.(Nichols&al.,20inonbothhumanandcmomisconfigurationtoenableaccessorescalateprivilegedaccess–vefromunauthorizedtorootaccess.CNAattackersusedeceitomputerassets.Theessentialelementsarevadingtrustordestroyingintegrity.(Bennett&Waltz,2007)UASareoftenusedasthedeploymentvehicleforcyberweapons20)Table7.6ShowstheComputertworkoperations(CNO)deceptionmatrixmethodsandyadoptedbytheCommunity. Table 7.6 Representative CNO Deceptive Operations Deception | 189
Present C as a valid service; track all users to lure, monitor users’ activity without authorization (Rowe, 2004)
Description / Example Conceal facts (dissimulation) Cryptography
Openly hide A by encryption process protected by public or private key (Nichols R. K., ICSA Guide to Cryptography, 1999) Steganography Secretly hide A within open material protected by a secret hiding process and private key (Wayner, 2008) Trojan or Backdoor concealment hides Hide C within A: conceal malicious code within a valid process; dynamically encrypt code ( polymorphic) or wrap code while not running memory to avoid a static signature detection; reduce trace logs (Skoudis, 2004).
QuadrMDeceptionatrixant MDeceptiveechanism
Present C to B as A, then C to A as B. Establish trusted links. Control information exchange (Schneier, 1995) Honeypot / Honeynet
190 | Deception
Present C as B to A; spoof a service, A, to execute a code C when appearing to request B by exploiting a vulnerability in the service (Skoudis, 2004)
Present C as B to A: spoof IP address or repeating captured authentication information (Skoudis, 2004) Buffer overflow
cSessiono-intercept
Intercept and replay security-relevant information to gain control of the session, channel, or process; co-opt a browser before a user can access it (Schneier, 1995)
Session Hijack Capture session information/ credentials from B and present A as B (Skoudis, 2004)
(MIM)Man-in-the-Middle
Reveal fiction (simulation) (Masqueradedecoy)
Denial of Service (DOS) Request excessive services from A, issue false requests from distributed hosts, clog the system. (R.K. Nichols & Lekkas, 2002) Reroute Route traffic intended for A to B: control routing information to intercept, disrupt or deny traffic requests (Skoudis, 2004). ficConcealtion cdeoperWithholdationalceptionapabilities. Maintain COMSEC, OPSEC, TRANSEC to protect CNA and CND capabilities Reveal fact (selective) disclosurSelectivee and conditioning Publish limited network capabilities – reduce attacker sensitivity asrhostsorserNote:TablegivesgeneraldescriptionsofactionsoncomputervicesorserversA,B,andC.Eachmethodhasoneeference.Therearemanyineachcategory,andcertainlyupdatedwemarchforward.Source:ModifiedfromTable4.5p124of(Bennett&Waltz,2007) Figure 7.2 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities Deception | 191
Source: (Army, FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, 2014) Figure 7.3 CEA / CEW in the view of Total War 192 | Deception
Source: (Askin, 2015) analclandestinesensors.ThesurD&DnaSensordeceptionactivitiesintheCEWspherearedesignedtotionaltechnicalmeanssuchasspacereconnaissanceandveillance,globalfixedsensordetectionnetworks,andythwartintelligencediscoveryandysis. Signal and Information Systems (IS) Denial and Deception se&DeUASisexceptionallywellsuitedtoSignalandInformationDenialception(D&D)Operations.Thiscategoryoftechnicalmethodsekstodeceivetheinformationchannelprovidedbyelectronic Deception | 193
logDeaThesemedeCyberairandselphinfluencsystems.Thesemethodsissuedeceptivesignalsandprocessesthateautomatedelectronicsystemsratherthanthesensorsofysicalprocesses.(Bennett&Waltz,2007)UAS/UUVarethenewynchpinsforelectronicwarfare(EW)andcyberwarfare(CW)ina.(Nichols&Mumm,UnmannedAircraftSystemsintheDomain,2ndEdition.,2019)[10]Thesecondcategory(Table7.5)oftechnicalmethodsseekstoceivetheinformationchannelprovidedbyelectronicsystems.thodsusedeceptivesignalsandprocessesthatinfluenceutomatedelectronicsystemsratherthanphysicalsensors.ceptioninvolvesthemanipulationofsignalsandsymbolstodefyicprocessing.(Bennett&Waltz,2007)
salooksin&RAir20gEle2004EW101AFinhisEWseries.(ThesubjectofE.W.iscoveredbyoneofmymostreveredmentorsAdamyD.-0.,2015)(AdamyD.,2009)(AdamyD.irstCourseinElectronicWarfare,2001)(AdamyD.L.,)(AdamyD.L.,EW103:TacticalBattlefieldCommunicationsctronicWarfare,2009)(AdamyD.L.,EW104:EWagainstanewenerationofthreats,2015)(AdamyD.L.,SpaceElectronicWarfare,21)OurseriesalsolooksatE.W.in(Nichols&Mumm,UnmannedcraftSystemsintheCyberDomain,2ndEdition.,2019)(Nicholsyan,2000)(R.K.Nichols,2020)(R.K.Nichols&Lekkas,2002)tothewirelesssecurityfieldanditsinterrelationshipswithtellitetelemetry,EW,andCybersecurity.
