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Contents
Mary Freiner, Samford University
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Despite the security issues associated with the sudden outpouring of over four million Venezuelan refugees into other parts of Latin America, reactions from neighboring nations have been shockingly proactive and sympathetic. Through solidarity, States have created a network of bridges across which they can better facilitate the implementation of regional agreements. To conceptualize the relationship between regional solidarity and implementation of regional refugee policies, this study compares Colombia’s implementation of the Brazil Plan of Action during the Venezuelan refugee crisis to Venezuela’s previous enforcement of the Mexico Plan of Action during the Colombian refugee crisis. Although the integration of refugees into the host country has not improved significantly since 2011, the protection and aid of refugees have greatly increased under the Brazil Plan of Action. These findings affirm that when regional solidarity is fortified through more precise goals and broader participation from the regional community, refugee quality of life and security increase for the region as a whole.
INTRODUCTION
After spending time with Venezuelan refugees during the summer of 2019, in Bucaramanga, Colombia, my view of refugee resettlement dramatically changed. Because of Venezuela’s deteriorating economy, countless individuals roam the city’s streets unemployed, pregnant mothers do not receive prenatal care, and numerous children fall behind in their education. Unfortunately, these occurrences typically transpire from forced immigration. However, continual misfortune is not the case for every person. Some refugees earn enough money to send for their loved ones back home, and others live comfortably in tall apartment buildings. If 4.3 million refugees are all simultaneously seeking to establish better lives in Latin America, what separates the “haves” from the “have nots”? (Grupo Intergencial sobre Flujos Migratorios Mixtos, August 2019, 1; hereafter GIFMM and Bennouna 2019). Latin America has made great strides to improve the number of refugees who “have.” However, research has not confirmed that the lives of refugees have improved nor does it explain which changes in policy have been the most effective. The pivot in refugee policy began with the construction of the Cartagena Declaration in 1984. Rather than acting exclusively as individual states to devise their specified plans of action, countries in Latin America have agreed to adopt the principle of regional solidarity and meet every ten years to outline regional programs and standards of treatment for refugees. With each agreement, more goals are included, and the rights of refugees become more specific. If each new agreement is intended to augment the previous plan, it is imperative to analyze these refugee policies consecutively to capture their sequential and progressive nature. Thus, an important question arises: to what extent does this increase in regional solidarity improve implementation of regional policy goals? In this article, regional solidarity is defined as joint action grounded in a shared interest built around a certain common identity or affinity. Whether increased regional solidarity has improved implementation was evaluated by the extent to which Venezuela previously implemented the Mexico Plan of Action (MPA) and the degree to which Colombia is currently implementing the Brazil Plan of Action (BPA). These particular countries were chosen because Colombia experienced a significant refugee crisis beginning in the late 1990s, which lasted within the time frame of the MPA (2004). Whereas, the Venezuelan refugee crisis falls under the umbrella of both the MPA and BPA (2014). (See Figure 1). As signatories of these two most recent regional refugee policies, the solidarity principle states that Colombia has a responsibility to reciprocate Venezuela’s treatment of Colombian refugees. However, in February of 2019, Maduro “decided to sever all ties with the fascist government of Colombia” (Romero 2019). With this bilateral tie severed, scholars are confronted with a new question: does reciprocity still exist between countries committed to regional solidarity? The analysis of these two case studies leads to two overarching conclusions. First, the increase in precision and scope of regional agreements improved the capacity of member states to implement refugee
Figure 1. Solidarity Timeline
Columbian Refugee Crisis
Venezuelan Refugee Crisis
Cartagena Declaration 1984
San Jose Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons 1994
Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action 2004 Braxi Declaration and Plan of Action 2014
policies. Second, as an act of reciprocity in the spirit of regional solidarity, Colombia implemented the BPA to a comparable or exceeding degree as that of Venezuela’s commitment to the MPA. Following the introduction, the literature review secondly explains how specific methods can provide different perspectives on the impact of regional solidarity. The next section then argues for particular attention to how regional solidarity affects the individual refugee and describes why a comparison of the Colombian and Venezuelan refugee crises is appropriate to examine this concept. Then, I analyze the extent to which the MPA and BPA have been implemented during both case studies using 2011 and 2019 data reports from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Interagency Group for Mixed Migration Flows (GIFMM is the Spanish acronym). After conducting the analysis, the findings conclude an overall strengthened notion of regional solidarity and greater implementation by the Colombian government than the Venezuelan government. This study has been limited to only two countries in Latin America. Thus, a suggestion for future research would be to analyze whether regional solidarity improves implementation in Latin American states where a large-scale refugee crisis has not occurred.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Latin American scholars attempting to evaluate various forms of refugee policy debate the importance of regional declarations and plans as effective instruments of regional cooperation. The orchestrating of these regional agreements function as building blocks of the regional solidarity principle. Under the framework of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, states reconvene every ten years and improve upon previous policy – the 1994 San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons (1994), the Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action (2004), and most recently the 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action (2014). Although some scholars praise Latin America as a model for refugee law and policy, the body of literature remains ambiguous as to whether this movement toward better treatment of refugees is enhancing their quality of life. Subsequently, the literature begs the question: to what extent does regional solidarity in Latin America improve implementation of regional refugee policies? The following paragraphs explain how scholars have differed in their approach to studying this idea and how looking at this relationship from an international, state, or individual level can radically affect the conclusions. But first, the principle of regional solidarity is placed in the context of Latin American refugee policy.
