Spring edition 2015 final edition (2)

Vol. XV No. 1

Spring 2015

The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics (ISSN 1556-2034) is published bi-annually by the Nu Omega Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha, Oakland University, Department of Political Science, 418 Varner Hall, Rochester, MI 48309-4488. The journal is funded by Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, http://www.pisigmaalpha.org.

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The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Spring 2015 Volume XV

Number 1 Twenty-Ninth Edition

Alexa James Krista Squier Jacqueline Yee Eric Burgess Molly Knappenberger Dr. Terri Towner

Co-Outreach Editor Co-Outreach Editor Content Editor Co-Technology Editor Co-Technology Editor Faculty Advisor

Editorial Board Marissa Coloske James Eveslage Flora Ivezaj Jessica Kaljaj Chantel Kolodynski Kendall Kosikowski Luke Moloney

Priscilla Pelle Ashton Prasatek Jeffrey Schuett Nicholas Scott Courtney Stockman Mikaela Strech Nicholas Walter

Advisory Board Dr. Robert Alexander Dr. Nicole Asmussen Dr. Cristian Cantir Dr. Rosalee Clawson Dr. Matthew Dabros Dr. David Dulio Dr. Natasha Duncan Dr. Alan Epstein Dr. Megan Hershey Dr. Jennifer Hopper Dr. Dwaine Jengelley Dr. John Klemanski

Dr. Paulette Kurzer Dr. Laura Landolt Dr. Jonathan McKenzie Dr. Daniel O’Neill Dr. D’Andra Orey Dr. Diana Orces Dr. Christine Pappas Dr. Jo Reger Dr. Robert Spitzer Dr. Harry “Neil” Strine IV Dr. Peter Trumbore Dr. Byungwon Woo

Editor’s Preface to the Spring Edition The Pi Sigma Alpha Journal of Undergraduate Politics would first and foremost like to acknowledge all those individuals and institutions which make the publication of this Journal possible semester after semester and year after year. The Journal has continued to grow in terms of submissions, quality, and prestige. Admissions to the Spring 2015 edition were both vast in number and constituted a diverse array of topics. We greatly appreciate all those who have submitted their work to the Journal in hopes of being published. The articles published herein exemplify a high quality sample of the types of undergraduate research being conducted across the country.

Although the publication is a completely student-run endeavor, the efforts of the student Editorial Board are guided and supported by a number of individuals and institutions which we would like to thank. First, we would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and Executive Committee whose vision and financial support has maintained the quality and direction of the journal. Second, we would like to thank the Faculty Advisory board: the thorough and constructive reviews provided by the members of this board have ensured the articles published herein meet a consistent standard of quality. Finally, we extend tremendous thanks to Editorial Board Faculty Advisor Terri Towner, who has clocked countless hours to ensure the integrity of the journal continues to exceed the standards of excellence set by the editors of its previous editions.

The Editorial Board at Oakland University is proud to present the Spring Edition which contains a well-rounded set of articles with varied methodological approaches and topical matter. The publishing process for the Spring Edition followed a relatively smooth path from submission to publication, and the Nu Omega Chapter and Oakland University wish the readers of this edition a similarly enjoyable time.

Best, The Editors

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Table of Contents Gendered Legislation: Effects of Percentages of Females in Legislatures on Policy

7

Media, Identity, and Violence: American Indian Occupations 1969 – 1973

22

Hispanics in Florida Politics: The Case of Cubans versus Non-Cubans

39

The United States’ Cyber Privateers: Reviving the Letter of Marque and Reprisal

55

Reconsidering Revolutions: The Impact of Breakthrough Elections on Democratization in Croatia and Serbia

76

Revisiting Article 9: Japan’s Security Posture in a Changing World

Eric Stephen Bias, Hunter College, CUNY

94

Elizabeth Gribbins, Western Kentucky University

Hannah Trostle, Macalester College

Masiel Pelegrino-Sarduy, University of South Florida

Michael Tal, Macaulay Honors College at Lehman College of The City University of New York

Chelsea Kendziorski, Grand Valley State University

Gendered Legislation: Effects of Percentages of Females in Legislatures on Policy

7

Elizabeth Gribbins Western Kentucky University Does the amount of women in the legislature have an effect on the type of legislation passed?

Wide variation exists in gender parity across countries; however, whether or not the amount of women in legislatures has an effect on the type of policy that is proposed and/or passed by the government is largely overlooked. In this analysis, I analyze the percentage of women in the legislature and six measures of women’s rights in 139 countries. I have found that there exists a small positive statistical relationship between the percentage of women in the lower legislature and the more legislation passed that benefits women in the country.

Introduction

Although women remain underrepresented in elected offices, the current trend shows that more women are being elected to political positions, even to the highest office in a given state. There are currently fifteen elected female leaders in the world, but only two countries (i.e., Rwanda and Andorra) in the world have met or exceeded gender parity (50%+ women) in legislatures. Indeed, it is important to examine the factors that enable or deter women from becoming members of the legislature, but it is also critical to analyze the influence female officeholders have on policy outcomes. Thus, my research question asks: Does the percentage of women in the legislature have an effect on the type of legislation passed?

Women’s issues are discussed in this paper and are defined more specifically in my analysis in terms of policy which addresses domestic violence, sexual harassment, maternity leave, gender discrimination in the workplace, and equal pay for equal work.

These measures are crucial to this work as they overwhelmingly affect women yet are global and somewhat diverse.

In this paper, I focus on specific issues that affect women around the world. Not only do I wish to

discover whether or not legislation is gendered, but I also aim to see how this gendering affects the general population. While there is much disagreement about whether or not women in government help their female constituents, this research looks directly at policy that target problems women overwhelmingly face as a part of their daily lives without generalizing about female politicians. My research shows that there is a positive correlation between the number of women in the legislature and legislation that protects and benefits women, specifically, based on an index of profemale laws that I have created and will discuss more in detail below.

The overall goal of my paper is to examine the amount of women in governments and countries’ institution of policy that strives to fight gender inequality in direct ways by targeting particular issues.

Another important aspect of this research is its crossnational scope. Specifically, this work is not limited to a certain country or region and provides global results.

Proponents of gender equality assert that a government representative of its population, in terms of the amount of men and women that occupy its positions (usually 50/50), is more effective in protecting women and

8 promoting gender development. I will examine this assertion more explicitly by measuring percentages of women in lower legislatures and the amount of profemale policy passed within given countries.

Literature Review

A sizeable amount of literature addresses not only the role of pro-female legislation, but also whether gender parity in political office influences such legislation. Burgess (2011) finds that activists for women’s rights and violence against women legislation in Ethiopia must demonstrate that their reforms are “African”, fighting back against the trend of “westernization”. This demonstrates one key reason that having and studying women in the legislature is vital. Activists often have difficulty gaining ground because successful activism only takes places in the highly-controlled governmental sphere (Burgess 2011).

It is crucial to examine the impact that women can have through this sphere, as their civil activism often faces structural barriers. Kerevel and Atkeson (2013) explain that women often face marginalization and structural barriers to being elected and to functioning effectively once elected. Therefore, it is important to examine how overcoming these barriers and increasing female representation can impact the policy outcomes of a legislative body.

While previous research on this issue is generally in line with the views of Difference Feminism and Post-Modern Feminism, suggesting men and women will prioritize different policies in their roles as legislators, the issue is much more complex.

Payne (2013) finds that increased numbers of female representatives in U.S. state legislatures made those legislators and legislatures more likely to support a stronger welfare system, supporting the idea that women take different policy stances than men in

general circumstances. More specifically, regarding gendered legislation, Swers (1998) asserts that gender has a significant impact on voting for women’s rights legislation, most prominently seeing females vote in larger numbers for abortion and women’s healthrelated issues. Carroll and Dodson (1991) write that in the U.S., more female legislators than male focus policy on problems that more often directly affect women, such as rape, childcare, and spousal abuse. They also point out that even conservative female legislators are more likely to support these efforts than more liberal male legislators. Taylor-Robinson and Heath (2003) agree that female legislators do tend to prioritize issues concerning women’s rights, but in addition find that they do not seem to prioritize children and family issues any more than male legislators.

Perhaps most importantly, Thomas (1991, 970) finds that in state legislatures with more women, women are more likely to “introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of women, children and families than men in their states and more than their female counterparts in low representation legislatures”. This not only suggests that female representatives vote more for women’s issues, but that greater numbers of female legislators will produce more female-oriented legislation. This sets the stage for a strong hypothesis that the number of female representatives affects the outcome of gendered legislation, while still leaving room for further exploration of these findings. Although Thomas’ (1991) research provides a strong foundation for my research, it only applies to state legislatures in the U.S. As an older established democracy, the U.S. example may not set a standard for national level legislatures that vary widely across the globe.

While most of the previous research of female political participation discussed pertains to the U.S.,

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Western Europe, and slightly to Latin America, female politicians are often seen as anomalies in African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries, and therefore, are left out of a broader analysis. This is additionally limited by more Western views of feminism that focus on gender equality and democratic progress in terms of reproductive rights and sexuality, rather than access to land, safe working conditions, and election reform, which are themes commonly found in African feminism (Mikell 1997). Integrating countries from all regions of the world into a data analysis of female political participation is crucial in order to understand

deal with areas related to their traditional roles/ stereotypes. Miranda’s (2005) research here focuses more on non-Western countries, which is often left out of comparative analyses on gender and politics.

These theories assert that women in politics do not necessarily have homogenous interests and will not pursue liberal policies, either due to cultural norms and gender socialization or institutional barriers that hinder female political participation. Since these findings contradict others by Thomas (1991), Carroll and Dodson (1991), and Swers (1998), a cross-cultural and more in-depth study is necessary in order to reach

more universal factors that play into gender equality and development of the world’s women.

As stated earlier, it is important not to generalize about female politicians, especially in a global analysis, where feminism and politics differ greatly. Miranda (2005, 4) writes in “Impact of Women’s Participation and Leadership on Outcomes” that “women do not form a homogenous group defined by their sex alone,” meaning that female politicians do not always have the same values or views simply because they identify as the same gender.

Miranda (2005) also discusses several barriers that women face in politics inhibiting their support of progressive policy. Because of their upbringings and socialization, female politicians do not always believe in defying traditional gender roles in order to develop women’s rights. It should be additionally noted that female politicians may not support policy that aims to expand gender equality because they fear being seen as against men or men’s interests and further, could be less likely to be perceived favorably and/or elected.

Lastly, Miranda (2005) explores the notion that female politicians only support policy related to women’s issues because they are given more opportunities in this area or are even forced into positions that

definitive conclusions.

More recently, research has delved into the factors that affect the number of women in the legislature, such as gender quotas, although findings on this topic have been mixed. Tinker (2004) finds that gender quotas have significantly contributed to the increase in women as legislators around the world; however, the author also cautions that these quotas vary significantly based upon the type of electoral system and have little to no impact on policy outcomes. Zetterberg (2009) furthers this claim, asserting that women who are elected by quota systems tend to be constrained by other factors within the legislative system, and Schwindt-Bayer and Mischler (2005) also argue that the mechanics and design of the quota system determine its effectiveness.

Franceschet and Piscopo (2014, 85) also discover that in Argentina, quotas have increased female “access to elected office without altering either gendered hierarchies or gendered power networks that govern political advancement”. Consequently, women may also face institutional barriers once elected that prevent creating substantive policy change. This is significant for further study of female representation and quota systems because Davidson-Schmich (2006) explains

10

Gribbins

that effective gender quota systems are much more representative of women’s interests than ineffectively constructed quota systems. The latter suggests that higher numbers of women in the legislature alone may not be enough to create female-centered policy change; rather, having women elected under free and fair elections without gender mandates or institutional barriers will be the key to seeing women who vote for women’s issues.

Schwindt-Bayer (2006) suggests that apart from gender quotas, female legislators tend to vote for female-oriented legislation such as women and

If there was no information from The Guardian’s data set for my six measures of pro-female laws, however, then the country was omitted entirely.1 The final list of countries I compiled data for included 139 countries from all regions of the world, including 57 Free countries, 51 Partly Free countries, and 30 Not Free countries (See Table 1).

My research focused specifically on the data that included legislative protections of women’s rights and my dependent variable is an index based on the measures from The Guardian (2014). I chose the following six categories because they focus uniquely on

children’s issues because of changing attitudes about the roles of females in society, specifically within Latin America. Policy outcomes may also be affected by the institutional settings of which women are elected. Schwindt-Bayer (2006) explains that sitting on a committee responsible for the particular policy area increases a woman’s likelihood to vote for it, even though as a control, it still shows that women vote overwhelmingly more for women’s issues. Still, this shows that more complex factors are at play impacting the policy preferences of female legislators.

legislation and they are less culturally ambiguous than some of the other measures. The six categories that I chose to use are as follows:

1. Is there legislation that specifically addresses domestic violence?

2. Is there legislation that specifically addresses sexual harassment?

3. Are there criminal sanctions for sexual harassment?

4. Does the law mandate paid or unpaid maternity leave?

5. Does the law mandate equal remuneration

for men and women for work of equal value?

6. Are there laws mandating non-

discrimination based on gender in hiring?

With these measures, I created an index of pro-female laws and calculated a total for each country based upon their scores under each measure. If the country had passed the legislation, it received a score of 1 under that category and if it did not, it received a score of 0. Each country’s total was based upon the summation of these scores. Presently, my research is only directly measuring current legislatures with the percentage of women and their passage of these laws at some point in time. My research does not include the dates in which each country passed each piece of

Hypothesis and Research Design In February 2014, The Guardian released a comprehensive list of women’s rights by country based on data obtained previously by the UN Women’s 2011 Progress of the World’s Women report. This list included women’s rights to legal abortion, legal protections from domestic violence and sexual harassment, explicit constitutional equality, equal rights for women to property, and women’s rights in the workplace. I compiled a similar list of countries that The Guardian used in their data set and listed their percentage of women in the legislature (as of April 1, 2014) as well as their Freedom House score (Freedom House 2014).

Gendered Legislation

11

Table 1. List of Countries in Analysis Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bangladesh Belarus Belgium Benin

Colombia Congo Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire Croatia Czech Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo Denmark Dominican Republic

Guatemala Guinea Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel Italy

Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Namibia

Philippines Poland Portugal Republic of Korea Republic of Moldova Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal

Bolivia Bosnia & Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Chad Chile China

Ecuador Egypt* El Salvador Estonia Ethiopia Fiji* Finland France Gabon Georgia Germany Ghana Greece

Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Lithuania

Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru

Serbia Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan

Thailand The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Timor-Leste Togo Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United Republic of Tanzania United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Note: * indicates countries that did not have data on percentages of female legislators legislation, nor the change of the percentage of women in each country’s lower legislature over time. The passage of these laws could have aided the election of more female politicians and it is also possible that the percentage of women in the legislature as well as the passage of these laws are both correlated to other factors such as the countries’ cultural values, political and economic stability, and/or their Gross Domestic Products (GDPs).

My main independent variable for this project is the percentage of women in the lower legislature of each country examined (% of Women in Leg). To find this data, I drew from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) data from April 2014. I also included ten relevant control variables, which I explain in detail here. First, I include a measure of whether or not each country had a gender quota in place. A gender quota is defined by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2012) as an electoral system mechanism

12 that sets “a target or minimum threshold for women, and may apply to the number of women candidates proposed by a party for election,” or takes the form “of reserved seats in the legislature”. Data for gender quotas was taken from Global Database of Quotas for Women (2014a) and is represented as “Gender Quota” with either a score of 1 if the country has one present or 0 if not. For the purpose of this research, a gender quota was only recorded as present if it was legally required by electoral law or the constitution, and not just as a recommendation to the political parties in office. I included gender quotas largely because

system, gender equality, and development. These control variables were selected out of interest in the progress that previously French colonies, like Rwanda and Cameroon, have had recently in female political participation, despite their tumultuous history and unstable government system (Hunt 2014; UN Women 2013; Wilber 2011).

political scientists continue to debate whether or not gender quotas actually benefit female politicians and increase their participation. Thus, I seek to examine the effects of gender quotas on the index score as well as the percentage of women in government in each country.

whether or not the countries have majority Muslim or

Second, I include two control variables

measuring if the countries currently have or previously have had a female leader. To measure these, I used a list from J. McCullough’s “Female World Leaders Currently in Power”, updated April 18, 2014, to find data on countries that currently do and have previously had female leaders. The variable “Female Leader Present” represents whether or not countries currently have a female leader and “Female Leader Past” represents whether or not countries have had a female leader since World War II.

Next, I include two control variables

representing whether or not the country was a former British or French colony. Drawing from Lieberman (2015) and Sheers (2014), I recorded data for countries that were previously French or British colonies, as represented by “French Colony” and “British Colony”.

Past colonization and even current ties with colonial powers can have an effect on a country’s political

Fourth, I controlled for religion, particularly if

the country has a predominately Muslim or Catholic population. Using data from Golder, Golder, and Clark’s Principles of Comparative Politics (2012), the variables “Maj Muslim” and “Maj Catholic” measure Catholic populations (51% or higher). Existing works suggest that religion plays a strong role in determining cultural norms, and therefore, acceptable political behavior for women. If these two major world religions have an impact on female political participation, it is possible they will also affect policy.

Fifth, I incorporate control variables for each

country’s Freedom House score, gathered from the Freedom House’s 2014 report of Freedom in the World.

Freedom House is a nongovernmental organization that measures levels of democracy across the world by examining countries’ political rights and civil liberties. Factors such as election competitiveness, media freedom, and human rights are taken into consideration when given an overall score and ranked either “Free” (connoting a high score on an index associated with liberal democracies), “Partially Free” (a country with considerable restrictions on political and civil rights), or “Not Free” (mostly considered dictatorships). Countries’ Freedom House scores are commonly used as proxies for the level of democratization and should be included in this research as factors in gender equality and development.

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Lastly, I control for each country’s GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Each country’s GDP PPP for 2013 was gathered from the World Bank’s database (2014) and then entered into the dataset under “GDP PPP”. GDP PPP is a measure of economic development and as used in this research, can contribute to the idea that more developed countries tend to provide greater opportunities for women both economically and politically. If this is the case, then counties with a higher GDP PPP will most likely have higher index scores. These ten sets of data were combined and then analyzed using STATA

ranges of female representation extended from 0.3% (in Yemen) to 63.8% (in Rwanda) with the average being 21.96% women in the legislature’s lower house.

Figure 1 shows the percentage of women in the legislature among the examined countries. Within Free countries, the percentages of women in the lower house ranged from 8.1-45% while in Partly Free countries, it ranged from 2.7-41.6% and in Not Free countries, from 0.3-63.8%. As one would expect, Free countries had a generally higher range of the percentage of women in government than Partly Free and Not Free countries, except for Rwanda, which has

to determine whether or not there was a significant positive change in the countries’ index of pro-female laws when they had a higher percentage of women in government.

63.8% making it an obvious outlier. If Rwanda – a clear outlier – is removed from the analysis, the next Not Free country with the highest percentage of women in the lower house has 36.8% (Angola).

To briefly discuss the outliers in my research, I will address the country that has exceeded gender parity in the lower house with 63.8% women as well as the country that has only 0.3% women in the lower house, the lowest percentage out of the 137 countries.

Results and Analysis Of the 139 countries analyzed, 137 of them had data on the percentage of women in their legislature’s lower house as found by IPU.2 Of these countries, the

Figure 1. Countries’ Percentage of Women in the Lower Legislatures

Note: Y-axis represents percentage of countries

14

Gribbins

Rwanda is a Not Free country with an extremely high percentage of women in the legislature, especially when compared to countries similar in GDP and region of the world. The next highest percentage of women in the lower house, according to my data, is in South Africa, a Free country, with 44.8%.3 Studies of Rwanda and its peculiarly high percentage of women in the lower house of the legislature have been conducted and offer various explanations for this unusual characteristic. While there is no one factor that has created such a high percentage of women in the lower house, Rwanda’s governmental gender quota

elected by specific organs in accordance with national administrative entities” (Global Database of Quotas for Women 2014b). Gender quotas in Rwanda are just one institutional factor that could potentially explain the country’s 63.8% of women in the lower house. There may also be cultural factors to explain this (or the historical effects of the 1994 genocide that eliminated roughly 20% of the country’s entire population), though these would have to be more thoroughly researched and discussed in another paper.

Interestingly, the countries with both the highest and lowest percentage of women in the lower

more than likely contributes to this. According to the Global Database of Quotas for Women (2014b), both the lower and upper houses of Rwanda’s legislature have gender quotas in a percentage as well as an additional legislator count.

Out of the 80 seats in the country’s legislature, the Chamber of Deputies, 53 members are elected by “direct universal suffrage through a secret ballot using closed list proportional representation” and at least 30% of these seats must be reserved for women (Global Database of Quotas for Women 2014b). In addition, 24 women are also guaranteed seats through a provision in the constitution stating, “2 [women] elected from each province and from the city of Kigali by an electoral college with a women-only ballot,” (Global Database of Quotas for Women 2014b). Electoral law in Rwanda declares that these 24 women “shall be

house are Not Free countries. Yemen reports having just 0.3% women in the legislature—this meaning there is one woman in the country’s 301-member parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014).

Nevertheless, Yemen has made some advancements in women’s rights in the past 30 years. The country granted suffrage to women in 1967, the same year the southern part of the country received independence from Britain, despite its later slow movement toward democracy in the early 1990s (Freedom House 2005).

From 1990 to 1994, women in Yemen were guaranteed equality through the constitution and other legal measures, but when civil war broke out across the country in 1994, women lost almost all rights and were legally and socially reverted back to a secondclass status (Freedom House 2005). While the country may have scored a 3 on the index, Freedom House has

Table 2. Total Countries and Legislation Passed Legislation Passed Domestic Violence Sexual Harassment Criminal Sanctions for Sexual Harassment Maternity Leave Equal Pay for Equal Work Gender Non-Discrimination in the Workplace

Number of Countries 75 84 63 134 57 66

Gendered Legislation

15

published that “Gender inequality in the law remains a major problem today, and legal implementation and protections for women are very poor” (Freedom House 2005). This quote demonstrates the issue of enforcement of pro-female laws that I will bring up later.

There are several different factors that play into Yemen’s having such a low percentage of women in the lower legislature. From an institutional standpoint, the country does not have the means to enforce the compulsory education law, meaning the majority of Yemeni girls do not attend school, and the government

(Al Jazeera 2014) upon the ratification of the country’s new constitution. Culturally, many Yemeni people do not believe in educating girls due to religious teachings of gender inequality and girls are often married off early in life, further preventing them from attaining a basic education and economic independence, especially the chance to become an elected official.

Moving on to the breakdown of countries and their scores on the index of pro-female laws, the range of these total scores went from 1-6 with a 3.4 being the average score among the 139 countries. Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of countries with specified

does not have set gender quotas, even though 89% of Yemeni women who are aware of gender quotas strongly or somewhat support them, according to a survey done by The International Foundation for Electoral Systems and The Institute for Women’s Policy Research (2010). Recently, however, it has been reported that the Yemeni government will consider instituting an electoral gender quota recommending that at least 30% of governmental officials be women

total index scores and Table 2 shows the number of countries that had instituted each piece of legislation used in the pro-female law index. While Free countries had an average index score of 3.61, Partly Free countries had an average score of 3.64 and Not Free countries, an average of 2.83. Once again, there is a trend showing that Not Free countries generally are less protective of women’s rights and do not have as many laws instituted that protect women and gender

Figure 2. Countries’ Total Index Scores

Note: Y-axis represents percentage of countries Total Index Scores

16 equality. To say that Free countries are always more female-friendly, however, would not necessarily be true, as the Partly Free countries have a higher average score on my index than Free countries. One could argue that the average index score for Partially Free countries is higher than in Free countries because Free countries may seem already more egalitarian to the general public and legislators, therefore making these issues and laws seem not necessary to address/enact.

All three categories of countries, Free, Partly Free, and Not Free, had the same range of index scores from 1-6.

For each country, I examined whether or not they currently have or previously have had a female leader. Only 15 of the countries I analyzed currently have female heads of state4 and 30 have previously had female heads of state (since WWII)5. If the country currently has a female leader, it received a 1 under the “Female Leader Present” category and if it does not, it received a 0. This same method was used under the “Female Leader Past” category. I used the Global Database of Quotas for Women (2014a) to find out which of the countries had instituted electoral gender quotas. Below, Table 3 illustrates how many of the countries I analyzed currently have gender quotas. Countries with gender quotas received a 1 and countries without received a 0. In addition, I coded the countries with 0s and 1s under categories for “Former French Colony,” “Former British Colony,” “Majority Muslim Population,” and “Majority Catholic Population”6. These variables were used to determine whether or not religion and colonization play a

role in the countries’ total index scores and gender equality. Finally, the natural log of each country’s GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) was added into the data set.

As Table 4 shows, Model 1 included the independent variable of percentage of women in the lower legislature in order to determine what effect this has on the amount of pro-female policy that is passed in the legislature. This regression showed that there is a small but statistically significant increase in a country’s total index score when the percentage of women in the lower legislature is higher. In Model 2, I included the presence of gender quotas for each country and the variables “Female Leader Present” and “Female Leader Past.” Including the gender quota, which was not a statistically significant variable, resulted in the percentage of women in the legislature variable to have less of an impact on the countries’ total index scores; however, it remained statistically significant and has a positive effect on the index scores. Adding these variables did not produce any significant results despite the assumption by their supporters that gender quotas increase women’s representation in government and therefore, the passing of legislation that protects women. When a regression was estimated to examine if there was a positive correlation between the percentage of women in the lower legislatures and the presence of a gender quota, no statistically significant results were found.

Partially Free and Not Free countries were taken into consideration in Model 3. The category

Table 3. Percentage of Countries With and Without Gender Quotas Not Free

Partially Free

Free

No Quota

6.81

34.09

59.09

Quota

19.67

44.26

36.07

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics “Free” is omitted in this model to prevent perfect multicollinearity and thus, is used as a benchmark to evaluate the categories “Partially Free” and “Not Free.” In this model, I also controlled for the variables “Former French Colony,” “Former British Colony,” “Majority Muslim Population,” “Majority Catholic Population,” and GDP PPP. Percentages of women in the lower legislature remained significant, but the significance of the gender quota variable decreased.

This may be due to the fact that the mere presence of a gender quota does not necessarily mean there will be more women in government. The actual enforcement of a gender quota could possibly produce an increase in the countries’ total index scores, much like the actual percentage of women in the legislature.

To directly answer my research question, the percentages of women in the lower house of the legislature and total score on the index of pro-female laws were analyzed with the percentage of women being the independent variable and the total index score being the dependent variable. Through a series

17

of regressions, I found that for every 1% increase in women in the lower house of the legislature, there is a 0.03 unit increase in the country’s total score on the index of pro-female laws. If there is an even larger increase in the percentage of women in the legislature in a given country, there is a more dramatic change in the total score of the country’s index of pro-female laws. For example, a 33% increase in the amount of women in the legislature would result in a whole 1-unit increase in the total index score. The percentage of women in the lower legislature remained statistically significant and had a positive effect on the countries’ total index scores in all three of my models.

Conclusion While very few countries across the world have reached legislative gender parity and/or have female leaders, there are institutional factors that help or hinder women from entering the political sphere.

