Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Fall 2016 by psajournalou

Volume XVI No. 2

Fall 2016

Oakland University

The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics (ISSN 1556-2034) is published bi-annually by the Nu Omega Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha, Oakland University, Department of Political Science, 418 Varner Hall, Rochester, MI 48309-4488. The journal is funded by Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, http://www. pisigmaalpha.org. The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics was founded in the spring of 2001 by Delta Omega Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha at Purdue University, under the name The American Undergraduate Journal of Politics and Government. With the sponsorship of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, the name of the Journal was changed to The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics as of the Fall 2004 edition. Electronic editions of the Journal are available online at http://www.psajournal. org. For further information, please contact Dr. Terri Towner at Oakland University (towner@oakland.edu). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the editors and faculty advisors of The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics. The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics and content appearing therein is copyrighted by Pi Sigma Alpha. While holding these rights, Pi Sigma Alpha does not exert editorial or other control over the content of the Journal or the decisions or actions of its staff in the course of normal business operations. As such, Pi Sigma Alpha neither asserts nor accepts responsibility for the content or actions of staff of the publication in the normal course of business as the customs and usages of the law allow. All assertions of fact and statements of opinion are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, the Editorial Board, the Advisory Board, the Faculty Advisors, Oakland University, or its faculty and administration. COPYRIGHT ÂŠ 2016 PI SIGMA ALPHA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Fall 2016 Volume XVI

Thirty-Second Edition

Alexa James Kalsoom Hussain Jana Al-Jarrah Tanir-Vefa Avci Dr. Terri Towner

Number 2

Outreach Editor Scheduling/Content Editor Technology Editor Cover Designer Faculty Advisor

Editorial Board Jana Al-Jarrah Tanir-Vefa Avci Jenna Blankenship Abigail Brown Jaycey Cepiga Marissa Coloske Bethany Goss Meredith Kate Hubbell

Kalsoom Hussain Alexa James Madison Kubinski Brian Quinn Milena Rodriguez Moran Steven Sinishtaj Richard Williamson

Advisory Board

Dr. Robert Alexander Dr. Nicole Asmussen Dr. Cristian Cantir Dr. Rosalee Clawson Dr. Matthew Dabros Dr. David Dulio Dr. Natasha Duncan Dr. Alan Epstein Dr. Megan Hershey Dr. Jennifer Hopper Dr. Dwaine Jengelley

Dr. John Klemanski Dr. Paulette Kurzer Dr. Laura Landolt Dr. Daniel O’Neill Dr. D’Andra Orey Dr. Diana Orces Dr. Christine Pappas Dr. Jo Reger Dr. Robert Spitzer Dr. Harry “Neil” Strine IV Dr. Peter Trumbore

Editorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Preface to the Spring Edition The Pi Sigma Alpha Journal of Undergraduate Politics would first and foremost like to acknowledge all those individuals and institutions which make the publication of this Journal possible semester after semester and year after year. The Journal has continued to grow in terms of submissions, quality, and prestige. Admissions to the Fall 2016 edition were both vast in number and constituted a diverse array of topics. We greatly appreciate all those who have submitted their work to the Journal in hopes of being published. The articles published herein exemplify a high quality sample of the types of undergraduate research being conducted across the country. Although the publication is a completely student-run endeavor, the efforts of the student Editorial Board are guided and supported by a number of individuals and institutions which we would like to thank. First, we would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and Executive Committee whose vision and financial support has maintained the quality and direction of the journal. Second, we would like to thank the Faculty Advisory board: the thorough and constructive reviews provided by the members of this board have ensured the articles published herein meet a consistent standard of quality. Finally, we extend tremendous thanks to Editorial Board Faculty Advisor Terri Towner, who has clocked countless hours to ensure the integrity of the journal continues to exceed the standards of excellence set by the editors of its previous editions. The Editorial Board at Oakland University is proud to present the Spring Edition which contains a well-rounded set of articles with varied methodological approaches and topical matter. The publishing process for the Spring Edition followed a relatively smooth path from submission to publication, and the Nu Omega Chapter and Oakland University wish the readers of this edition a similarly enjoyable time. Best, The Editors

Submission of Manuscripts The Journal accepts manuscripts from undergraduates of any class and major. Members of Pi Sigma Alpha are especially encouraged to enter their work. We strive to publish papers of the highest quality in all areas of political science. Generally, selected manuscripts have been well-written works with a fully developed thesis and strong argumentation stemming from original analysis. Authors may be asked to revise their work before being accepted for publication. Submission deadlines are October 1st for the Fall edition and February 1st for the Spring edition. Manuscripts are accepted on a rolling basis; therefore early submissions are strongly encouraged. To submit your work please email psajournalou@gmail.com with an attached Word document of the manuscript. Please include your name, university and contact details (mailing address, email address, and phone number). If possible, include how you heard about the Journal. Submitted manuscripts must include a short abstract (approximately 150 words), citations and references that follow the APSA Style Manual for Political Science. Please do not exceed the maximum page length of 35 double-spaced pages. The Journal is a student-run enterprise with editors and an Editorial Board that are undergraduate students and Pi Sigma Alpha members at Oakland University. The Editorial Board relies heavily on the help of our Advisory Board consisting of political science faculty from across the nation, including members of the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council. Due to the time committed to the manuscript review process, we would like to remind students to submit to only one journal at a time. Please direct any questions about submissions or the Journalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s upcoming editions to our editors at psajournalou@gmail.com.

Table of Contents Arms Transfers and Conflict in the 21st Century Max Accardi, Drury University

Radicalization Rising? A Comparative Analysis of European Nationallevel Counter-Radicalization Policies and State Vulnerability to Terrorism Scott Bledsoe, Christopher Newport University

The Case for Consociational Democracy in Israel: Institutional Solutions to the Ethnic Conflict Nathaniel F. Sussman, University of Western Ontario, Canada

Between Pragmatism and Political Ideology: Changing South Korean Progressive Views on North Korea

Allison Kim, Georgetown University

Arms Transfers and Conflict in the 21st Century Max Accardi Drury University Arms transfers play a key role in U.S. foreign policy, but their impact in the post-Cold War world is hotly disputed, especially their impact on the likelihood of conflict emergence. Some argue that providing arms to nations across the world deters conflict, while others contend that arms transfers make conflict outbreak more likely. I explore several important models and theories of arms transfers and conflict emergence, and the strengths and weaknesses of these models in their application to modern conflict. Next, I employ logistic regression to test the relationship between arms transfer accumulation and conflict incidence across the world in the years 2000-2010. My findings indicate that arms transfer accumulation is not a good predictor of conflict incidence globally, but that arms transfers correlate with increased conflict in several regions. The absence of a clear, statistically significant relationship between these variables provides evidence against totalizing theories of conflict emergence and suggests a more complex relationship that bears further study. Introduction and Background The United States is the world’s largest arms merchant. According to recent estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the U.S. sells more arms per year than every other exporter combined, and six of the world’s top ten largest defense companies are located in the U.S. (Fleurant, Perlo-Freeman, Wezeman, Wezeman, and Kelly 2015). The international arms business is immensely profitable for American defense companies. In 2007, government-approved arms transfer agreements netted the U.S. $60 billion in revenue (Stohl 2009). Moreover, the industry is growing – worldwide arms sales have been on the rise in recent years due to destabilizing trends, such as the Arab Spring and Russian expansionism, which have increased the propensity for conflict in several regions. Arms transfers play an important role in U.S. foreign policy. American policymakers use arms transfers to achieve specific foreign policy goals, such as securing an ally’s cooperation, by making quid pro quo arrangements with arms transfer recipients (Silsin

1999). Arms transfers also play a role in the U.S.’s broader foreign policy objectives, such as developing regional security regimes or achieving a favorable balance of power (Betts 1981). Part of what makes the U.S. a preeminent arms supplier, both in terms of government contracts and private sales, is the relative lack of domestic or international oversight on sales of American arms. The U.S. has not ratified the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which is the primary international mechanism for limiting conventional arms proliferation, so it is relatively free to distribute arms as it sees fit. The American government regularly ships large volumes of weapons to its allies via governmentto-government arms transfers. Moreover, private corporations can apply for U.S. State Department permits which allow them to sell arms to virtually any entity worldwide. Information on these transactions is usually classified, and it is often difficult or impossible to obtain data on arms sales, particularly those conducted by private companies.

8 In spite of the increasing importance of American weapons, both as diplomatic tools in U.S. foreign policy and as possible drivers of international outcomes, there is a dearth of recent literature on the impact of U.S. arms transfers on recipient nations’ behavior. During the Cold War, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union used arms exports to undermine the other’s spheres of influence, there was substantial academic interest in determining the impact of these transfers on international stability. In recent years, although the U.S.’s arms industry is more dominant relative to its competitors than during the Cold War, there has been little empirical study on the impact of U.S. arms transfers on recipient countries’ conduct internationally. This is a serious oversight. Given the U.S.’s pivotal role in the global arms trade, data-driven analysis of the impact of U.S. arms transfer policy is critical to understanding international conflict in the 21st century. The aim of this study is to provide empirical evidence regarding the impact of U.S. arms transfers on recipient countries’ likelihood to engage in conflict. International Conflict in the 21st Century Before delving into the impact of U.S. arms transfers on modern conflict, it is important to understand the nature of modern conflict. Most scholars agree that conflict in the 21st century is meaningfully different from conflict in previous eras. Hoffman (2007) discusses the increasing incidence of “hybrid wars”. This term refers to conflicts that transcend the traditional distinctions made when categorizing combatants, such as state and nonstate, terrorist and soldier, and regular and irregular. Hoffman (2007) cites the Iraq War as an example of hybrid warfare. The war began as a conventional showdown between the Iraqi and U.S. national armies. However, in the chaos that followed the invasion,

the U.S. army faced terrorists, local militias, and armed ethnic sects, which displayed varying levels of organization and sophistication. Both sides relied on state and non-state forces. For example, the U.S. used private military contractors (PMCs) and Iraqi fighters were supplemented by aid from international terrorist organizations. In short, the conflict defied clear categorization. Hoffman (2007) attributes the increase in hybrid wars to a decentralization of fighting power, and considers this decentralization to be the defining feature of 21st century conflict. Munkler (2003), who reaches similar conclusions to Hoffman (2007), identifies three key features in 21st century conflict. First, Munkler (2003) points out that the diminishment of the state as the key actor in conflict leads to an increased use of “asymmetric” tactics, or tactics designed for use by relatively weak forces against stronger opponents. The widespread use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, and guerilla warfare in the Middle East are examples of such tactics. Second, Munkler (2003) argues that non-state-centric wars increase the incentive for corporations to take a greater role in driving conflict. The development of weapons of mass destruction made large interstate conflicts after World War II largely unprofitable. However, the increasing dispersion of military power has made war once again profitable, a fact that may explain the growing market for PMCs and military technology. Third, Munkler (2003) contends that war in the 21st century has become “demilitarized”. That is, war is no longer fought primarily by regular soldiers or in the pursuit of straightforward military objectives. The conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Chechnya, among others, exemplify many of these features. Arms Transfers and Conflict Where do weapons, and arms transfers in particular, fit into this schema of modern conflict?

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics In Weapons for Peace, Weapons for War, Craft (1999) offers the most comprehensive analysis to date on armaments and conflict. Specifically, Craft (1999) explains three general theories on the relationship between arms transfers and conflict: 1) deterrence theory, which holds that arms transfer recipients are less likely to engage in conflict; 2) exacerbation theory, which holds that arms transfer recipients are more likely to engage in conflict; and 3) resupply theory, which holds that nations purchase arms in the aftermath of previous conflicts. Below, this analysis focuses on the deterrence and exacerbation theories. Deterrence and exacerbation theories directly oppose one another, and there is a plethora of literature to support each theory and a variety of models which seek to explain the relationship between arms transfers and conflict. Resupply theory, however, has little normative value for assessing U.S. arms transfer policy, and thus is not within the purview of this discussion. Deterrence Theory The notion of deterrence is frequently used to justify proliferating weapons, and arms transfers are an important tool for maintaining stability under neorealist deterrence theory (Signorino and Tarar 2006). Within this theory, there are two related models of deterrence. The first considers arms transfers as a method to â&#x20AC;&#x153;balanceâ&#x20AC;? power between two or more nations. This model assumes that when states have opposing interests and asymmetric power, the more powerful nation is likely to use military force to achieve its interests. In such cases, arms transfers to the weaker nation may bolster its military power and dissuade the stronger nation from attacking. The second model considers arms transfers as a way to provide security to embattled nations. Governments that feel threatened may be more likely to engage in

risky international behavior, potentially escalating to conflict. In this case, arms transfers to threatened nations may bolster their security and remove the incentive for international brinksmanship. Balancing theory was employed extensively during the Cold War by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to counteract the otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s efforts. Kinsella (1988) considers U.S. and Soviet arms transfers to third-world countries with long-standing rivalries. Kinsella (1988) concludes that the Soviet Union typically used arms transfers to upset the balance of power in regional rivalries, especially its military support for Egypt and Syria in their rivalry with Israel. Conversely, U.S. arms tended to restore the balance of power and reduce the emergence of conflict. For example, the U.S. sending aid to Israel to help fend off its hostile neighbors is considered an example of successful deterrence. Sanjian (2003) employs similar analysis, examining arms transfers to the India-Pakistan dyad from 1950-1991, and the impacts those transfers had on the relative military strength of the two nations. Similar to Kinsella (2002), Sanjian (2003) concludes that U.S. arms transfers tended to restore the balance of power between the recipient nations, whereas U.S.S.R. transfers tended to disrupt it. Kinsella (2002) expands on this analysis and finds additional support for balancing theory by examining broad patterns of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers during the Cold War Period. Kinsella (2002) finds that most of the arms transfer behavior exhibited by the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War followed an action-reaction dynamic, in which one superpower would attempt to expand its influence in a region by providing military aid to a local ally, and the other superpower would react by arming an adversary, reducing the possibilities for a power imbalance. Krause (1990) suggests that the power balance model

Accardi

could be updated by the U.S. to maintain stability in the post-Cold War era by constructing “regional security regimes”. This strategy would involve unilaterally controlling arms supplies to conflictridden regions to secure a parity of power between the nations to prevent conflict. Balancing theory is an interesting framework for evaluating arms transfer policies. It is unclear, however, how well the theory applies to modern international relations. The U.S. no longer has a rival superpower that can exert roughly equal influence on the international community. This raises questions about whether any true balance of power is possible in an essentially unipolar world. In an analysis of arms transfer recipients in the Middle East, Krause (1994) points out that much of the drive to acquire arms may be a result of the “security dilemma”. In other words, nations which perceive their neighbors stockpiling arms may feel compelled to stock up on weapons for their own safety, potentially triggering an arms race and further escalation. Moreover, although Krause (1994) argues convincingly that arms transfers can preserve security via regional power balancing in a unipolar world, the extent to which this is reflected in real-world U.S. strategy is uncertain. The second model for deterrence involves boosting the security of threatened nations to reduce their likelihood of displaying aggression. Kinsella and Tillema (1995) examine several examples of this strategy. Kinsella and Tillema’s (1995) analysis indicates that increasing general security to contain aggression is possible. As an example of successful deterrence, the authors cite the U.S.’s military aid to Israel. During periods when Israel has been threatened, U.S. aid has bolstered its military capacity and made it confident in its ability to defeat potential aggressors; this has made preemptive war less desirable in Israel’s calculations. Kinsella and Tillema (1995), however, also conclude that Soviet arms transfers to Middle

Eastern nations increased the likelihood of those nations to start conflicts and act more aggressively abroad. The key difference is not that the Soviet Union wanted war and the U.S. wanted peace, but that the U.S. was more skillful at constraining its allies and used arms transfers more precisely in its efforts to secure stability. Revisiting Kinsella and Tillema’s (1995) study, Mayer and Rotte (1999) find support for their conclusions, particularly that U.S. arms transfers increased stability and Soviet arms transfers’ decreased stability. However, Mayer and Rotte (1999) use a more complex research design to study the total volume of arms transfers across time. Their findings suggest that the relationship between arms transfer volume and security is curvilinear: providing a small quantity of arms to a region decreased conflict in that region, but providing a large quantity increased conflict. The security model reflects the most common logic cited in favor of arms transfers. If the U.S. provides military aid to an ally, the ally will feel secure and not engage in risky or aggressive behavior. Arms transfers, then, are a useful tool for preventing international conflict from emerging. This theory has some serious pitfalls, however. Klare and Volman (1978), discussing U.S. military aid to Israel, warn that too much aid could cause Israel to become militarily self-sufficient. If Israel accumulates enough military capabilities that it no longer needs to rely on the U.S.’s assistance, the U.S. can no longer constrain Israel’s aggression. The latter poses the threat of an Israeli first strike against its looming Arab neighbors. Although this scenario has not occurred, and Israel remains fairly dependent on U.S. weapons, it highlights the danger to the U.S. of allowing its allies to become overly autonomous. Moreover, the “security dilemma” applies to this theory as well. Specifically, any arms transfer which increases the security of one nation necessarily decreases the perceived security of its adversaries.

Arms Transfers and Conflict in the 21st Century

served to intensify the rivalries examined, partially because the large volumes of arms enabled greater The opposing school of thought includes theories that contend that arms transfers increase or exacerbate military action by the recipients. Wezeman (2003) narrows his focus to small arms, noting a disparity conflict. In this school of thought, there are three between the use of small arms and larger weapons general explanations of how conflict exacerbation in conflict. Wezeman argues that small arms are occurs. The first and most straightforward asserts that used with far greater frequency in combat because arms transfers “enable” conflict. That is, access to more weapons allows nations to be more warlike, and they are cheaper and easier to acquire; thus, nations’ ready access to relatively inexpensive small arms when conflict breaks out, arms saturation makes the conflict deadlier because more participants have access is an enabling factor in conflict. Approaching the question from the perspective of recipient nations, to tools of violence. The second explanation posits Pearson (1989) finds that recipient nations that are that arms are often transferred, directly or indirectly, involved in a military dispute, or anticipate becoming to entities such as rogue states, criminal and terrorist involved in a military dispute, were more likely to groups, and violent internal factions. These entities seek out arms imports. This makes sense, as nations are by nature destabilizing, and arming them makes that are involved in wars, or think they will become conflict more likely to occur. The third explanation involved in wars, naturally seek out weapons with suggests that arms transfers tend to undermine the which to fight. Similarly, receiving arms transfers, authority of stabilizing institutions, such as United and the resultant increase in military capability, also Nations forces and national governments. This theory seemed to increase nations’ willingness to participate holds that a more heavily militarized environment in conflict. In this vein, Kinsella (1998) examines the is more difficult to control, and thus arms transfers undermine nations’ prospects for internal and external relationship between arms transfers and the adoption of “conflictual” foreign policy stances. His analysis stability. indicates that nations which receive greater volumes The enabling mechanism is the most logically of arms transfers act more confidently in their military clear: the presence of weapons and armed groups is capabilities, and are thus more likely to “pick fights” a prerequisite to conflict. After examining incidents in their international dealings. of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa over three “Enabling” is the best supported and the most decades, Craft and Smaldone (2002) conclude that theoretically consistent explanation present in the armed groups lead to conflict. Although they stop short literature on arms transfers and conflict. If enabling of asserting a causal link between weapons sales and theory is true, however, it does not necessarily indicate war, they argue that the militarization resulting from a causal link between weapons and war. If a country large-scale arms transfers is an essential ingredient of already expects to engage in war, even to defend interstate conflict. Their analysis calls for widespread itself against an aggressor, acquiring weapons to restrictions on arms suppliers to the region. increase its military capabilities is the logical choice. Analyzing U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers to Moreover, the strongest sources that support enabling several regional rivals in the Middle East, Sanjian theory consider global arms transfers and contain little (1999) concludes that both American and Soviet insight specific to the U.S. It is possible that American arms transfers were “profoundly destabilizing” and Exacerbation Theory