The Principle of Solidarity
The principle of regional solidarity in Latin America has been borrowed from European law theory to help explain why states engage in regional cooperation. The solidarity principle theorizes that a shared interest built around a specific common identity or affinity will motivate joint action (Vera Espinoza 2018, 87). In the case of displaced people groups in Latin America, there are a few primary affinities that scholars believe motivate cooperation among states. First, the level of development, economic and political stability, and the number of resources available within the confines of national sovereignty are not suited to address the magnitude of displaced persons in the entire region. But collectively, countries can distribute the costs, consolidate resources, and form a network of national projects. This distribution is known as responsibility-sharing (Barichello 2016, 193). Second, solidarity reduces the risk for both the individual and states. In other words, countries do not have to fear the closing of another state’s border, thereby forcing a greater burden on them, and individuals are ensured equal and humane treatment regardless of the country in which they choose to resettle (Vera Espinoza 2018, 262). Scholars identify this as harmonization (Fischel de Andrade 1998, 395). Furthermore, Hilpold (2015, 262) states, “solidarity expects solidarity.” That is, while the decision to help refugees from outside one’s borders might consist of some altruistic motivations, the stronger instrument of persuasion is the hope that one’s actions will be reciprocated if the tables turn in the future (Hipold 2015). Although Hilpold’s (2015, 262) study of solidarity within European Union law supports his claim that the reciprocal nature of regional solidarity “forms the basis of social contract that unites individuals to a political community,” the literature lacks verification of this claim in other areas where regional solidarity exists such as Latin American refugee policy. The underlying motives for Latin American countries to reciprocate are going to be quite different from those that drive the European Union to cooperate. For example, most countries in the E.U. are financially stable on their own, and there is no dominant external power. In contrast, Latin America is
composed of several developing nations, and the U.S. has a tremendous impact on regional politics. By providing a pipeline of resources and funding, the U.S. has the power to ease reciprocity or deter it depending on American interests in Latin America. The motivations behind reciprocity require further investigation into the political context of each crisis, but this study simply aims to conclude whether reciprocity exists. The literature includes a variety of methods previously applied to test the influence of solidarity in Latin American refugee policy. These methods commonly dissect the theory of solidarity by comparing the differing levels of influence – international and regional, regional and state, and lastly, regional and individual – but scholars debate which levels of analysis provide the most accurate assessment. Nearly all studies acknowledge consensus between regional and international standards. However, if states do not face any formal punishment or possess any legal obligation to enforce regional programs and procedures, then what incentive do states have to act? In his analysis of the MPA, Fabiano de Menezes (2016) finds that when accounting for implementation, regional solidarity does not improve the treatment of refugees (130- 140). Basically, scholars’ conclusions about the effectiveness of solidarity depend on the level of their analysis. If solidarity should be effective, evidence of progress should not only be seen within the written agreements but in statistics as well. The schools of thought below have been organized based on the differing entities scholars have analyzed to evaluate the strength of regional solidarity. While the primary focus of this study is to know if solidarity impacts implementation, scholars must also ask, why? This leads to the second question: Does reciprocity exist between Latin American countries committed to regional solidarity? Not only is solidarity assumed to facilitate the implementation of regional refugee policies, but it also serves as an alternative to bilateralism. Despite the heated bilateral tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, the expectation for Colombian assistance still exists because of its reciprocal obligation to other nations in the region.
