11 minute read
CTB INTERVIEW: Large-Scale Sporting Events
CTB Interview:
Large-Scale Sporting Events
Counter Terror Business (CTB) talks to David Stewart (DS) about security planning for the 2022 Commonwealth Games, safety within the ‘last mile’, and stadium security
CTB: MAJOR SPORTING EVENTS CAN BE AN IDEAL TARGET FOR TERRORISTS, AS HIGHLIGHTED BEST IN PARIS IN 2015. SINCE THEN, HOW HAVE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS CHANGED AT LARGE-SCALE SPORTING EVENTS?
DS: Obviously, in the UK our most recent incident was at the Manchester Arena in 2017 and this, whilst not a major sporting event, had a similar profile. Many major multi-sport events will use venues that are normally used for concerts etc, so really, the main focus is always driven by the threat and risk assessment for each individual venue and event. As such, there haven’t really been significant changes in the approach but just a greater acknowledgement that there is always a potential threat and then on a case by case basis, consideration has to be given to how to mitigate the risk posed by that threat.
The biggest challenge for major sporting events is trying to ensure that the event is safe and secure but without it feeling like it is defined by security. We always have to consider appropriate security measure but the security should ideally be secondary to the event itself.
Technology is moving on apace with new mass screening devices being actively tested at venues and what we are now seeing is technology being used in conjunction with suitably trained resourced to provide security layers. So, for example, there may be some mass screening ‘walk through’ type equipment in the ‘last mile’ as pedestrians are walking to a venue. These devices will not pick up a pocket knife but will detect large metallic objects that could potentially cause harm so that interventions can take place further away from the main external ‘crowded place’ where spectators are queuing to gain entry. Also in the last mile we can have specially trained behavioural detection officers. These can be police officers or security personnel who are looking for people who are displaying certain signals or behaviours that may call for further investigation.
Last year I attended a concert at the Manchester Arena and, on the approach I passed police officers with explosive detection dogs – another option for consideration and a valuable visual deterrent. At the turnstile I was then subjected to a pat down search and a scan with a hand held metal detector. These are very effective measures with the main failing being on the human aspect of the security personnel not undertaking the search with sufficient rigor. As such, suitable training and supervision of those carrying out the searches is crucial.
A recent development following the Manchester Arena attack has been discussion of ‘Martyn’s Law’ which, although not yet enacted, is proposing that every public ‘venue’ should include some kind of search and screening regime. My own experience of attending sporting and music events is that most have a version of this already in place (to some extent) but, as with all security processes, there also has to be a balance against anything that results in excessive queues and thereby extends the crowded place vulnerability to areas where no search has been undertaken.
During many discussions with many venue operators however, it is clear that they are taking seriously the potential threat of a terrorist attack and working closely with their local police forces and, through that, with experts at CPNI.
The main emphasis however remains unchanged – security profiles at major sporting events must be compared against current threat and risk assessments and developed in conjunction with local law enforcement, utilising suitably trained and equipped personnel.
CTB: YOU ARE CURRENTLY PROVIDING MAJOR EVENT SECURITY TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF FIFA 2022 WORLD CUP. WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ON PREVIOUS/RECENT LARGE TOURNAMENTS (FIFA World Cup 2018 IN RUSSIA, RUGBY World Cup 2019 IN JAPAN ETC)? WHAT WORKED AND WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY?
DS: All major international sporting events obviously will identify the potential risk from terrorism, but the profile of each can be significantly different. In a Commonwealth Games or Olympics – style multi-sport event, there is little threat of confrontation between spectators, so the main risk is one of the event becoming a target either because of the scale and volume of spectators or with a view to damaging the reputation of the host nation. The same can be said of most single sport events, for example Rugby World Cup, where again, fan violence is not something that has ever been seen as a significant risk.
The FIFA World Cup (and it’s regional variations (EUFA/CONCOCAF etc.) unfortunately bring the risk of significant fan violence and the planning for these events takes on a whole different range of threats.
It sounds very simple but the critical aspect of any of these type of events is in the planning and the development of the protective intelligence function. In Russia, for example, the authorities identified the threat from their own hooligan fans and acted to mitigate this (apparently successfully).
The next World Cup in Qatar 2022 will be somewhat unique. As opposed to the normal host country where geography and distance between cities can be used as a form of control (in terms of confrontation between fans), the reality is that the 2022 model will be more like an Olympic (city-based) event than a country-wide World Cup. Qatar has limited experience of hosting competitive international football events. In December 2019 they hosted the World Club Cup and it is through de facto ‘test events’ such as these that their plans can be assessed.
Although Qatar regularly scores as amongst the safest countries in the world in the Global Terrorism Index, hosting the World Cup brings a new and previously unheralded dimension. At a time of stability in the Middle East, the potential CT threat to such an event would be credible, but the added factors of a blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the UAE and a generally volatile broader Middle East political environment at present, bring additional potential threats.
However, my experience in Qatar and the investment being made by the country in expertise from previous events, along with a robust approach to protective intelligence, will go a long way to ensuring a safe and secure event from a CT perspective.
CTB: ACROSS EUROPE, STADIUM SECURITY COULD BE BEST DESCRIBED AS INCONSISTENT, WITH INSTANCES OF POORLY POLICED FAN SEGREGATION AND FLARES OFTEN SEEN IN EUROPEAN COMPETITIONS. HOW CAN SUCH INCONSISTENCY BE IMPROVED??
