Reflections on peace and security in northeast asia final

Reflections on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia -Perspectives from the Ulaanbaatar Process-

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This publication was created by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict Northeast Asia (GPPAC-NEA) and the Mongolian NGO Blue Banner, edited by Anjeli Narandran of Peace Boat, the Regional Secretariat of GPPAC-NEA, and Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan of Blue Banner. Editorial and communication support was provided by GPPACNEA Regional Secretariat members Meri Joyce (GPPAC-NEA Regional Liaison Officer) and Nancy Roberts.

It was published on the occasion of the Third Ulaanbaatar Process meeting in August, 2017— coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the single-state nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia.

We are deeply thankful to all who have bestowed their time and trust to participate in the regional network of GPPAC-NEA and the Ulaanbaatar Process, as well as those who have provided valuable expertise and support along the way. We would also like to express our gratitude to the members of organisations represented in this publication who made crucial contributions including translation, research, communication and more.

Reflections on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia -Perspectives from the Ulaanbaatar ProcessCONTENTS CHAPTER 1: Northeast Asian Security and a Vision for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 

Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan (Blue Banner) – Preventing a Catastrophe: Nuclear Diplomacy of a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (Mongolia's Case)

 Anastasia Barannikova (Maritime State University, Vladivostok Focal Point) – A Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and a Peaceful Resolution of the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula  Suzuki Tatsujiro (Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University) – A Comprehensive Approach Towards a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: Solving Japan's Nuclear Trilemma  Myagmar Dovchin – (Blue Banner) – Mongolia’s Contribution to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World and the Problem of Nuclear Energy Security CHAPTER 2: Korean Peninsula Security Issues and their Impact on Regional Stability  Lee Taeho (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) – The Change of Government in South Korea and the Outlook for the Resolution of the Nuclear and Missile Crisis on the Korean Peninsula  Lucy Roberts (American Friends Service Committee) – AFSC's Shared Security Vision for Northeast Asia: ‘Issues Pertaining to Peace and Human Security Issues on the Korean Peninsula’  Su Hao and Liang Xiao-jun (China Foreign Affairs University) – The Evaluation and Prospects of the Role of China Regarding the Development of Nuclear and Strategic Weapons in North Korea  Korean National Peace Committee – The Northeast Asian Context and the Ongoing War on the Korean Peninsula CHAPTER 3: Civil Society Dialogue and Multi-Track Diplomacy in Peacebuilding in Northeast Asia  Ahn Kim Jeong Ae (Women Making Peace) – Women's Perspectives on Korean Peninsula Security  Nyamdavaa Ravdandorj (Blue Banner) – The Current State-of-Play of Northeast Asian Relations: A Youth Perspective  Peter van Tuijl (Kemitraan-Partnership for Governance Reform Indonesia / former Executive Director, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict) – Northeast Asian Security: What Role for Southeast Asia?  Meri Joyce (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict Regional Secretariat, Peace Boat) – Making a Habit of Dialogue: Civil Society's Role in Peacebuilding in Northeast Asia EPILOGUE 

Kawasaki Akira (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Peace Boat) – The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Northeast Asia

FOREWORD Caution, distrust, suspicion, threats, fierce rhetoric and fears of military escalation—Northeast Asia remains locked in Cold-War-era political interactions which pose very real threats of devastating violence. Coupled with an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment, the US administration’s aggressive posturing towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korean (DPRK), as well as an unprecedented global power shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, unpredictability is the new normal. At the heart of the region’s instability lies the lack of sustained and committed engagement and a shared vision of a secure and peaceful future.

Launched in 2003, the Six Party Talks involve China, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, Japan and the United States of America (US). The Talks are the closest alternative to an institutional mechanism for regional peace and security, and have been widely perceived to be the best available tool for peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue in Northeast Asia.

Various rounds did achieve some results, demonstrating that progress in regional engagement is possible. Yet the suspension of the Talks since 2009 and increasing calls for hard-line responses have left little room for the resumption of dialogue on a governmental level.

Since the suspension of the Talks, Track II and civil society initiatives have taken important steps toward renewed dialogue. With a foundation for constructive dialogue already developed by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict in the region (GPPAC-NEA) and with a neutral platform and location in Mongolia to convene the different parties, the Ulaanbaatar Process, convened by GPPAC-NEA and Mongolian NGO Blue Banner, is uniquely positioned to serve as an effective regional Track II dialogue.

Crucially, the Ulaanbaatar Process creates space for civil society perspectives from across the region, including both the DPRK and the ROK, to be heard in the same forum. Each civil society participant in the Ulaanbaatar Process brings a unique perspective on the struggle for stability in the Northeast Asian region, reflecting the fact that each of their nations has its own stake in a prospective peace.

Two Ulaanbaatar Process meetings have been held to date—the inaugural meeting took place in Mongolia on June 23–24, 2015 gathering peace activists and experts from China, Japan, DPRK, ROK, Russia, the US and Mongolia for a two-day open and frank discussion on Northeast Asian peace and security issues and the role that civil society can play in addressing them. The meeting saw constructive debate and knowledge-sharing on issues of concern to the entire region, including the creation of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, the replacement of the Korean War armistice with a permanent peace treaty and the role that the women and men of civil society can continue to play in helping achieve these goals.

The second meeting of the Ulaanbaatar Process was successfully convened in the Mongolian capital on November 14–16, 2016. This provided an opportunity for further dialogue on promoting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, with a focus on efforts towards establishing a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and discussion of how civil society can contribute to reducing tension, expanding engagement and cooperation, and building peace and stability in the region.

Reflections on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia - Perspectives from the Ulaanbaatar Process is a collection of essays which capture the diverse and uncompromised opinions, concerns, tensions and contradictions of a region in turmoil at the time of the 3rd Ulaanbaatar

Process Meeting held on August 29–30, 2017.

The first chapter, Northeast Asian Security and a Vision for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, explores Mongolia’s audacious decision to declare itself a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone and the impact that an expanded zone of this nature could have on Northeast Asian Security. It will also explore the contentious issue of nuclear energy within the region and the implications that this may have on the efforts to achieve military denuclearization of the region.

In the second chapter, Korean Peninsula Security Issues and their Impact on Regional Stability, we examine the current state-of-play of the peninsula, frozen in a fragile armistice with intergovernmental relations stalled in a geopolitical impasse. What opportunities does the new Moon administration in the ROK present in this context? Can a new vision of Shared Security or the diplomacy of larger neighboring powers help to carve a new path towards peace? What pre-conditions for peace are required from the often-overlooked point of view of the DPRK? These questions will be addressed in this chapter.

The third chapter, Civil Society Dialogue and Multi-Track Diplomacy in Peacebuilding in Northeast Asia shifts the focus away from what governments can and cannot do. We explore the successes and challenges faced by non-governmental organizations in the context of peacebuilding, with a focus on the role of women and youth. The chapter also looks towards the neighboring region of Southeast Asia—with its own share of historical animosities, inequalities, allegiances and tensions—for precedents, cautions and inspiration for conflict resolution.

In the Epilogue, The Implications of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty for Northeast Asian Security, we look forward at the consequences of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Now that 122 nations have decided that nuclear weapons are not only immoral but also illegal, what recourse is left to nuclear-weapon states and those that depend on their security assurances? What are the next steps required to ensure that the legal ban translates into a practical denuclearization movement? And what does this mean for this region in particular?

The papers contained in this publication serve as a snapshot of the realities, fears, tensions and aspirations of a region in flux in 2017. The styles, opinions and visions contained in this publication are as diverse as the Northeast Asian region itself and the fact that they have been offered to us, willingly, and in good faith, is a modest yet significant testament to the success of the ongoing Ulaanbaatar Process experiment.

The Ulaanbaatar Process aims to make a habit of dialogue. In doing so, there is hope that civil society can contribute towards changing the prevailing narrative surrounding the contentious geopolitical relationships in the Northeast Asian region by promoting communication and cooperation. The Ulaanbaatar Process and this publication aims to demonstrate that sincere and constructive dialogue is possible in Northeast Asia by establishing a safe space for participation from all countries.

Anjeli Narandran Editor, Reflection on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia On behalf of the Conveners of the Ulaanbaatar Process August 2017

CHAPTER 1 Northeast Asian Security and a Vision for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

Preventing a Catastrophe: Nuclear Diplomacy of a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (Mongolia’s Case) Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan Chairman, Blue Banner (NGO), Mongolia Introduction In this nuclear age, naturally, much is being written and discussed about nuclear policies of nuclear-weapon states (NWS), both de jure recognized states (P51) and their allies under the nuclear umbrella as well as de facto nuclear weapon states that are trying, to some extent, to catch up with the P5. However, the vast majority of the international community, the nonnuclear-weapon states (NNWSs), is calling not only for nuclear non-proliferation but also for banning and elminating nuclear weapons altogether. In the past decade much has also been written about the nuclear program of Iran and the nuclear weapon program of the DPRK, the former portrayed as having a nuclear-weapons ambition that could change the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East and way beyond, and the latter as a de facto nuclear-weapon state that has no intention to abandon its nuclear-weapons program that, if continued, would trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia.

On the other hand, not much is known about the policies of NNWS, especially those that border on NWS that are, or could be, compelled to play a certain role in broader nuclear power geostrategic equations. However, the choice that such states make in this interconnected world is of no minor importance for regional predictability and stability.

The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the policy of Mongolia, a small NNWS sandwiched between two nuclear powers. It will show how it is trying to cope with a possible risk, if not checked, of a nuclear catastrophe and demonstrate that today, every state whether large or small, can and should contribute to making this world a safer place. The article will also underline the increasingly important role of diplomacy manifested by competition, cooperation and compromise, as well as the untapped possibilities and limits of NNWS in contributing to making this world safer. It will also show that it takes two to tango, meaning that cooperation on the part of the P5 is essential in making progress on such issues.

The article does not deal with the potential benefits as well as the risks of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That is a topic of a separate study.

Foreign policy goals and priorities In many respects, and certainly in foreign relations and diplomacy, Mongolia’s policies are mainly the products of its geographical location and reflection of the major events of that particular particular time period. In many cases, its policies can be understood as reactions to the events underway in neighboring Russia and China, in their relations as well as with other major powers. That is why Mongolia tries, within its limited possibilities and resources available and when circumstances allow, to foresee and influence events, to the extent possible,

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The P5 Member States are: US; Russia; China; UK; and France.

so as to reduce harm for itself and, if possible, to turn the circumstances or events to its advantage.

Mongolians are a proud people with an ancient and rich history. Suffice it to mention Genghis Khan (in Mongolian written as Chinggis Khaan) and his successors, who built the largest land empire in history linking Asia and Europe through the Silk Road. With the disintegration of the Mongol Empire, the world saw the gradual rise and expansion of Russian and Chinese empires overtaking the remnants of the Mongol Empire. By early XX century Mongolia found itself tightly squeezed between Russia and China and trying to protect its independence regained during the downfall of the Qing Empire in China in 1911. In order to protect itself from possible encroachment on its declared independence, Mongolia turned to Russia and became its satellite, thus following the latter’s domestic and foreign policies throughout the most of XX century until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s.

Membership in the United Nations in 1961, gradual expansion of foreign relations and establishing diplomatic relations with the United States in 1987 signaled the end of its diplomatic and political isolation. The break-up of the Soviet bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a fundamental transformation of Mongolia from an ideologically driven socialist authoritarian state to a multiparty democratic state with a free market economy.

Mongolia’s foreign policy emphasized promoting the country’s own national interests as perceived and defined by the Mongolians themselves and reflected in the post cold war 1992 democratic Constitution. The country’s foreign and security policy goals were outlined as follows:      

primacy of its own vital national interests, while at the same time respecting the legitimate interests of partners; pragmatic, open, multi-track2 and multi-pillar3 policy; ensuring a favorable external security environment primarily through political and diplomatic means; non-alignment with great powers against other powers; according top priority to good-neighborly and balanced relations with its immediate neighbors; maintaining neutrality in their disputes unless the latter affected Mongolia’s vital interests, in which case it would follow those interests; pursuing a “third neighbor policy” i.e. promoting closer relations with Eastern or Western democracies, international organizations and other stakeholders that support Mongolia’s chosen democratic path and values. When doing so special emphasis needs to be laid on fostering long-term economic interests of the major industrial powers in Mongolia.

Looking back at a quarter century of the country’s political and economic developments and its foreign policy, one can say that the major goals of democratic development, introducing market economy and broadening foreign relations have in general been achieved, though still with some mixed results. Mongolia does not have territorial disputes nor border issues with its 2

Multi-track foreign policy means policies in political, economic, social, science and technology, cultural and other areas.

3 Multi-pillar policy means policies that underline not only one or another area of foreign relations, but attach importance to all areas of relations be it political, economic, ecological, cultural, humanitarian, etc. ‘Third neighbors’ means states that share with Mongolia similar values (meaning democratic values), highly industrialized states as well as the United Nations, the European Union, OSCE and some other interntional organizations. Other pillars include relations with the Asian countries, the United Nations and other international organizations, and other countries with which it had or has close relations.

immediate neighbors, and fosters relations of comprehensive strategic partnership4 with both of them. All three have agreed not to allow the use of their territories to harm the interests of the other two. The neighbors have agreed to respect Mongolia’s choice of its political and socio-economic development. They have also tacitly agreed to its “third neighbor” policy as long as it did not infringe upon their vital national interests. Therefore, Mongolia serves not only as a buffer, but also as a stable partner and a convenient bridge between neighboring nations.

Development of meaningful or pragmatic relations with the third neighbors, be it with the states of Northeast Asia, USA or the European Union, requires first and foremost, developing transport and communications infrastructure so as to allow a greater flow of trade and investment as well as people-to-people contacts. With that in mind Mongolia has proposed a Steppe Road initiative that should logically link up with China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and Russia’s Eurasian Transport Network policy that would make it a transit state not only by further linking China and Russia, but also serving as a northern transit route linking Europe with Northeast Asia through the Trans-Siberian and Trans-Mongolian railways. Hence there are talks underway on trilateral cooperation in trans-border infrastructure development.

The transit link is expected to provide broader access of Mongolia to world markets and hence to the “third neighbors”. Another form of trilateral cooperation is to include an interested third neighbor and one of its immediate neighbors, based on the common interests of the three parties.

Mongolia and Nuclear Issues Nuclear power is a double-edged sword. It is fraught with grave dangers as well as provides great opportunities. Mongolia’s location between two nuclear powers makes it imperative to specifically address the issues of nuclear security, both of military nature or connected with the harmful effects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It could choose either to be passively affected by the perils of the nuclear age or try to play a somewhat active role in shaping its own future, promoting its national interests and reaping, to the extent possible, the benefits and dividends of the peaceful atom. It chose the latter.

Reminder of the risky past During the cold war Mongolia was involuntarily subject to double cold war pressures: EastWest and Sino-Soviet. As a Soviet ally, it hosted Soviet military bases on its territory. In the 1960s, during the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute which later turned into an inter-state one, Mongolia found itself involuntarily involved in their dispute and, by implication, in their military standoff.

When China developed nuclear weapons and the Sino-Soviet dispute resulted in border clashes in 1969, the Soviets briefly entertained the idea, or at least made believe, of contemplating a preemptive strike against China’s fledgling nuclear weapons and weapons facilities so as to delay, if not halt, such an ominous threat to the Soviet Union’s strategic interests. The Soviets at that time not only communicated its intention to its Warsaw Pact allies, but also approached USA for its reaction. Whether a pre-emptive strike really was the Soviet’s intention or a mere bluff to scare or put pressure on China, will become known when archived materials of that time are made fully available. In any case, a pre-emptive strike would surely have had a 4

Strategic partnership is a long-term commitment on principles and areas of deepened cooperation in bilateral or multilateral areas of mutual interest, as specified in a joint declaration or other instruments.

devastating effect on international relations, especially on Mongolia, since China was well aware of the location of soviet bases in Mongolia and the dual use weapons placed therein.

Mongolia’s hosting of Soviet military bases automatically provided military intelligence to the Soviets, including missile tests, early warning or even perhaps targeting data. Hence these bases in Mongolia were prime targets for Chinese military attacks; preventive, offensive or retaliatory. Mongolia was aware that even part of the USA’S nuclear arsenal, most probably based in Japan or on submarines, was aimed at those bases. USA’s negative response to the Soviet “inquiry” and warning of a possibility of such action leading to world war III were important in avoiding a possible catastrophe. Mongolians of that time, including this author, remember distinctly the civil defense drills that were carried out from time to time, including nuclear attack survival drills; how to act, where to get masks, where to go for shelter from fallout, etc.

Mongolia makes an initiative That is why when the Cold War came to an end and the Soviets/Russians were withdrawing their military bases and weapons from Mongolia in September 1992, President P. Ochirbat, the country’s first democratically elected President, when addressing the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), declared the country a nuclear-weapon free zone (NWFZ) and pledged to secure international guarantees for that status. In June 1994 the State Great Khural (parliament) adopted the first post-cold war national security concept, which underlined the country’s nuclear-weapon-free status as an important element of strengthening its security by political means, laying thus the basis of state policy on this issue.

The proposal’s gist was that Mongolia did not have nuclear weapons on its territory and that, unlike during the cold war, no country near or far would be allowed to place such weapons on its territory. Although this might be seen at a first glance as a selfish act, in practice it meant that no nuclear weapon threat to others would emanate from the vast5 Mongolian territory.

President Ochirbat’s reference to international guarantees implied that the five nuclear-weapon states, meaning US, Russia, China, France and the UK (known as the P5), thus including its two immediate neighbors, would recognize Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS), commit to respect the status and thus would not involve Mongolia in their geopolitical calculations, nuclear doctrines and policies. Hence Mongolia’s seemingly selfish act would in fact be a contributing factor to greater regional stability and predictability.

It is usual that heads of state, heads of government or foreign ministers use the occasion to address the UNGA to make important statements and to put forth ideas or peace initiatives.

However, most of the statements remain mere statements, while only a few are followed through to their realization. Mongolian President’s statement at that time did not attract any particular attention, including that of the P5. Consequently, it became important for Mongolia to draw the P5’s attention to the initiative and discuss with them the conditions as well as the ways and means for its realization.

The challenge for Mongolia was that as a small NNWS, it had little leverage to interest them, let alone talk with them on nuclear security-related issues. Its main tool or leverage was diplomacy of persuasion, making logical arguments, underlining the morality of the issue, the need for cooperation in the increasingly interdependent world and the general support that the issue enjoyed within the international community. On the other hand, and this needs to be 5

The territory of Mongolia is 1.565.000 km2.

underlined, that the P5 understanding of Mongolia’s policy and their collaboration, though perhaps reluctant, was necessary to move the issue.

Unilateral statements of support An opportunity to interest and involve the P5 came in 1993. First, in its Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation concluded with the Russian Federation in January of that year, the latter agreed to respect “Mongolia’s policy of not admitting the deployment on and transit through its territory of foreign troops, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction”. That meant Russia’s support for the initiative in principle. Also, that year the P5 approached many states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for their support of the indefinite extension of the treaty at the forthcoming 1995 NPT Review Conference. When approached, Mongolia linked its possible support for the extension of the treaty with the P5’s express support for its NWFZ initiative. First and foremost, the support of the United States was critical since it was the most influential state among them, (i.e. primus inter pares). Its position would influence those of the other Member States of the P5 (hereinafter referred to as P4). The initial US reaction was that it did not want to commit itself to addressing Mongolia’s initiative beyond offering general political support of the initiative as such. Then after several engagements, the United States expressed its support for the initiative in the form of a separate statement from the State Department. In that statement, USA welcomed Mongolia’s decision to support the indefinite extension of the NPT and stated that as a non-nuclear sovereign state friendly to the US, Mongolia benefited from the former’s positive6 and negative7 security assurances. Following the US example, soon thereafter the UK, China and France also made unilateral statements of support for the initiative as such. With the unilateral support of the P5, Mongolia believed that proper conditions were in place to engage them to have them make a joint statement of support.

Going for P5 joint support To start the ball rolling, Mongolia approached each one of the P5 indivudually with the proposal for a P5 joint statement in support of the initiative. Each of the P5 expressed understanding and support for the initiative in principle, but suggested that Mongolia approach the other Permanent Member States (especially the United States), and that a joint statement could be made if no parties opposed it. Such conduct is informally known as the “football” principle. Applied by the P5 towards novel issues, it is an attempt to win time to consult each other and agree or disagree on a joint response. The initial separate contacts with the P5 also showed that when it comes to novel ideas, they are very cautious even on such a seemingly constructive issue as Mongolia’s initiative. The reason was that they were concerned that Mongolia was setting a precedent for others to follow. For them, any innovation by third parties meant unnecessarily “rocking the boat”. However, their own new initiatives were presented as ‘bold steps’ that would strengthen over-all security. In this case, the role of the “bad cop” was played by France, whose representative declared that it could not support the idea of a joint P5 statement. France was concerned that if it were to issue such a statement, then many of the Francophone states would be surprised by the special treatment accorded by France to Mongolia. There were some other reasons given for France’s reluctance to support the proposal.

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Positive security assurance is a pledge provided by a nuclear-weapon state to a non-nuclear-weapon state that it would provide assistance to the latter should it become victim of a nuclear threat or attack.

7 Negative security assurance is a pledge provided by a nuclear-weapon state to a non-nuclear-weapon state that under certain conditions it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the latter.

This included, for example, France’s presidential elections and resultant complete review of its nuclear doctrine at that time.

Turning to the United Nations General Assembly To move the issue along, Mongolia proposed to have a meeting with the P5 as a group and discuss how to promote the idea at the United Nations, perhaps by having UNGA adopt a resolution in support of it. That proved to be easier said than done. Contacts with the P5 showed that though politically it was difficult for them to oppose the constructive idea per se, following the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 they had no real incentive to further support the initiative. Also there were other psychological and political factors to consider: the mere fact that the P5 would be negotiating with a small NNWS in good standing with the NPT on a nuclear weapons issue was difficult for them to imagine or explain.

The P5 prevents consideration of the establishment of a Single-State Nuclear Weapon-free Zone Bearing in mind that in 1997-1999 UNGA decided to draft guidelines on establishing new NWFZs “on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned”, Mongolia suggested drafting of parallel guidelines for establishing single-State NWFZs (SS-NWFZs) so as to prevent the emergence of blind or weak spots in the emerging vast nuclear-weapon-free area. Mongolia presented a working paper 8 to the UNGA Disarmament Commission for its consideration. The working paper defined the principles of establishing such zones, the basic elements of a model agreement on such zones and even the stages of consideration of the guidelines. Though Nepal, Afghanistan and some other states expressed interest in the issue, especially after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests of 1998, the P5 was against discussing even the very concept of such zones, seeing it as a distraction from elaborating on regional (i.e. traditional) zones. Privately they cautioned against establishing precedents that could be considered unfavorable to them. The P5 considered possible blind spots as a minor issue compared to establishing regional zones. Since the decisions in the Disarmament Commission are taken by consensus, the P5 were able to prevent substantive consideration of the Mongolian proposal or even making any reference to the concept of SS-NWFZs in the final document. When the guidelines were adopted, they contained only a footnote referring to the fact that UNGA had adopted a resolution on Mongolia’s NWFS. Thus the road to have the issue taken up at a broad international forum was closed by the P5. Mongolia therefore decided to proceed with the establishment of a singleState NWFZ in practical terms, instead of in theory.