Regional Solidarity and the Global Community
In the field of International Relations, multilateral agreements often receive criticism for their inability to have direct influence and produce significant results. However, experts contend that immediate influence at the local level is not the purpose of solidarity, but rather regional solidarity operates as a unifier between the regional and global community. Krasner (1993, 162) maintains that “ideals expressed in the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] were most strongly informed by western liberal conceptions.” It can, therefore, be implied that international declarations necessitate the development of regional plans to adjust for varying interests, cultural compatibility, and geographical proximity. Scholars who textually compare international and strictly regional agreements stress that regional solidarity is dependent upon the mutual acceptance of international norms. For example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and its 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees are cornerstones of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, which is a regional agreement accepted by almost all of Latin America (Cantor 2019, 283). Fischel de Andrade’s (1998) textual analysis of international refugee policies found Colombia and Venezuela both support the Cartagena definition of a refugee. Still, only Colombia acknowledges the definition adopted by the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention (402 and 404). Coincidentally, one prominent policy difference between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments was Colombia’s greater willingness to accept help from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Although Colombia gained access to a larger portfolio of experience, financial resources, and data, it had to sacrifice some autonomy to the UNHCR. Venezuela, in contrast, did not want to make this trade because, as with any transnational agreement, countries are not guaranteed tangible results. (Fischel de Andrade 1998, 392). As such, confining assessments to cooperation between the regional and global community is not sufficient to explain the empirical effects of regional solidarity.
Regional Solidarity and the Nation State
The second and most common type of analysis proposes that regional solidarity can be most clearly seen in the decision of nation states to give up some autonomy to collaborate on regional solutions. Fischel de Andrade (1998, 389) explains that in the spirit of solidarity, states recognize it is in their best interest to “avoid unregulated policies.” Scholars who focus mostly on the agreements themselves usually conduct a textual comparison of domestic laws and regional policies to provide support for the question of solidarity as a normative trend. Solidarity goals after each ten-year mark are undeniably more inclusive and precise than the period before, but what is rarely considered is how integrated these norms are on the domestic level. Vera Espinoza (2018, 89) finds that solidarity crumbles when interests of different economies and societies diverge because solidarity depends on “political willingness and budget,” which can fluctuate widely depending on the country and political context. De Menezes (2016, 130) states “Without the right strategic interests, countries will remain reluctant to cooperate.” Here, it is vital to recognize the dominant political influence the U.S. has over the Colombian government, given America’s strategic interest in overthrowing the communist Maduro regime. It is reasonable to believe that many of the resources and support put toward accomplishing the BPA’s goals resulted from Colombia’s desire to remain in good standing with the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere. Conversely, the Chávez dictatorship did not have a friendly relationship with the U.S. in 2011 and did not benefit from U.S. financial aid. De Menezes (2016) criticizes the optimism of some scholars who fail to see how the MPA underestimates the difficulties of cooperation, exaggerates the impact of
solidarity rhetoric, and ignores the minimal capacity of Latin American states to uphold these commitments. While an optimistic view of regional solidarity in Latin America is not inherently correct or incorrect, optimism must be grounded in reality. Thus, the next school of thought helps examine whether each successive treaty is generating better outcomes, such as more measures of protection, integration, and aid, than the previous one. Also, it makes room for explanation of successful implementation when nation states do not see eye to eye.
