Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Fall 2017 by psajournalou

Vol. XVII No. 2

Fall 2017

Oakland University

The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics (ISSN 1556-2034) is published biannually by the Nu Omega Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha, Oakland University, Department of Political Science, 418 Varner Hall, Rochester, MI 48309-4488. The journal is funded by Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, http://www. pisigmaalpha.org. The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics was founded in the spring of 2001 by Delta Omega Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha at Purdue University, under the name The American Undergraduate Journal of Politics and Government. With the sponsorship of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, the name of the Journal was changed to The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics as of the Fall 2004 edition. Electronic editions of the Journal are available online at http://www.psajournal. org. For further information, please contact Dr. Terri Towner at Oakland University (towner@oakland.edu). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the editors and faculty advisors of The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics. The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics and content appearing there- in is copyrighted by Pi Sigma Alpha. While holding these rights, Pi Sigma Alpha does not exert editorial or other control over the content of the Journal or the decisions or actions of its staff in the course of normal business operations. As such, Pi Sigma Alpha neither asserts nor accepts responsibility for the content or actions of staff of the publication in the normal course of business as the customs and usages of the law allow. All assertions of fact and statements of opinion are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, the Editorial Board, the Advisory Board, the Faculty Advisors, Oakland University, or its faculty and administration. COPYRIGHT ÂŠ 2017 PI SIGMA ALPHA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

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The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Fall 2017 Volume XVII

Number 2 Thirty-fourth Edition

Abigail Brown Meredith Kate Hubbell Jana Al-Jarrah Tanir-Vefa Avci Dr. Terri L. Towner

Outreach Editor Scheduling/Content Editor Technology Editor Cover Designer Faculty Advisor

Editorial Board Eleanor Lauer Jana Al-Jarrah Katherine Luongo Tanir-Vefa Avci Anthony Madry Maria Boersma Brian Quinn Abigial Brown Milena Rodriguez Moran Rolland Giberson Margarette Rogensues Ajaypal Gill Savannah Simancek Hannah Gorosh Caroline Wolber Meredith Kate Hubbell Monika Koleci

Advisory Board Dr. Paulette Kurzer Dr. Robert Alexander Dr. Jan Hardt Dr. Nicole Asmussen Mathew Dr. Megan Hershey Dr. Cristian Cantir Dr. Jennifer Hopper Dr. Ivy Cargil Dr. Dwaine Jengelley Dr. Rosalee Clawson Dr. Laura Landolt Dr. Matthew Dabros Dr. Daniel O’Neill Dr. David Dulio Dr. Diana Orces Dr. Natasha Duncan Dr. Christine Pappas Dr. Alan Epstein Dr. Jo Reger Dr. John Klemanski Dr. Harry “Neil” Strine Dr. Jeanine Kraybill Dr. Peter Trumbore © Pi Sigma Alpha 2017

From the Editors The Pi Sigma Alpha Journal of Undergraduate Politics would first and foremost like to acknowledge all those individuals and institutions which make the publication of this Journal possible semester after semester and year after year. The Journal has continued to grow in terms of submissions, quality, and prestige. Admissions to the Fall 2017 edition were both vast in number and constituted a diverse array of topics. We greatly appreciate all those who have submitted their work to the Journal in hopes of being published. The articles published herein exemplify a high quality sample of the types of undergraduate research being conducted across the country. Although the publication is a completely student-run endeavor, the efforts of the student Editorial Board are guided and supported by a number of individuals and institutions which we would like to thank. First, we would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and Executive Committee whose vision and financial support has maintained the quality and direction of the Journal. Second, we would like to thank the Faculty Advisory board: the thorough and constructive reviews provided by the members of this board have ensured the articles published herein meet a consistent standard of quality. Finally, we extend tremendous thanks to Editorial Board Faculty Advisor Terri Towner, who has clocked countless hours to ensure the integrity of the Journal continues to exceed the standards of excellence set by the editors of its previous editions. The Editorial Board at Oakland University is proud to present the Fall Edition which contains a wellrounded set of articles with varied methodological approaches and topical matter. The publishing process for the Fall Edition followed a relatively smooth path from submission to publication, and the Nu Omega Chapter and Oakland University wish the readers of this edition a similarly enjoyable time. Best, The Editors

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Submission of Manuscripts The Journal accepts manuscripts from undergraduates of any class and major. Members of Pi Sigma Alpha are especially encouraged to enter their work. We strive to publish papers of the highest quality in all areas of political science. Generally, selected manuscripts have been well-written works with a fully developed thesis and strong argumentation stemming from original analysis. Authors may be asked to revise their work before being accepted for publication. Submission deadlines are October 1st for the Fall edition and February 1st for the Spring edition. Manuscripts are accepted on a rolling basis; therefore early submissions are strongly encouraged. To submit your work please email psajournalou@gmail.com with an attached Word document of the manuscript. Please include your name, university and contact details (mailing address, email address, and phone number). If possible, include how you heard about the Journal. Submitted manuscripts must include a short abstract (approximately 150 words), citations and references that follow the APSA Style Manual for Political Science. Please do not exceed the maximum page length of 35 double-spaced pages. The Journal is a student-run enterprise with editors and an Editorial Board that are undergraduate students and Pi Sigma Alpha members at Oakland University. The Editorial Board relies heavily on the help of our Advisory Board consisting of political science faculty from across the nation, including members of the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council. Due to the time committed to the manuscript review process, we would like to remind students to submit to only one journal at a time. Please direct any questions about submissions or the Journalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s upcoming editions to our editors at psajournalou@gmail.com.

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Contents The Emerging Crisis: Crime and Trust in the Municipal Government in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Jaymee Westover, Vanderbilt University Losing Religiosity: The Impact of Religious Conflict on Religious Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Katherine Meyer, Santa Clara University Stereotypes and Self-Presentation: How Gender Affects Senate Candidate Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Georgia Konstam, Sewanee, University of the South Complex Democracy: The Framing of the Standing Rock Protests by U.S. Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 William D. Taylor, Allegheny College

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The Emerging Crisis: Crime and Trust in the Municipal Government in Latin America Jaymee Westover, Vanderbilt University This project examines the relationship between crime and institutional trust in Latin America. Previous scholarship has found a strong negative relationship between crime and trust in national-level institutions. Expanding on this foundation, it is argued that crime and insecurity are strong predictors of trust in the municipal government. To test this expectation, data from the 2014/15 round of LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer survey project are examined by employing OLS regression analysis. Findings reveal that crime victimization and insecurity have the expected effects on trust in the municipal government and that both crime victimization and insecurity have similar effects at the national and local levels, prompting questions about the way that citizens assign blame for lack of security provision.

n 2014, almost one out of every three Latin American citizens identified security as the most important issue in their respective countries, a fact that becomes rather unsurprising when one considers the state of crime and violence in the region (Latin American Public Opinion Project 2015). While Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for only about 9 percent of the world’s population in 2015, in that same year, they accounted for approximately one-third of the world’s homicides (Jaitman and Guerrero Compeán 2015). Around 60 percent of robberies in the region are violent, and the number is on the rise (Jaitman and Guerrero Compeán 2015). Citizens are worried about crime and security, and these concerns have important consequences for democracy in the region. To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the average degrees of insecurity in Latin America (0-100).1 This paper examines and offers an explanation for one of those consequences: declining institutional trust. Prior research has shown that crime, through both direct (victimization) and indirect (insecurity) effects, has a clear negative correlation with trust in the key institutions of the justice system, as well as other national-level institutions (Blanco 2013; Carreras 2013; Corbacho, Philipp, and Ruiz-Vega 2015; Malone 2010). What has thus far been understudied, however, is how this same phenomenon affects political trust at the local (municipal) level. Because citizens differentiate between the levels of government when assigning blame for policy failures (Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan 2008), understanding how crime affects local political trust is vital, as it has important policy implications. This project seeks to fill the current gap in research by considering the connections between several crimerelated variables and trust in the municipal government. It is posited that both crime victimization and feelings of insecurity ought to be strong predictors of trust in the municipal government and that these effects should be greater than those on trust in the institutions of the national government. To test

this expectation, survey data from the 2014/2015 round of the AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) are examined by employing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Overall, findings show that both crime victimization and the perception of local insecurity are strong predictors of trust in Figure 1: Average Degrees of Insecurity in Latin America (0100 degrees)

Source: AmericasBarometer 2014, map created by author

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the municipal government. Crime victimization has a negative correlation with this trust, showing that victims report lower levels of trust than non-victims. The perception of neighborhood insecurity has a positive correlation, signifying that the less secure a person feels, the less trust he or she reports. Furthermore, the perception of neighborhood insecurity has a much stronger correlation with trust in both the municipal government and the key institutions of the national government than crime victimization does. Identifying security as the country’s most important issue, however, has a statistically significant effect only on trust in the president. Interestingly, there is a positive relationship between the two variables. Finally, when comparing the effects of the key independent variables on trust in the municipal and national government, both crime victimization and a feeling of neighborhood insecurity have similar effects on both levels of government.

Extant Perspective on Insecurity, Crime, and Trust in Institutions Institutional trust represents citizens’ confidence that institutions (such as congress or the police) will provide beneficial outcomes for them. It is a measure of system support among these citizens, which is “an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively” (Easton 1975, 436). System support can be subdivided into two categories: diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support “refers to evaluations of what an object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does” (Easton 1975, 444). Specific support, on the other hand, focuses more on particular objects or institutions and “varies with perceived benefits or satisfaction,” or how well the institution is performing (1975, 439). Diffuse support for the system may remain even when the output of that system is not desirable for a time; nevertheless, long periods of poor outcomes, and subsequent low specific support, can also lead to a decline in diffuse support. Trust, while similar to specific support in many ways, is a better measure of diffuse support (Easton 1975). “Trust” implies overall confidence in the authority of roles while specific support focuses more on those who fill those roles (Easton 1975). When citizens trust institutions, they express feelings that those institutions will act in their best interests, even if they are subject to little oversight (Easton 1975). Trust is a vital measure of the willingness of citizens to cede authority to those institutions that govern their daily lives (see Carreras 2013; Easton 1975; Malone 2010). Trust in political institutions plays an important role in modern democracies. Effectively, citizen trust in institutions is a representation of their recognition of the institution’s authority (see Dammert 2012). When citizens no longer believe that institutions are representing them well, trust in those institutions declines. This declining trust in the institutions of governance leads to “reduced support for government action 8

to address a range of domestic policy issues,” making it harder for those within the institutions to act to rectify a country’s problems (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000, 239). This relationship holds at both the national and municipal level and can even affect the policy choices that citizens make (Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan 2008; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000). Additionally, institutional trust at the municipal level is vital for successful decentralization of the state, moving power closer to the people (Montalvo 2008). Corbacho, Philipp, and Ruiz Vega (2015, 400) further note that a lack of political trust can lead to a “vicious cycle of poor cooperation, weak institutions, and reduced economic opportunities” and even a decline in political legitimacy. Nevertheless, some studies have noted that a lack of institutional trust can create “critical citizens” that can help improve the way that their democracies function, leading to a counter-intuitive positive outcome (see Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). Norris (1999, 3) defines these critical citizens as those “who adhere strongly to democratic values but who find the existing structures of representative government ... to be wanting.” As these studies primarily focus on well-established Western democracies, however, it is important to examine if the concept of critical citizens transfers well to the Latin American context. Current research implies that it does not. Pérez (2015a), for example, finds that crime victimization in Honduras leads to an increase in authoritarian values. Thus, crime victims – who typically report lower levels of trust in government institutions – begin to support more authoritarian, and less democratic, measures after victimization. Blanco (2013) also notes that those that report a greater feeling of insecurity also record decreased support for democracy. This does not fit with Norris’s (1999) definition of a critical citizenry and demonstrates that this concept may not transfer well to these still-developing democracies. Institutional trust is a vital component of a wellfunctioning democracy, especially in the Latin American context. The current literature further shows, however, that rising levels of crime and insecurity can have disastrous effects on this trust. As Pérez notes, “high levels of crime reflect the state’s failure to provide an essential public good” (2015b, 325326). Because institutional trust represents citizens’ confidence that an institution will provide beneficial outcomes, this failure represents a violation of that trust. Consequently, trust in institutions, especially those directly involved in crime control, declines in high-crime situations. Crime can affect such trust through two measures: feelings of insecurity and personal crime victimization. Many researchers have studied the effects of either or both on trust in particular institutions. Because of their clear relationship with crime control, most studies focus principally on the effects of these variables on trust in the judiciary and trust in the police. Blanco (2013, 38), for example, finds that “perceptions of higher insecurity decrease support and satisfaction with democracy” and “perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization reduce trust in institutions,

The Emerging Crisis: Crime and Trust in the Municipal Government in Latin America

particularly in those that directly deal with crime” such as the police and the courts. Another study further notes that crime victimization has a stronger predicted effect on trust in the police than trust in the judiciary (Corbacho, Philipp, and Ruiz Vega 2015). Malone (2010) notes similar findings, but emphasizes the importance of country-specific context in this relationship, as insecurity plays a greater role in some contexts and victimization in others. She also notes the fear of crime (or feelings of insecurity) at the neighborhood level has a much greater effect on trust in institutions than does a feeling of general insecurity on the national level. Some studies have noted similar effects on system support more generally (see Carreras 2013). Nonetheless, a gap exists in this current research. As mentioned above, a lack of institutional trust has important consequences for both the national and municipal level of government; recent studies, however, have often neglected the latter. Importantly, there are likely key differences between the two, as the “responsibility for crime prevention falls on local, not national governments” in Latin America (Pérez 2015b, 325). Given that this is the case, research such as that done by Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan (2008) would suggest that punishment for lack of crime prevention should fall on the local government more than the national government, as citizens should be able to competently assign blame to the appropriate level of government for such policy failures. This differentiation by citizens emphasizes the importance of studying trust at both the national and municipal levels, as it implies that trust at the municipal level will affect support for the implementation of different policies than trust at the national or state level (Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan 2008). Thus, it is vital that social scientists and politicians alike come to understand the differences in the way that crime and insecurity affect trust at the different levels of government.

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Given this current research, a theoretical framework and related hypotheses that address the links between crime victimization, insecurity, and trust is developed below. For this study, the national government is defined as the president and congress, as these institutions are those most associated with the national government in the minds of citizens.2 Local levels of government are defined as the municipality. This study focuses on three key independent variables to capture both the direct and indirect effects of crime on trust in these institutions: personal crime victimization, the perception of insecurity at the neighborhood level, and the perception of the importance of crime and insecurity at the national level. Crime victimization represents a failure of key governmental institutions to provide safety for the citizens under their care, a violation of the trust that those citizens place in those institutions. Consequently, crime victims consistently

report lower levels of trust in all institutions currently studied than non-victims (Blanco 2013; Carreras 2013; Corbacho, Philipp, and Ruiz-Vega 2015; De Juan and Pierskalla 2016; Malone 2010; Pérez 2015b). This trend is expected to continue for both the municipal government and the institutions of the national government: H1a-c: Crime victims will express lower levels of trust in (a) the municipal government, (b) the president, and (c) the congress than non-victims. With regard to feelings of insecurity and trust in the municipality, the relationship should be similar to that noted above: those who feel less secure should exhibit lower trust in institutions. In other words, the less safe that people feel in the neighborhood in which they live, the less likely they are to express trust in the institutions that should provide security. Consequently, a positive relationship is expected between perception of neighborhood insecurity and trust in all institutions studied here: H2a-c: Reporting feelings of insecurity at the neighborhood level will predict lower levels of trust in (a) the municipal government, (b) the president, and (c) the congress. Additionally, citizens are more keenly aware of that which occurs in their neighborhood because it is closer to them and affects their day-to-day lives more than most events at the national level (O’Neill 1995). Because of the salience of these local contexts, then, it follows that feelings of insecurity at the local level should decrease trust in all institutions more than feelings of insecurity at the national level (see Malone 2010). Furthermore, crime victimization should also decrease trust less than a feeling of local insecurity, as citizens should perceive victimization as an idiosyncratic (rather than systemic) outcome. When citizens believe that crime victimization is simply a case of “bad luck” or being in the wrong place at the wrong time (an idiosyncratic outcome), they are less likely to punish the institutions that should provide safety. If, however, they perceive a more widespread (systemic) problem, they are more likely to assign blame to said institutions. Thus, when citizens perceive victimization as an idiosyncratic outcome, their trust in institutions declines less than if they view it as a systemic problem, as insecurity would be. The following hypothesis, then, also emerges from this discussion: H2d: The effect of a feeling of insecurity at the neighborhood level will be greater than the effect of the other key independent variables. Insecurity, however, is not only a local issue; even in areas where crime is low locally, a perception can exist that insecurity is an important issue for the country as a whole.3 To examine the differing effects that this perception of the importance of insecurity as a national issue has on trust in the institutions of the differing levels of government, the following hypotheses are tested: H3a: Those who report insecurity as the country’s most important problem will register somewhat lower levels of

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trust in the municipal government. H3b-c: Those who report insecurity as the country’s most important problem will register lower levels of trust in (b) the president and (c) the congress. Finally, as each level of government is responsible for implementing different policies, and the government cannot effectively implement these policies without the support of the citizenry (Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan 2008), trust at both the national and municipal levels is vital. When citizens trust in the institutions of the government, they are willing to cede authority to those institutions to act in their best interest. If citizens trust one level of government disproportionately more than another, this may create problems; they will allow that level of government to carry out policies, effective or not, while simultaneously blocking policies from the other level of government (Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan 2008). For this reason, examining both levels of government together is critical. Thus, this research analyzes how crime affects trust in the institutions of both levels of government individually as well as how the relationship between crime and trust varies across levels of government. This allows for a greater understanding of the overall effects of crime on trust and gives a complete picture of the detriment that crime can be to trust and political legitimacy. Because neighborhood insecurity is a clear example of a local issue, it should be more strongly correlated with trust in the municipal government than trust in national-level institutions (Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan 2008). A feeling of national insecurity, on the other hand, should affect nationallevel institutions more than municipal institutions, even if the effect is small. Overall, it is expected that the nationallevel variable (identifying insecurity as the country’s most important issue) will have a greater effect on the institutions of the national government, while local-level variables (crime victimization and perception of local insecurity) will have a greater effect on trust in the municipal government. To test these expectations, the following hypotheses are examined H4a-b: The predicted effects of (a) crime victimization and (b) the perception of neighborhood insecurity will be greater concerning trust in the municipal government than trust in national institutions. H4c: The predicted effect of reporting insecurity as the country’s most important problem will be smaller on trust in the municipal government than trust in national institutions.

Data and Methods The data employed are drawn from the 2014/2015 round of the AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which provides the most rigorous and highly lauded data in the field (Bateson 2012; Blanco 2013; Carreras 2013; Malone 2010; Pérez 2015b).4 The AmericasBarometer includes surveys from 34 Latin American and Caribbean countries; for the purposes of this paper, data only from the 10

18 Latin American countries for which data are collected will be used.5 The sample in each country includes at least 1,500 individuals and is stratified based on the most recent census data to be nationally representative. Furthermore, LAPOP uses the same core questionnaire in each country, allowing for comparisons across national borders. Interviews are conducted face to face in the respondent’s native language and are completely anonymous. All interviewees are selected randomly. LAPOP also enforces strict quality control measures to ensure high-caliber data. To run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses, all independent variables were recoded to run from zero to one. This allows for the comparison of the size of the maximum effect of different independent variables on the dependent variable being studied.6 All dependent variables are recoded from 0 to 100.7

Measuring Trust

In the AmericasBarometer core questionnaire for 2014, LAPOP included a series of questions asking about trust in various governmental and non-governmental institutions. Respondents were given a card showing a ladder with steps numbered one to seven, where one meant “Not at all” and seven meant “A lot.” They were then asked to use the ladder to respond to this series of questions using any number on the scale from one to seven. This series is used to develop measures of trust in the municipal and national levels of government. To gauge a person’s level of trust in the municipal government, surveyors asked, “To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?” (Trust in the Municipal Government).8 Similar questions were used to measure each respondent’s level of trust in the national government (as represented by the executive and congress). The question measuring the level of trust in the executive reads, “To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?” (Trust in the President).9 As for congress, the questionnaire item reads, “To what extent do you trust the National Congress?” (Trust in Congress).10 For all three measures, a low value indicates a lack of trust in that institution, while higher values indicate higher levels of trust. These measures will be independently tested as the dependent variables, each with the independent and control variables described below.11

Measuring Crime

Three measures of crime are included, as previously mentioned: personal crime victimization, the perception of insecurity at the neighborhood level, and the perception of insecurity as the most important issue for the country as a whole. Measuring personal crime victimization is straightforward. The AmericasBarometer core questionnaire includes a question that asks, “Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past

The Emerging Crisis: Crime and Trust in the Municipal Government in Latin America

12 months?”12 This measure (Crime Victimization) focuses on a period that is easy for the respondent to remember and that ascertains that the crime was recent enough to play a role in the respondent’s current opinions. Interviewees could answer either “yes” or “no” with a positive response coded as a one and a negative response coded as a zero. The core questionnaire also includes a measure of the perception of insecurity at the neighborhood level: “Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?”13 Respondents could answer using one of the four provided categories. This variable (Perception of Neighborhood Insecurity) was coded so that a lower number indicates that a respondent feels less safe in his or her neighborhood, and a higher number indicates that a respondent feels safer. For example, an answer of “very safe” receives a score of 1, while “very unsafe” receives a score of 0, and the other answers receive intermediary values. The final measure of crime considers citizens’ feelings on the salience of insecurity as a national issue (Insecurity as Most Important Issue). To create this measure, responses were used from the following core questionnaire item: “In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country?”14 Respondents were not given any specific alternatives and could give any one answer. Interviewers then selected the option that best fits the answer given, with 37 different answers listed along with “Other” for those responses that did not align with any listed answer option. These responses were later coded into five general categories, one of which is “Security,” including such answers as “Crime,” “Security (lack of ),” and “Violence,” among others. The variable measuring this takes a value of 1 if the respondent gave one of the answers in the “Security” category and a value of zero if he or she gave any other answer. This dummy variable allows me to see the different effects that identifying insecurity as the most important issue at the national level and a feeling of insecurity at the neighborhood level have.