Working for a UNGA resolution In the meantime, the international community, especially the Non-Aligned Movement and the NWFZ states, supported Mongolia’s initiative and its persistent follow-up policy which the P5 could no longer ignore. Some delegates even suggested putting the issue to a vote in the UNGA without bothering to negotiate with the US or other P4, a process they considered likely to be futile. However Mongolia did not need a Phyrric, hollow victory. It was not in a hurry.

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United Nations General Assembly Disarmament Commission, 1997 Substantive Session. Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones on the Basis of Arrangements Freely Arrived at Among the States of the Region Concerned – Working Paper Submitted by Mongolia. (A/CN.10/195). 22 April 1997.

Instead, in 1996-98 Mongolia held a number of informal meetings with the P5, especially with the US, which, at times represented the other P4 as well. Mongolia explained that its vast territory - free of nuclear weapons - would be a positive factor in strengthening confidence and predictability in the region. Although this was acknowledged by the United States, it was also pointed out that the establishment of NWFZs was a regional means of non-proliferation and that support for Mongolia would set a precedent for individual states to unilaterally declare themselves SS-NWFZs and expect the P5 to provide them with security assurances, which the US and other P4 were not prepared to do. The US also indicated that proliferation of security assurances would dilute the value of assurances. In the end, the sides agreed to the following: Mongolia would not insist on a SS-NWFZ status but could agree to an undefined nuclearweapon-free status (NWFS). In return, the P5 could agree to recognize Mongolia’s security interests in a broader than only nuclear weapons context, including its lack of direct access to world markets, its delicate ecological balance, etc. The P5 insisted that they would not, at that stage, agree to any reference to institutionalizing Mongolia’s unique status, since it would, again, set a precedent. That political understanding laid the basis for a subsequent UNGA resolution on the issue.

In October 1998 Mongolia introduced to UNGA a draft resolution, that had been agreed upon with the P5, which was adopted without a vote as resolution 53/77D9. It welcomed Mongolia’s policy and expressed support for its good-neighborly and balanced relations with its neighbors as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability. As a reflection of the political understandings reached, the resolution invited Member States, including the P5, to cooperate with Mongolia in strengthening its “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security, its ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its independent foreign policy”. Also, as according to the political agreement reached earlier, the resolution did not make reference to Mongolia as a SS-NWFZ nor to the “institutionalization” of the status.

National legislation In February 2000, the Mongolian parliament adopted a law10 that defined the country’s NWFS at the national level and criminalized acts that would violate that status. It reaffirmed Mongolia’s commitments undertaken by the NPT not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, the law prohibited the stationing of nuclear weapons and their transit through the territory of Mongolia, by any means. Mindful of the importance of the issue for society in general, the law allowed non-governmental organizations and even individual persons, within the mandate provided by the legislation, to exercise public oversight of the implementation of the law and submit proposals thereon to relevant state authorities. The P5 took note of the adoption of the law but did not wish to endorse nor welcome it, declaring that it was an internal affair of Mongolia. In reality they were not supportive of any national legislation that could have unpredictable repercussions for them. In particular, they opposed the law’s verification provision; that if need be Mongolian authorities would, within the country, be empowered to stop, detain or search suspected aircraft, trains, vehicles, individuals or group of persons.

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See annex to this article.

U.N. Security Council, 55th Year. Letter dated 28 February 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General. (S/2000/160). Official Record. New York, 2000.

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In 2005, the NGO Blue Banner was established with the aim of promoting nuclear nonproliferation and Mongolia’s NWFS, which made use of the provision of the law to “exercise public oversight of the implementation of the legislation … and submit proposals thereon to the relevant State authority”.

P5 joint statement as a setback Following General Assembly resolution 53/77 D, the abovementioned legislation by Mongolia as well as Russia’s suggestion to provide Mongolia with “appropriate assurances”, in October 2000, the P5 issued a joint statement11 providing Mongolia with both negative and positive security assurances. However, the joint statement avoided formally welcoming the legislation, since doing so, they thought, would set a precedent. Mongolia welcomed the P5 joint statement only as an initial positive step in institutionalizing the status. At the same time, it informed the P5 that since the joint statement was a political one that lacked legal force and could easily be rescinded by a subsequent joint statement, it could not serve as a viable security assurance.

Content wise, Mongolia thought that it was made in the spirit of the Cold War, by virtually enumerating conditions under which the P4 (except China)12 would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. It lamented that the substance of the joint statement was in stark contrast with the good-neighborly relations that Mongolia enjoyed with the neighbors and the other P313 states. The P5 knew that their ‘one size fits all’ approach was not appropriate in Mongolia’s case. However, they were reluctant to either admit or rectify it.

P5 meaningful joint declaration Not satisfied with the P5 joint statement, between 2000 and 2012, Mongolia held numerous bilateral, trilateral and multilateral meetings with the P5, persistently pointing out the inconsistency of the very nature of the joint statement with Mongolia’s de facto relations with each one of them. It also pointed out the inconsistency in logic of the P5 joint statement with the ones made at broader international fora, including at NPT Review conferences and preparatory meetings. After years of going back and forth, Mongolia finally agreed not to insist on a treaty that would define its NWFS and provide legally binding security assurances to it, provided that the P5 would jointly pledge to respect Mongolia’s status and refrain from any act that would contribute to its violation. Since Mongolia did not have any territorial, border or other problem or political dispute with its two immediate neighbors and in fact was upgrading its relations with each one of them to that of comprehensive partnership, it agreed that until SS-NWFZ is internationally accepted, it would not insist on a treaty form of assurance. The P5 recognition of the status and their pledge to respect it and not to contribute to any act that would violate that status could, in the interim, serve as an assurance for Mongolia.

11

U.N. Security Council, 55th Year. Letters dated 27 October 2000 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council. (A/55/530–S/2000/1052). Official Record. New York, 2000.

12 China had declared that the unconditional security assurances that it provided to NWFZs or non-nuclearweapon states applied to Mongolia.

13 The gist of P4’s (except China) unilateral statements regarding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states, made in April 1995 prior to the NPT Review and Extension conference, was that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on it, its territory, armed forces or other troops, on its allies or on a state towards which that particular state has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by that non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with another nuclear-weapon state.

The above political understanding took the form of parallel declarations that were signed in September 201214. In Mongolia’s view and in practical terms, the P5 joint declaration meant that none of them would involve Mongolia in their future nuclear strategies, including possible defense system(s), or counter defense system(s). In that sense, the joint P5 declaration was not only in the national interests of Mongolia, but also in the interests of regional stability and predictability. It could be interpreted that, through the joint declaration, the P5 reassured not only Mongolia, but also each other regarding Mongolia’s status. Moreover, the P5 in the joint declaration also welcomed ‘the passage” of Mongolia’s law of 2000, thus indirectly acknowledging its importance. The US played a leading role in all the talks and in reaching a mutually acceptable solution. Also, the US provided assistance to Mongolia in preventing possible nuclear and radiological smuggling across its borders by assisting in strengthening its radiation detection capacity commonly known as the second line of defense (SLD).

The next step towards the institutionalization of the status NWFZs are agreed regional arrangements that enhance confidence among the states of a particular region and consequently strengthen peace and security. Hence the next logical step for Mongolia is to make its unique status a stabilizing factor and a tool in strengthening regional security. For that purpose it organized in September 2015 an awareness-raising and brainstorming ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) workshop on the status. The forum participants showed interest in Mongolia’s innovative approach to NWFZ issues that would, to the extent possible, rule out future blind spots. In addition to this and in view of rapid technological changes, including RMA 15 , the notion of a “nuclear-weapon-free zone” should rule out accepting any part of a nuclear weapons system. This could include surveillance, tracking or homing devices designed to serve nuclear strategic systems.

Raison d'être for active foreign policy There is a saying in Mongolia that ‘a duck is calm when the lake is calm’. In other words, Mongolia’s interests are best served when the broader regional environment is stable and secure. That is why the country tries to play an active role in the region, especially since it maintains good-neighborly relations with all the countries of the region, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). With due respect to the latter, Mongolia believes that engagement rather than isolation of the DPRK is the key to addressing the region’s main security challenge. The passage of time and DPRK’s visible progress in its nuclear weapons program would only strengthen its bargaining position, which just cannot be ignored or wished away. If not addressed quickly and properly, it will have further destabilizing effect on the region and on the non-proliferation regime in general. Due to ‘ripe’ technological conditions in the region, a “domino effect” is real in the sense that, if a political decision is taken, Japan and the Republic of Korea could easily develop nuclear weapons of their own.

The “blame game” and “strategic patience” are not the answer. Only addressing the issue

14

U.N. Security Council, 67th Year. Letter dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. (A/67/393–S/2012/721).

Official Record. New York, 2012.

For Mongolia’s declaration see: U.N. Security Council, 67th Year. Letter dated 10 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. (A/67/517–S/2012/760). Official Record.

New York, 2012.

15 Revolution in Military Affairs.

realistically and pragmatically may lead to a solution that is fair to all. Hence engagement and dialogue are needed.

That is the purpose of the Ulaanbaatar security dialogue in Northeast Asia (UBD) initiative proposed by President Ts. Elbegdorj in 2013. It is intended to provide space and platform for Track 1.5 meetings to discuss soft security issues of mutual interest and concern under Chatham House Rules 16. Four UBD meetings have been held since, providing a convenient informal setting to discuss soft security issues that were not adequately addressed at the more formal, and currently suspended, Six Party Talks (SPT). Moreover, Mongolia has also expressed its readiness to promote informal exploratory meetings on the possibility of establishing a Northeast Asian (NEA) NWFZ. Following up on that idea, two such informal meetings have been held in Ulaanbaatar that focused on the essential preconditions that need to be addressed if there is to be a serious discussion of the issue.

In June of this year, the Panel on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia (PSNA), an independent group of security experts from the countries in Northeast Asia, the USA and Australia held its second meeting in Ulaanbaatar. The independent panel’s goal is to facilitate political processes by organizing public engagements and presenting timely policy recommendations to create a NEA-NWFZ as an integral element in establishing peace and security in the region. The Ulaanbaatar meeting provided a useful venue and space for a frank exchange of views and ideas on how to pursue this goal in the evolving security environment.

In the same spirit, Mongolian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also supportive of the track-2 efforts aimed to provide a broad space for dialogue among NEA NGOs as well as representatives of DPRK institutions and thus providing, to the extent possible, support to 1.5 track processes, including the UBD initiative. In light of this, Blue Banner, which serves as Ulaanbaatar focal point of GPPAC’s 17 NEA network, together with other fellow regional GPPAC focal points, launched a civil society-driven inclusive regional dialogue known as the Ulaanbaatar Process (UBP), in 2015. The process provides a much-needed political space and venue for civil society meetings and interaction. The priority themes are promoting peace and confidence in NEA as well as supporting the goal of establishing a NEA-NWFZ. So far, two such meetings have been held on these issues. The advantage of UBP meetings is that they are inclusive and highly informal, and that NGOs of NEA as well as the United States are represented. The next annual meeting of the UBP is scheduled to be held in August 2017.

Conclusions In the past 25 years Mongolia has been working patiently and persistently to establish a SSNWFZ on its territory and acquire security assurances from the P5, including from its giant neighbors. Its policies of “strategic patience” and perseverance have paid off since it felt that time was on the side of greater integration, cooperation and an inevitable trend towards common security and overall prosperity. Today no nuclear-weapon is trained on Mongolia due to its NWFS, while the P5 have committed to respect Mongolia’s status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it.

Mongolia’s experience, though not widely known, shows that all states, irrespective of their size, ideology or religion, geographical or geopolitical location, can contribute to making the 16

When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

17 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, established in 2005.

world a safer place for future generations. It is clear that the P5 cannot address evenly or adequately the issues of peace and common security. Hence, until a more effective system of ensuring international peace and security is established, other states need to be more proactive and persistent on issues affecting their vital interests and common security, since security cannot be based on blind trust of others or sheer luck. In particular, members of military and political alliances can play a positive role in this regard. A sensible approach, based on mutual understanding, genuine cooperation and mutually agreed upon regional security structure needs to be adopted.

As for Mongolia’s case, the work is still in progress. Mongolia now needs to link its security policy with the security of East Asia and make it an important factor of stability, predictability and mutual regional confidence. It should also find a way of acquiring non-treaty based, (yet viable) security assurances from the P5.

As a country with vast experience in promoting its interests in conjunction with that of others, primarily by political and diplomatic means, Mongolia can contribute to the joint search for ways to achieve greater stability and security in the region by establishing a NEA-NWFZ which will reflect the region’s specificities and interests.

Today, establishing a SS-NWFZ is not a mere theoretical or conceptual issue, but is becoming a reality, Mongolia being its first example. It is becoming a necessity if the world is to become nuclear-weapon-free. There are over one dozen non-nuclear-weapon states that are not under a nuclear umbrella; they also cannot fit in the prescribed traditional NWFZ format. There are many island states and territories that might want to be part of the emerging nuclear-weaponfree world and not serve as “blind spots” or “grey areas” where nuclear weapons or parts of such systems could be placed. They may wish to eschew, contributing to increasing tension and suspicion, or avoid become legitimate targets of nuclear weapons themselves. If the SSNWFZ issue remains a taboo, it would have a negative impact not only on the states or territories concerned but also on international peace, trust, and stability. Therefore, Mongolia should call for an expert level study on the issue of establishing second generation zones – i.e.

SS-NWFZs.

ANNEX United Nations General Assembly resolution 53/77D adopted on 4 December, 1998 Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status The General Assembly, Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling also the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Welcoming the decision of Mongolia to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Taking note with satisfaction of the separate statements made by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with Mongolia’s declaration of its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Counties, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, in which the Conference welcomed and supported Mongolia’s policy to institutionalize its single State nuclear-weapon-free status, Proceeding from the fact that nuclear-weapon-free status is one of the means of ensuring the national security of States, Bearing in mind its resolution 49/31 of 9 December 1994 on the protection and security of small States, Welcoming Mongolia’s active and positive role in developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the region and other States, Convinced that the internationally recognized status of Mongolia will contribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote Mongolia’s security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its ecological balance, 1. Welcomes the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status; 2. Endorses and supports Mongolia’s good-neighborly and balanced relationship with its neighbors as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability; 3. Invites Member States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security, its

ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its independent foreign policy; 4. Appeals to the member States of the Asia and Pacific region to support Mongolia’s efforts to join the relevant regional security and economic arrangements; 5. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to provide the necessary assistance to Mongolia, within existing resources, to take the necessary measures mentioned in paragraph 3 above; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution; 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fifth session an item entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status”.

A Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and a Peaceful Resolution of the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula Anastasia Barannikova Vladivostok Focal Point, GPPAC Northeast Asia The evolution of the nuclear program (technical progress, doctrine etc.) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has made the coerced nuclear disarmament of the country unfeasible and dangerous. New motivating factors within DPRK and the arms race in Northeast Asia (NEA) are diminishing the chances of voluntary disarmament. It has become clear that sanctions and pressure against DPRK do not solve the problem, but only lead to a dead end. Under certain conditions, this approach can even lead to the outbreak of conflict or nuclear proliferation. Thus, it is necessary to look for new ways to address the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. For this purpose, the international community must move away from old approaches and towards new initiatives. One of the most promising ideas at the moment is the creation of a NEA Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ). This initiative implies a fundamentally new approach to DPRK that cannot be underestimated by its leadership. With flexibility and due consideration of the interests of all NEA countries, the implementation of NEA NWFZ initiative could really contribute to the peaceful solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Over the past year, the tensions in Northeast Asia increased and the crisis on the Korean Peninsula escalated significantly. The nuclear and missile programs of DPRK accelerated drastically since the beginning of 2016; joint US-ROK exercises in the region have become even more provocative, taking into account the presence of nuclear weapons and the simulation by the United States of America (USA) and Republic of Korea (ROK) of a “decapitation strike”, designed to take out the top leadership of the DPRK. USA and ROK have agreed on the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems 1 on the Korean Peninsula and countries whose interests are threatened by these systems have already undertaken military-technical countermeasures. Russia and China are improving their strategic capabilities, developing hypersonic weapons to overcome US missile defense2 and their expert communities are discussing ideas such as collective missile defense systems 3 . China has deployed mobile Dongfeng-41 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)4 in its Heilongjiang province, bordering DPRK, and conducted tests of long-range DF-5C missile with 10 1

THAAD is a system designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. A THAAD battery consists of launcher vehicles equipped with missiles, with two mobile tactical operations centers (TOCs) and the AN/TPY-2 ground-based radar (GBR) which is capable of detecting not only ballistic targets (missiles), but also aerodynamic ones (aircraft).

2 Gertz, Bill, Air Force: Hypersonic Missiles From China, Russia Pose Growing Danger to U.S., The Washington Free Beacon, November 30, 2016, accessed December 22, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/air-force-hypersonic-missiles-china-russia-pose-growing-danger-u-s/.

3 Sitdikov, Ramil, “Will Russia and China Build an SCO-Based Joint Missile Defense System?,” Sputnik, July 20, 2016, accessed, September 1, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/military/201607201043363315-russia-chinajoint-missile-defense/; Chen, Hanhui, China and Russia are to enhance cooperation to counter THAAD Jūn bào: zhōng é kĕ shēn huà fǎn dǎo hé zuò tōng guò duō zhŏng fāng shì cuī huĭ sà dé 陈航辉. 军报：中俄可深化反导合作 通过多种方式 摧毁萨德, China News, August 1, 2016, accessed September 5, 2016, http://finance.chinanews.com/mil/2016/08-05/7962882.shtml.

4 China deploys DF-41 nuclear ballistic missiles “responding to US missile defense in Asia”, South Front, January 25, 2017, accessed February 5, 2017, https://southfront.org/china-deploys-df-41-nuclear-ballisticmissiles-responding-to-us-missile-defense-in-asia/.

warheads5, while Russia has completed a work on its “Barguzin” railroad ICBM system 6 able to zero in on US missile defense. Finally, DPRK successfully tested its “Pukguksong-2” 7 missile capable of overcoming the enemy's ballistic missile defense and “Hwasong-14”8, still raising questions about its range and classification9. Thus, another arms race is already taking place in Northeast Asia (and beyond), threatening to last for a long period, increasing the conflict potential of the region and diverting resources and forces of the countries involved from more important and constructive issues.

The situation was aggravated with the induction into office of the current President of the USA. Amid increasing mutual demonstrations of force and military threats, the statements about redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea began10, and some highranking officials even admitted in their public statements the emergence of (their own) nuclear weapons in ROK and Japan 11 . In such an atmosphere, the resolution of the long-standing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula has become ever more urgent. However, before attempting to work out an approach to settling the crisis, it is necessary to understand its essence and causes. The process of working out approaches to the crisis on the Korean peninsula at all its stages was hampered by the perception of this crisis as a solely "North Korean nuclear issue".

In reality, this issue is just a part of the complex of regional security problems. It is also the result rather than the cause of the crisis. At the same time, there is no concept of a "North Korean nuclear problem" for Russia and China; their officials refer to the "nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula”12. This automatically implies that its solution lies in simultaneously addressing other issues, such as the expansion of the US military presence in the Korean Peninsula and the destabilizing US-ROK joint exercises.

5

Orlov, Alexey, China tested a ballistic missile with 10 warheads Kitay ispytal ballisticheskuyu raketu s 10 boyegolovkami Китай испытал баллистическую ракету с 10 боеголовками, Defence.ru, February 1, 2017, accessed February 5, 2017, https://defence.ru/article/kitai-ispital-ballisicheskuyu-raketu-s-10-boegolovkami/.

6 Peck, Michael, Russia's Nuclear Missile 'Death Train' Arriving in 2019, The National Interest, February 26, 2017, accessed March 3, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/russias-nuclear-missile-death-train-arriving-201919581.

7 Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of surface-to-surface medium long-range ballistic missile, Korean Central News Agency, February 13, 2017, accessed February 14, 2017, http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf.

8 Kim Jong Un supervises test-launch of Inter-continental Ballistic Rocket Hwasong-14, Korean Central News Agency, July 5, 2017, accessed July 7, 2017, http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf .

9 Schilling John, North Korea Finally Tests an ICBM, 38 North, July 5, 2017, accessed July 7, 2017, https://www.38north.org/2017/07/jschilling070517/; Yamada, Kenichi, Seoul skeptical of North Korea's ICBM claims, Nikkei Asian Review, July 6, 2017, accessed July 7, 2017, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Seoul-skeptical-of-North-Koreas-ICBM-claims; Russia: North Korea tested medium-range missile not intercontinental, PressTV, July 9, 2017, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/07/09/527959/russia-north-korea-us-icbm.

10 Lee, Seung-Heon, U.S. considers return of tactical nukes to Korean Peninsula, The Dong-A Ilbo, March 6, 2017, accessed April 1, 2017, http://english.donga.com/List/3/03/26/864180/1.

11 Johnson, Jesse, Amid North Korea threat, Tillerson hints that ‘circumstances could evolve’ for a Japanese nuclear arsenal, The Japan Times, March 19, 2017, accessed April 1, 2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/19/national/amid-north-korea-threat-tillerson-hints-circumstancesevolve-japanese-nuclear-arsenal/#.WRZj0RheNmA; Edson, Rich, Tillerson refuses to rule out nuclearization of Asian allies to keep North Korea in check, Fox News, March 17, 2017, accessed April 1, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/03/17/tillerson-refusesto-rule-out-nuclearization-asian-allies-to-keep-north-korea-in-check.html.

12 See official sites of: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed April 1, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/en/main_en and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, accessed April 1, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/.

It is natural that approaches aimed at solving not the entire problem, but only parts of it, have failed and will continue failing. A stark example of an inevitably unsuccessful approach is the implementation of sanctions against the DPRK. Its inefficiency has already been recognized

by Russia and the United States. Indeed, sanctions have had no effect on the sphere at which they are targeted, i.e., nuclear and missile programs of DPRK. This is evidenced by the country's technical and technological progress subsequent to the tightening of international sanctions and its isolation.

The Problem of the Resumption of the Six-Party Talks The settlement of the Korean Peninsula crisis through negotiations seems to be the most desirable approach. Russia and China remain committed to the resumption of the six-party talks (6PT), though they understand that it would be virtually impossible without a change of the initial objectives and agenda. Other former 6PT participants seem to be uninterested in the resumption of this multilateral dialogue as they put forward unrealistic preliminary conditions13.

Now it is clear that possibilities for the voluntary disarmament of the DPRK have been missed over the years since the suspension of the 6PT. Sine qua non of DPRK’s nuclear disarmament is global denuclearization. Otherwise, the threats to its security, which pushed it to develop nuclear weapons many years ago, would remain. It is assumed that the new military doctrine of the DPRK relies on nuclear weapons as the main deterrent potential. In this case, nuclear disarmament would endanger the country’s security, as it would reduce the DPRK’s possibility of responding to large-scale enemy aggression, even that which uses conventional weapons.

At the same time, security is not the only factor14 that motivates the DPRK to develop its own nuclear potential (otherwise a non-aggression agreement with the US would be enough, to reverse its nuclear stance; this seems unrealistic now). The nuclear and missile potential of the DPRK was originally aimed solely at ensuring national security. However, it has now become part of the country’s ideology, an element of its domestic policy and a symbol of prestige. Kim Jong Un named DPRK a “nuclear power in the East” 15 in his New Year address, thus confirming the special status and role of nuclear weapons in the country. Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons are not only the main deterrent for the DPRK, but also a symbol of its prestige and indicator of the efficiency of the current political course. The abandonment of nuclear weapons in the current circumstances would undoubtedly have serious consequences for the image of DPRK’s leadership within the country.