12 arms sales rarely precipitate conflict, or even that American arms tend to counteract destabilizing arms accumulated from other sources.On the other hand, it is also possible that by supplying so many arms, the U.S. creates a more militarized and conflict-apt environment, which runs contrary to its stated goals. The second explanation within exacerbation theory concerns the risk of arms transfers falling into the hands of hostile and dangerous groups. This was a salient concern in the U.S.’s recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where weapons shipments intended to arm the national army and police were frequently captured by insurgent forces. Hartung (1995) cites data indicating that the vast majority of participants in recent ethnic and sectarian conflict had received military aid from the U.S. Hartung (1995) also explores cases such as the Haitian crisis and the first Gulf War, where U.S. forces faced enemies heavily armed with American weapons. This scenario can occur in several ways: a) the U.S.’s position on a former ally may shift; b) a government friendly to the U.S. may be replaced by a hostile government; or c) a national military may lose control of its weapons to a hostile faction. The latter is particularly likely when the U.S. ships arms to unstable or conflict-ridden parts of the world with weak national governments. Holtom (2012) discusses the deleterious effects of legitimate arms transfers that end up in the hands of dangerous non-state actors like drug cartels and terrorist networks. Nations with corrupt governments or weak police presence are particularly likely to let arms slip through the proverbial cracks. In addition to dangerous factions, it has been suggested that even stable governments receiving arms transfers are authoritarian and conflict-prone. Hess (1989) finds, unsurprisingly, that nations which receive high levels of arms transfers tend to exhibit high “force ratios”, which means that they have more armed forces per

capita than most countries. Nations with high force ratios are likely to be less democratic domestically and more conflict-prone internationally, suggesting that such nations are not ideal recipients of military supplies. Blanton (1999) confirms this analysis, suggesting that nations which receive large volumes of arms transfers tend to have questionable human rights records and exhibit authoritarian tendencies. The dangers posed by arming “bad guys” are well documented in recent history. Even U.S. military leaders admit that there have been serious problems with U.S. weapons possessed by al Qaeda and ISIS. But the argument also cuts the other way – it is possible that in regions plagued by destabilizing nonstate actors and factions, arms transfers to “legitimate” governments could help maintain order. Perhaps in a world without U.S. arms, there would be many more conflicting factions. It is also possible that the majority of the arms black market is composed of weapons from non-U.S. sources. It is commonly understood that Russia and former Soviet satellite states tend to have fewer qualms selling weapons to less reputable sources. Nonetheless, it is clear that U.S. arms sometimes fall into undesirable hands, and that this often results in violence. The final explanation within exacerbation theory contends that arms transfers tend to undermine the efficacy of institutions working to stabilize or de-escalate conflicts. The United Nations, in a comprehensive report on the impact of poorly regulated arms sales, argues that weapons proliferation undermines the ability of the U.N. to accomplish its objectives in several ways (United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms 2013). It is more dangerous and costly for the U.N. to deploy peacekeepers to heavily armed regions, undermining its ability to maintain stability in war-torn regions. A more militarized environment makes nations

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics more reluctant to deploy human rights assistance to assist civilian populations in war zones. Further, a higher concentration of weapons in war tends to result in greater physical destruction, to a country’s infrastructure for example, and higher civilian casualties. The U.N. does not blame any particular arms supplier for these issues, but it does call for more comprehensive regulation of the arms trade to reduce the level of militarization in developing countries. Using the Rwandan genocide as a case study, Goose and Smyth (1994) make a similar argument for arms trade regulation and levels of militarization. They blame profiteering arms merchants for creating a high concentration of small arms in the nation in the years leading up to the genocide. This concentration made it difficult for the Rwandan government to impose order and made possible the emergence of the chaotic militias that carried out the slaughter. Moreover, some studies indicate that high volumes of arms transfers can disrupt the balance of power between the military and the government of recipient nations. Maniruzzaman (1992) examines the relationship between the volume of arms transfers received by a nation and that nation’s likelihood to experience a military coup d’état, focusing on the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Maniruzzaman (1992) concludes that nations receiving large arms transfers are more likely to experience a coup, and in these cases, military rule is likely to last longer. Furthermore, the author concludes that military rule usually leads to greater internal and external conflict. Wang (1998) disagrees with Maniruzzman’s (1992) results. Wang (1998) finds that, over the long term, arms transfers tend to reduce the incidence of coup d’état. However, Wang (1998) also finds that arms transfers tend to undermine overall regime stability by disproportionately increasing the power of the military. This can cause regimes to experience power

struggles or display aggression internationally, both of which make it more difficult to maintain power. There tends to be moderate to strong support for the supposition that arms transfers undermine stabilizing institutions in underdeveloped regions, and the above sources present strong theoretical reasons why this is the case. In developed nations with more complex political systems, however, the latter relationship may not hold true. When the balance of power is more subtle, arms transfers may in fact be an effective tool for promoting stability. Moreover, as discussed in exacerbation theory, it is possible that this explanation uniquely does not apply to American arms transfers. The U.S. may be more circumspect about ensuring that its weapons do not support destabilizing elements, or U.S. arms transfers may tend to increase rather than undermine the strength of stabilizing institutions. Variables and Methods None of the arguments outlined above claim to explain the entirety of global conflict. Instead, these theories identify factors that may increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict. This study is designed to examine U.S. arms transfers as one such factor by empirically testing whether recipients of American arms are more or less likely to engage in conflict in the 21st century. I offer two directional hypotheses to represent the predictions of deterrence and exacerbation theories: H1: In a study of nations, those that have received a greater volume of arms transfers are less likely to engage in conflict. H2: In a study of nations, those that have received a greater volume of arms transfers are more likely to engage in conflict. I employ a longitudinal cross-sectional research design spanning the years 2000-2010. For each

Accardi

country and year within this timespan, I measure whether a conflict occurred and the volume of arms transfers the country accumulated in the prior three years in the examined time span. For example, in analyzing Uganda in 2004, the independent variable is the volume of arms transfers received by Uganda from the U.S. in 2002, 2003, and 2004, and the dependent variable is coded “1” if Uganda participated in conflict in 2004 and “0” if it did not. This results in a country-year unit of analysis: each country-year includes a variable pair representing arms transfer accumulation and conflict incidence. In addition to providing a conceptually sound method for analyzing the impact of arms transfers across time, this method also has the advantage of producing a large number of observations (N = 2266 country-years), which will add credibility to any relationship I find. I discuss quantification and data for these variables below. The Independent Variable: Arms Transfers To conceptualize arms transfers, I adopt a definition from the defunct U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) which is employed by many arms transfer scholars: “The international transfer… of military equipment, usually referred to as ‘conventional,’ including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities designed for military use” (ACDA 1996). Nuclear weapons are notably excluded from this definition, because there are so few nations with nuclear weapons and because there is such a strong international taboo against their use. Nuclear weapons are generally treated separately from conventional arms. Otherwise, this conceptualization is straightforward. Arms transfers are transfers of arms from one nation to another. Because arms transfers are supplies for military use, according to the enabling model, all arms transfers under this definition should bolster the recipient’s ability to wage war, so the

definition is well suited to this analysis. The volume of arms transfers, which I use as the independent variable, means the total military value of the arms supplied. This is obviously impossible to measure 4 directly, but I assume that the “market value” of the arms is representative of their military value. I obtain arms transfer data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which adjusts for inflation and different currencies to determine the value of arms transfers by compiling trend-indicator value (TIV) tables. Market values for different types and models of weapons are gathered and converted to one unit of measurement, the value of the U.S. dollar in 1990, effectively standardizing arms transfer values. Although the values found in SIPRI’s TIV tables do not represent the current market value of the arms transferred, they provide a useful and reliable way of comparing arms transfers between different countries and in different eras. Therefore, I operationalize volume of arms transfers as the total TIV value of military supplies imported by the recipient nation from the United States. The Dependent Variable: Conflict I use the word “conflict” to refer to armed conflict between two or more groups. To conceptualize conflict precisely, I adopt a definition from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): “…a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP 2016). There are several important features of this definition. In order for an incident to be regarded as a conflict, it must involve multiple sides which employ armed force in their hostilities. This excludes purely one-sided uses of military force like the 2006 Qana Airstrike or the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan. Additionally, at least

Arms Transfers and Conflict in the 21st Century one of the parties involved in the dispute must be the government of a nation or a directly state-sponsored actor, so civil wars are included in this definition, but other armed disputes (e.g., a gang war or non-state ethnic conflict) are not. Finally, the conflict must result in battle-related deaths. For data on conflict, I use the dataset provided by Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP-PRIO). In the UCDP-PRIO data, each conflict is assigned a specific identifying number, and then broken down by year and by combatants. For instance, the Korean War, coded 1-38, appears in the database five times for the years 1949-1953. For the sake of simplicity, I treat each conflict as dyadic, so a country is only treated as having participated in a conflict for a particular year if it is listed as one of the two primary combatants. Incidence of conflict in a given year is a binary; either a country engaged in conflict in that year, or it did not. Thus, country-years in which conflict occurred are coded “1,” and country-years in which no conflict occurred are coded “0.” Statistical Test As “conflict incidence” is a binary variable, I employ logistic regression on these arms transfer volume-conflict incidence variable pairs to determine whether there is a relationship between the variables, and if so, its direction and strength. Conflict incidence has no “magnitude” as a variable, so logistic

regression attempts to determine to what extent the independent variable, arms transfer volume, can predict the likelihood of conflict occurring. If there is a significant negative relationship, this test will support H1 and reinforce theories that arms transfers tend to deter conflict. If there is a significant positive relationship, this test will support H2 and reinforce theories that arms transfers tend to exacerbate conflict. If there is no significant relationship, I must accept the null hypothesis, suggesting that there is no relationship between arms transfers and conflict incidence. Empirical Results I performed the logistic regression in R, using the RStudio interface. The empirical results are reported in Table 1 below. The p-value for the relationship between arms transfers and conflict incidence is .126, failing the .05 test for statistical significance, which means null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Even if the relationship were statistically significant, the coefficient value for the independent variable is extremely small, .0001917, which means that for every $1 million increase in arms transfers to a nation, the likelihood of conflict increases .01917%. This is a very weak relationship, indicating that U.S. arms transfer volume is not a good predictor of global conflict incidence in the period studied. It is possible, however, that examining all countries around the world across a 10-year period

16 is too sweeping an endeavor. After all, for the 10year period in question, the majority of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s countries neither engaged in conflict nor purchased a substantial quantity of weapons from the United States. This produces a great deal of statistical noise that may cloak a real relationship. For this reason, it is worth performing further tests on these data. Specifically, I perform identical logistic regressions on a region-by-region basis for the same time period. This may provide insight into which regions are most significantly affected by arms imports, especially because some regions both import more arms and are more conflict prone than others. To define regions for

statistical significance, with a p-value of .0627. All of these correlations are positive, but relatively weak, providing tentative support for H2, the exacerbation hypothesis. By contrast, the p-values for the analyses of Europe and Asia are much higher, and the coefficients much lower, which means I cannot reject the null hypothesis for these regions. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that arms transfers tend to exacerbate conflict in regions that are already beset by war, but have little effect on more stable regions. After all, both Africa and the Middle East have been conflict-prone and unstable for much of recent history, and while North America is relatively

analysis, I use the divisions employed by the UCDPPRIO data, which results in five major regions: the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The results for each region are reported in Table 2. In Table 2, the region-by-region analysis yields several interesting results. For both the Middle East and the Americas, logistic regression reveals relationships that are significant at the .05 level, and for Africa, the relationship is very close to

stable, South America has experienced significant unrest in recent decades. Continental Europe and Asia, on the other hand, have been relatively conflict-free in the recent past. This pattern suggests another level of nuance for exacerbation theory, and especially its applications in Pearson (1989) and Maniruzzaman (1992), both cited above. Pearson (1989) claims that nations may seek weapon because they anticipate a conflict in

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

the immediate future, and want to be prepared for that eventuality. However, while this explains why arms transfer accumulation correlates with conflict in relatively unstable regions, it does not explain the lack of such correlation in stable regions. Perhaps the anticipation of conflict is one of several reasons for countries to seek armaments, a reason that is particularly compelling for countries in conflict-prone regions; nations in more peaceful regions may seek arms transfers to increase their prestige or deterrent, or for any number of other reasons. Maniruzzaman (1992), studying the relationship between arms transfers and coup d’état, finds that arms transfers

impact on conflict incidence on a global scale. This does not necessarily indicate that U.S. arms transfers have no impact on conflict incidence – rather, it suggests that the relationship is too complex to be explained in all cases by deterrence or exacerbation theory. Indeed, Kinsella (1988) and Sanjian (2003) both reach a similar conclusion from smaller-scale analysis: the impact of arms transfers is highly dependent on environment and context. Further, the region-by-region data reveal that, in some regions, U.S. arms transfers do exhibit a positive correlation with conflict incidence, while in others, there is no such relationship. This may be due to the explanation

increase the relative power of the military, which tends to produce more coups; this increase in military power may also prompt nations to conduct themselves more aggressively abroad. However, more developed countries are more likely to have civilian control of the military, which would check potential resultant instability. This is one of many possible explanations for the regional differences found in this analysis, but it seems to fit with both the data and much of the theory. If this explanation is sound, then it leads to an important conclusion: when the U.S. provides arms transfers to nations in unstable, conflict-prone regions, those arms transfers tend to decrease rather than increase stability,

presented above, that arms transfers have a greater impact in regions that are already unstable, or there may be another factor at play.

and make conflict emergence more likely. Of course, this does not mean that the U.S. should altogether avoid arms transfers to conflict-prone regions as a tool for foreign policy, but it does raise questions about the effectiveness of such transfers at achieving their purported goals of stability and deterrence.

on conflict outbreak. There are any number of ways to refine this methodology that may yield useful information. Because of the increasing prominence of arms transfers as tools of foreign policy, a renewal of critical inquiry on their impact is necessary to understanding modern conflict. This analysis is an effort to begin that conversation.

Summary and Conclusion The results at a global scale are ambiguous. There is no clear correlation to support deterrence or exacerbation theory. Therefore, I must accept the null hypothesis that arms transfers have no empirical

A great deal of further analysis is needed. For instance, it would be useful to segment the data based on the development level of the recipient nations, which would test the possible relationships proposed above. It may also be interesting to segment the data based on the authoritarianism of the recipient nation. It is possible that authoritarian regimes are more likely to use imported arms in war. Further, it could be illuminating seek data on arms transfers from foreign nations like Russia and China to determine whether those arms transfers have a different impact

Accardi References

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). 1996. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State. Betts, Richard K. 1981. “Whom Should We Arm?” The Brookings Bulletin 18(1):9-11. Blanton, Shannon L. 1999. “Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries.” Journal of Peace Research 36(2):233-244. Craft, Cassady B. 1999. Weapons for Peace, Weapons for War: The Effect of Arms Transfers on War Outbreak, Involvement and Outcomes. Abingdon: Routledge. Craft, Cassady, and Joseph Smaldone. 2002. “The Arms Trade and the Incidence of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1967-97.” Journal of Peace Research 39(6):693-710. Fleurant, Aude, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Pieter Wezeman, Siemon Wezeman, and Noel Kelly. 2015. “The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies, 2014.” December 7. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2015/siprifact-sheets/sipri-top-100-arms-producing-andmilitary-services-companies-2014 (Accessed January 3, 2017). Goose, Stephen D., and Frank Smyth. 1994. “Arming Genocide in Rwanda.” Foreign Affairs 73(5):86-96. Hartung, William D. 1995. “U.S. Conventional Arms Transfers: Promoting Stability or Fueling Conflict?” Arms Control Today 25(9):9-13.

Hess, Peter N. 1989. “Force Ratios, Arms Imports and Foreign Aid Receipts in the Developing Nations.” Journal of Peace Research 26(4):399-412. Hoffman, Frank G. 2007. Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. (Accessed January 3, 2017). Holtom, Paul. 2012. “Prohibiting Arms Transfers to Non-State Actors and the Arms Trade Treaty.” New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. https://www.sipri.org/ sites/default/files/2016-03/Prohibiting-ArmsTransfers.pdf (Accessed January 3, 2017). Kinsella, David. 1994. “Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries during the Cold War.” American Journal of Political Science 38(3):557-581. Kinsella, David. 1998. “Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 35(1):7-23. Kinsella, David. 2002. “Rivalry, Reaction and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers.” International Studies Quarterly 46(2):209-230. Kinsella, David, and Herbert K. Tillema. 1995. “Arms and Aggression in the Middle East: Overt Military Interventions, 1948-1991.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39(2):306-329. Klare, Mike, and Dan Volman. 1978. “‘Pre-Emptive Peace’: Arms Transfers and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” MERIP Reports 64:17-24. Krause, Keith. 1990. “Constructing Regional Security Régimes and the Control of Arms Transfers.” International Journal 45(2):386-423.

Arms Transfers and Conflict in the 21st Century Krause, Keith. 1994. “Middle Eastern Arms Recipients in the Post-Cold War World.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 535(September):73-90.

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2016. “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” https://www.sipri.org/databases/ armstransfers (Accessed January 3, 2017).

Maniruzzaman, Talukder. 1992. “Arms Transfers, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(4):733-755.

Stohl, Rachel. 2009. “Putting the Arms Trade Treaty into Context: Perspectives on the Global Arms Trade, Existing Arms Trade Initiatives, and the Role of the United States.” Proceedings

Mayer, Jochen, and Ralph Rotte. 1999. “Arms and Aggression in the Middle East, 1948-1991: A Reappraisal.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(1):45-57. Munkler, Herfried. 2003. “The Wars of the 21st Century.” International Review of the Red Cross 85(849):7-22. Pearson, Frederic S. 1989. “The Correlates of Arms Importation.” Journal of Peace Research 26(2):153-163. Sanjian, Gregory S. 1999. “Promoting Stability or Instability? Arms Transfers and Regional Rivalries, 1950-1991.” International Studies Quarterly 43(4):641-670. Sanjian, Gregory S. 2003. “Arms Transfers, Military Balances, and Interstate Relations: Modeling Power Balance versus Power Transition Linkages.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(6):711-727. Signorino, Curtis S., and Ahmer Tarar. 2006. “A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence.” Journal of Political Science 50(3):586-605.

of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 103:333-336. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). 2016. “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.” http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ (Accessed January 3, 2017). United Nations. Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA). 2013. The Impact of Poorly Regulated Arms Transfers on the Work of the United Nations. New York: United Nations. https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws. com/wp-content/uploads/assets/HomePage/ ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/ OP23.pdf (Accessed January 3, 2017). Wang, T. Y. 1998. “Arms Transfers and Coups d’Etat: A Study on Sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of Peace Research 35(6):659-675 Wezeman, Pieter D. 2003. Conflicts and Transfers of Small Arms. Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Disarm%20 Conflicts%20and%20Transfers.pdf (Accessed January 3, 2017).

Radicalization Rising? A Comparative Analysis of European Nationallevel Counter-Radicalization Policies and State Vulnerability to Terrorism Scott Bledsoe Christopher Newport University Counter-radicalization in Europe is an issue that it is at the forefront of national security agendas. The European Union plays a minor role in setting broad goals and guidelines for how EU member states can best fight radicalization, and many question the program’s effectiveness. Given that the EU is not a major contributor in the fight against radicalization, this study focuses on three national-level factors: policy scope, group contact, and minority community engagement. Development and implementation of programs is the primary responsibility of the individual states themselves, and the success of these programs in reducing radical Islamic terrorism is dependent on variations of the three factors identified above. A case study analysis was conducted on counter-radicalization programs in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France. The method of qualitative process tracing was utilized to determine how variations in national conditions contributes to rates of terrorism. The study concludes that reductions in terrorism in these three countries were related to a combination of comprehensive policy, low group contact, and cooperative minority community engagement.

Introduction Members of the European Union (EU) face a unique problem when it comes to counterradicalization efforts. That is, the process by which various policies and programs are implemented by governments at the international, national, state, and local level to prevent susceptible sections of their population from becoming radicalized by extremist ideology (Spalek 2016, 41). One of the most troubling outcomes of the radicalization process is that people may act on increasingly extreme beliefs, such as conducting acts of terrorism. In comparison to the United States, EU members often host a large portion of Muslim immigrants living in its member states. There are security concerns regarding these populations’ susceptibility to radicalization and participation in terrorist activities. A 2016 Europol report, detailing terrorist trends in the EU for 2015, illustrates these security concerns (European Police Office 2016). The report reveals jihadist terrorism as

the biggest security threat that the EU currently faces when compared to other categories of terrorism, such as leftist, right-wing, or single-issue terrorism. The report states that 150 people were casualties of jihadist terrorist attacks in 2015. There was also a significant increase in the number of jihadist terror attacks from 2014 to 2015, with four occurring in 2014 and 17 in 2015 (European Police Office 2016, 22). Arrests made for jihadist terrorism also significantly increased from 2014 to 2015, with 395 arrests being made in 2014 to 687 being made in 2015 (European Police Office 2016, 22). The report also stated that “terrorist cells [that are jihadist] ready to perpetrate a terrorist attack in the EU are largely domestic and/or locally based” (European Police Office 2016, 22). Besides the increase in incidents, this vulnerability may be more troubling in Europe than in the United States given that the counter-radicalization policies EU states implement may differ in effectiveness, but the borders are relatively open between most members.