Control Variables

To control for potential confounding factors, sociodemographic, attitudinal, and experiential variables are included in this model. The socio-demographic variables included are age, education, wealth, urban location, and gender (Bateson 2012; Blanco 2013; Malone 2010). The attitude- and experience-based variables are bribe victimization, interpersonal trust, and respondents’ evaluation of the economy (Blanco 2013; Carreras 2013; Miller and Mitamura 2003). Age is measured as the respondent’s age based on his or her year of birth.15 Age cohorts are used to organize the data.16 Education Level represents the years of schooling completed at the time of the interview. Respondents are grouped into one of four categories: No Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, and Post-secondary Education. Wealth is based on a series of questions about the assets a household contains,

which are then used to group respondents into wealth quintiles. Urban is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the respondent lives in an urban area and a value of zero if the respondent lives in a rural area, and Female is a dummy variable for gender that takes a value of one if the respondent is female and a value of zero if the respondent is male. Bribe Victimization is an index that measures whether an individual has been asked for a bribe in the past 12 months, whether by a government official, at work, or at school.17 Bribe victims consistently demonstrate lower levels of trust in government institutions and will often generalize that distrust to other institutions, regardless of the institution in which the victimization occurred (Montalvo 2008). Thus, a measure of all types of bribe victimization to ensure unbiased results was included (Blanco 2013). The measure of Interpersonal Trust comes from the question, “And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?”18 Respondents could indicate any of the options mentioned, and higher values indicate higher levels of trust in other community members. It is possible that some individuals may simply be more trusting of others, a trait that may also transfer to institutions; by controlling for interpersonal trust, it is ascertained that these effects are not confounding the crime-trust relationship (Miller and Mitamura 2003). A measure of the Evaluation of the Economy is included, as this is an indirect measure of the evaluation of a person’s perception of the government’s performance (Carreras 2013). When people feel that the economy is going well, they are more likely to rate the incumbent government highly, and they are more likely to punish the incumbent government if they feel that the economy is not going well. To eliminate any potential cross-effects in the analysis, this variable is controlled with the question, “Do you think that the country’s current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?”19 Respondents could answer “Better,” “Same,” or “Worse.” For this variable, higher values indicate a better evaluation of the current economy compared to 12 months prior. Finally, the effects of country-level variables are controlled through the use of dummy variables for each country, as each national context can play a role in the relationship between crime and trust (Carreras 2013; Malone 2010). The results of the OLS regression models are presented below.

Results The remaining analysis proceeds as follows. To test these hypotheses, the relationship between personal crime victimization and trust in each of the three institutions of interest is examined, as well as the relationship between the coefficients representing these effects.20 The relationship

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between the perception of neighborhood insecurity and trust in these institutions is tested. Finally, the effects of a feeling of insecurity at the national level on both the local and national government are examined, continuing to compare how this effect varies across levels of government. Through these analyses and comparisons, new insights are added to the discussion of how crime affects trust in the government in Latin American countries today. The complete results of each regression analysis are presented in Table 1, which lists the coefficients for each variable with the linearized standard error in parentheses. Crime victimization has a statistically significant negative relationship with trust in all institutions examined here, as hypothesized. When someone is a crime victim, they report significantly lower trust in the municipal government, the president, and congress. Consequently, this provides support

for hypotheses H1a-c. The most interesting note about the effects of crime victimization on trust, however, comes to light through a comparison of the coefficients showing the strengths of these effects. Because crime is a more local issue, it was predicted that the coefficient for trust in the municipal government would be larger than the coefficients for the other two institutions (H4a). While the coefficient is indeed the largest of the three, the difference is very small and unlikely to be significant. This implies that crime victimization does not predict a greater decline in trust in the municipal government than trust in the president or congress, which represent the national government. As a result, it appears that victims are not assigning more blame for their victimization to the municipal government than to the national government, and there is no support for hypothesis H4a.

Table 1: OLS Regression Analysis Results Independent Variables

Trust in the Municipal Government

Trust in the President

Trust in Congress

Crime Victimization

-3.422* (0.508)

-3.178* (0.544)

-3.074* (0.480)

Perception of Neighborhood Insecurity

10.533* (0.761)

9.154* (0.805)

7.953* (0.726)

Insecurity as Most Important Issue

0.454 (0.448)

1.522* (0.458)

-0.552 (0.431)

Age Cohort

-10.173* (2.650)

3.738 (2.745)

-14.906* (2.652)

Age Cohort Squared

10.616* (2.797)

2.299 (2.864)

14.066* (2.797)

Education

-5.667* (0.974)

-7.185* (0.986)

-4.150* (0.929)

Wealth

0.092 (0.670)

-4.256* (0.651)

-3.061* (0.629)

Urban

-0.438 (0.633)

-2.568* (0.580)

-3.766* (0.518)

Female

1.854* (0.369)

1.609* (0.381)

2.496* (0.361)

Bribe Victimization

-4.218* (0.532)

-3.327* (0.530)

-3.156* (0.498)

Interpersonal Trust

9.580* (0.762)

4.598* (0.759)

4.355* (0.737)

Evaluation of the Economy

8.987* (0.657)

23.986* (0.609)

11.537* (0.612)

Guatemala

-8.177* (1.523)

-2.397 (1.538)

-10.391* (1.480)

El Salvador

1.23 (1.521)

10.434* (1.384)

-0.465 (1.346)

Honduras

-0.292 (1.539)

12.490* (1.555)

-1.842 (1.413)

Nicaragua

-0.021 (1.557)

14.906* (1.552)

-0.797 (1.430)

Costa Rica

-3.170* (1.451)

-3.897* (1.392)

-6.620* (1.349)

ÂŠ Pi Sigma Alpha 2017

The Emerging Crisis: Crime and Trust in the Municipal Government in Latin America

Table 1: OLS Regression Analysis Results Cont. Panama

-10.979* (1.627)

-2.981* (1.520)

-8.352* (1.529)

Colombia

-10.018* (1.582)

-1.958 (1.540)

-8.325* (1.468)

Ecuador

-5.730* (1.702)

20.904* (1.580)

2.724 (1.553)

Bolivia

-5.658* (1.517)

12.736* (1.455)

-0.91 (1.337)

Peru

-13.764* (1.489)

-3.642* (1.468)

-18.854* (1.429)

Paraguay

-1.015 (1.830)

4.550* (1.646)

-16.190* (1.595)

Chile

1.826 (1.659)

11.687* (1.732)

-11.041* (1.632)

Uruguay

-5.173* (1.643)

12.770* (1.552)

2.749 (1.451)

Brazil

-15.813* (1.655)

-1.081 (1.580)

-16.701* (1.631)

Venezuela

2.241 (1.847)

0.98 (1.720)

-6.319* (1.750)

Argentina

-6.569* (1.901)

2.205 (1.690)

-0.23 (1.539)

Dominican Republic

-10.462* (1.750)

26.491* (1.381)

-5.187* (1.454)

Constant

43.540* (1.487)

33.665* (1.532)

45.654* (1.473)

26747

26727

26229

R-Squared

0.08

0.2

0.1

Note: * p<0.05

Nevertheless, one must also examine the relationship between perception of neighborhood insecurity and trust in these institutions. The less safe that citizens perceive their neighborhoods to be, the lower the level of trust that they report in the institutions of both the municipal and national government (a statistically significant positive correlation). This supports hypotheses (H2a-c). The coefficients representing these effects are much greater than those found for crime victimization, implying that the effects of the perception of insecurity are more important in determining trust in the municipal government, the president, and congress than actual experiences with a crime. This supports the prediction found in hypothesis (H2d). Furthermore, there is a larger difference in the coefficients representing the effect of this variable on the different institutions studied here than there is for the effect of crime victimization. The relationship between the perception of neighborhood security and trust in the municipal government is the strongest of the three institutions with a coefficient of 10.53. Trust in the president follows (9.15), and perception of neighborhood security has the smallest effect on trust in Congress (7.95), although even this effect is strong and significant. Nevertheless, it appears

that these differences in the relative sizes of the coefficients are not large enough to constitute a statistically significant difference. Ultimately, these results imply that citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; trust in the municipal government may decrease more when they feel less safe in their neighborhood than does trust in the institutions of the national government, but this difference may not be statistically significant. This implies potential, but unlikely, support for hypothesis (H4b). One question remains: How does identifying insecurity as the most important issue at the national level affect trust in these institutions? Interestingly, identifying insecurity as the most important issue in the country has a statistically significant effect only in relation to trust in the president. Even more notably, the relationship between these two variables is a positive one. In other words, the citizens that identify insecurity as the most important issue in the country report higher levels of trust in the president than those who name some other issue as most important. This contradicts expectations, and there is no support for hypotheses (H3a-c). It is true, however, that the coefficient for the relationship between this variable and trust in the president is greater than for trust in the municipal government, although this does

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Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

not apply to both national institutions studied. Thus, there is conditional support for hypothesis (H4c). Overall, there is evidence supporting the following hypotheses: H1a-c, H2a-c, and H2d; conditional support for H4c; and little to no support for the following: H3a-c, H4a, and H4b. The perception of neighborhood insecurity is the best predictor of trust in all three institutions, although crime victimization also has statistically significant effects for trust in the municipal government, trust in the president, and trust in congress. A feeling of the salience of insecurity at the national level (as shown by the identification of insecurity as the country’s most important issue), however, only has a statistically significant effect on trust in the president. This effect is positive, contrary to the hypothesized effect.21

Discussion and Conclusion Several important considerations and conclusions emerge from these results: 1. The perception of local insecurity plays a greater role in trust in institutions at both the local and national level than does crime victimization. 2. Crime victims’ trust in all institutions is lower than nonvictims’, and the size of the effect is approximately the same at both the municipal and national level. 3. There is no clear statistically significant difference in the predicted effect of a feeling of local insecurity at the national and municipal levels. 4. Those who identify security as the most important national issue report higher levels of trust in the president, but not in other institutions.22 Below, these conclusions are discussed, along with potential explanations and policy implications. First, the results show that perception of insecurity at the local level predicts trust in institutions at both the local and national level much better than crime victimization does. This has several possible explanations, but one of the most likely comes from the literature on how economic circumstances affect vote choice. Studies in this area suggest that citizens tend to view a decline in personal economic circumstances as an idiosyncratic outcome; in other words, they tend to believe that it is just “bad luck.” In this case, they tend to punish leaders less for what has occurred (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Markus 1988). However, when these citizens perceive the economic decline to be more widespread, they are more likely to assign blame to leaders and seek forms of punishment, often through the ballot box (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Markus 1988). One can view crime victimization and local insecurity in much the same way. Victims may view personal crime victimization as simply “bad luck” – being in the wrong place at the wrong time. When they begin to believe that this is a more widespread issue (as expressed in a feeling of insecurity in the neighborhood), however, they begin to see it as a more systemic problem that the government is not rectifying. Consequently, 14

they assign more blame to government institutions for their feelings of insecurity than for victimization itself (see Pérez 2015b for more information). This relationship also has important implications for policy choice. Because neighborhood insecurity plays a greater role than crime victimization, trust in government institutions may decline even when actual crime levels are low if there is a perception of insecurity in local contexts. Conversely, trust may increase even when the level of crime is high if the government can create a feeling of security. Thus, creating a feeling of security is vital for maintaining trust in institutions at all levels of government in high-crime situations. Second, the results suggest that the predicted decline in trust associated with being a crime victim is the same for the institutions of both the national and municipal government. This finding implies that victims do not differentiate between the local and national government when assigning blame for the lack of safety provision that led to their victimization. The phenomenon mentioned above could also play a role in this finding; if crime victims view their victimization as simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time, they may not assign blame to any one institution in particular more than another. Generalized trust in institutions, then, declines, but at similar levels for each institution. Third, there is no statistically significant difference in the predicted effect of a feeling of local insecurity on trust in the municipal government and on trust in national-level institutions. The coefficients representing the relationship between this variable and trust in the municipal government and the same variable and trust in the president are close enough that the difference is negligible. The disparity in the effects on trust in the municipal government and trust in congress is greater, but still not quite statistically significant. This is an intriguing finding, as conventional logic would suggest that citizens should assign blame more to the local level of government for the local conditions. The lack of a statistically significant difference suggests that they are not doing so, and it raises questions about the cause of this lack of differentiation. Do citizens not consider the local government as responsible for the conditions in their neighborhoods? Are their feelings of insecurity in their locality simply a reflection of larger feelings of insecurity in the country as a whole? Does this relationship become more distinct if the countries are divided by their level of decentralization? While it is still possible that perception of neighborhood insecurity does indeed predict a larger decrease in trust in the municipal government, this study makes it clear that this may not always be the case. Further studies will be needed to examine more deeply how this relationship changes across national contexts and to understand citizen’s reasoning for not assigning more blame to the local level of government. Finally, those who identify insecurity as the most important issue express higher levels of trust, but only in the president. This finding goes against what one might initially think; although these citizens identify insecurity as the most

The Emerging Crisis: Crime and Trust in the Municipal Government in Latin America

important issue in the country, they still trust in the president more than those who identify other issues as most important. One potential explanation for this relationship suggests that citizens feel that security should be prioritized as the most important issue while simultaneously feeling that the president is currently giving this issue precedence. This is consistent with the idea that perception of security is more important than actual security from crime itself; if people perceive that the president is acting to mitigate the problems of insecurity that citizens identify, they are more willing to trust than if they felt he or she were not taking action. Initial evidence suggests that this is not the case, however, as there is a slight statistically significant negative relationship between evaluations of the work the current government is doing in improving citizen security and saying that security is the most important issue.23 Those who identify insecurity as the most important issue tend to report slightly lower levels of satisfaction with the work that the government is doing to provide citizen security, going against this argument.24 Consequently, discovering the explanation for this relationship is an interesting avenue for further study. Overall, both the indirect and direct effects of crime have important consequences for trust in both the municipal and national levels of government in Latin America. A perception of insecurity in the neighborhood is more important than crime victimization in predicting levels of trust in the institutions of all levels of government, and citizens tend to not differentiate between the two levels of government when assigning blame for crime (although there may be some difference in the way that perception of neighborhood insecurity affects trust in the different levels of government upon further study). Furthermore, those who identify insecurity as the most important national issue actually report more trust in the president, and not less, and this finding does not hold for any of the other main institutions studied here. Through these findings, a series of questions for further study emerges. These include: 1. Do these relationships vary depending on the level of centralization in the country? 2. Does the system of government (unitary vs. federalist) affect the relationship between crime and the municipal government? Between crime and the national government? 3. How do these correlations change in different contexts, such as in the United States or other regions of the world? 4. Why do those who identify security as the country’s most important issue trust the president more, rather than less? The answers to these questions will provide further insights into the import of these findings for policymakers and government officials at all levels of government. With this knowledge in hand, they will be able to develop more effective policies against crime in the region and, with diligence, create lasting change. ■

About the Author Jaymee Westover works part time as a research assistant for Dr. Carol M. Swain while raising her one-year-old son. She graduated summa cum laude and with honors from Vanderbilt University in 2017 where she majored in Political Science and Spanish, with a minor in Economics. During her time at Vanderbilt, she was a Program Coordinator for AMIGOS, an organization serving Nashville’s Spanish-speaking population, and participated in a variety of other activities, including Victory Acapella and Sigma Phi Lambda. She also worked as an Undergraduate Research Fellow with the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). In the future she plans to pursue graduate studies in Public Policy and Administration.

notes 1. For more information on how the means of the key independent variables vary by country, see Appendix B. 2. To test the validity of this assumption, prior AmericasBarometer data from LAPOP was employed. In 2008 and 2010, the core questionnaire included a question that asked “To what extent do you trust the national government?” along with similar questions about trust in other key institutions. An OLS regression model tested which governmental institutions correlated best with the national government and found that the president and congress had the strongest positive correlations with this measure. 3. Identifying security as the country’s most important issue is used here as a measure of a feeling of insecurity at the national level. While this is not a perfect measure, it does provide some insight into the respondent’s perception of the state of security in the country. If a respondent feels that his or her country is completely safe, he or she will not identify security as the most important issue facing the country. Thus, the respondent must be identifying some level of insecurity at the national level to identify this at the most salient issue for the country as a whole. 4. The author would like to thank Dr. Mollie Cohen for her help in running additional data analyses. 5. Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic. 6. This is possible because of the utilization of an OLS regression model for the analysis. Ordinary least squares regression estimates the change in the dependent variable given a unit change in each independent variable. When the independent variable is recoded to begin at zero and end at one (a one unit change), a regression analysis will show the maximum effect of that independent variable on the dependent variable after removing the effects of the other independent variables. Thus, this form of recoding allows for the comparison of the maximum effects of each independent variable on the dependent variable in the regression model. The dependent variables are recoded from 0 to 100 for ease of interpretation and comparison of means across countries. 7. In order to verify the results, an ordered logistic regression model was estimated. The results were consistent with what was found in the OLS model presented here. 8. B32. Across all 18 countries, there were a total of 28,578 respondents to this question; the non-response rate was 1.03 percent. 9. B21A. There were 28,557 respondents and a non-response rate of 1.10 percent.

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics 10. B13. There were 27,971 respondents and a non-response rate of 3.13 percent. 11. For information on the correlations between these and other variables, see the correlation matrix in Appendix A. 12. VIC1EXT. There were a total of 28,791 respondents; the non-response rate was 0.29 percent. 13. AOJ11. There were a total of 28, 763 respondents and the non-response rate was 0.38 percent. 14. A4. There were a total of 28,479 respondents and a non-response rate of 1.37 percent. 15. In preliminary testing, age did not have a linear relationship with trust, but rather a parabolic one. To account for this, a variable for both age and age squared was included in the analysis.

Cooper, Christopher, H. Gibbs Knotts, and Kathleen Brennan. 2008. “The Importance of Trust in Government for Public Administration: The Case of Zoning.” Public Administration Review 68 (3): 459-468. Corbacho, Ana, Julia Philipp, and Mauricio Ruiz-Vega. 2015. “Crime and Erosion of Trust: Evidence for Latin America.” World Development 70 (June): 400-415. Dalton, Russell J. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Dammert, Lucía. 2012. Fear and Crime in Latin America: Redefining StateSociety Relations. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

16. The age cohorts are 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, and 66+.

De Juan, Alexander, and Jan Henryk Pierskalla. 2016. “Civil War Violence and Political Trust: Microlevel Evidence from Nepal.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 33 (1): 67-88.

17. EXC2, EXC6, EXC20 (except in Costa Rica), EXC11, EXC13, EXC14, EXC15, and EXC16.

Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” British Journal of Political Science 5 (4): 435-457.

18. IT1. There were a total of 28,366 respondents and a non-response rate of 1.76 percent.

Jaitman, Laura, and Roberto Guerrero Compeán. 2015. Closing Knowledge Gaps: Toward Evidence-Based Crime Prevention Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. Inter-American Development Bank. https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/7240/ ICS_TN_Closing_Knowledge_Gaps.pdf?sequence=1 (Accessed April 5, 2017).