The abovementioned points demonstrate that nuclear weapons are no longer a negotiable point for the leadership of the DPRK and cannot be exchanged for any economic benefits. DPRK’s position and rhetoric on its nuclear potential has hardened. Putting forward unfeasible prerequisites to the USA and its allies indicates that DPRK is no longer interested in nuclear disarmament. Moreover, its leadership has no more chances for this disarmament. Since the nuclear status of the country was enshrined in its constitution, no possibilities remain for a political dialogue on the disarmament of DPRK, including the 6PT. This impossibility, along 13

Yi Yong-in, US official reiterates conditions for resuming Six Party Talks, The Hankyoreh, April 6, 2016, accessed May 6, 2017, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/738496.html; Abe says no to resuming six-party denuclearization talks with North Korea, The Japan Times News, April 29, 2017, accessed May 6, 2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/04/29/national/politics-diplomacy/abesays-no-resuming-six-party-denuclearization-talks-north-korea/#.WXQ8IMaQxmA. 14 For more details about factors motivating states to develop nuclear weapons see: Harald Müller, Andreas Schmidt, The Little Known Story of De-Proliferation: Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapon Activities, Security Index Journal. №1 (100), 2011, pp. 71-90, №3-4 (102-103), 2012. Pp. 69-84.

15 Kim Jong Un New Year Address, Korean Central News Agency, January 2, 2017, accessed January 4, 2017, http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf.

with new motivating factors within DPRK as well as its technical progress, shows that DPRK will never give up its nuclear weapons. As DPRK has all the motivating factors, formulated by researchers studying problems of nuclear proliferation (technical progress, threats to security, political consideration, etc.), its nuclear status is an inevitable and natural outcome. After achieving the final goal of its program (reliable nuclear forces sufficient to deter USA), the country will work on the legalization of its nuclear status and recognition on the international arena.

On one hand, the changed circumstances security environment in NEA and the new position of DPRK leadership on nuclear weapons put the countries interested in stability and security in NEA in a difficult position. On the other hand, it gives them powerful an impetus to work out new approaches to the nuclear crisis of the Korean Peninsula. Old approaches should be abandoned as they led to the appearance of a new nuclear state in NEA, though this has not yet been recognized by the international community.

New Approaches Currently, the international community has not so many options at its disposal for the resolution of this crisis. Until recent years, DPRK was expected to abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for easing sanctions and pressure; these expectations were never met. A military approach can be immediately excluded, as it is so risky in terms of security and geopolitics, that even the new US administration abandoned it soon after having voiced their threats16.

However, there is still a choice between continuing current sanctions and pressure tactics and new approaches. As already mentioned, sanctions and pressure did not contribute to the curtailment of the DPRK's nuclear program, but instead produced the opposite effect. This approach, if continued, is likely to lead to nuclear and missile proliferation, rather than to nuclear disarmament of DPRK. So, the old approach is dangerous, both for security and the non-proliferation regime in NEA. However, the option of a negotiation process remains, with the primary purpose of guaranteeing security in the region, not nuclear disarmament of DPRK. It should not take the form of the six-party talks on the notorious “North Korean nuclear issue”, but rather, a new dialogue on the settlement of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

Among these new approaches, the idea of creating a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA NWFZ)17 is particularly noteworthy. A NEA NWFZ in its initial format assumes that nuclear weapon states — China, Russia and the United States of America will provide negative security assurances to DPRK, Japan, and ROK, which, in turn will undertake appropriate obligations to stay non-nuclear. Creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the 3 + 3 format, undoubtedly meets the interests of NEA states on the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, its implementation is impossible given the changed, and yet unrecognized status of the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state. Since six-party talks were suspended, the North Korean nuclear and missile program has significantly advanced. The

16

Washington refused to attack DPRK in the case of new tests Vashington otkazalsya nanosit' udary po KNDR v sluchaye novykh ispytaniy Вашингтон отказался наносить удары по КНДР в случае новых испытаний, Interfax, April 14, 2017, accessed April 15, 2017, http://www.interfax.ru/world/558543.

17 See also: Umebayashi, Hiromichi, A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone with a Three-plus-Three Arrangement, Nautilus Institute, March 13, 2012, accessed April 5, 2016, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnetspecial-reports/a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-with-a-three-plus-three-arrangement/; Barannikova, Anastasia, NEA NWFZ Initiative: Advantages and Problems, Mongolia World, January 23, 2017, accessed January 25, 2017,https://mongoliaworld.net/2017/01/23/nea-nwfz-initiative-advantages-and-problems/.

country achieved visible technological progress, recognized by IAEA18 and USA19, which had previously not considered DPRK nuclear weapons as a threat to their own security. Some experts estimate that North Korean missile and nuclear programs are too advanced and associated risks as too serious for a passive approach or the continuation of inefficient measures towards the DPRK 20. According to foreign observers, DPRK is currently capable of equipping Rodong missiles with a range of 1,300 km, with nuclear warheads. The completion of ICBM development is expected by 2020, and deployment of SLBMs for combat duty – by 202321.

Along with technical work and tests, the country is likely developing new strategic planning documents. In particular, the revision of military doctrine was announced last year22. The status of DPRK’s nuclear missile program no longer allows for the consideration of DPRK as a nonnuclear country, especially given the fact that its nuclear power status is enshrined in its Constitution.

DPRK also changed its rhetoric on denuclearization. Earlier, the reciprocal denuclearization of ROK was enough. Now, DPRK would agree to nuclear disarmament only in the case of global denuclearization (an implicit guarantee of the absence of the nuclear weapons of its most likely enemy - USA) which should start with the denuclearization of the South of the Korean Peninsula. This, in turn, would entail not only the absence of ROK’s own nuclear weapons on its soil, but also its government’s refusal to deploy any other nuclear weapons within the territory of South Korea, as well as the termination of joint US-South Korean exercises involving this type of weapon. In recent years, these exercises have involved nuclear aircraft carriers and planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons, in addition to conventional troops and weapons. DPRK perceives these exercises as a total nuclear threat, especially given the aggressive nature of the exercises.

Moreover, ROK cannot be considered a non-nuclear state since it has the guarantee of USA’s “nuclear umbrella”. ROK and Japan came under the US "nuclear umbrella" on the condition that they would not produce their own nuclear weapons. These legal guarantees are formalized in a number of bilateral treaties23, which are prolonged from time to time. Nuclear umbrella guarantees became an integral part of ROK and Japan defense and security strategies and concepts. So, from a certain point of view, ROK can be considered as a state possessing nuclear weapons, or even a nuclear state. Ideally, for the purpose of complying with the principles of equality and balance of power, ROK should abandon US "nuclear umbrella" guarantees.

18

Nuclear Progress of DPRK is Recognized by IAEA Yadernyy progress KNDR priznan na urovne MAGATE Ядерный прогресс КНДР признан на уровне МАГАТЭ, Voennoe obozrenie. March 22, 2017, accessed April 3, 2017, https://topwar.ru/111538-yadernyy-progress-kndr-priznan-na-urovne-magate.html.

19 Dorell, Oren, How Trump can stop North Korea's nuclear threats against the U.S., USA Today, January 3, 2017, accessed April 3, 2017, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/03/donald-trump-northkorea-nuclear-options/96121898/.

20 Haas, Richard N, Out of Time in North Korea, Project Syndicate, March 17, 2017, accessed April 3, 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/north-korea-strategic-options-by-richard-n--haass-2017-03; Leaf, Dan, A viable military option: countering North Korea’s weapons program, Defense News, April 13, 2017, accessed April 15, 2017, http://www.defensenews.com/articles/a-viable-military-option-countering-northkoreas-weapons-program-commentary.

21 Lewis, Jeffrey, North Korea Is Practicing for Nuclear War, Foreign Policy, March 9, 2017, accessed April 3, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/09/north-korea-is-practicing-for-nuclear-war/.

22 Kim Jong Un Watches Ballistic Rocket Launch Drill of Strategic Force of KPA, Korean Central News Agency, March 11, 2016, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf.

23 See, for instance: The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, first signed in 1952; Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America of 1953.

Alternatively, DPRK should be provided such assurances (say, by Russia or China). However, this is completely unfeasible.

The first option is impossible because USA’s "nuclear umbrella has become an integral part of the security architecture of the countries which are covered by this protection. Abandoning it without damage and threat to these countries’ security is hardly possible. As for the second option, DPRK reasonably considers itself a nuclear state without need for anyone's "nuclear umbrella", which had never been offered to it by any country in the first place. Russia and China, which could give such guarantees to DPRK theoretically, would not provide a "nuclear umbrella" to DPRK, as it would automatically create a block, opposed to the US - ROK - Japan alliance, thereby reintroducing a "cold war" atmosphere to the region and escalating the crisis and arms race. In contrast to ROK, DPRK cannot rely on any other country’s nuclear umbrella guarantees and defense. The Treaty between North Korea and Russia, which was signed in 2000 to replace the 1961 North Korean-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, has no clause on military cooperation. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed between DPRK and PRC in 1961, is still in force but the Treaty's Section II stipulates that aid will be provided to DPRK only if it "is invaded by" a third country.

Beijing has made it clear that if North Korea initiated an attack on South Korea, China wouldn't help DPRK. Given the fact that it is extremely difficult to confirm or deny the source of provocation in modern conflicts, one can hardly predict how an ally will behave. Having own forces (including nuclear ones) seems more secure and reliable.

It should be noted that the idea of a NWFZ was discussed in DPRK during Kim Il Sung’s rule.

Particularly, he said in one of his speeches: “For providing global peace and security, nuclearfree peaceful zones should be created and further expanded in various regions of the world”24.

The idea of an Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was first discussed at the governmental level in DPRK in April of 1959. Later, in March of 1981, The Workers’ party of Korea (WPK) together with Japan’s Socialist Party, jointly promoted an initiative of establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in NEA. Today, this initiative is discussed and studied in Mongolia, Russia, Japan and other countries of the region. The idea of a NWFZ could initiate the creation of a new regional security mechanism in NEA. However, the 4 + 2 format of NWFZ, implying DPRK’s participation as nuclear state, seems more feasible. Perhaps it would require or entail official recognition of its status in the international legal field. However, it would result in nonaggression guarantees from the DPRK to non-nuclear countries. It alone could significantly reduce tensions in the region and risks of further nuclear proliferation. DPRK’s negative security assurances to non-nuclear ROK and Japan would eliminate any threats to these countries, where politicians, from time to time advocate «going nuclear», specifically in reference to the "North Korean threat" as the main motivating factor for possessing nuclear weapons.

Despite all the difficulties of implementing the NEA NWFZ initiative, it has significant advantages over the 6PT. One of them is a revision of the place and role of DPRK. In the course of negotiations and discussions thus far, DPRK has been treated as an object, not a subject or equal participant in the dialogue. A NEA NWFZ initiative would involve the participation of DPRK on equal terms with other countries. This idea implies not unilateral concessions by DPRK to some "international community", but concerted and reciprocal actions by specific 24

Kim Il Sung. Report of the WPK CC to the 6th Party Congress, Collection of works of Kim Il Sung.

Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1987. Vol. 35. P. 368 (김일성. “조선로동당 제 6 차대회에서 한 중앙위원회 사업총화보고” ("김일성저작집". 35 권. 평양: 조선로동당출판사, 1987. 368 페지).

countries of the region. From this perspective, this initiative could be seen as more attractive and viable, and DPRK representatives are rather ready to discuss it rather than the resumption of 6PT. With a certain flexibility of both the format and participants, the NEA NWFZ initiative has a high chance of being implemented, thereby settling a long-standing crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

A Comprehensive Approach towards a Northeast Asian Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone: Solving Japan's Nuclear Trilemma Suzuki Tatsujiro Professor, Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) ABSTRACT Japan, as the only nation that has suffered a nuclear attack, has been facing a fundamental Nuclear Trilemma: pursuing the goal of nuclear weapons abolition; its dependence on the US nuclear umbrella (“extended nuclear deterrence”); and, its development of a civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Recently, Japan declined to participate in the UN negotiation for a legally binding scheme to prohibit nuclear weapon (“nuclear weapon ban treaty”) while still committing to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, citing the gap between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. In fact, given the recent tensions among countries in the Northeast Asia, especially the nuclear threats posed by North Korea, Japan’s dependence on US nuclear umbrella has become stronger. In addition, Japan’s large stockpile of plutonium and complete nuclear fuel cycle capability has generated concerns over its “latent nuclear capability.” To solve Japan’s nuclear trilemma and eliminate international concern, this paper proposes a comprehensive approach towards a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone published by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)1.

Introduction Hiroshima and Nagasaki of Japan are the two only cities in the world that have suffered nuclear attacks. Since then, Japan’s anti-nuclear sentiment, based on the tragic and traumatic experiences of bomb survivors (hibakusha), has been the core of Japanese basic non-nuclear policy. Its goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world eventually. On the other hand, despite such strong anti-nuclear weapon sentiment, Japan’s basic security policy has been dependent on the “extended nuclear deterrence” (nuclear umbrella) of the United States of America (USA). Japan’s so-called “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” (not to manufacture, not to possess and not to introduce nuclear weapons) are always coupled with its dependency on the US nuclear umbrella2. In addition, Japan has been promoting civilian nuclear power programs since the US “Atoms for Peace” policy announced in 1954, including a complete nuclear fuel cycle program which is considered as its “latent nuclear capability”. Although the Basic Atomic Energy Act in Japan legally limits Japan’s nuclear energy program to only “peaceful purposes”, it is now understood that its nuclear fuel cycle capability has been developed, at least partially, with the desire to develop such a latent capability3,4. In short, Japan’s nuclear and security policies have been facing this nuclear trilemma, (abolition of nuclear weapons and “Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach toward Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone”, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), March 2015, http://www.recna.nagasakiu.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Proposal_E.pdf.

2 Now it is proven that the Japanese government had a secret agreement with the US government to allow “bringing in nuclear weapons” to Japanese soil if necessary (without inquiry by the US government). See Ota, Masakatsu, Nichibei ‘Kaku’ Domei: Genbaku, Kaku no Kasa, Fukushima (US-Japan Nuclear Alliance: Atomic Bomb, Nuclear Umbrella, Fukushima), (Iwanami Shinsho, 2014).

3 Aikawa, H., Kakuni Miirareta Kokka (Nations obsessed by nuclear ambitions), (Mainichi Press, 2016).

4 Fitzpatrick, Mark, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers; Japan South Korea, and Taiwan (Routledge, 2016).

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nuclear deterrence plus latent nuclear capability), since the beginning of the nuclear age in Japan.

So, the main challenges of Japan’s nuclear policy are: how to pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world while being dependent on nuclear deterrence; and, how to eliminate concerns over latent nuclear capability while developing a civilian nuclear program. This paper aims to resolve this key trilemma.

Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Negotiation and Nuclear Deterrence On October 27, 2016, the United Nations adopted a resolution to negotiate a legally binding treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons in 2017. This is a historic moment for many nuclear bomb survivors (hibakusha) as well as for many institutions, researchers and NGOs who have been seeking a world free of nuclear weapons. One hundred and twenty-three states voted in favor but 68 states voted against and 16 abstained. Along with the five nuclear weapon states, Japan, one of USA’s allies, benefitting from the “extended nuclear deterrence”, voted against the resolution. It was a difficult decision for Japan, since it is reported that there was an intense pressure from the US Trump administration not to participate in the negotiation5.

Japan’s position, torn between nuclear abolition and nuclear deterrence, is even clearer now, as shown by the recent statement made by the Japanese government during the UN Conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons in New York in March 2017. Ambassador Takamizawa stated the following and left the Conference; “Japan has a mission, as the only country which has experienced the devastation of the war-time use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to raise awareness on the reality of atomic bombings and clear recognition of its humanitarian consequences across borders and generations...Nuclear disarmament and national security are closely linked; it is evident that disarmament will not be feasible without regard for the existing security concerns. Regrettably, given the present circumstances, we must say that it would be difficult for Japan to participate in this Conference in a constructive manner and in good faith.6” Concerns over Japan’s Latent Nuclear Capability Because of Japan’s basic nuclear policy of recycling plutonium from spent fuel, Japan has already accumulated 47.8 tons of plutonium (10.8 tons in Japan and 37.0 tons in France and the UK where Japan had commercial reprocessing contracts)7. This is the largest stockpile among non-nuclear weapon states and could increase further if the Rokkasho reprocessing plant starts operation and its recycling program into 15-18 reactors, as currently planned, does

“Trump administration opposes Japan’s participation in U.N. talks on banning nukes,” The Japan Times, March 16, 2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/16/national/politics-diplomacy/trumpadministration-opposes-japans-participation-u-n-talks-banning-nukes/#.WS5Zp2jyhPY. 6 Statement by Ambassador Nobushige Takamizawa, at the “United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons leading towards their total elimination”, March 27, 2017, New York, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weaponban/statements/27March_Japan.pdf.

7 Office of Atomic Energy Policy, Cabinet Office, “The Status Report of Plutonium Management in Japan2015” (unofficial translation), July 27, 2016, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2016/siryo24/siryo1_e.pdf.

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not move ahead smoothly. If the Rokkasho plant starts operating, Japan’s plutonium stockpile is likely to grow.8 Most recently, a senior US government official expressed his concern over Japan’s plutonium stockpile and its reprocessing policy. John Wolfsthal, Senior Director for Arms Control and Non-proliferation at the National Security Council said the following in a recent interview with Kyodo Press: “There is no question that plutonium recycling in Japan has been expensive. That is a challenging future for Japan. If Japan were to change course, they would find the United States to be supportive.... The upcoming renewal in 2018 of a bilateral nuclear agreement with Japan has the potential to become a very controversial issue...If Japan keeps recycling plutonium, what is to stop other countries from thinking the exact same thing?”9 This is exactly the concern expressed by US and other experts in an Open Letter to Prime Minister Abe on March 28, 2016, saying; “We call on Japan to announce....an indefinite postponement of its plan to start the Rokkasho reprocessing plant to further the mutual goal of US and Japan to minimize global stocks of separated plutonium.”10 Concern over reprocessing programs are also spreading in Northeast Asia. The ROK government, during bilateral negotiation with the US, strongly insisted that it has a sovereign right to reprocessing as Japan does. China is now planning to build a commercial reprocessing plant, imported from France, while criticizing Japan for holding a large plutonium stockpile.

So, it has become a regional security issue and needs to be addressed with serious attention11.

North Korea’s Nuclear Policy and Weapon Program: Possibilities for Negotiation Given the fact that North Korea has now conducted five nuclear tests, in addition to the missile tests conducted in the past, there is a new urgency to examine the North Korean nuclear weapon program with serious attention. In the past, many experts believed that North Korea’s nuclear weapon program was not meant for immediate military purposes, but rather to use nuclear weapon as leverage, to extract concessions from foreign governments (i.e. diplomatic tools for favorable conditions). However, a growing number of experts now suggest that North Korea is seeking a real, functioning nuclear weapon program for genuine military purposes. Jeffrey Lewis recently concluded that “North Korea’s nuclear weapons are not a mere totem or a symbol. They are a real military capability that North Korea believes will deter a US invasion of North Korea”.12

8

Takubo, Masafumi and von Hippel, Frank, Ending Reprocessing in Japan: An alternative approach to managing Japan’s spent nuclear fuel and separated plutonium, International Panel on Fissile Materials, November 2013, http://www.fissilematerials.org/library/rr12.pdf.

9 “U.S. would back a rethink of Japan’s plutonium recycling program: White House,” The Japan Times, May 21, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/21/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-back-rethink-japansplutonium-recycling-program-white-house/#.V1PF1PRAqD_.twitter.

10 “Open Letter to Prime Minister Abe; Stop plutonium separation,” Kakujoho, March 28, 2016, http://kakujoho.net/e/call_nuc_scrty.html.

11 Sakolski, Henry, “Can East Asia avoid a nuclear explosive materials arms race?”, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 28, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/can-east-asia-avoid-nuclear-explosive-materials-armsrace9295.

12 Lewis, Jeffrey, " Security Challenges and Denuclearization of Northeast Asia,” lecture given at the Public Symposium How to respond to nuclear threats? Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, Nagasaki, November 21, 2016.

On the other hand, it should be noted that North Korea repeatedly sent the international community signals calling for a negotiation. In January 2015, North Korea proposed that, in exchange for the USA’s temporary suspension of joint military exercises in South Korea, it would be ready to take responsive measures such as suspending nuclear tests. Moreover, on July 6, 2016, North Korea presented five concrete conditions for possible negotiation with the US.13 The five points were: 1) all nuclear weapons of the US in South Korea must be publicly disclosed; 2) all nuclear weapons in South Korea should be dismantled and verified; 3) Washington must guarantee that it will not deploy offensive nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity; 4) the US must commit not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea; and, 5) Washington must declare its willingness to withdraw from South Korea all troops holding the authority to use nuclear weapons.

Such conditions are worth considering for all interested parties of the US government. It is now an appropriate time for the US, under new President Donald Trump, to take new initiatives to bring about a possible breakthrough, shifting from its past “strategic patience” policy, which has not worked at all to deter North Korean nuclear weapon programs.

A Comprehensive Approach is needed: A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA- NWFZ) Now it is clear that engagement with the DPRK cannot be limited to just nuclear and missile issues, but should extend to a more comprehensive agenda including the signing of a peace treaty to end the Korean War, along with the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ) which will provide security assurances to a non-nuclear DPRK, the ROK and Japan. Considering the past, and the failed joint statements by North Korea, USA and other countries, Morton Halperin proposes a methodology where a legally binding agreement should be made and then followed by negotiations for details 14. When political leadership is weak, however, it can be difficult and prohibitively time-consuming to go through the parliamentary processes necessary to ratify legal instruments.

Based on such considerations, the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia” (CFA) has been put forward in RECNA’s Proposal 15 as an instrument to be concluded and effectuated with signatures of heads of state of the Six-Party Talks. It would also be possible, in this case, to include specific provisions within the CFA that are requested to be ratified and become strictly legally binding. Appointing an independent non-governmental, authoritative expert group for support and verification of CFA processes could alleviate concerns regarding the CFA being overruled by changing administrations. The expert group will be deeply involved in the process leading up to manifesting the CFA, and

13

Korea Central News Agency, July 6, 2016.

Halperin, Morton H., “A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia”, Global Asia, Vol. 6, No.4 (Winter 2011). Originally presented at ‘East Asia Nuclear Security Workshop’, November 11, 2011, Tokyo, cosponsored by Nautilus Institute, Mansfield Foundation, and Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN).

15 “Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach toward Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone”, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), March 2015, http://www.recna.nagasakiu.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Proposal_E.pdf.

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work for support and verification to ensure continuity of negotiations after an initial agreement is reached.

Specific Chapters of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia” are divided into “Declaratory” or “Actionable” categories and are composed of the following four: (1) Declare the termination of the Korean War and provide for mutual nonaggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. States lacking diplomatic relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing diplomatic relations. Encourage negotiations among states concerned for the Korean War Peace Treaty. (Declaratory) (2) Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear energy. Establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated to contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The invitation for committee members should extend beyond the six parties and be open to any state or state groups supporting the cause. Participation of Mongolia and Canada would be welcome.