Regional Solidarity and the Refugee
While the theme of regional solidarity in Latin American refugee law and policy is relatively new, the area of literature most in need of development is the method of qualitative analysis to evaluate the refugee experience considering the commitment states make to regional solutions. Scholars under this methodological umbrella also compare the regional and domestic spheres, but they take the process further by verifying policies and laws with statistical evidence. Although the three main programs outlined in the MPA are purposefully directed toward the Colombian refugee crisis, Vera Espinoza (2018, 86) found in a 2010 UNHCR evaluation of the MPA that “Colombian refugees experienced persecution and lack of social integration.” Gottwald’s (2004) individual-level investigation of the Colombian refugee crisis repeatedly mentions heightened border security and non-admission and deportation policies in both Venezuelan and Panamanian refugee decrees. At the time of this study, even in the most progressive of states, Chile and Brazil, regional solidarity failed to improve access to education, employment, housing, and legal rights (Vera Espinoza 2018). This gap between the regional level and individual level may not have been bridged very much by the BPA in 2014 as many Venezuelan refugees are currently experiencing the same issues of integration and protection. The Organization of American States calculates Latin America, as a whole, has received more refugees than it did during the height of the Colombian refugee crisis. The top three being Colombia at 1.3 million, Peru (768,000), and Chile (288,200) as of June 2019 (Organization of American States 2019, 7). Consequently, this dramatic increase in refugees provoked scholars to inquire about the role of regional solidarity. Has there been an advancement in Latin American refugee policy since the Colombian refugee crisis? If so, is it because of individual state effort or because solidarity works as a network of bridges cemented together by expectations of reciprocity? The principle of solidarity, which acts as the fuel for cooperation is impressive in theory, but when put into practice, does it fulfill its purpose to provide protection, aid, and integration to refugees, or will it collapse under pressure? This gap in the literature justifies a comparative analysis of the Venezuelan and Colombian refugee crises for two reasons. First, as more countries look to solidarity as a promise of support in the event of a refugee crisis, the reciprocal nature of regional solidarity could be a powerful tool for future security in Latin America, given that the Venezuelan refugee crisis is so widespread. Second, this analysis contributes to the fact or fiction debate regarding a dramatic shift in Latin American refugee policy.
METHODOLOGY
The first task was to find two regional policies that were formed one after the other because a plan-by-plan analysis only considers absolute success rather than relative progress. The expectation provided by the Cartagena framework is not that a plan of action is perfectly written or executed the first time, but instead, the goal is gradual improvement. To gauge growth, the amount of humanitarian assistance during the refugee crisis under each regional agreement was compared. The Venezuelan refugee crisis and Colombian refugee crisis were chosen as case studies to test the extent to which regional solidarity affects the implementation of the MPA and BPA. The independent variable, regional solidarity, is represented by the two columns in Table 1 labeled “MPA and BPA Goals” and “Goals Exclusive to the BPA.” Goals from both regional agreements were applied to each case study to test whether an increased precision and scope of these goals positively correlated with the dependent variable, implementation. Because the BPA expands the scope and is more precise than the MPA, implementation during the Venezuelan refugee crisis was anticipated to increase overall and
Table 1. Implementation Goals
Group
Protection
Aid
Independent Variable: MPA and BPA Goals
Asylum Registered Refugees
Financial aid
Integration Employment
Independent Variable: Goals Exclusive to the BPA
Birth registration Identification of Sexual Assault Victims
Healthcare
Education Housing Permanent Residence
specifically for the actions not listed in the MPA. Index 1 in the Appendix contains the policy objectives in the MPA and BPA that were analyzed and links them to the exact location of the provision outlined in the regional agreement. It is clear from Index 1 (See Appendix) that the BPA built upon what was previously outlined in the MPA and went further to address items that the previous plan did not include, such as statelessness, education, housing, permanent residency, sexual assault, and healthcare. In de Menezes’ (2016) study of the MPA, he concludes that the MPA did not successfully meet its goals and predicted the BPA’s future failure. Had he compared the results of the MPA with the 1994 San Jose Declaration, he would probably have made a different conclusion. Also, if his next body of research only looks at the BPA without taking into consideration the improvements it made on the MPA, de Menezes will likely come to his predicted conclusion. However, these agreements do not seek perfect implementation but improved implementation. Therefore, they should be measured based on improvement, not perfection. As listed in Table 1, the dependent variable was split into three categories – protection, integration, and aid – to provide a comprehensive picture of implementation. Within each group, there were at least two subcategories. By organizing implementation into groups and subcategories, it was easier to see where the regional policies lacked enforcement. The following section analyzed the following research questions:
Q1: To what extent does regional solidarity in Latin America increase the implementation of regional policy goals?
Q2: Does reciprocity exist between countries committed to regional solidarity?
Based on the findings and conclusions within the existing body of literature, this study hypothesized:
H1: As the precision and scope of a regional agreement increases, member states will also increase their amount of implementation.
H2: As an act of reciprocity in the spirit of regional solidarity, Colombia will implement the BPA to a comparable or exceeding degree as that of Venezuela’s commitment to the MPA.