19. SOCT2. There were a total of 28,592 respondents and a non-response rate of 0.98 percent. 20. All analyses were conducted using STATA version 14. Mexico is the baseline country for the country fixed effects. 21. For a detailed breakdown of how these variables related to trust in other government institutions, see Appendix C. 22. A similar relationship may be seen when examining the effect of this variable on trust in the military, however. See Appendix C for more information. 23. The evaluation of the work the current administration in improving citizen security is measured by questionnaire item N1: “To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen security?” Respondents could give any answer between 1 (Not at all) and 7 (A lot). The same basic demographic controls included in the main models were included in this analysis, as well. 24. The author examined if authoritarian values could be causing a spurious relationship here. The effect of identifying security as the most important issue remains even after several measures of authoritarian values are included.

References Archundia, Jaime. 2014. “The Problem with Public Security in Latin America.” https://reboot.org/2014/07/23/the-problem-withpublic-security-in-latin-america/ (Accessed April 17, 2017).

Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 23 (3): 495-527. Latin American Public Opinion Project. 2015. AmericasBarometer 2014. www.LapopSurveys.org (Accessed November 30, 2016). Malone, Mary. 2010. “The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems.” Journal of Politics in Latin America 3: 99-128. Markus, Gregory B. 1988. “The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled CrossSectional Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 32 (1): 137-154. Miller, Allen S., and Tomoko Mitamura. 2003. “Are Surveys on Trust Trustworthy?” Social Psychology Quarterly 66 (1): 62-70. Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. “Decentralize or Centralize? Challenges for Reform of the State and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean.” In Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-2007, ed. Mitchell A. Seligson, Nashville: Latin American Public Opinion Project, 89-118. Norris, Pippa. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Bateson, Regina. 2012. “Crime Victimization and Political Participation.” The American Political Science Review 106 (3): 570-587.

O’Neill, Tip. 1995. All Politics Is Local and Other Rules of the Game. Avon, MA: Adams Media Corporation.

Blanco, Luisa R. 2013. “The Impact of Crime on Trust in Institutions in Mexico.” European Journal of Political Economy 32 (December): 38-55.

Pérez, Orlando J. 2015a. “Crime Diminishes Political Support and Democratic Attitudes in Honduras.” https://www.vanderbilt.edu/ lapop/insights/IO925en.pdf (Accessed December 13, 2017).

Carreras, Miguel. 2013. “The Impact of Criminal Violence on Regime Legitimacy in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review 48 (3): 85-109. Chanley, Virginia, Thomas Rudolph, and Wendy Rahn. 2000. “The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government: A Time Series Analysis.” Public Opinion Quarterly 64 (3): 239-256. 16

Pérez, Orlando J. 2015b. “The Impact of Crime on Voter Choice in Latin America.” In The Latin American Voter, eds. Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew W. Singer, and Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 324-345.

The Emerging Crisis: Crime and Trust in the Municipal Government in Latin America

Appendix A Correlation Matrix

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Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

Appendix B Key Independent Variable Means by Country Country

Perception of Local Insecurity

Crime Victimization

Insecurity as Most Important Issue

Mexico

0.484 (0.289)

0.236 (0.425)

0.354 (0.478)

Guatemala

0.550 (0.281)

0.170 (0.376)

0.456 (0.498)

El Salvador

0.528 (0.323)

0.186 (0.389)

0.652 (0.476)

Honduras

0.611 (0.308)

0.183 (0.387)

0.479 (0.500)

Nicaragua

0.585 (0.338)

0.172 (0.378)

0.047 (0.212)

Costa Rica

0.510 (0.285)

0.125 (0.331)

0.214 (0.410)

Panama

0.581 (0.264)

0.082 (0.274)

0.257 (0.437)

Colombia

0.544 (0.321)

0.196 (0.397)

0.356 (0.479)

Ecuador

0.591 (0.265)

0.278 (0.448)

0.285 (0.452)

Bolivia

0.460 (0.268)

0.208 (0.406)

0.172 (0.378)

Peru

0.430 (0.284)

0.306 (0.461)

0.467 (0.499)

Paraguay

0.584 (0.242)

0.128 (0.334)

0.171 (0.376)

Chile

0.573 (0.292)

0.114 (0.317)

0.277 (0.448)

Uruguay

0.539 (0.295)

0.228 (0.419)

0.500 (0.500)

Brazil

0.502 (0.335)

0.164 (0.371)

0.273 (0.445)

Venezuela

0.365 (0.301)

0.244 (0.430)

0.303 (0.460)

Argentina

0.535 (0.296)

0.244 (0.430)

0.337 (0.473)

Dominican Republic

0.437 (0.298)

0.234 (0.424)

0.388 (0.488)

Note: The values reported are the mean values, with the standard deviations in parentheses. All variables are recoded to run from 0 to 1. For the Perception of Local Insecurity, higher values indicate feeling more secure, while lower values indicate feeling less secure; thus, the lower the value, the less safe that respondents feel in their local contexts in that country. With regard to Crime Victimization, a value of 1 indicates a crime victim and a value of 0 indicates a non-victim. In the case of Insecurity as the Most Important Issue, the variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent indicated that a security-related problem was the most important issue facing his or her country and a value of 0 if he or she identified another issue.

ÂŠ Pi Sigma Alpha 2017

The Emerging Crisis: Crime and Trust in the Municipal Government in Latin America

Appendix C Relationship between Crime and Trust in Other Institutions Independent Variables

Trust in the Courts

Trust in the Justice System

Trust in the Military

Trust in the Police

Crime Victimization

-3.126* (0.447)

-4.094* (0.480)

-1.539* (0.534)

-4.481* (0.464)

Perception of Neighborhood Insecurity

7.353* (0.702)

10.423* (0.712)

8.974* (0.814)

17.620* (0.736)

Insecurity as Most Important Issue

-0.5 (0.410)

-0.294 (0.430)

1.551* (0.468)

0.246 (0.431)

Age Cohort

-12.581* (2.505)

-10.737* (2.577)

-4.556 (2.983)

-2.526 (2.595)

Age Cohort Squared

10.867* (2.653)

10.252* (2.697)

6.491* (3.150)

7.261* (2.695)

Education

-3.018* (0.885)

-3.765* (0.903)

-7.313* (1.070)

-5.318* (0.926)

Wealth

-2.505* (0.577)

-3.514* (0.599)

-1.560* (0.696)

-1.571* (0.643)

Urban

-2.081* (0.522)

-3.733* (0.516)

-0.595 (0.605)

-2.818* (0.552)

Female

1.119* (0.326)

1.505* (0.354)

-3.462* (0.425)

1.527* (0.356)

Bribe Victimization

-4.238* (0.486)

-4.630* (0.498)

-4.195* (0.575)

-7.275* (0.499)

Interpersonal Trust

4.185* (0.700)

5.747* (0.731)

5.377* (0.839)

8.308* (0.740)

Evaluation of the Economy

6.373* (0.560)

8.848* (0.578)

5.838* (0.641)

8.133* (0.601)

Guatemala

-1.686 (1.493)

-0.549 (1.431)

1.09 (1.586)

-4.261* (1.512)

El Salvador

-2.058 (1.287)

2.038 (1.278)

-1.231 (1.433)

7.360* (1.382)

Honduras

1.688 (1.420)

0.719 (1.394)

-5.726* (1.620)

3.058* (1.545)

Nicaragua

4.071* (1.420)

7.919* (1.314)

-2.291 (1.577)

13.394* (1.460)

Costa Rica

6.717* (1.455)

8.219* (1.274)

--˚

4.580* (1.482)

Panama

3.961* (1.488)

2.476 (1.535)

--˚

10.345* (1.558)

Colombia

-5.508* (1.368)

-1.206 (1.345)

-9.208* (1.485)

6.888* (1.452)

Ecuador

1.063 (1.389)

1.557 (1.579)

4.054* (1.629)

15.035* (1.538)

Bolivia

-4.738* (1.436)

-5.230* (1.365)

-16.105* (1.460)

-3.588* (1.402)

Peru

-4.412* (1.589)

-8.014* (1.333)

-13.282* (1.546)

0.185 (1.521)

Paraguay

-11.441* (1.516)

-9.841* (1.487)

-10.259* (1.658)

-2.996 (1.550)

Chile

-7.136* (1.691)

-9.513* (1.485)

-9.166* (1.900)

18.494* (1.601)

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

Relationship between Crime and Trust in Other Institutions Cont. Uruguay

0.533 (1.425)

4.685* (1.395)

-16.316* (1.556)

9.358* (1.535)

Brazil

-3.463* (1.612)

-6.118* (1.403)

-6.169* (1.537)

4.053* (1.544)

Venezuela

-2.795 (1.809)

-3.096 (1.617)

-22.339* (1.810)

0.113 (1.695)

Argentina

4.574* (1.560)

1.476 (1.406)

-13.317* (1.705)

5.378* (1.664)

Dominican Republic

-3.599* (1.445)

-5.330* (1.324)

-13.169* (1.517)

-5.317* (1.510)

Constant

42.737* (1.428)

41.321* (1.386)

66.674* (1.629)

31.240* (1.473)

26257

26696

23561

26885

R-Squared

0.06

0.09

0.1

0.16

Note: * p<0.05 Note: Ë&#x161;Costa Rica and Panama are omitted from the model because there are no national armed forces in these countries and thus the question about trust in this institution is not asked in either place. All independent variables are rescaled to run from 0 to 1, and the dependent variables are rescaled to run from 0 to 100.

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Losing Religiosity: The Impact of Religious Conflict on Religious Identification Katherine Meyer, Santa Clara University How does a brutal and complex religious conflict affect an individual’s religiosity? Or, in other words, does religious violence “harden” or “soften” the identities of religious individuals? Most previous literature on identity conflict has categorized religious identity under the broader umbrella of ethnic identity; however, doing this fails to acknowledge the potential differences between individuals in religious and ethnic groupings. While addressing previously proposed frameworks on ethnic conflict and identity, this paper seeks to explore religion as a separate source of conflict that influences the self-identification of individuals with Islam and Christianity in Africa. The findings suggest that there is a softening in Muslim identification in correlation to religious conflict and no impact of religious conflict on Christian identification. This research is vital for asking further questions about the consequences of religious identity and providing mechanisms for maintaining peace in areas at risk to religious conflict.

ow does religious violence impact religious identity? Does religious conflict strengthen or weaken the identities of people belonging to religious groups in dispute? Instead of exploring these questions, for decades, political scientists have studied the correlation between ethnic identity and conflict, and have proposed several theories on what factors and components of ethnic identity lead to conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Sambanis 2001). However, alternatively, scholars have recently begun examining how ethnic violence affects identity (Ishiyama, Pulido Gomez, and Stewart 2016). By analyzing various case studies, these scholars have begun debating the extent and manner in which conflict affects identity. Some scholars assert that ethnic violence strengthens identity, building further barriers between ethnic groups within a state (Kaufmann 1996; Özdikmenli-Demir 2014; Sambanis and Shayo 2013). Others believe that the intensity of the violence weakens identity and allows for a more pluralist society or united national identity than before conflict (Kalyvas 2008). Finally, some scholars argue that no direct causal relationship exists between the two variables (Ishiyama, Pulido Gomez, and Stewart 2016). While these studies have opened the debate on a possible relationship between conflict and identity change, another question is where religious identification fits vis-à-vis ethnic identity. Theorists in the field of ethnic conflict most often subcategorize religious identity under the larger umbrella term of “ethnic identity.” Nonetheless, as with linguistic identity, religious identity receives some recognition for its role in differentiating one individual’s ethnic identity from another’s. Additionally, political scientists sometimes pinpoint religion as the primary factor of difference for two groups; however, they

still often label these conflicts as “ethno-religious conflicts” (Fox 1999a, 294). Based on previous studies that measure the impact of conflict on ethnic identity, this study seeks to explore religion as a separate source of conflict that influences identity. By subcategorizing religion under ethnicity, scholars have not placed enough emphasis on the important differences between the two. While similar to ethnic identity, an individual’s religious identity differs due to its supernatural features and its requirement for belief instead of just group membership. Therefore, there is a potential for a different relationship between religion and conflict when looked at separately from ethnicity that is necessary to examine. Below, the previous literature is discussed, a theory is proposed, and then a linear regression model is estimated to test the relationship between religious conflict and identity. The findings of this research are vital for asking further questions about the consequences of static and dynamic religious identity. Religious identity as an outcome of conflict requires different approaches for reconciliation than ethnic identity. Thus, understanding the impact of conflict on religious identity can provide mechanisms for maintaining peace in regions at risk to religious conflict.

Literature Identity, identity formation, and group relations are heavily studied topics in the fields of political science, sociology, and psychology. While identities may be formed as a way to understand oneself, they also serve as a way for an individual to differentiate their self from what they are not (Zolberg and Woon 1999). Social categorization comes from an

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individual examining the similarities and differences between another person and their “self ” (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 21). Moreover, groups are desired to meet certain cultural, economic, and political needs (Guetzkow 1957). In terms of national group identity, DeLamater, Katz, and Kelman (1969, 323-5) find that individuals who have a “symbolic commitment” to their nation, as opposed to a “functional commitment,” in which a person benefits from participation in a national system, often have a stronger attachment to it. Whether about cultural, racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, or national identity, certain variables exist for why individuals tend to develop close attachments to their identities and these variables can shift and change the strength of group identity.

Ethnic Identity and Conflict

As noted above, scholars have more recently begun conducting studies on these changes in the strength of ethnic identity after conflict. Many of these works assume a constructivist view of identity that argues that ethnic identity is malleable and flexible, affected by environment and circumstance (Kalyvas 2008; Wendt 1992). Others argue that ethnic identities are primordial, or “fixed at birth” (Kaufmann 1996, 140). These two approaches have opened the debate on whether ethnic conflict “hardens” or “softens” identity (Kalyvas 2008). The “hardening” of identity refers to a group becoming more exclusive and creating more defined barriers between itself and others (Kalyvas 2008). Scholars offer several factors that lead to the hardening of identity. Kaufmann (1996) asserts that people do not change ethnic identities, and thus conflict hardens identity through national rhetoric and war trauma. Ethnic war limits the choice of identity when extremists force inner-group conformity and opposing groups establish definitions of each other (Kaufmann 1996). These aspects of war increase group cohesion. Furthermore, violence can result from social uncertainty about how many people identify in a group, what these identities mean, and how individuals who identify a certain way are related to state-provided services (Appadurai 2006). Thus, violence results in the need to become socially certain and leads to a “full attachment” to group identity (Appadurai 1998). Sambanis and Shayo (2013) predict that more intense conflict will strengthen ethnic identity because it causes individuals to express more care for their group. For example, the Guatemalan Civil War led to “mayanization” in which the shared experience of violence strengthened indigenous group dynamics (Cox, Orsborn, and Sisk 2015, 26). Focusing more on predictors of ethnic identity hardening at the individual-level, Özdikmenli-Demir (2014) find a strong correlation between witnessing community violence and identity hardening for Kurdish university students in Southeast Turkey. These predictors display a relationship between ethnic conflict and the “hardening” of identity. On the other hand, several studies support a “softening” of ethnic identity. From a constructivist standpoint, Kalyvas (2008) asserts that ethnic identity does not remain fixed through 22

conflict and often “softens” in two manners: ethnic defection and identity shift. Ethnic defection refers to when individuals identify with an ethnic group that opposes and fights against their original ethnic group while identity shift simply implies the replacement of an old ethnic identity with a new one (Kalyvas 2008). During the coinciding Second World War and the Greek Civil War, rebel violence prior to German recruitment of Greeks as well as German territorial control led to the ethnic defection of many Greeks when Greeks collaborated with Germans to fight against their ethnic group (Kalyvas 2008). Two other country cases provide support for the softening of ethnic identity. After the Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front attempted to ban ethnic categorization in Rwanda and create “Rwandanicity” (Berry 2014). In the years after the civil war in Sierra Leone, many formerly opposing groups referred to each other as “brothers,” contradicting a dominant theory in conflict resolution that presumes the creation of the “other” during a conflict (Millar 2012). While both arguments for “hardening” and “softening” of ethnic identity display an impact on identity from conflict, most recently, studying Kenya during conflict events between 2005 and 2008, Ishiyama, Pulido Gomez, and Stewart (2016) find no correlation between frequency of violent acts, intensity of the violence, and the hardening of identity. Whether or not an individual’s ethnic group participates in the conflict does show a subtle impact on the softening of identity. However, they suggest a weaker relationship between the two variables.

Religious Identity

Although the debate on the “hardening” or “softening” of ethnic identity has provided a framework for understanding the influence of violence on identity, these scholars have explored ethnic identity as a broader topic and have often ignored religious identity as its entity. These studies have fallen short of examining how the relationship between religious conflict and religious identity could differ from their theories on ethnic conflict and identity. When examining religious conflict and identity, it is necessary to define religion. While no single definition of religion exists, Lincoln (2012, 75) offers a substantial definition. He defines religion as: 1. A discourse whose concerns transcend the human, temporal, and contingent, and that claims for itself a similarly transcendent status; 2. A set of practices whose goal is to produce a proper world and/or proper human subjects, as defined by the religious discourse to which these practices are connected; 3. A community whose members construct their identity with reference to a religious discourse and its attendant practices; 4. And an institution that regulates discourse, practices, and community, reproducing them over time and modifying them as necessary, while asserting their eternal validity and transcendent value.

Losing Religiosity: The Impact of Religious Conflict on Religious Identification

The advantage of this definition is that Lincoln (2012) captures the diversity of characteristics between religions and does not limit the understanding of religion to Abrahamic religions with terms such as “god.” Additionally, this definition illustrates the various aspects of religion – from practice to institution. The elements of this definition provide a basis for understanding the relationship between religious identity and conflict. A disagreement exists in the field of identity politics on the degree to which religious identity differs from ethnic identity. Gurr (1993, 3) argues that “communal groups” – meaning ethnic groups, minorities, and peoples – have various possible traits that distinguish them from other groups and can include religion, historical experiences, or language. For an ethnic group, religion could be the primary source of saliency, or it could be unimportant (Fox 1999a, 294). An ethnic conflict becomes an “ethno-religious conflict” when the main division between ethnic groups stems in differences in religious beliefs (Fox 1999a, 294). A “single cultural marker,” such as religion, serves as the basis for national identity (Seul 1999, 565). It creates an “us-them” mentality (Connor 1994, 46). Kaufmann (1996, 141) declares ethnic identity to be “harder” than religious identity under the presumption that ethnic identity includes both religion and culture which makes it harder than the two individually. Comparing the responsibility of religious versus non-religious ethnic nationalism for causing conflict, Fox (2004, 728) finds that religion is only an “exacerbating factor” in causing conflict. Thus, most previous literature tends to consider religion as primarily a component of the larger ethnic picture. However, several researchers consider the potential problems with refusing to break apart the broad and vague category of ethnicity. In their comparative article on Islam in Europe and Spanish in the U.S., Zolberg and Woon (1999) call attention to the problem of “Hispanics” being categorized together because they share a language even though they can greatly differ culturally. An individual might belong to more than one identity group and cannot be properly molded under one ethnic identity. Sambanis and Shayo (2013, 298) assert that “categorization need not imply identification,” and individuals will identify with only a subset of the social groups they belong to depending on the status of each group. In postcolonial Africa, Christianity and Islam served as an overarching point of identity between the multiethnic groups, but the strengthening of religious identity often ran parallel with the strengthening of ethnic identity (Spohn 2003). Seul (1999, 562) argues that religion lies closest to the heart of one’s identity because other elements in ethnic identity do not “address the full range of human needs” as well as religion does. While religion can be both a point of division and a point of unification between ethnic groups, Seul (1999, 565) asserts that both the former Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland are cases in which religion divided groups that were otherwise ethnically similar. Most recently, Basedau et al. (2017) argue that while ethnic and religious minorities might have similarities, they

are not the same, noting that an individual may belong to an ethnic minority but could also belong to a religious majority. Therefore, these elements of differentiation between religion and ethnicity suggest religious conflict could have differing effects on identity than ethnic conflict/identity. Nonetheless, the theories presented on ethnic conflict and identity offer robust frameworks for analyzing religious conflict and identity in its category. The question thus arises: to what extent does religious conflict impact post-conflict identity? Is it different from the broader category of ethnicity? The next section of this paper introduces a theory on this relationship.