(Declaratory. Actionable details will be decided by the Committee) (3) Agree on a treaty to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. It will include requirements to join the NPT and other details mandated to achieve a NWFZ. Signatory states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement will protect the rights of signatory states for peaceful space exploration in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will be provided to place collective sanctions on states in violation of the treaty, while restricting any unilateral sanction imposed by an individual state party because of treaty matters. (Actionable) (4) Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. The primary objective of this council will be to ensure the implementation of the CFA. The secondary objective will be, when appropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various Northeast Asian security issues. In the future, the council is expected to deal with more comprehensive security issues. The council could host the verification mechanisms of the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will form the initial members of the Council, while member states of the Energy Cooperation Committee and any other states offering to cooperate for Northeast Asian security are welcome to be general members. (Actionable) The proposed “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty” includes characteristics unique to the region, as shown below: (1) State Parties: A six party treaty in a “Three-plus-Three Arrangement” (South Korea, North Korea, and Japan are “Intrazonal States” and the U.S., China, and Russia are “Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States”) would be the most likely to succeed in the current state of affairs. It would be even more desirable for Mongolia, a country with recognized Nuclear Weapon Free Status, to join the NEA-NWFZ as a diplomatic strategy following the 20th anniversary of the declaration of its nuclear weapon free status in 2012.

(2) Flexibility in Effectuating the Treaty: Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ repeatedly point towards the lack of mutual trust between the states within the region. As demonstrated by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which entered into force after having overcome difficulties between Brazil and Argentina, the system in which articles enter into force can be flexible in order to facilitate achieving a NEA-NWFZ. For instance, the entry-into-force requirements of the NEANWFZ treaty can be provided for through their ratification by the three nuclear weapon states (U.S., Russia, China) and two non-nuclear weapon states (Japan and Korea). It may be feasible to provide an option for Japan and Korea to withdraw from the treaty after three to five years, if North Korea continues not to join. By ratifying the treaty under this scheme, Japan and South Korea will enjoy security assurances sooner against the potential threats from nuclear weapon

states other than the U.S. As for the benefits to North Korea, an article can be included to provide North Korea with a certain period of time to dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities, while the U.S. provides immediate security assurances in exchange for North Koreaʼs ratification.

(3) Requirements Prior to Negotiations: Considering that states with nuclear weapons are involved in negotiating a NEA-NWFZ Treaty, there is a need to address the issue of guaranteeing that negotiations are held in good faith once the negotiations commence. For example, North Korea would be requested to commit to a moratorium of nuclear weapon tests and other nuclear weapon related activities. The United States, South Korea, and Japan would likely be requested to commit to a moratorium of joint military exercises around the Korean Peninsula. Such mutually agreed “prior moratoriums” should be adopted before negotiations.

The “prior moratoriums” should also explore alleviating current sanctions imposed on North Korea.

(4) Eliminating Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence: When a NWFZ treaty is fully implemented, international law prevents the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the zone.

This implies that non-nuclear weapon states within the NWFZ do not need extended nuclear deterrence or a nuclear umbrella. Therefore, a NWFZ is a recommendable mechanism towards cooperative security that does not depend on nuclear weapons. (Because the proposed CFA includes a non-aggression agreement, non-nuclear weapons states in NEA-NWFZ are protected from attacks and threats by conventional weapons, as well as by nuclear weapons.

Considering past negotiations for a nuclear weapon-free Korean Peninsula, the possibility of including conventional weapons in the security assurances exists in the context of a NEANWFZ.) Nonetheless, there are many concerns and fears over losing the nuclear umbrella. One fear is that states will be defenseless if one state violates the treaty and either attacks or threatens to attack other states. However, once a state violates the treaty, the treaty becomes null and void; the state of affairs will return to pre-treaty conditions, thus they will not be defenseless. To further alleviate anxieties, the treaty could provide that states may take sanctions against the offender in accordance with international law and their individual national constitution Plutonium Stockpile Reduction and Possible Multilateral Approach Global stockpiles of separated plutonium are growing steadily mainly due to civilian reprocessing programs in a limited number of countries. In Northeast Asia, DPRK, China and Japan have stockpiles of separated plutonium. Out of these, Japan has the largest stockpile (47.9 ton as of the end of 2015) which has become a source of international concern, especially among the countries in the region.

To reduce international concern and minimize the risks associated with large stockpiles of plutonium, there have been some proposals for possible international schemes. For example, in 2014, Dr. Fred McGoldrick proposed that Japanese stockpile can be put under the IAEA custody16. The UK Government published its policy for its own plutonium disposition, in which they announced their willingness to take titles of foreign owned plutonium stored in the UK17. International cooperation in plutonium disposition with countries with large plutonium stockpile, such as the US, can also be an option to be considered. The bilateral cooperation McGoldrick, Fred, “IAEA Custody of Japanese Plutonium Stocks; Strengthening Confidence and Transparency”, Arms Control Today, September 28, 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/print/6555.

17 “Management of the UK’s Plutonium Stocks”, UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, February 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/42766/1243-uk-plutoniumstocks.pdf.

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agreement between Japan and the US on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which includes “blanket approval” of reprocessing/plutonium programs in Japan, will expire in June 2018. It would be useful for both Japan and the US to consider possible bilateral cooperation on this issue. Such options can be pursued by Japan, improving confidence in its civilian plutonium programs.

As of today, Japan and China have both enrichment and reprocessing facilities for civilian purposes while DPRK has both facilities for military purposes. In 1992, DPRK and ROK agreed not to possess reprocessing and enrichment facilities under the Joint Declaration, and it may be useful to reconsider such an agreement under the NEA-NWFZ. Given the fact that there are already running facilities in Japan, China and DPRK, one possible agreement could be to stop further production of plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium for military purposes, like with the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). This, combined with a clear commitment to reduce and eliminate existing stockpiles of fissile materials, can minimize the security risks involved in nuclear proliferation.

It is often argued that reprocessing is necessary to deal with spent fuel, and thus it would also be useful to consider possible international schemes for the storage of spent fuel in the region.

However, it is quite difficult to select a suitable site for such an international spent fuel storage facility. One possible option is to use existing reprocessing facilities in China or Japan as a possible host for such storage, under the NEA-NWFZ arrangement. It is also worth considering an international storage (or final repository) of radioactive waste as no country in the region has found a site for civilian nuclear waste. Viable options for such waste storage have been proposed including non-governmental approaches, such as “international consortium” and/or “corporate entity” approaches, in which private sectors in interested countries can form business entities to implement waste disposal18.

Conclusion On July 7, 2017, the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon was adopted by the UN 19. This is a historic moment for nuclear disarmament. Japan must take this opportunity to change its security policy which is currently dependent on the US nuclear umbrella. Japan also needs to fully rethink its commitment to civilian nuclear fuel cycle programs to eliminate international concerns. In order to resolve Japan’s nuclear trilemma, a comprehensive approach towards a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) could be one potential option to pursue. Given the urgent need for Japan to address nuclear threats in the region and to respond to the hibakusha’s voices, it is time for the Japanese government and civil society to work together to transform such a proposal into action.

Sloan, Robert D., “Multinational Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other High-level Nuclear Waste: A Roadmap for Moving Forward,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2017, https://www.amacad.org/multimedia/pdfs/publications/researchpapersmonographs/GNF-Spent-NuclearFuel/GNF_Spent-Nuclear-Fuel-Storage.pdf.

19 United Nations General Assembly, Draft treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, A/CONF.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1 (July 6, 2017), http://www.undocs.org/en/a/conf.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1.

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Mongolia’s Contribution to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World and the Problem of Nuclear Energy Security Professor Myagmar Dovchin, (Sc.D) Director, Mongolian Institute of Geopolitical Studies Mongolia’s contribution to a nuclear-weapon-free-world One of the main goals of Mongolian foreign policy is to ensure its security by political and diplomatic means. In the framework of implementing this goal, it has been 25 years since Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear- weapon-free zone in 1992.

So far, our initiative to establish a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone has received understanding and support from many countries of the world including the nuclear weapon states, and from the United Nations. It is considered a substantial contribution to international efforts to promote a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Because of its geographical location, tensions on the Korean peninsula as well as the conflict of interests of great powers, Mongolia places great importance on nuclear issues and firmly supports nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy since its ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international instruments.

During the Cold war, Soviet troops were deployed in Mongolia. My country at that time was aligned against China, a newly emerging nuclear weapon state. In other words, during the SinoSoviet split, which lasted from the mid 60s until the late 80s, Mongolia remained under the constant threat of becoming a possible nuclear battlefield. Fortunately, thanks to the improvement of Soviet-China relations, Soviet troops withdrew from Mongolia in 1992.

However, it is impossible to say that the nuclear danger, which may threaten Mongolia, has totally vanished. 27 percent of all nuclear tests of the world were conducted in the vicinity of Mongolia. The environmental and health consequences of these tests have not been thoroughly studied. Today, more than 20 nuclear facilities, including nuclear weapons and nuclear waste repositories of Russia and China, still operate in the proximity of Mongolian borders.

Considering the abovementioned reasons, the Mongolian government upgraded the country’s nuclear-weapon-free-existence to official state policy, and in 1992, from the UN rostrum, solemnly proclaimed its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

From its very beginning, Mongolia’s initiative had been welcomed in principle by its two neighbors and other countries of the world. In doing so, they accepted Mongolia’s policy of neutrality; its desire not to be involved in different kinds of plans and calculations of nuclear strategy of its two neighbors and other nuclear powers. On 4 December 1998, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on “Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status” without a vote. The resolution welcomed the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status and invited member states, including the five nuclear-weapon states, to cooperate and support it. Since then, Mongolia’s efforts to institutionalize its nuclear-weapon-free status through international law have been advancing, though at a moderate pace. Among the measures taken at the national level, adoption of a Law

defining its nuclear-weapon-free status in 2000 was a historic turning point. The joint statement by five permanent members of the UN Security Council on security assurances to Mongolia was a one of the first expressions of their endorsement of Mongolia’s initiative.

In September 2001, representatives of Mongolia and of the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council met unofficially to discuss the institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and adopted two concrete recommendations. They advised the Mongolian government to either conclude a trilateral treaty with China and Russia, its two neighbors or a multilateral treaty with all the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Following the first recommendation, in 2002, the Mongolian government proposed to the governments of its two neighboring countries to conclude a trilateral treaty. By concluding such a treaty, Mongolia’s two neighbors would commit to respecting Mongolia’s status. In principle, they agreed to adopt a legal instrument and shared their views with Mongolia regarding its possible content. Based on these proposals, Mongolia drafted the treaty and submitted it to its neighbors in September 2007. Mongolia also consulted with them about the draft treaty in March and September of 2009.

The draft reflects not only the traditional positions of the three countries about nuclear-weaponfree zones, but also contains some specific provisions related to Mongolia’s unique geopolitical location between two great and nuclear powers. In addition, it defines their responsibilities in consolidating Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. Like other nuclear-weapon-free zones, the draft treaty also covers issues like the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the safeguarding and verification of nuclear material, as well as dispute settlement. It also has an additional protocol which would invite the other three nuclear powers - USA, the United Kingdom and France - to respect Mongolia’s status and to assist in the implementation of the trilateral treaty.

On September 17 2012, permanent representatives to the UN of the five nuclear weapon states signed a joint declaration to provide security assurances to Mongolia by officially recognizing the country’s nuclear weapon free status as agreed on August 23 of the same year in Geneva.

This was a specific expression of the success of Mongolia’s consistent nuclear-weapon-free policy, especially the country’s commitment to institutionalize its independent nuclearweapon-free status through international support. The declaration mainly stipulates that the five nuclear weapon states will welcome Mongolia’s legislation on its nuclear-weapon-free status, and affirm their intent to respect Mongolia’s status and not to contribute any act that would violate it.1 To sum up, Mongolia’s initiative to establish a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone is receiving growing support from the international community. Mongolia’s successful conclusion of a trilateral treaty with China and Russia will help it to become a full-fledged member of an emerging network of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It would not only institutionalize its status officially through international law, but would also mark a huge success for Mongolia’s peaceful foreign policy, and serve as an important leverage to raise the

1

U.N. Security Council, 67th Year. Letter dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. (A/67/393–S/2012/721).

Official Record. New York, 2012.

country’s positive image and reputation on the international stage. Furthermore, it would serve as an important contribution to the creation of a collective security system in Northeast Asia.

The Problem of Nuclear Energy Security Mongolia declared its territory free of nuclear weapons in 1992, and since then it has been taking sequential and steadfast actions to recognize this initiative at a national level, to make it state policy and to confirm along with international treaties.

In the last 25 years more and more countries have started to acknowledge and support this initiative, valuing international efforts to create a collective security system for Northeast Asian security. This is a great achievement of peace-oriented Mongolian foreign policy as well as a testimony to the significant process Mongolia has made in building its reputation on the international stage.

The next policy Mongolia will make in the nuclear arena is to enable the mining of uranium and the production of nuclear power. In 2009, the State Great Khural (Parliament) ratified the Law on Nuclear Energy2 and Mongolia’s state policy on radioactive resources and nuclear energy,3 attracting the attention of not only Mongolians but of the whole world.

Besides that, the extraction and export of nuclear raw materials, the building of atomic power plants, the import of nuclear fuel, and adherence to international monitoring regimes – as always necessitated by the production of nuclear power – have to be considered. Indeed, the prevention of any accident and harm to people and the environment due to unspent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are factors of nuclear security to keep one’s eyes on when making policies at the governmental level.

Thus, countries violating or not joining the NPT, along with terrorist organizations abusing nuclear raw materials and enriched uranium, will be blocked according to Mongolian law, implemented by the government to carry out its responsibilities.

Main Issues Surrounding Nuclear Energy Security Disarmament, nonproliferation and the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes are reflected in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which sets up a legal framework for implementation.

Nuclear power is a comparatively new source of energy, attracting more and more attention from numerous countries because of its potential to be less harmful than coal and some other sources. In order to meet energy security requirements, we need to have a trusted source of energy; hence, more countries are considering choosing nuclear energy. On the other hand, the production of nuclear fuel brings many risks associated with technological or human error, as well as proliferation risks related to attempts at nuclear weapons production.

The major raw material in nuclear energy production is uranium. Uranium is very common on earth, can be found even in geopolitically small countries, commanding attention for international security reasons. The cost of the uranium itself is only a small part of the total 2

Law of Mongolia on Nuclear Energy, Jul 16, 2009, http://legal-policy.mn/uploads/files/143703289285658440.pdf.

3 “45 dugaar togtoolyn khavsralt” 45 дугаар тогтоолын хавсралт [Parliament of Mongolia Annex to Resolution 45] 2009, http://www.legalinfo.mn/annex/details/3309?lawid=6174.

expense of nuclear power production, leading nuclear power plant owners to not to worry about the price of uranium. Also, strategically preserving uranium for years is easy and financially insignificant.

There have been occasions in some countries, including Russia and China. where reactors have had to be shut down in order that the nuclear plants be renovated or repaired, or because of changes in general safety and security requirements. However, those countries have managed to promote high standards of security without losing trust in and reliability of their power supply.

In order to implement the NPT and to prevent any terrorist actions, international organizations monitor nuclear fuel market. However, a specialized international organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has monitoring rules which supplement every country’s laws on the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes, allowing trade of nuclear materials.

The problems of supplying and safeguarding of reactor fuel, the storing of spent fuel and the burying of nuclear waste are some of the main issues in promoting the security of nuclear fuel production. Also, in recent years, the spread and abuse of nuclear materials by terrorists has also been discussed. We therefore have to create a multilateral monitoring system for nuclear fuel production.

The idea of subjecting nuclear fuel production to multilateral monitoring is not new. In the beginning of the nuclear era in 1946, it was first reflected in Baruch4 and Gromyko’s5 plans and never excluded in subsequent contracts and treaties. The main principle behind the idea is that nuclear fuel production should not be under the control of a single state, but rather a group of countries or international organizations. The purpose of multilateral monitoring is to coordinate nuclear power production with the objective of international security thereby prohibiting the uncontrolled spread and theft of nuclear raw materials and stopping their use for terrorist actions. Multilateral monitoring helps countries to manage their nuclear objectives as well as save on the costs this would entail. Moreover it is a strong tool for enhancing trust among states and has the ultimate goal of assembling real conditions to promote security in this high-tech and risky field.

International Nuclear Power Security and a Mechanism of Cooperation “Towards a Safer World”, the 2003 Economist article by former IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, 6 clearly mentions the need to subject nuclear fuel production to multilateral monitoring. The point of his article was that the level of management of the processes of uranium enrichment and reprocessing, as well as the disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste, must be increased.

“The Baruch Plan” (Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946), http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml.

5 Address by the Soviet Representative (Andrei Gromyko) to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 19, 1946, https://www.scribd.com/document/323042045/Gromyko-Plan-1946.

6 ElBaradei, Mohamed, “Towards a safer world,” The Economist, October 16, 2003, http://www.economist.com/node/2137602.

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In 2004, under the initiative of ElBaradei, an international team of experts was formed in order to research this issue. This team published a report entitled “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.” 7 Since then, governments, representatives of the nuclear field and international organizations have come up with around 12 significant proposals. Below is a brief summary of some of those proposals, published in a 2007 IAEA report8: 1. Preparing reserves for nuclear fuel /September 2005/: On the occasion of the 49th General Conference of the IAEA, the USA promised to downgrade 17 tons of high-enriched uranium to low-enriched to supply nuclear fuel to countries which had stopped enrichment and reprocessing.

2. Creating Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure /January 2006/: The Russian Federation proposed the creation of a Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure (GNPI). This infrastructure would aim to give equal rights to countries which actively participate in the campaign of nuclear nonproliferation to use nuclear power. If things were to happen according to this initiative, there would be suitable conditions to establish international stations running the service of nuclear fuel production, particularly the enrichment of uranium, under the control and guidance of IAEA, based on the rule of equal treatment.

3. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership /February 2006/: The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), initiated by countries like the USA with highly developed nuclear technology proposes the formation of a joint consortium. This consortium would aim to reliably supply nuclear fuel to countries that refused to invest in enrichment and reprocessing.

4. World Nuclear Association /May 2006/: This association proposed a mechanism of three levels of uranium enrichment services. The goal of this proposal was to give a joint guarantee to enriching companies responsible for security in front of the IAEA and their governments, in accordance with the present-day world market’s need for raw materials. It also aimed to promote supply security using those countries’ stocks of enriched uranium, which is currently under the control of individual governments.

5. Concept for a multilateral mechanism for reliably access to nuclear fuel /June 2006/: Some countries engaged in the enrichment of nuclear fuel (USA, UK, Russia, Germany, France, Netherlands) recommended a two-level verification of supply. If this proposal comes into practice, these countries would reliably supply nuclear fuel to other countries that comply with the NPT, compensating each other when the supply runs dry, and deciding together whether to replenish low-enriched uranium.

6. IAEA’s coordination of a system of reserves /September 2006/: Japan recommended an information network on nuclear fuel reserves as an amendment to the previous proposal. This information network would be administrated by the IAEA, saving and spreading information gathered voluntarily from member states.

7. IAEA’s nuclear fuel bank /September 2006/: The Preventing Nuclear Threats Initiative submitted a proposal to the IAEA to help create a reserve of low-enriched uranium. The reserves would be used when the supply is diminished.

“Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Expert Group Report to the Director General of the IAEA", February 22, 2005, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/mna-2005_web.pdf.

8 “Annual Report”, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2007/anrep2007_full.pdf.

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8. International center for enriching uranium /January and May 2007/: Within the framework of establishing global nuclear power infrastructure, Russia recommended building an international center for enriching uranium in Angarsk. This center will be situated in the Electrolyze chemical complex of Angarsk, and will promote verification of the supply of enriched uranium to participant countries. There is also the idea to create a repository of lowenriched uranium in order to make supply and export more efficient.

9. The project of establishing an enrichment center with multilateral monitoring /May 2007/: Proposal submitted by Germany. This center would work under the control of the IAEA when it trades, becoming a new supplier on the market. With this proposal, customers would have the opportunity to purchase nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes under strict control.

10. Subjecting nuclear fuel production to multilateral monitoring /May 2007/: Initiated by Austria. They recommended a two-level multilateral monitoring mechanism. The first level aims to increase transparency of the IAEA; the next level is a Nuclear Fuel Bank which would control the supply of nuclear fuel. Also, one of the most important ideas was to create opportunities to take part in monitoring.

11. Documentation of unofficial nuclear fuel production /June 2007/: The European Union submitted a proposal of some requirements for a multilateral mechanism of nuclear fuel supply.

This includes the guarantee of market neutrality, regardless of their nuclear weapon status, and that each country should have an equal right to supply nuclear fuel to the market and conduct verification relating to other countries.

Experts determine, however, that while these proposals and projects differ from each other in terms of long-term objectives, area of impact, strategy and implementation timeline, most of them focus on monitoring of the supply of nuclear fuel. However, Russia’s proposal of establishing a Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure, the US proposal for a Global Energy Partnership, and the Austrian two-level multilateral monitoring mechanism are attracting much more attention, as they aim to encompass not only supply of nuclear fuel but also enrichment and reprocessing.

In the researchers’ opinion, modest proposals and projects have the advantage that they can be carried out in a short period. Unfortunately these small projects are less beneficial to customer countries, giving more dominance to supplier countries – suspected to be part of the secret strategy. Bigger proposals and projects are really multilateral, allowing customer countries to gain more. But to implement these, an enormous construction of infrastructure and solutions to political, legal and economic issues would be needed, requiring a great amount of time.

To promote nuclear energy security, countries such as Mongolia should carefully consider the conventions, initiatives and international organizations shown below:     

Treaties we can join: International Convention on Nuclear Security Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage



Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy Multilateral initiatives with which we can cooperate:

  

The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (formerly the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) IAEA’s rules on the safety of radioactive material management and the safety of preservation, additional rules of import and export of radioactive resources International Uranium Enrichment Center (Russian proposal) Organizations with which we can cooperate:

  

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Conference on Nuclear Security Educational program for the operation of civil nuclear sites Cooperation on the Promotion of Security of Nuclear Power in the Asia-Pacific Region Another issue receiving a lot of attention is whether we should consider independent proposals and initiatives to promote the security of nuclear power in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Research should be conducted specifically on the proposal to establish a “Free independent zone of enrichment and reprocessing” involving ASEAN members. Establishing this zone may prevent the secret production of nuclear weapons in the guise of a civil nuclear power programme.

An international group of East Asian nuclear energy experts should be convened and their activities supported. Mongolia should see if its support could in any way benefit their activities, which should be carried out in a transparent manner. The group’s activities should aim to study the development of a multilateral monitoring system for nuclear fuel production.

It would be prudent to consider establishing an Asia Pacific Atomic Energy Association or regional verification mechanism for nuclear security, similar to EURATOM9 and ABACC10.

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific submitted such a proposal, not to replace the role of the IAEA but to lighten its burden, initiated by CSCAP.11 We should consider suggestions to create cooperation mechanisms on the issue of nuclear power for the Asia-Pacific:

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Establishing an international nuclear power administrating organization that has the right to decide ownership of nuclear raw materials in the region, sharing the cost of providing a mechanism of security with the IAEA. It could jointly support countries in the region to produce nuclear fuel centrally and coordinate the development of a nuclear security study in the framework of international contracts and conventions.