Gender quotas instituted by either electoral law or constitutions usually benefit female politicians by

Table 4. OLS Regression on Gender Legislation Index Model 1 Model 2 Coef SE Coef SE % Women in Leg 0.03** 0.01 0.03* 0.01 Gender Quota 0.46 0.30 Female Leader Present -0.31 0.56 Female Leader Past 0.23 0.45 French Colony British Colony Maj. Muslim Maj. Catholic GDP PPP Partially Free Not Free Constant 2.77*** 0.28 2.68*** 0.39 N 137 104 2 Adjusted R 0.04 0.03 Note: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p <0.05; Regressions are unstandardized coefficients

Model 3 Coef 0.03* 0.57 -0.20 -0.10 -0.43 0.63 -0.33 0.26 0.01 0.25 -0.58 2.44 104 0.06

SE 0.01 0.35 0.56 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.38 0.18 0.44 0.57 1.90

18

Gribbins

increasing their chances of getting elected to office in a society where male-dominated politics is the norm; although in this research, it was discovered that there was no correlation between an increase in the percentage of women in the lower legislature and the presence of a gender quota. It is important to study how certain institutional systems affect the amount of women in government, but what is as equally important, although less studied, are the affects the amount of female politicians within a given district or country have on legislation. In this research, I have found that there is significant data showing gendered legislation does exist.

By comparing countries from every region in the world along with their percentages of women in the lower legislature, their Freedom House scores, as well as some of the laws they possess that advance womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rights in some form, I discovered that there is a measureable effect of the amount of women in the legislature on pro-female laws. In Free, Partly Free, and Not Free countries, the amount of women in the lower house of the legislature increases the likelihood that these countries will have higher scores on the index of pro-female laws as derived from measures used by the United Nations to assess progress of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s women. I also found that, generally, Free countries have higher average ranges of percentages of women in the legislature than Partly Free and Not Free countries, however, Partly Free countries had a slightly higher average score on the index than Free countries.

This research is important because it provides evidence that the amount of women in government does have an impact on bettering the lives of women around the globe. Contrary to some arguments, female politicians can and do help other women through politics and sometimes their politics are different than that of male politicians. Whether legislation is

completely gendered or not remains to be discovered, though, my research suggests that there could be an indirect correlation between a stronger presence of women in government and the type of legislation (profemale) instituted by the government.

It is important to list some of the limitations of my research analysis. First, I did not attempt to measure the extent to which these laws used as measures in the index are enforced in each country.

There is an obvious difference between the passing, institution, and enforcement of a law and while many of the countries I studied may have passed or instituted such pro-female laws, they may not necessarily enforce the laws, thus, lowering the overall wellbeing of women within those countries. My research specifically examined the presence of a few pro-female laws and does not argue that having more women in government automatically creates a safer and more progressive environment for women. It is also possible that these pro-female laws encourage the election of more female representatives. I originally began to include data on each democratic countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s electoral system, to see whether or not this would have an influence on the total index score, however, much of my data was unavailable, and therefore, inconclusive.

Future expansion on this research should consider electoral systems as a direct effect on the percentage of women in government and an indirect effect on the total index score.

Future research should also examine the actual enforcement of such laws by using various measures of overall safety and well-being of women within a country; amount of lawsuits filed by women with complaints of breaching of the laws I introduced into the index; as well as legislative amendments made that increase the sanctions for violators of laws that protect women. There is also potential to expand this research

Gendered Legislation and use it to support theories that more women in government makes a difference in increasing domestic gender equality. Using measures such as gender gaps in education, employment, pay, life expectancy, and voter turnout (similar to those in the United Nation’s Human Development and Gender Inequality Indices) in addition to the variables analyzed in this paper, could make a stronger argument about the importance of increasing female political participation for the betterment of women and gender equality worldwide. If this research is extended, it will be able to help international researchers determine what factors contribute to the advancement or regression of women’s rights in legislation as well as contribute to politicians’ and feminists’ discussion of getting more women involved in government and making the world a better place for women overall.

19

The two countries that did not have these data were Egypt and Fiji.

2

This came from my preliminary research, as some countries were not included because they lacked additional data.

3

Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, Liberia, Lithuania, Norway, Philippines, Slovenia, South Korea , and Thailand.

4

Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.

5

Initially, models with a Majority Protestant Population variable were included, but they failed to reach statistical significance in any model.

6

Notes 1

Countries that lacked data and were omitted

included Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hong Kong, Iraq, Kiribati, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Myanmar, Nauru, Palestine, Palau, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

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Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

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Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M., and Roseanna Michelle Heath. 2003. “Do Women Legislators Have Different Policy Priorities than Their Male Colleagues?” Women and Politics 24 (4): 77101.

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22

Media, Identity, and Violence: American Indian Occupations 1969 – 1973 Hannah Trostle Macalester College What makes an occupation effective? I analyze this question using a case-study analysis of occupations from the American Indian Movement (A.I.M.) in the early 1970s. In this period, A.I.M. utilized occupations as their primary tactic of promoting change, but increasingly faced violence. I augment Tarrow’s (1998) theory with the scholarship of Bonney (1977) on American Indian Nationalism as well as Sanchez and Stuckey (2000) on A.I.M.’s rhetoric.

I examine three key variables: media coverage, ideology/identity, and state violence. From this analysis, I propose there are dual purposes to an occupation: 1) to generate a moment of ideological crisis to build a strong base; and 2) to gain media coverage to educate the public.

Introduction Alcatraz, Stolen Land. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, Colonialism. Wounded Knee, Massacre.

The latter events continue as historical moments of contention and violence. To occupy such sites is to demand recognition of the occupiers, the occupier’s communities, and the history of violence that has led to symbolic protest.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s in Minneapolis, urban American Indians formed the American Indian Movement (A.I.M.). The movement went to a national scale as A.I.M. focused on engaging reservation communities and challenging the federal government. Dennis Banks (Ojibwe1), Russell Means (Lakota2), and Clyde Bellecourt (Ojibwe3), became the most prominent leaders using bold, direct action tactics to bring attention to the American Indian experience. A.I.M. tried to moderate between the urban American Indian activists and the needs of the reservation communities, but the groups’ radical tactics continued to drive them apart from other American Indian activists.

I analyze three case studies of A.I.M.’s occupations in the early 1970s. I selected these cases because they generated significant media coverage and provoked divergent responses from the U.S. federal government. Through the media coverage, I will examine how A.I.M. used an ideology of identity in the occupations and crafted their message in each occupation in order to pursue stated and implicit goals. I note how A.I.M. occupations follow Tarrow’s (1998) claim about the model of violence, particularly that successful, nonviolent occupations will lead to more militant, violent confrontations with the state.

I propose that the purpose of an occupation is to educate the public through the media and to generate a moment of ideological crisis within the movement itself.

Theoretical Framework

Tarrow (1998) argues for a model of contentious politics based off conceptualizations of violence, namely the threat of violence. He describes social movements as encompassing several types of actions. One such action is a “disruption”, defined as a

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

23

symbolic form of protest: “the concrete performance of a movement’s determination” (Tarrow 1998, 96).

Occupations function as a way to enact a militant takeover without inviting significant state suppression.

This requires a high level of commitment (i.e., the risk of arrest), such that over-use of this tactic, and the resulting greater policing of protesters, will drive the less committed to leave. As a result, this allows the more radical, militant faction of a group to take over, ultimately leading to confrontation (Tarrow 1998, 98). A “confrontation” is the interaction between activists’ movements and police tactics that lead to

this warrior imagery to legitimize their radicalization.

This personal identification with a broader national project of American Indian nationalism generated the commitment needed to perform Tarrow’s (1998) disruption and confrontation tactics.

According to Sanchez and Stuckey (2000, 121, 131), the role of militancy and the warrior symbol had more to do with the public than with the formation of a national American Indian identity. In order to create policy changes with the federal government, A.I.M. had to appear as rational actors contrary to dominant stereotypes of American Indians. In order to garner

violent clashes with the state (Tarrow 1998, 95). This polarizes movements by driving away a moderate middle ground, limiting potential for the movement’s growth and sustainability (Tarrow 1998, 96). Violence can serve as a tool to radicalize members behind an ideology, but the movement’s ultimate goal is not reached without complete revolution. Tarrow’s (1998) model of violence, however, fails to explain how movements maintain members and interact with the greater public, not just the state.

To address the above shortcoming, I build on Bonney (1977) and Sanchez and Stuckey’s (2000) research. Bonney (1977) specifically analyzes A.I.M. within the intersection of leadership and national identity. Bonney (1977, 211) proposed that the formation of a national American Indian identity must be considered the key to A.I.M.’s mission.

Although American Indian communities are diverse and widespread, forming a national identity united the disparate needs of urban and reservation communities (Bonney 1977, 212). By integrating cultural and ethnic pride, the ideology utilized traditional religion and militant rhetoric to bring in members as “warriors fighting for their cultural survival” (Bonney 1977, 218- 219; 221). A.I.M. used

support from the public, however, they had to enact stereotypes of warriors (Sanchez and Stuckey 2000, 123). A.I.M.’s imagery and actions stand in tension to one another, balancing which audience they need to move: the federal government, the public, or American Indians.

A.I.M. could not draw attention to their goals without utilizing Tarrow’s (1998) disruption tactics, but the media and the public focused more on the confrontation’s imagery than on A.I.M.’s goal of opening up discussions with the federal government (Sanchez and Stuckey 2000, 131). The audience for each direct action complicated the imagery of the American Indian identity by mixing in stereotypes that confused A.I.M.’s messaging. Sanchez and Stuckey (2000) then seem to agree with Bonney (1977) that this imagery brought radicalization inside the movement and furthered the possibility of violent confrontation.

The movement attempted to re-assert the violence’s origins as a product of the federal government’s intervention in American Indian communities (Sanchez and Stuckey 2000, 130). The rhetoric plays upon Tarrow’s (1998) understanding of the threat of violence as power, such that A.I.M.’s occupations are shown as reactionary to a history of state violence.

24

Trostle

Through this, A.I.M.’s tactics encouraged “collective responsibility” in the public by retelling history from the perspective of the colonized (Sanchez and Stuckey 2000, 128). Confrontational tactics drew attention to an overall American Indian narrative.

These complications are obscured by Tarrow’s (1998) theory that synthesizes direct actions into just three categories. Building on Bonney (1977) and Sanchez and Stuckey’s (2000) research, A.I.M’s tactics can then be seen as part of a broader rhetoric and ideology of a national pan-American Indian identity.

Thus, A.I.M.’s occupations can be described as a call

the adolescents attended the colleges at San Francisco State University and the University of California Berkeley (Alcatraz Is Not an Island 2002). In 1969, however, the cultural center burned down, and the American Indian community began to look for land to build a new center (Deloria 1974, 37). This is when the American Indian community began to recognize Alcatraz as a symbol of what they had lost and of what they could become.

The federal government had closed Alcatraz prison in 1963. The island then became property managed by the General Services Administration

to re-interpret the dominant discourse of American history or as a militant, radical expression of a panAmerican Indian identity in response to assimilationist pressure.

(GSA). If the GSA could find no use for the property within government programs, the property would be declared surplus and could be sold to state, local, regional agencies or nonprofits for public benefit.

When the GSA declared Alcatraz surplus property, the American Indian community made their move under the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie saying that the status of “surplus land” returned control over the land to the Sioux4 (Alcatraz Is Not an Island 2002).

This occupation is the catalytic moment in the movement for American Indian rights, encompassing direct action tactics, unification through ideology, and negotiation with a white authority. I chose this case, the Alcatraz Occupation, because it is the first occupation with widespread media coverage and a violent government response. The occupation presents its stated goals through hyperbole in the Alcatraz Proclamation, but, in actuality, their true goals are implicit. The takeover of Alcatraz would not have been possible without a coalition of American Indians. Due to its distance from Minneapolis, A.I.M. took a supportive role, participating in conferences and learning from the occupiers on the island. I will analyze how this occupation was successful and how it shaped A.I.M.’s future actions.

The Alcatraz Occupation (1969-1971) Alcatraz as a Site of Violence

In San Francisco Bay sits a rock with a history of violence, suppression, occupation, and freedom known as Alcatraz. For some, the island evokes the federal prison that stood on there until 1963. For others, the island is the catalyst in a movement of freedom for American Indian peoples.

In the 1950s, the federal government implemented “tribal termination”, a policy that ended the formal relationship between American Indian tribes and the U.S. federal government. American Indians were encouraged to enter urban environments to assimilate further to the dominant Anglo-U.S. culture. American Indians, however, formed their own communities, and for the first time many Americans Indians met other tribes and recognized their shared history of oppression (Alcatraz Is Not an Island 2002). In San Francisco, the urban American Indian community founded a cultural community center, and

Media, Identity, and Violence Seizing Alcatraz

Several attempts were made to take the island, but no occupation really took root until November 1969. On November 20th, a group of American Indians, many of whom were college students, took the island and demanded recognition as “The Indians of All Tribes” (Smith and Warrior 1996, 18). The U.S. Coast Guard attempted a blockade for three days, but failed to keep supplies and additional occupiers off the island (Harvey 1970, ii). The occupation reached a crescendo seven days later on Thanksgiving Day when more than four hundred protesters poured onto its shores (Fortunate Eagle 2002, 84). In December 1969, the occupiers held a conference proposing the creation of a cultural and educational center on the island (New York Times 1969). For this conference, the fledgling A.I.M. of Minneapolis sent a delegation to support the occupation and learn from the occupiers’ momentum (Hagan 2012, 151).

Richard Oakes (Mohawk5) stepped up as a spokesperson of the Indians of All Tribes. He became a major figure in the media, delivering speeches and explaining the purpose of the occupation. Tragedy struck in January of 1970, Oakes’ stepdaughter died from a fall on the island, and Oakes left the occupation (New York Times 1970). The power vacuum caused by Oakes’ absence created tension among the occupiers.

Despite the internal politics, the occupation seemed to be getting through to government administrators.

Misfortune fell again on June 1, 1970, as fire broke out for several hours on Alcatraz, destroying four of the prison’s old buildings (Smith and Warrior 1996, 93).

In July 1970, President Nixon distributed a “Special Message on Indian Affairs” stating his disagreement with the U.S. government’s tribal termination policy (Nixon 1970). By June 1971, however, the public’s attention had drifted away, and the government ended

25

the occupation, forcibly removing the last few people who remained on the island.

Unification without a Solid Base

A key question emerges: how did this group manage to control Alcatraz island for nineteen months? The occupiers on the island changed regularly, as many had to return to their daily lives.

Then, new occupiers would take their place. Some were urban American Indians with little connection to their culture, while others had traveled from their reservations. The occupiers represented several hundred tribes from around the nation, and the leadership on the island was not clearly delineated or established. The opportunities for internal strife and outward disorganization seemed endless, yet the occupation put up a united front. In order to explain this, I argue that a rhetoric of American Indian Nationalism unified this disparate group even as occupiers entered and left the island.

Following the logic of Bonney (1977) and Sanchez and Stuckey’s (2000) scholarship, the spokespeople created a pan-American Indian nationalism to bring the disparate group of American Indians together with a common, radical ideology.

John Trudell (Santee6), an Alcatraz occupier and future leader of A.I.M., articulated this through one of the community radio broadcasts on the island: “We would like to see a strong sense of nationalism built and I think Alcatraz is starting to do that. Alcatraz started doing that just by the physical occupation” (Johnson 1995, 108). Trudell asserts that the formation of this American Indian nationalism must begin at Alcatraz.

He recognizes that the occupation’s ultimate success or failure pales in comparison to the overarching issues affecting the American Indian community. In order to maintain unity during the island’s occupation, the occupiers had to share a common understanding

26 of American Indian identity and nationalism.

Nationalism is not only present, but also a goal of the occupation for the movement’s future.

Media: On Target

The media could not ignore the occupation’s dramatic events. An occupier even described the press coverage as “enthusiastic” (Harvey 1970, 3). A range of media outlets, including mainstream television and leftist magazines, covered the occupation’s significant events. Their reactions varied from praise to dismissal.

In addition to mainstream media, the occupiers had their own media outlets that covered the island and their home communities. I propose that because the occupiers attracted national media through sensational events and produced their own media, the occupiers were able to disseminate their message and dictate the occupation’s extent.

First, as noted above, the occupiers published

and broadcasted their own media. They published a manifesto entitled the Alcatraz Proclamation, ran a community radio called Radio Free Alcatraz, and created an Indians of All Tribes newsletter known as “Rock Talk”. The Alcatraz Proclamation, largely through sarcasm and hyperbole, detailed the occupation’s purpose: “We, the native Americans, reclaim the land known as Alcatraz Island in the name of all American Indians by right of discovery” (Indians of All Tribes 1969). As Bonney (1977) and Sanchez and Stuckey (2000) proposed, the occupation presented itself as a return to American Indian culture and pride.

Although the language is hyperbolic, the occupation did mean to create a community and education center there. These proclamations and news articles were not just distributed on the island, but also in the occupier’s home communities.

National television news focused on the occupation’s sensationalism, covering Alcatraz nine

times in the evening news broadcasts. A search of the Vanderbilt University Television Archives revealed that ABC and CBS each covered the occupation twice.7 NBC, however, had the most extensive coverage beginning mid-January through the end of the occupation.8 In general, broadcast television reported on only the major events, such as the fires and the ultimate removal of the occupiers from the island. National newspapers gave a more in-depth perspective on the occupation. The New York Times created a series following the events on Alcatraz, ranging from coverage claiming that the American Indians are violent (see Caldwell 1970) to the everyday life of the occupation (see Johnson 1970). The coverage legitimized the occupation as a non-violent protest movement, but also uncovered aspects that the occupiers did not want revealed to the public.

The occupiers attempted to control the outside mainstream media, which eventually led to the erosion of the trust that had developed between the media and the occupation. According to Fortunate Eagle (Ojibwe), the occupiers felt hostility towards the media’s presence on their island, and “when reporters covered some of the problems on Alcatraz, the island council was quick to condemn them” (1992, 119-120).

In preventing the media from full access to the island, the occupiers were attempting to preserve their image, but this led to lessened media interest and distrust on the part of reporters. Media coverage waned, diminishing the public and occupiers’ pressure on government administrators, leading to the occupation’s collapse in 1971.

The Success of the Alcatraz Occupation

The occupation’s impact lasted long after the last American Indians were removed from the island. Within the American Indian communities, the occupation’s experiences forged a strong pride in

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics American Indian identities, inspiring new leadership.

John Trudell later became a leading member of A.I.M. in the 1970s. One of the student occupiers during the Alcatraz Occupation, Wilma Mankiller, later became the first female chief of the Cherokee Nation and recognized Alcatraz as a defining moment in her life (Alcatraz Is Not an Island 2002). Nationally, the occupation brought positive media attention to the issues faced by American Indian communities, creating a space for the federal government to reevaluate its relationship with the tribes. The occupation found success, not in its physical occupation of the island, but in the actual changes it brought to the American Indian communities.

A.I.M.’s role in the Alcatraz Occupation was that of a supportive member of a larger coalition.

Their delegation in December 1969 attempted to study how the non-violent protest was carried out in order to emulate it when they returned to Minneapolis (Alcatraz Is Not an Island 2002). Alcatraz had been the first pan-American Indian activism, and A.I.M. resolved to not let it be the last. After the occupation ended, AIM called for a conference in 1972 to continue to pressure the U.S. federal government.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs Takeover (1972)

27

the protest. The occupation’s goals are also clearly delineated in the “Trail of Broken Treaties 20-Point Position Paper” (1972), offering a more accurate comparison between the stated and implicit goals of the action. Furthermore, the B.I.A. takeover involved a coalition of American Indian activist groups, such that I can investigate how A.I.M. maintained members and handled group dynamics throughout the occupation.

According to my analysis, the occupation did not truly succeed in any of its stated or implicit goals.

The B.I.A. Takeover Background

The B.I.A. building takeover arose directly out

of a longer national protest march, the Trail of Broken Treaties. The march acquired added urgency when Richard Oakes, a leader of the Alcatraz Occupation, was killed in September 1972 during an unrelated confrontation in California (Deloria 1974, 46). The march’s official name was The Trail of Broken Treaties Caravan and the Pan American Native Quest for Justice, highlighting the greater goals of a national American Indian identity and the common concerns of urban and reservation American Indians (Smith and Warrior 1996, 142). Eventually, the march became simply known as the “Trail of Broken Treaties” in mainstream newspapers. The march began in October 1972 on

Moving forward to Washington D.C.

the west coast and made its way east, recruiting

participants as they passed through reservations. This

In November 1972, a group of American

Indian activists occupied the Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.I.A.) federal building in Washington D.C., and they erected a tipi in front of what they now called the Native American Embassy. This incident evoked wider themes within indigenous social justice movements: direct action tactics, unification of a diverse group, and negotiation with an imbalanced power dynamic.

I chose this case because of the wide media coverage and the U.S. government’s tempered response to

action united many of the most prominent American Indian organizations at that time into a coalition with a shared goal (Smith and Warrior 1996, 142). When the march reached A.I.M.’s headquarters in Minneapolis, the organizers drafted the “Trail of Broken Treaties 20Point Position Paper” (1972) that described the many grievances with the federal government’s treatment of tribal sovereignty and treaty rights. The effort was united and diplomatic, and the actions planned for

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when they reached Washington D.C. were all nonviolent, symbolic protests.

Problems arose, however, as their housing coordinator in Washington D.C. was unable to secure a large enough location for the 800 or so American Indians, so the caravan went to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.I.A.) to request assistance (Deloria 1975, 54). The B.I.A. officials and the organizers finalized a deal where the caravan could stay in an auditorium at the Labor Department (Smith and Warrior 1996, 157). Through a series of miscommunications, the riot police attempted to disperse the caravan from the B.I.A. at 5:00pm. The American Indians barricaded themselves inside the building. The occupiers renamed the building “The Native American Embassy” and assigned offices to the different groups in the coalition who were now involved in an impromptu occupation.

A.I.M. took the media spotlight as the militant instigators of this move. The occupiers demanded that their “Trail of Broken Treaties 20-Point Position Paper” (1972) be considered by President Nixon’s administration. Finally, after more than a week of occupation, the U.S. federal government arranged a transportation grant for the occupiers to return to their homes, ensured that amnesty would be granted to the protesters for any damage caused, and that they would respond to the “Trail of Broken Treaties 20Point Position Paper” (1972). The latter actions by U.S. federal government finally brought the occupation to a close (Deloria 1974, 53-62).

Communication and Unification

The occupation’s perplexing question is how were they able to occupy a federal building in Washington D.C. for more than a week on the spur of the moment without any planning? This central conundrum can in part be answered by recognizing how such a disparate group united to act as a

coordinated whole. Modes of communication between the different groups taking part in the “Trail of Broken Treaties 20-Point Position Paper” (1972) had already been established along the month-long march. In fact, their paper referred to “Indian people” and called for the restoration of treaty-making processes between the U.S. and the tribes (“Trail of Broken Treaties 20-Point Position Paper” 1972). The underlying assumption of this demand is that the American Indian community is united nationally and has rebuffed the assimilationist policies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

They had united under a national American Indian identity and were going to petition the government as American Indian peoples.

This shared national identity lent legitimacy to their occupation: there was a sense of ownership of the B.I.A. One of the occupiers, Sid Mills (Yakama9), explained why the caravan had originally gone to the B.I.A. in search of a place to stay: “We’re going down to our building. We’re going down to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. We own that son of a bitch” (Smith and Warrior 1996, 153). This was the only place that they had Washington D.C., and the actions of the riot police propelled them to defend their right to be present.

They felt that it was their building, that they should have access to it, and that the federal government was encroaching on that access and on their land.

The Building Itself

The location was not the most defensible, seeing as it was connected to several other buildings in the capitol complex via underground tunnels.

Furthermore, although the building was in Washington D.C., the targets of the “Trail of Broken Treaties 20-Point Position Paper” (1972), namely President Nixon and Congress members, were not currently in Washington D.C. because 1972 was a midterm and presidential election year. Theoretically,

Media, Identity, and Violence

29

the protest was in the right place to create legislative change to how treaties were instituted (i.e., the nation’s capital), but their stated audience was not there, as they were campaigning on their home turf. As the occupation continued, American Indians feared everthreatening evictions by the riot police, as the damage done to the B.I.A. building increased. The attempts to secure the building created more damage as offices were upturned in search of makeshift weapons. As Tarrow’s (1998) scholarship predicted, what started as a disruption to the normal order, saw escalating levels of threatened violence between the protestors and the state as the situation threatened to devolve into a confrontation.

The proximity to high-ranking officials in the nation’s capital, however, kept the protest from devolving into a riot. The occupation’s location increased communications between occupiers and public officials. It also forced the government to come to a speedy resolution of the occupiers’ claims. Officials could not wage a war of resilience. They could not wait for the occupation to fade out on its own, as in the Alcatraz Occupation. They had to act now or risk the continual embarrassment of armed fights in a federal building in the capital. The U.S. federal government could not ignore the location. Even if the main targets of the demand were not present, federal officials had to give the protesters a response.

takeover appearing from November 1st through November 10th, 1972. The New York Times frequently described the occupation as “militant” (Richardson 2010, 13). While The Washington Post emphasized the orderliness of the caravan and occupation, mainstream newspapers saw the occupation as “ineffectual, weak, and trivial” whereas American Indian newspapers framed the protest as a peaceful, even spiritual undertaking (Richardson 2010, 13, 15). Richardson’s scholarship, however, omits a significant portion of the media coverage: the occupation’s aftermath.

After originally dismissing the occupation as fruitless, the mainstream media latched onto the idea of American Indians causing damage to the B.I.A. building. Journalists compared the occupation to the “burning of Washington by the British in 1814 and the destruction of government buildings in the San Francisco earthquake in 1906” (Katz 1972, A4).

Journalists then reported that the federal government was attempting to charge some of the protesters for damage and theft, including a quote calling the protesters “bloody revolutionaries” and comparing their occupation to much smaller sit-ins (Baker 1972).

The media sensationalized the resulting destruction and further delegitimized the American Indian occupiers after the occupation had ended.

Media: Missing the Point

Was the B.I.A. occupation a success? I argue that it

Although government officials could not ignore occupiers, the media originally downplayed the occupation’s importance. A search of the Vanderbilt University Television News Archives revealed that broadcast television mentioned the takeover 15 times between November 2, 1972 and November 10, 1972.10 The occupation did not take up the public imagination.

Richardson (2010) analyzed the news stories of the

The Success of the B.I.A. Occupation

The final question then can now be answered:

was not. Indeed, the B.I.A. occupation had brought the “Trail of Broken Treaties 20-Point Position Paper” (1972) to the attention of government officials, with responses expected within sixty days of the occupation’s end. According to the scholar, Vine Deloria (Standing Rock Sioux11) (1974), the document had received scant attention, such that the government dismissed all the claims that the paper put forth. The

30 mainstream media, first downplaying the protest and then conversely sensationalizing the damage, certainly had no interest in it. The “Trail of Broken Treaties 20Point Position Paper” (1972) introduced such items as “4. Commission to Review Treaty Commitments and Violations” and “12. Repeal of State Laws Enacted Under Public Law 280 (1953)” and so on for more than fifteen pages. The occupiers had successfully managed to stay in a building in the nation’s capital despite the

that they had forged fractured in the face of federal bureaucracy and power. Ultimately, the occupation resulted in an atmosphere hostile to coalition organizing within the American Indian community and hostile to American Indian activists’ tactics on the national level.

Standoff at Wounded Knee (1973)

enact the policies in the “Trail of Broken Treaties 20-

Although experiencing the failure at the B.I.A. and the dissolution of their major coalition, A.I.M. continued to be a presence nationally. They embraced their mainstream media-given role as the militant group of American Indian activists As Bonney’s (1977) scholarship suggests, the activists’ ideology became significantly more nationalist as they built on the media’s stereotypical portrayals, and their actions escalated in terms of violence. In this case study, I will examine how A.I.M. utilized American Indian nationalism and the media within Tarrow’s (1998) model of violence in protest movements.