Theoretical Framework Theories on religious identity and conflict have been limited to studies discussing ethnic identity in its larger context. While these two identities may share many of the mechanisms associated with group identities, this study seeks to understand the impact of religious violence on religious identity – whether in the characteristics it shares with ethnic identity or differs in. Below, a theory on the relationship between religious conflict and identity is proposed. This study speculates that intergroup conflict between two religions strengthens the religious identities of the individuals who belong to those groups involved. This theory assumes a constructivist stance in which identity is capable of changing. As previously stated, a debate exists in the literature on whether identity remains fixed or changes. There is good evidence to suggest that while a person may be born with a certain identity, the strength of this identity can be shifted by environmental factors. Furthermore, the context of war can be a source in reshaping identity (Kalyvas 2008). Thus, when theorizing that religious conflict will strengthen religious identity, this research presumes that an individual’s attachment to their religious identity has the capability of transforming during violence. Moreover, this study focuses on the strengthening of religious identity by religious intergroup conflict. Intergroup conflict refers to the violent action that occurs between two different religious groups, such as between Muslims and Christians. However, this study includes violence by sects, such as Protestants and Catholics, in defining intergroup violence since often the degree of difference between major sects may equate to the degree of difference between two separate religions entirely. Previous studies have considered sectarian conflicts, such as between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, in an intergroup framework (Goeke-Morey et al. 2015), supporting this claim for a wider conception of intergroup conflict. Lastly, this framework chooses to focus on religious affiliation. Since this study arises from a sociological perspective, it opts for measuring religiosity regarding religious membership. It also assumes that although practice and rituals are a part of religion, since religion is a choice, a person can be considered religious solely based on their identification with the religion. Given this, this study assumes that religious

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individuals do not have to regularly practice all rites or behaviors of a religion to be considered a member. Therefore, the suggestions made by this theory apply broadly to anyone who identifies with a religious group affected by conflict. The theoretical framework proposes that patterns seen in the strengthening of religious identity will follow patterns associated with the strengthening of any identity group in any conflict; however, there are some specific elements in these processes that are particular to religion. Thus, the first part of this theory explains why religious identity strengthens in conflict based upon general assumptions about identity, while the second part of this framework explains what in religion particularly allows it to harden.

The Direct and Indirect Experience of Violence and Identity

The theories that argue for the general hardening of identity in conflict can apply to religious identity. First, the religious violence one experiences, whether through physical participation in the conflict or observation of it in daily life, strengthens an individual’s religious identity. According to the social identity theory, a social identity is a form of “selfreference” in which an individual begins to self-categorize themselves by finding similarities with those in their group and distinctions from those outside their group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Thus, when an individual witnesses a person of their religious group murdered, they interpret it as a personal offense against themselves (Fox 1999b, 446). Fox (1999b, 446) references an original argument by Wentz (1987), noting that individuals create a “psychological wall of religion around themselves and their religious communities in order to deal with reality and are prepared to defend it.” A feeling of attack will cause individuals to build stronger divisions. Furthermore, losing members of a religious group that one feels personally attached to, since the group is a part of an individual’s selfconcept, creates a desire to blame. When individuals define themselves through their similarities with those in their group, they create a sense of “Other” for those outside their group (Buzan and Waever 2009; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Millar 2012). Combined with the desire to “maximize intergroup distinctiveness” (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 23), individuals will place the blame for the emotional pain of watching those in their religious group die around them on the “other” religious group. This creates harder borders between religious groups and strengthens individuals’ identities. Additionally, when an individual is directly involved in the conflict, it increases the attachment to religious identity. Those who are directly involved in violence risk their lives for their religious beliefs. Participating in religious violence forces a hardening of identity because individuals are less able to back away from their beliefs. Any weakening in their attachment to their religion would undermine their justification for harming and killing others. Even if they do begin to question their attachment to their identity, participation in a violent conflict 24

creates a need for unwavering commitment to avoid a sense of guilt or shame.

Saviors, Salvation, and Charismatic Leaders

While the previous portion of the theory on the hardening of religious identity may overlap with ethnic identity, certain supernatural and metaphysical elements of these processes only exist in religious conflict and the strengthening of religious identity. The nature of religion adds certain components to conflict that affect identity. First, religion serves as a source of comfort during violent conflict. Unlike other identity groups, religion can attend to the “deepest existential concerns” of individuals (Seul 1999, 565). In the aftermath of a conflict, when people have witnessed cruelty, lost friends and family, and watched their towns be destroyed, individuals tend to look for answers to the emotional pain. James (2013, Lectures 16 and 17) notes that individuals’ experiences with the mysticism of divinity lead them to their religious beliefs; however, physical experiences, such as death and pain, also impact the strength of one’s belief in a higher power. Since divine figures often serve as the moral framework for those who identify with the religion, individuals look to a supernatural being to either praise or blame for their hardship (Gray and Wegner 2010). The strengthening of dedication to the divine occurs more often during misfortune than good (Gray and Wegner 2010). Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that after a conflict, religious individuals will turn to their religion as a source of both comfort and answer to their hardship. Building on this, individuals may see the divine as a saving figure at the conflict’s end. Religious individuals tend to refer to the divine as an explanation to life-changing events with good outcomes instead of negative outcomes (Lupfer, Tolliver, and Jackson 1996). For those who survive the violence, the supernatural becomes a reason for praise. Furthermore, for those directly involved with conflict, religion introduces the concept of martyrdom. Weber (1958, 272) underlines the importance of “redemption” to religions. Most religions define certain rites, practices, and behaviors that must be acted upon in order for an individual to achieve the benefit of their religion – whether that be nirvana or heaven. For example, the Roman Catholic Church has established Sacraments, such as baptism, which Catholics must take part in to receive salvation. Risking one’s life for their religion, or martyrdom, illustrates the ultimate devotion to receive salvation. While martyrdom implies the actual death of an individual, the act of risking one’s life for their religion shapes how the surviving individual feels about their identity afterward: it fastens “the individual’s identity to a group identity that one expects to continue indefinitely” (Seul 1999, 560). For example, some religious conflicts are fought over sacred lands, such as the Hindu-Muslim violence in Ayodhya (Kimball 2002). Therefore, combatants feel closer to the supernatural after defending the holy place belonging to the divine. Although ethnic identities may support extreme forms of sacrifice for the group, Durkheim

Losing Religiosity: The Impact of Religious Conflict on Religious Identification

(1995, 419) writes that when a person acts faithfully towards their religion, it is “as though [they are] raised above the miseries of the world, because [they are] raised above [their] condition as a mere [hu]man; [they believe] that [they] are saved from evil.” In this sense, religious conflict strengthens religious identity for those who participate in the conflict because they see their acts as the ultimate form of faithfulness towards their religion – earning favor in the eyes of the divine and attaining eternal salvation. Even further, as in Irish Catholic Culture, these martyrs can become examples for others within the religious group for how much stronger their commitment to their identity should be (McAllister 2000, 851). Lastly, religious identity may strengthen after conflict as a result of deception during conflict. It is important to understand that this deception can cause conflict too and may lead to a certain amount of religious identity hardening before conflict. Kimball (2002) explains this when he introduces the concepts of “blind obedience” and “charismatic authority figures” in his five-part framework on “when religion becomes evil.” He argues that religion often becomes violent when individuals blindly follow statements made in favor of their religion without critical thought (Kimball 2002). These charismatic leaders, such as Jim Jones, manipulate their followers and require absolute dedication, often radicalizing a religion and leading it to violence (Kimball 2002). Pulling from Kimball’s (2002) argument for the causes of religious conflict, this notion of “blind obedience” transfers into the post-conflict atmosphere of religious identity. Religious leaders use the former conflict as a way to continue manipulating their people. They highlight the suffering of their people during the conflict in an attempt to maintain the commitment of their people. Thus, religious identity strengthens after conflict through the means of leaders who utilize the conflict as a source for continuing to build commitment to a religious identity. In sum, incorporating religious elements to universal themes on identity and conflict provides a theory for understanding how religious conflict can harden religious identity. Religious identity particularly hardens because it offers a source of comfort after conflict as well as the divine may be seen as a saving figure from the brutality of violence. Religious individuals may view themselves as martyrs and become more attached to their religion because they have risked their lives for it. Lastly, religious conflict may harden as a result of continued manipulation and deception by religious leaders who use the conflict as a source for building support. Based on the explanations provided above, this framework suggests the following: Hypothesis 1: Religious conflict is associated with an increased hardening of religious identity

Methodological Design This project tested the theory detailed above through an empirical investigation of religious identification and conflict in Africa. The unit of analysis was subnational regions of Africa.

The independent variable was the occurrence of an intergroup religious conflict. Each subnational region for the occurrence of religious conflict between 2006 and 2014 using the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) was recorded. The dependent variable was the change in the average identification with religion. The dependent variable was measured using interview data from Afrobarometer in Round 3 (2005) and Round 6 (2016) to evaluate the average number of individuals who identify with Christianity and Islam within subnational regions of 18 different countries. The average change in the identification with Christianity and Islam for each subnational region was recorded based on the responses from Round 3 and Round 6 of Afrobarometer data. A linear regression model was estimate to test the effect of the occurrence of intergroup religious conflict on the average change in identification with Christianity or Islam.

The Change in the Average Identification with Religion

First, the dependent variable referred to the change in average percent of individuals identifying with a religion at the regional-level. The change in identification with Islam and Christianity was measured because they are the two most present religions in Africa regarding both identity and conflict. Furthermore, while it would have been more effective to measure the change in religious identification at the individuallevel, Afrobarometer does not conduct interviews with the same individuals before and after conflict and thus, it was not possible to measure the change in religious identification at this level. Therefore, the average results from the individuals surveyed in each subnational region in the Afrobarometer dataset are examined. Since the conflict period was between 2006 and 2014, this study used Round 3 (2005) and Round 6 (2016) from Afrobarometer. By analyzing data from a year prior to conflict and two years after conflict, this method was able to properly capture any effect that conflict may have had on a change in identity. Round 3 provided data on 18 countries while Round 6 provided data on 36 countries; therefore, this study excluded data from subnational regions in the 18 countries that only occurred in Round 6 because data needed to exist in both rounds in order to create a percent change in identification. In addition, regions that were not included in the subnational regional ArcGIS shapefile used to define which regions the SCAD conflict events took place were excluded. This project used the following question to note the religious identity of individuals before and after conflict, marked as Q91 in Round 3 and Q98A in Round 6: Question: What is your religion, if any? The number of value labels that Afrobarometer used to code the religious identification of the interviewees noticeably increased between the Round 3 and Round 6 interviews. To respond to this difference, many of the values in both rounds had to be consolidated to fit into the categories of Christian and Muslim. For example, “Orthodox,” “Roman Catholic,” and “Coptic,” from Round 6 were grouped

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into “Christian.” These subcategories had to be categorized differently into their more generic categories despite possible differences in belief and practices amongst the groups. This prevented a more detailed understanding of individual’s religion, but it was sufficient for this research as the study compared more general religious group change. Furthermore, while it did not capture how the individual necessarily feels about their religion, the question “What is your religion, if any?” was chosen employing the assumption provided earlier that religious identity is based upon self-identification. Religious group belonging is defined by how individuals view themselves, whether or not some individuals may practice more or have more genuine beliefs. Regarding measuring the change in the average identification with a religion, the average percentage of individuals who identify with Islam and Christianity was collected for every subnational region in Round 3 and Round 6. The difference between the two average percentages from each round was recorded. A positive value was considered as evidence of the “hardening” of religious identity while a negative value was considered evidence of the “softening” of religious identity.

The Occurrence of Intergroup Religious Conflict

This study used the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) on intergroup religious conflict. The SCAD provided a list of various types of violence (e.g., riots, strikes, and war) that occurred in Africa between the period of 1964 and 2015. This study only included those violent events that were religiouslybased began during or after 2006 and concluded no later than 2014. Moreover, using an ArcGIS shapefile that resembled the definition of a subnational region that Afrobarometer presented, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of religious conflict was marked for each religion in each subnational region using the SCAD conflict events. The study included 122 subnational regions in its analysis. Every region that had a religious conflict during the period was coded with a “1.” The regions that did not have a religious conflict during the time frame were coded with a “0.” While it is possible that a difference in the number of conflicts in each region may have impacted the percent change of religious identity, the independent variable was simplified to only the occurrence of at least one conflict in a region because this study aimed primarily to examine whether the presence of religious conflict influenced religious identity. The impact of the number of religious conflicts on religious identity may be a consideration for future research studies. Lastly, this study included several control variables. Education, economic status, and urban/rural location were included as controls, because they are known for influencing religiosity (Cantril 1943; Chalfant and Heller 1991). The average status of individuals for each control variable for both rounds of Afrobarometer was measured. Additionally, this study also examined two other regional-level control 26

variables: whether or not a region had religious conflicts prior to 2006 and the former presence of conflict. Previous conflict could have had an impact on the religious identification of the individuals in Round 3 of the Afrobarometer survey data. The study also controlled for conflicts in the last ten years in each region. Since this study focused on the relationship between religious conflict and religious identity, it controlled for non-religious conflict in the regions to avoid conflation with the effect of a non-religious conflict on average religious identification.

Results and Analysis A preliminary spatial analysis was conducted using the change in the average identification with a religion as the dependent variable. Figure 1 illustrates the percent change in Muslim identification in the subnational regions of Africa between Round 3 and Round 6 of Afrobarometer. Figure 2 illustrates the change in Christian identification. The average percent change for Muslim identification was -0.245% with a standard deviation of 0.359. The average percent change for Christian identification was -.023% with a standard deviation of 0.454. The average percent change for both religions was slightly negative. The map of Christian identification had a larger range from a 3.489% decrease to a Figure 1: Spatial Analysis Findings for Percent Change in Muslim Identification

Losing Religiosity: The Impact of Religious Conflict on Religious Identification

Figure 2: Spatial Analysis Findings for Percent Change in Christian Identification

Table 1: Linear Regression Analysis for Muslim Identification Variable

Coefficient (S.E.)

P > |t|

Religious Conflict

-.170 (.058)

0.004**

Average Economic Level

-.395 (.065)

0.000***

Average Education Level

.202 (.027)

0.000***

Average Urban/ Rural Location

-.161 (.123)

0.192

Previous Conflict

-.076 (.076)

0.318

Non-Religious Conflict

-.022 (.072)

0.752

Note: *p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 N=122 R2 =.460.

Table 2: Linear Regression Analysis for Christian Identification Variable

1.764% increase in contrast to the percent change in Muslim identification that stretched from a 1.116% decrease to a .14% increase. The larger standard deviation in the percent change of Christian identification is represented by the greater variance in colors on the map. These results illustrate a decrease in the average percentage of individuals who identify with Islam and Christianity between 2006 and 2014 but a slight variation in the decrease between the two different religions. The proposed hypothesis stated that religious conflict is associated with an increased hardening of religious identity. To measure the relationship between the percent change in the average identification with Christianity and Islam in each of the subnational regions and the occurrence of religious conflict, a linear regression model was estimated. Table 1 reports the results of the model for Muslim identification while Table 2 reports the results for Christian identification. The results do not support the proposed hypothesis. The linear regression results for Muslim identification does illustrate statistical significance. The religious conflict variable has a p-value of 0.004, making it significant at the 99% confidence level. (See Table 1). Despite the statistical significance, the negative coefficient implies a softening of Muslim identity after conflict which offers no evidence for the hypothesis that proposed a hardening of religious identity after conflict. The -.170 coefficient with a standard error of .058 suggests that the average percentage of people identifying with Islam hardly decreases with the presence of a religious conflict. As the results in Table 1 show, Muslim identification does not demonstrate

Coefficient (S.E.)

P > |t|

Religious Conflict

-.076 (.071)

0.288

Average Economic Level

.075 (.079)

0.347

Average Education Level

.027 (.033)

0.412

Average Urban/ Rural Location

.329 (.151)

0.031*

Previous Conflict

.099 (.093)

0.292

Non-Religious Conflict

-.081 (.089)

0.362

Note: *p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 N=122 R2 =.067.

significant effects from the previous conflict and non-religious conflict control variables, but economic and education levels are statistically significant. An increase in the average education level is associated with an increase in the average percentage of those who identify with Islam while an increase in average economic level is associated with a decrease in the average percent of Muslim identification. The model was tested for multicollinearity to verify if the predictors are not highly correlated or associated. The test reported a mean variance influence factor (VIF) of 1.35, indicating that multicollinearity is not very relevant. The model explains 46% (R-squared) of the variation in identification in Islam. The latter suggests that there are other factors that cause changes in Muslim identification that were not considered in the model. On the other hand, while the coefficient is also negative, the linear regression results for Christian identification reported in Table 2 illustrate no statistical significance for a relationship between the occurrence of a religious conflict and change in Christian identity. However, the control variable for urban/rural location has a slight significance and shows an increase in identification with Christianity for those who live in a rural location.

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The different results between Muslim and Christian identification suggest that religious conflict may not affect all religions or have the same impact on every religion. These results could suggest that varying characteristics between religions may make a religion more vulnerable to identification change as a product of religious conflict. It is possible that Muslims in Africa may have had a different experience than Christians during this period that would have affected their identities. There could be factors inherent to the Muslim and Christian religions that impacted the relationship between religious conflict and their followers’ identification. It is also conceivable that having one’s religious group be involved in the conflict may impact individuals differently than the general occurrence of a religious conflict that may not involve a particular individual’s religion. Regarding this study, between 2006 and 2014, Africa experienced an increase in radical Muslim violence which may explain the notable change in Muslim identification but not in Christian identification. It may be beneficial for future studies to control for which religions are involved in each conflict.

Discussion and Conclusion This paper evaluated the relationship between religious identification and religious conflict. It aimed to assess religion and examine how religious conflict may impact the saliency of religious identification. By evaluating subnational regions of Africa, the project found a slight softening of Muslim identification due to the occurrence of religious conflict while it found no relationship between religious conflict and a change in Christian identification. Although this outcome may have occurred due to various limitations discussed below, the results for Christianity and Islam warrant a more in-depth discussion on religious identification and religious conflict. The suggested change in Muslim identity illustrates how conflict can impact religious identity without considering the other elements attributed to ethnic identity – such as language. Religion has qualities unconnected to ethnicity, namely the belief in a divine figure that might correlate to conflict differently than ethnicity. Additionally, the significance of the change in Muslim but not Christian identification could imply an inherent, behavioral, or experiential factor of a religion that would allow conflict to have a significant effect on one religion but not another. Some religions may have unique characteristics that change how their followers react to violence. These results propose a trend of lessening Muslim religiosity in Africa in response to Africa’s religious conflicts – a crucial consideration for groups seeking to evaluate and mediate still existing religious tension in the region. From the ISIS terrorist attacks to the Buddhist violence against Muslims in Myanmar, it is clear that religion can propagate violence. Since identity is an important part of how individuals perceive themselves and others, studying religious identity after conflict provides insight on social 28

relations in a community after conflict. This research is worthy of attention because knowledge of information, such as the very slight softening of Muslim identity found in this study, helps conflict resolution practitioners evaluate how to approach peacekeeping in regions with a history of violence. While a softening of religious identity after conflict does not necessarily insinuate that violence will not continue to arise or return, it is worth considering how it may impact peacemaking and peacebuilding. For example, it might mean that solving economic problems after conflict is needed more than interfaith dialogue initiatives if individuals have lost religiosity significantly. Thus, maintaining peace requires understanding how religion affects social relationships. Increasing comprehension of the causes of strong and weak religiosity will be effective for future peacekeeping and conflict prevention in areas facing religious hostility. As identity wars have become more prevalent in the last half-century, it is critical to find ways of analyzing social tensions to prevent future conflict. It is time to consider the heavy impact of religious identity in conflict.

Limitations

The lack of evidence for the proposed hypothesis may stem from the difficulty of employing appropriate data to measure the change in religious identification. Due to a limited overlap of similarly defined subnational regions by SCAD and Afrobarometer, the model tested was from a small population. Averaging the individuals’ identification responses could have concealed some of the variance in identification and allowed outliers to affect the percentage. Additionally, the model had to generalize the Afrobarometer religious identification labels, such as Shia Muslim or Catholic, into the larger groups of Islam and Christianity which may have masked some of the change in identification. Next, while it measured the number of people who choose to identify with a certain religion, the question of “what is your religion, if any?” from Afrobarometer was limited in its scope when measuring the hardening or softening of religious identity. The identification of individuals may have been shifting due to conflict but not so extreme as to deny their identification. Furthermore, this study did not acknowledge possible changes in the population size of subnational regions. If there were a large-scale violent event that led to a sizable number of deaths in a certain religious group, this would have an impact on the percentage of people identifying with that religion. The model also could not test for all predictors of change in religious identification. Individual behavioral factors that may add saliency to religious identity, such as a person’s level and type of worship, were not considered in this study. An individual who often attends ritual events may have a harder religious identity than an individual who never attends ritual events. There could already have been high or low levels of saliency of religious identity in subnational regions based on religious practice that should be acknowledged when attempting to measure the independent effect of religious

Losing Religiosity: The Impact of Religious Conflict on Religious Identification

conflict. Additionally, while the study analyzed the occurrence or nonoccurrence of religious conflict in each subnational region, the number of conflicts and the intensity of the conflicts could have had a potential impact on the different percent changes in identification for each religion. Religious violence that occurs in the form of an organized violent riot may have a different impact than a larger violent event.