Reacting when accidents related to nuclear energy occur in the region, planning and prioritizing international work, as well as providing a mechanism of international cooperation.

9

EURATOM: the European Atomic Energy Community, an international organization founded in 1957. See https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/euratom.

10 ABACC: the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. See https://www.abacc.org.br/.

11 CSCAP: the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security issues in the Asia Pacific. See http://www.cscap.org.

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Providing help for developing countries to develop a national strategy for nuclear power in cooperation with countries where nuclear technology has proven to be lucrative; calculating risks of making stocks; promoting safety and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; and seriously considering the problem of nuclear fuel supply, spent fuel management and disposal by burying.

Establishing an Asia-Pacific information gathering and dissemination center by exchanging best practices and conducting training.

Establishing a central repository for spent radioactive nuclear fuel.

Developing international cooperation in the region so as to assemble qualified human resources in the field of nuclear energy.

Activating international technical cooperation on the management of spent nuclear fuel and waste.

Joint researching promotion of safety on nuclear sites and broadening the process of information exchange, creating general standards on the management of spent fuel and waste, and establishing regional organizations to experiment with new proposals and technologies.

In conclusion, Mongolia has made significant achievements with regard to the use of nuclear power. Mongolia has declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone, actively pursuing recognition in this regard – which it is likely to continue to receive from many countries. It can serve as an exemplar country with sound policies for promoting safety of nuclear power and related activities. Cooperating effectively with other countries in this field will ultimately tie in with Mongolia’s fundamental interests.

CHAPTER 2 Korean Peninsula Security Issues and their impact on Regional Stability

The Change of Government in South Korea and the Outlook for the Resolution of the Nuclear and Missile Crisis on the Korean Peninsula Lee Taeho Chair of Policy Committee, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 1. Introduction The candlelight demonstrations held by millions of South Korean citizens from late October 2016 year to early March 2017 resulted in the impeachment of Park Geun-hye. Moon Jae-in, the main opposition party candidate, won the ensuing presidential by-election. The Moon administration faces a historic mission to cater to the mounting popular demand for change and reform across all areas of policymaking, including national security. Over the last nine years, under two conservative presidential administrations, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula have escalated to new heights, while the rivalry between the United States and China has also taken a turn for the worse. The new South Korean President now faces an unprecedented level of complexity in foreign relations. Now is the time to explore what the election of the more progressive-leaning Moon Jae-in administration means for the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding countries, and how the Moon administration could affect and change the relations between South Korea, on the one hand, and North Korea and other countries, on the other.

2. President Moon’s Campaign Pledges Regarding National Security The Moon administration, which has come to power amid the watershed moment in Korean politics occasioned by candlelight demonstrations and impeachment, is expected to introduce major changes into the Korean government’s foreign and national security policies.

Candlelight Demonstrations and the Impeachment of Park Geun-hye The bill for impeaching Park Geun-hye, the then South Korean President, was passed with the consent of 234 out of the 300 members of the National Assembly on December 7, 2016. The Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment of President Park unanimously on March 11, 2017.

The beginnings of this so-called “candlelight revolution” date back to the summer of 2016, when news media began to divulge facts concerning the Park administration’s abuse of power and corruption. Enraged citizens took to the streets and began to hold candlelight demonstrations. They were not just angered by the corruption of the Park administration and its officials. As the most popular slogan during the demonstration, “Is this really a country?” implies, citizens had been frustrated by the incompetence and corruption structurally perpetuated over the preceding nine years by the last two conservative administrations that neglected the wellbeing of the people. As such, Sewol the name of the Ferry that sank in April 2014 emerged as a central keyword throughout the candlelight demonstrations1.

1

As one of the main reasons for impeaching Park Geun-hye, the National Assembly explicitly stated in its impeachment bill that Park had failed “to fulfill her duty to protect the lives of citizens” in the sinking of the ferry Sewol. The Constitutional Court did rule in favor of impeaching Park, but did not accept this particular reason as a valid ground for impeachment, citing “the lack of evidence.” However, the Constitutional Court did

During the presidential campaign, Moon Jae-in pledged to strengthen popular control over all aspects of policymaking, fight and eradicate corruption, mitigate income inequality and achieve income-led economic growth through economic democratization and social welfare services, as well as promote ecological sustainability, gender equality, cultural diversity and the freedom of expression. The Moon camp accepted almost all the demands made at the candlelight demonstrations. In the days following his election, President Moon promised to run the government in ways that respect popular sovereignty, end the cycle of using national security to control the public, and achieve national cohesion based on justice. In sum, he has promised to pursue national cohesion, while putting an end to old and corrupt politics.

Democratization of National Security and Consideration of Human Security A central vision of Moon’s election camp was to create “a peaceful Korean Peninsula and a strong and safe South Korea.” 2 Moon emphasized four main principles for achieving this: namely, the responsibility of the defense policy, cooperation in foreign relations, priority on peaceful national unification, and the democracy of policymaking on national security issues.

The messages of “democratic foreign policy,” “foreign policy that caters to the public interest,” and the protection of human rights in the military as well as its “democratization” all seem to be parts of the Moon administration’s determination to democratize national security.

A distinct feature of the Moon administration is that it puts the prevention of disasters and the safety of the public together with the strengthening of national security. This appears to reflect the rising social demand in Korea for the protection of human security in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown and the Sewol tragedy. As part of its vision for national security, the Moon administration has announced plans to nullify the plans for the construction of additional nuclear power plants and to refuse to extend the lifespans of existing ones so that South Korea would be reborn as a nuclear-free nation.

The Simultaneous Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Establishment of a Peace Regime The change of government is also evident in policymaking on conventional security issues.

Throughout his campaign, Moon criticized the two preceding conservative administrations, under Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, for failing to deter North Korea from enhancing its nuclear capability through four nuclear experiments and missile launching tests.

Moon emphasized that the lack of consistency in his predecessors’ foreign policy served only to worsen South Korea’s relations with North Korea and other partner countries. The two preceding administrations and the U.S. government insisted that no dialogue with North Korea would happen unless Pyongyang first abandoned its nuclear program. This, however, has been the main excuse for refusing to make a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula. The Moon administration has put forward a contrary strategy; resolving to adopt “step-by-step and comprehensive” solutions to the North Korean nuclear problem by engaging in dialogue in response to each of the steps Pyongyang takes toward freezing and ultimately abandoning its find the Park administration’s making of a “black list” against personages critical of Park and abuse of power toward covering up the truth of the Sewol tragedy and silencing dissent as legitimate grounds for impeachment. “deobul-eominjudang daeseongong-yagjib choejongpan” 더불어민주당 대선공약집 최종판 [Democratic Party of Korea Presidential Election Campaign Pledge], April 28 2017, http://theminjoo.kr/President/noticeDetail.do?bd_seq=65855.

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nuclear and missile development programs. Even while stressing the need to resort to all available means, including dialogue and sanctions, to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions, the Moon administration has promised to “make active use of bilateral and multilateral channels of dialogue, including the six-party talks” and to “establish a joint SouthNorth Korean military control system toward preventing unforeseen clashes, lowering the military tension, and steering disarmament.”3 Systematizing New South-North Korean Relations and Cooperative Diplomacy In his address at the ceremony held to celebrate the 17th anniversary of the June 15th Joint Declaration of 2000, President Moon reaffirmed the agreement that the two Koreas reached at the historic summit as “an important asset that ought to be respected despite changes of government,” thus distinguishing his policy from those of his two predecessors. The Moon administration has thus explicitly stated that it would abandon the hopes of sudden and radical national unification by absorption. Instead, it plans to systematize new South-North relations by entering a new basic agreement toward achieving incremental and step-by-step unification.

Contrary to his predecessors, President Moon has promised to allow for exchange at the civilian level to continue between the two Koreas despite the official sanctions against North Korea. In fact, President Moon has authorized all civilian requests for contact with North Korea.

As for foreign relations, the Moon administration has expressed its intent to balance and strengthen its relations with all the neighboring countries, including China, Japan, and Russia, even while strengthening South Korea’s alliance with the United States. In addition to strengthening partnership with China and Japan, the Moon administration has pledged to establish a new regime for multilateral collaboration toward restoring the platform for six-party talks and to help create a responsible Northeast Asian community encompassing cooperation on multilateral security and economic issues.

“Responsible National Defense” Involving Military Reform and Increasing Armament The Moon administration also stresses that national defense is ultimately “our own responsibility” even as it will be based upon a “strong ROK-USA alliance.” Putting forward his vision of “strong and responsible national defense,” President Moon criticized the preceding conservative governments for their incompetence in protecting national security. He pledged to raise the defense spending from the current 2.4 percent of the GDP to 3.0 percent by the end of his term. In addition to quick development of preemptive strike and interception systems, such as the Kill Chain and Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) systems in case of possible nuclear or missile strikes from North Korea, the Moon administration will also foster the defense industry and the development of cutting-edge weaponry in ROK. South Korea is already spending far more on defense than the total GDP of North Korea.

The Moon administration has also pledged to take wartime operational control from the U.S. military to realize the ideal of “responsible defense,” which the preceding Park administration has neglected to achieve. This way, the South Korean government will be able to spend its significantly increased defense budget on ensuring the ROK Army’s capability for operational planning and drills. A key precondition for realizing “responsible defense” is the intense military reform, which has been put on hold since the Roh Moo-hyun administration. The reform will centrally feature the reduction of the number of troops to 500,000 and shortening 3

Also from Pledge Document listed in previous footnote.

the military service term to 18 months, while raising the pay for soldiers and permitting conscientious objection.

3. Prospects and Challenges Ahead Moon, who was a long-time friend and also the chief of staff to the late ex-president, Roh Moohyun, has articulated a vision of national security that is in strong contrast with those of the preceding conservative governments and that seems to inherit the reconciliation- and cooperation-focused approaches - the so-called Sunshine or Peace and Prosperity Policies - of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. The Moon government’s approach, however, also fundamentally differs from the policies of the previous progressive governments in key respects.

Sunshine Policy and More First, the Moon administration takes the threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions far more seriously than the Kim and Roh administrations. Since his inauguration, President Moon has strenuously emphasized the need to expand South Korea’s capability for preemptive strikes, the strategic and deterrent assets provided by the United States, and the strengthening of the alliance with the United States. President Moon also acknowledges the necessity of the sanctions that the United States and the United Nations took against North Korea over the last decade or so.

The Moon administration shows a markedly different, and more advanced, approach to negotiations. Pointing out the failure of Washington’s “strategic patience” - requiring North Korea’s abandonment of nuclear weapons as the precondition for dialogue - President Moon has advocated adopting a different and step-by-step approach to negotiation. He also stresses a more comprehensive strategy of negotiation encompassing military and political issues together as necessary for resolving the Korean Peninsula crisis, emphasizing the need to outgrow the functionalist hope for economic aid leading to political and military cooperation.

Recognizing that foreign and security policies cannot be placed outside democratic control, the Moon administration also emphasizes the democratic capability of citizenry as the bedrock of strong and successful foreign relations and national security.

The Moon administration’s approach to the Korean Peninsula crisis strives to compromise and reconcile diverse and often conflicting demands against the backdrop of a policy environment, in and outside Korea, that has been rendered all the more complex and uncertain over the last nine years. President Moon’s new policy vision stems from an assessment that the past hardline and sanction-centered stance has, in fact, worsened the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

Yet it is also informed by the growing anti-Pyongyang sentiment in South Korea and other countries, provoked by North Korea’s expanding nuclear and missile arsenal. At the same time, President Moon is also mindful of the conflict between the demand for South Korea’s greater independence from the United States in matters of foreign policy, on the one hand, and the fear inspired by the possible weakening of the ROK-USA alliance, on the other. Heeding the changed policy priorities of citizens heard at candlelight demonstrations, the Moon administration seeks to invest in protecting the lives, safety, and welfare of the public and enhancing the democratic control over the institutions of national security, such as the military and the National Intelligence Service (NIS). It is also intent, however, upon assuaging the public’s general fear of a “leftwing government,” aggressively investing in expanding South Korea’s armament and showing off its military preparedness to the North.

Now that the South-North Korean relations have dropped to a new low since the Korean War, the Moon administration has expressed a strong determination to solve the crisis by applying all the resources and pressure it can. The first and foremost step towards finding the solution, according to President Moon, is for South Korea to resume its position behind the steering wheel and actively lead the process of resolving the crisis itself.

ROK-U.S. Alliance and South Korea’s Lead on Negotiations President Moon sought to ascertain the Trump administration’s understanding of his new policy and vision for solving the Korean Peninsula crisis and to establish and strengthen new channels of cooperation between South Korea and the United States, while sending clear messages of negotiation and cooperation to North Korea and other countries. This plan culminated in the South Korea-USA Summit on June 30, 2017 and the Berlin Peace Initiatives announced soon afterward.4 President Trump has brandished a hardline stance against North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions, threatening to resort to preemptive strikes if necessary, and going so far as to warn of “fire and fury”.5 Yet he and President Moon agree on certain things, such as the failure of the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” policy, and skepticism of the U.S. government’s traditional pursuit of regime change and state building through conquest in rogue states. As the Trump administration recognizes North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as posing a serious threat to the United States’ national security and therefore deserves utmost attention as a top foreign policy issue, President Trump’s emphasis on “maximum pressure and intervention” might work better than strategic patience in bringing North Korea to the negotiation table.

According to the joint statement released at the June summit, both Presidents Moon and Trump have agreed to work together toward achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceable manner, while recognizing sanctions as a component of their foreign policy and still maintaining openness to dialogue with North Korea under the right conditions. Both leaders stress the need to maintain the existing sanctions even while trying out new actions in order to maximize the pressure on North Korea to refrain from provocative behavior and return to serious and constructive dialogue. The two presidents have also decided to continue cooperation over the speedy transfer of wartime operational control, contingent upon certain conditions, to the South Korean military. A precondition that needs to be met for this to happen: it requires South Korea to continue to develop and expand its core military capabilities, such as the mutually operable Kill Chain and KAMD systems6. These are deemed necessary for the ROK Army to lead the joint defense process, and safeguard, detect, disrupt, and destroy North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. Agreeing to mobilize all available national resources toward enhancing their respective capabilities for extended deterrence against North Korea,

Berlin Peace Initiatives’ --‘Korea Peninsula Peace Initiative’, a package proposal to North Korea authority for making peace in Korean peninsula by President Moon on July 6, 2017 in Berlin, http://english1.president.go.kr/korea/korea.php?srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=738.

5 James Oliphant and Ben Blanchard, “Trump warns 'fire and fury' if North Korea threatens U.S., Pyongyang weighs Guam strike”, Reuters, August 9, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/northkorea-missilesidUSL4N1KU4QA. 6 Jun Ji-hye, “3 military systems to counter N. Korea: Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR”, The Korea Times, November 1, 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/11/205_217259.html.

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Presidents Moon and Trump reaffirmed their resolve to strengthen cooperation with Japan so as to better deter North Korea’s threats.

Peace Initiatives and “Simultaneous Cessation” Having obtained President Trump’s consent to South Korea’s leadership over the negotiations with North Korea, President Moon boldly announced his peace initiatives at the G20 Summit in Berlin, despite North Korea’s decision to launch and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) after the Moon-Trump summit. Now that he confirmed in this announcement7 “that if the right conditions are met, the United States, China, and the rest of the international community are keeping the door open for dialogue at any time,” President Moon exhorted Kim Jong-un to “fully stop… nuclear provocations and come out to the forum of bilateral and multilateral dialogue on denuclearization.” He warned Pyongyang that, as long as it insists on continuing nuclear provocations, it leaves the international community “no other choice but to further strengthen sanctions and pressure.” While President Moon articulated the need to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the North Korean nuclear problem and the peace-building regime, with a view to achieving “the conclusion of a peace treaty along with complete denuclearization,” he has yet to specify what the “right conditions” would be, and what South Korea and the United States could offer to North Korea in exchange for its agreement to freeze its nuclear and missile tests. President Moon did suggest a reunion of the war-separated families, North Korea’s participation in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, a mutual agreement to disengage from hostile activities along the Military Demarcation Line, and a South-North dialogue for peace and cooperation. President Moon subsequently proposed a military talk and meetings between Red Cross officials. Pyongyang refrained from making any response to this offer, and reacted to it instead by testing the launching of an upgraded ICBMclass missile on July 29.

Some speculate that Pyongyang proceeded with its repeated missile tests and avoided giving an official answer to Seoul’s offer because the Moon administration had refused to accept North Korea’s demand, since 2014, for the cessation or reduction of the joint ROK-USA military exercises. Not only North Korea, but also China and Russia, some of the policy advisors to President Moon, and Korean NGOs have consistently argued that both South and North Korea should withdraw from the joint ROK-USA military exercises and cease nuclear and missile experiments respectively and simultaneously in order for the two Koreas to resume dialogue. That South Korea already spends more than North Korea’s GDP on its defense – in addition to the cost of supporting U.S. troops stationed in South Korea - and continues to enhance its extended deterrence through conventional and nuclear means as well as large-scale military exercises, strengthens Pyongyang’s obsession with asymmetric capabilities, such as nuclear weapons. Some also believe that the renewed agreement between Seoul and Washington to maintain the existing sanctions against North Korea and mobilize their respective national resources toward reinforcing extended deterrence has further provoked North Korea. In other words, the insistence of Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo on maintaining their military strategies resorting to nuclear deterrence and missile defense systems justifies North Korea’s obsession with expanding its nuclear and missile arsenal. Knowing that South Korea and the United States can introduce few additional sanctions without China’s help, North Korea will likely focus on expanding its “irreversible” nuclear and missile capabilities before the Moon-Trump alliance begins to exert pressure toward resuming negotiations.

Bae Hyun-jung, “Full text of Moon's speech at the Korber Foundation” (Cheong Wa Dae's unofficial translation), The Korea Herald, July 7, 2017, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170707000032.

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In sum, the Moon administration has apparently failed to offer unequivocal and justified measures for reducing mutual threats that would be crucial to bring North Korea to the negotiation table before North Korea makes its nuclear and ICBM arsenal a fait accompli. The Moon administration has failed to offer effective measures of maximum intervention aside from the sanctions already imposed against North Korea.

The Deployment of the THAAD System and ROK-USA-Japan Military Cooperation The road ahead for relations with neighboring countries still remains rocky for the Moon administration. This is mainly because the Korea-Japan agreement on victims of Japanese military sexual slavery, the Korea-Japan Agreement on the Security of Military Information, and the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system that the Park administration single-handedly decided on in a matter of several months from 2015 to 2016, have resulted in a backlash of public opinion and in the relations with other countries.

Despite the severe public opposition and the risks they posed of souring relations with other neighboring countries, the Park administration went ahead with signing these agreements without seeking the understanding or consent of the National Assembly. This engendered legal controversies as well. The package of these agreements was instrumental to the goal of coopting South Korea into the USA-Japan-led missile defense system and elevating the status of ROK-USA-Japan military cooperation into a de-facto military alliance. As such, it caused tension with China and North Korea.

The Moon administration criticized the Park administration for its blatant neglect of the democratic process in deciding on the deployment of the THAAD system. Yet the Moon administration has not reversed the decision, opting instead to delay the deployment by conducting an environmental impact assessment and affirming to Washington that it would respect the agreements reached between Washington and the Park administration. Now that North Korea has repeatedly tested its ICBM-class missile systems however; President Moon has agreed to authorize the deployment of four more THAAD launchers in addition to the two already installed. Although President Moon had pledged to revisit the Korea-Japan agreement on the victims of Japanese military sexual slavery throughout his presidential campaign, the Moon administration has not yet articulated any position on other recent agreements with Japan, such as the ones on the sharing of military information with Japan and joint military exercises between ROK-USA-Japan, that continue to raise tensions in Northeast Asia. President Moon also remains undecided on the Abe government’s continued pursuit of Japan’s right to military self-defense. The incorporation of South Korea into the USA-led missile defense system over Asia-Pacific and the strengthening of military cooperation with the United States and Japan would provoke China further, weakening Beijing’s resolve to cooperate with the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

4. Conclusion The Moon administration, which came to power amid huge popular support, organized and mobilized by the candlelight demonstrations, has openly criticized the “strategic patience” policy of the Park and Obama administrations and brazenly stepped up to the task of restoring South Korea’s leadership over the processes of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and building a peace regime in a comprehensive and step-by-step manner. The Moon administration, however, has yet to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ICBM ambitions. Nor has President Moon gained strong and sufficient assurance from Washington.

As the Moon administration began to shape its foreign and security policies amid circumstances that could not be worse, it may need to embrace an even more macro-level and comprehensive approach to stemming North Korea’s nuclear threats, by going over and beyond the abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and addressing the multilayered structure of military tension in Northeast Asia. In other words, it may benefit from shifting the course of its strategy, from peacebuilding through denuclearization to peacebuilding for denuclearization.

Moreover, the Moon administration may need to propose more specific and unambiguous steps - measures for mutual trust, such as reducing the joint ROK-USA military exercises and disarmament - in order to persuade Pyongyang to refrain from deploying its nuclear weapons and ICBMs, which have already come at a huge military, economic, and political cost for North Korea. The Moon administration should also prioritize introducing and enhancing democratic control over military cooperation with the United States and Japan, despite the justification provided by North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. The uncompromising emphasis on “strong security” could make it more difficult for the Moon administration to take more practical and effective approaches to building peace on the Korean Peninsula.

AFSC's Shared Security Vision for Northeast Asia 'Issues Pertaining to Peace and Human Security on the Korean Peninsula' Lucy Roberts Asia Regional Director, American Friends Service Committee American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is a US Quaker organisation in its centennial year, working for peace, justice and sustainable well-being for all. The foundational philosophy of justice and equality underlying our work has been consistent over the decades, and AFSC has been able to achieve positive results and gain valuable insights into conflicts around the world, enabling resolution. AFSC is an implementer of programme work, always in partnership; a facilitator addressing unjust divisions; a convenor; and a leader in quiet diplomacy. We recognise the humanity in all people and are ready to engage with all parties. Our lessons learnt through analysis of our long history suggest we are in fact working effectively, with an approach proven to be successful, as documented by Erica Chenowith 1 .We describe this approach as one of ‘shared security’, more of which will be presented later.

This paper will commence with a brief history of AFSC’s experience on the Korean peninsula, followed by the current context from a DPRK perspective and finish with an analysis showing why the shared security framework is exceptionally well-suited for mapping the necessary initial steps towards authentic peace and security in the region and beyond.

Since the very start of AFSC’s engagement with Korea in the 1950s, we have had three consistent intentions. First to provide much needed humanitarian support to the DPRK. Second, to build trust between the two nations by circumnavigating the political arena and maintaining fragile links of engagement and diplomacy through tumultuous times. And third, to provide a foundation for and an example of peace-building to policy makers and those inclined towards military solutions. Only very recently however, has AFSC made the implicit explicit; by articulating our goal to normalise relations, meaning the resumption of peaceful relations, between the US and the DPRK. Now this forms a conscious part of our work and we have been able to develop and resource an astute strategy2.

Our involvement with Korea started following the armistice agreement, signed July 1953, which ceased hostilities but did not officially end the Korean War. AFSC responded to U.N. calls for refugee assistance and began working to improve conditions for over 33,000 displaced Koreans. AFSC became involved specifically and intentionally as a US organization offering reparation. In response to the devastation wreaked by three years of heavy US bombing, AFSC initiated a “Houses for Korea” campaign, providing materials for and training in reconstruction efforts, and went on to provide agricultural and livelihoods tools and supplies. AFSC withdrew in 1958 as we observed improved conditions.