I chose this case because this was A.I.M.’s last nationally well-known action, and the government’s response was undeniably violent. The mainstream media noticed the sensationalism of the story of American Indians fighting the government at gunpoint. A.I.M.’s direct action tactics verged into violence during this occupation as the rhetoric of nationalism became clearer and only the radical members of A.I.M. remained after the B.I.A. failure.

I investigate how the media explained the events, how A.I.M. utilized violence in the direct action, and whether the occupation achieved its aims.

Point Position Paper” (1972). The mainstream media

Standoff at Wounded Knee Background

coverage ruined their credibility with the public, as

The occupation of Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation began February 27, 1973, and lasted seventy-one days until May 8, 1973. Bloodshed and death marked the events at Wounded Knee as the F.B.I.

threat of riot police and had opened negotiations with the government, but it appeared to have resulted in no gains for the American Indian community.

Smith and Warrior (1996) further point

out that 1972 had begun with the organizing of an American Indian coalition, connecting disparate groups throughout the U.S., but the coalition had fractured under the stress of the B.I.A. occupation with A.I.M. leading the more militant factions. Although they had occupied a building in Washington D.C. for more than a week, the mainstream media did not bring national attention to American Indian issues, rather it amplified the image of A.I.M.’s leaders as warriors while obscuring American Indians’ grievances with the federal government. One of the main negotiators, Hank Adams (Assiniboine12), noted the confusion in the occupation’s outcomes: “To some, we had defeated the building; to others, the building had defeated us” (Smith and Warrior 1996, 166).

Therefore, I purport that the occupation

could not be considered successful, as A.I.M. did not successfully negotiate with the federal government to

American Indians were painted as vandals rather than as activists. The coalition group broke down during the occupation, and the national American Indian identity

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics and A.I.M. were locked in a standoff. How did A.I.M. end up in this situation? Unlike Alcatraz, Wounded Knee was not surplus land and unlike occupying Washington D.C., South Dakota was not a site of political power. Wounded Knee was, however, the site of the last massacre of the American Indian Wars in 1890 and a place of political conflict in the early 1970s. The location was an important reminder of past violence and a meaningful place to shape the future for American Indians.

The Pine Ridge Reservation underwent internal strife when Dick Wilson was elected tribal chairman (Smith and Warrior 1996, 191). He had long been hostile to A.I.M.’s activism, and was accused of putting the needs of Pine Ridge village before those of the rural, traditional members (Deloria 1974, 70-71). This more traditional sect of the Pine Ridge Reservation, the Oglala Lakota, invited A.I.M. to help them depose Wilson (Smith and Warrior 1996, 191-192). Wilson, however, ran an informal private militant group called the Guardians Of the Oglala Nation, more commonly called the G.O.O.N. Squad, in order “to handle people like Russell Means and other radicals” (Reinhardt 2007,158). This situation worried the U.S. federal government who then increased staffing of the B.I.A. and F.B.I. on Pine Ridge as well as sending the Special Operations Group of the Marshal Service to Pine Ridge (Smith and Warrior 1996, 192). At this point, A.I.M. issued a single demand: that Senator William Fulbright hold hearings to honor the Sioux treaties in order to remove Wilson from power (Deloria 1974, 74). As a result, the stage was set for violence between A.I.M. and the federal authorities.

More than seventy-five tribes took part in the occupation of Wounded Knee (American Indian Movement 1973, 1). The U.S. federal marshals set up roadblocks, and the activists and federal officials

31

began to exchange gunfire as tension mounted.

The occupation continued to grow. Two American Indians supporting A.I.M. were killed: Buddy Lamont (Lakota13) and Frank Clearwater (Cherokee14). Frank Fools Crow, an elder of the traditional Oglala Lakota flew to New York to petition the United Nations (We Shall Remain 2009). Upon the death of Lamont, Frank Fools Crow called for an end to the occupation before another Wounded Knee Massacre could take place.

Clearwater’s death was unexpected, occurring at the occupation’s end, shortly after Clearwater had arrived in Pine Ridge. A.I.M. supporters fled from the town in the middle of the night, and the federal government came in the next day on May 8, 1973, to arrest the remaining 120 people.

Nationalism and Violence

At this point, I would like to draw attention back to Tarrow’s (1998) model of violence. The Standoff at Wounded Knee illustrates Tarrow’s (1998) point that power is equated with violence, and social movements are most powerful when they operate under the threat of violence. Wounded Knee went beyond just the threat of violence, the idea of disruption tactics, towards that of confrontation tactics. What began as what Tarrow (1998) called a “disruption” or a symbolic form of communicating commitment to the cause turned into a violent confrontation. The federal government sought to suppress the occupation. Because A.I.M. had moved towards a violent protest in response to the government amping up security on the reservation, they had provided the U.S. federal government with a legitimate reason to respond with more violence.

A.I.M. had attempted to utilize the American Indian nationalism that they had built through previous occupations to support their right to be at Wounded Knee, but, in doing so, they were co-opting

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the traditions and past of the Lakota. According to Reinhardt (2007, 160), the invitation from the Oglala Lakota “...offered [A.I.M. members] a connection to their native roots”. Wounded Knee functioned not only as a space for resistance, but also a site of transformation for members to connect their cause to the greater past, the encroachments of the U.S. government on native land and in tribal affairs. A.I.M. members came from all over the U.S. to connect to the Massacre at Wounded Knee. This was a way for them to legitimize themselves and their pan-American Indian nationalism rhetoric.

That nationalism moved the organization towards violence, however, as their rhetoric grew more violent. In November 1973, A.I.M. issued a statement on the purpose of the Standoff at Wounded Knee: “The hell with that. You are going to honor your treaty with us from now on and we are going to force you to do that because if you don’t, you will have to kill us” (American Indian Movement 1973, 1). In this statement, the move towards violence is evident from the vitriolic language. A.I.M. highlights their purpose from the occupation: the risk of death.

According to Tarrow (1998, 98-99), risks are part of social movement actions: the higher the risk, the more threatening the action. A.I.M. took that risk and convinced hundreds of other American Indians to put their lives on the line for the movement at Wounded Knee. They only stopped because the Oglala Lakota tribal elder Frank Fools Crow, who had been working with A.I.M., requested surrender.

Media: Platform of Resistance

During the protest, the mainstream media became the principal ally of the American Indians at Wounded Knee. The coverage was extensive and included support from broadcast television and even celebrities. The U.S. federal government had to exercise

caution in how they quelled the rebellion brewing at Wounded Knee in order inhibit further public support for the American Indian cause. A.I.M. did not seek to control the media as in the Alcatraz case, nor did they seek the limelight such as during the B.I.A. takeover.

They recognized that a free press, where they did not attempt to control messaging, would provide them with the public support they needed to pressure the U.S. federal government.

Broadcast television, equally distributed amongst the three major channels (CBS, NBC, and ABC), mentioned the occupation eighty-three times (Vanderbilt Television Archives).15 The U.S. federal government displeased the media, especially towards the end of the occupation. In ABC’s news coverage of the end of the standoff, there is evident frustration among the media towards the federal government. The federal government had blocked them from reporting on the actual events at Wounded Knee (“impossible to witness”), and they present the government as controlling (“information relayed to them by government spokesmen”) and incompetent (“about two hours behind schedule”). Meanwhile they present the American Indian protesters as fairly reasonable (“won as many concessions as possible”) and (“sufficient money”). Because only the federal government had attempted to control the messaging of the event, the media was inclined to treat the protesters (although violent) as rational beings in the face of a large bureaucracy, the federal government (Wordham 1973).16 Unlike in previous protests, A.I.M. recognized the importance of controlling its message without controlling the media. They accepted that their actions could be misinterpreted. They, however, trusted that the publicity they would gain from the occupation would be enough to prevent the U.S. government from forcibly removing them from Wounded Knee. It was

Media, Identity, and Violence a risk that paid off, as they were able to escalate the protest over the course of seventy-one days and end the occupation on their own volition rather than on the increasing presence of the federal government.

Wounded Knee National and Local Success

Nationally, the Standoff at Wounded Knee was useful to A.I.M. The occupation drew needed public attention to the concerns of American Indian communities. It created a space and an ideology that brought American Indians together, creating a shared experience of resistance connected to the past resistance at Wounded Knee in 1890. The occupation opened a dialogue with the mainstream media that highlighted the government’s suppression of information. Overall, the occupation’s impact on the national level were positive for the American Indian community, and the threat of renewed violence (now that it had been proved to be more than just an empty threat) created a space for A.I.M. to better negotiate with the U.S. federal government.

On the local level, however, the occupation caused more years of suffering for the people on the Pine Ridge Reservation that did not end until Tribal Chairman Wilson, leader of the G.O.O.N. squad, was ousted in 1976 (Reinhardt 2007, 208). A.I.M.’s actions had stirred up discontent among the American Indians there. While A.I.M. had utilized the traditionalism of the Oglala Lakota to justify their American Indian nationalism by reconnecting it to spirituality and tradition, the Oglala Lakota had reaped no immediate, substantial benefit from A.I.M. entering their community.

The Standoff at Wounded Knee, which started as a local tribal issue, became a stage for a national pageant of the U.S. federal government versus the American Indians. If nothing else, the occupation was a re-enactment of centuries of oppression by the

33

federal government and of resistance by American Indians. This brought public attention back to the U.S’s colonial roots and urban American Indians back to their traditional cultures. The Standoff at Wounded Knee was one of A.I.M.’s last, large occupations as the organization underwent leadership changes.

Analytical Comparison Through these three case studies (the Alcatraz Occupation, the B.I.A. Takeover, and the Standoff at Wounded Knee), I track Tarrow’s (1998) model of violence as the protests gradually faced more government forces. Within this framework, mainstream media coverage and occupier ideology stand out as contributing factors to this state violence.

If the Alcatraz Occupation gave momentum and power to American Indian communities, the B.I.A. splintered the movement’s coalition and Wounded Knee radicalized that faction. All three occupations created intense moments of ideological crisis. Each occupation drew public awareness to the injustices and issues of American Indian communities. Why did each occupation have a different level of violence and a different level of success? Alcatraz’s ideological crisis drew the American Indian activists together and the media coverage they generated was overall positive. The B.I.A. takeover showed the fractures in the American Indian Movement’s coalition, and the media presented the protesters in a negative light. At Wounded Knee, the press recoiled from government pressure to downplay the violent events at Wounded Knee, and A.I.M. radicalized its base in the occupation to maintain order under duress.

Ideological Crisis An occupations’ success depended upon which type of ideological crisis would be presented by the occupiers. Moments of ideological crisis can: 1) bring

34 people together under a common belief (unification); 2) divide them along philosophical lines (division); or 3) radicalize the members to enable more risks (radicalization). The ideological crisis contributed to the type of action in Tarrow’s (1998) model of violence.

The more factional and radicalized the occupations became, the higher the level of risk of state violence (see Table 1).

During the Alcatraz Occupation, the occupiers created an ideology of American Indian nationalism.

To be an American Indian was to support the occupation of traditional, indigenous land for future generations. To question the occupation was to side with the U.S. government and their policy of tribal termination. This was the ideological question of identity put forth in that occupation and it united the disparate American Indian communities. According to the logic of Tarrow’s (1998) scholarship, the U.S. government remained unthreatened by this allowing it to dissipate on its own as the novelty of the ideology normalized.

Disruptions like Alcatraz and the B.I.A. takeover, however, demand a high-level of

commitment (that is, the risk of arrest). According to Tarrow (1998, 98), continual use of this tactic will lead to more state response and will split the movement. This is exactly what happened during the B.I.A. takeover. The ideology during the occupation demanded a choice: to follow the established lines of arbitration between the U.S. government and the tribes or to break these modes of power by occupying a U.S. government building. While Alcatraz was a defensive measure to resist U.S. encroachment on indigenous land, the B.I.A. takeover could be seen as an offensive measure, reclaiming land temporarily for political gain.

This generated an ideological crisis of respecting power or demanding power, a question that divided the American Indian coalition as Tarrow’s (1998) theory had predicted.

This proved to be a continual pattern when the Standoff at Wounded Knee began as an occupation and spiraled into a series of firefights. Wounded Knee used American Indian nationalism to radicalize the occupiers to risk death from the violence of the federal and tribal government forces. According to Tarrow’s (1998, 96) model, the Standoff at Wounded Knee was

Table 1. Factors in American Indian Movement Occupations 1969-1973 Alcatraz

Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.I.A) Takeover

Standoff at Wounded Knee

American Indian Movement’s Role

Supporting Role

Co-Organizer

Lead Role

Ideological Crisis

Unification

Division

Radicalization

Media Coverage

Positive

Negative

Positive

Type of Action

Disruption

Disruption

Confrontation

State Violence

Coast Guard Blockade

Riot Police

U.S. Marshals, G.O.O.N. Squad

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics a confrontation that polarized A.I.M. by putting it in direct conflict with the state. After Wounded Knee, A.I.M. moved away from such intense direct actions.

The success of the Standoff at Wounded Knee was that it radicalized the current members of A.I.M. towards a greater commitment to challenging the federal government on American Indian issues, but did not allow the event to limit the movement’s potential to grow.

Occupation Media Coverage The mainstream media coverage of each occupation contributed to the success levels. The media enjoyed the sensationalism of the Alcatraz story and presented the occupiers as a dedicated, united group. The occupiers controlled their image and provided their own interpretation of events through their own media. The B.I.A. takeover had no cohesive messaging and the media frame their public image in the occupation’s aftermath. While Alcatraz had brought public awareness to American Indian issues, the B.I.A. takeover’s presentation of the injustices of the U.S. government were overshadowed by their presentation in the media as violent savages. The successful occupation kept the media on their side and controlled their image.

Sanchez and Stuckey (2000) hypothesized an educational aspect to media portrayals of A.I.M. that I apply to the media coverage of their occupations. If an occupation’s purpose is to bring public awareness to an issue, then the organizers cannot overlook the educational and informational aspect. In the Alcatraz Occupation, the focus of the occupier’s media was on educating themselves and their home communities.

As Bonney (1977) highlighted, this self-awareness brought forth American Indian nationalism. The cases of B.I.A. and Wounded Knee, the occupiers did not produce their own media, instead they allowed it to

35

be controlled by national newspapers and broadcast television. According to Sanchez and Stuckey (2000), A.I.M. performed for the media in order to earn political leverage against the U.S. government by teaching the public about the issues facing American Indian communities.

National newspapers and broadcast television briefly covered the occupations of Alcatraz and the B.I.A., but fixated on the sensationalism of Wounded Knee. The media’s positive coverage of Alcatraz and Wounded Knee allowed the public to sympathize with the occupiers and limited the federal government’s use of force to end the occupations (see Table 1). At risk of alienating the public, the government attempted to restrain media coverage of the events during the Standoff at Wounded Knee, but this initiated a backlash of further positive media coverage of A.I.M. The B.I.A. takeover, however, failed to garner public support, and the occupiers were unable to use the media for positive coverage and to educate the public on American Indian issues. Alcatraz and Wounded Knee succeeded in educating the public because they maintained positive relationships with the media and ultimately, the public.

Conclusion

From these three cases, it is evident that occupations serve two distinct purposes: 1) to create moments of ideological crisis; and 2) to generate media coverage. An occupation is purposeless without media support to draw public pressure to prevent retaliation and to raise funds for continued actions. Occupations are useful at the beginning of movements to form coalitions with a shared purpose and ideology, but they can also drive away moderate members and later coalition partners if not properly maintained as can be seen in the case of the B.I.A. takeover. Alcatraz was

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able to last as long as it did because they occupied a space that the government had little interest in, and the media was a constant presence. It served as a way to distribute American Indian nationalism as an ideology to a wide group of people as they constantly entered and left the island. Wounded Knee, because A.I.M. acted without many coalition partners, was able to capitalize on members’ ideological commitment to the cause and take greater risks than just arrest without driving many members away.

Affiliated with the Yakama, an American Indian tribe of the North West.

9

Vanderbilt University Television News Archives, Keyword: “Indian”. Time-period: 1972-11-01 to 1972-11-10. http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/ (Accessed November 1, 2014) 10

Affiliated with the Standing Rock Sioux, an American Indian tribe on the border of North and South Dakota.

11

Associated with the Assiniboine, an American Indian tribe of the Great Plains.

12

Notes Affiliated with the Ojibwe, an American Indian tribe of the Great Lakes Region, sometimes referred to as Chippewa.

1

Affiliated with the Lakota, an American Indian tribe of the Great Plains.

2

Affiliated with the Ojibwe, an American Indian tribe of the Great Lakes Region, sometimes referred to as Chippewa.

3

A group of American Indian tribes of the Great Plains (primarily: the Santee, the Yankton-Tanktonai, and the Lakota) 4

Affiliated with the Mohawk, an American Indian tribe of the North East 5

Affiliated with the Santee, an American Indian tribe of the Great Plains.

6

Vanderbilt University Television News Archives.

Keyword: “Alcatraz, Indians”. Time-period: 1969-11-01 to 1971-06-21. http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/ (Accessed November 1, 2014) 7

Vanderbilt University Television News Archives.

Keyword: “Alcatraz, Indians”. Time-period: 1969-11-01 to 1971-06-21. http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/ (Accessed November 1, 2014) 8

Affiliated with the Lakota, an American Indian tribe of the Great Plains 13

Affiliated with the Cherokee, an American Indian tribe of the South East 14

Vanderbilt University Television News Archives.

Keyword: “Wounded Knee”. Time-period: 1973-02-01 to 1973-06-01. http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/ (Accessed November 1, 2014) 15

The previous phrases quoted in parenthesis represent direct quotations from ABC News coverage “Siege at Wounded Knee Ended” (Wordham 1973).

16

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Public Broadcasting Service (U.S.), Apograph Productions., Tecumseh (Firm), Native American Public Telecommunications, Inc., Firelight Media., WGBH Educational Foundation., WGBH (Television station : Boston, Mass.), PBS Home Video. DVD. 2009.

Wordham, Bill. 1973. “Siege at Wounded Knee Ended.”

ABC News. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ extras/2012/02/27/feb-27-wounded-kneestandoff-1973/ (Accessed November 12, 2014).

Vanderbilt University Television News Archives.

Keyword: “Alcatraz, Indians”. Time-period: 1969-11-01 to 1971-06-21. Keyword: “Indian”.

Time-period: 1972-11-01 to 1972-11-10.

Keyword: “Wounded Knee”. Time-period: 1973-02-01 to 1973-06-01. http://tvnews. vanderbilt.edu/ (Accessed November 1, 2014).

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Hispanics in Florida Politics: The Case of Cubans versus Non-Cubans Masiel Pelegrino-Sarduy University of South Florida This research focuses on Hispanic voters in Florida to explore their political influence in recent general and midterm elections. Specifically, I ask: What are the causes and consequences of the changes in the political ideology of the Cuban population in the State of Florida? To answer this question, I focus on two subgroups of Hispanics: Cubans and non-Cubans. I examine these Hispanic subgroups to establish a comparison between them and assess how Cuban Hispanics deviate politically from Non-Cubans. This study tests three hypothesis: 1) the Cuban electorate itself is changing due to generational replacement making the Cuban vote less Republican; 2) as the Cuban share of voters in Florida shrinks and the non-Cuban share increases due to in-migration, the Hispanic vote becomes more Democratic; and 3) as more non-Cuban Hispanics become more active at the polls, the Hispanic vote becomes less Republican. This research draws on Florida survey data collected during the 2012 presidential election and the 2014 midterm election. It shows that recent changes taking place in the Cuban and non-Cuban populations in Florida have significantly changed Hispanic politics in the Sunshine State. The Cuban vote has become less Republican resulting in a more Democratic Florida Hispanic vote.

Introduction Over the past several decades, the U.S. has witnessed the massive arrival of numerous groups of Hispanics. These groups have settled in different regions, transformed the panorama, and adopted this land as their own. Their presence is evident in several aspects of the American society, especially in politics. These subgroups, however, are changing demographically and these changes are impacting the political composition of the U.S., specifically the State of Florida. The Hispanic population in Florida accounts for 23% of the total state population (Pew Research Center 2011). Cuban Hispanics are the largest group in the state, representing 30% of the Hispanic population and 7% of the state population (Brown and Lopez 2013). Cubans have been actively involved in Florida politics; they have dominated

politically due to a combination of political power and a reliably high turnout (Ball 2011). Their participation does not end at the polls, as the majority (10 out of 13) of Hispanic state legislators are Cuban (Ball 2011). In addition, Florida Congressional representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Carlos Curbelo, and U.S. Senator Rubio are Cuban-Americans (Cuban Research Institute N.d.).

This study focuses on Hispanic voters to determine their influence on recent presidential and midterm elections. The Hispanic category is divided into two main subgroups, Cubans and non-Cubans, to establish a comparison in terms of population size, party affiliation, and voting patterns. The Cuban and non-Cuban populations have experienced several changes in demographics over the past several decades that have significantly affected Floridaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political landscape. This study explores the causes

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and consequences of the changes occurring in each of these Hispanic subgroups, particularly those related to generational replacement and in-migration.

Definitions, Research and Methodology

survey data are examined from the 2012 presidential election and the 2014-midterm election in Florida.

The Cuban Diaspora

Throughout this paper, the term Hispanics refers to those individuals of Spanish-speaking ancestries regardless of country of origin. Latino/ Latina is used to refer to individuals of Latin American ancestry. Cuban refers to those born in the island and now residing in the U.S. and to those born in the U.S. with Cuban heritage. The terms Cuban and

The Cuban population in the U.S. has traditionally shared a strong anti-communist sentiment that has played a role in their political behavior. Since the beginning of the Cuban immigration waves, they have settled mostly in South Florida, maintaining strong feelings of hostility and disenchantment toward the Castro regime (Garcia 2012, 53). The U.S. saw the presence of Cubans as early

Cuban-American are used interchangeably. Non-Cuban includes Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and other Hispanic subgroups such as Central and South Americans and Dominicans. However, for the purposes of this paper, the term non-Cubans mostly refers to Mexicans and Puerto Ricans given that they constitute two of the three largest and most influential Hispanic subgroups, both in the U.S. and in Florida (the other subgroup being Cubans).

This study focuses on the influence of Hispanics in the politics of the Sunshine State by comparing Cubans and non-Cubans in terms of population size, party identification, voting patterns and changes through time. Specifically, this study explores the causes and consequences of the shift in Cuban American politics in the state of Florida. Three hypotheses will be tested: 1) the Cuban electorate itself is changing due to generational replacement leading to a less Republican Cuban vote; 2) as the Cuban share of voters in Florida shrinks and the non-Cuban portion increases as a result of in-migration, the Hispanic vote becomes more Democratic ;and 3) as more non-Cuban Hispanics become increasingly active at the polls, the Hispanic vote becomes more Democratic (Cohn 2014; Gebeloff and Leonhardt 2014). To test the hypotheses,

as 1850 when they settled along the Gulf of Mexico.

The appearance of Fidel Castro and his communist regime in the late 1950s gave birth to the Cuban exile community (Garcia 2012, 53; Pew Research Center 2006). After Castro defeated Batista, a wave of middle and upper class professionals migrated to the U.S. (mostly to Florida) in the 1960s and 1970s. They brought their professional, entrepreneurial, political, educational, and technical skills which facilitated their integration to the American society (Geron 2005, 54).

This wave of Cuban immigrants was highly educated.

Many of them had previous experience in the political world, making them more likely to participate upon entering the U.S. political arena (Geron 2005, 55).

The 1980s witnessed the arrival of a different group of Cuban immigrants. After Fidel Castroâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s announcement on April 20, 1980, that anyone wanting to migrate to the U.S. was allowed to do so through the port of Mariel, a massive exodus of Cubans abandoned the island and crossed the Straits of Florida on anything that could float. This event is known as the Mariel boatlift (Aguirre, Saenz and James 1997, 488). In a very short time, 125,000 Cubans arrived unexpectedly (Glass 2009). Upon their arrival to the U.S., the Mariel boatlift immigrants or Marielitos were

Hispanics in Florida Politics

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considered “entrants” and did not receive the refugee status that their predecessors had enjoyed. As a result, receiving health care, education, job training and general welfare was particularly challenging (Aguirre, Saenz and James 1997, 493). These individuals were not as welcomed as the previous group of Cuban immigrants. The Marielitos were mainly unemployed and convicted criminals released from Cuban prisons (Geron 2005, 55; Pew Research Center 2006). The Marielitos transformed Miami and were seen as an economic burden (Geron 2005, 55). “Cuban migration underwent significant socioeconomic,

citizenship, enabling them to be involved in the political system (Geron 2005, 23). The Mexican population in the U.S. has traditionally been the oldest and largest of the Latino subgroups (Garcia 2012, 47; Zong and Batalova 2014). Since the Treaty of Guadalupe in 1848, the majority of Mexican immigrants have settled in the southwestern states.

Subsequently, the presence of Mexicans has been felt in other regions of the U.S. (Garcia 2012, 47). In 1970, the Mexican population in the U.S. was fewer than one million. The following decades saw the exponential growth of the group. This group can

racial, and political changes with the Mariel boatlifts” (Garcia 2012, 54). The Marielitos’ arrival changed the moral identity of the previous Cuban immigrants from “golden” political refugees to “undesirable” (Aguirre, Saenz and James 1997, 488). Besides the negative stigma, fear, and discrimination faced by the Marielitos, they were also blamed for the abrupt rise in crime and violence in Miami (Aguirre, Saenz and James 1997, 494). With the arrival of this wave of immigrants, the city of Miami witnessed its highest crime rate in history. In addition, racial riots between African American groups and incoming immigrants, specifically Cubans, were part of the violent scene (Rothe and Pumariega 2008). The strong presence of this new wave of Cuban immigrants was felt, as tourists water skied in Key West among boats filled with Cuban immigrants and increasing murder rates in the city of Miami (Sainz 2005).

be found in high concentrations in the western states (Motel and Patten 2012). In Florida, the Mexican representation does not mirror that of the U.S.. While Mexicans are the largest group in the country, they are not the majority in Florida (Brown and Lopez 2013, 9).

After World War II, Puerto Rican migrants came to the U.S. in search of employment (Geron 2005, 50). This group, however, has had a different immigration experience. Puerto Ricans enjoy several privileges as citizens of the commonwealth; they are entitled to some autonomy while being part of special programs and obtaining U.S. citizenship benefits (Garcia 2012, 50). Despite the benefits the Puerto Ricans receive, the status of the island remains a concern for those in the mainland. Many of their political interests focus on having direct input in discussion and the right to vote in the plebiscite (Garcia 2012, 50). While this group has mostly settled in the northeast states, such as New York, Florida was the state with the second highest concentration of Puerto Ricans in 2010 (Brown and Lopez 2013, 9; U.S. Census Bureau 2011, 8).

Other Hispanics also have a strong presence in the U.S.. Although the largest subgroups are Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, the U.S. has increasingly

Non-Cuban Immigration: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Other Hispanics

Beginning in the 1600s, Mexicans settled in the northern regions of Mexico (what later became U.S. territory) (Geron 2005, 21). After annexation, members of the educated class obtained U.S.