Electronic Warfare (EW)
EW ElectrGeneralitiesonicwarfare(EW) isdefinedastheartandscienceof preservingtheuseofthe electromagneticspectrum(EMS) for ligAFfriendlyusewhiledenyingitsusebytheenemy.(AdamyD.,EW101irstCourseinElectronicWarfare,2001)TheEMSisfromD.C.tohtandbeyond. Legacy EW definitions 194 | Deception
• EW was classically divided into (Adamy D., EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, 2001) • ESM – Electromagnetic Support Measures – the receiving part of EW; • ECM – Electromagnetic Countermeasures – jamming, chaff, flares used to interfere with operations of radars, military communications, and heat-seeking weapons; • ECCM -Electronic Counter-Counter Measures – measures are taken to design or operate radars or communications systems to counter the effects of ECM.[11] ESisdif(NotincludedintheEWdefinitionswereAnti-radiationWeaponsARW)andDirectedEnergyWeapons(DEW).USAandNATOhaveupdatedthesecategories:•ES–ElectronicwarfareSupport(oldESM)tomonitortheR.F.environment;•EA–ElectronicAttack–theoldECMincludesARWandD.E.weapons;todeny,disrupt,deceive,exploit,anddestroyadversaryelectronicsystems.•EP–ElectronicProtection–(oldECCM)(AdamyD.,E101AFirstCourseinElectronicWarfare,2001)toguardfriendlysystemsfromhostileattack.[12]ferentfromSignalIntelligence (SIGINT). SIGINTcomprises CommunicationsIntelligence (COMINT) andElectronicIntelligence (ELINT). Allthesefieldsinvolvethereceivingofenemy Wtransmissions.(AdamyD.,EW101AFirstCourseinElectronicarfare,2001) COMINT receivesenemycommunicationssignalstoextract intelligence. Deception | 195
ELINT usesenemynon-communicationssignalstodeterminethe deELINTsystemscenemy’sEMSsignaturesothatcountermeasurescanbedeveloped.ollectsubstantialdataoverlargeperiodstosupporttailedanalysis. ES/ESM collectsenemysignals,eithercommunicationornonEleandeleenemleTheraboutthosesignalsorthewcommunication,withtheobjectofdoingsomethingimmediatelyeaponsassociatedwiththosesignals.eceivedsignalsmightbejammed,ortheinformationsenttoathalresponder.Receivedsignalscanbeusedtotypeandlocatethey’stransmitter,locateenemyforces,weapons,distribution,ctroniccapability.(AdamyD.,EW101AFirstCourseinctronicWarfare,2001)[13]The informationchannels ofEWincluderadaranddatalink 2019Unmannesystems(systems,satellitelinks,navigationsystems,andelectro-optical(EO)e.g.,laserradarandEOmissileseekers.)(Nichols&Mumm,dAircraftSystemsintheCyberDomain,2ndEdition.,) EA methodsincludejammingtechniquesthatdegradesignal cprocessingsystems’detectionanddiscriminationperformanceandomplementarydeceptiontechniques.(Bennett&Waltz,2007) Electromagneticdeception(EMD) isdefinedasthedeliberate Tinserdefneutreleinenhancradiation,re-radiation,alteration,suppression,absorption,Denial,ement,orreflectionofelectromagneticenergyinamannertendedtoconveymisleadinginformationtoanenemyorenemyctromagnetic–dependentweapons,therebydegradingoralizingtheenemy’scombatcapability.(Army,JointDoctrineorElectronicWarfare–JointPub3-51,April7,2000)Theseceptiveactionsincludeexploitingprocessingvulnerabilities,tingtoomanysignaturesinthedetectionbuffer,andspoofing.able7.7presentataxonomyofEMDtechniqueswithintheformat 196 | Deception