Future Research

To properly understand the relationship between religious conflict and religious identification, future research should be performed using an individual-level of analysis to more closely assess individuals’ potential change in religious identification. Future studies could estimate logit regression analyses to predict the likelihood of religious identification after conflict using panel data. Also, scholars should look more specifically at which religious groups are involved in a conflict, the number of conflicts occurring in a region, the intensity of the conflicts, and the effects of individuals’ religious behavior on the saliency of their identity. Lastly, future studies should consider creating an ordinal scale of individuals’ strength of identification, as opposed to the dichotomous identity variable used in this study, to more accurately measure saliency of religious identity. ■

About the Author Katherine Meyer is currently a senior at Santa Clara University. She is majoring in political science (with an emphasis in international relations) and religious studies. Katherine also minored in French and Francophone Studies. At Santa Clara, she served as a research assistant for Dr. Naomi Levy in the Political Science Department. Last summer, she participated in the National Science Foundation Research Experience for Undergraduates in Civil Conflict Management and Peace Science and she will present her project at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference. After graduating in June 2018, Katherine plans to pursue a Master’s degree in international affairs or specifically conflict resolution.

References Abrams, Dominic, and Michael A. Hogg. 1988. Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes. New York: Routledge. Appadurai, Arjun. 1998. “Full Attachment.” Public Culture 10 (2): 443-9. http://www.arjunappadurai.org/articles/Appadurai_Full_ Attachment.pdf (Accessed July 24, 2017). Appadurai, Arjun. 2006. Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger. Durham: Duke University Press. Basedau, Matthias, Jonathan Fox, Jan H. Pierskalla, Georg Stüver, and Johannes Vüllers. 2017. “Does Discrimination Breed Grievances – and Do Grievances Breed Violence? New Evidence from an Analysis of Religious Minorities in Developing Countries.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 34 (3): 217-239.

Berry, Marie. 2014. “Violence and the Transformation of Ethno-Racial Categories in Rwanda.” The Society Pages. https://thesocietypages. org/specials/ethno-racial-categories-rwanda/ (Accessed December 26, 2017). Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2009. “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory.” Review of International Studies 35 (2): 253-276. Cantril, Hadley. 1943. “Education and Economic Composition of Religious Groups: An Analysis of Poll Data.” American Journal of Sociology 48 (5): 574-579. Chalfant, H. Paul, and Peter L. Heller 1991. “Rural/Urban versus Regional Differences in Religiosity.” Review of Religious Research 33 (1): 76-86. Connor, Walker. 1994. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cox, Fletcher D., Catherine R. Orsborn, and Timothy D. Sisk. 2015. “Religion, Peacebuilding, and Social Cohesion in Conflict-Affected Countries.” https://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/ faculty_pubs/sisk/religion-and-social-cohesion-reports/rscresearchreport.pdf (Accessed September 20, 2017). Delamater, John, Daniel Katz, and Herbert C. Kelman. 1969. “On the Nature of National Involvement: A Preliminary Study.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 13 (3): 320-357. Durkheim, Emile. 1995. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: The Free Press. Fox, Jonathan. 1999a. “The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno-Religious Minorities.” Journal of Peace Research 36 (3): 289-307. Fox, Jonathan. 1999b. “Toward a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-Religious Conflict.” Nations and Nationalism 5 (4): 431-463. Fox, Jonathan. 2004. “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001.” Journal of Peace Research 41 (6): 715-731. Goeke-Morey, Marcie C., Ed Cairns, Laura K. Taylor, Christine E. Merrilees, Peter Shirlow, and E. Mark Cummings. 2015. “Predictors of Strength of In-Group Identity in Northern Ireland: Impact of Past Sectarian Conflict, Relative Deprivation, and Church Attendance.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 25 (4): 283-295. Gray, Kur, and Daniel M. Wegner. 2010. “Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14 (1): 7-16. Guetzkow, Harold. 1957. “Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-Nation Relations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (1): 48-68. Gurr, Ted R. 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Ishiyama, John, Amalia Pulido Gomez, and Brandon Stewart. 2016. “Does Conflict Lead to Ethnic Particularism? Elector Violence and Ethnicity in Kenya 2005-2008.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 22 (3): 300-321. James, William. 2013. The Varieties of Religious Experience. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2008. “Ethnic Defection in Civil War.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (8): 1043-1068.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (3) 259-282.

Kaufmann, Chaim. 1996. “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars.” International Security 20: 136-175.

Sambanis, Nicholas, and Moses Shayo. 2013. “Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict.” The American Political Science Review 107 (May): 294-325.

Kimball, Charles. 2002. When Religion Becomes Evil. New York: HarperCollins. Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild. 1996. Containing Fear: “The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” International Security 21: 41-75. Lincoln, Bruce. 2012. Gods and Demons, Priests and Scholars: Critical Explorations in the History of Religions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lupfer, Michael. B., Donna Tolliver, and Mark Jackson. 1996. “Explaining Life-Altering Occurrences: A Test of the ‘God-of-theGaps’ Hypothesis.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 35 (4): 379-391. McAllister, Ronald J. 2000. “Religious Identity and the Future of Northern Ireland.” Policy Studies Journal 28 (4): 843-857. Millar, Gearoid. 2012. ‘“Our Brothers Who Went to the Bush’: PostIdentity Conflict and the Experience of Reconciliation in Sierra Leone.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (5): 717-729. Özdikmenli-Demir, Gözde. 2014. “Ethnic Identities of University Students: The Relationship Between Community Violence, Ethnic Discrimination, and Aggression.” SAGE Open (July-September): 1-13.

Seul, Jeffrey R. 1999. “‘Ours Is the Way of God’: Religion, Identity and Intergroup Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36 (5): 553-569. Spohn, Willfried. 2003. “Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective.” Current Sociology 51(3-4): 265-286. Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations. 2nd ed. The Nelson-Hall Series in Psychology, eds. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austens. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 7-24. Weber, Max. 1958. “The Social Psychology of the World Religions.” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 267-301. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46(2): 391-425. Wentz, Richard. 1987. Why People Do Bad Things in the Name of Religion. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press. Zolberg, Aristide R., and Long Litt Woon. 1999. “Why Islam is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States.” Politics & Society 27(1): 5-38.

Stereotypes and Self-Presentation: How Gender Affects Senate Candidate Behavior Georgia Konstam, Sewanee, University of the South Research demonstrates that campaigns can affect election outcomes, that stereotypes can affect campaigns, and that women are underrepresented in U.S. political offices. Are these patterns connected? This paper demonstrates that they are linked. Using a matched pair method, data collected from 14 different senatorial debates in 2014 are examined. Results reveal that gender plays a significant role in how candidates present themselves to the public, as both male and female candidates attempt to demonstrate their suitability for office by emphasizing helpful gender stereotypes while attempting to revise harmful gender stereotypes. Moreover, these findings suggest that female candidates attempt to counter negative gender stereotypes and highlight positive gender stereotypes more than do male candidates. This study has implications for the success of female candidates’ campaigns, highlighting the techniques that could disadvantage or advantage women seeking office.

omen have been, and continue to be, largely underrepresented in American politics, as they currently hold no more than 26% of seats at any level of political office (Center for American Women and Politics 2017). Many scholars have found that this underrepresentation of women has substantive effects on the functioning of government, as women prioritize diverse issues and have more inclusive leadership styles than men (Holman 2014; Kathlene 1994; Rosenthal 2000; Swers 2005). Some scholars have argued that underrepresentation of women in political office is due to women’s lack of political ambition (Swers 2005), women being recruited into political office at slower rates than men (Swers 2010), the gendered nature of politics which favors men (Duerst-Lahti 2012), and relatedly, gender stereotypes that present women as lacking necessary leadership skills (Fox and Oxley 2003; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000; McDermott 1998). This paper focuses on the latter explanations for women’s underrepresentation; specifically, how male and female candidates present themselves to potential voters, and how they navigate gender stereotypes are examined. Given the gendered nature of politics that favors masculine characteristics (Duerst-Lahti 2012), there is reason to expect both male and female candidates to highlight gendered characteristics. This study seeks to determine whether they do so by gathering an extensive collection of data from senatorial debates in 2014. While scholars have examined how candidate gender affects other types of campaigning (i.e., campaign websites, news coverage, and press conferences) (Fridkin and Kenney 2014), scholars have not examined the effects of candidate gender in debates. Unlike other campaign contexts, debates give candidates a chance to present themselves however they wish

to be construed (Benoit, Brazeal, and Airne 2007), within the minimal constraints imposed by the moderators. Furthermore, because debates have an effect on which candidates viewers support (Fridkin, Kenney, Gershon, Shafter, and Woodall 2007), how candidates present themselves in debates may affect which candidates voters prefer, how the media covers the candidates, and consequently women’s representation in American politics.

Women in Political Office

Understanding the underrepresentation of women in American politics is imperative to achieving a more inclusive democracy as previous research suggests female politicians make a substantive difference when in office. Some scholars have found that female political leaders prioritize a different set of issues than their male colleagues (Carroll 2003; Holman 2014; Swers 2005). For example, Swers (2005), utilizing data on cosponsorship activity in two Congresses, finds that female legislators are more likely to cosponsor bills regarding health care and education than male legislators. Additionally, the presence of a female mayor increases the likelihood of a city’s participation in the funding of social welfare programs (Holman 2014). Scholars have also found that women pursue different leadership styles than men (Kathlene 1994; Jewell and Whicker 1994; Rosenthal 2000). For example, Rosenthal (2000) finds that women are more inclined than men to collaborate with others when resolving conflict. Scholars have also found that more women in political office can increase the political participation of women in the electorate (Atkenson 2003; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Reingold and Harrell 2010). For example, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) find

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that if more women were in office, the gender gap in political engagement would begin to close. Given that findings indicate that the presence of women in office has substantive effects on the functioning of government, understanding reasons for women’s underrepresentation is imperative.

Explaining Women’s Underrepresentation

Scholars have identified several reasons for women’s underrepresentation in government. Some scholars have pointed to women’s lower political ambition to explain the low numbers of women entering politics (Lawless and Fox 2005). The latter, utilizing a survey of potential candidates, found that women with the same qualifications as men are significantly less likely to consider themselves suitable for office. For this reason, it is theorized that female candidates will be more likely to promote their qualifications when campaigning. For example, if women believe they need more qualifications to be suitable for office, then female candidates may try harder than male candidates to prove their qualifications in debates. One way female candidates may attempt to prove their qualifications is by making ample statements of their own skill set and experience, through what Benoit, Brazeal, and Airne (2007), in a study of gubernatorial debates, define as “acclaims.” Another argument for why this underrepresentation exists in the U.S. is that politics is a gendered arena, in which candidates with stereotypically masculine characteristics are considered more viable for political office (Duerst-Lahti 2012; Meeks 2012). Meeks (2012, 176), for example, claims that “the disconnect in America between women and political office is fed by the cultural premise that politics is a domain for masculinized behaviors, messages, and professional experiences--creating a masculine stereotype for politicians.” Thus, women are put at a disadvantage if they do not possess these “masculine” characteristics. The implication of this argument is furthered by scholars who demonstrate the impact that gender stereotypes have on both male and female candidates (Fox and Oxley 2003; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000; McDermott 1998). Because gender stereotypes serve to reinforce a division between male characteristics and female characteristics, scholars find that the presence of these stereotypes can make it harder for women to make the case that they are suitable candidates for government positions. Regarding specific gender stereotypes, previous research has demonstrated that women are viewed by the citizenry as being more competent on issues of health care, education, abortion, women’s issues, child care, and the environment (McDermott 1998; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Men, alternatively, are viewed as being more competent on issues like the economy, foreign policy, crime, agriculture, defense issues, and the military (Alexander and Andersen 1991; McDermott 1998; Shapiro 1981). There is additional evidence which shows that the issues which men are believed to be stronger on are those that have continued to rank high on the most important issues in the presidential elections (Pew Research Center 2016). 32

While female candidates can capitalize on their presumed superiority on issues such as health care and education, they may be at an overall disadvantage in seeking public office due to gender competency stereotypes, as women are not perceived as being competent on the issues most often ranked by citizens as important. Regarding gender trait stereotypes, research also suggests that women possess more “communal” traits, and are therefore considered more trustworthy and compassionate than men, while men possess more “agentic” traits, and are therefore considered to be assertive and aggressive, in addition to being better leaders and more experienced than women (Best and Williams 1990; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Again, due to the gendered nature of politics, women may be disadvantaged by not being viewed as possessing the “necessary” traits for political office (Duerst-Lahti 2012; Meeks 2012). Consequently, it is theorized that gender stereotypes will shape the behavior of male and female candidates regarding both the issues and the traits they emphasize to voters. Because debates allow candidates to present themselves however they desire, candidates will seek to prime policy issues or traits on which they may have an advantage due to gender stereotypes, by discussing them more frequently than policy issues or traits on which they are believed to be less competent. However, because stereotypically masculine policy issues are typically considered the most important issues by voters and stereotypically masculine traits are more often desired by voters than stereotypically feminine traits, female candidates will also seek to demonstrate their skill with masculine policy issues and their masculine traits. Previous research has looked specifically at how candidates navigate campaigns, given that gender stereotypes can either help or harm candidates. Dittmar’s (2015) work shows that candidates and their campaign consultants explicitly consider candidate gender and how to effectively campaign given the characteristics of their candidate and opponent. Some scholars argue that the more effective strategy for female candidates is to campaign on issues on which they are already considered competent (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004). Research suggests that this “issue ownership” strategy is utilized by female candidates in order to capitalize on perceived strengths (Dolan 2005; Kahn 1996). However, others suggest that candidates can be more effective when emphasizing policy issues incongruent with their gender, or “genderbending” (Schneider 2014), and have utilized gender-bending during campaigns in their websites and press conferences (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004). Schneider (2014), using an experimental design, finds that both male and female candidates can successfully prime and persuade voters to evaluate candidates on issues incongruent with gender stereotypes by gender-bending. Building on these findings, including studies of campaign websites and press conferences, this research posits expectations regarding how candidates will attempt to present themselves positively when debating.1

Stereotypes and Self-Presentation: How Gender Affects Senate Candidate Behavior

Given research that demonstrates that it is often more necessary for women, than men, to possess a substantial set of qualifications before becoming candidates (Lawless and Fox 2005), it is expected that female candidates will more often use debates to outline their qualifications than male candidates. Specifically, it is hypothesized that female candidates will make more acclaims than male candidates (H1). Additionally, given research indicating that male candidates are benefited by gender stereotypes because masculine stereotypes fit well with expectations about political leaders, while gender stereotypes about female candidates are not always positive for political leaders, it is expected that male candidates will behave in gender congruent ways while female candidates emphasize both beneficial feminine stereotypes and gender-bend to demonstrate strengths in stereotypically masculine arenas. Specifically, it is hypothesized that female candidates will attempt to gender-bend and emphasize politically helpful masculine trait stereotypes (H2), and male candidates will emphasize policy issues congruent with their gender, while female candidates will emphasize policy issues both congruent and incongruent with their gender (H3).

The Influence of Female Candidates in Campaigns

There is limited research on the effects female candidates have on campaigns. Some scholars, however, have argued that candidates act differently in campaigns depending on the opponent’s gender (Fox 1997, 2000). In examining gubernatorial campaigns, Fox (1997, 2000) suggests that the presence of a female candidate can alter male opponents’ behavior in two ways. Firstly, in fear of coming off as “bullying” their female opponent, male candidates use what Benoit, Brazeal, and Airne (2007) call an “attack strategy,” in which a candidate directly points out negative characteristics of his or her opponent, less frequently than female candidates (Fox 1997, 2000). Given this research, it is hypothesized that female candidates will attack their male opponents more than male candidates will attack their female opponents (H4). Secondly, Fox (1997, 2000) argues that because women are seen as competent on some stereotypically feminine policy issues and traits, male candidates will try to present themselves as competent or at least aware of some of these issues when they face a female opponent. Furthermore, having more women present in politics increases the political participation of women (Reingold and Harrell 2010; Atkenson 2003; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001), potentially increasing female voter turnout in and attention to races with female candidates. Thus, male candidates facing female opponents may choose not to rely only on their typically advantaged masculine trait and policy stereotypes during their campaigns. Rather, male candidates facing female opponents may shift their campaign strategy to address perceived strengths of their female opponents or perceived preferences among the potentially larger group of female voters. Given this research, it is hypothesized that male candidates opposed by a female candidate will gender-bend more than male candidates opposed

by a male candidate, by emphasizing issues incongruent with their gender (H5).

Data and Methods To test these hypotheses, data were collected from 14 senatorial debates in 2014. This collection includes 28 senatorial candidates: seven female and 21 male. Debates were selected during the 2014 midterm election in order to limit the effects of external factors like a presidential election on candidate behavior. A matched pair method design was employed when selecting Senate races, in order to control for the ideology of the candidates, the party of the candidates, the characteristics of the states, and the incumbency status of the election. This method allows a decrease of the variation between the senatorial candidates that are compared, so that one can be confident that differences found between male and female candidate behavior, or male-male and male-female races, are due to the candidate’s gender rather than other unmeasured variables. To match candidates by ideology, Nominate scores are used, pairing candidates in races with both a male and female candidate and match them with similar Nominate scores of candidates in races with only males. Nominate scores are a measure or indication of candidates’ previous political behavior, such as whether a candidate has a more conservative or liberal voting record. In order to control for general characteristics (i.e. population, demographics, income, major sources of revenue) of the states, states were matched using data from the U.S. Census Bureau. To control for both party and incumbency status, debates were matched for seats that are either open or have incumbents running with similar contests in other states, and matched candidates by their party. The data gathering was constrained by the presence of a female candidate, a reliable matched pair, the availability of the debate online, and, of course, the attendance of both candidates at the debate. Thus, while nine states had female candidates running against male candidates in 2014, collected data was only used from seven debates including female candidates and their seven matched pairs. (For specific details on which states were selected and the characteristics to match the states, see Appendix A). Fourteen debates were coded by recording the number of times a candidate mentioned a stereotypically feminine policy issue, a stereotypically masculine policy issue, each time a candidate emphasized a stereotypically feminine trait, a stereotypically masculine trait, and each time a candidate attacked their opponent or acclaimed something about themselves. In terms of policy issues, mentions of education, health care, abortion, and the environment for feminine policy issues were coded. For masculine policy issues, mentions of agriculture, crime, the economy, and foreign policy were also coded. For female traits, compassion and empathy are coded under one category and are referred as “communal” traits.

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For masculine traits, experience and leadership are coded separately, and are referred to as “agentic” traits (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Lastly, criteria similar to Benoit, Brazeal, and Airne (2007) is employed for coding attacks and acclaims. Each time a candidate directly attacks their opponent claiming something negative about them, which was considered an attack. Acclaims were coded for when candidates would claim something positive about themselves, whether that be a characteristic or a previous action they had taken (For more detail on coding, see Appendix B). Each senatorial debate was between 40 and 90-minutes long, with most debates lasting 60-minutes. In order to account for variation in the length of the debates, data were analyzed in terms of mentions per minute rather than mentions per debate. Additionally, it is important to note that candidates in all coded debates were given strict amounts of time to talk and thus no candidate spoke substantially more or less than their opponent. Lastly, data were omitted from a case when the rules imposed by moderators restricted the candidates in a way that limited how candidates behaved. In particular, data on attacks from a debate were omitted when the moderators specifically asked candidates not to directly address each other during the entire debate. Thus, the length and rules of the debate were taken into account when analyzing data.