42 seen an influx of “other Hispanics” – immigrants from Central and South America. The Central American countries are Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador and Costa Rica; the South American countries include the Spanish-speaking countries. Brazil is sometimes excluded from this group (Garcia 2012, 56). These subgroups have the highest number of foreign-born individuals among Hispanics. Central and South Americans tend to be more widely distributed among the different regions and states (Garcia 2012, 56). In 2010, Miami-Dade County in Florida was identified as the county with

Hispanic population almost doubled over a 10-year time period. Compared to the national population growth, which was 9.7%, the Hispanic population tripled during the same period (U.S. Census Bureau 2011, 3). Figure 1 shows that the three largest Hispanic subgroups in the U.S. are Mexicans (31.8 million), followed by Puerto Ricans (4.6 million) and finally Cubans (1.8 million) (Lopez and Dockterman 2011).

the largest population of Colombians, Hondurans, and Peruvians (Motel and Patten 2012).

growth in the past decade, surpassing the Puerto Rican population growth and becoming the second highest increase among the three main Hispanic sub-groups.

Other Hispanics experienced a population growth of 22.5% (U.S. Census Bureau 2011, 3).2

Hispanic Population

In 2010, the presence of Hispanics in the U.S. totaled 50.5 million. This number represents a 43% increase in the Hispanic population since 2000 (35.3 million Hispanics) (U.S. Census Bureau 2011, 2). The

The Mexican population increased by 54.1% from 2000 to 2010.1 Similarly, during this same time period, the Puerto Rican population increased by 35.7%. The Cuban population saw a 43.8% population

Florida has the third largest Hispanic population in the U.S. (4.4 millions) (Brown and Lopez 2013; Harrington and Martin 2014). While Mexicans

Figure 1. 2010 Hispanic Population in the U.S. by Country of Origin

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2011

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

43

are generally the prevalent group in several states,

Mexicans and other Hispanics have the tendency to be

Cubans are the largest group in Florida (Brown and

more spread out throughout the state.

Lopez 2013). At the same time, Florida is the state with the highest number of Cubans (U.S. Census Bureau 2011, 8). Cubans represent 30% of Florida’s Hispanic population while Puerto Ricans are 21%, Mexicans 15%, and Other Hispanics 35% (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). Figure 2 shows Florida’s distribution of the three main Hispanic groups and other Hispanics. There is a clear concentration of Cubans in the south while Puerto Ricans are mostly found in Central Florida.

Party Identification among Florida Hispanics

For decades, the Cuban population has

identified with the Republican Party and voted in ways that reinforced their party affiliation (Girard, Grenier and Gladwin 2012, 42). This behavior has played a fundamental role in Florida politics. Some researchers attribute Cuban-Americans’ Republican inclinations to the fact that the GOP has traditionally held strong

Figure 2. Hispanic or Latino Population Composition

Source: Office of Economic and Demographic Research, 2010

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anti-communist sentiments (Girard, Grenier, and Gladwin 2012, 43). Historically, the Democrats’ attempts to normalize relations with Cuba have pushed Cuban-Americans to join the Republican Party. For instance, the return of Elian Gonzalez to Cuba during the Clinton administration strengthened CubanAmericans’ loyalty to the GOP (Girard, Grenier, and Gladwin 2012, 43-44). In addition, domestic issues, such as government expansion and taxes, have also influenced Cuban-Americans’ Republican Party affiliation, specifically small business owners (Girard, Grenier, and Gladwin 2012, 44). However, this pattern

On the other hand, non-Cuban Hispanics are more interested in domestic affairs such as education, governmental assistance, immigration and civil rights (Girard, Grenier, and Gladwin 2012, 44). In this way, non-Cuban Hispanics interests align more with the views of the Democratic Party. These elements are not seen as fundamental by the Cuban population, as their position in Florida has brought them a certain level of prosperity. Moreover, their ethnic enclave has been significantly less exposed to prejudice and discrimination. Cuban Hispanics enjoy exclusive immigration privileges denied to

has changed over time. The Pew Research Center National Survey of Latinos shows the shifting party affiliation of Cuban voters (See Figure 3) (Krogstad 2014). The reasons and consequences of such changes are discussed in detailed below.

other subgroups (Girard, Grenier, and Gladwin 2012, 44). These privileges include automatic entry to the U.S. and assignment of legal paperwork upon entrance. Furthermore, a breakdown of registered Hispanic voters’ demographics (including Cuban

Figure 3. Political Party Affiliation Among Cubans

Source: “After Decades of GOP support, Cubans shifting toward the Democratic Party.” Pew Research Center, 2014.

Hispanics in Florida Politics Americans) shows that Hispanics affiliated more with the Democratic Party after accounting for gender, age, educational attainment, household income, nativity, origin and religion among others (Lopez and Minushkin 2008). In short, even after controlling for these factors, the Hispanic population tends to identify, affiliate and vote Democratic.

Hispanic Voting Patterns: Analyzing the 2012 Presidential and 2014 Midterm Elections

Historically, Cubans have supported Republican candidates at the polls. In recent years, however, this support has slipped considerably. Exit poll data collected during the 2012 presidential election revealed an almost evenly split Cuban vote between the Democrat and Republican candidates (Barack Obama - 48%, Mitt Romney - 52%) (Bendixen

45

& Amandi International 2012). Figure 4 illustrates, however, a periodic dissociation of Cuban-Americans from the Republican Party prior to 2012. In Florida, President Obama won 61% of the Hispanic vote (Bendixen & Amandi International 2012). According to a Florida exit poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, 34% of Hispanic voters in the state were Cubans and 57% were non-Cuban (Lopez and Taylor 2012). Non-Cuban Hispanics have favored Democratic presidential candidates in past elections (Bendixen & Amandi International 2012). In the 2012 presidential election, a majority of Florida’s non-Cuban Hispanics supported president Obama with 66% of their votes compared to Romney’s 34% (Lopez and Taylor 2012).

The 2014 midterm election in the Sunshine State followed a similar pattern. Hispanics represented 13% of the electorate; 4% of those voters were Cubans

Figure 4. Presidential Preference of Cuban-Americans

Source: “Exit Poll of Hispanic Voters in Florida.” Bendixen & Amandi International, 2012.

46 (NBC News 2014). According to NBC News (2014) exit polls, Hispanics as a group significantly supported the Democratic candidate Charlie Crist, who garnered 58% of the Hispanic vote as opposed to the Republican Rick Scott with 38% of the Hispanic vote (NBC News 2014). Among Hispanics, the Cuban and non-Cuban votes were different. Non-Cuban Hispanics favored Crist with 66% of the votes and Scott with 31% (NBC News 2014). Given the traditional Democratic inclination of this subgroup, this outcome was expected. The Cuban vote was more evenly distributed (Crist 50%, Scott 46%), which has been the pattern of

Americans supported the Democratic candidate slightly more than the Republican candidate. This outcome portrays the evident change in ideology and party identification among Cuban-Americans. Second, although some analysts expected the Cuban American vote to favor Crist, the Cuban vote contributed to Governor Scott’s slim margin, facilitating his victory (Contreras 2014).

It is worth noting that both major party candidates running in the 2014 midterm election realized the importance of the Hispanic vote and attempted to appeal to this growing population. Both

this subgroup in the last few years (NBC News 2014).

Figure 5 shows the distribution of the Cuban and nonCuban vote by gubernatorial candidate including the Libertarian candidate Adrian Wyllie.

The Cuban American vote in the 2014 midterm election is interesting for several reasons. First, Cuban-

candidates, Crist and Scott, selected running mates of Hispanic descent. Republican Governor Scott chose Carlos Lopez-Cantera, a Cuban-American born in Madrid. Democrat Charlie Crist selected Colombia-born Annette Taddeo (Buzzacco-Foerster 2014; Robles 2014). According to scholars, Lopez-

Figure 5. Percentage of Cuban and non-Cuban vote by gubernatorial candidate

Source: “Decision 2014.” NBC News, 2014.

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Cantera represents the more traditionally Republican and middle-class Hispanics while Taddeo appeals to non-Cubans in Florida (Buzzacco-Foerster 2014).

In summary, the Cuban vote has become more Democratic and less Republican. But, what is causing this shift in Cuban American Politics and what are the consequences of such changes?

Cuban Electorate is Changing

The Cuban-American population has changed over time. This change is due to generational replacement and the differences between Cuba-born and U.S.-born individuals. The older generation of Cuban-Americans is being replaced by U.S.-born Cubans who share different political attitudes. Today, almost half (44%) of the 1.8 million Cuban-American total population was born in the U.S. (Krogstad 2014). These individuals have been in the U.S. all their lives and do not share the same experiences as their parents. However, their parentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; political attitudes in the household may still influence the U.S.-born Cuban American politics. While their American upbringing has shaped their attitudes and beliefs, the engrained Republican convictions of the older Cubans have prevailed. As a result, this second generation of Cuban-Americans exhibits a mixture of political attitudes and deviates from the older generation in its stance on Cuba (Eckstein 2009a, 124). For example, U.S.-born Cuban-Americans : 1) are less likely to trust government; 2) are less likely to identify with the Cuban community; and 3) favor less government spending (Garcia 2012, 55). In addition, anti-Castro sentiments have diminished among the second generation of Cuban-Americans (Garcia 2012, 55).

Research suggests that there is an obvious shift in attitudes of the Cuban population due to generational replacement. In the case of Cuban-Americansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;

47

presidential preference, 60% of Cuban-Americans born in the U.S. voted for President Obama and 40% for Mitt Romney whereas 45% of those born in Cuba voted for Obama and 55% for Romney (Bendixen & Amandi International 2012).

Another reason for the change in political attitudes of the Cuban electorate is the recent waves of Cuban immigrants. According to a Pew Research Center report, 56% of Cuban immigrants have arrived since 1990 (Lopez and Krogstad 2014). This alteration of the Cuban-American population is influencing their own views of Cuba and causing variations in their political party affiliation. The different waves of Cuban exiles are marked by different experiences while living in the island. The first wave of immigrants was heavily influenced by the Cuban Revolution of 1959 which explains their strong anti-Castro stance. This experience has shaped the political views of the older generations for decades. To older cohorts, supporting the economic embargo, even after acknowledging its ineffectiveness, reflects their commitment to the fight against the Castro regime. On the other hand, the more recent Cuban immigrants were influenced by the dramatic economic crisis after the ending of Soviet aid and trade. As a result, many of the more recent arrivals are due to economic reasons (Eckstein 2009b, 139).

Specifically, the post-Mariel immigrants share more progressive views and are mostly economic as opposed to political refugees (Bishin and Klofstad 2012, 590).

In this way, younger exiles are less interested in Cuba and more focused on U.S. domestic issues that affect them directly, such as education and healthcare. At the same time, the more recent Cuban immigrants are less willing to isolate Cuba, mostly because they are more likely to have family members in the island (Adams 2007). While the older exiles see the economic embargo, travel ban and other restrictions

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as attacks against the Castro regime, the more recent immigrants see these policies as a financial burden imposed on their relatives in the island and as an impediment to visit them (Bishin and Klofstad 2012, 590). Consequently, as the anti-Castro generation is replaced, a more liberal generation willing to normalize relations with Cuba has emerged (Bierman 2014).

Statistically speaking, the majority (57%) of Cuban-Americans arriving to the U.S. after 1990 identifies with or has Democratic Party tendencies as opposed to only 19% who favor the Republican Party

relations as opposed to those 65 and older (Bendixen & Amandi International 2014, 15). Unquestionably, generational replacement has transformed the political landscape of Cuban-Americans. The Cuban vote and party preferences have shifted from solid Republican to a more evenly distributed, but slightly Democraticleaning vote.

(Lopez and Krogstad 2014). On the contrary, only 35% of Cuban-Americans who arrived before 1990 identify with the Democratic Party and 48% with the Republican Party (Lopez and Krogstad 2014).

Nonetheless, while the politics of Cubans in the U.S. are shifting and there is an observable division of the Cuban vote, the scenario may not be entirely depicted at the polls due to a much higher turn-out of the older Cuban immigrants, particularly in midterm elections (Lopez and Krogstad 2014).

A more current example of attitudinal and ideological changes within the Cuban population is the reaction of this subgroup to President Obama’s recent normalization of diplomatic relations with the island. In fact, survey results show that 44% of Cubans agree with the normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations whereas 48% disagrees and 8% does not know/no answer (Bendixen & Amandi International 2014, 12).

When this category is further analyzed by country of birth, however, the results differ. Thirty-eight percent of those born in Cuba agree with the normalization of diplomatic relations while 64% of Cuban-Americans born in the U.S. do so as well (Bendixen & Amandi International 2014, 13). Furthermore, 18 to 64 year olds are more likely to agree with the U.S.-Cuba

Democratic. The Cuban share of the state’s Hispanic vote is being surpassed by the massive arrival of nonCuban Hispanics, such as Puerto Ricans who have made Central Florida their home (Ball 2011). This non-Cuban Hispanic subgroup is migrating in high proportions to Florida from New York, Chicago, and Puerto Rico (Rufty 2011).

The high concentration of Puerto Ricans in the Tampa-Orlando area, known as the “I-4 Corridor,” has contributed to the political transformation of Florida (Ball 2011). U.S.-born Puerto Ricans and those who have been in the U.S. for long periods tend to register as Democrats. Those who have arrived from the island more recently tend to identify as Independents (Lopez Torregrosa 2014). This large number of Independent Puerto Ricans contributes to the even larger number (20% of I-4 corridor voters) of voters with no party affiliation in the I-4 corridor area (MacManus and Bonanza N.d.).

Puerto Ricans are not the only immigrants that account for the non-Cuban population growth. The Central and South American population has increased by more than half-million and South Florida was their primary destination (Associated Press 2011). More than 50% of the incoming individuals settled in Broward,

A More Democratic Hispanic Electorate

As the Cuban share of voters in Florida shrinks and the non-Cuban portion increases due to in-migration, the Hispanic vote becomes more

Hispanics in Florida Politics

49

Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach counties (Associated Press 2011). About 100,000 of these new immigrants moved to the Tampa-Orlando area (Associated Press 2011).

Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans do not face the same challenges that the other Hispanic groups experience to obtain citizenship. For instance, the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 grants legal permanent residence to Cubans (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2011). Subsequently, Cubans can apply for citizenship. Seventy-four percent of Cuban Hispanics in the U.S. were citizens in 2010,

2012 presidential election, 34% of the total Hispanic voters in the Sunshine State were Cuban whereas 57% were non-Cuban (Lopez and Taylor 2012). This helps explain President Obama’s turnout improvement among Hispanics over 2008. Studies of the 2012 election have shown that, aside from Puerto Ricans, there was a strong Democratic vote from Mexicans and Dominicans (Frey 2015). In 2014, The Pew Research Center reports that Cubans made up 32% of Hispanic eligible voters in Florida and non-Cubans accounted for 68% (Brown and Patten 2014). NonCuban eligible voters doubled the amount of Cuban

only surpassed by Puerto Ricans (99%) who enjoy citizenship privileges and do not have to follow any special process (Motel and Patten 2012). Most other immigrants have to go through long, tedious, and sometimes unsuccessful naturalization processes.

These two groups can exercise their right to vote more than other Hispanic groups. Since all Puerto Ricans are American citizens and given their massive inmigration rate to Florida, they are now transforming Florida’s once Republican-dominated Hispanic population. In this manner, the shrinking CubanAmerican share of the Hispanic vote and in-migration of a strongly Democratic non-Cuban subgroup has and will continue to result in a more Democratic Hispanic

eligible voters. Figure 6 shows Florida’s Hispanic eligible voters by country of origin. Given the more Democratic tendencies of the growing non-Cuban Hispanic population and as their political participation increases, the Hispanic vote is likely to become more and more Democratic.

electorate.

Greater Non-Cuban Turnout, Less Republican Control

As more non-Cuban Hispanics become active at the polls, the Hispanic vote becomes less Republican in Florida. Currently, Puerto Ricans represent 27% of Hispanic registered voters and Cubans are 32% (Brown and Patten 2014). This slight 5-percentage-point edge for Cubans is likely to be surpassed by the rapid increase in Florida’s non-Cuban population. In the

Predictions

The number of active Hispanic registered voters in Florida has steadily increased since 2006 (Brown and Patten 2014). There was a 3.9% increase in the Hispanic share of Florida electorate vote over an 8-year time period. This percentage translates into 623,000 voters, a significant number that cannot be ignored especially in this battleground state (Brown and Patten 2014).

Research suggests that the upcoming years will witness the continued increase of Hispanic-eligible voters in the Sunshine State as more non-Cubans naturalize. With the total non-Cuban population surpassing Cubans in registered voters, and the evident changes among Cuban-Americans, the Florida Hispanic electorate will likely vote more Democratic than it has in previous elections. As 2016 quickly approaches, both Democrats and Republicans are

50 closely watching these numbers due to the determinant nature and importance of the Hispanic vote.

This study has shown that the Cuban population itself is changing due to generational replacement which has resulted in a less staunchly Republican Cuban vote. In addition, as the Cuban share of the Hispanic electorate in Florida has declined and the non-Cuban portion increases due to in-migration, the Hispanic vote has become more Democratic. Finally, as more non-Cuban Hispanics become increasingly active at the polls – due to improved naturalization rates – the Hispanic vote will become more Democratic. However, further in-depth country-of-origin research of smaller Hispanic subgroups is needed to better discern their political proclivities. For these groups, it is more difficult to obtain citizenship and become politically

active. Indisputably, however, as we have shown, the differences between Cubans and non-Cubans and the changes they have undergone are transforming Hispanic politics in Florida. On a larger scale, the diverse Florida population makes it a highly contested swing state in presidential elections (Farrington 2012).

Given the nature of Florida as a swing state, a shift in state politics has a greater impact in the direction of the country. If this trend continues, Florida’s Hispanics may potentially change the political scene of the U.S..

Notes This percentage increase is greater than the total Hispanic population increase during the same time period (43%).The Mexican population increased at a 1

Figure 6. Florida Hispanic Eligible Voters By Country of Origin

Source: “Latinos in the 2014 Election: Florida.” Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project, 2014.

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

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much higher rate than the other main groups and the Hispanic population.

ElectionResults-ExitPoll.pdf (Accessed January 6, 2915).

While this group did not increase as much as the main groups, the population change reported cannot be ignored given the extraordinary growth of several subgroups within this category. For example, the Central American population increased by 137%, and more specifically, the Honduran population grew by 191.1% (U.S. Census Bureau 2011, 3).

Bendixen & Amandi International. 2014. “US-Cuba Relations. Flash Poll of Cuban Americans’ Reaction to President Obama’s change in U.S.Cuba Policy.” http://bendixenandamandi.com/ wp-content/uploads/2014/12/BendixenAndAmandi_ElNuevoHerald_TheMiamiHerald_ TampaBayTimes_Cuban-American-Flash-Poll. pdf (Accessed January 11, 2015).

2

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Brown, Anna, and Mark Hugo Lopez. 2013. “Mapping the Latino Population, By State, County and City.” Pew Research Center. August 29. http:// www.pewhispanic.org/2013/08/29/mappingthe-latino-population-by-state-county-andcity/ (Accessed January 6, 2015).

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The United States’ Cyber Privateers: Reviving the Letter of Marque and Reprisal Michael Tal Macaulay Honors College at Lehman College of The City University of New York The War Powers Clause in the U.S. Constitution contains a provision that allows Congress to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal” – letters of governmental provision allowing sailors of private ships to capture enemy vessels. The Founders included this provision to allow for government-endorsed private military action on the high seas and territorial waters. Only one vessel has operated under a Letter of Marque and Reprisal since the War of 1812. In light of the current era of cyber warfare, this portion of the War Powers clause should receive renewed attention. I argue that our nation’s current cybersecurity affairs mirror the circumstances that encouraged the hiring of privateers in 1812: a government unable to defend itself against foreign opponents on its own. The U.S. faces great difficulty defending itself from potentially catastrophic cyber attacks, so long as it goes it alone. In this paper, I examine constitutional scholarship on this issue, as well as current legal movements and discussion, and make an argument for the constitutionality of hiring private cyber warriors to defend the United States.1 Introduction The American Constitution is a document of sweeping range, meant to guide the U.S. through its political developments. Yet some developments “... could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of [the constitution’s] begetters” (Missouri v.

Holland 1920, 433). This paper seeks to examine one of those unforeseeable developments, cybersecurity, through a constitutional lens. An emerging field of national and international security, cybersecurity is an issue gaining increasing attention from governments and societies around the world. This research analogizes cyber warfare to naval warfare, and argues that despite a two century hiatus, issuing Letters of Marque and Reprisal is constitutional, and that the federal government can commission private cybersecurity professionals through this mechanism.

In early American history, the U.S. federal government issued Letters of Marque and Reprisal when commissioning privateers, who can be thought

of as military contractors, to bolster the government’s Navy. The present situation in cyberspace parallels the circumstances surrounding naval war during the Ratification Period and early American history.

During the Framers’ era, the U.S. Navy was not well developed. To bolster naval forces, Congress issued Letters of Marque and Reprisal, citing the War Powers Clause. Cybersecurity policy is in its developmental stages, leaving virtually every entity vulnerable to cyber aggression. In light of this, the War Powers Clause provides the U.S. federal government with the authority to hire modern day privateers to bolster the front lines of the U.S.’ cybersecurity forces.

Historical Background The Text of the Constitution Article 1, section 8, clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution provides: “[Congress shall have the power to] declare war, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on Land and

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Water.” Letters of Marque and Reprisal were paper contracts that authorized private citizens who had been victims of piracy to seek redress in the high seas.

The Letter of Marque and Reprisal is the combination of two initially distinct contracts: the Letter of Marque and the Letter of Reprisal (Cooperstein 2009). The word, Marque, deriving from either the French marches or German marks for “frontiers”, signifies the right of the possessor of the Letter to cross his national boundary and seek redress on the high seas or in a separate nation’s waters (Cooperstein 2009). Reprisal is a term that indicates a victimized party justly

France while the Royal Navy did not yet exist, in 1242 the King relied on private sailors on the Channel coast towns to provide additional naval force (Stark 1897).

The story of the first English commissioned privateers, Adam Robernolt and William le Sauvage, illustrates the allure of privateering. The pair was obligated to give only half of their gains to the King, making it free to keep the other half. Usually, however, goods could not be accounted for in their entirety, letting sailors run with more than half irrespective of the total value of goods (Stark 1897). The sailors, not operating under any formal law and impassioned by the idea

punishing the aggressor (Stark 1897). The modern, combined contract debuted in the 16th century, after the Peace of Westphalia, when the development of modern nation-states changed the nature of warfare (Stark 1897).

of wealth, caused excessive damage, attacking both foreigners and their own countrymen (Stark 1897).

This characteristically haphazard activity continued, but within a year it was somewhat tamed by new, restrictive language in the commissions (Stark 1897).

Privateering sometimes led to wars not overseen by governments as well (MacCoby 1924).

Indeed, if a central government could not provide justice for its victimized sailors, self-redress was necessary, and common. Fighting therefore followed.

In one instance in 1292, a full-blown war began after an English and a Norman sailor scuffled. The English sailor, losing the fight, resorted to stabbing and seriously injuring his Norman foe. The Normans sought justice via formal processes and institutions, but could find no legal recourse. Instead, the Norman King instructed the sailors to take their own revenge, and they ultimately seized the first English ship they encountered and hung its crew (Ward 1795). Indeed, two hundred Norman ships searched the English waters and attacked sailors. The English responded, with even more vigor than the Normans, killing 15,000 men. Eventually, six countries, without the consent of any of the governments, were represented in this war.

The governments of the nations involved ultimately

Origins of Letters of Marque and Reprisal Scholars trace the roots of Letters of Marque and Reprisal to 12th century Tuscany (Sechrest 2001).

As retaliation without license was considered piracy at the time, the government of Tuscan City-States issued Licenses of Reprisal, a distant precursor to the “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” in the American Constitution.

These licenses offered a legal method of retaliation for sailors who had suffered depredation at sea (Sechrest 2001). Later, and in addition to allowing private retribution, governments commissioned private ship owners as an auxiliary governmental naval force.

The first issuance of commissions for private ship owners to fight on behalf of the government in England dates back to 1243, when King Henry III granted licenses in order to “...annoy [his] enemies by sea or by land” (Garitee 1977, 3). Here, the privateers licensed were not seeking to redress themselves — they were motivated by the potential profit through government-endorsed plunder. Engaged in battles with

The United States’ Cyber Privateers had to reach formal diplomatic agreements to stop the war (Ward 1795).

In 1295, the first English “letter of mark” was issued after a Portuguese crew seized an English merchant vessel (Cooperstein 2009). Not satisfied with mere reprisal, the English merchant wanted authorization to additionally “retain and appropriate” any of the Portuguese sailor’s goods (Cooperstein 2009). Evidently, there was a still a difference between privateering and acting under a letter of reprisal at this point. Privateers were recruited only during wars, and were to be paid according to what they captured (Cooperstein 2009). The letter of reprisal was issued for a sailor who sought self-redress, and the actions committed after did not violate international law (Cooperstein 2009).

By the sixteenth century, England had evolved into a major player in maritime war (Stark 1897).

While the royal navy had increased twofold in size, historian Francis Stark insists that the navy played only a small part in the naval successes of England, and that nearly all the victories at sea were due to “private adventurers” (Stark 1897, 65). In 1588, ongoing enmity between England and Spain culminated in a declaration of war between the countries, and “with the secret connivance of Elizabeth’s government,” English privateers “committed enormous depredations upon Spanish commerce” (Stark 1897, 61). Stark (1987, 61) describes the actions of the Englishman Sir Francis Drake as typical of privateers. In 1577, Drake took “a Spanish ship” and “plundered the port” of Valparaiso, a Spanish territory. In another instance, Drake had taken thirteen bars of silver beside a sleeping Spaniard in Tarapacà. Upon returning from his adventures, Elizabeth “visited [Drake’s] ship and knighted him” (Stark 1897, 62). The theme in Drake’s expeditions, as well as those of his contemporaries is of the reckless

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pursuit of wealth and of nationalist victory (Stark 1897).

Evolved Marque and Reprisal The destructive incidents mentioned above encouraged sovereign states to regulate private reprisals using what we now know as Letters of Marque and Reprisal. These letters “...referred primarily to sovereign utilization of private forces, and sometimes public forces, to injure another state” (Lobel 1986, 1044). By the end of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), private forces had been shaped into better-disciplined, readily expandable auxiliary to newly enlarged national navies (Stark 1897). Privateers also were less expensive than formal naval personnel. For example: while government would have to pay “pensions” and let the privateers keep “bounties,” government sloops would “...have had to have pensions and bounties, in addition to being equipped and sailed at the government’s expense” (Stark 1897, 132).

Attention must also be paid to how privateering took form in other countries. The English considered privateers as simply forces to supplement the royal navy whereas France often had no navy and relied heavily on privateers. According to Stark (1897, 89-90): “In early times, when there was no regular navy, and in later times, when the regular navy was now and again driven off the seas by the English, it was a question of commissioning private individuals, or of allowing the French flag to disappear from the ocean altogether.” As the central government dissolved during the French Revolution, the makeshift National Convention enacted laws that allowed private citizens to “fit out privateers” and to “accelerate private armaments if there shall be any,” to defend France “against the enemies of the republic” (Stark 1897, 105).

On the other side of the Atlantic, and a few years earlier, foreign trade and commerce were

58 the central concerns of the United Colonies when they fought for independence from England. The Continental Congress sought to address the British attempts to seize ships bound for rebellious colonies, and attempts to close ports, such as Boston, outright.