1

Chenoweth, Erica, and Orion A. Lewis. "Unpacking nonviolent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset." Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 415-423. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343312471551?journalCode=jpra Chenoweth, Erica, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. "Understanding nonviolent resistance: An introduction." Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 271-276. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343313480381 2 Peters, Mark, “What does it mean to ‘normalize,’ exactly?”, The Word, November 17, 2016, https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2016/11/17/what-does-mean-normalizeexactly/nsvIiXsSwh5aDDW3lsBnTO/story.html.

Although conditions improved within the DPRK for a while, international relations soured over the next two decades, along with the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. AFSC returned in 1980, as tensions increased between the US and the DPRK, becoming the first US public affairs organization to enter the troubled country. Through collaboration with the Korean Committee for Solidarity with the World’s People (KCSWP) 3 on exchanges, we arranged peace delegations to the DPRK and hosted North Koreans in the US, work we would like to undertake today, but are unable to because of the US stance of non-engagement towards the DPRK. In 1994, alongside economic deterioration in the country, the DPRK began to suffer a severe famine, and in 1995 AFSC became one of the first international organizations calling for humanitarian aid to alleviate the impact of this. This action was taken based on the understanding that human need and suffering, and responding to that need and suffering can transcend contentious politics. Our response, again in partnership with KCSWP, was to develop an agricultural assistance project providing food security, a collaboration which has been maintained, without break, ever since.

Today we work with four cooperative farms, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and Kye Ungsang College of Agriculture of Kim Il Sung University, to raise productivity and implement sustainable agricultural practices. We also organize education and training opportunities in Asia for North Korean citizens, institutions, and government agencies on various topics.

The success of AFSC’s current project is primarily due to the strength of the partnership built with KCSWP over 37 years, through sharing pragmatic, sustainable agricultural practices that are field-tested on partner farms. AFSC’s history and work with KCSWP is conceivably the most continuous example of a successful relationship between a US and North Korean organization, despite ongoing political turmoil and tense international relations. The partnership has been at the forefront of identifying and addressing some of the most urgent humanitarian needs in the DPRK4.

Contextual history from the DPRK perspective I was fortunate to interview Mr. O Ryong Il5, a presidium member of The Korean National Peace Committee on a recent visit to the DPRK. Listening to him describing the events leading up to the current tense situation was illuminating. I was curious to hear the history of the DPRK from a North Korean perspective, and Mr. O Ryong Il created a dynamic impression of a proud, yet vulnerable country, surrounded by super-powers pursuing their own interests on the broken peninsula.

It is crystal-clear that the DPRK’s key goal is to maintain and protect North Korean sovereignty.

It is felt that without self-determination, there is little reason to survive. Recent history shows that the DPRK has been exploited and colonised repeatedly, and there is a sense that only since Kim Il-Sung came to power in 1948, after the overthrow of Japanese rule, has the sovereignty of the DPRK been truly protected, with self-reliance being at the very core of the country’s Juche philosophy.

It may be that the key threat to the DPRK today is the US, but the DPRK wants to deflect imperialism from any quarter, and is determined not to become a puppet for others in the region.

3

KCSWP is a DPRK Government Committee with whom AFC has partnered since the 1980s to date.

See: Jasper, Daniel, “Engaging North Korea”, American Friends Service Committee, June 2016, https://www.afsc.org/document/engaging-north-korea, for a fuller account.

5 Interview conducted May 22, 2017, in Pyongyang, DPRK. 4

Therefore, the DPRK prioritises military defence at the cost of human development, and only when the country feels secure, will attention and resources address internal needs.

The Korean National Peace Committee is working for peace on the peninsula and in the region, and central to this is unification of the Koreas. This can only happen if the intimidating presence of the US diminishes in the ROK. The DPRK proposes that those countries who fomented the Korean War have a responsibility to be part of the solution. The US should take steps to normalise relationships with the DPRK, and, as the DPRK presented to Obama, without response, a first step would be to stop the annual provocation of the war games between the US and the ROK6. The US’s response to this request was to increase the ferocity of the military exercises in March this year, which involved more than 300,000 troops7.

According to Mr. O Ryong Il the DPRK clearly recognises the value to the US of vilifying the DPRK in the media, thereby justifying the US bases and 28,000 US troops in the ROK, as close to China’s doorstep as possible, and not far from Russia’s. The DPRK also observes that when signs of engagement between the DPRK and the ROK are apparent, the US and others become alarmed and intervene. For peace on the peninsula, the DPRK and the ROK need the overpowering presence of other states, specifically the US, to step back and give some breathing space. a space that could be created if the ROK reviewed its close alliance with the US. Mr. O Rong Il says 'US troops in South Korea are the biggest obstacle to reunification.

They are under the power of the US military. South Korea should think of becoming independent from US control'8 Mr. O Ryong Il painted a picture of what he would like to see, saying “Peace is for all countries in the region. They should have the same rights as a human being – they may be of different size, population and economic development, but they should have the same rights – every nation should trust and agree with other nations’ rights and sovereignty. In the region, there will be a peaceful environment for common prosperity, which the people of the region expect, without interference from outside forces. Now the people would like globalisation of the world, but every nation has its own cultural background, and we should trust and respect each other.

One nation should not threaten the other nation with military means, we should not oppress the other with sanctions, or as a big country. Then there will be a good environment”9.

Mr. O Ryong Il's words highlight some aspects of AFSC's concept of shared security, which is based on the simple understanding that shared problems require shared solutions. All our interests are best served when we foster peaceful and just relationships and protect the natural resources we all depend on. This begins with the way in which parties engage with each other.

Peaceful and just ends are most easily achieved through peaceful and just means. Violent engagement is proven to perpetuate violence10. We should treat others as we wish to be treated and this can be understood at an individual, community, national or global level.

A Shared Security Approach AFSC suggests that to enable sustainable peace there needs to be shared access to fair and accountable public institutions and support designed to protect all, including the most vulnerable, not just those who are the most vocal and powerful. In addition, lasting peace “Foal Eagle”, Wikipedia, last modified August 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foal_Eagle.

Beinart, Peter, “Why Won't the Democrats Challenge Trump on North Korea?”, The Atlantic, July 6, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/democrats-north-korea/532770/.

8 Interview conducted May 22, 2017 in Pyongyang, DPRK. 9 Interview conducted May 22, 2017 in Pyongyang, DPRK. 10 Daniel Bar-Tal, The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology, Volume 1 (2012), 193.

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requires a commitment to healing breaches caused by destructive acts.

Figure 1: Envisioning Shared Security11

Whether an act of violence is perpetrated by a person, group, or state, steps need to be taken to ensure root causes are addressed to prevent further violence and destruction. Restorative approaches to justice are proven more effective than punitive, retributive approaches.

Finally, recognition of our shared communities, regions, and planet is elementary. We are all affected by degradation of our shared environment, infrastructure, and social systems in our interconnected world. No person or state can afford to act for their own interests alone, if they aspire to a just peace.

Working with these principles, shared security joins the concepts of “collective security,” “Shared Security: Building peace in an interdependent world”, American Friends Service Committee, accessed August 21, 2017, p.5, https://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Shared%20Security%20booklet_WEB_0.pdf.

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which emphasizes cooperation among nations, and “human security,” which focuses on the dignity and well-being of communities. To enable the adoption of a shared security framework for conflict resolution at regional and global levels, a change of narrative is needed. We need a new narrative allowing for analysis of shared problems and root causes, encouraging the capability to rise above short-term opportunism, and to acknowledge, yet put aside, less critical historical slights, and so begin to build trust through words and actions.

Failures of the Traditional Security Model The relationship between the DPRK and the US exemplifies a classic 'traditional security' approach, as presented in the diagram above, and is beset by unconstructive posturing. From problem analysis to the current US strategy with the DPRK, to the tools used, it is apparent there is little hope for just peace and security to emerge. The US DPRK relationship is entrenched in 'us versus them' rhetoric and accompanied by an absence of neutral trusted institutions to act as peace-brokers.

With the central focus of this zero-sum game on the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, the US continues, in effect, to refuse engagement. US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, on his March visit to the ROK declared 'the policy of strategic patience12 with North Korea's nuclear and missile programs has ended'. This could have been interpreted optimistically. However, he also warned that military action would be 'on the table' if Pyongyang elevated the threat level. The reality is that the US has nothing to supersede strategic patience, recognises the risks of military intervention, but still continues to “up the ante” with its ultimatums to the DPRK.

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A term meant to demonstrate to the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that his country will not receive any international recognition as a nuclear-weapons power or experience the benefits of being a full member of the international community unless and until the DPRK lives up to its earlier commitments on denuclearization. If Pyongyang wants help from the world, according to the strategy, then it must show the world upfront that it is willing to suspend its nuclear activities and genuinely work toward the “verifiable denuclearization for the Korean Peninsula” that it signed up to in 2005. See: DePetris, Daniel, “Enough Strategic Patience: Time for a New US North Korea Policy”, The Diplomat, September 13, July 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/enough-strategic-patience-time-for-a-new-us-north-korea-policy/.

Figure 2: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 2017 Countries by estimated total nuclear warhead stockpile, Federation of American Scientists.13

From the DPRK perspective, denuclearization has long ceased to be an option. 'North Korea has perceived external security pressure and has not been successful at acquiring a security guarantee, despite having attended different forms of peace talks' 14 says Fu Ying, China's former vice minister of foreign affairs. She also notes that the DPRK's observation of US interventions in countries such as Libya has not instilled confidence. Journalist Peter Beinart reminds us that following January's nuclear test, the DPRK official news agency said “the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the Qaddafi regime in Libya could not escape the fate of destruction after being deprived of their foundations for nuclear development and giving up nuclear programs of their own accord... History proves that powerful nuclear deterrence serves as the strongest treasured sword for frustrating outsiders’ aggression.”15 The DPRK has little reason to trust that, without weapons, it would be permitted to survive as an autonomous state.

The DPRK feels forced to secure safety within its own borders, the US intensifies the pressure, and as the traditional model of security identifies, neither approach is conducive to the development of sustainable security.

Compounding the tensions, the DPRK does not have access to fair and accountable public institutions to support negotiations, and perceives the UN as following a western agenda. The flying of the UN flag over the ROK side of the Korean DMZ presents a good metaphor for this.

Further, Ed Royce, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, convened a meeting in June entitled 'Advancing US interests at the United Nations' thus indicating the prevailing Kristensen/Norris, “Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 2017”, Federation of American Scientists, last modified July 8, 2017, https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Inventories2017-2.png.

14 Fu Ying, “The Korean Nuclear Issue: Past, Present, and Future a Chinese Perspective”, Brookings, May 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/north-korean-nuclear-issue-fu-ying.pdf.

15 Beinart, Peter, “Why Won't the Democrats Challenge Trump on North Korea?”, The Atlantic, July 6, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/democrats-north-korea/532770/.

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sentiments in DC around the acceptability of influencing the UN to follow a US agenda, and so, over-riding the UN's potential as peace-maker. He commended Ambassador Nicki Hayley for her work to date, especially in relation to DPRK, and in fact said 'I was pleased to see Ambassador Haley’s prepared testimony recognize that “human rights and conflict are directly connected.” Regimes that don’t respect the citizens over which they hold power... won’t respect their neighbors or international agreements'. 16 The UN has not convinced the DPRK of its impartiality, and the US assumes entitlement to bend the UN to follow its own agenda specifically in relation to the DPRK. The rights agenda has been used as a form of coercive diplomacy, though more so by the US than the UN. There are a number of critical reports and papers on the DPRK, ranging from the 2014 Commission of Inquiry report17 to papers on the rights of persons with disabilities in the DPRK18, based in part on unverified data. Such reports have inflamed the relationship between the West, namely the US, and the DPRK, have done nothing to protect the rights of DPRK citizens, and have exacerbated tensions. There are more balanced reports, which provide verified information on the situation of the rights of persons with disabilities19 in DPRK for example, to counter the dominant narrative, but these are rarely referenced in western mainstream media.

What is interpreted by the DPRK as the UN's partiality has impaired the DPRK's faith in the multilateral body, in spite of ongoing aid and support delivered by UN agencies in DPRK. Positively, the new Special Rapporteur to DPRK is genuinely committed to trust building and engagement with the DPRK and is appreciative of the engagement between humanitarian organizations and the DPRK, as indicated in his first two reports20, but it will take time, effort and will from both parties to build on these good intentions, as well as indications that the UN is not a puppet for the US. The rights of individuals in the DPRK should not be overlooked and the UN urges the Security Council and other parties to seek peaceful and political solutions, whilst also keeping political and humanitarian concerns separate. The UN is doing its utmost to promote diplomacy, and to protect citizens' rights.

Since the success of the six-party talks, which brokered a second pledge from the DPRK in 2005 to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs”, there have been numerous actions from both the DPRK and other parties undermining conditions for trust building and positive engagement. Now, deadlocked strategy, toughening of sanctions and escalation in militaristic rhetoric indicate the traditional approach is not bearing fruit. Relations “Royce Remarks at U.N. Hearing with Ambassador Haley”, Foreign Affairs Committee, June 28, 2017, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/royce-remarks-at-u-n-hearing-with-ambassador-haley/.

17 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/25/63), February 7, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.

18 Lord, Janet, E. “Nothing to Celebrate: North Koreans with Disabilities”, Foreign Policy in Focus, December 3, 2013, http://fpif.org/nothing-celebrate-north-koreans-disabilities/.

19 Zellweger, Katharina, People with Disabilities in a Changing North Korea, Shorenstein APARC Working Paper, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 2014, http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/people_with_disabilities_in_a_changing_north_korea.

20 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/34/66, February 22, 2017, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/041/43/PDF/G1704143.pdf?OpenElement; and, “Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea”, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/CountriesMandates/KP/Pages/SRDPRKorea.aspx for links to further reports.

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between the US and the DPRK are at their lowest point for decades, and nearly all prior steps in building trust have been completely eroded. The only genuine option for the US is to commence engagement with the DPRK without the pre-condition of denuclearisation, in order to break the deadlock, and to de-escalate tensions as soon as possible. If the US continues to keep its preconditions on talks, the policy will continue to drive the US and the DPRK towards war, precisely what the policy purportedly aims to prevent. For the US to change its stance and commence diplomatic engagement is clearly a more constructive and mature approach than deferring the responsibility to China, and pressurizing the ROK to be militarily complicit with the US. Shared Security and the DPRK: The only viable option There are many signs of interest in alternatives to the traditional model of security from the EU, from China, now more audibly from the ROK, and various voices in the US. The ideas presented in articles, such as Beinart's, quoted earlier, suggesting the Democrats need to develop a strategy for engagement and challenge the Republican's tired approach, are becoming more acceptable and mainstream. Trump has given an assurance to the DPRK that the US 'is not seeking a regime change'21 and though this may be treated with some skepticism, it does suggest an attempt to build trust. President Moon Jae-in, who took up leadership in the ROK on 10th May, said at the G20 summit in July, "We do not wish for the collapse of North Korea, and we will not pursue any form of unification by absorbing it. We will not pursue unification by force”. President Moon may also change course on the THAAD missile protection system, also opposed by Russia and China, giving the DPRK more space, and reducing threats on its immediate borders. Similarly, the UN is promoting engagement with the DPRK and trying hard to listen to the DPRK and civil society voices. Finally, there are some indications from the DPRK that there is an appetite for engagement and diplomacy if some assurances of protected sovereignty can be provided.

To quote Mr. O again, 'The Korean people are thinking the sovereignty of the nation is really valuable. That is why, when you are talking about security, the other nations, the US, should trust the Korean nation’s feelings and needs to acknowledge the DPRK's sovereignty. It means the first step comes automatically – the US should approve the reality of the situation on the peninsula and agree with the DPRK itself, as a member of the UN. The US has to talk to the DPRK on the same level, as another nation'22.

Building trust between the DPRK and the US through humanitarian support in the form of an agricultural programme, work that has been undertaken by AFSC, is vital. Such engagement can become the foundation that enables politicians and policy advisors to meet with some historical, positive reference points. This allows more open relationships, encouraging understanding between parties who otherwise do not know how or where to begin. Because of the extended stand-off, neither party has had first-hand experience of the other, and both are highly aware of negative propaganda, lacking recourse to examples of positive engagement.

The next steps to help develop a shared agenda could include the resumption of the US-DPRK project, abandoned by the US in 2012, to return the remains of over 8,000 US service people to the US. The DPRK is open to re-engagement on this and it is a mutually beneficial conversation starter.

“Trump finalizes 4-point strategy on N. Korea: lawmaker”, Yonhap News Agency, May 26, 2017, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/05/26/0200000000AEN20170526000251315.html.

22 Interview conducted May 22, 2017 in Pyongyang, DPRK. 21

The US and the DPRK could work together on the reunification of families separated by the 38th parallel. There is general support of Moon's proposal for the two Koreas to resume reunions of families separated by the Korean War. As Ambassador Joseph De Trani, US former special envoy to the six party talks, has said, "family reunions are a good humanitarian issue that I support. This transcends nuclear and political issues". AFSC agrees that this work transcends politics, but also believes such engagement provides a potential gateway to diplomatic discourse on political issues.

Another opportunity for tentative steps toward engagement between the US and the DPRK is through supporting people to people exchanges – a process that has been a precursor for more peaceful relations between the US and other countries such as China, USSR, Myanmar, Cuba, Iran and Vietnam in the past. Congress approved funds for exchanges in 2004 and although those funds still exist, they are being diverted into indirect and one-way forms of communication, such as broadcasting in the DPRK. All these initiatives are described in greater detail in the AFSC publications Engaging North Korea volumes I and II 23 , and we believe they could provide significant steps towards diplomatic, normalised relations between the US and the DPRK, which in turn could lead to a de-escalation of military one-upmanship and could aid the development of peaceful relations in the region.

Jasper, Daniel, “Engaging North Korea”, American Friends Service Committee, June 2016, https://www.afsc.org/document/engaging-north-korea; and, Jasper, Daniel, “Engaging North Korea – Volume II”, American Friends Service Committee, June 2017, https://www.afsc.org/document/engaging-north-korea-volume-ii.

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The Evaluation and Prospects of the Role of China Regarding the Development of Nuclear and Strategic Weapons in North Korea Su Hao Professor/Ph.D., Department of Diplomacy, China Foreign Affairs University Liang Xiao-jun Associate Professor/Ph.D., Department of Diplomacy, China Foreign Affairs University The development of North Korean strategic weapons, especially its nuclear capability, has always been a critical issue in the context of peace and security in Northeast Asia, as well as the whole world. As a legacy of the Cold War, a sharp opposition exists between the North and South of the Korean Peninsula. In the context of the hostility between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America (USA), DPRK, the weaker party, adopts a “military-first” policy as its national policy. Its purpose: to ensure the DPRK’s basic right to survival by means of developing strategic weapons as deterrence. Nevertheless, the arguably irresponsible and irrational actions of the DPRK pose a huge threat to Northeast Asian security and shake the foundations of the international nuclear non-proliferation framework.

Therefore, although it maintains its traditional friendly relations with the DPRK, China cannot abide the existence of a nuclear-weaponized country in its neighborhood. For this reason, China has always played a deterring role in the process of DPRK’s developing nuclear weapons. This paper will explore China’s such functions, especially illustrating China’s irreplaceable function in the process of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. And this function will be able to lay an important foundation for the eventual reunification on the Korean Peninsula.

I.

DPRK’s National Security Needs and a Puzzle in Chinese-North Korean Relations

After the Korean War, China and DPRK were closely linked due to common security interests that were based on a common security threat - the pressure from the western capitalist camp.

The result of the Korean War sent North Korea a clear message that China was the safeguard of DPRK’s survival. The opposition between China and the US-led Asia-Pacific military alliance revealed that China, just like DPRK, was facing a political and military threat from the US and its allies including ROK. China, naturally, shared similar needs of national security with DPRK; to confront the hostile actions in Northeast Asia of USA, Japan and ROK. This friendship, forged in adversity, prevailed even during the period when the relations between China and the Soviet Union soured. Despite the fact that DPRK was still on good terms with the Soviet Union, China maintained close security relations with DPRK for historical and geopolitical reasons. Therefore, in 1961 China and DPRK officially signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which stipulates that “The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.”1 This treaty was regarded by the DPRK as an “amulet” to help preserve its national security during the entire Cold War era.

1

“Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance”, Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 28, (1961): p.5.

However, we should be clear that although China became a nuclear power in as early as 1964, China has always abided by the “no first use” policy of nuclear weapons, stipulating that China should never use nuclear weapons on a non-nuclear country or without being first attacked by nuclear weapons. This implies that China cannot provide an “active” nuclear security guarantee to its ally - DPRK. That is to say, when the US deployed nuclear weapons in the south of the Korean Peninsula, China failed to provide sufficient security guarantees to DPRK, which realized it needed its own nuclear capacity. During the Cold War era, with the help from the Soviet Union, DPRK began to build its nuclear program.

We can say that the initial reserve and establishment of North Korean nuclear energy were achieved with direct assistance from the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, DPRK started to study nuclear energy, and built a large-scale atomic energy research facility in Yongbyon. In 1965, the Soviet Union provided a “IRT-2M” research pile to DPRK, and also supplied highly enriched 10% uranium fuel to this pile from 1965 to 1973. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union also trained a large number of North Korean technical personnel. It is evident that DPRK started its nuclear program with the assistance from the Soviet Union, and without the participation of China. In 1977, DPRK reached an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to accept their inspection of the research pile built with the help of the Soviet Union.

DPRK joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but refused to sign the comprehensive safeguard agreement with IAEA. One could say that, at that time, DPRK took a cautious attitude towards nuclear exploration.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the international situation DPRK was facing changed dramatically, greatly increasing the uncertainty of North Korean national security. On one hand, DPRK was unhappy about China’s reform and opening-up, and was under a lot of political stress. On the other hand, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, DPRK lost an important security support. As a small nation in the sub-region of Northeast Asia, DPRK had no alternative but to rely on its security cooperation with China. However, in 1992, China established diplomatic relations with South Korea, North Korea’s sworn enemy. DPRK accepted China’s decision, but with grievances,2 laying a hostile foundation for future SinoDPRK relations. From DPRK’s point of view, it had lost a decisive source of external support for its national security, and it had to be completely self-reliant in the preservation of its security interests. Thus, there was a conflict between North Korean national security needs and the development of Sino-DPRK relations.

After the Cold War, China’s “no first use” nuclear weapons policy and its responsible actions in support of nuclear non-proliferation basically eliminated the possibility of DPRK obtaining nuclear technology from the outside world. In 1992, China officially signed the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty which it had consistently opposed and explicitly stated, “China supports the three goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: to prevent nuclear proliferation, to boost the process of nuclear disarmament, and to promote international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” 3 In the meantime, China promised not to spread nuclear material or nuclear technology to any other country. China is serious in its implementation of the NPT, because it fully understands that nuclear non-proliferation is the foundation of international security, and ensures the global strategic balance, peace and stability. In addition, it would be against China’s national security interests if a new nuclear power appeared in 2

Qian Qichen, Ten stories of A Diplomat, (World Affairs Press, 2003), 159.