Reports produced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 2011 on the Colombian crisis (post-MPA but pre-BPA) and in 2019 on the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis (post-MPA and BPA) were used as datasets intended to measure the dependent variable. Although the data are derived from assessments of international plans of action, these statistics can be applied to regional agreements made among Latin American states because “the implementation of UNHCR activities in the region” depends on government cooperation (Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados 2011b, 1; hereafter ACNUR). Following the data accumulation, the case studies were compared side by side within the areas of protection, integration, and aid. To account for the comparatively greater magnitude of Venezuelan refugees, the numbers were converted to a percentage and stated as a general increase or decrease. In doing this, the results were better framed within the context of the crisis and allowed for a more balanced comparison. By exclusively selecting data from UNHCR and GIFMM, this study controlled for any state bias that would stem from wanting to appear more proactive or altruistic. In addition, the UNHCR has been the primary institution involved in the implementation of refugee strategies throughout the region, which helped to provide a comprehensive picture of both crises in the context of Latin America as a whole.
ANALYSIS
By applying the above procedures, the following discussion has been split up into the three areas of implementation: protection, aid, and integration. Within these three sections, the 2011 and 2019 reports from UNHCR have been compared for the Colombian and Venezuelan refugee crises. Once the data comparison has been conducted, the theory of reciprocity is applied to explain the increase in implementation.
Protection
Following the 2004 Mexico Plan of Action, twenty countries in Latin America called upon UNHCR to enact a plan facilitating the regional agreement’s implementation (ACNUR 2011b). Under the MPA, the protection of refugees is accomplished through the granting of asylum or refugee status. In 2011, a total of 219,255 Colombian refugees lived in Venezuela, which accounted for 54% of the 404,981 displaced Colombians in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panamá, and Venezuela (ACNUR 2011b, 2). This number, however, can be deceiving as there were also over 3.6 million internally displaced persons in Colombia. Gottwald (2004) reveals the government did not want the severity of its internal conflict to be known by the international community. At the same time, increasing nationalism and opposition against U.S. involvement in Colombia made Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez more resistant toward cooperation with the Colombian government (Gottwald 2004). Unwilling to bear the international shame and burden of the refugee crisis, both countries deliberately refused to acknowledge the humanitarian issue. In doing so, they managed to free themselves from any commitment to solidarity under the MPA. However, Venezuela still registered 5150-5650 refugees and asylum-seekers, which amounts to approximately 2.3-2.6% of the total refugee population residing in Venezuela (ACNUR 2011b, 2). While a small community of individuals received legal protection, this
also means over two hundred thousand refugees were left unprotected (ACNUR 2011b, 2). Under the Brazil Plan of Action, Colombian refugees would have also been expected to receive citizenship if they were born in Venezuela and at least be made aware of the potential for sexual assault or genderbased violence (GBV). The MPA did not target statelessness or sexual assault victims until 2014; therefore, there is no data in the UNHCR report on these subcategories. In contrast to the Colombian refugee crisis, the gravity of the Venezuelan refugee crisis is widely known, and countries in Latin America are receiving large waves of refugees daily. Colombia currently contains the largest portion of Venezuelan refugees at 1.4 million, yet less than 1% are asylum-seekers (GIFMM 2019, 1). Because of the rapidly increasing number of people flowing into Colombia, the application process to obtain refugee status or asylum has become suboptimal. Instead, ensuring regular status as opposed to irregular status has become the focus. As of August 2019, 677,313 Venezuelans have either a visa, foreign identity card, or a Special Stay Permit (PEP). Conversely, UNHCR estimates 699,677 individuals exceeded their legal stay (33%) or entered irregularly (67%). When converted to a percentage, the Colombian government is giving about 44% more refugees regular status than the Venezuelan government granted during the Colombian refugee crisis in 2011. Contrary to expectation, regional solidarity has not weakened or buckled under the weight of more refugees. Not only has Colombia improved protection since 2011, but it also has made great strides to meet the protection goals of the BPA as well. For instance, UNHCR made a note of President Iván Duque’s decision to “grant Colombian nationality to children born in Colombia to Venezuelan parents and with undetermined nationality” (GIFMM 2019, 2). This resolution is expected to reach more than 27,000 children and sufficiently reflects the regional commitment under Chapter 6 of the BPA to eradicate statelessness in the region (GIFMM 2019 and ACNUR 2014). Likewise, more precision under the BPA has made it easier for Colombia to strategically address the need to identify, prevent, and protect victims of sexual assault and GBV. As a result, approximately 16,600 potential sexual assault victims were informed of their rights, legal processes, and eligibility for asylum (GIFMM 2019, 5). The precision and scope of a regional agreement do matter because it identifies the unprotected classes and puts pressure on the group to act.