The Congress considered these actions as acts of economic war (Stark 1897, 121). To retaliate, they called for their own embargo of British goods in America. In 1775, early in the War of Independence, the U.S. Congress directed and temporarily authorized privateers to seize any enemy ships whose target was the United Colonies, or ships supplying the enemies

administrations and the political principles of the three republican administrations which succeeded them, prevented the development of any substantial federal navy” (Stark 1897). When James Madison sent his war message, “...the available naval force consisted of seven frigates and about a dozen smaller vessels, many of which were unfit for sea” (Stark 1897, 128). In comparison, England had over 1,000 ships (Stark 1897). The threat of a blockade loomed over the U.S., but Congress had, “...with a wisdom born of experience,” passed an act to allow privateers (Stark 1897, 128). The legislation prohibited privateers from

of the United Colonies. Because Britain’s continuous aggressions threatened American commerce, the Congress reauthorized privateers, “...it being necessary to provide for the defense and security, and justifiable to make reprisals upon their enemies, and otherwise to annoy them, according to the laws and usages of Nations” (Stark 1897, 121).

In the United Colonies, “...the privateer system assumed approximately the shape of a marine militia” (Stark 1897, 121). In fact, during the American Revolutionary War, “...the first naval victory of the colonists… was the result of private enterprise” (Stark 1897, 118). The extent to which privateers were employed was necessary because “...the personnel of a navy were as difficult to find as the materiel” (Stark 1897, 118). The Continental Congress commissioned merchant vessels as ships of war, and merchant captains as naval officers (Stark 1897). Privateering was a significant obstacle to the economy of the Colonies’ enemies. According to Stark (1897, 119), “The misery inflicted by [American] privateers on the ubiquitous British commerce was steadily increasing.”

Privateers guaranteed defense and deterrence when the government could not.

Between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, the “...poverty of the three Federalist

threatening or using force against neutral vessels (Stark 1897).

The Framers The Framers had not been unfamiliar with the idea of privateering—it is found in the Articles of Confederation: “The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, and of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the united states shall be divided or appropriated, and of granting letters of mark (sic) and reprisal in times of peace” (Articles of Confederation).

The late Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story elaborates on the logic of the writers of the Articles regarding the federal government’s jurisdiction, as opposed to state governments’, over privateering: “A State might otherwise enter into engagements with foreign governments, utterly subversive of the policy of the National Government, or injurious to the rights and interests of the other States. One State might enter into a treaty or

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics alliance with France, and another with England, and another with Spain, and another with Russia—each in its general objects inconsistent with the other; and thus, the seeds of discord might be spread over the whole Union. For the same reasons, the states right to grant letters of marque and reprisal is prohibited. If the state had the right to issue the letters, it “would hazard the peace of the Union by subjecting it to the passions, resentments, or policy of a single state. If any State might issue letters of marque or reprisal at its own mere pleasure, it might at once involve the whole Union in a public war; or bring on retaliatory measures by the foreign government, which might cripple the commerce, or destroy the vital interests of other States. The prohibition is, therefore, essential to the public safety” (Story 1865, §232).

As contemporaneous intellectual movements influenced the Framers, including Emerich de Vattel’s philosophy of war, attitudes about the Letters evolved. Vattel’s (1883) major treatise, The Law of Nations, was a precursor to modern international relations, and it detailed the circumstances under which reprisal occurs. The overarching theme found in Vattel’s writing about Marque and Reprisal is that a sovereign’s goals are the safety of his citizens and urity of his nation, and therefore commissioning privateers should only occur to achieve those goals.

Vattel (1883, §339) wrote, “...when a nation cannot obtain justice, whether for a wrong or an injury, she has a right to do herself justice.” There are two such instances: 1) either when the defending government is unable to respond militarily, or 2) when the opposing government is unwilling to cooperate in amicable negotiation. Vattel (1883, §343) insists that reprisal should only occur after justice has been “ineffectually demanded” from the defending government or if there

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is “...every reason to think that it would be too vain… to demand it.” While there are preferable alternatives for settling disputes, if an adversary “refuses to pursue or artfully evades the necessary steps for bringing the matter to the proof—if he does not candidly and sincerely accede to some pacific mode of terminating the dispute—especially if he is foremost in adopting violent measures—he gives justice to our cause [reprisal]” (Vattel 1883, §343). Indeed, self-redress emerges in circumstances that inherently evoke violent passion, namely after a party has been attacked. As those seeking redress are prone to behave recklessly in the heat of vengeance, individuals must be prohibited to act without the consent of their government (Vattel 1883). While taking account of realities, such as non-state-endorsed privateering, Vattel (1883, §347) wrote that reprisals may be made “against a nation not only for the actions of the sovereign, but also for those of his subjects.” In determining the appropriate scope of reprisal, Vattel (1883, §350) wrote that the law of nations allows for reciprocity when attaining justice: “The only truth in this idea of retaliation is, that, all circumstances being in other respects equal, the punishment ought to bear some proportion to the evil for which we mean to inflict it—the very object and foundation of punishment requiring thus much.”

Therefore, under the right circumstances, reprisals are not only lawful, but are just and therefore cannot rightly be cited as a reason for a nation to declare war.

These ideas about military engagement were articulated in the Federalist Papers, essays written by the U.S. Framers that debated the ideals of government administration in the U.S. In Federalist Paper, No. 41, James Madison argues, in part, that the federal government of the U.S. should be able to establish a military, as that would ensure the common defense and security of liberty of America’s citizens. Madison

60 posited that there existed a constant possibility of war.

Noting some of the particular vulnerabilities of the U.S. at that time, Madison suggested that the military, on its own, could be toppled: “[New York’s] seacoast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an island...

The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous” (Federalist Paper, No. 41).

Moreover, there was a belief that the Letters of Marque and Reprisal were a natural part of the nation’s war power, and a legitimate way to enforce international law (Cooperstein 2009).

Justice Story interprets the War Powers Clause found in his Familiar Exposition: “The power to declare war would, of itself, carry the incidental power to grant letters of marque and reprisal…. But such letters are also sometimes granted by nations, having no intention to enter into a general war, in order to redress a grievance to a private citizen, which the offending nation refuses to redress…. It thus creates an imperfect state of hostilities, not necessarily including a general warfare. Still, however, it is a dangerous experiment; and the more usual, and wise course is, to resort to negotiations in such cases, and to wait until a favorable moment occurs to press the claim…. [T]he States, separately, are incapable for affording adequate redress in such cases, the power is appropriately vested in

Tal the General Government (Story 1865, §187).”

In the next section, the importance of the government’s ability to commission privateers when its defense is too weak will become evident.

The Judiciary The Thomas Gibbons (1814), a Supreme Court case, dealt with the question of whether the President may restrict privateering. Justice Story wrote in his opinion that: “[I]t has been the great object of every maritime nation to restrain and regulate the conduct of its privateers. They are watched with great anxiety and vigilance, because they may often involve the nation, by irregularities of conduct, in serious controversies, not only with public enemies, but also with neutrals and allies” (429).

The Supreme Court used this reasoning to justify the President’s authority over the commissioning of privateers: “[I]t is very clear that the President has, under the prize act, the power to grant, annul, and revoke, at his pleasure, the commissions of privateers.” These commissions are “qualified and restrained by the power of the President to issue instructions. The privateer takes it subject to such power, and contracts to act in obedience to all the instructions which the President may lawfully promulgate” (428).

In another case dealing with privateering, The Mary and Susan (1816), the Court held that the United States could commission foreigners to be privateers, writing, “it has been the universal practice of nations to employ foreigners, and even deserters, to fight their battles” (14).

The Supreme Court has not opined further about Letters of Marque and Reprisal, but the issues around privateering and private military contracting are relevant today. The Supreme Court has

The United States’ Cyber Privateers acknowledged the constitutionality of privateering, and this paper argues that today, the War Powers Clause should allow Congress to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal to entities from independent hackers to large corporations. The American government lacks a sufficient cyber defense, and it could benefit, especially in the short term, by authorizing private firms to reduce the threat of a catastrophic attack.

The Cyberscape Nature of Cyber War

A cyber attack is defined as being destructive

in nature (Lin 2010). The purpose of such an attack is to cause a target’s computer systems and networks to be unavailable or untrustworthy, and therefore less useful (Lin 2010). An example of a cyber attack is an “...erasure by a computer virus resident on the hard disk of any infected computer” (Lin 2010, 63). Cyber attacks are targeted at adversary systems or networks, and may have indirect effects on “...entities coupled to or reliant on them” (Lin 2010, 63). Cyber exploitation, on the other hand, is nondestructive. This method of cyber-conduct seeks to obtain information, often confidential, that transits through a target’s system or network (Lin 2010). Accordingly, this method is most effective when unnoticed by the target (Lin 2010).

The underlying technology and “associated operational considerations” between both methods are similar (Lin 2010, 64). Both exploit accessible vulnerabilities, and both need payloads to be executed (Lin 2010). Vulnerabilities are simply pregnable defense mechanisms (Lin 2010). The payload is the action that can be taken once vulnerability has been exploited. The nature of the payload is what differentiates cyber attacks from cyber exploitation (Lin 2010).

There are established definitions for certain cyber activities, two of which are in the scope of this

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paper. The first, “hacktivism,” describes the secret exchange of information between an intelligence agency and private-sector hackers “so that truths too sensitive for the government to tell will nevertheless” become available (Gross 2011). The second term, “patriotic hacker,” describes private citizens who take advantage of attribution difficulties (Lin 2010). Author Michael Joseph Gross (2011), specifically addressing Chinese cyber attacks on the U.S., adds: “Dozens of nations have highly developed industrial cyber-espionage programs, including American allies such as France and Israel. And because the People’s Republic of China is such a massive entity, it is impossible to know how much Chinese hacking is done on explicit orders from the government. In some cases, the evidence suggests that government and military groups are executing the attacks themselves.”

One common type of cyber aggression is a distributed denial of service (DDoS) (Lin 2010). In this attack, a hacker infects a large number of computers by sending “Trojan horse” viruses to unwitting users (Lin 2010). Once the Trojan horse is on a computer, the hacker can externally activate it and then send Internet traffic to a website (Lin 2010). Often numbering in the millions, these masses of “zombie” computers, called “botnets,” overwhelm the host’s network and deny service to users (Messerschmidt 2013).

South Korea has been the victim of several DDoS attacks that have been attributed to North Korea (Hern 2013). It is believed that North Korea gained access to and directed traffic from computers in at least six countries, including the United States (WalkerMorgan 2009). Attacks from North Korea have caused South Korea over $800 billion in damages, and attacks have affected the Web sites of banks around the world, the U.S. Secret Service networks, and South Korea’s presidential Blue House, among others (Sang-Hun and Markoff 2009).

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Malicious software usage is another form of cyber aggression. By exploiting vulnerabilities in a computer system, a hacker can gain access to this system and then execute a payload (Owens, Dam, and Lin 2009). Malware is traditionally a “virus” or a “worm”: self-propagating and replicating computer programs that take advantage of flaws within computer systems (Messerschmidt 2013). Worms are selfsustaining independent programs that reproduce themselves by copying themselves in full from one computer to another via a network or the Internet (Messerschmidt 2013). Worms can spread rapidly from system to system and, if programmed to do so, deliver their payload on the new system after replicating (Sklerov 2009).

The Stuxnet worm is the highest-profile and most damaging example of a malicious software cyber attack. Most likely engineered by Israel or the U.S., or both, Stuxnet severely damaged the Natanz Iranian nuclear enrichment facility in 2010 (Zetter 2011). This type of attack targets industrial control systems, which are especially vulnerable to malware. Surprisingly simple in nature, and therefore not equipped to recognize malware, industrial control systems, which are responsible for regulating critical infrastructure, are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks such as Stuxnet (Langner 2011). Cybersecurity consultant Ralph Langner (2013) estimates that the attack has set back Iran’s nuclear program by two years. Because Stuxnet was propagated over the course of a year and through local networks rather than the Internet, it reshaped the previous assumptions regarding the form of cyber warfare (Langner 2013). It also changed the perceptions of appropriate cyber defense (Langner 2013), which will be discussed below.

The final type of cyber aggression is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). Cybersecurity defense firm Mandiant issued a landmark report

discussing China’s cyber espionage against the U.S. The report noted that APTs generally gain access to target networks by “spear phishing,” a hacking technique where an individual inside a target organization is sent a misleading e-mail with an attachment (Messerschmidt 2013). Appearing familiar and harmless, a hacker’s attachment is a malicious file that will infect the target network. It seeks to create a backdoor through which more intruders can gain information about the target (Messerschmidt 2013).

Until recently, passive defense methods, including mechanisms such as firewalls, tarpits, and honeypots, had been the main defense strategy.

Firewalls “...protect computer systems by examining each packet of data that travels over the network.

Clues about a packet’s purpose can be read from its destination address” (Sklerov 2009, 24). Although fast and transparent, these systems were easily breached. In the early 1990s, a new generation of application layer firewalls emerged. Although more cumbersome to set up and operate, the latter provided a more thorough defense. By the early 2000s, most firewalls were hybrids of these two primary types (Messerschmidt 2013).

Tarpits are computer entities designed to respond slowly to cyber threats (Messerschmidt 2013). By slowing the progress of a cyber threat, tarpits serve not only to delay the impact of threats, but also to provide time needed to identify the intruders. “Honeypots” are traps that appear desirable to an intruder, but are actually decoys that enable the system to capture information critical to determining the source of the intrusion (Messerschmidt 2013).

Cybersecurity in The United States

The United States faces a human capital shortage in the area of cyber security (Evans and Reeder 2010), similar to its shortages in naval personnel in its early history. Academics and other professionals with insight have estimated that the U.S.

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has between 1,000 and 3,000 cyber security specialists “...who have the specialized skills to operate effectively in cyberspace” (Evans and Reeder 2010, 1). Founding director of the CIA’s Clandestine Information Technology Office, Jim Gosler, says that the U.S. needs between 10,000 and 30,000 such experts (Evans and Reeder 2010). In The New York Times, David Sanger (2014) writes that President Obama intends on increasing the American cyber security force to 6,000 by 2016, but even that falls far short of the force deemed necessary to defend the U.S..

The responsibility to defend the U.S. in

processing systems (Sanger and Perloth 2014). If America’s energy resources were compromised, the impact, if not devastating, would be felt by a large part of the U.S. (Pizzi 2014). While the statistics regarding the number of cyber attacks—total or successful—vary to the point of unreliability, critical infrastructure such as energy grids and power plants are unequivocally threatened.

Critical infrastructure includes, among others things, regional power grids, water supply, private sector voice and Internet communications networks, public transportation systems, commercial

cyberspace is currently delegated to several agencies.

Each military branch of the Department of Defense, for instance, has its own cybersecurity program.

Two well-known American intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency (under the Department of Defense) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (under the Department of Justice), have their own cybersecurity programs. This is in addition to the Central Intelligence Agency’s program, and the Department of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity program, with the latter intended to be the primary civilian cybersecurity service. The disparate distribution of responsibility results in unnecessary delay and bureaucracy in the implementation of cyber policy. In the cybersecurity news website Bankinfosecurity, Eric Chabrow (2014a) writes that The U.S. government is seeking to alleviate this disjointedness by modeling a federal civilian cyber campus after Fort Meade, which houses the National Security Agency and other military intelligence agencies.

In the U.S., both the public and private sectors experience cyber attacks and would benefit from effective policy. In 2013, attacks were perpetrated against American energy companies, and it is suspected that attackers sought control of industrial

fuel refineries, the financial industry, crucial defense systems and hardware, and military readiness. The Department of Homeland Security estimates that approximately 85% of critical infrastructure is owned privately.

Both the public and private sectors have begun to explore active defense measures, namely counterattacking. In cyber warfare, this is called a hackback. As the name implies, a firm would “[access, disable, or destroy] the hacker’s assets, exploiting the vulnerabilities of an attacker’s system” in retaliation to a cyber attack (Messerschmidt 2013, 294). In addition to the non-preventive nature of passive remedies, legal remedies are cumbersome and include problems such as “...lengthy prosecutions, thorny jurisdictional matters, technologically unsophisticated juries, and slow courts,...” which would surely delay justice (Katyal 2005, 60). The expertise needed to respond to these threats cannot be easily found within traditional law enforcement, nor is law enforcement able to act outside of its national boundary (Messerschmidt 2013).

Additionally, if a firm is perceived to have gaping cyber vulnerabilities, its stock price or brand are likely to suffer (Messerschmidt 2013). Hacking back privately allows for a quick response and can deter future cyber attackers (Messerschmidt 2013).

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While hacking back is a desirable countermeasure for firms, there are questions about the symmetry of damage done. Hackbacks are, like other forms of retaliation, liable to excessively damage the target, accurate or not, of an attack.

Missing counterattacks are especially problematic because they threaten innocent third parties (Katyal 2005). For instance, computers infected and acting in a DDoS botnet may be “...operated by hospitals, governmental units, and telecommunications entities” (Messerschmidt 2013, 294). Although this form of selfredress is clearly imperfect, it has clear advantages over

peace. The Supreme Court established that the law was indeed designed to “secure neutrality in wars” (Fallon 2012, 127). Judge Judson, of the Southern District Federal Court of New York, noted that: “[The Act’s] great object — the all-pervading object of this law — is peace with all nations — national amity — which will alone enable us to enjoy friendly intercourse and uninterrupted commerce, the great source of wealth and prosperity — in short, to prevent war, with all its sad and desolating consequences” (United States v.

Sullivan 1851, 3).

Some argue that under the purview of this

passive defense. The capability of firms to hack back may not only be used for reprisal: the U.S. government may also harness it should it want to commission cyber privateers.

law, private firms should be able to take their own action against cyber attackers, while not responding so severely as to motivate a war (Fallon 2012). The Pentagon developed an effects-oriented approach for analyzing cyber activity in 2011. With respect to the Neutrality Act, this approach dictates that cyber-conduct of U.S. firms are only illegal “military expeditions” if critical infrastructure is damaged (Fallon 2012, 124). Therefore, intellectual property theft, cyber espionage and cyber attacks that damage only non-critical infrastructure do not make a corporation liable under the neutrality act. This suggests that if U.S. firms, such as Google, conduct cyber espionage, do not damage critical infrastructure, and therefore do not engaging in military expeditions or incite war, that their private recourse would be legal.

The Supreme Court is, of course, responsible for interpreting the term “military expedition”, and it has decided 40 cases under the Neutrality Act (Fallon 2012, 127). Each of these cases has dealt with scenarios that were related to traditional, kinetic warfare, where hostile intentions are relatively easily discernible (Fallon 2012). Fallon (2012) suggests that the Court cannot evaluate whether a hacker intends to carry out a military expedition in violation of the Neutrality Act; however, the Court must evaluate the effects of the

Domestic Law

The Neutrality Act, enacted in 1793, is cited as the starting point in U.S. domestic law for cyber warfare (Fallon 2012). The Act provides: “Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both” (18 USC §960).

Christopher Fallon (2012), scholar and former U.S. Army officer, argues that a firm should be able to engage in cyber warfare to a limited degree, and elaborates on this idea in the context of the Neutrality Act. The purpose of the legislation was to prohibit people, and corporations, from engaging in military conflict with sovereignties with which the U.S. was at

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cyber-conduct, namely whether military escalation follows.

President Obama’s International Strategy for Cyberspace, signed in May 2011, cites the Laws of Armed Conflict and states that the U.S. will respond to a cyber attack as it would to a traditional kinetic attack, with a “...proportional and justified military response” (Fallon 2012, 129). The Department of Defense soon after revealed its own Strategy for Operation in Cyberspace, which “...is a further development of the Equivalence Doctrine,” the United States’ justification of a nuclear response during the Cold War (Fallon

for 24-hours, and the website of a college that hosts hackers would be shut down, barring the hackers from using their college email accounts (Fallon 2012).

This would also not pass the threshold of a “militaryexpedition” because it would not damage critical infrastructure or have the impact of a traditional kinetic attack.

Fallon (2012) considers the arguments against his analysis. The first is that Google’s responses violate the Neutrality Act because they are attacks against a foreign state. His counter-response is predicated on the critical infrastructure rule: because the attacks did

2012, 130). The Strategy “...justifies a kinetic military response to a cyber attack” (Fallon 2012, 130).

Experts have suggested that the U.S. could only make such a response to an attack that damages critical infrastructure. Fallon quotes Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn, who says that damage to critical infrastructure qualifies as: “...[c]onduct causing loss of life or damage similar to what would result from physical hostilities…” (Fallon 2012, 131). Fallon therefore reasons that “...cyber espionage and attacks that damage non-critical infrastructure...” do not cross the threshold and thus “...do not subject the victim corporation to liability” (Fallon 2012, 132).

Fallon (2012) proposes two measures that Google could have taken in response to the Chinese attack (Fallon 2012). The first remedy would be to conduct cyber-espionage to confirm that China was in fact the perpetrator. Because this attack would not entail any damage to critical infrastructure as defined above, Fallon argues that this response does not rise to the level of casus belli, an occurrence justifying war.

Fallon’s (2012) second remedy would be to crash a governmental website and quasi-governmental website in China, using a denial of service attack. He hypothesizes that China’s Politburo members and staff would be unable to access their official e-mails

not damage critical infrastructure, they should not be considered military expeditions. The attacks would not be an adequate justification for military escalation between the two nations, and therefore would not violate the Neutrality Act.

The counter-argument against Fallon’s (2012) second remedy is that as a non-government entity, Google has no right to attack a foreign state. The Neutrality Act is, in part, meant to protect the War Powers delegated to the Federal level of government from being usurped. Fallon (2012) notes that if a citizen or an organization takes independent military action and attacks another sovereign, these powers would indeed be unconstitutionally usurped. While this is the case, the historical and Constitutional analyses above suggest that Congress can commission a private entity, such as Google, to conduct military action against a sovereign and its people.

Consequently, an entity such as Google, operating with the permission of a Letter of Marque and Reprisal, would not violate the Neutrality Act. International Law

Issuing Letters of Marque and Reprisal must also be examined in the context of international law.

In his article, Messerschmidt (2013) examines the

66 pertinent international law around cyber warfare. He argues that the principle of transboundary harm, if violated, provides the basis for hacking back, a method of self-redress. Under the doctrine of transboundary harm, states are required to perform due diligence and ensure that its citizens harm another country (Messerschmidt 2013). Messerschmidt (2013) argues that a nation’s failure to prevent its citizens from causing harm through cyber-aggression, hacking back should be permitted under international law.

The principle of transboundary harm was established by the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 1941 decision in the Trail Smelter case between the United States and Canada (Messerschmidt 2013).

The dispute revolved around emissions originating in Canadian smelter plants that crossed into parts of the State of Washington and harmed crops and fisheries (Messerschmidt 2013). The ICJ stated: “No state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence” (Trail Smelter Case 1941, 1965).

Furthermore, the tribunal found Canada to be “...responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter...” and held that it was “...the duty of the Government of the Dominion of Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in conformity with the obligation of the Dominion under international law as herein determined” (Trail Smelter Case 1941, 1966).

The ICJ elaborated on the principle of transboundary harm in the Corfu Channel case. Here, the Court noted that a state violates the principle of transboundary harm if a state so much as suspects that actors within its national borders will commit an action “contrary to the rights of other states” (United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v.

Albania 1949, 22).

If states do not meet their obligation to prevent transboundary harm, then victims are entitled to self-redress, including reprisal (Messerschmidt 2013).

These countermeasures, taken in response to wrongful conduct by another state, are lawful methods to enforce compliance in an inherently decentralized system. The International Law Commission (ILC) emphasized that “...countermeasures are a feature of a decentralized system by which injured States may seek to vindicate their rights” (United Nations General Assembly 2001, 43).

Customary International Law also plays a role in the discussion of cyber privateers. In 1856, the Declaration of Paris, an international treaty meant to outlaw privateering, was signed by fifty-five nations, including the United Kingdom, France and Russia.

The U.S., however, did not sign (Young 2009). Despite not signing, the U.S. has not commissioned privateers since 1812 (Young 2009). Because a state’s action over time is a factor when determining its adherence to the relevant Customary International Law, the United States’ long hiatus from issuing Letters of Marque and Reprisal for over 200 years is presumably regarded as a settled practice.

Moreover, the ICJ states that: “…[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitates [an opinion of law or necessity].

The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics obligation. The frequency, or even habitua1 character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty” (North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969, 44).

The U.S., however, did not refuse to sign the

declaration because it objected to the prohibition of privateering. It in fact proposed an amendment to more broadly prohibit the seizure private property, which was rejected (Young 2009). Indeed, the U.S. wanted a stronger prohibition against the depredations associated with privateering while the Declaration was being signed. Issuing Letters of Marque and Reprisal may therefore be seen an outright violation of the Declaration of Paris, and of International Law. On the other hand, the U.S. may convincingly demonstrate to other nations that today’s cybersecurity concerns parallel those of naval warfare 200 years ago, necessitating the renewed endorsement of privateers.

Increasing Connections

As network-based technology proliferates,

the number of cyber vulnerabilities will naturally rise. The efficiency and consistently decreasing price of technologies, such as the Internet of Things and Cloud Computing, both explained below, are drawing an increasing number of companies and government agencies. As these technologies are being increasingly employed, the risk of being hacked will become widespread and will necessitate thorough defense measures.

The Internet of Things refers to devices spanning from kitchen appliances to exercise tracking devices and hospital beds that are wirelessly connected

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to a network (Manyika, Chui, Bughin, Dobbs, Bisson, and Marrs 2013). These devices within infrastructure are equipped with sensors and actuators that allow the exchange of information and instructions over a network (Manyika et al. 2013).

Experts predict that far more processes will be shifted over from traditional technology to the Internet of Things (Manyika et al. 2013). The new technology is desirable because of its “datafication” capability, or the ability to quantify action that was previously obscured for later data analysis. Because an almost unlimited number of physical objects and activities can be datafied, businesses are likely, even if not immediately, to use this technology to optimize efficiency in several areas (Manyika et al. 2013). Companies, such as FedEx, are using Internet of Things technology to allow customers to track shipments (Manyika et al.

2013). Manufacturers can use the Internet of Things to improve operational efficiency (Manyika et al. 2013).

Sensors can be added to machinery, providing real time updates on repair needs or productivity levels.

Inventory can be monitored as it moves across a factory floor, and in precision manufacturing sensors can optimize the processes of assembly lines (Manyika et al. 2013).

Governments see the Internet of Things as “an important enabler of better management of urban infrastructure, systems, and services, including traffic, waste and water systems, and public safety” (Manyika et al. 2013, 57). The governments of London and Singapore use traffic monitoring sensors that optimize traffic flow by adjusting traffic light timing and changing bus routes (Manyika et al. 2013). Doha, São Paolo, and Beijing use sensors on pumps and other water infrastructure to identify any structural issues and minimize leaks (Manyika et al. 2013). An electricity supplier in the U.S. has already implemented

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a smart grid that uses Internet connected sensors that seek to reroute service around failed transmissions automatically, rather than waiting for a consumer to report an outage (Manyika et al. 2013, 53).

The use of Internet of Things technology has been predicted to be highly valuable for both public and private sector operations (Manyika et al. 2013).

Furthermore, the prices of the technology are dropping while the technology itself is improving, making it more accessible (Manyika et al. 2013). It stands to reason that these circumstances will motivate both the private and public sectors to increasingly adopt the

needed, is cost effective. Productivity remains high because Cloud setups can shift processing among machines in the case of failure.

The Cloud is predicted to enable most of Information Technology and Web applications in the coming decade. Cloud Computing technology is not inherently more vulnerable than a traditional datacenter, but the impacts of a security breach of a Cloud system could be more far reaching. One breach of the Cloud system could have effects on every user because third party Cloud providers have multiple tenants, or users. Federal agencies, for

technology in their operations, thus also taking on the associated vulnerabilities. In Bankinfosecurity, Eric Chabrow (2014b) writes that devices, including those on airplanes like the Boeing aircraft that went missing between Kuala Lampur and China, do not require network security features to be certified. With the continued proliferation of these devices, vital functions will increasingly operate without adequate security.