“China’s Arms Control and Disarmament”, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, November 1995, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/cjjk/cjzfbps/t176939.htm.

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China’s neighborhood. Therefore, China has faithfully executed the duties required by the NPT as a responsible great power under the framework of the treaty. For this reason, China would undoubtedly oppose any actions that violate the NPT, setting the stage for the future SinoDPRK problems caused by the North Korean nuclear issue.

With the disappearance of the socialist camp, the US increased its strategic pressure on East Asia, and the three socialist countries - China, DPRK and Vietnam – have been under a strategic attack due to their differentiation from the western world. Among the three, North Korea is at the frontlines of the western strategic threat, because of its rigid political system and its opposition to South Korea. Although the global Cold War has long ended, the Cold War tension on the Korean Peninsula has never abated; indeed, it has become more severe than before. North Korea has made some efforts to be moderate: it obtained membership to the United Nations and became an official member of international society; it tried to gain acceptance from the US and other western countries, and began the process of normalizing its relations with ROK. In 1992, it even signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with ROK.4 However, all the abovementioned efforts were not met with any positive reactions from the USA or ROK. It may therefore have seemed to DPRK that it was impossible to change the Cold-War-style opposition with the US and ROK through its normal efforts. This posed a very serious challenge for North Korean national security: the USA, a global superpower, together with South Korea, was trying to change the North Korean political system, and possibly even “swallow up” North Korea in order to unify the Korean Peninsula. What was worse, was that China, as DPRK’s strategic support for its national security, could not provide active nuclear protection or help DPRK to increase its military attack technology. Under these double pressures from the perceived active “attack” by the US and ROK, as well as the passive “support” of China, DPRK had no choice but to develop nuclear weapons through its own research and study so as to be self-reliant in safeguarding its national security.

It’s obvious that China’s policy towards nuclear weapons and standpoint of nuclear nonproliferation diminished its security guarantee for DPRK. While North Korea’s rational approach to protecting itself resulted in the development of its own nuclear weapons, this was contrary to China’s standpoint of nuclear non-proliferation. Thus, the relationship between China and North Korea became strained.

II. DPRK’s Pursuit of Strategic Weapons and China’s Restrictive Function In order to ensure its national security and deal with external threats, DPRK needed strategic attack capabilities that could produce a deterrent effect on its rivals. Therefore, the pursuit of strategic weapons, especially nuclear weapons, became North Korea’s natural and rational choice. During the initial construction of DPRK’s strategic weapons, the Soviet Union and China had provided some assistance. However, after the Cold War, DPRK had to rely on its own resources for this purpose. In fact, China had already realized the potential threat for regional security which North Korea’s pursuit of strategic weapons might engender, and had 4

Letter dated 20 March 1992 from the Permanent Representatives of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the agreement of Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, as well as the Text of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Conference of Disarmament Official Document, CD/1147, 25 March 1992, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_911213_Agreement%20on%20reconciliatio n%20non%20aggression%20and%20exchangespdf.pdf.

always exerted a deterrent function with regard to North Korea’s construction of weapons of mass destruction.

DPRK’s strategic weapons capability can be divided into two tiers: the first, strategic weapons that may serve a destructive blow to ROK; and the second, strategic weapons that may cause significant damage to South Korea’s allies.

In the first tier, DPRK has actually constructed weapons of huge strike capability. At present, the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army owns more than 130,000 cannons and multiple rocket launchers. Among them are 1,100 units of 170mm caliber remote self-propelled guns and 240mm caliber multiple rocket launchers.5 During the Cold War era, with the help of the Soviet Union and China, the North Korean military industry grew rapidly. By the 1970s it had developed the industrial capacity to produce its own automatic cannons and to replicate the Soviet Union’s tanks. 6 Although the remote guns are generally regarded as conventional weapons, in the specific case of the Korean Peninsula, they are strategic weapons. This is because ROK’s capital Seoul is only 42km north of the demilitarized zone and if the guns are deployed along the 38th Parallel, Seoul would be well within their firing range. This serves as a significant strategic deterrence against South Korea. Moreover, DPRK also possesses special forces of around 100,000 soldiers, which DPRK regards as a great strategic advantage over ROK. The second tier of strategic weapons consists of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. DPRK started to study and experiment on ballistic missiles in the 1970s. In this respect, DPRK obtained direct and indirect assistance from both the Soviet Union and China.

The Soviet Union provided frog missiles and samples of scud missiles to DPRK thereby playing a comparatively more important role in North Korean development of ballistic missiles.

The further development of North Korean missile technology mainly relied on the DPRK’s traditional friendly relationships with Syria, Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. It obtained missile samples from these countries, and reverse engineered and copied them. It’s safe to say that DPRK was able to develop rather advanced ballistic missile technology through its own efforts and by learning from other countries.7 One point worth mentioning is that since the end of the Cold War, China has been very cautious about DPRK’s development of ballistic missiles and has never provided any advanced technology to DPRK. With regard to weapons of mass destruction, one category is very unclear; biological and chemical weapons. DPRK is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention,8 so it is not subject to the inspection and supervision regime of the convention. Neither DPRK nor any other country or organization has confirmed whether DPRK owns biological and chemical weapons. However, the example of the Syrian government’s official admission of owning chemical weapons in July 2012, proves that we cannot eliminate the possibility of DPRK’s possession of such weapons. According to reports from South Korea’s intelligence agency, Yu Haibo, Tian Shuangxi, “A General Survey of DPRK’s Remote Guns”，Modern Weaponry，Vol. 4, (2004).

“The Great Britain”, Jane's Defence Weekly, November 11, 2003.

6 “The General Situation of DPRK’s Military Industry”, New Development in Foreign Weapons, May 13, 1998.

7 CNS Special Report, North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies, March 22, 2006, http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/0623.pdf.

8 “OPCW Members”, Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, accessed August 21, 2017, https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/.

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DPRK has all the necessary requirements for producing biological and chemical weapons, and even possesses reserves of certain chemical agents. Once a war breaks out, DPRK will be able to launch biological and chemical weapons against its opponents via missiles. 9 It’s necessary to mention that China has signed international conventions against biological and chemical weapons, so China never provides any assistance to DPRK with regard to developing or possessing such weapons.

The most important weapons in the second tier are nuclear weapons. As mentioned above, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union helped DPRK build the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Institute in 1965. It provided the DPRK with their first 800 kilowatt nuclear reactor, and trained nuclear technology personnel, thus making it possible for North Korean nuclear technology to take shape.10 In the 1990s, DPRK further studied and researched nuclear weapons, and in the two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 respectively, it demonstrated that it had basically accomplished the design of nuclear weapons. To some extent, DPRK has actually possessed nuclear weapons for a while, but had simply not yet proven whether such nuclear weapons could be used in a battlefield, or be miniaturized to be loaded onto ballistic missiles.

On the whole, the two above-mentioned tiers and four categories of strategic weapons, as well as the so-called coordinating “strategic armies”, strike a “lethal blow” for DPRK, allowing it to preserve its national security and deter ROK and the US.11 In summary, China provided certain assistance to DPRK in the context of the first tier of strategic weapons during the early years of the Cold War era, while for the second level of strategic weapons, DPRK started out with the Soviet Union’s help, and then further developed its capacity totally on its own.

After the Cold War, in order to safeguard international and regional security, China made a solemn commitment to the international community that it would never export weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, or sensitive weapons, to any other country. For this purpose, China established a set of strict export control regulations. 12 In 1997, China issued a list of Control Regulations for Exporting Military Products that clearly stipulated control, regulations and laws. In 2002, China revised this document, further refined some regulations, and published a detailed Control List for Exporting Military Products. In its 2002 white paper on National Defense, China publicly declared that it accepted and supported the prevailing legal system of international non-proliferation, and pointed out that it was “willing to make joint efforts with the international community to make contributions to maintaining the legal system of international arms control and disarmament, and to promote the process of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.” In December 2003, the Chinese government published a white paper on China’s Policy and Measures for Non-Proliferation, making it the first official declaration of export control for non-proliferation. This is China’s most concrete promise of non-proliferation. China fully accepts the international mechanism of nonproliferation and already regards itself as a participant and supervisor of this mechanism. China stated in the 2004 white paper: “China’s export control of non-proliferation conforms to 9

IISS, North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 53-56; International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, Asia Report No.167, 18 Jun 2009, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/north-korea-s-chemical-andbiological-weapons-programs, accessed August 21, 2017.

10 Mary Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues” Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2013, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf.

11 “Owning four main forces and strategies against the US and South Korea: DPRK takes strategic force as trump card”, Global Times, November 21, 2006, 8.

12 Teng Jianqun, “Major regulations of export control”, in A Survey of International Arms Control and Disarmament, World Knowledge Press, 2009.

international conventions. China adopts the international conventional export control measures: control system for export business registration, guarantee system for ultimate users and ultimate usage, control system for license, control system for inventory, overall control principle, etc. China also explicitly stipulates the punishment system for breaking related laws and violating related rules.” That was the first time that China had clearly addressed export control in a white paper. In the implementation of the export control, the Chinese government adopts two measures of export license regulations and the “three-report-and-three-approval procedure” to tightly control weapon export. 13 Western scholars also believe that Chinese leaders are practically investing human, financial, material and political resources in supporting an export control mechanism.14 Being a responsible member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, China always abides by its duties and responsibilities, and never provides any assistance to DPRK with regard to nuclear weapons. Although China is not a member country of the Missile and Its Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Chinese government has almost the same control regulations for exporting missiles and related technology as the MTCR. China has even expressed its hope of entering into the MTCR.15 China has placed strict prohibitions on the export of missiles and related technology to any other country, including DPRK. For this reason, China explicitly expressed its disapproval of DPRK’s exploration of strategic offensive middle- and long-range missiles. In light of such an export control policy, when voting for UN Resolution 171816 in 2006, China agreed to prohibit DPRK from experimenting on missiles. It is important to note that China also opposes the spread of missile technology to DPRK, and has declared that it will never provide any help to DPRK in this regard. Some media outlets reported the rumor that DPRK transmitted missiles to Iran via China; however, China has strongly denied this claim.17 In the 2004 Pyongyang Military Parade, the DPRK army displayed long-range missiles leading some US and ROK media to claim that the carrier vehicles for the missiles were exported from China. Again, China has categorically denied this allegation. 18 Of course, China has made a “Export License Regulations” includes four categories: business permit, business scope permit, project permit and customs clearance permit. It stipulates that China’s military products export can only be conducted by military business companies which have obtained military products export license. And up till now, there are only ten such companies in China. “Three-report-and-three-approval procedure for project approval” means that before weapons and related technologies are to be promoted to foreign countries for the first time, a project approval procedure must be fulfilled (product projects must be approved by both State Commission of Science and Technology for National Defense Industry and Ministry of National Defense, while major projects must be approved by the State Council and Central Military Commission); after obtaining the project permit, the military business companies can promote related products in foreign countries, but they must submit export applications to State Commission of Science and Technology for National Defense Industry when they have got potential clients; after the project is permitted, the military business companies can then sign export contract with foreign clients, and the contract is not valid before obtaining another approval.

See Lv Zhengtao, “China has the strictest weapons export control in the world”, International Herald Tribune, October 12, 2011.

13

Scott Jones, "China reforms its strategic exports control regime”，JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, April, 2005.

14

15

“Zhōngguó chóngshēn yuànyì jiārù dǎodàn jí qí jìshù kòngzhì zhìdù (MTCR)” 中国重申愿意加入导弹及其

技术控制制度（MTCR）[China reiterates its willingness to join the Missile and its Technical Control Regime (MTCR)], June 6, 2004, China.Com, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/HIAW/579418.htm.

16 United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1718-%282006%29.

17 “N. Korea used China as conduit for arms export – UN report”, Russia Today, June 30, 2012, accessed August 21, 2017, http://rt.com/news/north-korea-violates-sanctions-112/.

18 “China denies North Korea missile transporter export”, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), June 13, 2012, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18421414.

clear distinction between North Korean experiments on ballistic missiles and their development of satellites. China believes that middle- and long-range missiles pose direct threats to security in Northeast Asia, and so must be opposed and prohibited. However, China does not object to the DPRK’s exploration of space for peaceful purposes. Therefore, when DPRK launched the Kwangmyongsong-3 missile in 2012, despite the fact that China and the international community castigated North Korea within the framework of the United Nations, China didn’t support the international community’s hastily imposed sanctions against DPRK.19 It is obvious that China definitely opposes DPRK’s development of ballistic missiles, and that it has fulfilled its international duties to work together with the international community to deter North Korea from developing its ballistic missiles which threaten regional security.

III. China’s Positive Role and Future Prospects in the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula In the past decade, DPRK has regarded its nuclear deterrence capability as the core goal of its strategic development. When DPRK started its nuclear project in the 1990s, it simply hoped to put pressure on the US so as to obtain energy assistance from it within the framework of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO); thus further normalizing its relations with the US.20 However, the US failed to satisfy DPRK in this regard. Furthermore, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US explicitly deemed North Korea a "rogue state" and part of the “axis of evil”. It listed DPRK as a potential target of nuclear weapon attack in its Nuclear Posture Review, 21declaring that the US would provoke regime change in North Korea by means of preemptive actions. North Korean national security was at stake. China didn’t provide any security guarantee, nor was it any longer truly a military ally as it had been in the 1950s. Under such circumstances, it was a rational choice for DPRK to be self-reliant and develop nuclear weapons for its own survival.

However, what North Korea did was against China’s goal of nuclear non-proliferation. China had always opposed DPRK’s nuclear program. In as early as 2002 and 200322 the Chinese government clearly stated that it knew nothing about DPRK’s nuclear program and firmly stressed that it would not support the emergence of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.

China supports denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, believes peace and stability should be maintained on the Korean Peninsula, and that related problems should be solved through peaceful means. In the meantime, DPRK’s reasonable security concerns should be addressed “China objects to the UN Security Council’s imposing new sanctions against DPRK”，SINA, April 14 2009, accessed August 21, 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-04-14/044217603221.shtml.

20 Snyder, Scott, “The North Korean Nuclear Challenge The Post-Kim Il Sung Phase Begins”, United States Institute for Peace, December 1994, accessed August 21, 2017, https://www.usip.org/index.php/publications/1994/12/north-korean-nuclear-challenge-post-kim-il-sung-phasebegins.

21 William M. Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable”, Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/10/opinion/op-arkin.

22 In October 2002, after the US president’s special envoy and assistant Secretary of State Kelly visited Pyongyang, the US declared that DPRK “has admitted” its uranium enrichment program, and accused that DPRK was developing nuclear weapons. DPRK stated that it “had the right to explore nuclear weapons and even weapons more destructive than nuclear weapons”. In December of the same year, the US stopped its supply of heavy oil to DPRK because DPRK has violated the “Nuclear Framework Agreement between DPRK and the US”. Soon afterwards, DPRK declared to abandon nuclear freezing, remove the monitoring equipment installed on its nuclear facilities by IAEA, and restart the nuclear facilities for electrical production. On January 10, 2003, the DPRK government declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but at the same time DPRK also expressed that it had no intention of developing nuclear weapons. The DPRK nuclear crisis broke out.

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as well.23 All this proves that China has never given any help to DPRK’s nuclear program. The Chinese government has been quite consistent in its policies and opinions over the last 10 years, maintaining its basic standpoint towards DPRK’s nuclear issue. It is for the purpose of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and as a testament to China’s standpoint of maintaining peace and stability, that China has always played the leading role in the efforts to solve DPRK’s nuclear issue through multilateral talks. So at China’s initiative, the three-party talk of China, the US and DPRK was held in April 2003, and six-party talks on the DPRK nuclear issue was convened in August of the same year. In six-party talks, the Chinese government played an active role of mediator, making great efforts to bring the countries of DPRK, the US, ROK, Japan and Russia together to seriously discuss the issues of denuclearization and improving relations, thus helping to bring about a series of positive joint declarations.

The Chinese government maintains that it is not an unprincipled peacemaker, but rather a mediator which firmly sticks to its principles. China is serious and firm in dealing with DPRK’s denuclearization issue. In fact, DPRK’s ownership of nuclear weapons is not only a threat to the Korean Peninsula and the international community, but to China’s national security in particular. Therefore, during the six-party talks in September 2005, the Chinese government took great pains to coordinate the antagonistic parties, and eventually reached a Joint Statement on the 4th Round of the Six-Party Talks on September 19th 2005, in which DPRK officially promised the following: “The DPRK is committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.”24 In October 2006 when DPRK carried out its first nuclear test, the Chinese government issued a statement strongly condemning DPRK’s actions, even using the word “flagrantly” to harshly criticize North Korea, and demonstrated China’s “firm opposition” to its actions.25 As for DPRK’s second nuclear test in May 2009, the Chinese government, together with other Member States of the UN, supported UN Resolution 1874, “condemned DPRK in the strongest terms”, and agreed to impose strict sanctions on DPRK.26 To this day, the Chinese government has continued to do its utmost to persuade North Korea to stop its nuclear program, and to realize denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula by resuming the six-party talks.

In the foreseeable future, the confrontation between the north and south on the Korean Peninsula will continue to exist, and the relationship between the US and DPRK will not improve in the short run. Under these circumstances, North Korea will keep its deterrence force of strategic weapons, and it will be a difficult task to urge DPRK to abandon its nuclear program. On the whole, China’s fundamental understanding of North Korean strategic “China knows nothing about DPRK’s nuclear development program”，China Youth Daily, April 30, 2004.

“Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 19, 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/dslbj_665832/t212707.shtml.

25 “Foreign Ministry Statement of the People's Republic of China” (Oct. 9, 2006) stated: “On 9 October, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea flagrantly conducted a nuclear test in disregard of the common opposition of the international community. The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to this act. To bring about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and oppose nuclear proliferation is the firm and consistent stand of the Chinese Government. China strongly urges the DPRK to honor its commitment to denuclearization, stop all moves that may further worsen the situation and return to the Six-Party Talks.” See: “Foreign ministry statement of the People’s Republic of China”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 9, 2006, http://sydney.chineseconsulate.org/eng/xwdt/t275508.htm.

26 United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1874, June, 12, 2009, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1874%282009%29.

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weapons is that conventional strategic weapons have a role to play in keeping the balance between the north and south on the Korean Peninsula. This is a framework of strategic stability, and will be helpful to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula in the future. However, China firmly opposes weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, because such weapons pose great threats not only to the security of Northeast Asia, but also to China itself.

China has therefore committed to making continued efforts in the following areas: First, China maintains its standpoint of opposing North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, and has vowed to make persistent efforts towards the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For this purpose, China hopes to persuade DPRK to abandon further pursuit of nuclear weapons and to stop ongoing nuclear tests. In the meantime, China will try to draw the six parties back to talks, and look for effective ways to actually implement the contents of the Joint Statement of September 19th.

Second, China plans to take the responsible attitude of firmly controlling exports and will abide

by UN Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2270 27, so as to prevent sensitive weapons and technologies from entering North Korea. At the same time, China plans to closely follow North Korea’s development of ballistic missiles, and continues to oppose the construction of middleand long-range ballistic missiles and any possible development of biological or chemical weapons.

Third, China hopes to make use of its special relationship with DPRK and strives to create a comparatively relaxed international environment for North Korea. China aims to help the international community to understand and respect DPRK’s reasonable concerns of national security, making it possible for North Korea to confidently communicate with the international community. Moreover, China hopes to aid communication and contact between North Korea and South Korea to facilitate mutual understanding, and boost communication and trust between DPRK and the US to lay the foundation for coordinating their relations.

Fourth, China aims to play an active role in the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Both the north and south have set reunification as their ultimate goal; one which China supports entirely.

Therefore, by cooperating with North Korea on the economy and by enhancing its economic development, China intends to gradually narrow the gap of economic and social development between the north and south. Meanwhile, China also plans to guide South Korea towards adopting a positive attitude to North Korea, and changing its antagonistic policy of suppression and regime change. The north and south should carry out positive interactions through communication and cooperation, realize co-evolution and co-development, thereby laying a solid foundation for eventual reunification.

Conclusion

Resolution 1718 (2006) banned a range of imports and exports of “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.” Resolution 1874(2009) extended the arms embargo on North Korea by banning all weapons exports from the country and most imports, with an exception to small arms, light weapons and related material.

Resolution 2087(2013) recalled all previous relevant resolutions on the situation concerning North Korea, including resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Resolution 2270(2016) aims to cease further progress on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs by prohibiting states from providing any specialized teaching or training of North Korean nationals in disciplines which could contribute to North Korea’s proliferation.

Kelesey Davenpont, “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea”, Arms Control Association, last modified August 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-on-north-korea.

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The development of relations between China and DPRK faces a paradoxical challenge. That is, China’s no-first use nuclear weapons policy and its refusal of active protection for nonnuclear countries caused great insecurity and uncertainty to DPRK, prompting it to develop weapons of strategic deterrence on its own. Thus, China’s good-will policy became a negative stimulus to North Korea in the context of developing weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, as a responsible great power in the international community, China needs to stick to the principle of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems so as to maintain international and regional security. This requires China to oppose the North Korean nuclear program and middle- and long-range missiles, which, in turn, hampers the smooth development of Sino-DPRK relations.

Being in an antagonistic situation with ROK and the US, DPRK perceives a need for military means of using strategic deterrence forces to hold back possible attacks from its rival countries.

DPRK could also take advantage of such military forces to intimidate the US and ROK into giving it assistance, and further normalize their relations. DPRK could even use their military might as a bargaining chip to influence China’s policies towards it. However, this is a very dangerous game. In essence, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is not only a threat to the security of Northeast Asia and the international community, but also a great potential threat to China itself.

China has made substantial efforts to realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and restrict North Korea’s development of ballistic missiles. China has demonstrated its resolution and willpower by adhering to the UN resolutions concerning the North Korean nuclear issue.

However, we have to admit that the conditions for forcing DPRK to denuclearize are not ripe yet. After a period of offensive operations from both sides, it has become clear that opposition cannot solve the problem, but may instead create a vicious cycle of confrontation. Therefore, China proposes, “As a first step, the DPRK suspend its missile and nuclear activities in exchange for a halting of large-scale U.S.-ROK exercises. This ‘double suspension’ approach can help us break out of the security dilemma and bring the parties back to the table. Then we can follow the dual-track approach of denuclearizing the Peninsula on the one hand and establishing a peace mechanism on the other. Only by addressing the parties’ concerns in a synchronized and reciprocal manner can we find a fundamental solution for lasting peace and stability on the Peninsula.”28

“Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified March 8, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml.

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The Northeast Asian Context and the Ongoing War on the Korean Peninsula Korean National Peace Committee It is well known that Northeast Asia is a very sensitive region in geo-political terms, in which there exists fierce competition between world powers as well as serious long-running disputes and confrontational structures in terms of territorial and historical issues. On top of this, the Korean peninsula, which is yet to see an end to the war and faces the risk of further war all the time, has become the world's biggest hotspot.

The Korean peninsula is located at a strategic stronghold in Northeast Asia. If military confrontation and conflict continue to prevail and if a war were to eventually break out here, it would, in turn, plunge the situation in the whole area of NEA into extreme tension and could be a fuse for nuclear war worldwide.

Safeguarding peace and security on the Korean peninsula is an urgent task for bringing about the reunification of the country. Peace is as precious as life to the Korean people, since they have suffered innumerable misfortunes in the hottest, most unstable, most divided place in the world for over 70 years. However, the danger of nuclear war is ever increasing in the Korean peninsula, contrary to the desires and wishes for peace of our fellow countrymen.