21 This openness may make EU members particularly vulnerable to the consequences of failed counterradicalization policies abroad. A good illustration of this vulnerability from open borders can be seen in the November Paris attacks that occurred in November 2015. The mastermind of those attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, was a Belgian national (BBC News 2016). Two other attackers, Brahim Abdeslam and Abdelhamid Abaaoud, grew up in the Molenbeek district in Brussels, which is often described as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;breeding ground for jihadistsâ&#x20AC;? by some Belgian officials (BBC News 2016). While the EU put forth an official counterradicalization strategy in 2005, most researchers are cynical about the impact of international organizations when it comes to counterradicalization strategy (Coolsaet 2010; Norman 2007). For this reason, the focus of this study is national-level policies in the EU. The research question that will be addressed is: To what extent are EU member state counter-radicalization programs effective in reducing rates of radical Islamic terrorism within their borders? This research argues that national-level policies and conditions regarding counter-radicalization have the prime effect on rates of terrorism within their borders. In particular, this study argues that three national-level factors alter the effectiveness of policy in reducing terrorism: level of group contact (high or low), policy scope (comprehensive or limited), and minority community engagement (cooperative or combative). The ways in which the three EU member states vary in these areas have a potential impact on the rates of radical Islamic terrorism within their borders. It is expected that countries with low group contact, comprehensive policy, and cooperative minority community engagement will lead to the lowest rates of radical Islamic terrorism.

The study analyzed the relationship between counter-radicalization programs and terrorism from 1995-2015 in three individual case studies, or states: France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. After examining national policies, a method of process tracing was employed to analyze the impact of those different policy implementations on rates of radical Islamic terrorism from 1995 to today in the three aforementioned countries. Literature Review As mentioned above, member states of the European Union face somewhat unique challenges in counter-radicalization efforts that other Western nations, such as the United States, do not. The presence of fifteen million Muslims in Europe presents a significant challenge in counter-radicalization efforts (Zimmerman 2006). The governments of European nations must take steps to prevent the radicalization of its largely Muslim immigrant population. This can be difficult when immigrants in Europe are often far less well integrated into mainstream society compared to Muslims in the United States (Zimmerman 2006). This issue of Muslim immigrant assimilation as it relates to counter-radicalization is only going to become more prominent in the future. The percentage of Muslims making up the European population will continue to grow, due to both demographic decline in Europe and the difficulties faced by non-European Mediterranean countries on their path to development (Zimmerman 2006). A majority of Muslims living in Europe are not radicalized nor are they involved in radical activities (Archick 2011). Since September 11, 2001, European nations are nevertheless concerned over the fact that certain portions of Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Muslim population have the potential to be influenced by radical ideology or be recruited by terrorist organizations (Archick

Bledsoe 22 2011). Terrorist attacks such as those carried out by Muslim citizens or immigrants in 2004 and 2005 in Madrid and London called into question whether enough steps have been taken to integrate Muslim immigrants into European society (Archick 2011). There is particular concern that many young Muslims are more vulnerable to radicalization due to the fact that they feel isolated in or discriminated by society (Stern 2010). For example, in France, Muslim youths in suburban areas are often “equated with thieves” or described as “veilers” or even “scum that has to be simply scrubbed out” (Boukhars 2009, 299). A

policy response by states (Lindekilde 2012). There is disagreement regarding the purposes of counterradicalization programs and initiatives. It is not clear as to whether the purpose of counter-radicalization is to encourage the individual to disengage from their terrorist activity and/or have them reject radical ideology (Lindekilde 2012). Additionally, examining the factors that cause one to become radicalized further complicates the implementation of programs to combat it. If political or religious reasons drive individuals to radical activity, then programs should have political and religious components. If peer

2006 survey by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, a branch of the EU, revealed that minorities and immigrants in the European Union have higher unemployment rates, often have the least desirable jobs, and are paid less (Stern 2010). They then turn to Islam as a “badge of cultural identity” and are more likely to get involved in fringe, fundamentalist movements (Archick 2011). While no government has expressed concerns that large portions of its Muslim population are radicalized, there are Islamic extremists that exist in fringe communities that can serve as a source of radicalization. These extremists also have links to major terrorist groups based in the Middle East and other regions (Archick

pressure drives radicalization, then programs should focus on providing positive alternatives for peer social interaction (Lindekilde 2012). There is no consensus on what explains why one is drawn to radical activity, and the reasons are often complex with a mixture of different factors (Lindekilde 2012). The process of radicalization can be broken down into four stages: 1) pre-radicalization; 2) conversion; 3) indoctrination; and 4) terrorism (Ali 2011). The first stage is the most crucial, as it involves youth having early encounters with potentially radical influences in schools, prisons, mosques, and the Internet. (Ali 2011). There are many theories about what leads an individual into the first stage where they began to

2011). In the existing literature, there is no strong consensus regarding what the process of radicalization specifically looks like nor what the most effective methods are to combat radicalization. In the most general political sense, radicalization can be defined as “increasing time, money, risk-taking, and violence in support of a political cause” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 416). A lack of consensus regarding the definition of radicalization often results in an ineffective or inconsistent counter-radicalization

seek out radical groups and ideology. Some scholars assert that economic inequality and poverty push individuals to radical, terrorist activity (Senzai 2015). Feelings of oppression can also drive individuals to radical activity due to their feelings of social or political isolation (Senzai 2015). A search for identity can also be a factor, and the psychological aspects of belonging to a group dedicated to a common cause can be appealing to those who want a sense of purpose, seek revenge for past wrongdoings, or want to be able to freely express behaviors that are restricted by

Radicalization Rising? A Comparative Analysis

mainstream society (Senzai 2015). After the second stage, conversion, an individual has accepted the beliefs of the extremist organization and moves into the indoctrination stage (third stage), where they travel to other countries to be trained and further educated about extremist ideology (Ali 2011). The fourth stage, terrorism, involves the individual planning and carrying out a terrorist attack (Ali 2011). While major terrorist organizations still pose a significant threat to national security, there has been an emergence in popularity of “homegrown” or “grassroots” jihadism (Rosler 2010, 64). These grassroots movements center

de-radicalization looks like, however, both in the short and long term. In its current state, the strategy “represents a limited and partial solution” (Horgan and Altier 2012, 87-88). Family, youth populations, and social media also play significant roles in the radicalization prevention process. The struggle for individual identity within one’s own family can fuel the radicalization process. There could be disconnect regarding values and beliefs between someone and their family which increases the risk of that individual turning to radical ideology for a sense of purpose (Spalek 2016).

on a “Devolved” jihadism, meaning that attacks are often carried out by unprofessional, untrained, unfunded individuals or small groups (Rosler 2010, 64). Outside of defining radicalization, there is also a disagreement over whether the effectiveness of counter-radicalization methods, such as deradicalization, disengagement, and radicalization prevention. In regards to efforts to de-radicalize and disengage former terrorists, there is no consensus as to what constitutes a success, meaning that it is difficult to determine when a terrorist has completely given up their radical beliefs (Horgan and Braddock 2010). Additionally, reliable markers that indicate a successful de-radicalization or disengagement have

Family members themselves also have the potential to contribute to the radicalization of an individual if they hold radical views and ideas that they impress upon them as they raise them (Spalek 2016). On the other hand, families can also serve as important safeguards against radicalization, sometimes proving to be instrumental in forming a meaningful support network to hold an individual accountable and prevent them from slipping into radical or terrorist activity (Spalek 2016). Youth without strong family support networks are at higher risk for succumbing to radical ideology and participating in violent activity (Ozerdem and Podder 2011). They are seeking purpose for their life, often reaching out to terrorist groups through social media. Indeed, social media play a pivotal role

yet to be identified (Horgan and Braddock 2010). The de-radicalization programs do still have great potential, however. Disengaged terrorists can serve a vital part in educating populations susceptible to radical activity, especially youth. By sharing their own experience, they can reduce the desirability of joining a terrorist organization as well as deconstruct messages that are used in recruitment narratives to entice people to join (Horgan and Altier 2012). There is still a lack of concrete mechanisms to measure what

in the spread of radicalization. Just like any benign group or organization can use social media to share information, fundraise, and garner support for a cause, so can radical groups (Thompson 2011). Social media can prove to be a polarizing method by which people can succumb to ideology that defies social norms and to share private information about themselves that can be used to manipulate them into accepting a certain world view (Thompson 2011).

24 Efforts to combat radicalization by international organizations, such as the EU, while well intentioned, have not been very effective. EU counterradicalization policy and strategy has always depended heavily on member states for contribution and implementation. The trickle down of policy solutions from the EU to member states “has been highly limited” (Bossong 2014, 74). This is due mainly to the different political, social and national security priorities that exist across member states (Bossong 2014). Member states closely guard their national sovereignty, which “results in endemic gaps between

clarification can be given as to what the best national policies are to address the problem of radicalization within a state’s borders. Counter-Radicalization at the National Levels

‘comprehensive’ EU strategies or action plans and national implementation” (Bossong 2014, 74). Given this, it is best in this study to examine and compare radicalization programs primarily on the national level rather than the EU, with an emphasis on how member states are working to combat radicalization. Member states, in implementing their national policies, aim to combat radicalization through various technological, social, and political channels. The literature reinforces the latter as being the primary channels through which radicalization can occur. In general, there is still a high degree of ambiguity and non-consensus regarding the process of radicalization and de-radicalization, particularly the policy solutions formed to address the two issues.

likelihood of an individual coming into contact and engaging with a radical group. Second, the scope and implementation of a national counter-radicalization policy. Third, minority community relations are all relevant factors that have the potential to either prevent or drive individuals to radical activity (Ali 2011; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Senzai 2015). It is expected that variations in these three factors yield different results on rates of radical Islamic terrorism in a state. The first condition, group contact, refers to the number of opportunities open to individuals in a state to interact with extremist and terrorist groups. This condition is categorized as either high or low within a state’s borders.

While there is an exhaustive list of psychological, sociological, economic, and political explanations for why individuals become radicalized, there is no consensus as to what factors are most influential in driving radicalization or what national policies are most effective in countering it. This study will contribute to the discourse on radicalization by analyzing three national-level factors supported by the literature as being potentially influential in combating radicalization. By analyzing certain variations and combinations of these three factors, further

To explain why certain counter-radicalization policies are more effective, this study focuses on three national level conditions: 1) group contact; 2) policy scope; and 3) minority community engagement in three specific countries: France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. The literature reinforces the decision to choose these three national conditions to study in relation to radicalization. First, the

High group contact in a state means that there is a higher probability that an individual belonging to a susceptible population in that country will meet terrorists and become radicalized than there is for a person in a state with low group contact. This high probability could be do factors such as a significant number of radicalized individuals living within a state’s borders. The second condition, policy scope, refers to variation in counter-radicalization tools and methods. This condition is divided into two categories: comprehensive or limited. Comprehensive policies

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics are multifaceted in their approach, incorporating a combination of multicultural integration policies as well as some targeted surveillance. Multicultural integration policies are policies that are aimed at promoting inter-faith dialogues and incorporating minorities (mainly Muslims) more fully into the social and economic framework of society. Targeted surveillance refers to policies that put in place monitoring mechanisms that target specific minority communities in order to collect data on the success rate of the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s comprehensive counterradicalization strategy. Limited national policy refers to policy that have either never been fully developed or implemented or only use one policy tool. Governments that fall under the limited category may have implemented sporadic measures aimed at countering radical ideology, but never fully developed a comprehensive counter-radicalization policy or strategy. The third national condition, minority community engagement, refers to how the government incorporates social groups into policy implementation. Some governments may encourage community leaders to help in identifying vulnerable members of the population and preventing radicalization, while other governments may view the minority community as a threat to be monitored. This condition is divided into two categories: cooperative or combative. If evidence suggests that the government worked with the minority community in implementing the policy, then minority engagement is categorized as cooperative. If evidence suggests that the minority community was targeted for additional surveillance and aggressive policing tactics, then minority engagement is categorized as combative. The three case studies of France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands vary in national conditions. In the first case study of France, where

there is a high level of group contact, limited national policy, and combative minority engagement, the highest levels of radical Islamic terrorism are expected. In the second case study of the United Kingdom, where there is a high level of group contact, comprehensive policy, and combative minority engagement, moderate levels of radical Islamic terrorism are expected. In the third case study of the Netherlands, where there is low group contact, comprehensive policy, and cooperative minority engagement, the lowest rates of radical Islamic terrorism are expected. Variables and Methods Independent Variables The independent variables in this study are national conditions and policies at the state level. These include policy scope, group contact, and minority community engagement. In regards to policy scope, comprehensive measures take a more holistic, proactive approach to countering radicalization. This involves implementation of policy that focuses on integration, inter-faith understanding, and addressing socio-economic gaps that could contribute to the stigmatization of minorities. Limited measures means that there is not a fully developed counterradicalization plan on the national level. Under this scope, states address radical activity through a more repressive approach, using targeted surveillance, law enforcement, and criminal prosecution as their key tools to suppress radical ideology. Data for national policies were drawn from national government documents, reports, news articles, and scholarly secondary sources. National government documents consisted primarily of written policy statements and progress reports regarding counterradicalization that were drawn from the respective governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; intelligence agency, social welfare,

Bledsoe 26 and crime prevention websites. The Prevent strategy and progress reports were analyzed for the United Kingdom (Department of Communities and Local Government 2007; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 2009; Secretary of State for the Home Department 2011). The Netherlands strategy titled “The Netherlands comprehensive action program to combat jihadism: Overview of measures and actions” was analyzed as well as various progress reports (Ministry of Security and Justice, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2014;

radical ideology, or that there was an absence of large numbers of people who are susceptible to radicalization, then the state was considered to have low group contact. Data for minority community engagement were drawn primarily from scholarly articles retrieved from JSTOR and ProQuest databases and news articles that were retrieved from Lexis Nexis news database searches (Al-Arian 2016; BBC News 2016; BBC Monitoring Europe 2016; Ford and Miller 2015; Safdar 2015; O’Toole, Meer, DeHanas, Jones, and Modood 2015). If these documents demonstrated

Minister of Immigration and Integration 2006; U.S. Department of State 2006; Ragazzi 2014; Vidino 2008;). France did not have a written counterradicalization strategy for the time period studied so most all information regarding counter-radicalization efforts in the country where drawn from U.S. State Department country reports on terrorism for France (U.S. Department of State 2005, 2007, 2008-2012; Ragazzi 2014). Data for group contact were drawn primarily from scholarly articles and NGO reports. Scholarly articles that discussed group contact were retrieved from JSTOR and ProQuest databases (Ali 2011; Boukhars 2009; Zimmerman 2006). NGO reports were retrieved primarily from reports from EU-level organizations

evidence that a significant portion of the minority population had negative views or challenged a government’s counter-radicalization approach, then the state was considered to have combative minority community engagement. If the documents showed little to no evidence that the minority community within a state had combative attitudes or actions towards the national counter-radicalization policy, then the state was considered to have cooperative minority community engagement.

such as the European Urban Knowledge Network and Europol as well as a report from The International Centre for the study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (European Urban Knowledge Network 2016; European Police Office 2016; Brandon and Vidino 2012). If information from those various sources asserted that there was a large population susceptible to radicalization living within a state’s borders, then the state was considered to have high group contact. If the information asserted that susceptible populations had demonstrated high resilience towards

Dependent Variable The dependent variable is the rates of radical Islamic terrorism within a state’s borders. Rates of radical Islamic terrorism in each country were drawn from the Global Terrorism database, with the number of radical Islamic attacks being tallied for each year from 1995 to 2015 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2016). There were specific reasons behind the exclusive focus on rates of radical Islamic terrorism, as opposed to all extremist forms of terrorism that occur within a state’s borders. First, the large Muslim populations in the countries studied are conventionally thought to be the most susceptible to radicalization in the current international political climate. Second, the national counter-radicalization policies of the states selected

Radicalization Rising? A Comparative Analysis have an obvious slant towards preventing counterradicalization in Muslim communities. While other forms of extremism are mentioned in some policies, the predominant focus is on Islamic extremism. The three countries that are being studied are the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and France. These countries were chosen due to ways in which they vary in their counter-radicalization strategy and its implementation. France’s counter-radicalization program is virtually non-existent. Evaluating France can give insight into whether a national counterradicalization program is needed at all to effectively combat radical Islamic terrorism. While the UK and Netherlands are similar in that they both have comprehensive programs, they differ in regards to level of group contact as well as how positively their programs were received by the minority community. Evaluating the UK and Netherlands can give insight into how successful the same counter-radicalization program is when implemented in countries with different national conditions. Method The qualitative method of process tracing was used. In this study, this method involved compiling chronological information in five year increments about the evolution of each country’s counterradicalization policy from 1995 to 2015 and the corresponding rates of radical Islamic terrorism during those time periods. Then, the data were organized chronologically and rates of terrorism were compared to different policy tools and types overtime to determine which policies, if any, were effective in reducing radical Islamic terrorism.

Case Study Analysis Case Study 1: France The highest levels of radical Islamic terrorism are expected in France. This is due to the fact that they have a high level of group contact, a limited program, and combative minority community engagement. France has a high Muslim minority population within its borders that is susceptible to radicalization. They address radicalization through targeted surveillance and repressive measures, treating terror and radical activity solely as crimes to be prosecuted, not things that should be addressed through a proactive counterradicalization program like those in the UK or Netherlands. This approach has resulted in minorities feeling greatly stigmatized and combative towards engaging with the government in their fight against terror. France differs greatly from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in that from 1995-2015, it did not have an official national policy addressing counterradicalization. This is due mainly to how the French government views terrorism and radicalization. They do not view the stages of the radicalization process as culminating to terrorism, but rather view terrorism as a clear cut violation of laws (Marret 2009). Additionally, the French government believes that terrorist acts are legitimized when explained through the lens of the radicalization process (Marret 2009). The earliest instances of French efforts to combat radicalization began in the 2002-2005 range with a policy of expulsion of non-French citizens “…engaged in activities that promoted hate” (U.S. Department of State 2005). At the time of the state department report in 2005, 19 Islamic extremists had been expelled. Since 2002, a total of 102 extremists were expelled (U.S. Department of State 2005).

28 This policy continued on, with as many as 18 foreign imams being expelled in 2007 for being preachers of hate (U.S. Department of State 2007). Despite its lack of official counter-radicalization policy, the French government did make attempts to engage Muslim minority communities during this time frame (2002 to 2005). In 2002, the French council for the Muslim Religion was created by Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy to serve as connecting institution between French Muslims and the government in regards to matters concerning state interference and regulation of Islamic religious practices and activities (Rascoff 2012) However, it has been critiqued as an institution. Activist Marwan Muhammad saying “…[it] has mainly aligned with the government’s positions, which still deals with Muslims by means of ‘control’” (Al-Arian 2016). The French government began to become very concerned about the spread of radical Islamic ideology in their prison system and commissioned a study in 2008 to gain more knowledge on what behaviors and/or actions indicate radicalization and what the best proposals are to prevent and suppress it in prisons (U.S. Department of State 2008). In 2009, the

prison report was finished and released to all 27 EU member states. The French government also invested time and resources in 2009, to giving police further training on how to be more cognizant of the signs of radicalization. No specifics were provided as to what the training entailed (U.S. Department of State 2009). Although the French government still did not implement a national policy or strategy during the 2010 to 2015 time period, the French government became more aware and active in thinking of ways to combat radicalization. Many of the efforts were educational in nature. In 2010, the government began to consider methods to combat radicalization by providing after school programs, making access to higher education more equal, and finding ways to increase social mobility. These changes could have potentially contributed to the fact that there were few attacks from 2010 to 2011 (See Figure 1). Imams were also given the opportunity to participate in a training program for professional development that was run by mainstream Muslim leaders (U.S. Department of State 2010). In 2011, the Ministry of Education worked to instill “universal values” in all students in the French public school system, with civic education

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics being mandatory in the curriculum (U.S. Department of State 2011). Vocational training was also offered by the government for older immigrant and minority populations who never had the opportunity to matriculate through the French public school system (U.S. Department of State 2011). In 2012, programs focused on rehabilitation and reintegration were implemented by the Ministry of Justice to help ex-convicts transition back into mainstream society. The Penitentiary system also issued a statement in 2012 that it would increase the number of Muslim chaplains in prisons to 166 (from 151) starting in 2013 (U.S. Department of State 2012). In 2013, the number of Muslim chaplains employed in the French prison system increased to 164. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior increased the presence of police forces in underprivileged areas of the country where crime rates and rates of juvenile delinquency were high (U.S. Department of State 2013). In 2014, the number of Muslim chaplains employed in the prison system increased to 185. In the spring of 2014, a toll-free hotline was also established for families to utilize if they believed that one of their members has become radicalized (U.S. Department of State 2014). 2015 served as a significant year in regards to the country’s counter-radicalization strategies. Repressive measures were intensified, which leads to an expected increase in terrorist rates. This expected increase is supported by the significant increase in number of radical Islamic terror attacks that occurred in France in 2015 (See Figure 1). In December 2015, an estimated 100-160 mosques were shut down by the government as part of a “… nationwide state of emergency police operation…” which allowed for the closing of places of worship that promote radical views (Safdar 2015). In response to the January 7-9, 2015, terrorist attacks, the Ministry of Education announced new efforts to enhance the

civic and integrative aspects of school curriculum (U.S. Department of State 2015). On January 28, the national government launched a new campaign in the form of a website called “Stop Djhadisme” which was aimed at combating Islamic extremism at various levels of society, especially in education and the prison systems, mainly through allocation of additional resources (European Urban Knowledge Network 2016). Rates of radical Islamic terrorism in France have fluctuated throughout the years, with the most activity being concentrated in the 2012-2015 time frame, with a significant spike in attacks in 2015 (See Figure 1). This could be due to the high involvement of French citizens with the jihadist activities abroad. A news source reported in 2015: ...especially as the number of French “involved” in the jihad in Syria and Iraq, where they swell the ranks of ISIL, has risen dramatically. In March 2014 the Interior Ministry counted 700. In September, there were 930 and today more than 1,400. The public authorities are realizing that the work of the police and intelligence services will not be enough to contain this problem… (BBC Monitoring Europe 2015). This reveals that the French government was beginning to acknowledge that its lack of a national counter-radicalization strategy and heavy focus on repressive and targeted surveillance measures could be contributing to the problem of French citizens becoming radicalized. In 2015, a Christian Science Monitor article highlights some other ways in which the French capacity to effectively counter radicalization is lacking (Ford and Miller 2015). One reason is that there is a lack of resources with “…nearly 3,000 potential

Bledsoe 30 French jihadis” needing constant surveillance but only 3800 agents available to do so (Ford and Miller 2015). The government also has difficulty gathering intelligence from areas that are believed to have high recruitment activity by extremists, with government official Louis Caprioli saying that these “ghettos” are essentially impenetrable and “We cannot do discreet surveillance there” (Ford and Miller 2015). There is also difficulty breaking through an ideological barrier with Muslim youth. Lhaj Thami Breze, former president of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, stated “...these young radicals don’t listen to us. They say we have sold out to the authorities” (Ford and Miller 2015). There was also continued debate and controversy into 2015 regarding the integration level of Muslims. Prime Minister Valls caused controversy with a statement in January 2015 that “…France suffers from territorial, social, and ethnic apartheid” and that the Paris suburbs resemble “ghettos” (Ford and Miller 2015). The lack of French progress in the most common counter-radicalization policy areas (i.e., education, integration, community trust) that countries such as the Netherlands and UK have devoted resources to positively developing could serve as a potential explanation as to why the French experienced a spike in 2015 in radical Islamic attacks whereas the British and Dutch did not (See Figure 1). There could be other factors that influence rates of radical Islamic terror beyond the French government faltering on counter-radicalization policy. One such factor could be France’s involvement in other countries. Attack summary reports from the Global Terrorism Database for two attacks on December 16, 2008, and January 15, 2009, both gave evidence that radical Islamic attacks can stem from France’s involvement in Afghanistan and their attacks against Hamas in Gaza, respectively (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2016).