If a hacker or terrorist gained access to the networks that carry information or instructions for any critical infrastructure, the damage could be catastrophic.

The other important technology being pursued by both private and public sector is Cloud Computing.

This technology connects computers to remote pools of computing resources, including servers, storage, and applications (Mell and Grace 2011). To access Cloud services, an organization would either outsource its datacenter needs to a third party Cloud provider or collaborate with another organization and create a private cloud.

Governments and companies are attracted to Cloud technology because it is cost efficient and offers operational efficiency through redundancy. The combination of usage based pricing and “elasticity,” or the ability to shrink or expand network capacity as

example, are moving to use a shared Cloud service, rather than continuing with traditional data centers, to reduce costs (Perepa 2014). Additionally, Cloud technology relies on the process of virtualization, an additional layer of software processes that creates more ddd“surface” for an attacker to target (Steiner 2012).

Similar to the above-mentioned technologies, virtual currency’s popularity is increasing. The individuals and large companies that use it are flocking to the Bitcoin marketplace. Not backed by any government as legal tender, Bitcoin can be traded within a virtual economy, or it can be used as a substitute for government-issued currency and purchase goods and services in the real economy (Brito and Castillo 2013).

Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer, decentralized payments network—this is in contradistinction to a centralized client-server model. The users in the network substitute the role that a third party such as PayPal might play, namely solving the “doublespending” problem of electronic payments (Brito and Castillo 2013). Rather than having a third party responsible for ledgers, the Bitcoin network members, called “miners”, use their computer’s processing power to keep a public ledger (Brito and Castillo 2013).

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Miners’ processing power goes toward solving complex

in 2012 and conducting a series of DDoS attacks

math problems that verify a past Bitcoin transaction.

against another exchange, Mt. Gox, in 2013 (Brito and

Once the problem is solved, a miner earns Bitcoins

Castillo 2013). Of course, virtual currency is inherently

(Brito and Castillo 2013).

vulnerable to cyber attack. But even if it proves

challenging for government to protect virtual currency

Bitcoin attracts users because of its low

transaction costs. For small businesses seeking to

users from theft, it has an interest in making serious

reduce costs, the negligible transaction fee of Bitcoin

efforts to do so as these currencies are becoming

exchange is alluring (Brito and Castillo 2013). Typical

taxable, and therefore can become a revenue stream

fees charged to merchants by credit card companies

(Abrams 2014).

can be burdensome. Avoiding the fees of credit card

Recent Developments

transactions once meant that companies would forgo the business of people who preferred the ease of credit card transactions. Due to reduced transaction costs, there has been a movement among small businesses to accept Bitcoin as currency (Brito and Castillo 2013).

The lower costs also permit Bitcoin to be a potential remittance mechanism (Johnson 2013).

Bitcoin also has the potential to alleviate

poverty in either developing countries or countries whose economic environment is volatile. The poor belonging to developing countries often lack access to basic financial services, and research has suggested that increasing such access is a promising method of reducing poverty (Brito and Castillo 2013). Some of the technology companies that make products for Bitcoin have created products that allow the poor (who have turned to mobile banking) to use the more cost efficient exchange of Bitcoins (Spaven 2013). Many citizens of Argentina, who are burdened from their nation’s consistent inflation and capital controls, have also turned to the unregulated currency (Matonis 2013).

As the use of virtual currency usage increases,

so does the likelihood of cyber vulnerability. Malware aimed at Bitcoin theft has already been developed (Doherty 2011). Hackers have succeeded in stealing $250,000 worth of Bitcoin from one exchange, Bitfloor,

There have been several major occurrences

concerning cybersecurity during the time of writing.

The “Heartbleed” bug, discovered by researchers in Finland, is a vulnerability in OpenSSL, an encryption technology. OpenSSL generally protects the exchange of information between an end-user and a server, but the bug allows hackers to potentially uncover keys that contain vital information including passwords.

In addition to fueling another Snowdenesque discussion regarding government intrusion, the discovery of Heartbleed has highlighted the increasing cybersecurity vulnerabilities for Internet users (Chabrow 2014c).

According to Eric Chabrow (2014d), the

missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 prompts consideration over cybersecurity for services, such as air travel, that rely on the Internet of Things.

The Federal Aviation Administration noted that new designs in the Boeing 777 airplanes increase connectivity between systems on the airplane, including those available to passengers, such as entertainment. This creates room for cyber vulnerability. While it does not appear that the plane went missing because of a cyber attack, experts have noted that such an attack is possible through the Internet of Things.

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Finally, the recent court trial of a leading black hat hacker, Hector Monsegur, serves as a textbook case of an emerging ethical and legal grey area in cybersecurity. Monsegur was instrumental in cyber attacks against targets such as PayPal and Mastercard (Mazzetti 2014). The F.B.I. hired him as an informant, where he was responsible for cyber espionage against government websites in Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, and Brazil (Mazzetti 2014). Moreover, by exploiting a vulnerability similar to the Heartbleed bug, Monsegur was able to provide the F.B.I with critical information about Syria, which is currently torn by civil war and

the successful capture of terrorists, could be adapted to work for cybersecurity. Entities regarded as APTs, for instance, are likely to be considered enough of a threat to qualify as a bounty. Third, foreign citizens or organizations as well as smaller domestic firms might, in various combinations, want to fund a commission led by a large firm to neutralize a common threat (Young 2009).

Another question has been raised in the discussion of modern day privateers. Prize law, now defunct, governed the capture of property on the seas during times of war (Garrett 2013). In an academic

highly vulnerable. A federal court in New York has criticized the F.B.I. for illegally extracting information to be help tip the balance in the civil war (Mazzetti 2014).

article, Nathaniel Garrett, Second Lieutenant of the United States Air Force Reserve, proposes that prize law be revived to adjudicate issues of cyber warfare and espionage (Garrett 2013). However, prize courts would authorize the auction of captured goods, which were nearly always finished products whose value was limited. In contrast, the information that is the loot of cyber aggression can contain trade secrets with theoretically unlimited consequences, economic or other. One can imagine the long-term effects of capturing and selling a room full of jewelry versus capturing a company’s or country’s secret information, such as blueprints for revolutionary technological products or formulas for building nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the analogy of naval and cyber warfare should not include the element of prize law.

The dubious aspects of privateering in maritime warfare, as well as concerns over potential cyber reprisals, have been discussed in this paper. If Congress seeks to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal, it must also evaluate private security contracting.

Privateering has rightly been deemed an early form of private security contracting. The use of Private Security Contractors (PSCs) has continued and evolved, while the nomenclature of privateering has died out.

The two continue to share the same fundamental

Further Considerations and Conclusions

The circumstances that call for privateers today, though similar, are not identical to those of early U.S. history. William Young notes, for example, that one obstacle in hiring privateers today would be the need for private funding (Young 2009). Historically, the United States’ government did not pay privateers. It seems that in order to “...pass constitutional muster as privateers,” (Young 2009, 921) the government could not provide funding for them. While it has been argued that private parties would have to fund traditional privateers today, it is not clear that this is necessarily true in cyberspace. The Letter of Marque and Reprisal can, in addition to being granted to auxiliary cyber forces, be sought exclusively as a method of self-redress by firms that can likely fund themselves (Young 2009). If Congress should seek to commission firms or private hackers and require funding, however, private funding could be organized in at least three ways: First, private, wealthy U.S. citizens could fund the commission. Second, a system such as Rewards for Justice, which issues rewards for

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characteristic: a government outsourcing its military tasks to civilians. Therefore, examining the current practice of PSCs will provide a sufficient starting point for Congress to more empirically speculate scenarios to which cyber privateering could give rise.

Currently, the U.S. contracts private security firms to supplement its forces abroad. Blackwater, the most well known of the private security contractors, engaged in a firefight with civilians in Nisoor Square in Iraq. The incident caused outrage among Iraq’s citizens and government, which revoked the firm’s license to operate in the country (Elsea 2010). This is

cyber attacks a new form of aggression that threaten the economy and safety of the United States, but the federal government does not have adequate personnel to respond to a severe cyber attack. Moreover, the federal government’s strategy for cybersecurity is currently disjointed. While the U.S. seeks to maintain security in cyberspace, it might do well to look for the help of its private citizens and corporations that have the necessary expertise. Instead of U.S. intelligence agencies repeating the F.B.I.’s recent entanglement, Congress can consider issuing Letters of Marque and Reprisal as a legal method of cyber aggression. An

not an isolated occurrence, but it has drawn the most attention among similar shootings (Hackman 2008).

The response could have elicited more severe backlash, from either the Iraqi citizens or government.

Blackwater is a well-funded organization and its reputation implied accountability and organization (Hackman 2008). The fact that a firm such as Blackwater is liable for such mishaps suggests that so would cyber privateers. If the U.S. commissions a cyber privateer that accidentally damages an unintended target, the repercussions could be dangerous. The firm, for instance, may have control over domestic critical infrastructure networks, which could be targeted in retaliation. As the United States’ networks are already vulnerable, the attractive option of an active defense via renewed use of Letters of Marque and Reprisal will likely increase the burden of potential retaliation.

As this paper has illustrated, the U.S. government once commissioned privateers to serve as auxiliary naval forces when is actual navy was weak.

Since it last issued a Letter of Marque and Reprisal in 1812, the U.S. has become a military superpower with no need to seek the aid of private citizens. Today, however, the state of United States’ cybersecurity parallels the state of its maritime security before the Navy could function independently. Not only are

examination of early American history provides us with the evidence that privateering was Constitutional and effective. An examination of today’s cybersecurity might warn us that it is necessary.

Notes The author would like to thank Professor Ira Bloom for his continuous guidance, and his mother and brother for always pushing him forward in all of his efforts.

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Reconsidering Revolutions: The Impact of Breakthrough Elections on Democratization in Croatia and Serbia Chelsea Kendziorski Grand Valley State University Recent research highlights the democratizing impact of breakthrough elections in postcommunist Eurasia, some of which have been accompanied by the so-called “color revolutions”.

Scholars have noted improvements in democracy procedures and accountability in countries where electoral breakthroughs occurred. Drawing on evidence from Croatia and Serbia, this research investigates the extent to which individual breakthrough elections contributed to democratic development. While these countries have both experienced overall democratic progress, improvements in some areas, such as civil society development, the autonomy of media outlets, and electoral processes, have been less robust than one would expect. This analysis examines the ways in which actors respond to domestic and international structures to show how elite decisions can be critical in shaping governance trajectories.

Introduction For many activists, scholars, and political leaders, the breakthrough elections that swept across the post-communist world in the late 1990s and early 2000s were perceived to be precursors to positive democratic change. Geographic diffusion of protests - from central to southeastern Europe, to Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan - and the fact that they inspired similar protests for change in the Middle East certainly gave scholars and democratically-minded world citizens hope that demands for democracy would prevail. Since elections provide opportunities for civil society development and can promote political competition (Bunce and Wolchik 2011), assumptions that democratization would follow in the wake of electoral breakthroughs are reasonable, particularly as some countries made substantial inroads following similar events in 1989 and 1990.

In some countries, these “second transitions” did produce impressive democratic development (McFaul 2005). For instance, Vladimir Mečiar was

defeated in 1998 elections in Slovakia, and Freedom House (1999) reported that the country’s status was “free” just a year later. The successful opposition empowerment in Slovakia inspired activists in Croatia to adopt similar strategies in 2000, such as unifying the opposition, to remove the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) from power (Bunce and Wolchik 2011).

These elections similarly fostered democratization, as Freedom House has consistently reported the country’s status as “free” since 2001 (Freedom House 2001-2014). However, not all countries that experienced electoral breakthroughs have seen robust democratic progress in their wake. For instance, the electoral defeat of authoritarian leader Viktor Yanukovych occurred in Ukraine in 2004. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution prompted the presidential election of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, who many hoped would end the severe corruption that characterized the former regime. Ten years after the Orange Revolution, however, the Yanukovych regime used severe coercion tactics, including violent police

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brutality, to suppress protestors (Way 2014). The majority of countries that have undergone electoral breakthroughs tend to lie somewhere in between the two extremes of either making great strides in democratization or achieving almost no progress at all.

Democratic progress occurred following breakthrough elections in Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. The latter countries continue to face serious impediments to democracy, however. For example, obstacles include corruption and unequal access to state institutions and resources that seriously undermine electoral competition (Levitsky and Way

(EU) membership makes engagement in this sort of systematic manipulation more costly and difficult for leaders. With prospective membership, the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s more direct involvement helps to discourage elites from making decisions that promote their personal advantage to the disadvantage of organized societal forces.

Below, I review the current literature on the democratizing impact of breakthrough elections as well as an outline of general democratization literature.

I show how previous research offers valuable insights, but falls short of solving the theoretical puzzle posed

2010b).

Despite the uneven nature of democratic progress following these breakthrough elections, some scholars insist that such elections have a democratizing impact (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Lindberg 2009).

Building on previous research that suggests these elections to be a mode of transition (Lindberg 2009), I argue that these events have produced not only uneven progress, but also that democratization has been less robust than anticipated. Additionally, this analysis addresses the roles of agency and structure in shaping democratic trajectories by incorporating elements of both approaches to explain uneven levels of democratic development. Furthermore, I consider how both domestic and international conditions can affect democratic trajectories. In short, my central argument is that the uneven democratic progress in Croatia and Serbia following breakthrough elections can be best explained by examining the ways in which elite actors have taken advantage of weak civil society and media forces to limit opposition potential. The premise here is that elites can shape and benefit from domestic conditions, such as a financially and human resource poor opposition, to ensure their political power. However, the prospect of European Union

here. Then, I develop my argument concerning the nature of domestic and international incentive structures that elites can manipulate, ultimately outlining how it contributes to our understanding of the democratization process. The following sections describe my method of case selection, emphasizing the structural similarities that these countries share and presenting evidence of uneven democratic progress. Then, I apply my argument to the evidence of democratic trajectories in Croatia and Serbia. The final section offers concluding remarks and implications for policy makers.

Democratization: Insights and Gaps Given the tremendous positive press coverage of elections that unseat incumbent authoritarian leaders and are sometimes accompanied by mass mobilization, the assumption that such elections are conducive to democratization does not appear far-fetched. Scholars, however, are divided about the democratic impact of so-called breakthrough elections, sometimes referred to in the postcommunist world as â&#x20AC;&#x153;color revolutionsâ&#x20AC;?. Lindberg (2009) suggests elections as a mode of democratic transition. Bunce and Wolchik (2011) partly agree

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with this assessment and argue that breakthrough elections change the political opportunity structure, expand the boundaries of popular mobilization and participation, and encourage a more competitive political environment. After reviewing the evidence of progress in the aftermath of these elections, Bunce and Wolchik (2011) conclude that democratic outcomes are enhanced in countries with a robust civil society and opposition whose efforts are aimed at constructive power sharing. With this in mind, it seems more appropriate to refer to the liberalizing potential of these elections rather than assert their democratic

a country is moving close to its “structural norms”.

They claim that the significant democratic progress following Serbia’s electoral breakthrough in 2000, for example, represents a convergence to where the country “should be” based on its geographic location and levels of economic development (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2014).

This emphasis on modernization as a significant explanatory variable for democratization is a reminder of the weighty influence of Lipset’s (1959) contribution to the democratization debate (Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski and Limongi

nature to avoid the democratizing bias inherent in the term “democratizing elections”.

The debate about the role of elections as a mode of transition to democracy has taken a more pessimistic turn as analysts review the evidence and conclude that the case made in support of their democratizing nature has been overstated. While democratic progress has been robust following electoral breakthroughs in Serbia, Slovakia, and Croatia, it has been much less notable in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. This has encouraged Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) to claim that analysts have overemphasized the role of elections.

Additionally, they contend that improvements in elections ignore deeper structural impediments to real democratic change, and that newly empowered leaders do not always implement democratic reform programs unless pressured by international actors such as the European Union (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009). Even scholars who recognize some democratic improvement in the wake of electoral breakthroughs have been hesitant to attribute successful democratization to this phenomenon. Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2014) insist that democratic change following breakthrough elections occurs only when

1997). While levels of economic development may explain broader patterns across regions and time, such explanations focus more on the process of regime change, estimating probabilities of regime transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, or examining democratic stability. Why countries struggle with deepening democracy once they have crossed a minimal democratic threshold is a question less likely to be answered solely by examining a structural factor such as level of economic development. Instead, investigating the ways in which actors interact with structural conditions is more likely to offer a satisfying explanation of political trajectories following breakthrough elections.

Additional structural elements, particularly the variable levels of pluralism tolerated by communist parties throughout the region, were highlighted as an important explanatory factor in accounting for various democratic trajectories across the post-communist world (Comisso 1994; Jowitt 1992). It was argued that countries that enjoyed higher levels of pluralism, such as Poland, Hungry, and the former Yugoslavia, would be comparatively quicker to develop political competition and societal accountability following the collapse of communism than countries under

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more hardline regimes, where pockets of dissent were prohibited and market-like innovations in central planning were absent (Hanson 1995; Geddes 1995).

Some scholars added international dimensions, such as the degree of imperial control exerted by Moscow, to clarify the interplay of both domestic and international forces inherent to communist legacies (Motyl 2004).

Actors’ decisions, however, came to be seen as decisive, particularly as political leaders in the more liberalized former Yugoslavia variably plunged their newly independent countries to war. In contrast, leaders in the Baltic states, inheriting a more hardline communist

Ziblatt (2013) view post-communist transitions as a result of long-standing historical patters involving a variety of political choices constrained and empowered by the past. In a similar vein, Fish (1999) considers how elite interests at the time of transition were shaped by the organizational profile of the communist party in each country and how decisions regarding the privatization process have influenced the extent to which post-communist economies are marketized (Fish 1999). However, his investigation does not consider how international structures and agents impact democratic trajectories, which is a line of

legacy, navigated their countries toward decidedly more democratic forms of governance (Csergo 2011).

Similarly, stateness problems, as defined

by Linz and Stepan (1996), present an incomplete explanation of contrasting democratic trajectories.

While stateness poses a difficult challenge for democratizers, numerous countries, including India and Spain, have been able to overcome these problems and successfully democratize. The latter is a result of how political actors decided to define citizenship and promote national as well as subnational cultural identities (Linz and Stepan 1996; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). When political elites build new states via exclusivist political projects that favor one group at the expense of another and adopt unilateral strategies over negotiation across ethnic lines, their actions are likely to undermine democratic possibilities by driving these states toward conflict and perhaps even war (Csergo 2011).

Much of the earlier democratization debates centered on which type of factor or explanation structural or agency, domestic or international - best accounted for different regime trajectories. More recently, however, analysts have attempted to bridge these theoretical divides. For example, Ekiert and

inquiry that has gained considerable attention since the end of the Cold War (Huntington 1991; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Levitsky and Way 2010). Bunce and Wolchik (2011), whose research bridges the agency/ structure divide and considers both international and domestic variables, offer some assistance here. They refute the structure-centric arguments of Levitsky and Way (2010), showing how international and domestic actors can adopt the “electoral model” to help the opposition win elections (Bunce and Wolchik 2011).

With the assistance of international actors, domestic actors make choices to adopt the electoral model.

These choices are conditioned by opposition unity and the unpopularity of regime incumbents (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). In essence, Bunce and Wolchik’s (2011) research contributes significantly to understanding democratization and electoral breakthroughs. They take into account actors’ decisions as well as the structural environment, illustrating how the electoral model can be diffused across countries to impact election outcomes. However, when explaining divergent democratic trajectories following liberalizing elections, they draw on mostly structural factors.

80 Reconsidering Revolutions and Building Bridges With an aim to pick up where Bunce and Wolchik (2011) left off, my argument attends to the structure-agency debate in an effort to explain democratic trajectories following breakthrough elections. In addition, I build on existing research by considering the impact of both international and domestic influences. My working definition of democracy is borrowed from Larry Diamond (1999), who builds on Robert Dahl’s (1989) definition of polyarchy. Diamond (1999) defines liberal democratic regimes as those that: 1) ensure uncertain electoral outcomes; 2) allow for civil liberties and citizens’ access to multiple sources of information; 3) respect and defend minority rights; and 4) maintain horizontal accountability in ensuring the independence of the judiciary and legislature from the executive.

As my argument hinges on the complex interactions between agency, structure, international variables, and domestic factors, it is necessary to clearly define these terms. Foremost, the structural factors and agency variables are mutually exclusive.

Within these separate categories, factors can be further classified as either domestic or international.

Put simply, variables may be categorized as domestic structural factors, domestic agency factors, international structural factors, or international agency factors. I use the term “agency” throughout this paper to refer to strategic decisions and choices made by actors. Examples of agency factors include: 1) tactical decisions on the part of political actors to form alliances with powerful economic elites; 2) hateful rhetoric to fuel ethnic tensions; or 3) coerce opposition leaders. Political elites make choices about whether to cooperate diplomatically with international actors and how to respond to domestic opposition.

Agency-centric approaches to understanding political trajectories emphasize the role of elite decisions and strategic actions that occur both domestically and internationally.

In contrast with agency variables, structural factors are longer-term conditions that are inherent to the structure of a state. Structural variables include historical legacies, resource wealth, economic structure, time of independence, and demographic composition. Similar to agency variables, structural factors are found in both the domestic and international environments. Domestic structural conditions include a states’ level of economic development, the strength of civil society, and the autonomy of media outlets. International structural conditions consist of a country’s position in the global economic system and the polity’s relative geographic location.

The following analysis shows how democratic progress after breakthrough elections in Croatia and Serbia has been uneven despite similar structural conditions, and investigates the reasons behind the diverging democratic trajectories of these countries.

In addition, I challenge the idea that these elections have produced significant democratic progress by showing how improvements have been less robust than one would expect. Exploring the different ways in which actors have responded to similar structural conditions in Croatia and Serbia helps explain the countries’ contrasting governance trajectories. I argue that elite actors make decisions within the confines of domestic structural conditions, such as civil society and independent media. If these domestic structures are weak, elites are able to manipulate them in order to gain and maintain political power. Additionally, I address how the variable potential for EU membership

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can influence an actor’s behavior as well as domestic

media depending on two main factors: 1) the strength

voter preferences. When the potential for EU

of domestic pluralism and 2) the possibility of EU

membership is high, political actors are incentivized

membership. This analysis demonstrates when

to behave in accordance with democratic norms so

domestic pluralism is feeble or non-existent, elites are

as not to jeopardize membership. In a similar vein,

able to further weaken civil society and independent

when EU membership seems plausible, voters become

media outlets through instrumental means.

increasingly concerned with how political candidates

Additionally, I build on Kopstein and Reilly’s (2000)

plan to pursue accession. On the other hand, when

claims that EU proximity opens up greater doors to

potential for membership is low, political actors are

financial and political assistance to post-communist

not incentivized to behave democratically in pursuit of

democratizers, and in doing so increases democratic

EU accession, and voters are less concerned with EU

incentives. I argue that the increasing possibility of

relations.

EU membership, more so than geographic proximity,

McFaul (2002) builds on earlier agency

creates an international incentive structure that

arguments (Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell and

discourages political elites from engaging in overtly

Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991) by highlighting

manipulative behavior. When domestic pluralism

the importance of powerful elites’ decisions to

and the possibility of EU membership are weak or

impose democratic or non-democratic institutions in

not present, actors can more easily construct a less

determining political trajectories. Emphasizing the role

democratic system that allows them to maintain

of power dynamics, McFaul’s (2002) research suggests

political power.

that democratic outcomes are more likely to occur when opposition leaders with normative democratic commitments win initial elections. My argument

Case Selection: Similar Systems Croatia and Serbia are the country cases

questions the nature of such normative commitments,

selected to explore the aftermath of liberalizing

showing how elites are likely to make decisions that

elections. I chose these countries because their

further their quests for political power over those

democratic progress following breakthrough elections

that adhere to normatively democratic promises.

has been uneven. Therefore, there is some variation on

Drawing on evidence from two country cases, I show

the dependent variable, which is considered a hallmark

how elites can engage in the systematic manipulation

of solid research design (King, Keohane, and Verba

of civil society and independent media in pursuit of

1994; Przeworski and Teune 1970). In addition, these

maintaining and expanding their power.

countries share numerous structural similarities. Both

Moreover, I build on McFaul’s (2002) research

Croatia and Serbia are newly independent states that

and other agency-centric analyses by addressing how

have experienced ethnically charged border conflicts.

domestic and international structural conditions

Furthermore, they share an historical legacy of

can both enable and restrict elite actors in their

communist rule, and neither country is rich in natural

decision-making processes. Actors are more or less

resources. By holding these conditions constant in

able to manipulate civil society and independent

a similar systems design, this analysis looks beyond

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just structure-centric explanations to investigate the complex reasons behind the different democratic trajectories that these countries have followed after their breakthrough elections.

Croatia and Serbia both experienced communist rule, and hence share a structural legacy that scholars have claimed can impede democratization. Perhaps even more importantly, both countries became independent states only after the breakup of Yugoslavia. As a result, the countries share the stateness challenges common to newly independent states (Linz and Stepan 1996). Such difficulties have been exacerbated in both countries due to the presence of ethnically charged border conflicts and civil wars throughout the 1990s.

Additionally, leaders in each country have fueled ethnic tensions in order to rally popular support and secure votes. The historical legacy of this instrumental manipulation has posed serious obstacles for successful democratization in these countries.

Importantly, a final structural similarity shared by these countries is that neither is rich in natural resources. Scholars have studied the effects of oil wealth on democratization and concluded that countries dependent on revenue from natural resources for a large portion of their GDP are less likely to democratize than countries with more diverse economies (Ross 2001). Croatia and Serbia are both resource poor means that the resource curse cannot be blamed for the difficulties they have faced with democratization.

This analysis works to bridge the structureagency gap in the literature by investigating how political actors are able to take advantage of domestic structural weaknesses in order to gain power and prolong their rule. While previous research has contended that domestic structures, such as weak parties, opposition, and civil society, impede democratic progress, my analysis examines how elites

can shape these conditions, inflame ethnic tensions, and form alliances with prominent economic actors to create a structural environment that is less conducive to democratization. Building on Bunce and Wolchik’s (2011) investigation of transnational diffusion, my argument shows how actors can be either limited or empowered in their decision-making capacity by the international environment, depending largely on the potential for EU membership.

Evidence of Uneven Democratic Progress Before reviewing the evidence for my argument, a discussion of Croatia and Serbia’s democratic trajectories following electoral breakthroughs is necessary. Croatia and Serbia experienced electoral breakthroughs in 2000. Figures 1-3 show that both countries made progress with overall democratization, civil society development, and the expansion of media outlets in subsequent years. However, upon exploring alternative measures of democratic progress, the differences in these countries’ political trajectories become evident. Figure 4 illustrates that the differences in corruption control in these countries were especially stark immediately following breakthrough elections. Croatia experienced increased control of corruption immediately following the breakthrough election in 2000, and scored in the 63rd percentile in 2002 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2002). On the other hand, two years after the Bulldozer Revolution, Serbia ranked in only the 22nd percentile (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2002). Croatia continued to maintain impressive corruption control, and the country consistently ranked between the 57th and 61st percentiles after 2000 (See Figure 4). Serbia, however, struggled with control of corruption throughout the 2000s, and did not rank above the 49th percentile until 2011 (See Figure 4). Figure 5 displays clear disparities between the countries’ trajectories also exist in

Reconsidering Revolutions

Figure 1. Nations in Transit Democracy Scores

Source: Nations in Transit 1998-2013 Note: Vertical axis values in reverse order, with 1 being the most democratic score a country can receive and 7 being the least; diamond indicates timing of breakthrough election.