DS: In my 30 years in the police, this was one of the major challenges. In the UK as a whole, there is now a consistent approach to both policing and security of football matches however, even with this robust approach, there are still regular instances of flares and pyrotechnics inside stadiums. The only answer to this is through coordination between clubs (or national Associations), the police and security authorities and the broader justice system of the courts. In addition, engagement with fan groups to try, wherever practical, to ensure self-policing is of value.
At the World Club Cup in Doha in December, fans of the African champions managed to bring flares into one of their qualification matches. This again was a first for the Doha police and security officers and, while it would have been nice for it not to have happened, the learning from this will be invaluable for them moving forward. At the same event this coming December, I am certain that enhanced security measure will be implemented.
For the World Cup, FIFA produce a manual that outlines the security requirements – both in terms of physical and procedural operations. The lessons learned from previous events are also shared and this information is added to the protective security plans for the event.
However, the simple fact is that, if groups make a concerted effort to disrupt and event, either through violence or pyrotechnics (or organised crime etc.) then the response needs to be appropriate, including the justice system dealing swiftly and harshly with offenders.
It is only through the consistent approach to planning, prevention, mitigation and response that things will improve and the ability of authorities to be allowed to take a learning approach as opposed to a ‘blame game’ will play a big part in the overall improvement.
CTB: HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO RECOGNISE THE CRUCIAL PART THAT AREAS OUTSIDE OF THE GROUND PLAY IN THE SAFE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF SPECTATORS?
DS: The common terminology for this area is ‘last mile’ – not to be taken literally, but usually reflective of the zone between transportation hubs at a venue and the turnstiles. This space during a major event, in effect becomes a ‘crowded place’ and attracts the associated risks. We see this week in and week out in the Premier League (or other football competitions) and this is an area that tends to fall under the responsibility of the police, as opposed to private security contractors.
Compared to the areas inside the ‘red line’ of a venue (where search and screening takes place) the last mile can be seen by some as a soft target. Nowadays however the work to secure the safety of people in this area is becoming much more sophisticated. The use of specially trained Behavioural Detection operatives is now commonplace. Portable (or permanent) technology such as HVM or CCTV adds both physical and visual deterrence. The advent of Artificial Intelligence software to CCTV also provides more options, along with more traditional resources such as explosive detection dogs.
However, much of the focus in the past was on the time leading up to entry to the venue but the horrific attack at the Manchester Arena will ensure that, moving forward, the same emphasis is placed upon the egress of spectators, until they have fully dispersed.
What is crucial for event organisers is that the security operation goes far beyond the geography of the venue and the actual duration of the event.
CTB: BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCE OVER A 12 MONTH PERIOD AS INTERIM DIRECTOR OF SECURITY FOR BIRMINGHAM 2022, ARE THE EVENT AND CITY IN A GOOD PLACE IN TERMS OF SECURITY PLANNING?
DS: Bearing in mind that Birmingham was a last-minute replacement for Durban as the host for the 2022 Commonwealth Games, the security planning for the event is in a very good place (in my humble opinion). The Commonwealth Games Federation have an individual contracted as their ‘Security Advisor’ and, as soon as Birmingham was awarded the Games, this individual ensured that the necessary early strategic plans were in place. By the time of my appointment as Interim Director of Security in October 2018, the Home Office and DCMS had already established a Security Board to provide high-level oversight of early plans.
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My first job was to progress with the development of an agreement with West Midlands Police around roles and responsibilities. The outcome of this was an agreement that, as had happened at the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, the Chief Constable of WMP would retain ultimate accountability for security of the Games, with the police responsible for areas in the public domain and the Organising Committee responsible for the venue security from the ‘red line’ inwards. Early engagement also took place with the UK Military who have in recent major events, played a crucial role in supporting both police and Organising Committee.
Support from government has also been excellent with both the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure providing specific advice on search and screening options and the National Cyber Security Centre also engaged at an early stage.
The event will also obviously have a wider impact on Birmingham and the West Midlands and the Head of Resilience for Birmingham City Council has also been engaged from the outset, along with partners in other areas, such as Transport for West Midlands and British Transport Police.
One thing that those not involved in mega sport events will not be aware of is the crucial work that is undertaken inside an Organising Committee with other functional areas. Key internal stakeholders include Venue Operations, Sport and Transport. The final security plans cannot be completed until the venue plans are at an advanced stage (where to search and screening lanes fit at a venue) the sport schedule is complete (the length of time between sessions can dictate the type of search to be undertaken depending on flow rate of spectators per hour) and the means of getting both spectators and competitors to and from a venue are known.
Fortunately for Birmingham 2022, the Organising Committee have employed a team of vastly experienced professionals in all of the above areas. The West Midlands Police planning team are now co-located with the Organising Committee Security Directorate and, with a permanent (and experienced) Director of Security now in place, swift progress on this hugely complex event can be achieved.
David spent 30 years in the police, rising to the rank of Chief Superintendent.
He is now the Managing Director of Taynuilt Associates Ltd which provides consultancy and training services across all aspects of security, risk and crisis management, including clients in the UK, Europe and the Middle East. David spent 12 months as the Interim Director of Security for the Birmingham 2022 Commonwealth Games and is currently providing training relating to protective intelligence and major event security to government agencies in Qatar.
David is a Fellow of the Security Institute, Fellow of the Institute of Strategic Risk Management and is a Visiting Speaker at the University of St Andrews.
Further Information
www.taynuilt.org.uk