Evidence from the French case supports the expectation that rates of radical Islamic terrorism will be highest in that state. France has high group contact within its borders, combative minority community engagement, and a limited policy. While France has similar national conditions to the UK in regards to group contact and minority engagement, the absence of a national policy appears to be the key differing variable that potentially contributes to the rates of radical Islamic terrorism within their borders. Case Study 2: The United Kingdom Moderate levels of radical Islamic terrorism are expected in the United Kingdom. This is due to the fact that they have a high level of group contact, comprehensive program, and combative minority community engagement. The UK has a fairly high minority population within its borders that is susceptible to radicalization, with many immigrants having come from areas of the world where radical ideology has a strong presence. Their counterradicalization program, “Prevent” emphasizes a multicultural approach with some targeted surveillance measures, and has faced much criticism and noncompliance from Muslim minority communities. The United Kingdom is a prime example of a country that has high potential for radical Islamic group contact within its borders. This can be attributed to a variety of factors. A few common explanations are the large numbers of Islamists that immigrated to the country during the 1970s and 80s, a “state multiculturalism” in the 1990s that many critiqued as having “turned a blind eye to growing domestic Islamist extremism,” and close alliance of foreign policy with the United States, making the UK a key al Qaeda target (Brandon and Vidino 2012, 11). The United Kingdom first began its counterradicalization efforts in 2003, making it the first country in Europe to start developing a comprehensive

Radicalization Rising? A Comparative Analysis national policy centered on counter-radicalization. The first version of their strategy had three broad goals: developing counter-narratives to work against violent ideology, preventing the appeal and recruitment of terrorist groups, and working with local partners such as mosques and schools in order to address at risk populations for radicalization (Ragazzi 2014). The policy was also shaped by the 2005 London bombings. While focus on multicultural policy was still emphasized, the UK, along with other countries, began to reorient their counter-radicalization strategy in a way that increased expectations of minorities to fully integrate into their society. For instance, countries reoriented by demonstrating language proficiency and becoming literate to the political and social norms of that country (Ragazzi 2014). The national strategy would later be named “Prevent” in 2007 (Brandon and Vidino 2012, 11). The strategy was implemented on national and local levels. Various government departments provided strategy and resources but local governments were given almost full autonomy in deciding how “Prevent” would be implemented within their communities (O’Toole et al. 2015). A Department of Communities and Local Government publication issued in April of 2007 gave further directives regarding the prevention of radicalization on the local level. The main objects laid out were “promoting shared values, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and leadership, and strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders” (Department of Communities and Local Government 2007, 5-10). These broad headline strategies covered various topics underneath them such as promoting civic education and equality of opportunity, engaging local organizations that have shared values, and working with faith leaders (Department of Communities and Local Government 2007, 5-11).

After the initial unveiling of “Prevent” in 2007, there were some challenges in regards to local implementation. In 2007, in Leicester, there was push back from the local council in adopting the terminology of the strategy, and instead revised it to include all forms of extremism, rebranding it “Mainstreaming Moderation” (O’Toole et al. 2015, 11). The rationale behind this was that “Prevent’s” exclusive focus on Muslims would clash with their populace given the high diversity of faiths in their municipality and strong presence of multifaith tolerance and respect (O’Toole et al. 2015). Minutes from a 2008 Local Government Association revealed reservations from other local authorities about the adoption of “National Indicator 35”, which is a mechanism the government uses as part of its assessment framework to monitor the success of “Prevent” and resilience to radical ideology across the country (O’Toole et al. 2015, 11). The minutes read that: “Local authorities are reluctant to pick up the indicator because the term ‘violent extremism’ could alienate communities, undermining cohesion work and are extremely cautious making public statements around preventing violent extremism” (O’Toole et al. 2015, 11). Despite battles over rhetoric, some local communities did have success. In 2008, in Bristol, a conservative mosque was successful in reporting a radical convert to “Prevent”. This was directly attributed to the effective police outreach and established bonds of confidence with local Muslim communities in Bristol (Brandon and Vidino 2012). A 2009 progress report on “Prevent” also revealed two case studies that showed the success of the program. The first one detailed a successful parentteacher intervention for a student after they “provided a class presentation about an aspiration to join a terrorist organisation” (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of

32 Constabulary 2009, 31). The second case involved successful intervention of school and law-enforcement officials for a girl who had been in communication with a radicaliser who was working to recruit her (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 2009). “Prevent” was revised in 2011 to correct several perceived problems. The main issue regarded concerns and complaints that had repeatedly been raised by members of Muslim communities regarding the perception that “Prevent” stigmatized Muslim communities. The overlap between the cohesion policies, which focused on inclusivity and integration, and “Prevent” had “…led to accusations that the government’s interest in Muslim communities is related only to the risk of terrorism” (O’Toole et al. 2015, 9). In order to remedy this, the government stated in their revised 2011 policy that “…we will do more than any other Government before us to promote integration, but we will do so separately and differently from ‘Prevent’” (Secretary of State for the Home Department 2011, 2). The 2011 revision also stated that the government would continue to “… work closely with the EU and EU Member States…” acknowledging that even though there had been some bilateral communication in the past it “…has not proceeded systematically and we will take steps to improve those connections” (Secretary of State for the Home Department 2011, 80). In October of 2015, domestic strategy was announced that introduced new measures to further counter extremism. These measures involved further restriction placed on youth travel to areas with high terrorist activity, mandatory counter-radicalization education for ex-terrorist convicts, a ban on exterrorist convicts working with youth in any capacity, and increased power given to Britain’s media regulator to sanction channels for extremist content or appearance of hate preachers (Eyal 2015). Rates

of radical Islamic terrorism were relatively low from “Prevent’s” official inception in 2007 until 2013, where there was only one attack (See Figure 1). This could perhaps be attributed to the success of the United Kingdom’s “Channel” program, which is a “Prevent” referral program aimed at carrying out targeted interventions of people, mostly youth, who are determined to be on the path to radicalization (Brandon and Vidino 2012). In the 2011 review of “Prevent”, statistics were provided that indicated the program’s progress since December 2010. It is significant to note that of the 1120 people referred to the program since 2010, 88% “…were referred owing to concerns around international terrorism [NB: this almost always refers to jihadist terrorism].” (Brandon and Vidino 2012, 19). This could explain in part the relatively low rates of radical Islamic terrorism in the UK from 2010 to 2015. Almost 4,000 people have been referred to the “Channel” program as of March 2014. Of those referrals, 20 percent were taken into the program (Ford and Miller 2015). Rashad Ali, who is a mentor through the “Channel” program, said in 2015: “All you can measure is whether the risk factors have been reduced. But generally speaking, that is the case. Most of the time it works” (Ford and Miller 2015). It is also significant to note that no individual who has gone through the “Channel” program has later been arrested for any terrorism-related offenses (Ford and Miller 2015). Evidence from the UK case supports the expectation about rates of radical Islamic terrorism within the state. While the UK experienced high group contact within its borders and combative minority community engagement, the implementation of a comprehensive policy that did not exclusively focus on targeted surveillance or repressive measures perhaps mediated the other two factors, making rates of radical Islamic terrorism in the UK moderately high.

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Case Study 3: The Netherlands The lowest level of radical Islamic terrorism is expected in the Netherlands. This is due to the fact that they have a low level of group contact, comprehensive program, and cooperative minority community engagement. While the Netherlands does have a significant number of minorities within its borders that are susceptible to radicalization, no substantial evidence could be found that these minority communities had combative attitudes towards the country’s counter-radicalization programs. After their only attack in 2004, the country has been diligent in seeking out and eradicating racial ideology within their borders. Their counter-radicalization programs have been based in two national strategic plans that spanned from 2007 to 2015. These plans emphasized cohesive social and multicultural policies that focused on integration. Given that their programs were very similar to those in the UK, it was concluded that low group contact and more cooperative minority attitudes are the key differing variables that explain why the Netherlands experienced lower rates of radical Islamic terrorism. The Dutch government first began to develop a national counter-radicalization policy in 2004. From 1995 to 2015, the Netherlands experienced only one attack in 2004, which was carried out by a radical Islamic terrorist. Compared to the UK, the Netherlands has not had as much of a problem with high group contact within their borders. Their experience with radical jihadist terror has been fairly isolated and not as threatening. For example, the Hofstad group (i.e., radical jihadist terror group that began to develop in the country in 2002) was best described as “…an amorphous collective of radicalised young Muslims centered around a hardcore of extremists.” (Schuurman, Eijkman, and Bakker 2014, 65).

Although this group was evolving to develop ties towards a more robust and international jihadist network, it never came into fruition. The group’s 2004 attack was its only one, and subsequent arrests made in 2004 and 2005 brought about the end of their organization and activities (Schuurman, Eijkman, Bakker 2014). The 2004 counter-radicalization strategy had a primary focus on countering Islamic extremism (Vidino 2008). Similar to the United Kingdom, the policy is national, but the task of implementation is left primarily to local municipalities, with local authorities having complete autonomy (Vidino 2008). In 2006, the Dutch National Counterterrorism Coordinator raised concerns in a quarterly threat analysis report about the radicalization of Muslim youth in the country, specifically by way of the Internet (U.S. Department of State 2006). A 2007 report issued by the Dutch Intelligence Service revealed that approximately 20-30,000 Muslims were at risk to succumb to radical ideology (U.S. Department of State 2006). In 2007, the government launched a national counter-radicalization plan titled the “Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan: 2007-2011”. The national strategy had a primary focus on social cohesion of minorities through preventative, proactive, and repressive measures. The main goals that stemmed from these measures were to foster integration through education, putting in place a process for local officials and partners to identify the early signs of radicalization, and socially isolating those who are radicalized in order to minimize the influence they could have on other individuals (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2007, 7). It is also significant to note that in this action plan the Dutch government explicitly mentions the 2005 EU counter-radicalization policy and states that they

Bledsoe 34 are “playing an active role in the implementation” (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2007, 27). It is stated that they do this by sharing of best practice in the context of the EU, which involves sharing of information and resources with other EU member states (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2007). Most of the Dutch programs aim to combat radicalization by having an exclusive focus on ensuring that an individual feels integrated into society. This is achieved mainly on the local level through practices such as group meetings, conferences, trainings, art projects, and neighborhood festivals that all have a focus on inter-faith understanding and inclusion (Vidino 2008). There are also de-radicalization programs in place to encourage radicalized individuals to work through their identity crisis by giving up Salafist views and embracing the tenets of democratic society (Vidino 2008). The government identifies someone to potentially be in “identity crisis” if they are still searching, with not much success, for where they fit into the social framework (Vidino 2008). In 2011, the “National Counterterrorism strategy 2011-2015” was launched. Within the strategy, there was a section on combating radicalization that discussed countering radicalization in terms of supply and demand. The “demand” side represented the young generation of Muslims who are searching for meaning and identity while the “supply” side represented the ideology that was offered by al-Qaeda and inspired movements (Ministry of Security and Justice 2011, 70). From this, there were four goals outlined regarding counter-radicalization policy: “to reinforce resilience on the demand side, undermine the supply, reduce breeding ground, and revere observed process of radicalisation (deradicalisation).” (Ministry of Security and Justice 2011, 71).

A 2014 national strategy to combat jihadism also introduced some new measures to counter radicalization. Some of the new measures included expanded training for local and national level officials, establishment of an anonymous reporting system, establishment of facilities to provide support and resources for families of radicalized individuals, and the establishment of an “expert centre” that is focused on providing resources and support to localities in their fight against radicalization and social tensions (Ministry of Security and Justice 2014, 17-20). It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the Netherland’s counter-radicalization programs due to the fact their progress reports do more in the way of describing how and which policies have been implemented as opposed to providing evidence of successful outcomes. The reports do provide evidence of engagement, however. A 2006, a progress report cites an instance of 20 meetings being held to address radicalization and a range of 50-250 young Muslims attending each meeting (Minister of Immigration and Integration 2006, 4). In regards to the youth, the report also states that young people from refugee organizations are very active in organizing meetings on a national and regional level and that through these experiences “…they understand like no other the value of living a free life in a democratic society” (Minister of Immigration and Integration 2006, 4). There is another instance of 250 parents and young people in South Holland attending a forum on intercultural dialogue and generational gaps (Minister of Immigration and Integration 2006, 10). In regards to cooperation with Muslim communities, it was cited that 70 Koran teachers signed up for a social orientation course with only 25 spots (Minister of Immigration and Integration 2006, 11). “Some 50” Turkish and Moroccan imams and mosque administrators attended a two-day conference

Radicalization Rising? A Comparative Analysis

on radicalization (Minister of Immigration and Integration 2006, 12). While it was not ever stated that any of these programs had a direct positive impact on reducing radicalization or rates of radical Islamic terror, it is implied that they in part have been a key component of the Netherlandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largely successful record of preventing radical Islamic terror within their borders. A 2014 progress report on the 2014 Dutch strategy to combat jihadism also has a section on radicalization, but, similar to the 2006 report, does not provide any explicit evidence of successful outcomes.

can be stated that countries with low group contact, comprehensive policy, and cooperative minority community engagement could potentially expect to see the lowest rates of radical Islamic terrorism. It is important to note that while those conditions in the Netherlands yielded the lowest levels of terrorist activity, a different country with the same conditions might not experience lower levels. Conclusions drawn about the three cases are specific to those cases only and should not be automatically applied to other countries with similar national conditions.

There is mainly continuing dialogue regarding how Muslim minority community leaders, both in the civil and religious spheres, are continually being engaged by the government to develop plans to combat radicalization and discrimination (Minister of Security and Justice. Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 2014, 1). Evidence from the Netherlands case supports the expectation about rates of radical Islamic terrorism within the state. The Netherlands has low group contact within its borders, cooperative minority community engagement, and a comprehensive policy. It is concluded that low group contact and cooperative minority community engagement contributed to the

community engagement were supported by this case. The Netherlands had low group contact and cooperative minority engagement, which, when combined with comprehensive policy, produced the lowest rates of radical Islamic terrorism. The UK had high group contact and combative minority engagement, which, when combined with comprehensive policy, produced moderate rates of radical Islamic terrorism. France had high group contact and combative minority engagement, which, when coupled with the limited presence of a national counter-radicalization strategy, produced the highest rates of radical Islamic terrorism. It is important to note, however, that success in

fact that the country experienced the lowest rates of radical Islamic terrorism. Conclusion This study sought to address the following research question: To what extent are EU member state counter-radicalization programs effective in reducing rates of radical Islamic terrorism within their borders? After evaluating counter-radicalization policies at the national level for the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands as well as the subsequent change in radical Islamic terror in their states, it

Predictions about group contact and minority

developing national counter-radicalization strategy cannot be attributed as the sole determinant of whether a state will experience high, low, or moderate rates of radical Islamic terrorism within its borders. There are other factors such as resources and size of Muslim populations that further research could take into account. What the research produced is the assertion that successful development of counter-radicalization policy at the national level that emphasizes comprehensive measures such as promoting interfaith understanding and multicultural integration, could potentially be one of the factors that could positively

36 contribute to lower rates of radical Islamic terror within a state’s borders. It is also important to acknowledge that not all radical Islamic terrorist attacks carried out within a country’s borders could be perpetuated by a citizen of that country. This can be troublesome when the research is attempting to link a country’s counterradicalization policy to how effective it is in reducing rates of radical Islamic terror among its citizenry. However, even if a perpetrator of an attack was not an official citizen of the country in which they committed it, it does not mean that they had not lived in that country for some time and could have potentially been influenced by that government’s counter-radicalization policy. References Ali, Shehzad. 2011. “Home-Grown Terror in Europe: Threat in the Midst.” Journal of European Studies 27 (2): 90-122. Archick, Kristin, Paul Belkin, Christopher Blanchard, Carl Ek, and Derek Mix. 2011. “Muslims in Europe: Promoting Integration and Countering Extremism.” Current Politics & Economics of Europe 22(4): 563-629. Al-Arian, Ali. 2016. “Why Western attempts to Moderate Islam are Dangerous,” Aljazeera, January 19. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ features/2016/01/western-attempts-moderateislam-dangerous-160118081456021.html (Accessed June 18, 2016).

BBC Monitoring Europe. 2015. “France said Lagging Behind in Non-Repressive Aspect of Countering Radicalization,” BBC Monitoring Europe, February 24. Bossong, Raphael. 2014. “EU Cooperation on Terrorism Prevention and Violent Radicalization: Frustrated Ambitions or New Forms of EU Security Governance?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 27 (1): 66-82. Boukhars, Anouar. 2009. “Islam, Jihadism, and Depoliticization in France and Germany”. International Political Science Review 30(3): 297-317. Brandon, James, and Lorenzo Vidino. 2012. “Countering Radicalization in Europe.” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. http://icsr.info/wp-content/ uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-CounteringRadicalization-in-Europe.pdf (Accessed June 18, 2016). Coolsaet, Rik. 2010. “EU Counterterrorism Strategy: Value Added Or Chimera?” International Affairs 86(4): 857-873. Department of Communities and Local Government. 2007. “Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning Hearts and Minds.” http://webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080545/ http://communities.gov.uk/pub/401/PreventingviolentextremismWinningheartsandminds_ id1509401.pdf (Accessed February 3, 2017).

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European Police Office. 2016. “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016.” https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorismsituation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2016 (Accessed June 10, 2016).

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Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. 2009. “Prevent: Progress and Prospects.” https:// www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/publications/prevent-progress-and-prospects-report/ (Accessed July 1, 2016). Horgan, John, and Kurt Braddock. 2010. “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs.” Terrorism & Political Violence 22 (2): 267-291 Horgan, John, and Mary Beth Altier. 2012. “The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Programs.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 13(2): 83-90. Eyal, Jonathan. 2015. “Britain Beefs Up Measures to Combat Extremism,” The Straits Times, October 20. http://www.straitstimes.com/world/ europe/britain-beefs-up-measures-to-combatextremism (Accessed July 15, 2016). Lindekilde, Lasse. 2012. “Value for Money? Problems of Impact Assessment of Counter-Radicalisation Policies on End Target Groups: The Case of Denmark.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 18(4): 385-402.