Figure 2. Nations in Transit Civil Society

Source: Nations in Transit 1998-2014 Note: Vertical axis values in reverse order, with 1 being the most democratic score a country can receive and 7 being the least; diamond indicates timing of breakthrough election

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84 Figure 3. Nations in Transit Independent Media Scores

Source: Nations in Transit 1998-2014 Note: Vertical axis values in reverse order, with 1 being the most democratic score a country can receive and 7 being the least; diamond indicates timing of breakthrough election

Figure 4. World Bank Control of Corruption

Source: World Bank 1998-2013 Note: Diamond indicates timing of breakthrough election

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Figure 5. World Bank Rule of Law Percentile Rank

Source: World Bank 1998-2013 Note: Diamond indicates timing of breakthrough election

terms of improvements in the rule of law following breakthrough elections. Croatia saw relatively slow and consistent improvements in the rule of law after 2000, while Serbia experienced initial improvement followed by relative stagnation until 2005, after which the country’s rank has consistently increased (See Figure 5).

Qualitative assessments similarly highlight disparities in democratic development following electoral breakthroughs in these countries. In a comparative study, Zakosek (2008) contrasts Croatia’s moderate pluralist party system and successful state-building initiatives with the problematic conditions in Serbia, where the presence of nondemocratic structures that were established under the Milošević regime continue to undermine democratic consolidation (Zakosek 2008).

Croatia In 1999, the death of Franjo Tudjman left the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) without its autocratic leader and presented the democratic

opposition with an opportunity to gain power in 2000.

Democratic progress ensued virtually immediately in the wake of Croatia’s electoral breakthrough. The newly empowered Social Democratic Party (SDP) began pursuing democratic social and economic reforms (Freedom House 2001-2014). Favorable domestic conditions and international structures that were highly conducive to democratization enabled Croatia to achieve impressive democratic progress throughout the 2000s. Domestic structural conditions discouraged elite actors from attempting to manipulate civil society, and international conditions incentivized political leaders to behave democratically.

The emergence of a moderate pluralist party system after 2000, and the fact that nationalist sentiments were largely surface-level, meant that Croatian elites could not easily manipulate civil society or enflame ethnic tensions. However, domestic structures were by no means immune to potential elite exploitation.

Croatia’s independent media landscape suffered from disadvantages that made outlets particularly vulnerable to political manipulation. Importantly, the prospect of

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European Union membership was on the table almost immediately, and effectively provided an incentive for elites to refrain from engaging in anti-democratic behavior.

Croatia’s party system gained stability throughout the 1990s. By 2000, right-wing extremism was weak in Croatia outside of the HDZ and leftist populism did not exist (Zakosek 2008). After the HDZ transformed itself into a center-right party and dropped its nationalist platform in 2002, a moderate pluralist party system developed (Zakosek 2008). Croatian party leaders recognized quickly

2000s, and leaders began pursuing EU accession at all costs. By 2003, the issue of Europeanization had become a major focus for voters in Croatia (Boduszynski 2011). Ivo Sanader was elected HDZ president in 2002, and promptly worked to vocalize the party’s reform agenda. Sanader promised cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ITCY) and supported Croatia’s bid for EU membership by 2007 (Boduszynski 2011).

Croatian democratization benefited from the country’s moderate pluralist party system, which discouraged elites from manipulating civil society and

that appealing to extremism would not generate widespread popular support. By the time the HDZ was reelected in 2003, the party had abandoned nationalistic ideals and adopted a pro-European party platform. Croatia’s moderate pluralist party system encouraged HDZ leaders to reform the party’s nationalist ideology, which originally lacked a strong foundation. Throughout his rule, Tudjman emphasized the HDZ’s nationalist ideology, but nationalist sentiment did not resonate particularly strongly with the general Croatian public or the majority of political elites. In pursuit of political ends, Tudjman systematically manipulated the HDZ’s ideology to include anti-Serb sentiment, though the party did not initially associate itself with nationalist ideals (Solem 2007). Power-hungry HDZ leaders reflected Tudjman’s nationalist sentiment, knowing that such loyalty made them prime candidates for coveted political positions.

However, many of Tudjman’s loyal followers did not really identify with the nationalistic component of the HDZ ideology (Solem 2007). Therefore, it was not difficult for the party to abandon its nationalist ideology following Tudjman’s death, when leaders saw political incentives to do so.

Additionally, elites were conscious of the shifting interests of the Croatian public in the early

promoting nationalist sentiment. Yet, the Croatian media landscape that existed in 2000 was ripe for elite exploitation. Media outlets suffered from a severe lack of funding, which made them vulnerable to political manipulation, proxy ownership, and bribery. The HDZ’s pressure on media outlets, as well as the media’s dependence on party politics, increased between 2005 and 2006. The latter was likely due to the financial insecurity of journalists who demonstrated their willingness to abandon professional standards and practice self-censorship (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2008; Perusko 2013). This allowed the HDZ to use independent media outlets to promote the party and its interests, leaving potential opposition parties at a significant disadvantage in gathering support. Levitsky and Way (2010b) contend that this sort of unequal access to media characterizes an uneven playing field between regime incumbents and opposition actors, which undermines political competition and democracy. While the state continues to have shares in local media, Croatia has made notable strides in reducing political bribery and increasing the transparency of media ownership (Perusko 2013).

For instance, in 2012, Ivo Sanader was found guilty of having paid private marketing agency Fimi

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Media over ten million euros in state funds (Regional Anti-corruption Initiative 2013). Nevenka Jurisic, owner of the agency, had agreed to serve HDZ needs, including election campaign financing, in exchange for Sanader and HDZ treasurer Mladen Barisic’s promises that Fimi Media would get compensation and business from state institutions (Croatian Times 2010). The Fimi Media scandal should be viewed as a progressive step toward improving the rule of law and expanding the autonomy of media outlets. Since Sanader is now serving time in prison, the trial verdict sets the precedent that even political elites are subject to the

did not want to jeopardize the country’s chances of obtaining the economic and social benefits that accompany EU membership. Additionally, supporting Europeanization seemed like the only rational choice for elites hoping to enjoy broad public support, as EU accession quickly became a prominent issue in political discourse (Boduszynski 2011).

Croatia became the newest member of the European Union in July 2013. The ability to meet EU conditionality requirements attests to the country’s impressive strides in democratization.

After breakthrough elections in 2000, Croatia began

rule of law in Croatia. Additionally, the HDZ became the first political party to be sentenced for corruption, which will likely increase the transparency of political financing in Croatia (Radosavljevic 2014). The trial has been referred to as being part of Croatia’s “anti-graft” agenda, which was implemented in pursuit of EU membership (Radosavljevic 2014).

Following breakthrough elections in 2000, Croatia’s moderate pluralist party system discouraged elite civil society manipulation, but the country’s media landscape was extremely vulnerable. While some notable independent media manipulation occurred throughout the 2000s, Croatian political elites generally refrained from engaging in overtly antidemocratic behavior. These elites came to power fully aware of the international incentives associated with democratic progress. The prospect of EU membership was on the table shortly after breakthrough elections in Croatia, as the country signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001. The Račan government (2000-2003) promoted EU accession from the start. During this time, the EU consistently promised Croatia eventual membership (Boduszynski 2011). Due to this international incentive structure, elites in Croatia were discouraged from engaging in obviously manipulative behavior. Croatian elites

implementing reforms and showing improvements in democratic processes. The country’s moderate pluralist party structure discouraged elite actors from manipulating civil society and spreading antidemocratic nationalist rhetoric. Despite the fact that some domestic structures, such as independent media outlets, were vulnerable to manipulation, international pressure encouraged elites to behave democratically.

Serbia The ousting of Slobodan Milošević in 2000 opened up a window of opportunity through which democratization in Serbia could occur.

While significant democratic progress did follow the Bulldozer Revolution, the country continued to struggle with improvements in civil society development, independent media outlets, corruption control, and ethnically charged border conflicts throughout the 2000s. While Croatia enjoyed structural conditions that were highly conducive to democratization in 2000, Serbia boasted a polarized party system, widespread radical nationalist ideologies, and vulnerable independent media outlets.

International incentives restricted elite behavior in Croatia, but the possibility of EU accession was extremely low for Serbia in 2000. Without

88 international pressure to behave democratically, Serbian elites further weakened the country’s polarized party system, instrumentally manipulated independent media outlets, and used the states’ power over these institutions to promote ethnic nationalism and antidemocratic sentiment.

In contrast with the moderate pluralist party system that emerged in Croatia, strong radical nationalism continued to characterize the ideological platforms of the most popular Serbian political parties throughout the 2000s (Zakosek 2008). Unlike Croatia’s HDZ, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) held onto its

elite actors in Serbia that they did not need to abandon anti-democratic tendencies or reform nationalist ideologies in order to enjoy popular support and political power.

The media landscape in Serbia in the wake of the Bulldozer Revolution was also vulnerable to elite manipulation and political pressure. Under the Milošević regime, party officials were in charge of almost all news media outlets, and the regime used its monopoly on news and information to manipulate Serbian public opinion (Basom 1995). In the wake of the Bulldozer Revolution, Serbia’s new regime lifted

nationalistic platform and retained political support and popularity after 2000. Elites had no incentive to reform the party’s anti-democratic, nationalist platform. In 2003, the unreformed SRS gained a parliamentary majority, confirming that radical nationalist ideologies continued to resonate with the Serbian population (Boduszynski 2011). The SRS was nominally led by indicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj, but Tomislav Nikolić carried out general operations (Boduszynski 2011). Nikolić openly challenged existing Serbian borders, encouraged feelings of victimization among ethnic Serbs, and advocated an anti-western position (Boduszynski 2011). The SRS remained the strongest Serbian party throughout the 2000’s, which can be partially attributed to the polarized structure of the Serbian party system (Zakosek 2008). In the context of the country’s polarized party system, centrist parties continued to be unheard and had little political influence - even after 2000. This party structure presented political elites with the opportunity to promote anti-democratic and radical nationalist sentiment without serious concerns about losing support or being surpassed in popularity by another party (Zakosek 2008). The SRS’s electoral victory in 2003 only reinforced the sentiment among

formal restrictions on independent media, but the common practice of exerting informal government pressure on editors lingered (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009). The SRS and other ideologically radical parties enjoyed significant political power throughout the 2000s. Elites used their influence over media outlets to censor as well as frame news coverage that reached the Serbian public (Cohen 2011; Matic 2011). For example, in an effort to foster feelings of victimization, elites ensured that media coverage of domestic war crime trials was limited (Ljubojevic 2012). On the rare occasions when trials were covered, Serbian media carefully avoided mentioning defendants’ nationalities so that ethnic Serbs were not openly blamed for committing war crimes (Ljubojevic 2012). This virtual monopoly on media coverage is a powerful political tool, as media content can influence not only how an audience views a particular issue, but also which issues the public considers to be important (Ljubojevic 2012).

Prime Minister Koštunica used his power over Serbian media coverage to frame the Kosovo question as a central issue in political discourse (Matic 2011).

He assured that Kosovo remain a prevalent news topic, and appealed to Serb nationalism and victimization

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sentiment by emphasizing the importance of protecting Serbia’s integrity and sovereignty from Kosovo (Matic 2011). Koštunica’s media manipulation enabled him to rally significant support for his antidemocratic political goals - putting the prospect of EU membership on hold until the EU recognized the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo - primarily by emphasizing nationalistic interests and appealing to victimization sentiment (Matic 2011).

After the Bulldozer Revolution, Serbia’s polarized party system and weak media outlets were vulnerable to manipulation. Indeed, elites used the

2011). EU membership suddenly seemed within reach, and the prospects of receiving the myriad of benefits that come with accession excited voters and political elites alike. The development and expansion of international incentives for democratization seem to have influenced elite behavior and become an important focus of political discourse in Serbia.

Reformed nationalist, Tomislav Nikolić, became president in 2012 and actively promoted pro-western sentiment and democratic procedures. Nikolić also publically apologized for Serbia’s role in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, and signed an EU Association

latter structures as avenues to promote nationalistic ideals and anti-western sentiment. In Croatia, international incentives urged political elites to refrain from manipulating domestic structures. Serbian elites were unburdened by such incentives in 2000, as prospects for EU membership were low. In 2004, Serbia-Montenegro was the only country in the postYugoslav region not to have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. Given that the possibility of EU membership seemed far-fetched, Serbian actors were not initially incentivized to abandon anti-democratic tendencies. For the same reason, Europeanization was not a main voter concern (Boduszynski 2011). This meant that other issues, such as nationalism and border sovereignty, were able to remain prominent in political discourse, and party elites were able to appeal to these issues to gain support (Boduszynski 2011).

In January 2005, Serbia launched negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement, and a favorable international incentive structure began to develop. With the prospect of EU membership on the table, political leaders began to endorse Europeanization, and parties slowly stopped promoting anti-western sentiment (Boduszynski

Agreement in June 2013 (Freedom House 2014; Ramet 2013). In recent years, voters and elites have increasingly focused on the pursuit of EU membership as an important political goal. This ideological shift could help to offset the appeal of extremist parties, and eventually moderate the Serbian party system.

In the wake of the Bulldozer Revolution, opportunistic Serbian elites took advantage of the country’s polarized party system and vulnerable media landscape. Elites manipulated these weak domestic structures with ease, often using them to promote nationalist ideologies and spread Serb victimization sentiment. In Croatia, political elites were incentivized to behave democratically in pursuit of EU membership, the prospect of which was on the table immediately following breakthrough elections.

Alternatively, Serbia’s prospects for EU membership in 2000 were very low. At this time, Serbian political elites hardly entertained the notion that the country could actually achieve EU membership, and they knew better than to abandon tried and true antidemocratic tendencies in pursuit of a pipe dream. It was not until 2005, when Serbia launched negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement, that EU membership became a viable possibility. Since

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then, the country has made notable strides in its pursuit of membership. The expanding international incentive structure encourages political elites to act within the confines of the democratic process or risk jeopardizing membership potential. In recent years, the focus of Serbian political discourse has shifted away from nationalism and toward EU membership.

Political elites have employed pro-western rhetoric and democratic reforms and relations with Kosovo are improving. Nearly fifteen years after the Bulldozer Revolution, favorable domestic and international conditions have the potential to steer Serbian elites

are able to further manipulate structural conditions in order to ensure that they maintain power. Yet, international incentive structures, such as EU conditionality, have the potential to discourage elites from engaging in this anti-democratic behavior.

This research has important implications for policy makers and democracy promotion. Policy makers tend to assume that empowering “democratic” individuals is the key to democratization. This analysis has shown, however, that elites who are unencumbered by domestic and international incentive structures, are likely to abuse power and engage in anti-democratic

toward robust democratic progress.

behavior. Policy makers must remain conscious of this phenomenon, and should not pin hopes of democratization on individual actors, even in the wake of electoral breakthroughs.

Conclusion Given that the ousting of authoritarian rulers opens up opportunities for liberalization, the popular notion that democratization would follow in the wake of electoral breakthroughs was not unreasonable.

Democratic progress, however, has actually been uneven in the wake of breakthrough elections. Scholars have examined potential causal factors to explain the differences in countries’ political trajectories after these elections. Debates regarding the roles of structural and agency factors as well as discussions attributing political development to either domestic or international conditions dominate democratization literature. My argument has explored the influence of both structural and agency variables, and built upon existing research by considering the impact of international as well as domestic conditions.

This analysis has investigated the reasons behind diverging political trajectories following electoral breakthroughs in Croatia and Serbia.

My argument has shown how domestic structural conditions can influence the decisions of elite actors by either constraining or empowering these agents. When elites are not restricted by domestic structures, such as strong political competition and civil society, they

Notes Levitsky and Way (2002) condemn analysts who treat hybrid regimes as diminished forms of democracy, highlighting the democratizing bias inherent in labels such as “virtual” or “semi” democracy.

1

Indeed, later in this research I show how structural conditions can influence actor’s choices, and vice versa.

2

In Serbia, incumbent authoritarian leader Slobodan Milošević was ousted as a result of mass protests following fraudulent elections. Croatia is different here, as Tudjman’s death in 1999 opened a window of opportunity through which the democratic opposition was able to gain power.

3

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Revisiting Article 9: Japan’s Security Posture in a Changing World Eric Stephen Bias Hunter College, CUNY The Japanese government’s recent reinterpretation of their constitution is often interpreted to represent a return to a Japanese militarism not seen since World War II. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, however, has maintained that the reinterpretation is necessary to ensure Japan’s “collective security” obligation as a primary member of a military alliance with the United States. Despite a rising China and an unpredictable North Korea, none of Japan’s actions have been outside the norm, especially given the country’s history of following realist defense policies. For instance, since shortly after they were established the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have been utilized in a fashion that is arguably at odds with Article Nine of the Japanese constitution. In addition, after taking into consideration Japanese defense spending patterns over time, recent increases are not consistent with a change in overall defense policy.

Introduction Article Nine of Japan’s constitution, written while the country was under post-war occupation by the U.S., renounced the use of force except in the case of a direct attack (Feffer 2014). On July 1, 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his cabinet officially reinterpreted Article Nine. This reinterpretation allowed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to actively assist in the armed defense of its allies, even if Japan itself is under no immediate threat (Sieg and Takenaka 2014). Such a move represents a fundamental (and controversial) change of Japanese defense policy (Editorial Board 2014; Sieg and Takenaka 2014). Indeed, military spending seems to be on the rise, nationalistic rhetoric by Abe and other Japanese politicians has been increasing, and Japan-watchers have noted a buildup of defenses in the Southwest (Scanlon 2014). Scholars and pundits view Asia as growing more threatening by the day. The region’s pariah state, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), acts ever more belligerently, while

China asserts newfound wealth in terms of both rapid economic development and military expansion (Chanlett-Avery, Manyin, Cooper, and Rinehart 2014, 7-8; Fackler 2010). Furthermore, Japan remains under the United States’ security umbrella, and has frequently received criticism from the U.S. government as a free rider (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014, 15).

While the official response from the Abe government is that the reinterpretation is necessary to fulfill Japan’s commitment to “collective security,” this action, among others suggesting recent Japanese military expansion, can lead one to believe this is part of a larger shift in Japanese military policy (Sieg and Takenaka 2014). The true motivations for these policy changes are more complex, particularly when examining the changing nature of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. For example, the concerns of the general public in regards to Japanese security versus the sanctity of the Japanese constitution, in addition to the strict support role of the JSDF in foreign military operations, all counter the narrative of Japanese militarization. This essay is therefore dedicated

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to answering the following research questions: 1) What are the driving factors behind a constitutional reinterpretation? Is it a natural outcome that stems from an increasingly hostile East Asian environment?

What is the role of the Japanese economy or the domestic political climate?; 2) If reinterpretation is a solitary response to a hostile region, is it an effort to become more “active” in international security, and is it a function of collective security as officially stated?; 3) Is the presence of a security dilemma between a fearful Japan and a rising China a factor?; and 4) Is Japan’s current behavior merely an product of Abe’s

behavior does not represent a change in the regional status quo, but a continued defensive realist trend on the part of Japan pursued by the ruling government party in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the U.S. The Self-Defense Forces are and will be principally defensive in nature, not in the service of a more assertive, offensively-focused Japan.

tenure in government, or does it signify a larger trend in Japanese politics and military policy?

I explore the above research questions, approaching each from several different directions.

First, I examine the theory of collective security, and determine its viability as the sole reason for Japanese military expansion. I then also investigate the presence of a Sino-Japanese security dilemma. In my case study, I also examine several other Japan-specific elements, such as their defense alliance with the U.S., the perception of threat in the East Asian region, and the role of Japanese domestic politics.

Given Japan’s historical trends in military policy and current events regarding its chief row with China over the Senkaku/Daioyu islets (or “tiny islands”), I assert that Japan may not be acting on a security dilemma on any level with China. As Abe defines, collective self-defense is a valid reason for constitutional reinterpretation. Yet, what some outside observers may consider to be a change in the status quo is actually a small refinement in policy to meet a longstanding alliance obligation with the U.S.. Japan’s primary motivation stems from the desire to normalize in response to a shifting power dynamic in the region, namely China’s ascension. My thesis is that the present

Kupchan 1995, 52-53). According to Kupchan and Kupchan, “...under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression” (1995, 53). Similarly, Claude describes collective security as “...resting upon the proposition that war can be prevented by the deterrent effect of overwhelming power upon states which are too ratio¬nal to invite certain defeat. In this respect, it is fundamentally similar to a balance of power system involving defensive alliances” (1984, 245-246). States are reliant on trust for their own security, and they must forego the use of force to change the status quo (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 14). In other words, states must trust in other state allies to renounce aggressive tactics to achieve their goals, and in turn, they must rely upon other states to defend them in the event of an attack (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 14). Key examples of collective security systems are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations, and the League of Nations, which exist (or in the case of the latter, existed) to protect members with a promise that an attack on one is an attack on all.

The purpose of collective security is to reduce the level of threat to allied states from less trustworthy

An Examination of Collective Security

Collective security is a concept directly concerned with the prevention of international conflict through group deterrence (Kupchan and

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states outside of the alliance. The system, however, relies heavily on the assumption that other states within the alliance will come to a member’s defense in the event of an attack (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 31).

Similarly, Mearsheimer points to a frequent caveat of collective security, the free rider problem. As collective security operates in a realist world, states will likely only intervene in a situation when their own interests are directly in jeopardy (1994-95, 28-30). States often back out of their collective security agreements, or engage in so-called “checkbook diplomacy,” meaning they contribute resources with the least risk simply to

for offensive purposes, making them potentially threatening to other states, 3) states are always uncertain of the motives of other states, 4) the primary motivation of all states is survival, and 5) states think rationally and strategically on how to survive (1994-95, 10). In neorealism, states are the primary international actors, with no international sovereign entity that can mediate crises, enforce laws, or regulate agreements among states (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 9-10). Any sovereign state can do what it wishes without repercussions from a higher regulatory body – there is no international police force. States therefore exist in

fulfill their minimal obligations while other states carry more of the weight (Betts 1992, 26). Such is a frequent criticism of Japan. According to the Abe government, there is legitimate need for a reinterpretation of Article Nine to allow Japan to fully hold its end of the bargain. In the words of Prime Minister Abe himself: “…imagine that U.S. vessels on the high seas were being attacked and an armed ship, say an Aegistype destroyer, from Japan, America’s treaty ally, was just passing by. The arrangement we currently have in Japan does not allow the destroyer to make any response whatsoever. That is insane” (Abe 2013). This is a clear signal that Japan is seeking to enhance its U.S. alliance. But how does this relate to a possible Japanese military buildup?

a state of perpetual uncertainty and must ensure their own survival in a self-help system (Mearsheimer 199495, 11).

Jervis and Glaser, adherents of a variant within the neorealist school of thought known as defensive realism, believe that some opportunities to increase a state’s power may in fact be counterproductive, as with a phenomenon known as the security dilemma (Jervis 1999, 49; Taliaferro 2000, 129). Again, as states exist in anarchy, with no international code of laws nor any militarized, multilateral body to enforce them, states are wholly responsible for their own security. It is therefore in a state’s interest to maximize its security vis-à-vis its military capability relative to other states.

In turn, however, the security of other states can be reduced by a shifting balance of power (Jervis 1978, 169-170). Uncertain of the intentions of a securitymaximizing state, other states will likely regard such actions – an arms buildup, a shift of troop or fleet positions, or a new alliance, for instance – as a threat (Jervis 1978, 170). As a result, the states with reduced security increase their own military capabilities to reach parity with the revisionist state, and so on.

The constant escalation among states becomes a vicious cycle that ultimately reduces the security of

A Neorealist Theory

Neorealism has been the dominant school of thought in international relations for a number of decades, including notable scholars as John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz as adherents (Taliaferro 2000). According to Mearsheimer, neorealism depends upon five assumptions: 1) the international system is one that exists in a state of anarchy, 2) states possess and maintain militaries

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all involved. The resulting race can become overly expensive (arms races are not cheap) as well as increase the value that an offender may place on expansion, thus reducing the effectiveness of deterrence.

The security dilemma is subject to a number of factors that affect its severity. According to Jervis, a security dilemma can be lessened if a state’s military expansion is made more costly by the domestic climate of the same country (e.g., democratic political resistance from a state’s populace) (Jervis 1978, 175).

The perceptions that states possess of each other also play a role. For example, the U.S. will regard a military

commitments, it is difficult to find evidence of a security dilemma between Japan and its neighbors.

When taking force assessments and long-term military spending patterns of both countries into account, there is no evidence of a spiraling arms race between China and Japan, and certainly not between Japan and the DPRK. Japan’s defense spending has remained on a more or less steady trend for decades – so far, their “expansion” is more a reorganization. Per their own admission, the constitutional reinterpretation is merely an intention to provide assistance to allied states, and not an arms buildup per se. Furthermore,

reorganization in Iran with a higher degree of concern than with a similar event in Israel, a state that shares common interests with the U.S. and is perceived as an ally (Jervis 1978, 175). A tense environment, one that would typically occur between a pair of enemy states, tends to lead to a security dilemma more often than one between two friendly states (Jervis 1978, 175).

Furthermore, the balance between an offensive or defensive advantage can affect the security dilemma in that if status quo states expand, it appears that they are moving aggressively on the offensive, aggravating tensions and increasing the effects of the dilemma (Jervis 1978, 187). Similarly, if defensive states increase their security against a status quo state, there is no incentive for the other state to increase their own security as long as offensive and defensive actions can be distinguished. In addition, Jervis mentions that depending on how the security-maximizing weapons that are garnered by a state can be perceived by others, namely as either offensive or defensive in nature, it may likewise hold an effect on the security dilemma (1978, 199).

Notwithstanding the government’s public proclamation that Japan’s nationalistic pivot towards a greater defense posture is to meet collective security

Japan’s strong alliance with the U.S. negates much of the security concerns that a lone state may possess, although this may lessen as China continues to increase and modernize its forces.

An Alternative Approach

Therefore, there is no indication of an arms race in this case, but could there be another explanation for Japan’s behavior? In regards to threat perception, Singer describes it as a function of a potential aggressor state’s capability and intent (1958, 94). Similar to the outlook of a typical realist, each state views another as a potential threat with possibly malicious intentions. These tensions are also informed by historical disputes, fundamental political differences, and the preconceived attitudes each country may harbor of the other (Jervis 1983, 11; Singer 1958, 94-97). Again, Japan, China and the DPRK have a rich history of animosities. There is a mechanism to reduce the effect of these factors with trade and cultural exchange. Singer terms the latter as the “UNESCO approach,” but this is limited by the policy preferences of the elite (Singer 1958, 95-97).

This idea is disputed by Jervis, who maintains that the elite are incapable of predicting how those from

98 possible aggressor states would perceive them, creating uncertainty (1983, 4). A state with a strong, vibrant economy can have a deterrent effect, which had been Japan’s strategy along with aligning militarily with the U.S.. Jervis, however, also writes that if there is visible strain between countries, which has been present between Japan and China, and Japan and the U.S., as evidenced by a cooling of relations, the deterrent effect is diminished (Jervis 1983, 6). Given such a situation, possible responses to the perception of threat are a buildup of arms or balancing with another great power, none of which seem to be significantly present (Walt

Japan became one of the largest donor states of foreign direct investment (FDI), and is a major contributor to the World Bank (Inoguchi 1993, 6-7). Abe and his allies may view Japanese pacifism as a position of “subservience” to the U.S., but the reality is more of a quid pro quo arrangement. For instance, the U.S. enabled Japan to enjoy privileged access to world markets, and in return the U.S. maintained bases on Japanese soil, which were vital during U.S. operations in the Cold War (Inoguchi 1993, 10). Without the extra burden of becoming a military power, Japan has succeeded in becoming one of the largest economies in

1987).

the world today, third only to the U.S. and China.