gEleofthedeceptionmatrix.(AdamyD.,EW101:AFirstCourseinctronicWarfare,2001)(AdamyD.L.,EW104:EWagainstanewenerationofthreats,2015) Spoofing – GPS Spoofing time.rrGPSsignalcaptursimilartotheoriginftorSpoofing–ACyber-weaponattackthatgeneratesfalsesignalseplacevalidones.GPSSpoofingisanattacktoprovidefalseormationtoGPSreceiversbybroadcastingcounterfeitsignalsinalGPSsignalorbyrecordingtheoriginaledsomewhereelseatsomeothertimeandthenetransmittingthesignal.TheSpoofingattackcausesGPSeceiverstoprovidethewronginformationaboutpositionand(T.E.Humphrees,2008)(Tippenhauer&et.al,2011)SpoofingTechniques Accordingto(Haider&Khalid,2016),therearethreecommonGPS simplistic,Spoofingtechniqueswithdifferentsophisticationlevels.Theyareintermediate,andsophisticated.(Humphreys&al.,2008)The simplisticspoofingattack isthemostcommonlyused doescSAlmosNtosignalsimulatechniquetospoofGPSreceivers.ItonlyrequiresaCOTSGPStor,amplifier,andantennatobroadcastsignalswardstheGPSreceiver.ItwasperformedsuccessfullybyLosationalLaboratoryin2002.(Warner&Johnson,2002)implisticspoofingattackscanbeexpensiveastheGPSsimulatoranrun$400Kandisheavy(notmobile).TheavailableGPSsignalnotsynchronizesimulatorsignals,anddetectioniseasy.Inthe intermediatespoofingattack,thespoofingcomponent prtbrestimaaspooconsistsofaGPSreceivertoreceiveagenuineGPSsignalandfingdevicetotransmitafakeGPSsignal.TheideaistotethetargetreceiverantennapositionandvelocityandthenoadcastafakesignalrelativetothegenuineGPSsignal.ThisypeofspoofingattackisdifficulttodetectandcanbepartiallyeventedbyusinganIMU.(Humphreys&al.,2008)Insophisticatedspoofingattacks,multiplereceiver-spoofer Deception | 197
ainthisscwhichtheangdirdevicestargettheGPSreceiverfromdifferentanglesandections.Theangle-of-attackdefenseagainstGPSspoofinginleofreceptionismonitoredtodetectspoofingfailsenario.Theonlyknowndefensesuccessfulagainstsuchanttackiscryptographicauthentication.(Humphreys&al.,2008)[14]Notethatpriorresearchonspoofingwasto exclude thefake signalsandfocusonasinglesatellite.ECD(nextsection) includes prthefakesignalonaminimumoffoursatellitesandthenogressively/selectivelyeliminatestheireffectuntilthereal weaker GPS signals become apparent. (Eichelberger, 2019) EICHELBERGER’S CD–COLLECTIVEDETECTIONMAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD LOCALIZATION APPROACH (ECD) Returningtothespoofingattackdiscussion, Dr.Manuel Eichelberger’s localizationapprCD–Collectivedetectionmaximumlikelihoodoach , hismethodnotonlycan detect spoofing attacksbutalso mitigate them!TheECDapproachisarobust thosesignalsomeknoThisenablesow(Wfunder19montheTEXBactoencrspooprdifalgorithmtomitigatespoofing.ECDcandifferentiatecloserferencesbetweenthecorrectandspoofedlocationsthaneviouslyknownapproaches.(Eichelberger,2019)COTShaslittlefingintegrateddefenses.MilitaryreceiversusesymmetricallyyptedGPSsignals,subjecttoa“replay”attackwithasmalldelayconfusereceivers.ECDsolveseventhetoughesttypeofGPSspoofingattack,onsistingofspoofedsignalswithpowerlevelssimilartotheuthenticsignals.(Eichelberger,2019)ECDachievesmedianerrorsATdataset,thede-factoreferencedatasetortestingGPSanti-spoofingalgorithms.(Ranganathan&al.,2016)esson,2014)TheECDapproachusesonlyafewmillisecondsorthofrawGPSsignals,so-calledsnapshots,foreachlocationfix.ffloadingofthecomputationintotheCloud,allowingwledgeofobservedattacks.[1]ExistingspoofingmitigationthodsrequireaconstantstreamofGPSsignalsandtrackingvertime.Computationalloadincreasesbecausefake 198 | Deception
2019signalsmustbedetected,removed,orbypassed.(Eichelberger,) Table 7.7 Standard Taxonomy of Representative Electromagnetic (EM) Deception Techniques Deception | 199
Deception
Navigation beaconing: intercept and rebroadcast beacon signals on the same frequency to cause inaccurate bearings and navigation solutions
EW Deception Techniques
Simulative EM deception: simulate friendly or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces Saturation and Seduction decoys to misdirect, overload signal generators, or cause fire control to break the lock on the intended targets conceal ficConcealtion Withhold deception capabilities until the surprise project Protect electronic deception emissions modes—husbandand assets.