Results and Analysis Female Candidates Emphasize their Qualifications More Often than Male Candidates

In order to account for the varied debate length, findings are displayed in figures which indicate the number of mentions per minute of a given trait, policy, or other behavior. However, for ease of substantive comparison, data are presented in terms of mentions of a trait, policy, or other behavior in a typical 60-minute debate. As displayed in Figure 1, female candidates made more acclaims than male candidates. Specifically, female candidates acclaimed 111 times in a typical 60-minute debate, while male candidates acclaimed 88 times. Thus, results confirm the first hypothesis, and suggest that female candidates, more so than male candidates, may be using acclaims as an attempt to prove themselves to be qualified for office. Because of the gendered nature of politics, which favors masculine characteristics, the second hypothesis expects that female candidates to gender-bend more than male candidates, in order to demonstrate their qualifications for the masculine domain of elected office. To test this hypothesis, the number of times female candidates emphasize stereotypical feminine or “communal” traits (i.e. compassion and empathy) and the number of times they emphasize stereotypically masculine or “agentic” traits (i.e. leadership and experience) to the number of times male candidates emphasize masculine or feminine traits are compared. Again, a matched pair method is used to control for the variables mentioned above. Figures 2 and 3 show that female candidates emphasize both communal and agentic traits more than male candidates. The second hypothesis is supported by these findings. Specifically, in a typical 60-minute debate, female candidates emphasize compassion and empathy two times while male candidates refer to compassion and empathy only one time. Notably, female candidates also refer to leadership three more times than male candidates, and refer to experience five more times than male candidates in a typical 60-minute debate. These findings suggest that female candidates are not only genderbending more than male candidates but they are also, in general,

In order to test the first hypothesis, that female candidates will make more acclaims than male candidates as a way of highlighting their qualifications for office, the number of times a female candidate makes an acclaim in a typical 60-minute debate to the number of times a male candidate makes an acclaim in a typical 60-minute debate are comparted. The data used for Figure 1: Number of Acclaims Made by Male and Female Candidates during Debates this analysis are gathered using a matched pair method. Thus, these data gathered for female candidates come from male/ female races, or races in which there is both a male and female candidate opposing each other. While these data gathered for the male candidates comes from male/ male races, or a race in which there are two male candidates opposing each other, which were matched with the male/female races in order to control for incumbency status, party and ideology of the candidates, and characteristics of the states.

Stereotypes and Self-Presentation: How Gender Affects Senate Candidate Behavior

trying to emphasize politically helpful traits more often than male candidates. Also worth noting is that in these debates agentic traits were mentioned significantly more times more than communal traits by both male and female candidates. This finding further confirms that politics is a gendered arena, in which stereotypically masculine characteristics are perceived as more important to political office than stereotypically feminine characteristics (DuerstLahti 2014). Next, the third hypothesis, that male candidates will emphasize policy issues congruent with their gender, while female candidates will emphasize policy issues both congruent and incongruent with their gender, is tested. In order to do so, the number of feminine and masculine policy issue mentions by female candidates in races with male candidates to the number of feminine and masculine policy issue mentions by the male candidates in male races are compared. As demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5, both male and female candidates emphasize policy issues that are congruent with gender stereotypes, however female candidates also emphasize policy issues incongruent with their gender. Figure 4 shows that female candidates mentioned feminine policy issues substantially more than male candidates. Specifically, in a typical 60-minute debate female candidates mentioned these issues 35 times while male candidates only mentioned feminine policy issues 17 times. Furthermore, as Figure 5 demonstrates, female candidates mentioned masculine policy issues 28 times while male candidates mentioned masculine

Figure 2: Number of Times Candidates Mentioned Stereotypically Masculine Traits

Figure 3: Number of Times Candidates Mentioned Stereotypically Feminine Traits

Figure 4: Number of Times Candidates Mentioned Stereotypically Feminine Policy Issues

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Figure 5: Number of Times Candidates Mentioned Stereotypically Masculine Policy Issues

Figure 6: Total Number of Times a Candidate Mentioned a Policy

policy issues 35 times in a typical 60-minute debate. Thus, as hypothesized, candidates emphasize policy issues congruent with their gender. Additionally, confirming the third hypothesis, female candidates mentioned stereotypically masculine policy issues significantly more than male candidates mentioned stereotypically feminine policy issues suggesting that female candidates utilized a “gender-bending” tactic more often than male candidates. Focusing more narrowly on stereotypically feminine issues, in a typical debate, female candidates mentioned education eight more times than male candidates, healthcare six more times than male candidates, and the environment five more times than male candidates. Specifically notable is that abortion was only mentioned by female candidates, as female candidates mentioned abortion two times in a typical debate. When taken together, these findings suggest that in these 36

debates, female candidates discussed stereotypically feminine issues significantly more frequently than male candidates. Examining masculine policy issues, male candidates mention stereotypically masculine policy issues slightly more than female candidates. As Figure 5 demonstrates, in a typical 60-minute debate, male candidates mentioned foreign policy six times more than female candidates. However, there are no compelling findings to suggest that in a typical 60-minute debate male candidates mention agriculture, the economy, or foreign policy substantially more than female candidates. Thus, while male candidates mentioned stereotypically masculine policy issues more than they mentioned stereotypically feminine policy issues, they did not discuss most stereotypically masculine issues significantly more often than female candidates. A most striking finding, shown in Figure 6, is that in a typical 60-minute debate, female candidates mentioned policy issues 11 times more than male candidates. Thus, female candidates are not only covering a more diverse set of policy issues, but they are also discussing policy issues more than male candidates. This follows from the theory regarding differences between men and women’s perception of their qualifications. Specifically, female candidates appear to feel the need to prove their qualifications for office more so than male candidates.2

Female Candidates Attack More than Male Candidates

To test the fourth hypothesis, that in a typical 60-minute debate female candidates would attack more than male candidates, due to male candidates’ fear of coming off as a bully (Benoit, Brazeal, and Airne 2007), the total number of attacks per minute by female candidates to the total number of attacks by the male opponents are compared. Figure 6 shows that, in a typical 60-minute debate, female candidates attacked their male opponents more than male candidates attacked their female opponents. Specifically, female candidates attacked their male opponents 47 times while male candidates attacked their female opponents 20 times. These findings support the hypothesis and suggest that female candidates may be attempting to prove their qualifications for office more than male candidates.

Stereotypes and Self-Presentation: How Gender Affects Senate Candidate Behavior

Another interesting finding is that, in a typical 60-minute debate, female candidates, overall, attacked more often than male candidates. Figure 7 shows that male candidates in races with a female opponent attacked almost the same number of times that male candidates in races with male opponents attacked. Thus, male candidates are not just attacking less when opposed by a female candidate as to not come off to viewers negatively. Rather, female candidates are attacking more in general, and may be doing so as a way of displaying more stereotypically masculine traits. Thus, it may not be the “bully” factor that is dissuading male candidates from attacking female opponents; rather it may be that female candidates are utilizing a “gender-bending” strategy in order to persuade voters that they are qualified to hold a stereotypically masculine position – public office.

Figure 7: Number of Attacks Made by Candidates in Male/Female Debates

Figure 8: Number of Attacks Made by Male Candidates in Male/Male Races versus Male Candidates in Male/Female Races

Men Emphasize More Diverse Issues and Traits When Running Against a Woman

The fifth hypothesis asserts that when male candidates are opposed by female candidates they would mention more stereotypically feminine policy issues and traits, or “gender-bend,” in an effort to portray themselves positively on a wider range of issues. Given previous findings that suggest gender-bending can be particularly effective for both male and female candidates to prime and persuade voters (Schneider 2014), gender-bending may be seen as a strategic approach for candidates in debates. To test this hypothesis, that male candidates running against female candidates (i.e. male/female race) will act differently than male candidates running against male candidates (i.e. male/male race), male candidates in male/male races to male candidates in male/female races in terms of policy mentions, traits mentions, and attacks are compared. Matched pairs in this comparison are employed in order to control for party and ideology of the candidates, the incumbency status of the race, and the general characteristics of the states. Examining feminine policy issues, the number of times male candidates in male/male races mentioned feminine policy issues in comparison to male candidates in male/female races are examined. As Figure 9 demonstrates, in a typical 60-minute

debate, male candidates running in male/female races mention stereotypically feminine policy issues more than male candidates running in male/male races. Specifically, male candidates in male/female races mentioned education two more times, healthcare two more times, and the environment two more times than male candidates in male/male races. Male candidates in male/male races did not mention abortion at all, while male candidates in races with a female opponent did mention abortion. These findings support the hypothesis and suggest that the gender of a male candidate’s opponent makes a difference in whether these candidates speak about stereotypically feminine policy issues. In short, male candidates in male/female races mentioned stereotypically feminine policy issues more than male candidates in male/male races. This finding provides compelling evidence that having a female candidate present in debates increases the diversity of issues covered.

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Figure 9: Number of Times Male Candidates in Male/Male Races Mentioned Stereotypically Feminine Policy Issues versus Male Candidates in Male/Female Races

Figure 10: Number of Times Male Candidates in Male/Male Races Mentioned Stereotypically Masculine Policy Issues versus Male Candidates in Male/Female Races

Regarding masculine policy issues, there is more variation in the effect that the presence of a female candidate has on male candidates in debates. As Figure 10 demonstrates, the number of times male candidates in male/male races mention stereotypically masculine policy issues differs from the number of times male candidates in male/female races mention these policy issues, except for crime. In a typical 60-minute debate, male candidates in male/male races mentioned foreign policy eight more times than male candidates in male/female races and mentioned agriculture five more times than male candidates in male/female races. Particularly notable is that, in a typical 60-minute debate, male candidates in male/female races mentioned the economy ten more times than male candidates in male/male races. The variation found between issues, when considering the effects that the gender of an opponent has on male candidates, is compelling. Future research is needed to uncover the reasons this variation exists, as it is beyond the scope of my research. 38

The hypothesis, that male candidates will behave differently when running against a female candidate, is further tested by examining candidatesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; emphasis on traits: the number of times male candidates in male/male races emphasize stereotypically masculine or feminine traits to the number of times male candidates in male/female races are compared. Figures 11 and 12 show that male candidates in male/male races emphasize stereotypically masculine and feminine traits less than male candidates in male/male races. Findings show that, in a typical 60-minute debate, male candidates in male/female races emphasize communal traits (specifically compassion and empathy), or stereotypically feminine traits, one more time than male candidates in male/male races. Furthermore, male candidates in male/female races emphasize agentic traits (specifically leadership and experience), or stereotypically masculine traits, eight more times than male candidates in male/male races. Together, these findings suggest that having a female candidate present in debates induces male candidates to discuss more diverse issues and to emphasize both masculine and feminine traits more.

Discussion and Conclusion The results suggest that gender substantially affects how candidates present themselves in senatorial debates. At the most general level, female candidates, more than male candidates, attempt to present themselves in ways that emphasize their qualifications for political office. The first three hypotheses that female candidates would attempt to prove their qualifications for political office through gender-bending and acclaims more than male candidates, were supported by the findings. Specifically, female candidates discussed more policy issues, emphasized both stereotypically masculine and feminine traits more than male candidates, and lastly, acclaimed far more than the male candidates. Given the gendered nature of politics which, as many scholars have noted, favors masculine characteristics (Duerst-Lahti 2012; Meeks 2012), it is not surprising that

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Stereotypes and Self-Presentation: How Gender Affects Senate Candidate Behavior

Figure 11: Number of Times Male Candidates in Male/Male Races Emphasized Stereotypiwomen strategically emphasize cally Masculine Traits versus the Number of Times Male Candidates in Male/Female Races policy issues and traits that are Emphasized These Traits stereotypically incongruent with their gender. A finding that is particularly telling of masculine characteristics dominating the political sphere is that agentic traits were emphasized significantly more than communal traits in all debates. This is not surprising given that politics is a gendered arena, in which masculine traits are regarded as more important than feminine traits for a political leader. Thus, the finding that female candidates are gender-bending more than male candidates suggests that these candidates are acting strategically Figure 12: Number of Times Male Candidates in Male/Male Races Emphasized Stereotypin order to present themselves ically Feminine Traits versus the Number of Times Male Candidates in Male/Female Races as having those favorable Emphasized These Traits stereotypically masculine characteristics. While the fourth hypothesis, that female candidates would attack more than their male opponents, was also supported, the reasoning behind this hypothesis seemed to be incorrect. It is found that female candidates attack more than male candidates, but not because male candidates are behaving differently when opposed by a woman. Rather, both male candidates in a male/male race and male candidates with a female opponent attack less than female candidates. This too, may be interpreted as a type of genderbending that female candidates are pursuing. Because attacking throughout the debates, whether by discussing more policy, is considered aggressive and thus considered a more masculine emphasizing more positive traits, or making more acclaims. trait (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993), female candidates may One possible interpretation of these findings is that female be strategically attacking more in order to present themselves candidates are trying harder because they have lower selfas possessing stereotypically masculine characteristics. The perceptions of their qualifications and higher expectations of implications of these findings are quite significant as research voter biases against female candidates, and therefore believe shows debates have the power to influence viewersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; perception of they need to show far more qualifications to run for office candidates (Fridkin et al. 2007), and gender-bending is effective than men with the equivalent skills (Lawless and Fox 2005). in priming and persuading voters (Schneider 2014). The results By discussing policy more, demonstrating they possess both suggest that female candidates, by gender-bending so extensively favorable feminine traits and masculine traits, and claiming in debates, may be able to prime voters to evaluate them on more achievements or positive actions, female candidates are issues other than the stereotypically feminine policy issues. likely attempting to prove to themselves and viewers that they Female candidates also seemed to be making are viable for the office. Another explanation for this pattern substantively more appeals to voters than male candidates may be that because of womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lower self-perceptions of their ÂŠ Pi Sigma Alpha 2017

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preparation to seek office, women do not run until they are very highly qualified to do so and therefore, those who do run tend to be more experienced than the male candidates who run (Lawless and Fox 2005). While the educational backgrounds of the male and female candidates are almost identical, it is possible that female candidates have sought other qualifications at levels higher than male candidates, and thus can cover more substantive issues than their male opponents. Either way, female candidates are choosing to emphasize their qualifications more than male candidates. Lastly, the findings support the fifth hypothesis, that male candidates act differently when opposed by a female candidate than when opposed by another male candidate. Thus, the results of my research suggest that the presence of female candidates can alter the general discussion of a political campaign. Whether this is because female candidates themselves are provoking different conversations or because the moderators are asking different questions to female candidates, the presence of a woman in debates nonetheless changes the substance of discussion. Male candidates with female opponents cover a broader range of issues, both feminine and masculine, than male candidates with male opponents. Men also emphasize both masculine and feminine traits more when running against a woman. The implications of these finding are potentially quite significant. First, if debates can strengthen issue knowledge of viewers (Fridkin et al. 2007), then having women present in debates, and thus having discussion that covers more and a wider range of policy issues, would increase viewers’ issue knowledge. Viewers would not only learn more about stereotypically masculine policy issues, but also potentially learn more about stereotypically feminine policy issues when observing debates with female candidates. These findings may also have significant implications when it comes to media coverage of female candidates. Many scholars have found that female candidates receive substantially less news coverage than their male opponents (Kahn and Goldenberg 1991). Given the media’s bias toward the interesting (Niven 2012) and its tendency to cover politics in a way that garners attention from as many people as possible, female candidates could either benefit or be hurt by their debate strategy. Because female candidates discuss policy issues significantly more than their male opponents, and because policy issues often do not fit with the media’s “interesting bias,” they may receive less coverage. However, given that female candidates attack more than male candidates, this may benefit them as attacking shows conflict, something the media is often looking to cover (Niven 2012). Thus, the implications of my findings are mixed: women may benefit from their campaigning strategy in terms of media coverage but may also be further disadvantaged in trying to prove their qualifications. Gender matters for how candidates present themselves in senatorial debates. This research demonstrates that female candidates, given the same amount of speaking time in a 40

debate, will emphasize more traits and address more policy issues than male candidates. Having female candidates in debates provokes a more diverse discussion of policy issues and thus may serve to increase viewers’ issue knowledge. The strategies female candidates use in debates may also influence the amount of media coverage they receive. Thus, how female candidates present themselves in debates may have substantive effects on how they are perceived by the public and thereby the political representation of women. ■

About the Author Georgia Konstam is a junior at Sewanee: The University of the South, where she is majoring in Political Science as well as Environment and Sustainability. She was inducted into Sewanee’s honor society, the Order of the Gown, at the end of her first year. In addition to studying how gender affects Senate candidate behavior, she has been researching the effectiveness of constructed wetlands in treating wastewater and has presented her findings at the Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry North America's Annual Meeting. Currently, she is part of a research project regarding the politics of wastewater treatment at state and local levels of government. Konstam is a co-director of the Socially Responsible Investment Club at Sewanee and the president of the Sewanee Moot Court Team. She is also on the Sewanee Equestrian Team and a student pilot in the university’s aviation program. She lives in New York City and plans to attend law school after college with a particular focus oncivil rights.

Notes 1. Given Dittmar’s (2015) research, it is likely that some of the differences found between male and female candidates are due to their strategic behavior, given their gender and that of their opponents. However, these data employed in this study do not allow a test of this proposition. 2. To determine whether this distinction derived from different levels of candidate preparation by gender, data were gathered on the educational background of the male and female candidates. Findings reveal that male and female candidates in these races had similar levels of education, with all candidates having a college degree, and the same percentage -86% - of both men and women having higher than a college degree. Thus, the relatively greater policy focus of female candidates appears not to be due to the female candidates having greater educational preparation for their candidacies than male candidates.

References Alexander, Kristi Andersen. 1993. “Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits.” Political Research Quarterly 46(3):527-545. Atkeson, Lonna Rae. 2003. “Not All Cues Are Created Equal: The Conditional Impact of Female Candidates on Political Engagement.” Journal of Politics 65(4):1040-1061.

Stereotypes and Self-Presentation: How Gender Affects Senate Candidate Behavior Barrett, Edith J. 1995. “The Policy Priorities of African American Women in State Legislatures.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20(2): 223–247. Williams, John E., Robert C. Satterwhite, and Deborah Best. 1999. “Pancultural Gender Stereotypes Revisited: The Five Factor Model.” Sex Roles 40(7-8): 513-525. Benoit, William, LeAnn M. Brazeal, and David Airne. 2007. “A Functional Analysis of Televised U.S. Senate and Gubernatorial Campaign Debates.” Argumentation and Advocacy 44(2):75-89. Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. The Private Roots of Public Action. Harvard University Press. Carroll, Susan. 2003. “Women and American Politics: New Questions, New Directions.” Oxford University Press. Center for American Women and Politics. 2017. “Women in Elective Office 2017.” http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/current-numbers (Accessed December 1, 2017). Dittmar, Kelly. 2015. Navigating Gendered Terrain: Stereotypes and Strategy in Political Campaigns. Temple University Press. Duerst-Lahti. 2014. “Presidential Elections: Gendered Space and the Case of 2012.” In Gender and Elections: Shaping the Future of American Politics, eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. New York: Cambridge University Press, 13-43. Dolan, Kathleen. 2005. “Do Women Candidates Play to Gender Stereotypes? Do Men Candidates Play to Women? Candidate Sex and Issues Priorities on Campaign Websites.” Political Research Quarterly 58 (1):31-44. Druckman, James, Lawrence Jacobs, and Eric Ostermeier. 2004. “Candidates Strategies to Prime Issues and Image.” Journal of Politics 66 (4): 1180-1202. Fox, Richard L., and Zoe M. Oxley. 2003. “Gender Stereotyping in State Executive Elections: Candidate Selection and Success.” Journal of Politics 65 (3): 833-848. Fox, Richard. 1997. Gender Dynamics in Congressional Elections. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Fox, Richard. 2000. “Gender and Congressional Elections.” In Gender and American Politics: Women, Men, and the Political Process, eds. Sue Tolleson-Rinehart and Jyl Josephson, Armonk, NY: Sharpe. Fridkin, Kim L., and Patrick J. Kenney. 2014. The Changing Face of Representation: The Gender of U.S. Senators and Constituent Communications. University of Michigan Press. Fridkin, Kim L, Patrick J. Kenney, Sarah Allen Gershon, Karen Shafer, and Gina Serignese Woodall. 2007. “Capturing the Power of the Campaign Event: The 2004 Presidential Debate in Tempe.” Journal of Politics 69(3):770-785. Holman, Mirya. 2014. “Sex and the City: Female Leaders and Spending on Social Welfare Programs in U.S. Municipalities.” Journal of Urban Affairs 36(4):701-715. Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. “Gender Stereotypes and Perceptions of Male and Female Candidates.” American Journal of Political Science 37: 119-147.