Together with his cabinet, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe adopted a resolution that pushed through a reinterpretation of the constitution, bypassing a traditional revision by amendment and national referendum (Sieg and Takenaka 2014). While lauded by the U.S., then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel remarked that this was “...an important step for Japan as it seeks to make a greater contribution to regional and global peace and security” (Feffer 2014). The reinterpretation angered Japan’s neighbors, namely China and the DPRK, who see it as a step backwards toward World War II-era Japanese aggression (Feffer 2014). Within Japan as well, a recent poll stated that 58% were opposed to the move (Feffer 2014), and a Tokyo man lit himself on fire in a rare act of protest (Fackler 2014).

Case Study: Shinzo Abe’s Japan, “Towards a Beautiful Country” Background

Written by the Americans while Japan was under U.S. occupation post-World War II, the constitution stripped Japan’s ability to maintain an offensive military capability, and enshrined pacifism as a matter of permanent policy in Japanese government (Editorial Board 2014; The Constitution of Japan).

Japan had been forbidden from directly assisting in the conflicts of other states, whether they are small regional skirmishes or full-scale wars (The Constitution of Japan). The use of force was sanctioned only in the strict case of national defense (Editorial Board 2014; The Constitution of Japan).

While the current Japanese government now views Article Nine as a constraint, it has historically been a great benefit to Japanese economic prosperity.

Japanese pacifism, not to mention a comfortable position under the U.S. security umbrella, negated the need for large military expenditures, allowing Japan to invest heavily in other pursuits and to blossom into an economic superpower (Inoguchi 1993, 6-7).

Shinzo Abe and the LDP

Despite the controversy, Abe has been a proponent of constitutional reinterpretation because Japan needs to normalize its role in international security. According to Abe, Japan cannot fulfill its commitment as a member of the U.S.-Japan alliance to engage in collective security, or rather, the defense of an ally in the event of attack. Abe took power in

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late 2012 and proved to be a hawkish, right-of-center politician as well as a strong advocate of Japanese nationalism (Fackler 2012). Abe is in favor of a departure from the “guilt-based” diplomacy of the post-war period, and aims for Japan to project a sort of “proactive pacifism” to the world (Takahashi 2014).

“I will make Japan a force for peace and stability,” he said. “Japan will newly bear the flag of ‘proactive contribution to peace’” (Tisdall 2013). This is evident in his actions as prime minister, both in terms of the constitutional reinterpretation and his establishment of a Japanese National Security Council modeled on the

power almost continuously since 1955 except for only two brief occasions, and Abe’s tenure has been the longest following a streak of weak, ineffectual prime ministers (Fackler 2012). The most recent found a ruling coalition between the LDP and the right-ofcenter Komeito receiving a landslide win, despite poor turnout and longstanding economic woes (Kyodo Staff 2014). As of 2012, 78 lawmakers in the Japanese Diet supported constitutional revision to allow for collective self-defense (Hong 2012).

Abe has been known to also employ nationalist rhetoric during election years, but in more sensitive

U.S. and the United Kingdom (Takahashi 2014).

Similar to Japanese prime ministers before him, and much to the indignation of South Korea and China, Abe has made a point to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, a World War II memorial to fallen Japanese soldiers, including numerous Class-A war criminals (Nishiyama 2013). Abe has downplayed the Japanese military’s use of “comfort women,” or women who were forced into sexual slavery for invading Japanese soldiers. In fact, he backtracked an apology given in 1993 by the then-Chief Cabinet Secretary on the matter (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014, 5-6). He has been criticized as appealing to a sector of the Japanese populace that perceives World War II-era Japan as a victim fighting a defensive war, a voice that harkens back to a nostalgic “beautiful country” free from foreign meddling and contamination (Scanlon 2014).

He has also been criticized as promoting a revisionist account of the Japanese military’s behavior during World War II, even calling into question whether or not Japan was an invading power, as well as Japanese guilt for war crimes (Takahashi 2014).

It would appear Abe’s leadership on national security is welcome among the current Japanese ruling class (Jiji 2013). The conservative LDP has been in

instances can be more diplomatic towards Japan’s neighbors. Abe has declined to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine on occasion (with one exception), and has toned down his rhetoric towards China in post-election periods (Hong 2012). As discussed below, Japan and China also reached a diplomatic compromise in regards to a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Daioyu islets, a matter that was once nonnegotiable to both parties (Neuman 2014). For Abe, it would seem that pragmatism trumps nationalism.

A More Dangerous Asia

Abe and his supporters who argue for military expansion can find their worries of a more hostile East Asian region bolstered by current events. According to a white paper issued by the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD), the “...security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, being encompassed by various challenges and destabilizing factors, which are becoming more tangible and acute” (Japan Ministry of Defense 2014, 1). It cites numerous threats from China, the DPRK, and Russia, as well as the increase of so-called “gray zone” threats, which are defined as situations “...neither purely peacetime nor contingencies, over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests, etc.”

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(Japan Ministry of Defense 2014, 1). The most notable of these have proven to be Japan’s most troublesome: the dispute with China over the Senkaku/Daioyu islets.

China, becoming one of the most influential Asian states and a challenger to U.S. hegemony in the region, is in the process of branching out militarily as well as economically, which also worries many of its neighbors. From 2003 until 2013, Chinese military spending shot upwards by a factor of four, from an estimated $30 billion to $120 billion USD (Thomson Reuters 2013). The Japanese MOD wrote that China has made assertive gestures that have

agents kidnapped dozens of Japanese citizens to take back to the peninsula (Hughes 2009, 298). Despite disproportionate levels of strength between Japan and the DPRK, the DPRK’s 1993 and 2006 testing of ballistic missiles in the Sea of Japan was a clear threat to Japanese nuclear power facilities and population areas (Hughes 2009, 298; IISS 2014, 254). The DPRK is widely known to be a nuclear state as well, and is suspected to be working on miniaturization efforts to mount a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile. It is currently unknown how far along the North Korean military is in development (International Institute of

upset the status quo, and Japan fears that such acts will destabilize the region (Japan Ministry of Defense 2014, 5). Furthermore, Japan has been embroiled in a number of territorial disputes that have exacerbated current animosities, the most notable of which being the competing claims with China over ownership of the Senkaku/Daioyu islets. These islets are barren, unpopulated rocks surrounded by natural resources, but under Japanese administration for decades (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014, 6-7). Both sides have increased their military presence in the area. Although no shots between the two countries have been fired, tensions have escalated to a level high enough to breed uncertainty (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014, 6-7).

For instance, in response to repeated Chinese patrol incursions into the Senkaku/Daioyu region, Japan scrambled warplanes 464 times last year (Yamaguchi 2015).

Besides China, one of the largest immediate threats in the eyes of the Japanese remains the DPRK, which has a rich history of being unpredictable and belligerent (Hughes 2009, 291). It has fired upon South Korean ships numerous times, and in 2010, it shelled a South Korean island without provocation, killing two soldiers (Kim and Jae-won 2010). In the 1970s, DPRK

Strategic Studies 2014, 254; Schiller 2012).

The Self-Defense Forces and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Despite numerous regional threats, Japan is by no means defenseless, as it is in possession of one of the most advanced and well-financed militaries in the world. Instead of a traditional “army”, Japan depends upon the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces for defense. While the JSDF is only defensive in nature, it currently ranks as being the eighth largest military in the world (Feffer 2014). As a bulwark against an aggressive DPRK, Japan’s Maritime SDF depends upon a fleet of destroyers equipped with the U.S.-supplied AEGIS missile defense system (Szechenyi 2006, 142). Japan does not possess a nuclear arsenal, yet it relies upon its inclusion within the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and is assumed to be able to become a nuclear-armed state in short notice (Kato 2014).

It must be stated, however, that the capability of the JSDF outside of a defensive role is limited. While it is renowned for its professionalism, the Marine SDF maintains only 16 submarines (all lacking ballistic ordinance), and 48 surface ships (destroyers, frigates, etc.), including a few helicopter carriers (Holmes 2012; International Institute of Strategic Studies 2014, 250253). For comparison, as of 2012, China boasted 64

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submarines and 74 surface ships (Holmes 2012). For the other branches of the JSDF, the story is the same. In an expert interview with BBC News, it was stated that in the event of a Sino-Japanese confrontation, Japan could not defend itself for more than a week against Chinese forces (Scanlon 2014).

Of course, such a scenario assumes that the U.S. or other allied powers would not intervene in the conflict, which is highly unlikely. The U.S.-Japan security alliance has been instrumental for both countries since established by the Yoshida Doctrine of the early 1950s (Xu 2014). In return for a promise

While Abe’s move to reinterpret Article Nine is perhaps the most noteworthy gesture toward a more militarily-active Japan in recent memory, history shows that is not apart from a larger defensive realist trend. For instance, there had been a push from the U.S. military for Japan to utilize its strategic position since the beginning of the Cold War. With the Korean conflict, the “peace constitution” had first begun to be eroded from its original form with outside pressure to militarize as an eastern counter-balance to China and Russia (Szechenyi 2006, 140). The delicate balance that successive administrations have had to maintain

to defend Japan in the event of an attack, the U.S. was given the right to maintain bases on Japanese territory, thus providing the U.S. with a strategic position in the Pacific while in turn relieving Japanese pressure to maintain a more robust military force (Xu 2014).

Japan has no doubt benefited greatly; however, there is no shortage of tension between the two allies. The Futenma base in Okinawa, which houses 65% of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, has proved burdensome for local residents due to the base’s proximity to heavily populated Ginowan City (Harner 2014). Also, a 1995 sexual abuse case involving several American service members and a 12-year-old girl sparked outrage and an anti-American protest movement (Xu 2014). More relevant to international security, however, is that the U.S. has been applying pressure on the Japanese government to take up more of the burden of its own country’s defense (Armitage and Nye 2012, 16; Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014, 17). Post-Cold War, the U.S. considers Japan vital for its own “pivot” to Asia, mostly to counter China’s rising influence (Armitage and Nye 2012, 2). In an interview for the Council on Foreign Relations, Jennifer Lind wrote that “...this is the most relevant the alliance has been [to the U.S.] in a long time” (Xu 2014).

between realistic security obligations and Japanese constitutional constraints is evident even in the wording chosen to describe their military. For instance, the Yoshida government – the same government that originated the U.S.-Japanese alliance – established the JSDF to significant domestic opposition because its very existence stands in direct contradiction with Article Nine in that Japan may not maintain “land, sea, and air forces” (Xu 2014). This is evident in the original Japanese name of the JSDF, jieitai (自衛隊), which in English translates as “self-defense group.”

(The kanji (隊) or tai, reads as “group,” as opposed to the Japanese gun (軍), meaning “military.”) The distinction is purely semantic. The JSDF is every bit a technologically-advanced military force with many of the same capabilities as its contemporaries in Asia, Europe and elsewhere.

Furthermore, the JSDF has been deployed numerous times in active conflict zones, yet it was always constrained to support roles. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi ordered the JSDF to theaters in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Second Gulf War on the grounds of fighting international terrorism (Hein 2011, 140). Before that, Prime Minister Kaifu ordered JSDF minesweeping ships to aid in the first

102 Gulf War, and tried to secure materiel airlifts to Iraq.

The Japanese Diet defeated these initiatives, however (Hein 2011, 138). Abe’s support roles for the JSDF in Afghanistan have been on a similar vein, more active than before, but still eschewing combat. The only thing this reinterpretation accomplishes is to allow Japan to fulfill its side of a long-standing defense agreement with the U.S. Aside from that, there has so far been no indication that Japan is moving toward a more offensive military role or posture, but a more normal one in keeping with Abe’s overall goals.

Similarly, Japan’s defense spending buildup

defense spending (Spitzer 2013). IHS Global, a defense research firm, defines this as “reorganization” rather than an expansion (Hardy 2014).

While significant, it is important to note that the most effective and tested role of the JSDF is for relief. The 2012 tsunami that devastated the Northeastern Tohoku region and the subsequent meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station were events that commanded significant usage of JSDF workers and supplies, especially in terms of orchestration, logistics, and search and rescue (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014, 16). The JSDF also was

is nothing particularly new or revolutionary, and despite criticism, is not enough to represent a recent change in the status quo. Japan has one of the largest Gross Domestic Products (GDPs), the eighth largest military, and the fifth largest defense budget in the world (Feffer 2014, Spitzer 2013). According to BBC News, defense spending has risen 3.5% from last year’s budget (BBC News 2014), and is planned to increase 5% over the next five years (Hardy 2014). Except for a few instances, however, the JSDF’s budget has been traditionally capped at 1% of GDP. Even after the projected increases, it will remain within this limit (Spitzer 2013). For comparison, between 2012 and 2013 Chinese defense spending increased 3% to 10% up to approximately $112 billion, more than double than that of Japan (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2014, 205).

Also, while the most recent increase in the defense budget is high compared to the shortterm trend, it will mostly be allocated to maintain existing JSDF force levels after the tsunami recovery efforts (Spitzer 2013). Some of the spending will be allocated to bolstering defenses near Japan’s southern territories, namely the Senkakus, but overall, they will not contribute much to countering Chinese

instrumental in providing aid to foreign countries, notably sending 1000 service members, three ships, and a heavy transport plane to the Philippines following the impact of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 (Yoshida 2013). Coincidentally, a large quantity of the current military spending hike will pay for the restoration of pay cuts after the Fukushima disaster, as well as for military training and surveillance measures along the Southwestern coast (Spitzer 2013). Missiles, warplanes, and ships are curiously absent on the list of priorities (Spitzer 2013).

Domestic Public Opinion

While many have embraced pacifism as a natural part of the Japanese identity, including a nonoffensive role for the JSDF, the Japanese public reflects a defensive realist position when it comes to national defense. Japanese citizens are conflicted on how to approach China, however, they are skeptical of a more aggressive Japanese military overseas. According to a 2006 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 56% of Japanese citizens surveyed believed that the constitution should be revised, and 70% of that cohort found that the role of the JSDF should be explicitly defined (Szechenyi 2006, 145-146). The same poll, however, reported that 23% – a plurality – did not favor language in the constitution

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validating collective self-defense, revealing skepticism for Abe’s constitutional reinterpretation (Szechenyi 2006, 145-146).

Furthermore, majorities have wholeheartedly supported Article Nine (Midford 2011, 67). As previously discussed, the Japanese public tends to view the primary role of the JSDF for immediate national defense and relief efforts, rather than promoting Japanese national interests (Midford 2011, 32).

According to a poll conducted in 2000 by the Prime Minister’s Office, clear majorities of the Japanese public believe that the JSDF, both in terms of its reason for

penalties will be severe. Critics of deterrence theory may question whether the U.S. will allow itself to be drawn into a costly war with the DPRK or China over an attack on Japan. Yet, these critics fail to account for the high numbers of U.S. service members stationed there, nor for the value of Japan as a principal base of U.S. operations in the Pacific. The U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to the interests of both countries, and despite a recent cooling of relations between both countries, it is in no danger of being compromised (Armitage and Nye 2012, 15-16; Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014, 19; Japan Ministry of Defense 2014, 2). The extended deterrent

existence and in terms of its future role, is for disaster relief (Midford 2011, 31-33). Recalling the events of World War II, many Japanese are distrustful of an assertive military presence, as they fear that they will lose civilian control. However clear majorities of Japanese citizens envision the principle role of the JSDF to be non-military disaster relief similar to Operation Tomodachi, the joint-U.S.-Japanese relief and rescue effort for victims of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Midford 2011, 14). Moreover, they were generally supportive of humanitarian JSDF involvement in Afghanistan, but not in Iraq, which was viewed as anything but self-defense (Midford 2011, 108-109). Therefore, Chinese anxiety of a return to Japanese belligerence remains unfounded, at least on the domestic level, and cannot be counted on as a reason for the current fear of Japanese military expansion.

effect that the alliance provides is more than enough to prevent an attack.

As for China, Japan has surpassed the U.S. as China’s biggest and most crucial trade partner.

Despite a drop in numbers following the Senkaku/ Daioyu dispute, total trade expenditures reached an estimated $334 billion in 2012 (Schuman 2013). In addition, China is also Japan’s largest aid recipient out of all Asian countries (Hardy 2014). Even if this were untrue, the dispute falls under the same circumstance that protects Japan from the DPRK. During an April 2014 tour through Asia, U.S. President Barack Obama stated that although the U.S. will not take a side in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, “...our commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and Article Five [of the security treaty] covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands” (McCurry and Branigan 2014). With U.S. involvement, a military conflagration between Japan and China would almost certainly be extremely costly, not just for both sides, but the entire region.

More importantly, the Senkaku dispute is now largely moot as the chief point of Sino-Japanese contention. In November 2014, both countries agreed to jointly acknowledge their claims to the islands

Threat Perception

With all of these factors aside, is there a valid threat for Japan? The instability created by the DPRK has been cited as an existential threat, but in saying so one ignores that Japan remains a vital ally to the U.S. Any attack on Japan by the DPRK or any other nation will be perceived as an attack on the U.S., and the

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and to “...gradually resume political, diplomatic and security dialogues” (Neuman 2014). The agreement renders weeks of bitter rhetoric and dangerous military standoffs as meaningless. No change in ownership had taken place. The two nations simply agreed that the dispute had gone too far. War between Japan and China was highly unlikely given the previously mentioned defense alliances, and now it is even less so.

Practical, rational diplomacy won the day.

Economic and Demographic Limitations

These above two issues together present Japan with serious limitations that narrow its choices in regards to international relations. For a country that must secure its domestic future long-term, Japan cannot afford to alienate its neighbors. Trade with China (as well as South Korea and others in the Asian region) is essential to the Japanese economy, and regardless of U.S. intervention, the Japanese are not in the shape to endure a prolonged military conflict of any sort.

Finally, before any accurate analysis of Japanese behavior can be made, it is necessary to address two

Analysis

pressing concerns facing Japan. First, Japan’s economy is one of the most developed in the world; however, it has faced crippling stagnation for more than two decades. Abe’s stimulus plan, dubbed “Abenomics”, had been intended to remedy the situation with increased government spending and labor reforms, but it so far has yet to make any meaningful improvement (Schoen 2014). Public debt has also been estimated to be over 200% of GDP (Schoen 2014). This year, analysts determined that the Japanese economy has slipped back into a recession (Schoen 2014).

Second, compounding the unstable economy is a demographic crisis that threatens Japan’s long-term viability domestically as well as internationally. Japan’s population has been in rapid decline since 2004, and is currently aging faster than any country on Earth (Banyan 2014). Twenty-two percent of Japanese are 65 years or older. As a result, the increased need for social welfare services is placing an extra burden on an already strained economy. In addition, Japan has the lowest fertility rate of any country (Banyan 2014).

Experts have indicated a need to increase immigration to make up for the downturn. Cultural and institutional barriers, however, have made immigration policy difficult to implement (Banyan 2014).

immediate threat for Japan, what then explains a Japanese move towards a more active role in defense?

Collective self-defense is a valid explanation, as Abe has cited, albeit on a smaller, one-by-one alliance level as opposed to the grander example, such as a defense obligation by the United Nations. For instance, it is difficult to argue against collective defense in the context of an alliance obligation. “Our only option [in the event an attack on an ally] is simply to overlook the situation. [...] Our Self-Defense Forces,” Abe writes, “...which participate in peacekeeping operations together with forces from the member states of NATO, are unable to come to the aid of these other countries’ forces even should they come under attack by guerrillas. We are unable to do so even though these forces of NATO can and would protect the SelfDefense Forces. I ask again, is that an appropriate response?” (Hardy 2014). Presently, there is no alternative answer to the latter question.

A security dilemma also seems unlikely to exist between Japan and China. The Senkaku/Daioyu dispute, the most contentious row between the two countries, has been largely put to rest. There is a sense of Sino-Japanese mistrust, however, economic ties are strong enough to forestall any military conflict.

Given these points and the lack of an

Revisiting Article 9 Most indicative of all, the present military “buildup”

by Japan cannot be considered a buildup, rather than a clarification on roles within an alliance. Japanese military spending increases are not enough to counter that of China, and the militarization of Japan has been part of a trend that has been in place since shortly after Japan gained post-war independence. There is no indication of any arms race between China and Japan.

Given the lack of a Sino-Japanese security dilemma, as well as the strong likelihood of Japan pursuing small-scale collective defense, I argue that Japan is hedging in a manner consistent with defensive realism. The U.S. has been the regional hegemon for decades since World War II and China is on track to become the new regional hegemon. Japan is torn between two sides and knows it. With efforts to buttress its defenses with regards the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan is serving as a key pillar in the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, reassuring its allies that it is willing and able to pull its own weight. At the same time, Japan is taking care not to further alienate the Chinese, as evident by the recent bilateral suspension of the Senkaku/Daioyu dispute. As Heginbotham and Samuel (2008, 111) describe as a “dual hedge”, Japan is simply maximizing its own advantages, militarily and economically (2008, 110-111). Japan is by no means a subservient power to the U.S. For example, Japan made a $6 to $12 billion USD investment deal with Iran that is sure to draw the concern of the U.S. Yet, Japan, is careful still to maintain its role as a key ally in the region (Hardy 2014). The true security arrangement is a classic case of neorealism – states pursuing their own interests to the best of their abilities. After looking over the applications of the JSDF over time, from its establishment to its gradual buildup, this need is very apparent. The revision of Article Nine is no different.

When approaching this question in the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance, there is another dimension

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to note. Considering the highly publicized Asian pivot of the U.S., the U.S.-Japan alliance is paramount for both countries in different ways. However, given America’s recent endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as evidence of U.S. decline or a “post-American world”, some Japanese elites worry that the U.S. cannot be counted on indefinitely (Sieg 2014; Zakaria 2008). In keeping with Singer’s (1958) viewpoints on threat perception, this has intensified the level of threat that China is projecting upon the Japanese by China’s assertiveness. Economic and technological deterrence is less effective as China makes relative improvements on its own capabilities. Therefore, Japan has opted to engage in a strategy of defensive realism by reorganizing local defenses and reinforcing alliances, rather than taking part in actions typical of a security dilemma. Japan is making small, incremental steps towards an active international role for the JSDF. Takashi Inoguchi agrees that this is a valuable road for Japan to follow, along with actions to increase its participation in international institutions. For instance, a push for collective security could be part of more proactive way to take part in U.N. action (Inoguchi 2014, 958). Such a strategy accomplishes two major things: some burden on the U.S. is relieved, and Japan’s own security is improved. Japan is taking a page out of the American book, however, more cautiously.

It must be stated as a caveat that the relatively recent developments cited in this paper lend many, if not most, of these conclusions a degree of speculation.

While present trends do not point to a sustained increase in Japanese military spending as of yet, how this will fare beyond five or ten years is unclear, and may become contradictory to this paper. Of course, one cannot also foresee future events that occur spontaneously outside of the perceived trend, such as the testing of a ballistic missile in Japanese territory

106 by the DPRK. Regardless, from analysis of the current evidence and theory, a political scientist can only extrapolate to the best of his or her ability so far from what he or she sees at the present. I am confident I have done as much, although I would stress that the multitude of different factors that point towards my conclusions lend a higher degree of weight than if one or two had stood alone.

Policy Suggestions

Based upon my research, I propose three policy recommendations in response to Japan’s changing priorities and security environment: First, recognizing Japan’s need for a robust self-defense, policy makers within the Japanese government should further solidify their relationship with the U.S. The U.S. should recognize JSDF reorganization as Japanese recognition of the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance and make concessions to better alleviate current disputes.

For example, a greater effort must be made to ease local resistance regarding the relocation controversy surrounding the Futenma base in Okinawa. Second, Japan should take every measure to build stronger ties with its regional neighbors. Behavior that is needlessly provocative – visits to the Yasukuni Shrine

by Japanese high officials, for example – should be strictly avoided. The benefits of appealing to domestic nationalism do not outweigh the division of a region that is becoming increasingly interdependent. Third, the Japanese government should put questions surrounding the constitution to their constituents.

Constitutional reform should come via traditional means of democratic vote. “Re-interpretation”, while effective, undermines public consensus and is needlessly provocative. There are valid concerns to be addressed with the constitution in its current state, but they should not be dealt with by fiat.

Conclusion

The recent Japanese government’s reinterpretation of the constitution allowing the JSDF to assist in the armed defense of allied states is a multifaceted decision that requires a complex read on the changing security landscape of Asia.

This is no doubt a difficult job, and there are many factors that one must consider before evaluating any one phenomenon. From my research, I find that the government’s de facto explanation for an obligation to collective security is a valid reason, but only on a simplified level. In a simple head-to-head scenario of a hostile attacker, an ally, and a Japanese unit, under the new arrangement the JSDF unit may defend the ally where before that was not possible due to the previous interpretation of Article Nine. An a larger scale, however, the present evidence of one of the main criticisms of collective security, the free rider problem, may be a reason for Japan to address the issue in a revision of its constitution.

The Asian region is embroiled in uncertainty, with a rising, more assertive China, an unpredictable and erratic DPRK, and a traditional ally, the U.S., which is overburdened with foreign commitments.

Yet, a security dilemma in response to China is too simplistic to be applied to this case, and does not fit with Japan’s military history and current defense spending patterns, nor the current near-symbiotic economic relationship Japan maintains with China.

There may have been one regarding the Senkaku/ Daioyu islet dispute, but that has since been resolved through diplomatic means. China and Japan share an economic partnership that places them both in a very difficult position in the event of violence. The fact that the U.S. would be compelled to respond in such a case, as President Obama has indicated, further complicates this scenario.

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When taking into account its relationship with the U.S. since the end of World War II, Japan has shifted from a nation under total occupation, to a semi-sovereign state under U.S. protection, to finally the most prosperous democracy in the region.

However, the security of Japan remains beholden to the U.S. in many ways, and vice versa for U.S. interests in the Pacific. The U.S.-Japan alliance is therefore a factor in Japan’s military policy, and it has historically been responsive to U.S. needs. Yukio Okamato, for example, a special advisor to former Prime Minister Koizumi, said that the U.S. “...has an even bigger role

its own self-interest. While the U.S. may label Article Nine “anachronistic” by current standards, it has allowed Japan to garner much of the economic power that it holds today (Xu 2014). For a nation that prides itself on honoring its past, something Prime Minister Abe and his like-minded contemporaries would no doubt relate to, Japan is reluctant to discharge that power. Yet in a realist world, change is necessary and normal. Change is a behavior that all sovereign nations pursue in order to maximize their own security, both militarily and economically. A world that is constantly changing compels nations to adapt or die.

[than before]—to not only mediate, but create a new framework of cooperation in the region” (Xu 2014).

Japan’s move for collective security is principally for its own normalization in international relations, and the reassurance and protection of allies, namely the U.S., from the words of Prime Minister Abe himself.

Historically, the JSDF has been in various states of conflict with Article Nine since its establishment in the 1950s, and regardless, its current buildup is not an indication of a fundamental change in the status quo. Defense spending has largely remained below the traditional 1% of GDP, and current spending increases are for the reorganization of existing forces, not an arms race with China or a buildup against the DPRK. Despite its size and advancement, the JSDF is primarily a defensive organization that has found itself also devoted to disaster relief efforts at home and regionally.

Furthermore, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Daioyu islets has been resolved, rendering the primary source of conflict between the two states as nonexistent.

Japan has characteristically been somewhat of an outlier in the international community. It possesses a strong history of isolationism, and is unique in that its constitution forbids warfare as a means to pursue

Japan, caught between two regional behemoths, is no different.

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