cSurveillanceonditioning display Display signatures and selected capabilities to desensitize radar/overwatch surveillance |
Conceal Facts (dissimulation)
Type 2 manipulative EM deception: convey misleading EM telltale indicators that hostiles may use deceptive Deceptive jamming to induce error signals within receiver–processor logic or range estimation errors
QuadrMDeceptionatrixant DeceptionElectromagneticCategories
Type 1 manipulative EM eliminadeception:terevealing, EM telltale indicators that hostile forces may use radar Radar Cross Section (RCS) suppression by low observable methods: radar absorption materials or radar energy redirection to reduce effective ConcRCSeal signals within wideband spread-spectrum signals (sequence, frequency hopping) Radar chaff and cover jamming to reduce signal quality and mask the target’s signature
Reveal facts
200
Reveal fiction (simulation) Imitative EM deception: introduces EM energy into enemy systems imitates emissionsenemy Radar signature, IFF [15] spoofing; store, repeat, or imitate RCS, power signatures, or IFF codes to appear as the enemy system signals,
PubthrSources:(AdamyD.L.,EW104:EWagainstanewgenerationofeats,2015)(Army,JointDoctrineforElectronicWarfare–Joint3-51,April7,2000)(Bennett&Waltz,2007) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) DeceptiontechniquesarealsoemployedwithSIGINTagents/ EletoCr(K.,Chapter18:CyberseinfCOccommunity.SIGINTemploysdeceptivemethodstointercept,ollect,andanalyzeexternalandcommunicationsintelligence(MINT).Cryptanalyticdeceptionmethodstogainkeyingormationordisruptorbypassencryptedchannels.[16](NicholsR.curityCounterUnmannedAircraftSystemsC-UAS)andArtificialIntelligence,2022)(NicholsR.K.,ICSAGuideyptography,1999)(Schneier,1995)(Army,FM3-38CyberctromagneticActivities,2014)(Bennett&Waltz,2007)Towit: Ciphertextreplay:Unencryptedciphertextisrecorded,modified, and replayed with a valid key interval to disrupt the target system. Keyspoofing:Impersonateskeydistributionserverandissuesfalse keys to target, then decrypts traffic issued under the false key. Man-in-the-Middle(MIM)Secureatrustedpositionbetweentwo decandpartiesandissuespoofedkeystoboth.Theninterceptsalltrafficcanchangeatwill.Theabovemethodsmaybeusedtointercept/disrupthostileommunicationbyinsertingfalse/misleadingtransmissionstoceiveorreducetheintegrityofcommunicationchannels . (Bennett & Waltz, 2007) CONCLUSIONS 200fmultiplesourmeDeceptionplanningrequirescarefulapplicationofmultiplethodsacrosschannelstolimitatarget’sabilitytocomparecesforconflicts,ambiguities,uncertainties,oreedbackcuestosimulatedorhiddeninformation.(Bennett&Waltz,7)UASsarereasonableagentstodeliverdeceitfulpayloads Deception | 201
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[5] OnMay9,2001,Ghana’stwomostprominentteams—Accra DefDisruptivin(K.,Chapter18:CyberseEdiMumm,Unmanne[fdebigteband[[oper[7[asphmasseshadcletoebutabulleDisasterandhurangrina2orinSHeartsandAsanteKotoko—cametogetherforamatchatAccraportsStadiumthatwouldbecomethedeadliestsportingdisasterAfricanhistory.Duetotheheatednatureoftherivalry,extrasecurityhadbeendered,andtroublehadbeenanticipated.Whenthematchended1AccraHeartsvictory,thematchliveduptoitsexpectations:yKotokofansbeganrippingplasticchairsoutofthegroundlingthemontothepitch.AswiththeEstadioNacional,policerespondedbylaunchingteargasandfiringplastictsintothecrowd—notjustatthoseguiltyofhooliganism,teveryonepresent.Amassivestampedeof40,000fansrushedxitthestadium,resultinginpackedcorridors;bythetimetheared,127laydead,mostfromcompressiveyxiation.6]Theintroductoryballparkexampleexploitsdisinformation.]TheseconceptsareimportanttotheuseofUASindeceptionations.8]ThinkF.B.,Instagram,andeverysocialmediaoutlet.9]Onedoesn’thavetolookfarintoday’ssocietytoseethewagoneffectsofpushinganagendaandhavinggovernment,ch,andthemajorityofnewsoutletsharpingonanyone’sception.Truthshinesthelightonallsituationsbutusuallyisoundouttoolate.10]EWandIO.arecoveredindetailinChapter14(Nichols&dAircraftSystemsintheCyberDomain,2ndtion.,2019).Cyberoperationsarecoveredindetailin(NicholsR.curityCounterUnmannedAircraftSystemsC-UAS)andArtificialIntelligence,2022),andMaritimesecurityvolvingCyberisdiscussedvigorouslyin(Nichols&Sincavage,eTechnologieswithApplicationsinAirline,Marine,andenseIndustries,2021) Deception | 207