Aid
The necessity of accumulating financial aid to fund various programs, whether they are through domestic or international resources is established in both the BPA and MPA using almost identical wording. Because Latin America mainly consists of developing nations, acting in solidarity to redistribute the financial responsibility works in the interest of all states to prevent weak economies in the region from experiencing a domino effect. While the 2011 report briefly mentions that Venezuela organized ten projects and budgeted 150,000 USD to finance them, this amount is not placed within the broader regional context (ACNUR 2011a, 2). The lack of a clear financial strategy is likely the outcome of states not knowing how much financial cost they are expected to bear in light of the country’s economic condition and amount of refugees. Conversely, the regional response to the Venezuelan refugee crisis has done a much better job of stating financial goals for each country in proportion to their weight of responsibility. According to the 2019 UNHCR Regional Plan to Assist Venezuelan Refugees, Colombia possesses the highest financial requirement of any state in the region, which coincides with the regional dispersion of refugees (UNHCR 2019). Of the 315 million budgeted for Colombia, 119 million has been raised by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (I.O.s), and individual states (UNHCR 2019, 9). Instead of competing to receive funding or expecting each state to raise their financial support, regional cooperation serves the critical function of signaling to the global community where the allocation of funds is needed most. Even though the subject of healthcare does not appear anywhere in the MPA, UNHCR references a meeting held in Cúcuta (a border city between Venezuela and Colombia) to address the treatment plan for individuals affected by HIV/AIDS (UNHCR 2019, 2). Also, 5150-5650 registered Colombian refugees and asylum seekers benefited from public health services by their legal status (ACNUR 2011b, 2). Unlike the MPA, the BPA outlines goals for the administration of healthcare to refugees. In agreement with this goal, Colombia has created the Special Stay Permit (PEP), which allows 596,035 or 41% of the total number of regular status refugees in Colombia access to basic rights such as healthcare and education (GIFMM 2019, 1 and UNHCR 2019, 40). The UNHCR additionally reports 220,400 refugees have received food assistance, and thousands more obtained other forms of aid such as vaccinations, prenatal care, and mental health services (GIFMM 2019, 3). Since the passage of the BPA, a wider group of countries are working together to raise money for Venezuelan refugees and implement more concrete solutions to tackle the demand for adequate healthcare.
Integration
Finally, integration has gradually become a more prominent area of focus under the Cartagena framework because it focuses on ensuring a stable future for refugees. The purpose of promoting integration is to increase access to education, employment, housing, and permanent residence. As previously stated in the analysis of healthcare during the Colombian refugee crisis, only those who possessed legal status as a refugee or asylum-seeker could receive public services such as healthcare and education. Thus, only 2.3-2.6% of the Colombian refugee population in Venezuela were provided access to education in 2011 (ACNUR 2011b, 2). On the other
hand, Venezuelan refugees in Colombia do not have to be granted asylum or refugee status to enroll in an educational institution. Instead, educational opportunity is based on whether or not someone has a PEP, which has the potential to reach close to six hundred thousand people (GIFMM 2019, 1). Under the BPA, Latin America recognized education as a common goal in favor of the entire community because it keeps people, specifically kids, off the streets and in a secure environment. Although employment availability is stated as a goal in both the MPA and BPA, the UNHCR report on the Colombian refugee crisis does not include any information on employment. This failure to implement policies that increase job availability is the weakest link in the development of integration programs. Individuals without money or means of providing for themselves and their families will likely find it more challenging to pay for school or housing. The PEP, in contrast, grants Venezuelan refugees the right to seek employment in Colombia. The BPA expands the scope of integration to incorporate housing and permanent residence. Still, because the number of refugees continues to soar past 1.4 million, Colombia has limited those with PEPs to two years stay (UNHCR 2019, 40). Although housing and permanent residence are likely to have been granted to Colombian and Venezuelan refugees with regular and irregular status, data confirming this is not available. Overall, this suggests that integration presents a particular challenge for solidarity in Latin America. One possible reason for this lack in implementation could be that in the hierarchy of needs, integration falls behind protection and aid. According to the principle of solidarity, however, implementation decreases because political and economic interests diverge. Helping refugees find housing, education, employment, and permanent residence is likely to receive more disapproval from the host population who fear increased scarcity of resources and opportunity. Consequently, politicians are more motivated to act in favor of personal state interests to reiterate commitment to their constituents.