Minister of Security and Justice. Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. 2014. “Letter of 12 November 2014 from the Minister of Security and Justice and the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment to the House of Representatives on the progress of the plan of action ‘An Integrated Approach to Jihadism’.” https://english. nctv.nl/binaries/letter-to-parliament-progressof-the-plan-of-action-an-integrated-approachto-jihadism_tcm32-83605.pdf. (Accessed July 20, 2016). Ministry of Security and Justice, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. 2014. “The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism: Overview of measures and actions.” https://english.nctv.nl/organisation/ counterterrorism/The-Netherlands-comprehensive-action-programme-to-combat-jihadism/ index.aspx (Accessed June 10, 2016). Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. 2007. “Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan: 2007-2011.” https://www.nyidanmark.dk/ NR/rdonlyres/E9353925-A523-41C6-94F1643EACF826CC/0/minbiz007_actieplanukv3. pdf (Accessed July 18, 2016).

Bledsoe 38 Minister of Immigration and Integration. 2006. “Policies on Integration and Prevention of Radicalisation in the Netherlands: A Progress Report.” http://english.nctb.nl/search.aspx?simpleSearc h=%22Policies+of+Integration+and+Preventio n+of+Radicalisatio n+in+the+Netherlands%22 andzoekknop=Search (Accessed July 1, 2016). Ministry of Security and Justice. 2011. “National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015”.. https:// english.nctv.nl/binaries/nationale-ct-strategie2011-2015-uk_tcm92-369807_tcm32-90349. pdf (Accessed July 20, 2016). National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2016. Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. https:// www.start.umd.edu/gtd (Accessed February 2, 2017). Norman, Paul. 2007. “From Enforcement to Strategic Partnership: The Contemporary Challenge of the United Nations in Countering Terrorism.” Security Journal 20(3):197-209. O’Toole, Theresa, Nasar Meer, Daniel N. DeHanas, Stephen H. Jones, and Tariq Modood. 2015. “Governing through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State-Muslim Engagement.” Sociology: 50(1):160-177. Özerdem, Alpaslan, and Sukanya Podder. 2011. “Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism.” Journal of Strategic Security 4(4): 63-80. Ragazzi, Francesco 2014. “Towards ‘Policed Multiculturalism’? Counter-Radicalization in France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.” SciencesPo. Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales. http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/

sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/Etude_206_anglais.pdf (Accessed February 2, 2017). Rascoff, Samuel J. 2012. “Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization.” Stanford Law Review 64 (January): 125-189. Rosler, Aaron. 2010. “Devolving Jihadism.” Journal of Strategic Security 3 (4): 63-74. Safdar, Anealla. 2015. “France Likely to Close more than 100 Mosques,” Aljazeera, December 2. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/ france-100-mosques-close-151202142023319. html (Accessed June 18, 2016). Schuurman, Bart, Quirine Eijkman, and Edwin Bakker. 2014. “A History of the Hofstadgroup”. Perspectives on Terrorism 8(4):65-81. Secretary of State for the Home Department. 2011. “Prevent Strategy.” https://www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review. pdf (Accessed June 10, 2016). Senzai, Farid. 2015. “Making Sense of Radicalization.” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 32 (2): 139-152. Spalek, Basla. 2016. “Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, and Counter-Radicalisation in Relation to Families; Key Challenges for Research, Policy, and Practice.” Security Journal 29 (1): 39-52. Stern, Jessica. 2010. “Mind over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists.” Foreign Affairs 89(1): 95-108. Thompson, Robin L. 2011. “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media.” Journal of Strategic Security 4 (4): 167-190.

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U.S. Department of State. 2005. “Country Reports on Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview: France.” 28 April 2006. http://www.state.gov/j/ ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm (Accessed June 15, 2016).

U.S. Department of State. 2012. “Country Reports on Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview: France.” 30 May 2013. http://www.state.gov/j/ ct/rls/crt/2012/209981.htm (Accessed June 15, 2016)

U.S. Department of State. 2006. “Country Reports on Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview: Netherlands.” 30 April 2007. http://www.state. gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2006/82732.htm (Accessed June 16, 2016).

Vidino, Lorenzo 2008. “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-radicalization in the Netherlands.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-preliminaryassessment-of-counter-radicalization-in-thenetherlands (Accessed June 10, 2016)

U.S. Department of State. 2007. “Country Reports on Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview: France.” 30 April 2008. http://www.state.gov/j/ ct/rls/crt/2007/103707.htm (Accessed June 15, 2016). U.S. Department of State. 2008. “Country Reports on Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview: France.” 30 April 2009. http://www.state.gov/j/ ct/rls/crt/2008/122432.htm (Accessed June 15, 2016) U.S. Department of State. 2009. “Country Reports on Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview: France.” 5 August 2010. http://www.state. gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140885.htm (Accessed June 15, 2016) U.S. Department of State. 2010. “Country Reports on Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview: France.” 18 August 2011. http://www.state. gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170256.htm (Accessed June 15, 2016) U.S. Department of State. 2011. “Country Reports on Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview: France.” 31 July 2012. http://www.state.gov/j/ ct/rls/crt/2011/195543.htm (Accessed June 15, 2016)

Zimmermann, Doron. 2006. “The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(2): 123-145.

The Case for Consociational Democracy in Israel: Institutional Solutions to the Ethnic Conflict Nathaniel F. Sussman University of Western Ontario, Canada The ethnic division between Jews and Arabs in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories is an enduring source of concern in contemporary geopolitics. The severity of this division presents a growing threat to any political stability in the State of Israel or the surrounding region. In Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (1977), Arend Lijphart presents a consolidated and systematic argument for “consociational democratic theory”. This theory has been noted, perhaps most prominently, for its effectiveness in helping to model the best possible political outcomes in the face of deep societal divisions. Through a detailed description of consociationalism, and an analysis of Israel’s modern history and recent sociological data, I investigate how Lijphart’s theory might be employed within the state’s governmental institutions in order to alleviate the ethnic cleavage. I conclude that consociational theory, if applied in most but not all of its dimensions, can be beneficial in treating the Jewish-Arab tension in Israel. I also suggest that additional policy measures are necessary for long-term stability, including a complete end to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Introducing a Potential Solution to Ethnic Conflict The ethnic conflict between Jews and Arabs is a societal cleavage that defines Israeli politics and, by extension, broadly affects the nature of contemporary international relations. While attempts to alleviate this tension have been present for over half a century, the successes of such initiatives have been questioned even during times of relative stability. Slight provocation from either group has historically led to the potential for large-scale violence and international attention. The State of Israel must address its deeply divided society in a way that creates a degree of lasting peace and stability. Consociational democracy may offer hope to Israel’s situation: its practices have proven effective in some past cases, in which deeply segmented societies have been brought to peaceful

coexistence under state institutions. However, even the theorists who advocate for consociationalism caution that every state’s circumstances are different, and that consociational practices must be implemented delicately and with restraint. In the interest of providing a straightforward analysis, this proposal uses an ethnic dichotomy of “Jews” and “Arabs”. This dichotomy does not entirely capture the overlapping character that a person’s ethnic identity can take. For example, Sephardic Jews that speak Arabic and immigrated to Israel from Arab states will be considered ethnically “Jewish”. In other words, the dichotomy presented throughout this analysis is centered upon those Israelis who identify as “Jewish” in some regard, and those Israeli or Palestinian Arabs who do not identify as Jewish at all.

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This proposal assesses the fitness of consociationalism to address Israel’s deeply divided society. Below, I begin with a detailed description of the theory of consociational democracy as developed by Arend Lijphart. Next, I present a contextual explanation of the historical roots of the JewishArab ethnic cleavage leading up to the present. I then investigate any past attempts that the state has made to adopt consociational practices, with a subsequent analysis of the successes and failures of these attempts. Finally, I prescribe certain elements of consociationalism to Israel and then suggest areas for

might therefore be thought of as a two-pronged approach: it attempts to quell social unrest or violence while simultaneously promoting political cooperation and effective policy-making. Lijphart (1977) stresses that consociationalism is an empirical, normative and ideal-type theory. The theory is empirical in the sense that it provides an explanation of the political stability that has been achieved by a small group of countries which struggle with deeply divided societies (Lijphart 1977). The theory is normative in that it provides an “example to plural societies elsewhere in the world” for how they might best address their

further discussion. This proposal concludes that Israel ought not attempt consociationalism with the occupied Palestinian territories, and that it should rather end its occupation of these territories altogether. It concludes further that the implementation of consociational elements is highly desirable to accommodate the large population of Arabs who reside within Israel’s undisputed borders.

divisions (Lijphart 1977, 47). It is an ideal-type theory in that, while it includes four fundamental elements, Lijphart (1977) maintains that all four elements need not be fully employed. Rather, consociationalism ought to be applied in different forms and to different degrees according to each plural society’s unique situation, “with caution and restraint” (Lijphart 1977, 44). Before progressing to an analysis of the current situation in Israel and its fittingness for the employment of consociationalism, I will define each of the four fundamental elements of consociational democracy as Lijphart describes them, and then explore the dimensions of each. The first element of consociational democracy, and the most important according to Lijphart, is the “grand

Defining Consociational Democratic Theory Consociationalism, or “power sharing”, became notable as a democratic political theory in the 1960s, although the political practices and structures associated with it can be observed since the early 20th century. Arend Lijphart (1977) is one of the foremost proponents of consociational theory, which he describes and defends in Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. The theory is designed to address political and social instability associated with deeply divided societies in which the population is segmented based on racial, ethnic, nationalist, linguistic or religious cleavages. Lijphart (1977) prescribes consociational democracy as a means of maintaining societal stability in situations of such divisions, where segmental hostility threatens to cause turmoil. Consociationalism

coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society” (1977, 25). This may be contrasted from the more common model of democracy “in which the leaders are divided into a government with bare majority support and a large opposition” (Lijphart 1977, 25). Lijphart (1977, 25) cites the British Parliament as the clearest example of the standard “adversarial” system of government leadership, and suggests that consociationalism demands the more “coalescent” model of the “grand coalition”. In the “British Model” of adversarial

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parliamentary parties, Lijphart (1977, 26) notes that we tend to see cooperative behavior between governing and opposing parties in accordance with William H. Riker’s “size principle” (Riker 1962). The “size principle” uses the assumptions of game theory to predict the cooperative outcome of a small group of people to be a “minimum winning coalition”: one in which cooperation between the smallest possible number of parties, and absolutely no more than this, will exist in order to achieve a given goal (Lijphart 1977, 26; Riker 1962). Lijphart (1977, 26) adds that a particularly illuminating aspect of the “government-

the system (Lijphart 1977). Decisions taken under the principle of consensus are therefore the objective of consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977). This objective, according to Lijphart, is why the grand coalition – as opposed to a minimum-winning coalition – is central to the consociational project (1977). Grand coalitions may take various institutional forms. Lijphart (1977, 31) stresses that the grand coalition is “not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the participation by the leaders of all significant segments in governing a plural society”.

versus-opposition” model of government, acting in accordance with the size principle, is the “zero-sum condition”. In other words, government-opposition models consider “only direct conflict between parties…and common advantages are ignored”; thus a situation in which one group’s gain is treated as another group’s loss (Lijphart 1977, 26). Due to this zero-sum condition, Lijphart (1977, 27) asserts that the government-opposition model functions most effectively for the governance of “homogenous societies with a high degree of consensus where common advantages are taken for granted”. One might say that governmental functioning in accordance with the size principle is only effective when politics are perceived as a “game”, as is the

Thus far, I have discussed them in the context of simultaneously involving all segments in government decision-making. However, this simultaneity is not absolutely necessary: “diachronic” grand coalitions employ a system in which government power alternates between all societal segments based on pre-arranged term limits (Lijphart 1977, 30). Grand coalitions can also exist at different levels of government. The prototypal mode is the “grand coalition cabinet”, where the cabinet is composed of members that represent all significant segments of society, but grand coalitions can and do also exist in organs such as government advisory councils or committees (Lijphart 1977, 32). Though grand coalition cabinets fit most easily into parliamentary

case for homogenous societies (Lijphart 1977, 27). Plural societies of all kinds clearly fall outside of this description. In particular, however, deeply divided societies on the brink of significant conflict often have too much at stake for the zero-sum style governmentopposition democratic model to be conducive to peace (Lijphart 1977). Rather, government decisionmaking must be conducted with careful attention to the objectives of all groups involved, and taken in such a way that one group’s gain does not come at the cost of the total resignation of another group from

systems, Lijphart (1977) asserts that grand coalitions can be molded to fit any type of political regime: from parliamentary to presidential systems, and from republics to monarchies. The second element of consociational democracy is the instrument of “mutual veto”, also referred to as the “minority veto” or “concurrent majority” (Lijphart 1977, 36). Lijphart (1977) explains that this instrument is designed to address the lack of absolute protection granted to minority segments by the grand coalition. Indeed, though the grand coalition model

The Case for Consociational Democracy in Israel

has consensus as its objective, pressing government decisions must be made and this may at times warrant majority voting. If decisions made by such majority voting affect the “vital interests of the minority segment”, this could endanger political stability (Lijphart 1977, 36). Therefore, the minority veto provides each segment of the consociational system with a “complete guarantee of political protection” that is not present in the grand coalition principle alone (Lijphart 1977, 37). However, Lijphart (1977, 37) stresses that this is a mutual veto at the disposal of all segments involved, thus mitigating any risk of a

sharing and allowing for a proportional influence on decision-making by each segment. The fourth and final element of consociational democracy as described by Lijphart is “segmental autonomy” and federalism (1977, 41). Segmental autonomy entails the “rule by the minority [or segment] over itself in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern” (Lijphart 1977, 41). This principle is the “logical corollary” of the grand coalition principle, which states that, “on all matters of common interest, decisions should be made by all of the segments together” (Lijphart 1977, 41).

“minority tyranny” that can arise from the overuse of veto power. This caveat is based on the assumption that minority groups will desire to advance their own interests, rather than to exclusively block the objectives of other groups. The third element is “proportionality”, which is also designed to supplement the grand coalition principle (Lijphart 1977, 38). The function of proportionality is to provide a method of “allocating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources in the form of government subsidies among the different segments” (Lijphart 1977, 38). This might be juxtaposed to the governmentopposition model, in which the minimum winning coalition favors their respective segments through

While Lijphart (1977, 42) acknowledges the common objection against segmental autonomy – namely that it maintains or even strengthens segmental cleavages – he suggests that this is precisely his objective: the approach “is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy”. Lijphart (1977, 42) also points out that federalism, in which autonomy is granted to “constituent parts of the state”, may be regarded as a “special form of segmental autonomy”. Obviously, the application of federalism as a consociational element most often requires that “each segment is territorially concentrated and separated from the other segments… [when] segmental cleavages coincide with regional

“unrestrained majority rule” (Lijphart 1977, 39). The establishment of the principle of proportionality within a consociational democracy provides a “neutral and impartial standard of allocation” that the government will follow in its decision-making in order to avoid political issues related to claims of unjust favoritism toward certain segments (Lijphart 1977, 39). Further, the principle of proportionality may foster the adoption of a proportional scheme of representation in the grand coalition, thus alleviating potential contentions regarding the proper formula for power

cleavages” (Lijphart 1977, 42). However, there is also the possibility for “nonterritorial federalism”, in which every individual declares a nationality and each nationality is autonomous regarding its exclusive, internal affairs (Lijphart 1977, 43). This nonterritorial federalism can be of considerable use when a society’s segments are geographically dispersed, as is the case in the Netherlands (Lijphart 1977). Lijphart (1977, 46) openly admits that consociationalism may be “far from an abstract ideal” model of democracy. However, as a practically

44 oriented political theorist, he asserts that it is “the best kind of democracy that can realistically be expected” of countries that struggle with deep divisions in the population and looming threats of violent turmoil (Lijphart 1977, 48). He argues that the liberal democratic ideals of “liberty, equality and fraternity” are not totally lost in consociational democracy, but are rather applied in the context of groups rather than individuals (Lijphart 1977, 48). He addresses those political scientists and theorists who accuse consociationalism of reinforcing deep divisions in a plural society through instruments such as segmental

grand coalitions and mutual vetoes (Lijphart 1977). In addition to his defense of the theory, Lijphart (1977) suggests that the benefits and costs of adopting consociationalism must be weighed against each other for the individual cases of each deeply divided society. While it may be an unpopular position among contemporary political theorists, he states that, “partition [or secession] is worthy of consideration as a serious possibility” when the risks of bringing “disparate communities within the framework of a single government” under the consociational model appear to be too formidable (Lijphart 1977, 46-47).

autonomy, and urges them instead to accept “the plural divisions as the basic building blocks for a stable democratic regime” (Lijphart 1977, 45). Lijphart (1977) also considers practical objections to consociationalism, which include complaints of inefficiency at every level of government decisionmaking and administration that can be caused by the four fundamental elements of the theory. He dismisses issues of administrative and financial inefficiency as “relatively minor” costs to incur in the pursuit of peace and stability, though he does believe the risk of “immobilism” in government decision-making is more serious (Lijphart 1977, 51). He attempts to mitigate this concern by pointing out that while governmentopposition democratic models may be more effective

The Modern History of Israel’s Ethnic Division

with regards to decision-making in the short-term, the obvious segmental antagonisms that this model would cause “lead to a breakdown” in the long-term (Lijphart 1977, 51). While consociational decisionmaking may be “slow and ponderous in the short run”, it “has a greater chance to produce effective decisions over time, particularly if the leaders learn to apply the mutual veto with moderation” (Lijphart 1977, 51-52). He points to examples of European consociational democracies, such as Switzerland, to show that deadlock is by no means inevitable as a result of

Before discussing the past, present and future possibilities for consociationalism in Israel, I will provide a brief overview of the history of the state, in order to explain the roots of the deep societal division that is observed today. While religious tension between Jews and Muslims may play an important role in shaping Israel’s modern divisions, this proposal focuses on the contemporary ethnic conflict between Jews and Arabs that primarily concerns territory and rights disputes. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, the British Mandate for Palestine was established in the region now known as Israel (Mansfield 2003). While the population mostly consisted of Arabs at the time of the Mandate’s establishment, there came to be a massive influx of Jewish immigration from Europe to the region, particularly after World War II in response to the atrocities of the Holocaust (Mansfield 2003). In light of the Arab-Jewish tensions that began to arise, the 1947 United Nations partition plan proposed a geographical division of the region between Jewish and Arab territories (Mansfield 2003). While this plan was passed by the UN General Assembly and accepted by the Jewish leadership, the Arab leadership

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rejected it on the grounds that it allegedly violated the principle of national self-determination (Hadawi 1990; Mansfield 2003). Moreover, the Arab League resolved to militarily support Palestinians against this “aggression” and to act “without mercy” toward a State of Israel; although the apparent Arab unity was largely motivated by each state’s own territorial ambitions regarding Palestine (Mansfield 2003; Morris 2008, 67-72; Schulze 1999). Subsequently, on May 14, 1948, Israel declared its independence as a state (Hadawi 1990; Mansfield 2003; Schulze 1999). This rallied the surrounding Arab countries into conflict

1967; Mansfield 2003, 304-305). In response to the Six-Day War, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 242 in November 1967, which referred to the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and demanded that Israel withdraw its armed forces from the occupied territories (United Nations Security Council 1967, 8). Resolution 242 also demanded “respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area” (United Nations Security Council 1967, 8). The content of this resolution elucidates the geopolitical conundrum in the

with the newly formed State of Israel and ignited the 1948 Arab-Israeli War or Palestine War (Hadawi 1990; Mansfield 2003; Schulze 1999).1 The 1948 ArabIsraeli War ended with Israel retaining its originally expected territory, in addition to much of the area that would have been left to the Palestinian-Arabs under the UN partition plan (Mansfield 2003; Schulze 1999). This war also resulted in Transjordan and Egypt’s annexations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively, as these areas were the only PalestinianArab regions left out of Israeli control after the fighting ceased (Mansfield 2003; Schulze 1999).2 In 1964, the Palestinian National Covenant established the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a quasi-governing body in the Arab-

region: the Arab states would not recognize the State of Israel until it ended its occupation of the Palestinian territories, and Israel refused to end its occupation without recognition from its neighbors (Mansfield 2003). Despite this heavy tension, the PLO continued to operate for Arab-Palestinian interests in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which eventually led to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 between the PLO and the State of Israel (Kurtzer and Lasensky 2008; Mansfield 2003). The Oslo Accords attempted to maintain Israeli legitimacy as a sovereign Jewish democracy whilst establishing the right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination. The Accords began with the PLO’s recognition of the legitimacy of the State

controlled territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Mansfield 2003; Schulze 1999). However, after military aggression from both Egypt and Israel prompted the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights (Mansfield 2003). This regional occupation resulted in Israel’s Arab state neighbors proclaiming “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel”, and Gaza and the West Bank became known as the “occupied Palestinian territories” (OPTs) or the “Israeli-occupied territories” (Arab League

of Israel, and Israel’s recognition of the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian people (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993a). The Accords established the Palestinian Authority, which would exercise limited forms of Palestinian self-governance in the OPTs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993b). Since the Oslo Accords, there have been a multitude of security-related conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the OPTs (Kurtzer and Lasensky 2008; Mansfield 2003). While the