Jewell, Malcolm, and Marcia Lynn Whicker. 1994. Legislative Leadership in American States. University of Michigan Press. Kahn, Kim. 1996. The Political Consequences of Being a Woman. New York: Columbia University Press. Kahn, Kim Fridkin, and Edie N. Goldenberg. 1991. “Women Candidates in the News: An Examination of Gender Differences in U.S. Senate Campaign Coverage.” Public Opinion Quarterly 55 (2): 180–199. Kathlene, Lyn. 1994. “Power and Influence of State Legislative Policymaking: The Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates.” American Political Science Review 88:560-576. Koch, Jeffrey. 1999. “Candidate Gender and Assessments of Senate Candidates.” Social Science Quarterly 80: 84-96. Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2005. “To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 642-659. McDermott, Monika. 1998. “Race and Gender Cues in Low Information Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 51: 895-918. Meeks, Lindsey. 2012. “Is She Man Enough? Women Candidates, Executive Political Offices, News Coverage.” Journal of Communication 62 (1): 175-193. Niven, David. 1998. The Missing Majority: The Recruitment of Women as State Legislative Candidates. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. Niven, David. 2012. “An Interesting Bias: Lessons from an Academic’s Year as a Reporter” Political Science and Politics 45(2):259-263. Pew Research Center. 2016. “2016 Campaign: Strong Interest, Widespread Dissatisfaction.” http://www.people-press. org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/ (Accessed January 1, 2018). Reingold, Beth, and Jessica Harrell. 2010. “The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Women’s Political Engagement Does Party Matter?” Political Research Quarterly 63 (2): 280-294. Rosenthal, Cindy Simon. 2000. “Gender Styles in State Legislative Committees: Raising their Voices in Resolving Conflict.” Women and Politics 21(2):21-45. Shapiro, Robert Y., and Harpreet Mahajan. 1986. “Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s.” Public Opinion Quarterly 50(1): 42-61. Shapiro, Virginia. 1981. “When are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women.” American Political Science Review 75 (3): 701-713. Schneider. 2014. “The Effects of Gender-Bending on Candidate Evaluations” Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy 35 (1) Swers, Michele. 2005. “Connecting Descriptive and Substantive Representation: An Analysis of Sex Differences in Cosponsorship Activity.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 30(3):407-433.

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Appendix A: Debates Coded

Matched Pair Number

Name

Party

Gender

State

Incumbent

Won

Braley

Democratic

Male

Iowa

Ernst

Republican

Female

Iowa

Yes

Domina

Democratic

Male

Nebraska

Sasse

Republican

Male

Nebraska

Yes

Grimes

Democratic

Female

Kentucky

Yes

McConnell

Republican

Male

Kentucky

Yes

Durbin

Democratic

Male

Illinois

Yes

Oberweis

Republican

Male

Illinois

Yes

Landrieu

Democratic

Female

Louisiana

Yes

Cassidy

Republican

Male

Louisiana

Yes

Pryor

Democratic

Male

Arkansas

Yes

Cotton

Republican

Male

Arkansas

Yes

Curtis

Democratic

Female

Montana

Daines

Republican

Male

Montana

Yes

Weiland

Democratic

Male

South Dakota

Rounds

Republican

Male

South Dakota

Yes

Shaheen

Democratic

Female

New Hampshire

Yes

Brown

Republican

Male

New Hampshire

Yes

Mitchell

Democratic

Male

Idaho

Yes

Risch

Republican

Male

Idaho

Yes

Hagan

Democratic

Female

North Carolina

Yes

Tillis

Republican

Male

North Carolina

Yes

Warner

Democratic

Male

Virginia

Yes

Gillespie

Republican

Male

Virginia

Yes

Merkley

Democratic

Male

Oregon

Yes

Wehby

Republican

Female

Oregon

Yes

Udall

Democratic

Male

Colorado

Yes

Gardner

Republican

Male

Colorado

Yes

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Stereotypes and Self-Presentation: How Gender Affects Senate Candidate Behavior

Appendix B: Code Book • Education: Number of statements a candidate makes that reference education • Healthcare: Number of statements a candidate makes that reference healthcare • Abortion: Number of statements a candidate makes that reference abortion • Environment: Number of statements a candidate makes that reference the environment • Foreign Policy: Number of statements a candidate makes that reference foreign policy • Economy: Number of statements a candidate makes that reference the economy • Agriculture: Number of statements a candidate makes that reference agriculture • Crime: Number of statements a candidate makes that reference crime

Leadership: Number of statements candidates make on leadership. These statements include, but are not limited to: • “I will fight,” • “I have led” • “we need strong leadership” Experience: Number of time candidates talks about their previous experience. Phrases that are coded under experience include but are not limited to: “I have worked across party lines to pass ___ bill” “I have working with politicians since ___” “I have experience with handling economic issues”

Note on issue mentions: Does not count mentions of issue if candidate repeats him or herself entirely. For example, if moderator interrupts candidates and candidate has to start sentence over. Or, if candidate stutters and repeats sentence for clarity.

Attacks: Number of times candidate directly attacks their opponent. Phrases considered as attacks include but are not limited to: • “When ____ was in office he/she voted for a bill that create an increase in unemployment” • “____ has continuously failed to keep to his/her promises. She/he says he/she will make sure everyone has affordable health care, but has voted against ____ every time” • “____ does not understand the needs of the people in this state”

Compassion/Empathy: Number of statements candidates make emphasizing how he or she feels compassion or empathy towards something/someone. These phrases include, but are not limited to: • “I understand what the people of this state are feeling” • “I empathize with the people” • “I am compassionate about the wellbeing of our community”

Acclaims: Number of times candidate claims something positive about themselves. Phrases include but are not limited to: • “I believe” • “I think” • “I support” • “I have”

Complex Democracy: The Framing of the Standing Rock Protests by U.S. Media William D. Taylor, Allegheny College C. Edwin Baker proposed the theory of complex democracy which, by emphasizing a participatory political system that recognizes multiculturalism and the functional utility of cooperation, places high expectations on both citizens and media systems. This study employed a framing analysis of media coverage of the Standing Rock protests during fall 2016. The purpose of this research was to determine the extent to which coverage from four prominent media outlets met the requirements of complex democracy. The outlets with the most ideologically uniform audiences published the most partisan versions of the events. The outlets with more moderate audiences primarily followed a similar pattern. These findings suggest how some online partisan news outlets in the United States frame political events can play a role in polarizing the public.

ew would argue against the notion that the citizens in a democracy require access to accurate and reliable information about all matters that may be considered necessary to make reasonable political decisions. Such decisions may include choosing to attend town halls, participating in protests, organizing voter registration drives, or simply voting. The latter activities require citizens to formulate their viewpoints and ideas about political matters. However, what may be considered the optimal amount of information required by citizens varies according to a multitude of different democratic theories. The extent to which citizens should be expected to become involved in the political process is not universally agreed upon and, therefore, neither is the availability of politically relevant information to fulfill this expectation. If the media’s primary purpose is to disseminate important political events and occurrences initiated by political actors to the citizenry so that the citizenry may hold political actors accountable, then determining what expectations ought to be placed on media systems will depend largely on which theory of democracy is believed to be most appropriate. This article analyzes coverage by four major media outlets of protests organized by the Standing Rock Sioux tribe in North Dakota against the construction of Energy Transfer Partners, LLC’s Dakota Access Pipeline in fall 2016. This coverage is interpreted through the lens of three distinct theories of democracy: complex democracy, liberal pluralism, and civic republicanism. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the degree to which online media outlets in the U.S. encourage internal deliberation among different political groups and attempt to appeal across lines of difference to make substantiated arguments that particular interests are consistent with a common good. Thus, this article addresses the following question: To what extent do media outlets in the U.S. meet the expectations of C. Edwin Baker’s (2002) theory of “complex democracy”?

As will be explained further, Baker (2002) proposes a theory of democratic thinking that places high expectations on both citizens and media systems. By combining components of civic republican and liberal pluralist theories, Baker’s notion of complex democracy embraces a participatory political system that recognizes multiculturalism and the practical value of political compromise. Such a theory, is most suitable for understanding democratic processes in the U.S. and will, therefore, be the primary interest of this study. The protests that took place on the Standing Rock reservation in fall 2016 over the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline serve as an interesting topic of study. For example, these events can be characterized as a particularly polarizing disagreement between two primary groups. The first group is comprised predominantly of Native Americans and environmental activists whereas the second group is comprised primarily of law enforcement and the fossil fuel industry. While pipeline supporters relied largely on economic appeal, those opposed to construction typically emphasized how this particular issue fit into a larger pattern of negligence towards Native American sovereignty on the part of industry and government. For instance, Energy Transfers Partners argued that the project would reduce U.S dependence on foreign oil and create 12,000 local jobs, generating $129 million in tax revenue (Hersher 2017). The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, on the other hand, expressed concern and that the pipeline’s construction would devastate their sacred burial grounds and pollute their water (Hersher 2017). To make these determinations, a qualitative content analysis of media frames from four online outlets, diverse in the ideologies of the primary audiences, was employed. Articles published between November 1, 2016, and December 7, 2016, by The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic, and National Review covering the protests at Standing Rock were selected for analysis. A criterion for each of the three relevant

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democratic theories was established and frames from these articles were coded based on those criteria. Additionally, frames were coded based on whether or not they were considered episodic or thematic, enabling a more nuanced analysis of the extent to which the media outlets included in this study meet the requirements of complex democracy. When applied, this methodology demonstrated that the four major media outlets were likely to frame the events at Standing Rock in a manner which lacked emphasis on the following: (1) making concessions with political adversaries, (2) encouraging internal deliberation within particular groups, and (3) a general concern for the common good. In analyzing these findings, this article takes into consideration the cognitive mechanisms related to how citizens process and evaluate political information. Drawing on literature that supports the notion of motivated reasoning and evidence that citizens’ ideological beliefs become more extreme when they are exposed to factual contradictions, with additional consideration given towards the increased likelihood of inadvertent exposure to political information online— primarily through social networking—among audiences most susceptible to be influenced by partisan content, it is argued that the manner in which the Standing Rock protests are covered by the four media outlets analyzed potentially contributed to, or at minimum are complicit towards, the escalation of violence between law enforcement and protesters.

The Standing Rock Protests

The dispute was first instigated in April 2016, when a letter from the Army Corps of Engineers senior field archeologist for the project listed five “recorded cultural sites” within the area that could be affected by the construction of the pipeline, and over 30 more within a 1-mile radius of the construction site. Nonetheless, the letter contended, “no historic properties will be subject to effect” (Army Corps of Engineers 2016). The U.S. government’s Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, however, was disputing this determination in June 2016, urging that cooperation with tribal leaders be prioritized to identify areas of concern (Fowler 2016). On July 25, 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers approved the pipeline route encompassing these very areas at the Missouri River and the Lake Oahe reservoir, stating, “No significant comments remain unresolved” (Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 2016). On August 4, 2016, The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, alleging that the Corps violated the National Historic Preservation Act by not appropriately consulting tribe members prior to approving construction of the pipeline. On August 15, 2016, Dakota Access LLC, a subsidiary of the pipeline company Energy Transfer Partners, countersued leaders of the Standing Rock Sioux, claiming that protestors near the Lake Oahe river crossing had “halted construction activities”. They explained that, in a single afternoon, the number of protesters had increased from approximately 15 to nearly 100 (Hersher 2017).

The events that followed—and more specifically, the coverage of them by numerous online media outlets—are to be the primary focus of this article. Over the course of several months, thousands of U.S. citizens traveled to North Dakota to participate in an occupation intended to prevent the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline. Of critical importance is how information about civic these events was disseminated to the citizenry by online media outlets. With consideration towards the cognitive processes by which citizens make sense of political information, as well as the potential for increased inadvertent exposure to online political news among audiences more susceptible to be polarized by partisan content, this study intends to examine whether or not online media outlets frame events like the protests at Standing Rock in a manner consistent with Baker’s (2002) theory of complex democracy. Indeed, the information that citizens receive and the ways in which that information is framed will have important implications for their continued participation in the political process.

Literature Review Complex Democracy

According to Baker (2002), media systems ought to “encompass arenas where both individuals and groups look for and create common ground . . . [and] also advance their own individual and group interests”. Baker’s theory of complex democracy combines components from the liberal pluralist traditions of democratic theory with those from the school of civic republican theory. Prior to elaborating further on complex democracy and the expectations that it places on citizens and media systems, it will first be necessary to explain these different traditions of democratic thought. Civic republican democratic theory, Baker (2002) explains, emphasizes deliberation as a method of determining a “common good”. Similarly, Fraser (1990, 71-71) explicates that the civic republican model “stresses a view of politics as people reasoning together to promote a common good that transcends the mere sum of individual preferences” (71-72). As Stoker (1992, 372) emphasizes, however, “public justification requires . . . some account of how [individual] interests are to be reconciled with the interests of others—some recognition of the requirements of community life” (372). Civic republicanism, therefore, expects individuals and groups to substantiate their viewpoints by articulating reasons that these particular interests are to the benefit of all members of society. Civic republicans, however, are not ignorant of the fact that different groups and individuals develop differing and competing interests. Where civic republicanism and liberal pluralism differ, however, is in how each theory of democracy expects citizens to regard those with whom their interests diverge. Indeed, civic republicanism expects individuals and groups to listen to and consider positions that may deviate

Complex Democracy: The Framing of the Standing Rock Protests by U.S. Media

from and challenge their own. Dewey (1976, 228) provides the notion of “amicable cooperation”, which is particularly relevant to this matter. Accordingly, citizens are to treat those with whom they disagree profoundly “as those from whom we may learn . . . as friends”. Similarly, Allen (2004, 140) proposes the conception of “political friendship,” which she explains to be “[not] a sentiment of fellow-feeling for other citizens”, but instead as a practice by which citizens are expected to “try to be like friends (emphasis original)” with strangers and treating them with “political trust” (Allen 2004, 156). Therefore, citizens and media systems adhering to civic republicanism would set out to determine and evaluate conflicting standpoints about matters deemed as politically important in order to promote “civic virtue” and a decisionmaking culture of considerate negotiation with the intent of producing concessions and agreement from competing groups (Baker 2002; Fraser 1990). Liberal pluralists, on the other hand, “recognize intractable diversity” and view conflict “among both values and interests . . . as incorrigible” (Baker 2002, 137). Accordingly, a liberal pluralist democracy functions to carry out the interests of groups that maintain popular participation in electoral events. Mobilization of particular groups is, therefore, prioritized. Civic republicanism and liberal pluralism do overlap in that they are both participatory theories of democracy— placing the expectation of all citizens to be active participants in the political process—and through their recognition that different groups will develop separate interests. Civic republicanism and liberal pluralism also differ, however, in how they expect citizens to participate when such conflicts become relevant within deliberative public arenas. While civic republicanism expects citizens to develop arguments that appeal to a notion of the common good and to make concessions occasionally in order to promote a culture of civic virtue, liberal pluralism expects citizens to place all of their energy in bolstering up whichever side their views align with most, with little to no emphasis on cooperation with political adversaries. Such bolstering involves seeking out evidence to support a particular group’s interests to mobilize supporters (Baker 2002). Baker’s (2002, 137) notion of complex democracy combines elements from the civic republican perspective with those of the liberal pluralist. As he explains, complex democracy, “assumes that a participatory democracy would and should encompass arenas where both individuals and groups look for and create common ground, that is, common goods, but where they also advance their own individual and group values and interests”. Complex democracy, thus, acknowledges that different interests among different groups may be inevitable—even desirable—in a free society. A complex democracy would allow groups to engage in an “internal process of value formation and clarification” as a means to determine their own “common good” (Baker 2002, 144). Baker’s (2002) proposition of “complex democracy” also draws heavily on Fraser’s (1990) conception of the “public 46

sphere”. Fraser explains that—in a society characterized by social inequality—the conception of the type of allencompassing public arena imagined by civic republican theory will work to the disadvantage of non-dominant groups by inadequately acknowledging existing power disparities. Such circumstances necessitate the development of “subaltern counterpublics” to simultaneously function as “spaces of withdrawal and regroupment” as well as “training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics” (Fraser 1990, 67-68). In summary, complex democracy combines elements of civic republicanism and liberal pluralism to establish a vision of democracy that embraces multiculturalism. By acknowledging that society is unavoidably comprised of separate groups based on different identities (e.g., race, gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and others), complex democracy expects citizens to engage in a deliberative process of determining a common good within these distinct groups. From there, groups are expected to appeal across lines of differences and make compelling arguments to others groups about why working to advance their particular interests will also be to the benefit of the society as a whole.

The Role of Partisan News Media

Indeed, complex democracy places high expectations on citizens and—as the primary means by which citizens acquire information about political matters—high expectations on media systems as well. Complex democracy requires media outlets that both inform particular groups when their interests are being threatened as well as those that consider competing perspectives with the goal emphasizing compromise in the name of a greater societal good. Perhaps even more demanding, however, complex democracy also requires media outlets that “support groups internal discursive and reflective needs for selfdefinition, cultural development, and value clarification” (Baker 2002, 150). With consideration of the theories discussed, it is necessary to inquire: to what extent do media outlets live up to these expectations? The role played by partisan media in shaping the political and ideological preferences of the public has been the subject of numerous studies by political scientists. For example, Levendusky (2013, 136) demonstrates that viewers of partisan media “become more polarized, more certain their beliefs are the correct ones, less willing to compromise and support bipartisanship, and more willing to attribute election victories by the other side to nefarious motives”. However, Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) employ experimental methods to advance an “active audience theory” and posit that it is unlikely that partisan media contribute directly to polarization. For example, they found that “when people are allowed to choose what they view, the direct effects of partisan news talk shows are limited to the people who actually tune into them,” and that, “partisan news shows have a smaller effect on those who regularly watch them” (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013, 148). Thus, their

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findings imply that the expansion of choice for cable audiences over the last couple decades attenuates the influence of partisan media on the electorate as a whole, as most viewers will not likely expose themselves to counterattitudinal programs and those who do will only become more extreme in their previously held beliefs (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013). However, while Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) employed an impressive methodology to yield quite compelling evidence that partisan news programming in the context of cable television is unlikely to have any direct effect in polarizing the U.S. citizenry, their work contains little to no consideration about the role played by partisan media online. Certainly, as the gap between Americans who get their news from television and those who get their news online rapidly narrows (Gottfried and Shearer 2017), it will become increasingly important to include online partisan media outlets in studies seeking to make contributions to an understanding of the general role played by partisan media with regard to polarization. Indeed, the findings of a study conducted by Messing and Westwood (2012, 17) with regard to political information circulated via social networking websites suggest that, “…the odds of exposure to counterattitudinal information among partisans and political news among the disaffected . . . [is] substantially higher than . . . traditional media venues”. As Arceneaux and Johnson (2013, 152) explain, “…the only time partisan news shows should have large direct effects is when the inadvertent partisan news audience is large”. Thus, while cable partisan news programs are not likely to be the main reason for rising polarization, it is possible online partisan media are a better predictor.

Cognitive Functioning and Implications for Democracy

These considerations regarding the role that partisan media play in the polarization of the electorate necessitates a further discussion about how citizens process and evaluate information. While many may feel inclined to believe that the mental process by which citizens interpret the information they receive from the media as a practice by which they actively participate in an impartial evaluation of presented facts, evidence exists suggesting that such determinations are largely influenced by subconscious feelings. For example, Lodge and Taber (2013, 3) theorize and confirm that people are typically incapable of accurately expressing political preferences and that “their conscious deliberations are typically more rationalizing than rational”. Lodge and Taber (2013, 32-33) explain: “As soon as a citizen recognizes the ‘subject, object, and verb’ of a news report—that is, who is saying or doing what to whom—the feelings associated with these objects come inescapably to mind, whether consciously recognized or not, and for better or for worse these feelings guide subsequent thought.”

This sort of subconscious rationalization that citizens engage in while evaluating information is commonly referred to as

“motivated reasoning” (Lodge and Taber 2013). Motivated reasoning is the result of several cognitive processes including selective exposure, or the seeking out of information that supports ones already maintained views, confirmation bias, where information that is congruent with a citizen’s already maintained perspectives is accepted with little to no consideration that it may be inaccurate, and disconfirmation bias, where information that challenges a citizen’s previously held beliefs is taken with a great deal of skepticism and effort to delegitimize (Lodge and Taber 2013). There exists a great deal of literature supporting the theory that citizens are motivated reasoners. For example, Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 323) found that “factual contradictions can actually strengthen ideologically grounded beliefs (emphasis original),” meaning that when citizens encounter factual information that is contrary to their ideological perspectives, their false ideological beliefs are likely to be strengthened as a result. Lodge and Taber (2013) posit a theoretical framework for better understanding these cognitive processes and the role they play in citizens’ evaluation of political information. They call this framework the John Q. Public Model, and explain that it is a “dual process model . . . of the architecture and mechanisms that can account for when, how, and why thoughts feelings goals and behavioral expectations come to mind automatically to promote behavior” (Lodge and Taber 2013, 2-9). These findings support the possibility that online partisan news outlets play a role in polarizing the public. Thus, one may be inclined to inquire about the extent to which popular media outlets meet the expectations of complex democracy by encouraging internal value formation among distinct groups and attempt to appeal across lines of difference and make compelling arguments about why working to advance a particular interest is in the society’s general interest. If, however, popular media outlets do not meet the expectations of complex democracy and are more aligned towards the expectations of a liberal pluralist theory of democracy, by which priority is placed on political mobilization and an emphasis on compromise with political adversaries is absent, then it may be worthwhile for scholars and students of disciplines like media studies and political science to conduct further research on the role played by online partisan media outlets in the polarization of the American public.