Reciprocity
Due to the more considerable burden created by a higher number of refugees in 2019 than in 2011, opponents of regional solidarity expected implementation to decrease. On the contrary, the data above show a significant increase in people receiving protection, aid, and integration assistance. Table 2 provides a summary of the findings for refugees in the benefactor state and compares implementation before and after the BPA. If a subcategory is bolded, then it indicates implementation during the Venezuelan and Colombian refugee crises. A plus or minus sign follows each subcategory to show whether implementation has increased or decreased from 2011 to 2019. In addition, some data were not available, which is identified by the letters “N/A”. Although the percentage of asylum-seekers in Colombia slightly shrinks from the percentage of asylum-seekers in Venezuela in 2011, failure to reciprocate is not necessarily the issue. When considering all forms of regular status, Colombia has done a significantly better job of providing some kind of legal status to Venezuelan refugees within its borders. Because thousands of refugees are crossing the border daily, vetting everyone who applies for asylum promptly is nearly impossible. The data show strategies to implement birth registration, and protection for sexual assault victims occurred during the Venezuelan refugee crisis but not the Colombian refugee crisis. These findings support the second hypothesis, which predicted: as an act of reciprocity in the spirit of regional solidarity, Colombia will implement the BPA to a degree comparable or exceeding that of Venezuela’s commitment to the MPA. Compared to Venezuela in 2011, Colombia’s distribution of aid has increased significantly since the passing of the BPA. On a per capita scale, Colombia has raised $82.23 per refugee, while the 150,000-budget allotment from Venezuela amounted to $.68 per person. Because it cooperated with UNHCR standards, aid during the Venezuelan refugee crisis has poured in through a variety of international organizations. Colombia is still recovering from its internal conflict and would likely not
Table 2. Summary of Findings
Group Independent Variable: MPA and BPA Goals
Protection Asylum –Registered Refugees +
Aid Financial aid +
Integration Employment
Bolded = goal implemented (N/A) = data not available (+) = increased implementation (–) = decreased implementation
Independent Variable: Goals Exclusive to the BPA
Birth registration + Identification of Sexual Assault Victims +
Healthcare +
Education + Housing (N/A) Permanent Residence (N/A)
be able to reciprocate if support beyond the Latin American community did not exist. The latter indicates a certain degree of regional dependence on international support, particularly from wealthier nations like the United States. In fourteen of the past nineteen years, Colombia has received the most U.S. foreign aid in the Western Hemisphere (USAID 2020). Financial assistance from the U.S. and political pressure from the U.N., in this case, is impacting Colombia’s ability and motivation to reciprocate. On the other hand, Venezuela generally did not want involvement from the U.N. but preferred to communicate bilaterally with Colombia (Gottwald 2004, 530). If Venezuela had cooperated with other states under the supervision of UNHCR to create a regional budget, financial resources could have been better allocated. Accessibility to healthcare also improved during the Venezuelan crisis by 38.5%. This change is due to expanding regular status benefits to those with the Special Stay Permit. Similar to protection, this increase in aid since the Colombian refugee crises suggests increased solidarity promotes reciprocity and cooperation. Although employment was listed as a goal under the MPA, implementation in this area of integration did not develop until the BPA’s passage. As a way of achieving this integration goal, Colombia incorporated education and employment as basic rights for those holding PEPs. In the areas of housing and permanent residence, Venezuela did not take any action to ensure access to housing or permanent residence status. Consequently, the findings fail to indicate reciprocation from Colombia in either of these subcategories. Even though the BPA outlined housing and permanent residence as integration goals, the results do not show an increase in implementation like the subcategories for birth registration and sexual assault. Rather than indicating a break in reciprocity, this failure to implement new goals likely stems from an absence of solidarity.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to de Menezes’ prediction that the BPA was “doomed to fail,” these changes indicate improved implementation of the BPA (de Menezes 2016, 141). Because more rights have been extended through Colombia’s special stay permit and aid has increased through supporters in the international community, Venezuelan refugees are receiving better treatment than their Colombian counterparts eight years ago. However, the analysis does not offer positive results across the board. Although employment and education have become more accessible since the Colombian refugee crisis, mechanisms to ensure housing and permanent residence status are still lacking. Regarding integration specifically, if states cannot see it working in the interests of their people, regional solidarity becomes more complicated to achieve. A significant factor in increased implementation from 2011 to 2019 has been the cooperation of Latin American states to protect, provide aid, and integrate refugees within its borders. During a regional influx of refugees, especially one as big as the Venezuelan refugee crisis, it is typical for national security to become a higher priority, but the method of defense can vary. In this case, Latin American states found it more beneficial to offensively work together to address refugees in the region rather than tighten border security or handle it themselves. The explanation for regional cooperation is expected or indebted reciprocity. Either other countries want the same to be done for them in the future, or in the case of Colombia, they are acting in response to how its refugees have been treated in the past.