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Accords were intended as interim agreements while negotiations continued, new agreements have not been reached and the Palestinian Authority has existed in perpetuity (Kurtzer and Lasensky 2008). Issues that remain as sources of tension include the borders of Israel and Palestine, the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the autonomy of the Palestinian Authority in the OPTs and the status of Jerusalem (Kurtzer and Lasensky 2008; Mansfield 2003; Pappé 2006; Said 1999).3 As a result, more militant Palestinian interest organizations such as Hamas have gained prominence, which has complicated

with addressing the deep and volatile division between Jews and Arabs in Israel and the occupied territories, an analysis of Israel’s political arrangements regarding the current segmentation of these two groups is of particular importance. Within this segmentation, I make a distinction between Israel’s PalestinianArab population residing in the OPTs and the Arabs otherwise living within Israel. Before progressing to any prescriptions regarding this ethnic division, I will discuss Israel’s previous experiences with consociational institutions concerning other societal cleavages.

negotiations (Mansfield 2003; Mukhimer 2012).4 Additionally, there are internal tensions in Israel due to the massive Arab population living as citizens within its borders, outside of the OPTs. The PLO does not represent this Arab segment of Israel’s population, as its efforts have been focused almost entirely on negotiations regarding the OPTs (Ghanem 1998). Contemporary Israel is widely defined in scholarship as a “multi-cleavage society…often riven by tension” (Soen 2002, 98). Hazan (1999, 111) notes that four contemporary cleavages characterize Israel’s segmented society: (1) socio-economic segments, (2) Jews and Arabs, (3) secular and religious Jews, and (4) Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewish ethnic divisions. The former two involve the entire population while

Analyzing Israeli Institutions: Past and Present Pre- and immediately post-independence, Israel “can be said to have exemplified consociational mechanisms” that were comparable to classic European examples of consociational democracy such as Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands and Switzerland (Hazan 1999, 114). Hazan (1999) points out that the consociational attitude of compromise that is observable in the early days of the State of Israel can most likely be attributed to the practices that Jewish segments were forced to adopt prior to Israeli independence. As the “state institutions…lacked any sovereign powers…predominance by one camp could only be relative” (Hazan 1999, 115). Therefore post-independence, in recognition of the “dangers

the latter two exclusively concern the Jewish majority. Of the entire population of 8 million, 75 percent is Jewish and 25 percent is Arab (Central Intelligence Agency 2016). Soen (2002, 98) notes that the JewishArab cleavage is the “clearest diagnostic dichotomy”, as there seems to be no place in society for graduated degrees between the two: a person is identified as either Jewish or Arab. Indeed, the tension between the “majority national group” and the “minority national group” is a source of significant social conflict and violence. As I am primarily concerned

of separation” and “through compromise”, the elites of various cleavages showed “a commitment to the survival of the system”: a tendency that resembles Lijphart’s grand coalition far more than it does a “government-versus-opposition” attitude (Hazan 1999, 115; Lijphart 1977, 26). As consociational theorists, such as Lijphart, would predict, these mechanisms played a major role in cementing the social segmentation in Israel, while simultaneously bringing political stability to the country (Hazan 1999). The consociational

The Case for Consociational Democracy in Israel

accommodations dealt mainly with “religious-secular tensions” within the Jewish community – a conflict of “intensive ideological differences” – while generally ignoring the Arab minority (Hazan 1999, 110, 116). Nevertheless, the state’s early tendency toward consociational practices was promising. The first 18 years of Israeli independence generally featured government coalitions that, while not necessarily existing explicitly as “grand coalitions”, held the support of Members of the Knesset that greatly exceeded what Lijphart would define as a “minimum winning coalition” (Hazan 1999, 118; Lijphart

by a gradual movement towards majoritarianism in the Israeli government, as relations between the subcultures within the Jewish population have become increasingly stable: this corresponds to Lijphart’s prediction that increasingly amicable populations may tend towards “minimum winning coalition” models of government (Hazan 1999, 124; Lijphart 1977, 26). This majoritarianism is exemplified by policies such as the 1992 “Basic Law: The Government”, which established the direct election of the Israeli Prime Minister by the population at-large, along with the stipulation that the Prime Minister may be

1977, 26). During the same period, the mutual veto mechanism was also observable through the implicit “status quo agreement”, which gave parties “veto power to block any changes in the existing framework [of policies] that involved vital sub-cultural interests” (Hazan 1999, 118). Proportionality in representation, appointment of public positions and the allocation of funding to Jewish sub-cultures were present in the Israeli system, and segmental autonomy was granted to Jewish religious sub-cultures in terms of the establishment of distinct education systems and courts (Hazan 1999). Indeed, Lijphart (1977, 129) noted that these consociational institutions in Israel were so strongly evident that the state deserved the status of a “semi-consociational” democracy with regards to its

removed by a simple majority vote in the Knesset (Hazan 1999, 127). While I do not presently discuss the abstract merits of majoritarianism versus consensualism in democracies, I treat this shift as a success for the practical aim of consociationalism in Israel: it peacefully brought deeply divided segments of a society under a single, stable government. Additionally, I note that other factors, such as geopolitical and cultural isolation from its Arab state neighbors, are likely to have been major contributors to the development of Israel’s internal political stability among Jewish factions (Hazan 1999). As this proposal has established, however, the consociationalism historically displayed by Israel can only be applied to political and social arrangements

accommodation of various Jewish factions. Hazan (1999) attributes the decline of consociationalism in Israel to its success: over the two decades in which its mechanisms were explicitly and implicitly employed, a relatively strong Israeli state was formed. The subsequent period in Israeli politics may be characterized as “consensualism”, which is defined as a weaker version of consociationalism where there remains an emphasis on the dispersion and limitation of concentrated political power (Hazan 1999, 121). This “consensualism” has been followed

within the country’s Jewish national majority. Hazan (1999) asserts that Israel’s status as a Jewish state has always disqualified it from the title of a consociational democracy with respect to its substantial Arab national minority. Indeed, the “definition of Israel as a Jewish state” creates “institutionalized control over the state and the party system by the Jewish majority”, thus securing a kind of built-in political primacy of the Jewish majority over the Arab minority (Hazan 1999, 111). I suggested earlier that, regardless of the historical exclusion of Arabs

48 in political decision-making, the past willingness of the Israeli elite to adopt consociational practices might serve as a positive indicator for the possibility of future consociational efforts with regards to the Arab population. An issue to be considered, then, is whether Israel can adopt genuinely consociational institutions for its Jewish and Arab segments without giving up its status as a Jewish state. I will return to this issue below. Dan Soen (2002, 98) describes contemporary Israel as a “bi-national society” not only because its Arab minority makes up roughly 25 percent of the total population, but also because the Arab segment is growing faster than the Jewish population. However, the lack of mutual accommodation between these two segments has been destructive from the perspective of either side, and it is reasonable to assume that the conflict will worsen as the proportionality of the population shifts. This deep cleavage is not conducive to the majoritarian direction that the Israeli government has taken in recent years, as evidenced by Lijphart’s analysis of the political pitfalls of “zero-sum” attitudes when governing divided groups (Lijphart 1977, 26). Rather, based on Lijphart’s theory, consociational democracy may be the best long-term option for the peaceful co-existence of Jews and Arabs in Israel. If consociationalism is not successfully adopted in some form, the State of Israel may experience heightened Jewish-Arab unrest, and deteriorate beyond any hope of societal unity. Before prescribing specific consociational practices, I will survey any traces of consociationalism that currently exist between the Jewish and Arab populations within Israel, or between Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). Despite the aforementioned consociational elements observed during Israel’s early independence, there was still “no meaningful power-sharing with the Arab community” (Dowty 1998, 172). While there has only very

recently been an independent, nation-wide Arab political party, Dowty (1998, 172) points out that there is still “no [effective] Arab negotiating partner” nor any “Arab leaders of national stature” involved in the bargaining that characterizes Israeli politics. While the “Joint List” party represents Arab interests in the Knesset and holds 19 percent of its seats, it has never been involved in a governing coalition and there is no formal necessity or informal practice of taking its interests into consideration during government decision-making (Dowty 1998). This exclusion of the Joint List party immediately eliminates any possible suggestion that there is some semblance of a grand coalition or mutual veto. Though the proportionality element of consociationalism is present in Israel’s electoral system, the fact that Arab interests are represented proportionally in the Knesset means very little without the existence of the former two consociational elements. Further, without any body by which Israeli Arabs can make independent decisions regarding their unique cultural or educational affairs, they cannot be said to have segmental autonomy (Dowty 1998). One might argue that the existence of the Palestinian Authority, with limited governing capabilities in the OPTs, counts as a kind of federalism. However, this claim ought to be rejected on the basis that the Palestinian Authority enjoys no true autonomy: their territories are constantly subject to Israeli military intervention and the building of Israeli Jewish settlements in the West Bank shows a disregard for any Palestinian territorial lines. Potential Consociational Solutions to the Conflict My first prescription deals specifically with the occupied Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank. Lijphart (1977) justifies consociationalism on the grounds that while it may not be ideal, it is often the most practical method by which peace can be achieved in a deeply divided society. Along similar

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics lines of practicality, he admits that one or more segments’ secession from the state may in certain circumstances be more conducive to peace than invoking consociational democracy. The UN General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, and the Israeli High Court of Justice all consider the situation in the OPTs to be an illegal occupation by Israel (Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel and Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank 2004; International Court of Justice 2004; United Nations General Assembly 2011). For this reason, “secession” of the OPTs is an inappropriate term, as this would imply that these areas are acknowledged as territories of the Israeli state. However, regardless of the legal perspective on the situation, the possibility for Palestinian independence is captured in Lijphart’s suggestion that “secession” may in some cases be the most desirable option (Lijphart 1977). I therefore advise that Israel end its occupation of the Palestinian territories and allow them full independence. Palestinian independence is an explicit goal of the PLO, and the beginnings of achieving this goal have been visible in the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the OPTs. Indeed, when Israel and the PLO are engaged in negotiations, it bears a closer semblance to discussion between two sovereign states than to a government and a representative organization for one of its population segments. Any attempt to draw the PLO or Palestinian Authority into a consociational Israeli government structure would likely appear to be a setback for Palestinian interests. Therefore, based on past progress, and on the continuing goals of independence for the Palestinian leadership, it seems highly unlikely that any type of consociational system would be acceptable to the Palestinians. Even if the Palestinians were to accept some sort of federal arrangement, it would undoubtedly

include a stipulation demanding that the State of Israel relinquish its official Jewish status in order to accommodate the Arab population. This stipulation would be unacceptable to many if not most Jews, especially the Zionists who view Jewish state religion as a central existential objective of the State of Israel. These factors make any bi-national government agreement appear undesirable in some important respect from both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, and therefore the possibility for such an arrangement seems highly unlikely at the present time. Perhaps, if Israel’s population proportionality continues to shift in accordance with observed trends, the possibility for a federal arrangement with the OPTs will grow significantly. However, my prescription for ending Israel’s presence in the OPTs aims to achieve a more plausible and acceptable solution to the conflict as it is currently manifested. An end to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories would include its recognition of Palestine’s territorial and legislative sovereignty over the Gaza Strip and areas of the West Bank. This recognition would require the drawing of distinct borders. It would also likely include some type of allowance by which Palestinians could travel between these two territories, through Israel. Taking an external point of view, evidence shows that this “two-state” solution is strongly favored by the international community (Thomas 2005, 53). This favorability would be particularly helpful for Israel’s regional relations. For example, Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has been active in pushing for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine (Thomas 2005). Recall that, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 242, many Arab states consider an end to the Israeli occupation as a minimum requirement for recognizing the state’s legitimacy. Allowing full independence for the Palestinian territories would therefore most likely

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serve to ease the tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which would in turn reduce the general security concerns and volatility associated with the Jewish-Arab ethnic cleavage that would remain in Israel. My second prescription strongly favors the implementation of consociational mechanisms in the Israeli government, which are designed to accommodate the relatively large and increasing Arab population in the country (not including the OPTs). Once the threats of conflict associated with the OPTs are addressed through an organized end to Israel’s presence in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel would be left with comparatively less extreme internal competing interests. Yet evidence shows that a large portion of Arabs would remain in Israel if Palestine were to obtain total independence, in which case the State of Israel would continue to contend with significant societal division (Dowty 1998). While Israel’s Arab citizens enjoy the formal rights guaranteed by the state, there is informal but clear preferential treatment toward Jews. This preference manifests in various ways: Jewish control over the education system, the dominance of the Modern Hebrew language, and the consistent Jewish monopoly over government policy-making are examples (Dowty 1998). The “Law of Return” also gives Jews a distinct advantage in terms of immigration allowances (Dowty 1998, 174). Perhaps the most obvious example of preferential treatment is in Israel’s state religion: critics of Israeli democracy from both the Jewish and Arab sides of the debate recognize the conflict between Israel’s status as simultaneously a democracy and a Jewish state (Dowty 1998).5 The preferential attitude associated with these factors leads to arguments claiming that Arabs are “second-class” citizens in Israel, at times even contributing to an analogy of apartheid (Said 1999).

It seems that many dimensions of this conflict could be institutionally addressed in a way that satisfies both the Jewish and Arab nationalities by adopting a grand coalition and segmental autonomy. The grand coalition could be most effectively adopted in the Israeli governmental cabinet, by formally mandating that a certain number of Joint List party members – or members of any future party that explicitly represents Arab interests – must sit on the cabinet each term. The specific minimum number of Arab representatives could be determined each term by means of population proportionality: another foundational element of consociationalism. This would allow Arabs to feel that their interests are being substantially represented in policy-making. I note that a proportionally divided grand coalition model was implemented in neighboring Lebanon as part of its consociational government. However, Lebanon’s consociational system has largely been considered a failure as a solution to its societal division (Salamey 2009). Commentators note that this failure is the result of Lebanon’s “corporate” style of consociationalism, in which the salient power sharing groups and their precise influence are pre-determined in the institutional agreement (Salamey 2009, 84). Since corporate consociationalism does not allow the power sharing dynamics to change proportionally with the electorate, it is often considered to be a short-term solution, and ineffective in reducing political sectarianism within a divided society in the long run (Salamey 2009). In light of this observation from Israel’s neighbor, I have recommended a more liberal consociational model for Israel, in which the proportionality of the grand coalition is re-determined with each electoral term. Segmental autonomy could be granted to Israeli Arabs by allowing members of the population segment to administer their own education system and organize

The Case for Consociational Democracy in Israel their cultural affairs through independently elected bodies, as well as by allocating resources for these programs on a proportional basis. This prescription assumes that the Arab population would have the ability to choose whether or not to administer their own independent community institutions. As Lijphart (1977) noted, political stability can sometimes come as a result of embracing divisions rather than trying to bridge them through institutions such as common public education. The Jewish population ought to accept Arab autonomy in these matters, as they are of an exclusively Arab concern. Recall that similar structures were put into place to deal with different religious segments within the Jewish majority, so these measures are not unfamiliar to the country. Other concessions that might be made include “an explicit recognition of Israeli Arabs as a national minority with rights as a group…[in] an act of the Knesset”, as well as “making state symbols and practices more inclusive” (Dowty 1998, 176-177). One example of the latter type of concession would be the creation of “Israeli” holidays that “draw in both communities”, rather than only celebrating official Jewish holidays (Dowty 1998, 176-177). Perhaps the founding of an Arabic language university would also have a positive impact. Government policies could address transitional issues by normalizing security arrangements and practices in Israel: drawing back on the public military presence and ensuring that the police force has roughly proportional Arab representation are examples of how this might be executed. One might also expect the normalization of security measures to occur more fluidly after the occupation of the Palestinian territories has ended. Another transitional government policy might involve temporarily outlawing certain contentious cultural or religious demonstrations in public spaces.

These trust-building policies and institutional adjustments would perhaps address the discomfort of Israeli Arabs with what one might call an implicit status as second-class citizens in Israel’s ethnic democracy. These adjustments would also be unlikely to draw significant protest from the Jewish national majority, as ultimately Israeli Jews would see relatively little significant change to their livelihoods as a result. It is important to note that I do not recommend the adoption of a mutual veto mechanism, as this would bring with it the risk of gridlock in the policy approval and implementation cycle. As the possibility for government gridlock might risk the loss of Jewish support for consociational accommodations for Arabs, it is more advisable to focus on fostering a natural feeling that the Arab perspective is an important one in Israeli society. Dowty (1998, 177) contends that the implementation of some form of grand coalition would be the most important factor, as “nothing else would provide as clear an…extension of Israeli power-sharing to the Arab community”. Overall, these prescriptions may serve to reduce the distrust that exists between Israeli Jews and Arabs in the long-term while maintaining the distinctness of each community within the broader society: a fundamental goal of consociationalism. It may not solve all of the problems that arise when a nationstate’s population includes a significant national minority, but it would serve to normalize the situation and move away from a deep division that could otherwise prove to shake the state’s foundations. Finally, to return to an aforementioned issue, I don't include a recommendation that Israel relinquish its status as Jewish ethnic democracy as part of its adoption of consociationalism. I withhold from this recommendation on the grounds that it simply seems to be an unacceptable compromise from the point of view of the Jewish majority. This claim should

52 not be taken to suggest that there is no fundamental contradiction between state religion and the core values of liberal democracies. However, in keeping consistent with Lijphart’s practical attitude, this proposal does not make any recommendation that would seriously jeopardize the prospect of agreement between the salient groups. Furthermore, this proposal has been concerned from the outset with ethnic, not religious issues. Though the difference in this case is subtle, it elucidates the fact that Israel’s state religion is of somewhat less concern, from an ethnic Arab perspective, relative to other potential policy changes. Indeed, I have prescribed several suggestions that are

Bank, as well as the greater effectiveness by which this solution would allow the Palestinian territories to economically develop (Said 1999). While intriguing, these geopolitical and economic possibilities concerning federalism fall beyond the scope of this proposal’s present analysis and my pragmatic suggestions that are based on the apparent likelihood of success. Another question that warrants further research is the practical extent to which specific Jewish and Arab political parties would be willing to agree to the sorts of institutions described in this proposal. The extreme parties from both segments, in particular,

specifically designed to alleviate the feeling among Arabs that they are second-class citizens in Israel. While the presence of state religion may not be ideal for all ethnic groups involved, there is no reason to argue that the presence of this factor precludes the possibility for the implementation of genuine consociational institutions in the pursuit of political stability.

may stand to benefit more from strengthening their bases through conflict than through peace. It seems natural that identity politics and the politics of fear at the level of political parties and interest groups would present significant obstacles for the implementation of consociationalism in Israel. Furthermore, I briefly suggested that one cause for cohesiveness within Israel’s segmented Jewish population may be the feeling of isolation experienced relative to its Arab neighbors. If Jewish-Arab relations in the country and the surrounding region were to improve, one might speculate that this would be correlated with strengthening factions within the Jewish population, as was the case during early Israeli independence. Conclusion

Areas for Further Discussion There are several scenarios and possibilities that have not been discussed in this proposal, as my aim has been to suggest several, but not all, plausible methods by which consociational institutions could be adopted to aid in alleviating Israel’s Jewish-Arab ethnic division. I have not discussed the intricacies that would be involved with a federal agreement between Israel and the OPTs, on the grounds that such an agreement would be extremely difficult to reach in the first place. However it is worth noting that some commentators suggest that some form of bi-national federalism may genuinely be the most desirable option for both Israeli and Palestinian interests. Such suggestions take into account the political and social difficulty that would be involved with re-drawing borders in light of the Israeli settlements in the West

In sum, I began with a detailed explanation of consociational democratic theory as defended by Arend Lijphart. Next, I gave an account of the history of Israel’s deeply divided society, in order to provide the appropriate context for the conflict between Jews and Arabs that is observable today. I then conducted a survey of any past consociational practices in Israel, followed by an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these practices. Finally, I used Lijphart’s theory to make various

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics recommendations for Israel’s situation. The first recommendation was to end Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, as there is little likelihood that any mode of consociational democracy or federalism would be considered acceptable by both the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership. The second recommendation was in favor of implementing a grand coalition and segmental autonomy in order to accommodate the Arabs that would continue to reside in Israel after the OPTs become totally independent. This recommendation did not include a mutual veto mechanism, but it did include additional policy suggestions regarding transitional issues during the adoption of consociationalism. I conclude with the hopeful sentiment that Lijphart’s theory may provide a sound recommendation for addressing a deeply divided society that is of urgent concern in global politics. Notes 1 There appears to be some disagreement regarding whether Zionists originally declared the territory of the State of Israel in excess of that allotted by the partition plan. Schulze (1999, 12) claims that “on May 14, 1948, the [Zionists] declared the territory allotted to the Jews as the new state of Israel”. Hawadi (1990) implies that, on the same date, Israel proclaimed its territory in excess of the originally planned borders. 2 It is generally accepted that the surrounding Arab states of Transjordan and Egypt were primarily motivated in this action by the prospect of territorial expansion, as opposed to defending a Palestinian state (Schulze 1999). 3 The eastern side of Jerusalem is located in the West Bank. 4 Hamas has controlled Gaza since 2007 (Mukhimer 2012). 5 Some commentators classify Israel into a sparse category of nation-states: the “ethic democracy” (Dowty 1998, 173).