Research Methods To determine the extent to which various media outlets met the requirements of the three separate democratic theories with regard to coverage of Standing Rock protests, a qualitative content analysis was employed. The data analyzed in this study took the form of media frames. Frames, as Entman (1993, 52) explains, involve the selection of: “…some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote

Complex Democracy: The Framing of the Standing Rock Protests by U.S. Media a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described . . . Frames, then, define problems . . . diagnose causes . . . make moral judgments . . . and suggest remedies…”

A qualitative approach to analyzing the frames was most appropriate for this study, in part, because as Bryman (2012) explains, “qualitative research tends to be concerned with words rather than numbers”. Additionally, Bryman (2012, 380) explicates that qualitative approaches are rooted in: “…an ontological position described as constructionist, which implies that social properties are outcomes of the interactions between individuals, rather than phenomena ‘out there’ and separate from those involved in its construction.”

Therefore, such a methodology was most appropriate for analyzing these data with the intention of interpreting them in the context of the mental processes by which citizens process political information. In discussing their John Q. Public Model, for example, Lodge and Taber (2013, 9) explain it as: “…a constructionist approach whereby the content of one’s thoughts and the coloration of feelings change moment-bymoment in response to unnoticed ‘priming’ events that link changes in political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.”

Sample

Four major news outlets were selected: The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic, and National Review. The articles were selected thematically based on their coverage of the protests at Standing Rock, North Dakota, of the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline. Articles were selected if they were focused primarily on the protests and were published during the established time frame. Specific information about the articles analyzed can be found in the Appendix. It should be noted that the outlets selected for analysis vary according to a number of criteria that have implications for interpreting the findings. First, these outlets differ in terms of publication frequency. For example, The New York Times and Wall Street Journal are newspapers published daily. The National Review and the Atlantic are magazines and therefore, are published less frequently. Second, the outlets differ along lines of the journalistic norms and standards followed when reporting political events. While National Review and The Atlantic would likely be categorized as advocacy outlets—taking strong and obvious stances on the events being reported—The New York Times and Wall Street Journal would be categorized among outlets that prioritize objectivity and balance to multiple sides of political disputes. Nonetheless, all four outlets are accessible online and thus able to be circulated via social media, potentially leading to inadvertent exposure by members of the public most susceptible to be persuaded by their content. 48

The time frame that was established to analyze the coverage of the Standing Rock protests ranges from November 1, 2016, to December 7, 2016. While The New York Times and The Atlantic provided relatively steady coverage of the events at Standing Rock from about mid-August through October, the coverage significantly picked up during November and extended to other outlets—such as The Wall Street Journal and The National Review. During this time period, The New York Times published seven articles about the Standing Rock protests. Somewhat surprisingly, The Atlantic only published two articles and one video1 about the Standing Rock protests. Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal published four articles about the Standing Rock protests and The National Review published two articles about the Standing Rock protests. Furthermore, the audiences of the four media outlets vary considerably regarding political ideology. The Atlantic’s audience is the most liberal, with 41% of readers identifying as liberal, 25% as moderate, and 19% as conservative (Gewurz 2012). The New York Times’ readership is slightly more moderate with 36% of readers identifying as liberal, 35% as moderate, and 22% conservative (Gewurz 2012). The Wall Street Journal is perhaps the most moderate, with only 21% of the audience identifying as liberal, 41% as moderate and 32% conservative (Gewurz 2012). Although no specific data about the ideological preferences of the audience of National Review could be found, most of the content covers issues and events from a strongly conservative angle. This leads to the assumption that the audience of The National Review is primarily comprised of conservatives.

Procedure

Frames were selected according to Entman’s (1993) aforementioned definition. If a sentence or group of sentences in an article presented a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or suggested a solution, it was deemed a frame. Frames were then coded according to their adherence to each of the three democratic theories discussed: civic republicanism, liberal pluralism, and complex democracy. It is important to note, however, that frames need not necessarily contain all of these components. Entman (1993, 52) explains: A single sentence may perform more than one of these four framing functions, although many sentences in a text perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not necessarily include all four functions.

Therefore, it was not always the circumstance that a sentence or paragraph(s) were considered as frames to be analyzed. Indeed, if a given sentence or group of sentences did not contain any of the components included in Entman’s definition of a frame, it was not analyzed. Similarly, many if not most of the frames that were analyzed did not contain all of the components described by Entman (1993). A frame was coded as adhering to civic republicanism if it did the following: (1) made substantiated arguments that a

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particular interest is congruent with the interests of the society as a whole, (2) presented conflicting standpoints neutrally, (3) acknowledged that different groups develop different interests, (4) promoted “civic virtue” as defined by Baker (2002), and/or (5) promoted concessions between opposing sides. For example, this frame from the November 21, 2016, article by Kris Maher in Wall Street Journal was coded as “civic republican” in paragraph 1: “A standoff in North Dakota near the site of an oil pipeline nearing completion turned violent late Sunday as police sprayed water, fired rubber bullets and used tear gas to disperse protesters, some of whom had set multiple fires at a highway crossing.”

In this particular frame, the problem is that “a standoff . . . turned violent”. The cause of the problem is that police used violent tactics and protesters set fires. The frame does not seem to sympathize with or favor a particular group’s version of events but presents the events in an impartial manner. Additionally, this frame implicitly recognizes that different groups foster dissimilar interests. Although it does not explicitly promote “civic virtue” (Baker 2002) or concessions, this specific frame meets more of the criteria of civic republicanism than either of the other two democratic theories being considered. Additionally, a frame was coded as adhering to liberal pluralism if it: (1) prioritized political mobilization, (2) bolstered the views or assertions of one particular side, (3) lacked emphasis on cooperation with political opponents, and/ or (4) provided evidence to support a specific position. For example, this frame from the December 6, 2016, article by Rich Lowry in National Review was coded as “liberal pluralist” read in paragraph 1: “It’s unclear what more could have been done to accommodate the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. One of the Obama Administration’s core competencies is suspending pipeline projects with no cause. It will leave office with another notch in its belt, now that the Army Corps of Engineers has acted to block a final piece of the Dakota Access Pipeline. The 1,200-mile pipeline is designed to move oil from North Dakota to Illinois and will have to await completion in a Trump administration with a more rational attitude toward pipelines specifically and fossil fuels generally.”

Here, National Review journalist Rich Lowry accuses the Obama administration of making decisions “with no cause” and implies that the administration’s general attitude toward fossil fuel policy has been consistently irrational. Clearly absent in this particular frame is any emphasis on cooperation with political opponents. This frame is an obvious attempt to bolster one particular side of a political disagreement. Furthermore, media coverage was coded as adhering to complex democracy if it: (1) placed emphasis on an “internal process of value formation” to determine a group’s “common

good” (Baker 2002), (2) encouraged internal deliberation, and/ or (3) attempted to appeal across lines of difference and made compelling arguments to other groups about why working to advance a particular interest would be to the benefit of the society as a whole. For example, this frame from the November 16, 2016, article by Kris Maher in Wall Street Journal was coded as “complex democracy” in paragraph 4: “What we can do now is assure that this pipeline will be safe, efficient and well constructed,” Mr. Warren said. “That’s one reason I’d like to meet with Mr. Archambault, to make sure he’s comfortable with that”. (para. 4)

By alleging his concern for the chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe—Dave Archambault II—the Chief Executive Officer of Energy Transfer Partners—Kelcy Warren—is encouraging internal deliberation among the Standing Rock Sioux. Additionally, by expressing a commitment to prioritize safety when constructing the pipeline, Warren is also making a substantiated argument to his political adversaries that the particular interests of his group are consistent with the society’s interests as a whole. Articles from the sample were also analyzed based on whether issues were framed thematically or episodically. Drawing on a distinction originally made by Iyengar and Adam (1993), Leighley (2004, 187) explains characterizes episodic framing as “seemingly unrelated, discrete events,” while thematic framing is characterized by the situation of issues in a broader social and political context. Leighley (2004, 187) explains further “the news media’s choice of which theme to present has a significant effect on individuals’ beliefs about the issue”. The distinction between episodic and thematic framing enables a more nuanced analysis of the extent to which the media outlets included in this study meet the requirements of complex democracy. For example, Baker (2002) posits that complex democratic media institutions should be expected to incorporate a breadth of different types of media, promoting the social value of such media as art, fiction, and music. Such media, Baker (2002) implicitly suggests, provide a broader cultural context that can help facilitate the discursive development of interests among particular groups. Indeed, Baker (2002) emphasizes the reflective component of value formation and provides an example in which the thematic framing of a political issue dramatically altered opinions. Baker (2002, 152) explains: “In a 1999 study conducted by the Freedom Forum, 51 percent of those surveyed said when asked that the Constitution should ‘be amended to prohibit burning or desecrating the American flag,’ but 90 percent of this group changed their mind when told that this ‘would be the first time any of the freedoms in the First Amendment [were] amended in over 200 years.’”

Thus, it seems that the thematic framing of political events plays a role in Baker’s (2002) theory of complex democracy.

Complex Democracy: The Framing of the Standing Rock Protests by U.S. Media

An analysis intended to determine the extent to which the frames analyzed were episodic or thematic was, therefore, included in this study. Frames were coded as thematic or episodic according to the distinction made by Iyengar and Adam (1993) and Leighley (2004). For example, this frame in the November 1, 2016, The New York Times article by Jack Healy was coded as “episodic”: “Last week, clashes erupted between lines of law enforcement officers and protesters. The air was filled with pepper spray and black smoke from burning tires. The authorities arrested 142 people during what local sheriffs denounced as a riot and protesters said was a peaceful demonstration.” (see A10)

In this particular frame, problems and causes are proximal. The violence that occurred at the site of the protests was not situated within the larger context of the protest itself, the environmental movement, or the historic struggles of indigenous peoples in the U.S. Instead, the violence is described as a random event with no clear connection to a more general pattern of political and cultural forces. On the other hand, this frame from the December 6, 2016, article in National Review by Rich Lowry was coded as “thematic” in paragraph 3: “With Keystone, the narrative was that the pipeline would doom the planet by bringing to market oil from the tar sands of Canada. With Dakota Access, the narrative is that Native Americans are once again getting railroaded by greedy interests who don’t care about their history or their welfare. After the decision by the Army Corps, one demonstrator told the press that the victory was “due to our people for the hundreds of years of genocide and oppression,” which is putting a lot of weight on what should be a routine bureaucratic decision to approve an otherwise unremarkable pipeline.”

In this frame, the halting on the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline is described in the context of similar decisions made by a political actor. Instead of being framed as a random occurrence with nearby causes, the problem of construction being halted is described about a more general pattern of political decisions. Specifically, the frame connects this event to the Obama administration’s decision to block construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline in 2015.

Findings The time frame that was established to analyze the coverage of the Standing Rock protests ranges from November 1st to December 7th of 2016. During this time, The New York Times published six articles focusing primarily on the protests at the Standing Rock reservation. These six articles contained a combined total of 79 frames that were analyzed. Of these 79 frames, 13.9% were coded as adhering to complex democratic 50

theory. Additionally, 78.48% were coded as adhering to liberal pluralist democratic theory. Finally, 34.04% were coded as adhering to civic republican democratic theory. During the same period, the Wall Street Journal published five articles focusing primarily on the protests at the Standing Rock reservation. These five articles contained a combined total of 47 frames that were analyzed. Of these 47 frames, 27.69% were coded as adhering to complex democratic theory. Further, 57.44% of these frames were coded as adhering to liberal pluralist democratic theory. Lastly, 34.04% of these frames were coded as adhering to civic republican democratic theory. Within the same time span, The Atlantic published two articles and one video focusing primarily on the protests at the Standing Rock reservation. These two articles and one video contained a combined total of 26 frames that were analyzed. Of these 26 frames, 11.53% were coded as adhering to complex democratic theory. Also, 96.15% of these frames were coded as adhering to liberal pluralist democratic theory. Further, 34.04% of these frames were coded as adhering to civic republican democratic theory. Finally, National Review published two articles focusing primarily on the protests at the Standing Rock reservation during the established time frame. These two articles contained a combined total of 21 frames that were analyzed. Of these 21 frames, 4.76% were coded as adhering to complex democratic theory. Additionally, 90.47% of these frames were coded as adhering to liberal pluralist democratic theory. Lastly, 9.52% of these frames were coded as adhering to civic republican democratic theory. These findings are represented in Figure 1. It is important to note that, in theory, the separate schools of democratic thought are not mutually exclusive categories. Indeed, complex democratic theory contains components of both civic republicanism and liberal pluralism. Practically, however, it proved difficult to reconcile the inherent tensions between civic republicanism and liberal pluralism when coding frames from the sample set. While frames that were coded as adhering to complex democratic theory were frequently also coded as liberal pluralist or civic republican, it was extremely uncommon for a given frame to be coded as liberal pluralist and civic republican. This is, in part, due to the fundamental incompatibility of the respective criteria established for each category. Specifically, a key component of the liberal pluralist theory is a lack of emphasis on cooperation with political adversaries in contrast to a key component of the civic republican theory being the promotion of concessions between opposing sides. Articles from the sample selected for this study were also analyzed based on whether issues were framed thematically or episodically. Of the 79 frames analyzed from the six articles published by The New York Times during the established time frame of this study, 86.07% were coded as being framed episodically. Interestingly, of the 47 frames analyzed from the five articles published by the Wall Street Journal during the same

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Figure 1. Media Coverage of Standing Rock Protests: Democratic Theories

coded as adhering to liberal pluralist democratic theory, 14.2% were coded as thematic, while 85.7% were coded as episodic. Similarly, of the frames that were coded as civic republican, 14.6% were coded as thematic, compared to 85.3% coded as episodic. These findings are represented in Figure 3.

Discussion Among the media outlets analyzed, issues were most often framed episodically and frames most commonly adhered to a liberal pluralist theory of democracy. In other words, most of the articles framed problems in such a way that general political context and consideration of particular events as part of broader patterns of political decision-making were absent. Additionally, the frames analyzed period, 100% of them were coded as being framed episodically. frequently lacked emphasis on cooperation with political Meanwhile, of the 26 frames analyzed from two articles and adversaries and were often sympathetic to a particular group. one video published by The Atlantic during the established These findings have potentially troubling implications period, 73.07% were coded as being framed episodically. Lastly, for democracy in the U.S. The outlets with the most polarized of the 21 frames analyzed from the two articles published by audiences published the most one-sided versions of the the National Review, 85.71% were coded as being framed Standing Rock protests. Additionally, the media outlets with more moderate audiences, while more likely to adhere to episodically. These findings are represented in Figure 2. complex democratic theory than the other two, tended to Across each of the three democratic theories, events frame issues through a liberal pluralist perspective as well. With were more likely to be framed episodically. Of the frames consideration towards the potential for online partisan media that were coded as meeting the requirements of complex to cause polarization resulting from the increased likelihood democratic theory, 17.8% were coded as thematic, compared of inadvertent exposure to political news associated with social to 78.5% coded as episodic. Among the frames that were networking sites, as well as motivated reasoning and the cognitive processes by Figure 2: Media Coverage of Standing Rock Protests: Thematic vs. Episodic Issues which citizens are likely to uncritically accept information that is congruent with their ideological beliefs and reluctantly information that is contradictory to their ideological beliefs (Lodge and Taber 2013), these findings support the possibility that online partisan news outlets can play a role in polarizing the public. Although these outlets were likely to frame events in a manner consistent with the liberal pluralist theory of democracy, The New York Times and Wall Street Journal demonstrated more frequently that framing issues in a manner consistent with the theory of complex democracy was possible. Despite that the events being covered could be characterized by a policy disagreement so vehement and polarized that violence ÂŠ Pi Sigma Alpha 2017

Complex Democracy: The Framing of the Standing Rock Protests by U.S. Media

and media systems. With consideration towards cognitive processes like motivated reasoning, this study employed a qualitative content framing analysis of coverage by four prominent media outlets of the Standing Rock protests during fall 2016. This study seeks to determine the extent to which prominent media outlets in the U.S. meet the expectations of Baker’s (2002) theory of complex democracy. The findings have potentially concerning implications for U.S. democracy. The outlets with the most ideologically uniform audiences published the most one-sided versions of the Standing Rock protests. Further, the media outlets with more moderate audiences, while more likely to adhere to complex democratic theory than the others, typically leaned towards framing issues in a manner that prioritized political mobilization and lacked emphasis on cooperation with political opponents. With consideration towards the literature reviewed above, these findings suggest that it is possible for online partisan news outlets to play a role in polarizing the public. There are some notable limitations. First, the time frame established from which articles were sampled for the study only covered a small period of the total length of the protests. A similar study with a larger time frame, including the initial stages of the protests in mid-August 2016 and the events that unfolded concerning pipeline construction as the Trump administration took office, would provide a more holistic understanding of how these events were covered. Moreover, only four media outlets were analyzed. In addition to extending the time frame of the sample, broadening the sample to include other online media outlets would also have provided a more general understanding of the extent to which online partisan entities contribute to the polarization of citizens. Particularly, all of the media entities included in this study are for-profit style outlets and have an incentive to consistently publish content that appeals to their primary audiences. Having included public outlets such as the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) or National Public Radio (NPR) in this study would have helped to address this limitation. In addition to addressing these limitations, further research in this area could extend to coverage of other major recent events in U.S. politics including coverage of the 2016 presidential campaign, the legislative battle over the Affordable Care Act, the “Unite the Right” rally at Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, and others. By extending this methodology to events other than the Standing Rock protests, researchers would be able to more accurately determine the

Figure 3: Media Coverage of Standing Rock Protests: Thematic vs. Episodic Framing according to Democratic Theory

resulted, over a quarter of the frames analyzed from Wall Street Journal, which has the most ideologically moderate audience of the four outlets, met the requirements of complex democracy. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that the events being covered were inherently polarizing. As was discussed earlier, the gap between Americans who get their news from television and those who get their news online is rapidly narrowing (Gottfried and Shearer 2017), partisan news is most effective in polarizing the public when mass exposure is inadvertent (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013), and the odds of generally apolitical audiences being exposed to political information and others being exposed to counterattitudinal information are greater on social media (Messing and Westwood 2012). Moreover, many of the articles indicated that a large proportion of the protesters at the reservation in November were not residents of North Dakota, but had been recruited from across the U.S. by online media and social networking sites. Thus, it is not outside the realm of possibility that online partisan media coverage of the events at Standing Rock may have contributed to the escalation of violence between activists and law enforcement.

Conclusion Citizens in a democracy require access to accurate and reliable information about all matters that may be considered necessary to make reasonable political decisions. C. Edwin Baker (2002) proposed the theory of complex democracy which, by emphasizing a participatory political system that recognizes multiculturalism and the applied usefulness of political compromise, places high expectations on both citizens 52

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extent to which the types of coverage observed in the findings of this study are indicative of the general tendency of media outlets to adhere to a liberal pluralist theory of democracy. For example, if this methodology were replicated and applied to a different political event and the findings were inconsistent with those yielded by this study, it may be worth considering that the protests at Standing Rock themselves had a larger influence on the ways that they were covered than did journalistic and editorial decisions. Nonetheless, the findings of this study have important implications for the contemporary era of U.S. politics, commonly categorized by disunity and division. Understanding why the increasingly familiar political disagreements of our time seem more and more to yield acts of political violence requires an understanding of the narratives on which citizens rely to fulfill their most fundamental function in a democracy—being informed. This study attempts to take a systematic approach to understanding the methods used to create these narratives with consideration towards the mental processes by which citizens interpret them. In so doing, this article contends that how some online partisan news outlets in the U.S. frame political events can play a role in polarizing the public. ■

About the Author Will Taylor graduated from Allegheny College in 2017 with a Bachelor of Arts, having majored in Community and Justice Studies with a minor in Political Science. He plans to pursue an MA in Political Communication at American University. At Allegheny College, he served as a Bonner Service Leader, Vice President of the College Democrats, and the General Manager of 90.3 WARC Meadville. Currently he is serving as an AmeriCorps VISTA member at Penn State Erie, the Behrend College, utilizing research and outreach to support the development and sustainability of community-based food systems. The author would like to acknowledge Professor Andrew Bloeser for his guidance and mentorship throughout the research process.

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Notes

1. The video published on The Atlantic’s website was transcribed and coded according to the same methodology used for the other articles.

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Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

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