LIMITATIONS
The limitations stem primarily from the lack of data in the areas of assistance given to refugees, such as how many cases of sexual assault or gender-based violence have occurred, the number of refugees that received access to housing or permanent residence status, and the portion of individuals who found jobs. While the data from the 2019 report includes more specific statics on the humanitarian work conducted in the region than the 2011 report, a standardized data set would have provided a more accurate comparison. In addition, this study only compares Venezuela and Colombia’s implementation of the MPA and BPA. A truly comprehensive understanding of regional solidarity necessitates a comparative study of all the countries in the region whether or not they have witnessed a refugee crisis. Also, more attention to the U.S.’s role would provide new insight into whether reciprocity in Latin America still exists when U.S. interests are not at stake. Therefore, the first suggestion for future research is to investigate further why solidarity takes root in some states, but not other states. To examine the latter, scholars should examine states who either claim no commitment to the MPA or BPA, or have never suffered a wide-spread refugee crisis. Although the refugee crisis in Venezuela is still ongoing, the findings produced in this study are essential to the decisions made by policymakers and those studying international affairs. For future researchers, this study has provided a guide for studying regional policies and their effectiveness over time. In general, scholars analyze regional policies separately, but the fundamental flaw in this method is that these regional policies are not separate. Instead, they build on one another. If the study was extended back to 1984, the progress would be even more dramatic. Also, this study does not shy away from applying the solidarity principle on the individual level and setting high standards for implementation. Latin America’s regional approach to refugees shows slow but gradual progress in all areas of implementation. However, there is still work to be done as far as integrating refugees into the local population. n
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mary Freiner graduated in December 2019, from Samford University with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Spanish minor. In addition to Pi Sigma Alpha, Freiner is also a member of the Sigma Delta Pi Spanish Honor Society and Alpha Lambda Delta. Beginning in fall 2020, she plans to move to Washington D.C. to pursue a two-year Master’s degree at the Elliott School of International Affairs. Within the Latin American and Hemispheric Studies program, her specializations will be in global gender policy and migration. “Building Better Bridges: Improving Regional Response to Refugees in Latin America through Solidarity,” is her first academic publication.
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APPENDIX Index 1 Asylum
BDPA: “asylum‐seekers’ right to receive a decision on their case” (Chapter 2, Section 2, Action F, Line IV) MDPA: “Guaranteeing respect for due process standards by ensuring asylum-seekers’ access to refugee status determination procedures” (Chapter 2, Section 2.2, Paragraph 3)
Birth registration
BDPA: “Facilitate universal birth registration and the issuance of documentation” (Chapter 6, Section 2, Action C)
Education
Employment
BDPA: “generating employment for refugees” (Chapter 3, Section 3, Action G) MDPA: “Fostering the generation of sources of employment” (Chapter 3, Section1, Paragraph 3)
Financial Aid
BDPA: “greater human and financial resources” (Page 4, Provision 5) MDPA: “allocating to them more financial resources” (Chapter 2, Section 2.2, Paragraph 1)
Health Care
Housing
Sexual Assault Victims
BDPA: “implementation of differentiated referral and response mechanisms for victims of sexual and gender‐based violence” (Page 4, Provision 7)
Permanent Residence
BDPA: “Facilitate the change of the migratory status of refugees from temporary residents to permanent residents” (Chapter 3, Section 3, Action F)
Registered Refugees
BDPA: “the strengthening of national bodies for refugee status determination” (Chapter 2, Paragraph 2) MDPA: “States were urged to strengthen established refugee status determination mechanisms” (Chapter 3, Section 2.2, Paragraph 1)