References Arab League. 1967. Khartoum Resolution, September 1. http://www.cfr.org/world/khartoumresolution/p14841 (Accessed March 17, 2016). Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel and Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank. 2004. 2056/04 High Court of Justice. http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf (Accessed November 20, 2016). Central Intelligence Agency. 2007. “Middle East: Israel.” The World Factbook. March 7. https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/is.html (Accessed March 17, 2016). Dowty, Alan. 1998. “Consociationalism and Ethnic Democracy: Israeli Arabs in Comparative Perspective.” Israel Affairs 5(2-3):169-182. Ghanem, As’ad. 1998. “State and Minority in Israel: The Case of Ethnic State and the Predicament of its Minority.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21 (3): 428-448. Hadawi, Sami. 1990. Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine. New York: Olive Branch Press. Hazan, Reuven Y. 1999. “Religion and Politics in Israel: The Rise and Fall of the Consociational Model.” Israel Affairs 6 (2): 109-137. International Court of Justice. 2004. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion. Press Release 2004/28. http://www. icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71&code=m wp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6 (Accessed January 2, 2017).

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Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1993. IsraelPalestine Liberation Organization Mutual Recognition, Letters and Speeches, September 10. http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/ MFADocuments/Yearbook9/Pages/107%20 Israel-PLO%20Mutual%20Recognition-%20 Letters%20and%20Spe.aspx (Accessed November 20, 2016). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1993. IsraeliPalestinian Interim Agreement, September 13. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/ peace/guide/pages/the%20israelipalestinian%20interim%20agreement.aspx (Accessed November 20, 2016)/ Kurtzer, Daniel C., and Scott B. Lasensky. 2008. Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT & London: Yale University Press. Mansfield, Peter. 2003. A History of the Middle East. London: Penguin Books. Morris, Benny. 2008. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mukhimer, Tariq. 2012. Hamas Rule in Gaza: Human Rights under Constraint. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pappé, Ilan. 2006. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Riker, William H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Said, Edward. 1999. “The One-State Solution.” The New York Times Magazine, January 10. http:// www.nytimes.com/1999/01/10/magazine/ the-one-state-solution.html?_r=0 (Accessed November 19, 2016). Salamey, Imad. 2009. “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options.” International Journal of Peace Studies 14 (2): 83-105. Schulze, Kirsten E. 1999. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Longman. Soen, Dan. 2002. “A Binational Society: The JewishArab Cleavage and Tolerance Education in the State of Israel.” Israel Affairs 9 (1-2): 97-120. Thomas, Holli. 2005. “Rethinking the Path to Peace: A Binational State for Palestinians and Israelis.” Arena Journal 23 (23): 53-75. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 66/78. 2012. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, A/RES/66/78. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=%20A/RES/66/78 (Accessed November 20, 2016). United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, S/RES/242 .1967. http://www.un.org/ en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ RES/242(1967) (AccessedNovember 20, 2016).

Between Pragmatism and Political Ideology: Changing South Korean Progressive Views on North Korea Allison Kim Georgetown University The South Korean political realm has often been characterized as one clearly divided into two ideological camps. Conservative and progressive parties have represented the right and left of the political spectrum respectively, with certain defining traits consistently characterizing their foreign policy platforms in particular, and their North Korea policy even more so. Mixed among these competing ideological values are, inter alia, anti-Communism, ethno-nationalism, and anti-Americanism. As these ideologies pertain to North Korea policy, adherence to certain value sets has shaped and colored the competing policies advocated by conservatives and progressives in issue areas ranging from Korean denuclearization to reunification, and from economic engagement to human rights discourse. By analyzing South Korean political discourse from 2009 to 2013, the years during which pragmatism was first practiced by the Blue House, this paper seeks to determine the degree to which first, an ideological â&#x20AC;&#x153;middle groundâ&#x20AC;? existed and second, pragmatism was adopted by South Koreans as their guide for North Korea policy. In general, while South Korean conservatives did not exhibit much change over time, progressives were found to have increasingly adopted pragmatic and moderate perspectives from 2009 to 2013. Introduction The South Korean polity has long wrestled with the question of how to manage its relations with North Korea. As two states separated unwillingly at the end of World War II, North and South both have danced cautiously in a relationship pulled on one side by an ethno-nationalist desire to reunify, and on the other by their competing claims to sovereignty over the peninsula in its entirety. Within South Korean political discourse, the question of how best to interact with North Korea has historically been highly divisive and the proffered answers have cut cleanly along party lines. Conservatives have emphasized the security threat posed by North Korea, preferring policy solutions that take a tougher military stance against the communist state. On the other hand, progressive parties have called for increased engagement with North Korea, who they identify primarily as ethnic brethren. These broad approaches to North Korea have colored conservative and progressive policy proposals

on issues ranging from humanitarian aid to security policy, and from economic policy to human rights. In recent years, however, this dichotomy seems to have blurred. Calls for a pragmatic approach to North Korea policy under the Lee Myung-bak presidency and an increasing number of moderates among South Korean voters pointed towards a possible middle ground between two previously distinct policy approaches towards North Korea. This research seeks to determine the degree to which such a middle ground between South Korean conservative and progressive views towards North Korea and North Korea policy existed under the Lee administrationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s years. Comparing the views of South Koreans as reflected in the language and topical focuses of opinion pieces and columns in the conservative Chosun Ilbo and the progressive Hankyoreh newspapers from 2009 to 2013, and through a review of polling data, this research seeks to determine to what degree political

56 ideology was replaced by pragmatism as a guide for North Korea policy among South Korean progressives and conservatives. In addressing this question, it is important to distinguish between pragmatism as an idealized approach and the “pragmatic” policy that was executed as Lee Myung-bak’s foreign policy – the pragmatic approach desired by many South Korean constituents may not have been reflected in Lee’s foreign policy. This research finds that progressive South Korean voters became more pragmatic and moderate both over time, and in relation to their conservative counterparts. South Korean progressives both explicitly accepted pragmatism as their policy of choice and expressed pragmatism as their ideology of choice through their policy preferences. In this way, progressives departed further from progressive political ideology than did their conservative counterparts and expressed approval for a wider range of policy views on North Korea than did conservatives. They also displayed greater flexibility in their policy stances and perspectives on North Korea, and thusly tended to respond more extremely to changing circumstances in inter-Korean relations. Thusly, South Koreans progressives were less ideologically polarized from conservatives than they had been previously when it comes to North Korea policy. “Pragmatic policy” as it was expressed under Lee Myung-bak, however, was more conservative-leaning than progressive. While this could be attributed in part to the pressures of far-right forces in Lee’s party, it is also likely that conservatism in pragmatic policy was the natural response to the state of interKorean relations in the late 2000’s and early 2010’s. If pragmatic policy is conceptualized as a realistic approach to foreign policy that prioritizes rationalism and national interest, then the South Korean national interest in those years was focused on securing

the nation from an increasingly aggressive and unstable northern neighbor. For conservatives, then, espousing a “pragmatic” policy perspective meant that realistically, little departure from conservative ideology was necessary. Perspectives on South Korean Political Polarization Political ideology, ideological and political polarization, and the state of South Korea’s political parties have been the subject of much scholarship on South Korea. Conclusions range along the spectrum, with some claiming that South Koreans are more polarized than ever before (Hahm 2007; Lee 2007; Shin and Burke 2008), while others point to a bell curve of moderates at the center of the political spectrum (Chae and Kim 2006; Lee 2015). Many of these perspectives, however, must be contextualized within the time period of their analysis, though the trends they note remain relevant to this discussion. From 1992 to 2007, the literature indicated that the South Korean political realm was clearly politically divided. Shin and Burke (2008), for example, analyzed pieces in The Chosun Ilbo and The Hankyoreh in the period from 1992 to 2003. In an analysis that covers the length of two progressive South Korean presidents, Shin and Burke (2008) discuss the rise and redefinition of Korean ethno-nationalism as a defining political ideology under progressive presidential leadership, at once leading to strengthened ties with the North and eventually provoking a conservative backlash. Shin and Burke’s (2008) study attests to the ideologically divisive nature of the North Korea question in a period when progressives were finally given a chance to pursue engagement-focused policy with North Korea. Hyun-chool Lee (2007) reaches a similar conclusion in a 2007 study that analyzes South Korean national survey data from 2002 and 2004. His piece points broadly to a number of cleavages in South Korean politics, and notably to the South Korean trend of

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

centralizing conservative views, a political move that uses anti-Communist sentiment to push left-leaning ideologies to the extreme end of the political spectrum. Based on data from 2004, Lee (2007) found that South Korean policy was moving in a more conservative direction even as the center was polarizing back into two distinct, ideologically opposed groups. In contrast to Lee’s (2007) analysis, Hahm’s (2007) research on the U.S.-ROK alliance reports the rise of progressives throughout the 2000’s, found mostly among the younger generation of voters, and states that what was once the “leftist fringes” of South Korean political ideology had come to constitute the

for inter-Korean reconciliation efforts and in their support for engagement policies. Notably, the authors state that while progressive views were found to be less ideologically polarized than expected, surveyed conservative views were consistent with the expected characterization (Chae and Kim 2008). Jae Mook Lee (2015) reached a similar conclusion in a piece published in 2015 that analyzes why political polarization in South Korea is perceived as more acute than it actually is. In his own analysis of survey data collected by the Korea Social Science Data Center in 2012, Lee (2015) found that moderates continued to comprise the largest segment of the South

mainstream. The leftward movement of the South Korean political spectrum began with the election of Kim Dae-jung, and in Hahm’s (2007) view, became the majority opinion under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. While Hahm’s (2007) conclusion differs from Lee’s (2007), together their analyses point to clearly divided political identities between left and right in South Korean politics from the early 2000’s to 2007. However, more recent scholarship has noted that in the late 2000’s and early 2010’s, these political divisions became less distinct. Using survey data collected by Gallup Korea in 2007, Chae and Kim (2008) conducted a cluster analysis to measure the

Korean public. Lee (2015) also found that the views of voters who identified with the conservative Saenuri Party tended to fall in a range between moderate and very conservative, while voters who identified with the progressive Democratic Party were mostly moderate, with more trending towards conservative views than extreme progressive views. Conservative South Koreans were found once more to hold more strictly to the conservative line, while progressive South Korean views fell along a broader spectrum, and were more likely to be moderate. The above studies reveal two important trends in the South Korean political realm. First, that since the early 2000’s, South Korean voters have become

degree to which the South Korean public’s foreign policy views were ideologically polarized. Among their findings, the study notes that South Korean progressives held a more pragmatic and centrist view than was often assumed, and that the South Korean public as a whole was much more moderate than other studies had previously claimed. The survey data revealed that progressives and conservatives were united in their concerns over North Korea as a security threat and North Korean human rights abuses, and that progressives only differed in their heightened support

more moderate. Second, that while South Korean conservatives have consistently retained rather conservative views on foreign policy, progressives have increasingly adopted a wider range of policy perspectives. South Korean progressives are comprising a larger portion of moderates and are adopting more conservative perspectives than they have before, at least when it comes to North Korea policy.

Kim

Political Identities in South Korea Today Recent polling data and analyses seem to support the notion that these trends persist in South Korea presently, in the years after Lee Myungbak’s administration. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies has produced several reports that summarize recent public opinion polling data on South Korean views on foreign policy, collected through their Asan Daily Polls. Of particular relevance are the reports entitled “South Korean Attitudes towards North Korea and Reunification” (Kim, Friedhoff, Chungku, and Euicheol 2014) and “South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2015” (The Asan Institute for Policy Studies 2015). These polls provide insight into South Korean views on particular policy proposals relating to North Korea, as well as into South Korean attitudes towards the North and its leadership. While the reports do not indicate party allegiances among its participants, they do differentiate by age group on certain questions and still provide important information on where large subsections of the South Korean population stand on these issues. Firstly, both polls seem to support the notion that South Koreans as a whole are becoming more moderate in their North Korea policy preferences. Rather than seeing a consistent split among South Koreans in their support for more conservative or progressive policy approaches - such a split perhaps indicating where an ideologically-driven or partydrawn line might exist - the data shows that a significant majority of South Koreans support a range of policies that would be included in both securityfocused conservative agendas, and engagementfocused progressive agendas. For example, in both the 2014 and 2015 studies, polling data found that a significant majority of South Koreans recognized the necessity of an inter-Korean summit, a call for increased dialogue and engagement

with the North. In 2014, over 80% of South Koreans supported such a summit (Kim, Friedhoff, Chungku, and Euicheol 2014), and the percentage remained over 80% in 2015. Across demographic groups surveyed in 2015, the lowest support for a summit came from those in their 30’s and 60’s (78.4% support and 75.1% respectively) – still indicating very high levels of support. At the same time, the majority of South Koreans also objected to the policy of resuming economic aid to North Korea, with 67.8% of South Koreans in opposition. Within that group, the Asan Institute indicated that “there is very little variation among age cohorts” and that “[while] there is some variation among political ideologies, even a majority (55.1%) of those who identify as progressive oppose the resumption of economic aid. Among self-identified conservatives, that number is 77.0 percent” (Kim, Friedhoff, Chungku, and Euicheol 2014, 26). The latter observation also points towards the second trend noted previously, which is that conservative policies are becoming more popular among erstwhile progressives in South Korea and that progressives are adopting increasingly moderate and even conservative views. Of particular interest is the rise of new policy preference trends among the “post386” generation,1 the youngest group of politically engaged South Koreans. Many recent studies on this demographic have pointed to both a general apathy towards politics in the post-386 generation, and to increasingly conservative security policy views among those that do engage with politics. Studies from the Asan Institute have noted that young South Korean are identifying as “security conservatives” while otherwise left-leaning, feel less ethnically bound to North Korea, and are generally less interested in reunification (Kim 2014). While the majority still supports reunification, those South Koreans in their 20’s are the least willing to pay taxes to offset the

Between Pragmatism and Political Ideology costs of reunification, with only 34.5% in favor of a unification tax as opposed to the 54.3% and 63.8% of the 40’s and 50’s aged cohorts respectively (Kim, Friedhoff, Chungku, and Euicheol 2014). The desire for a pragmatic North Korea policy policy that is not driven by ideology or nationalism, but purely by national self-interest - can be seen as the reasonable result of these two trends. For the growing cohort of South Korean moderates, pragmatism replaces the two ideological poles, right and left, while also selectively adopting policies from both ends. As a result, pragmatism would be favored among moderates because it is seen as a “middle ground” between the ideological divide of the early 2000’s. Pragmatism also offers a new approach to North Korea that it is not limited by the ideologies of either left or right, of either ethno-nationalism or anti-Communism, and instead has no guiding political ideology. At most, its guiding philosophy could be seen as a realist and rational strategy that seeks to keep South Korea secure while coaxing the North towards peaceful reunification. For the purpose of this analysis, we will define “pragmatic” foreign policy as that which includes a wide range of policy proposals in the pursuit of a nation’s interests, including those that have previously been associated with the extremes of conservative and progressive thinking. The expression of pragmatic policy would thusly cover a wide range of policy and be flexible in its responses to changing circumstances on the Korean peninsula.

candidate had won and peacefully maintained office since the republic’s establishment (Oh and Arrington 2007). Kim and his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, were particularly noted for implementing the Sunshine Policy – a most significant North Korea engagementfocused policy initiative implemented by South Korea. This power transition allowed South Korea to fully implement progressive foreign policy approaches for the first time, which worked to improve relations with the North. Engagement policies seemed initially successful, yielding landmark meetings between North and South

Korean leadership in 2000 and 2007, as well as the opening of the Six Party Talks. Nationalist pride was resurgent as the South Korean public grew weary of its dependent relationship with the United States and as South Korea’s international and economic standing grew. This period also saw new heights for anti-American sentiment in South Korea, particularly after George W. Bush denounced North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” in 2001 and after the Yangju highway tank incident killed two South Korean school girls in 2002 (Oh and Arrington 2007). This national confidence emboldened the Roh administration in particular, allowing Roh – who had run for the presidency on an anti-American platform - to pursue ambitious policies such as his administration’s 2007 request to transfer wartime operational control of the Korean military from the American-led Combined Forces Command to the ROK Armed Forces (Su 2012). The Emergence of “Pragmatic” North Korea Policy Under Roh, approval for progressive policies hit its peak and declined. Roh himself faced constant The concept of a “pragmatic” North Korea policy criticism from conservative political factions and was dates back to the 2008 election of President Lee Myung-bak. The election came at the heels of a series impeached for illegal electioneering, a scandal that precipitated the collapse of his political faction and of progressive administrations, with Kim Dae-jung’s marked the resurgence of conservative forces. In the election in 1998 being the first time a progressive 2008 presidential election, Lee Myung-bak recaptured

60 the Blue House for the Saenuri Party, running against the more conservative, hawkish Lee Hoi-chang and the mainstream progressive Chung Dong-young. In his foreign policy platform, Lee Myung-bak placed himself in between these two candidates and advertised a “pragmatic” foreign policy. This stance involved reengagement with the United States and conditional engagement with North Korea – a middle ground in between Lee Hoi-chang’s promise of hardline North Korea policy and Chung’s insistence on maintaining the Sunshine Policy (Chae and Kim 2008; Snyder 2009). With 49 percent of the vote, Lee Myung-bak won

on inter-Korean agreements, increasingly aggressive military posturing from North Korea in the years around Kim Jong-il’s death, and the North Korean leadership transition meant that South Korean foreign policy required a “pragmatic” means of addressing North Korea as a military threat first and foremost – in other words, pragmatic policy was formed within a framework of inter-Korean relations that favored conservative policies over progressive ones. In these years, conservative voters could have accepted a supposedly pragmatic foreign policy without having to change their fundamental views on North Korea, while progressives that adopted

a surprisingly overwhelming victory, particularly as a conservative candidate in a time when only 36 percent of Koreans identified as conservatives and 64 percent as progressives (Chae and Kim 2008). Though his victory can in large part be attributed to the strength of his economic policy platform, Chae and Kim (2008) argue that Lee’s victory can also be attributed to the appeal of his foreign policy platform. They propose that Lee was “the only major candidate who advocated a foreign policy in line with the majority of all South Koreans” and that his stance towards conditional engagement “strategically repositioned his party towards a more centrist and moderate stance” (Chae and Kim 2008, 92). While debate surrounding North Korea policy remained divided, Lee had clearly tapped into a new approach with broad appeal. In practice, however, Lee’s “pragmatic” foreign policy tended to lean towards a more conservative security policy. Events on the Korean peninsula from the late 2000’s to 2013 forced South Korea to deal primarily with high military tensions with and instability in North Korea, and ultimately led to a “cold period” in inter-Korean relations that left little room for the type of dialogue and engagement that typifies progressive policy. The breakdown of the Six Party Talks, the revelation of North Korean “cheating”

pragmatism would have needed to develop a more nuanced position towards North Korea. Chae and Kim (2008, 84) sum up this observation succinctly, stating: “The more nuanced picture reveals that progressives distinguish inter-Korean reconciliation (Sunshine Policy) from national security (North Korea threat). Progressives support national reconciliation between the two Koreas but take conservative positions on issues related to national security…progressives are able to parse the complexities of inter-Korean relations…” By reviewing opinion and column pieces in conservative and progressive newspapers from 2009 – at the start of Lee’s administration – to its end and the early months of Park Geun-hye’s presidency in 2013, this paper now seeks to determine the degree to which these trends and attitudes were reflected in the public debate surrounding North Korea policy during Lee’s presidency. At the start of Lee’s administration, despite his victory the debate remained contentious and relatively divided along party lines. The following analysis seeks to determine whether or not views on various aspects of North Korea policy remained ideologically divided between left and right, and to what degree conservatives and progressives embraced pragmatism as a new guiding political philosophy.

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

Methodology and Newspaper Perspectives Analysis In order to best analyze the shape of South Korean political discourse under Lee while using English-language resources, this research emulates Shin and Burke’s (2008) study. Their study analyzes op-eds and columns published in the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankyoreh Sinmun from 1992 to 2003, focusing on those articles related to North Korea. Shin and Burke (2008, 290) argued that “the news media often set the agenda for public discussion of key policy issues and that exposure to news can significantly influence public opinion on

This research performs a similar analysis on the opinion and column pieces published in the English editions of The Chosun Ilbo and The Hankyoreh from January 2009 to December 2013. Focusing on those articles related to North Korea and inter-Korean issues, this analysis reviewed 734 articles (459 from The Chosun Ilbo and 275 from The Hankyoreh), noting the “topics of focus” and the “author’s tone” in each article. The topics of focus were organized into six broad categories: 1) reunification and inter-Korean relations; 2) East Asian security issues; 3) humanitarian issues and projects; 4) North Korean human rights issues;

foreign policy issues". The authors used the two papers as proxies for South Korean conservative and progressive views. Their study measures the importance that each paper assigned to various foreign policy issues and the articles’ tones towards those issues (Shin and Burke 2008).

5) inter-Korean trade and economic issues; and 6) domestic North Korean news. A single article may have addressed more than one topic of focus. Identifying the topics of focus in each article indicates which issue areas were important to South Korean conservatives and progressives, and how

Kim

issue importance changed over time and in response to particular events. Regarding the “author’s tone”, Table 1 outlines the numeric spectrum. Articles that did not discuss one of the coded tone categories were coded “NA” and excluded from analysis of that tone category. The coding scheme for “author’s tone” serves to create a quantifiable comparison of broad tone changes in the two papers over the five year time period under analysis. Therefore, changes in the mathematic difference between the tone values and changes in the topic focuses of each paper would indicate either a convergence or divergence of the way these two papers presented issues relating to North

Korea, in the language used to assign agency to either North or South Korea, and in the changing emphasis on various topics over the years. When discussing the tone used to address North Korea, I refer broadly to the type of language that reflects attitudes towards or opinions of the North Korean regime, categorized in the second tone code in Table 1 as “Tone towards the DPRK Regime.” This category takes into account, inter alia, insults to the North Korean regime, language that compliments or legitimizes the regime, language that criticizes or holds the regime accountable for an act, language that infantilizes the regime, and language that calls for regime change. From 2009

Korea, and would measure which paper’s perspective changed most over time.

to 2013, there was a general souring of progressive perceptions of North Korea, with particularly negative language emerging after the Yeonpyeongdo shelling in late 20102 and North Korea’s closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in 2013.3 This trend is reflected in Figure 1, in the average positivity expressed towards North Korea in The Hankyoreh articles each year.

Results Following the article review, several trends came to light. See the Appendix for charts containing all of the data used. Firstly, there were notable changes in the way pieces in The Hankyoreh addressed and framed their arguments regarding North Korea during the reviewed time period. This manifested in several ways – in the overall tone used to address North

Notably, the increasingly negative language used to describe North Korea after the Yeonpyeongdo shelling in late 2010. Language before 2010 is largely

Figure 1: Tone Regarding DPRK Regime in Hankyoreh Articles

Between Pragmatism and Political Ideology

neutral towards North Korea, while highly critical of the South Korean government for its failure to improve inter-Korean relations. The North Korean regime is generally framed as a legitimate state actor, which is at times criticized or chided for its policy decisions but is never delegitimized. Even when criticism is levied at the regime, it is never as aggressive as language one might see concurrently in an article about the same topic in The Chosun Ilbo. A telling quote comes from one of the preYeonpyeongdo articles most critical of North Korea, published in September 2009 after the Imjin River tragedy,4 which reads, “Even though six South Korean

some criticism of North Korea or North Korean actions, and remind the reader to blame the South Korean government for contributing to the situation at hand as well. Before 2010, these caveats were always highly critical of the South Korean government and assigned the government significant responsibility for the poor state of inter-Korean relations. After 2010, however, this began to change. After the Yeonpyeongdo shelling, articles in The Hankyoreh began articulating direct criticisms of the North Korean regime, and assigning much more responsibility and agency to the North Korean regime for harming inter-Korean relations. Quotes from an

citizens ultimately lost their lives, North Korea has not yet expressed an apology or regret. Looking beyond whether North Korea violated international agreements or existing practice, its failure to make reference to the human losses is worth criticizing from a humanitarian perspective” (The Hankyoreh 2009). While relatively negative, this statement simply states that an act of the regime is “worth criticizing,” while making no such direct criticism itself. Further, the article later states: Also deeply problematic is how the [South Korean] government appears to be trying to avoid its own responsibility by taking advantage of North Korea’s ‘water attack.’ South Korean authorities’ emergency system failure compounded North Korea’s failure to give sufficient notification about the water release which resulted in this man-made disaster… The South Korean government must not exaggerate and stress the other side’s responsibility in order to avoid its own responsibility (The Hankyoreh 2009).

article about Yeonpyeongdo stand in stark contrast to the comparatively neutral language used in the Imjin article: “North Korea’s attack is unacceptable…This is a truly inhumane and barbaric outrage that cannot be justified on any grounds” (The Hankyoreh 2010a). Regarding North Korea’s claim that the Yeonpyeongdo shelling was provoked by South Korean actions, the article also states, “This is a typical false accusation and refusal to take responsibility [from North Korea]. This brazen attitude from North Korea is nearly as infuriating to South Korea’s citizens as the unexpected military provocation itself. If Pyongyang really wishes to pass responsibility on to Seoul, it should provide irrefutable evidence of the so-called military provocation” (The Hankyoreh 2010a). The article does not include a caveat about the South Korean government’s responsibility in the matter. There are two important changes to note between these two articles – the first is the increased willingness to assign blame to North Korea for poor inter-Korean relations, and the second is the moderation of responsibility assigned to South Korea. Before 2010, there was an almost unreasonable willingness to avoid placing blame on North Korea and a pronounced enthusiasm for holding the South Korean government accountable for all tensions

This tendency to include a caveat is present in nearly all, if not all, opinion pieces in The Hankyoreh regarding North Korea. These caveats always follow

64 on the peninsula. Following a succession of events that started at the Yeonpyeongdo shelling and that were undeniably the responsibility of North Korea, however, progressives finally began shifting accountability from South to North. Such events included increasingly bellicose North Korean language after Kim Jong-il’s death in 2011, a rocket launch in late 2012, and a nuclear test in early 2013. By shifting agency in this direction, progressive writers in The Hankyoreh began actively criticizing the North Korean regime. Criticism allowed for the increased expression of negative sentiment towards the regime. While progressives continued to favor

hurting reunification efforts (The Hankyoreh 2010b). Another article discusses the issue in 2011, though only tangentially in a short comment about the North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens in a longer article about North Korea-Japan relations (see Jongwon 2011). Four articles in 2012 address the issue; three articles address the struggles of North Korean defectors, mostly highlighting abuses they face in transit from North Korea and not in the country itself. These articles also largely call for “quiet diplomacy,” a means of helping these defectors without calling too much attention to the issue for fear of upsetting North Korea. The fourth article, published in May 2012

dialogue and reconciliation as the proper policy for resolving issues with North Korea, they also became less forgiving towards the North Korean regime – both in their descriptions of the regime, and in their demands from it. North Korea was also described increasingly in an adversarial context as opposed to a cooperative one; for example, discussions on the North Korean nuclear program in later years called for ways of containing and coaxing North Korea, as opposed to working with the North as an equal and reliable partner. In this way, progressive expectations of the North Korean regime began to align more closely with those of conservatives. Demands for apologies and a less-forgiving stance on North

and addressing the detention of Shin Sook-ja and her two daughters in North Korea,5 contains the strongest language against North Korea from that year, citing the United Nations’ determination that the detention was “arbitrary, and violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…” However, the article expresses resistance to allowing the human rights issue affect inter-Korean relations, stating that the issue must be resolving with “the most basic humanitarian principles” and that there is “no need to add political motives to the mix” (The Hankyoreh 2012a). In 2013, an article entitled “Competitive Suffering” offers the strongest language against North Korean human rights in this five year time period, with the author

Korea’s nuclear program echoed similar calls from conservatives. Another way in which this conservative shift manifested was in the slow expansion of a discussion of North Korean human rights issues in The Hankyoreh. While North Korean human rights were a consistent staple of The Chosun Ilbo from 2009 to 2013, and likely in years before, the issue area is barely mentioned in The Hankyoreh. One article discusses the topic in 2010, but is primarily aimed at criticizing the North Korean Human Rights Law for

making mention of North Korea’s prison camps and characterizing them as crimes against humanity; however, the core of the article’s argument is a case for a more cooperative effort between human rights work and humanitarian economic engagement with North Korea (The Hankyoreh 2013). All this indicates a significant change in the way progressives discussed and perceived North Korea. Some of the more critical articles from 2011 onward would not have been out of place in The Chosun Ilbo. However, this is not to say that all

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics articles in The Hankyoreh suddenly espoused much more conservative viewpoints. Rather, the range of acceptable perspectives expressed in The Hankyoreh articles expanded, and it expanded rightward. Further, it is important to note that there was a high degree of fluctuation in the positivity expressed towards North Korea, depending on the topic discussed and on the perceived opportunity that existed for inter-Korean reconciliation. The Hankyoreh articles were exceptionally positive whenever North Korea extended a proverbial olive branch, often becoming much more critical of the South Korean government when it failed to take advantage of an opportunity for dialogue with the North. One such example was published in June 2013, after North Korea had offered an opportunity to discuss the Kaesong complex and family reunifications. The article refers to the offer as the start of a “new stage in inter-Korean relations,” and “an excellent opportunity to make a breakthrough,” expressing a high degree of optimism for the last-minute call to talks (The Hankyoreh 2013).

In significant contrast to the trend seen in The Hankyoreh pieces, the second trend to come to light from the article analysis was a notable consistency in the way articles in The Chosun Ilbo addressed issues relating to North Korea. If The Hankyoreh articles showed an increasing willingness to hold North Korea accountable for poor inter-Korean relations, The Chosun Ilbo articles rarely expressed any uncertainty that it was North Korea to blame for most of the woes on the Korean peninsula. Articles in The Chosun Ilbo expressed a consistently low positivity towards the North Korean regime, and included frequent insults directed at the nation’s leadership and calls for regime change. Figure 2 illustrates The Chosun Ilbo’s average positivity towards the DPRK regime over time, in contrast to the Hankyoreh’s. While generally trending downwards, The Chosun Ilbo’s positivity rating was always much lower than The Hankyoreh’s. In regards to North Korean human rights, The Chosun Ilbo articles consistently used the North Korean human rights record as a means of levying

Figure 2: Tone Regarding DPRK Regime in The Hankyoreh and Chosun Ilbo Articles

Kim Figure 3: Topic Distributions in The Hankyoreh and The Chosun Ilbo

criticism against the regime. Figure 3 shows a marked difference between how frequently the two papers discussed human rights – while North Korean human rights issues were discussed in 11% of The Chosun Ilbo articles, they were included in only 2% of the Hankyoreh articles. Regarding opportunities for interKorean dialogue, unlike articles in The Hankyoreh, The Chosun Ilbo articles generally expressed wariness towards North Korean requests for inter-Korean talks. The trends found in The Hankyoreh and Chosun Ilbo pieces reflect the findings of previous studies and the reviewed polling data. While conservatives have generally remained within the bounds of traditionally conservative views and ideology when it comes to North Korea policy, South Korean progressives have expanded their range of acceptable policy perspectives. In embracing more conservative views while retaining their traditional focus on interKorean dialogue and engagement, progressives have adopted a wider spectrum of policy approaches towards North Korea. Assuming that this acceptance of a wider spectrum is reflected in the attitudes held by progressive voters, this indicates that during the

Lee Myung-bak years there existed South Korean progressives that held very pragmatic views. The recommendations in The Hankyoreh pieces certainly offered a wide range of policy that was often very responsive to recent gestures made by North Korea – pragmatism was thus expressed through these flexible responses, which may have expressed anger at North Korean offenses, but also forgave North Korea quickly and wished to seize opportunities for dialogue whenever they arose. The article analysis also offers some insight into how these progressives viewed President Lee’s “pragmatic” foreign policy, and into their views on pragmatism as a concept. The Hankyoreh articles certainly expressed strong support for pragmatism. However, many of these articles only mentioned pragmatism when it could be levied against the Lee administration as criticism for its failure to live up to promises of pragmatic policy. Articles in The Hankyoreh often accused Lee of bowing to hardline conservative forces and the more ideologically-bent right-wing, instead of standing by a truly pragmatic policy. In this way, the progressives seemed to

Between Pragmatism and Political Ideology

define their support for pragmatism by juxtaposing it and themselves against the Lee administration’s submission to conservative hardliners. Progressives thusly supported pragmatism explicitly and implicitly in their discourse on North Korea policy. In contrast, The Chosun Ilbo articles did not discuss Lee’s foreign policy within a framework of pragmatism. In fact, the doctrine was not mentioned in any of the reviewed Chosun Ilbo articles. While some may have lauded Lee’s foreign policy, or warned him against wavering from a foreign policy that conservatives generally seemed to favor, “pragmatism” was never mentioned explicitly as

Thus far, however, those presidents that have had the opportunity to put pragmatism into practice have been two conservatives, with current President Park Geun-hye viewed as even more conservative than her predecessor. While her North Korea policy has been advertised and associated with pragmatism and realism, in practice Park hasn’t yet strayed far from the traditional conservative line. All this begs the question of how moderate a “pragmatic policy” can really be when thus far it has largely been shaped by conservative forces, and how wise it might be for progressives to loosen the bounds of their political ideology in order to embrace pragmatism.

part of that foreign policy nor was it supported separately as a concept. Conservatives, it seems, were disinterested in pragmatism or at least did not associate it as strongly with Lee. Instead, conservatives focused on the tangible products of Lee’s foreign policy, which was certainly much more conservative than his predecessor’s outcomes.

The weakness and factionalism in South Korea’s progressive parties have been no secret since the end of the Roh Moo-hyun era. The Democratic Party and the New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) party have been met with consistent electoral failure in recent years, despite low approval ratings for the opposing Saenuri Party. Some observers have pointed to a “liberal identity crisis” as one factor in the weakness of the NPAD, highlighting the party’s lack of a clear and united platform to address major policy issues and unify its strong voter base. If this is the case, then an unconsolidated and nebulous North Korea policy would certainly do the NPAD no favors. In June 2012, the Unified Progressive Party, a minority progressive party that was banned in 2014, issued a list of reformed policy positions including stances on North Korea policy. Included in this proposal was a staunch opposition to North Korean human rights abuses, the North Korean nuclear program, and the regime’s system of dynastic succession of power. One noteworthy line in the proposal stated, “There is no need to fear that a basic expression of position will lead to a breakdown in inter-Korean relations, and North Korea should recognize this as a diplomatic reality” (The Hankyoreh 2012b). The NPAD might have something to learn

Conclusion and Policy Implications Having concluded this analysis, two observations become apparent. The first is that South Korean progressives have become more pragmatic in their North Korea policy, both over time and in contrast to their conservative counterparts. Evidence for this is found in the widening range of policy perspectives adopted by progressives - which includes increasingly conservative views - and in their expressed approval for pragmatism as a guide for North Korea policy, both explicitly and through their votes. The second observation is that pragmatism in practice under Lee Myung-bak failed to meet the ideal policy desired by progressives. Whether as a result of conservative pressure or international circumstance, pragmatism the ideal has yet to fully be expressed in so-called pragmatic policy.

68 from the UPP, in that it may be time for the party to take a bolder and clearer policy stance on North Korea. While the ideal of pragmatism is an attractive policy option, thus far it has borne little fruit for progressive adherents. Progressive leaders must face the reality of pragmatism as policy, which they have allowed conservatives to dictate thus far, and develop a new approach to North Korea policy. Otherwise, they risk the loss of moderate constituents, and of their voice in the national debate over North Korea. Notes The “386” generation was a cohort of South Koreans characterized by left-leaning political activism, who as young adults were instrumental in the democracy movement of the 1980’s and the formal democratization of South Korea in 1987. Named for Intel’s 386 computer model, the moniker developed in the 1990s to refer to people in their 30’s, who had attended university in the 1980’s, and had been born in the 1960’s. In contrast, the “post-386” generation refers to a younger cohort that grew up in a democratic and prosperous South Korea, and is largely apolitical and much less politically engaged than the 386 generation. 1

In November 2010, unprovoked North Korean

forces fired about 170 artillery shells and rockets at South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island (known also as Yeonpyeongdo). The attack caused severe damage to both military and civilian infrastructure, and led to several civilian casualties. The United Nations categorized the attack as one of the worst incidents on the peninsula since the Korean War. 3 The Kaesong Industrial Complex was a collaborative economic development project jointly operated by North and South Korea, and located just north of the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ). The complex was viewed as a positive symbol of inter-Korean cooperation. Following rising inter-Korean tensions,

North Korea barred entrance to the complex and withdrew its employees in April 2013, and so unilaterally shut the complex down. Hundreds of South Korean employees remained at the complex for up to a month after its closure. A South Korean delegation bringing food and supplies to those employees remaining in the complex on April 17 was denied access by North Korea. The complex was finally reopened after intense negotiations in September 2013. 4 In the early hours of one morning in September 2009, North Korea suddenly released a large amount of water from its Hwanggang Dam on the Imjin River without warning South Korea, with whom it shares the river. The release sent huge flash floods into South Korea, doubling water levels in the Imjin River and leading to six civilian casualties, including one eight-year old child. While North Korea claimed that it was a necessary and urgent move in response to dangerously high water levels in the dam, South Korea rejected North Korea’s explanation as unsatisfactory. 5 Shin Sook-ja (also Shin Suk-ja) was a South Korean citizen imprisoned with her daughters in a North Korean concentration camp after her husband defected from North Korea to Denmark. Amnesty International began a campaign for her freedom in 1993, naming her a prisoner of conscience. In 2011, South Korean human rights activists from Shin’s hometown started a campaign on Shin’s behalf that garnered international attention. The United Nations launched an inquiry into her detention, to which North Korea responded that she had died of hepatitis. Shin’s husband, Oh Kil-nam, has stated that he believes that North Korea is lying about her death.

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Oh, Chang Hun, and Celeste Arrington. 2007. “Democratization and Changing AntiAmerican Sentiments in South Korea.” Asian Survey 47(2): 327-350. Shin, Gi-Wook, and Kristin Burke. 2008. “North Korea and Identity Politics in South Korea.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 15(1): 287303. Snyder, Scott. 2009. “Lee Myung-bak’s Foreign Policy: A 250-Day Assessment.” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21(1): 85-102. Su, Shelley. 2012. “The OPCON Transfer Debate.” In SAIS US-Korea 2011 Yearbook, eds. Jae-jung Suh. U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, 159-174. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies. 2015. “South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2015.” http:// en.asaninst.org/contents/south-koreans-andtheir-neighbors-2014 (Accessed December 21, 2016). The Chosun Ilbo (The English Edition). “Opinion.” January 2009 to December 2014. http://english. chosun.com/ (Accessed January 1, 2017). The Hankyoreh. 2009. “S. Korean Government should Prevent Imjin Tragedy’s Repeat.” September 10. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_ edition/e_editorial/375993.html (Accessed December 21, 2016). The Hankyoreh. 2010a. “Time for Pyongyang to Take Responsibility for Attack.” November 25.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_ edition/e_editorial/450650.html (Accessed December 21, 2016). The Hankyoreh. 2010b. “The North Korean Human Rights Law will Only Bring more Conflict to the Korean Peninsula.” February 12. http://

Kim english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_ editorial/404460.html (Accessed December 21, 2016).

The Hankyoreh. 2012a. “Human Rights are Universal in North and South. May 31.http://english.hani. co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/535483. html (Accessed December 21, 2016). The Hankyoreh. 2012b. “Progressive Party Reexamines its NK, US and Chaebol Policies.” June 19. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_ editorial/538470.html (Accessed December 21, 2016). The Hankyoreh. 2013 “Inter-Korean Talks could be a Breakthrough.” June 7. http://english.hani.co.kr/ arti/english_edition/e_editorial/590883.html (Accessed December 21, 2016). the Korean Peninsula.” February 12. http://english.hani. co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/404460. html (Accessed December 21, 2016). The Hankyoreh. 2012a. “Human Rights are Universal in North and South. May 31. http://english.hani. co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/535483. html (Accessed December 21, 2016). The Hankyoreh. 2012b. “Progressive Party Reexamines its NK, US and Chaebol Policies.” June 19. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_ editorial/538470.html (Accessed December 21, 2016). The Hankyoreh. 2013 “Inter-Korean Talks could be a Breakthrough.” June 7. http://english.hani.co.kr/ arti/english_edition/e_editorial/590883.html (Accessed December 21, 2016).

Between Pragmatism and Political Ideology Appendix: Charts and Data

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