In the 1950s, the United States started the Korean War with the purpose of dominating the whole of Korea. They are still staging large-scale war drills, picking on our satellite launch our legitimate right - and the nuclear and rocket-launching tests for defending our sovereignty.

Moreover, they are resorting to all sorts of cruel sanctions to rob our nation of its right to existence, abusing the UN as a stage for stifling our republic on the whole and outrageously violating international laws in order to conceal their nature as a devastator of peace.

History of the Armistice Agreement The Korean War Armistice Agreement (AA) was concluded on July 27, 1953 to bring the three-year Korean War to a halt. An armistice is not meant to be a once-and-for-all end of the war, but a temporary cease-fire. The AA was adopted as an international legal document, which envisaged the establishment of a lasting peacekeeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula, not as a temporary halt to belligerence.

Ever since then, for more than 60 years, the unstable cease-fire situation has prevailed over the Korean peninsula, which remains neither in a state of war nor peace. The abovementioned 60year interval should not be simply regarded as maintaining or sustaining the AA. It is the period during which the US, the belligerent party and the world's foremost nuclear power, has kept threatening the DPRK, the other warring party, with its nuclear arsenal and aggressor forces.

It is also the historical period during which the DPRK has safeguarded its national sovereignty and right to existence with its self-defensive counter measures.

Despite the adoption of the AA, the USA has desperately blocked the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue while reinforcing aggressor forces in south Korea and introducing all sorts of war hardware, including weapons of mass destruction, into south Korea from abroad in a systematic violation of the AA. The AA was nullified a long time ago due to the USA's persistent violations and consequently, the relationship between the DPRK and the USA turned from a mere technical state of war into a de facto belligerent state of war.

Peace Agreement and Confidence-Building Recently, at several multilateral platforms such as the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on NEA Security1 and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue2, some have argued that it could be desirable for both the DPRK and the US to take confidence-building measures first, as the perspective on the conclusion of a peace agreement seems far-off.

In confidence building efforts, it is a prerequisite for the parties concerned to forge mutual trust that they can peacefully co-exist and cooperate to achieve co-prosperity. Having trust in the other party's will for peaceful co-existence is the most basic and fundamental factor in confidence building. Without trust that the relevant party would neither invade nor do harm to the other party, it is unthinkable to build confidence among parties.

Requirements for a Peace Agreement The first and foremost issue in confidence building on the Korean peninsula is that the DPRK and the U.S. should conclude a peace agreement in order to put a definite end to the state of war. The conclusion of a peace agreement is an urgent matter to be tackled without delay in light of the present situation on the peninsula, where a war may break out at any moment due to the nullification of the Korean Armistice Agreement (AA).

At the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in May 2016, the DPRK clarified that the US should roll back its anachronistic hostile policy towards the DPRK and replace the AA with a peace agreement, with a clear understanding of the strategic status of the DPRK which has proudly joined the advanced ranks of nuclear weapon states, as well as the general tendency of the times.

The stand of the DPRK government and people remains unchanged - to put an end to the state of war on a legal basis, and to establish a lasting peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean peninsula on a legal basis by signing a peace agreement with the US. However, if the US persistently sidesteps the DPRK's demand for conclusion of a peace agreement and keeps posing extreme nuclear threats, the DPRK would physically remove the root causes of the state of war on the Korean peninsula with its powerful nuclear deterrent.

This is an urgent requirement stemming from the grave situation on the Korean peninsula – the world's biggest hotspot and the site of a showdown between nuclear powers – to conclude a peace agreement and establish a durable peacekeeping regime. The conclusion of a peace agreement is a prerequisite for peace for the sake of legal and institutional guarantees, and would lay the groundwork for confidence building between the DPRK and the USA as well.

DPRK Nuclear Development and Subsequent Change in DPRK-USA Relations

The “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” was initiated by the President of Mongolia Ts.Elbegdorj and launched in the capital of Mongolia in 2014.

2 The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) is a multilateral “track II” forum involving high-level policy makers, foreign and defense ministry officials, military officers, and academics from China, Russia, North and South Korea, Japan, and the United States. It was founded in 1993 by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation of UC San Diego.

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The US's persistent nuclear threats pushed the DPRK to join the advanced ranks of the nuclear weapons states and accordingly, turned the belligerent relations between the DPRK and the US into one that was between nuclear powers.

Times have changed and so has the DPRK's strategic status. The DPRK's successful test-fire of surface-to-surface intermediate strategic ballistic rocket “Hwasong-10” is a clear declaration that the US's unilateral nuclear threats to the DPRK have come to an end. The powerful DPRK, which now possesses even the H-bomb, which is striving for a just international order while deterring the nuclear threats, blackmail, high-handedness and arbitrariness of the US. Today, the belligerent relations between the DPRK and the US have fundamentally transmuted, and the strategic structure in Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean peninsula has also dramatically changed. Such a reality requires the replacement of the AA with a peace agreement, and the establishment of a long-lasting peacekeeping regime more urgently than ever.

The current belligerent relationship between the DPRK and the US on the Korean peninsula is no longer the same as the previous one, where the DPRK confronted the nuclear arms of the US with rifles. It is now a belligerent relationship between nuclear-armed states.

Previous DPRK-US Agreements A string of agreements has been made between the DPRK and the US in the past through negotiations on confidence building measures. However, those measures remain unimplemented due to the absence of legal groundwork to guarantee their implementation and in particular, due to the USA's persistent hostile policy toward the DPRK. Legal and institutional guarantees are also required to prevent any possible nullification of agreements between parties caused by every change of the administration in the US. A typical example is the Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK, signed on October 21, 1994 under the Clinton administration. Some measures taken by both parties became were nullified and were in vain as the new Bush administration in 2002 vilified the DPRK as part of the “axis of evil,” and designated it as the target of a potential preemptive nuclear attack.

The establishment of an institutional mechanism for peaceful co-existence, legally backed by the conclusion of a peace agreement, would make it possible for both parties to agree upon and implement practical measures for confidence building, based on trust in each other’s will for peaceful co-existence.

The DPRK's Sustained Efforts for the Conclusion of a Peace Agreement Since the conclusion of the AA, the USA, the world's largest nuclear power, has been threatening the DPRK's sovereignty and its right to live while blocking the latter's economic infrastructure building for peaceful development.

The DPRK has made sincere efforts for the conclusion of a peace agreement, out of the longcherished desire to put an end to the state of war and achieve peaceful development free from any serious threat, as well as out of its responsibility to defend peace and security on the Korean peninsula and NEA. However, the US has systematically violated core provisions of the AA -

such as Paragraph 60, which stipulates “the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question etc.�3 by the concerted efforts of the Korean people.

The AA - which should serve as the clear legal ground for concluding a peace agreement - was nullified by the US less than one year after it was signed.

In response to the USA's breach of the AA and the ever-increasing danger of war, the DPRK repeatedly proposed concluding a peace agreement on various occasions. The DPRK made such proposals to the USA and parties concerned in April, 1956 and to the US congress in March, 19744. As the cease-fire regime turned out to be no longer in effect due to the US in the early 1990s, the DPRK repeatedly proposed talks on the establishment of a new peace regime and in 1996, initiated the conclusion of a provisional agreement to replace the AA in order to prevent armed conflict between the two parties. It again proposed talks on a peace agreement to the AA signatories in January, 2010 on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war. 5 The DPRK proposed talks on a peace agreement yet again at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in 20156 and on various other occasions, as required by the recently dramatically changed situation on the peninsula.

The issue of the conclusion of a peace agreement between the DPRK and the USA is not a new one raised recently, and the belligerent relationship between the DPRK and the US was not spawned by the former's nuclear deterrence. It is well known that the DPRK has called for the conclusion of a peace agreement long before it had access to a nuclear deterrent force. This dates back to the post-war period of the 1950s, when the DPRK raised this issue with the US and the international community.

Thanks to the DPRK's proactive and insistent efforts, a resolution was adopted at the 30th session of the UN General Assembly which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from south Korea and the conclusion of a peace agreement between the DPRK and the US. 7 However, this has not been implemented yet due to the US's desperate opposition. Our fair proposals and sincere efforts have so far led nowhere due to the challenge and opposition of the US, who is the main party concerned and holds the actual commanding power over the military in South Korea.

The US's Aim Behind Sidestepping the Conclusion of a Peace Agreement with the DPRK Since the 1950s, US administrations have persistently refused to respond to the DPRK's fair proposal for the conclusion of a peace agreement and the establishment of a durable peacekeeping regime on the Korean peninsula and have instead resorted to war maneuvers, and the escalation of tensions. This is rooted in the USA's hostile policy towards the DPRK and its strategy for world domination.

The US's noisy fuss about the DPRK's alleged threat is nothing more than an excuse for 3

The Korean War Armistice Agreement, http://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf.

4 Proposal made in a letter sent to US Congress from DPRK Foreign Minister in March 1974.

5 In a DPRK Foreign Ministry statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

6 Statement by H.E. Mr Ri Su Yong, Minister for Foreign Affairs of The Democratic People's Republic of Korea At the General Debate of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 1 October 2015. https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_KP_en.pdf.

7 Question of Korea, 2409th plenary meeting, 18 November 1975, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/001/03/IMG/NR000103.pdf.

justifying its hostile policy and ambition for dominating the world. The US has aggressively enforced a hostile policy towards the DPRK across the spectrum of politics, economics and the military from the outset of the latter's founding. The US has refused recognition of the DPRK as a sovereign state because the latter has a different political system from its own. It has imposed various economic sanctions on the DPRK to block its development and today those sanctions have become all the tougher, to the full extent of aiming to bring down the DPRK's system.

Military Threats by the USA Against the DPRK In military terms, the US stations its aggressor forces of approximately 28,000 in South Korea, and worse still, it has kept threatening the DPRK with nuclear weapons by way of calling in all sorts of strategic assets in and around the peninsula.

In recent days, the US is driving the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of the outbreak of a nuclear war by openly conducting a “precision air raid operation” aimed at scorching the nuclear facilities and nuclear arsenal of the DPRK, while introducing its strategic assets into South Korea. This includes the nuclear-powered submarine “Mississippi” and a formation of B-52H nuclear strategic bombers. The US-South Korea joint military exercises against the DPRK are provocative and intrusion-oriented and as such, are the most vivid and specific evidence of a hostile policy towards the DPRK. The US seeks to justify these exercises as annual, defensive ones. However, no country would overlook its warring party's military exercises taking place before its eyes.

Last year in 2016, the US staged the “Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16” joint military exercises on the largest-ever scale with utmost hostility towards the DPRK. These exercises involved strategic assets and forces huge enough to fight a full war, as well as the extremely adventurous Operations Plan 5015. This was an integration of different operational plans such as the “decapitation raid operation”, a “precision strike drill” and “operation of storming Pyongyang” targeted at our supreme leadership, and launched under the simulation of an actual war.

The US launched a Missile Warning joint drill, the first of its kind, off Hawaii, together with Japan and South Korea, in late June 2016 under the pretext of protecting against the DPRK's missile attack. This clearly reveals the US's desperate attempt to lay the groundwork for forging a tripartite military alliance, by pushing South Korea to join the US-Japan Missile Defense system and to rationalize its THAAD deployment and gain the military upper-hand in the region.

The Real Intention of the USA The USA's persistent denial of the conclusion of a peace agreement with the DPRK is so prompted by its ulterior ambition for world domination by holding hegemony over Asia. It is believed that the US estimates that relaxation of the situation and the subsequent advent of peace on the Korean Peninsula would make it lose a good excuse for its military presence and reinforcement of forces in the region. This would, in turn, have adverse implications on their attempts to reign in big powers in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. For this reason, the US categorically avoids concluding a peace agreement and seeks to intentionally strain the situation on the Korean peninsula in an attempt to reinforce its justification for restraining and gaining military superiority over big powers in the region.

The US's real intention is to contain the military expansion of China and undermine the strategic balance with Russia through the staged establishment of its Missile Defense System in East Asia as it did in Europe, along with the formulation of an Asian version of NATO built upon the tripartite military alliance of the US, Japan and south Korea.

The US's insistence that denuclearization should take precedence over talks on a peace agreement is nothing but a nasty trick to conceal its deep-rooted hostile policy towards the DPRK and its ambition for domination over the world.

Proposals for simultaneous discussion on peace agreement & denuclearization Some argue that a “simultaneous discussion” on the peace agreement and denuclearization could be a fresh solution to breaking the existing deadlock. However, this is an impracticable theory, drawn from ignorance of history and the essence of the confrontation between the DPRK and the US. A “simultaneous discussion” formula was tried and failed in previous dialogues, long before the DPRK became the fully-fledged nuclear weapon state as it is today.

The Six Parties already tried simultaneous discussions on the issues of a peace agreement and denuclearization in the 2000s, but those efforts ended in failure because of the belligerent relationship between the DPRK and the US and the ever-increasing US hostile policy towards the DPRK. The conclusion of a peace agreement could be the first step in terms of the withdrawal of the US hostile policy towards the DPRK, but never the last step. Even if the state of war comes to an end through the conclusion of a peace agreement, the dangers of nuclear war could not be eradicated completely as long as the USA’s hostile policy and its ambition for world domination remain unchanged. The DPRK's nuclear deterrence should be considered in the context of the complete withdrawal of the USA’s hostile policy, and global denuclearization.

It is unthinkable to place in parallel the DPRK's nuclear deterrence and a peace agreement, which is long overdue.

As vividly demonstrated to the world, the DPRK has proudly joined the advanced ranks of nuclear powers today. The DPRK's access to nuclear weapons is the outcome of the USA’s hostile policy. It is not intended to be a political bargaining chip or to bring an economic deal to be put on the table of dialogue or negotiations.

The DPRK's access to a nuclear deterrent force shall never be any kind of bargaining chip unless the USA’s hostile policy fundamentally comes to an end. How each party approaches the idea of a peace agreement is in itself a touchstone to distinguish the peace-loving forces from trigger-happy ones.

Implications of a Peace Agreement for Other Relations Once a legal guarantee for peaceful co-existence between the DPRK and the USA is provided by the conclusion of a peace agreement, not only can DPRK-USA relations, but also issues of DPRK-Japan and the north and the south Korea relations be resolved. The DPRK stated that it would improve and normalize relations with countries that respect its sovereignty, and are friendly with the DPRK even if they had hostile relations with the DPRK in the past.

If the USA were to roll back its hostile policy towards the DPRK and make a bold decision to conclude a peace agreement without any excuses or preconditions, then the DPRK-USA relationship could see dramatic improvements on the basis of trust, giving impetus to confidence-building efforts in NEA. Reunification The current situation demands that the whole nation has to turn out more vigorously in the struggle to defend the three principles of national reunification, clarified in the July 4 Joint Statement (1972) between north and south Korea8. The July 4 Joint Statement is a declaration for peaceful reunification which gave our fellow countrymen hope and confidence for national reunification.

The difference in ideologies and systems in the north and the south does not mean that fellow countrymen will fight among themselves on the issue of reunification. That the north and the south are capable of decreasing their differences by way of dialogue and negotiations, and achieving unity and cohesion and peaceful prosperity, has been proven in the days when our nation worked together in both the north and the south. The face-off and strife between the north and the south will only cause our nation to suffer from the calamity of war, from which foreign forces would profit.

The proposal was put forth in 1980 to establish a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo,9 a most fair reunification proposal which was an all-out implementation plan of the three principles of national reunification, to open up the bright prospect of reunifying the country peacefully.

The DPRK put forward the policy of developing economic infrastructure and building up nuclear forces simultaneously, to meet the demands of the rapidly changing situation and greatly strengthen the self-reliant defense power and preemptive striking capabilities with a nuclear force as a mainstay. This is an immortal contribution to defending the peace and security of our state and safeguarding the peace and stability of the world.

Korean National Peace Committee The Korean National Peace Committee, founded on March 24, 1949, has striven vigorously to date, to achieve the peace and reunification of Korea and build an independent and peaceful new world free from war with the ideals of independence, peace and great national unity.

It has carried out various positive activities for 45 years since the publication of the July 4 Joint Statement to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement for the Korean Peninsula, withdrawing US troops from south Korea and easing the tensions and military

8

Three principles: First, unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference. Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, without resorting to the use of force against each other. Third, a great national unity as one people shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_720704_The%20July%204%20SouthNorth%20Joint%20Communiqu%C3%A9.pdf.

9 National Reunification, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Official webpage, http://www.koreadpr.com/reunification.html.

confrontation between the north and the south, while strengthening solidarity with international democratic organizations and anti-war and peace organizations of the world.

Progressive international organizations and national organizations, including the World Peace Council of which the KNPC is an executive bureau member, published many appeals and statements calling for the withdrawal of US troops from south Korea and denouncing the reckless annual joint war games staged by the US imperialists targeting the DPRK, to encourage our people greatly in their struggle to defend the peace and security of Korea.

In particular, in 2001 and 2002 an active signature campaign in support of the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Three Charters of National Reunification was launched to collect a total of 840,000,000 signatures from around the world. In 2003 the “Pyongyang international court on the crimes committed by the USA in Korea� was established to condemn and expose to the world the crimes of the top human rights violator, the USA. In recent years, peace organizations around the world are taking an active part in various international meetings and solidarity events supporting the reunification of Korea, to increase the voices supporting the struggle of our people to defend peace on the Korean Peninsula.

National independence, the great unity of the nation, peacekeeping and attainment of a federal system are the policies of our Party, designed to bring about national reunification by implementing the Three Charters of National Reunification.

The KNPC will, in the future too, continue to strive for national reunification and peace in the region, holding fast to the Three Charters of National Reunification which the great leaders put forth and formulated, regarding them as a unique set of guidelines for the whole nation for the reunification of the country and to strengthen the friendship and solidarity with peace-loving people around the world. This is so that the DPRK may fulfill its mission to contribute towards ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region, and the world over.

CHAPTER 3 Civil Society Dialogue and Multi-Track Diplomacy in Peacebuilding in Northeast Asia

Women's Perspectives on Korean Peninsula Security Ahn Kim Jeong Ae Representative, Women Making Peace, South Korea I. Introduction In 1945, the Korean Peninsula was liberated by two superpowers: the United States of America (USA) and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). However, the Peninsula is still divided into two Koreas and it is still at war.

Although there had been several independent movements against Japanese colonial rule, the 'liberation' of the Korean Peninsula was anything but 'independent': It was bestowed by the two super powers. The USA and the USSR divided the Korean Peninsula into two territories as World War II trophies. Each supported a different government established in 1948. In 1950, the Korean War, which was not only a 'civil war ' but also an 'international war,' broke out.

After the Korean War, in 1953, there was the emergence of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

There also followed a heavy concentration of armed forces by North and South Korea and the USA, the laying of around 1 million land mines, the erection of economic and psychological barriers, the emergence of symbols of division, justification of the presence of US forces in South Korea, and the asymmetrical alliance between South Korea and USA. According to the Armistice Agreement of 1953, the two Koreas are still at war.

The USA and the USSR began the Cold War, or the ideological war, at the end of World War II. They wanted to build up a bulwark against the enemy and demonize the other. Their foreign policy was based on alignment; pro-USA vs. pro-USSR. They set up an umbrella, under which were included most third world developing countries which had just been liberated from European imperial states like England, France, Germany, Italy etc. It can be argued that the foreign policy goals of the USA and the USSR were in the interests of the military-industrial complex, rather than of the people. Their strong rivalry resulted in an arms race, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They maintained the prevailing world order by using a 'balance of terror' instead of a 'balance of peace,' and by rationalizing the ensuing global security dilemma as “realism.”

The USA has 1,000 military bases and camps overseas in 59 countries, conducts military exercises in 170 countries, has 150,000 personnel, and the highest annual military expenditure in the world: of USD 597 billion. 48% of its total overseas stationing power is deployed in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan.1 Mutual distrust and the arms race between the two powers have divided the Korean Peninsula into two Koreas for the last 70 years. Leaders of both Koreas leaders (with the exception of three presidents, Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in in ROK) have used the division as a means to keep their autocratic and authoritarian powers. The North and South Korean Governments could be described as 'twins of hostile co-existence.'

In the name of the alliance, the USA has wielded strong power over the ROK; its military 1

Wikipedia, “Migun” 미군[United States Armed Forces]”, accessed August 21, 2017,

“https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/미군.

policy towards Korea is one-sided and hegemonic. The alliance between ROK and USA can be characterized as an asymmetrical relationship under the ROK-USA Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Under these conditions of division and conflict, women are treated as second-class citizens and the living conditions and the status of the human rights of many women are miserable.2 Since 2016 however, ROK has been experiencing the Candlelight Vigil civil revolution.

Koreans seek to change their regime from an elite system to a grass-roots one; from top-down to bottom-up. They want to shift power from 'the haves' to 'the have-nots,' which include women, minorities and other groups. Koreans want to change the existing 'Division Regime' to a 'Peace Regime.' There is hope to reopen dialogue between the two Koreas, independent from USA military hegemony, by using a women's paradigm based on life, peace and cooperation and 'women’s security' instead of a traditional security perspective.

Women, including this author, have been trying to develop a women's agenda at the United Nations. The first UN World Conference on Women was held in Mexico City in 1975, and was followed by meetings in Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985) and culminating in the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995). Especially important is the study of women and armed conflict because we are still in a suspended state of war.

In the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action3 of 1995, “the effects of armed or other kinds of conflict on women, including those living under foreign occupation” was the fifth of twelve Areas of Concern. Further reports on the condition of women in Korea were made in 2005 and 2015. The Platform for Action put forward several strategic objectives to address this area of concern.4 They are: 1) To increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation; 2) To reduce excessive military expenditures and control the availability of armaments; 3) To promote non-violent forms of conflict resolution and reduce the incidence of human rights abuse in conflict situations; 4) To promote women's contribution to fostering a culture of peace; 5) To provide protection, assistance and training to refugee women, other displaced women in need of international protection and internally displaced women; and 6) To provide assistance to the women of the colonies and non-self-governing territories.

In addition to this, South Korean women’s groups have been supporting UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325: Women, Peace and Security (passed in 2000), and pressured the South Korean government to make a National Action Plan (NAP), which was completed in in 2014.5 South Korean women are now trying to implement the NAP through monitoring by specific indicators. In line with UNSCR1325, efforts are underway to redefine the concept of

2

Enloe, Cynthia, Banana, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Uni. of California Press, 2014).

3 The Beijing Declaration and platform for action was the outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women organised by the United Nations in Beijing, China from 4 to 15 September 1995. For more information, visit: www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf.

4 Gah, Shirkat, Women’s Resource Centre, Women’s Agenda in the UN: To Beijing and Beyond (LahorePakistan, March 2004), p66.

5 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, “National Action Plan: S. Korea”, accessed August 21, 2017, http://peacewomen.org/nap-republicofkorea.

security from a military concept to one that is centered on citizens and on women.6 2. The effects of the Korean War Women and girls form the majority of victims of war. Here are some illustrations of the Korean War’s direct impact on women: scholars generally estimate that the war resulted in approximately 500,000 widows, 200,000-300,000 United States Forces Korea (USFK) “Comfort Women”, millions of women heading families split by war as well as over 100,000 orphans, brought as adoptees to the USA and other countries.7 The stationing of nearly 30,000 USFK and the spread of militarism has made women's security in the Korean Peninsula precarious. For example, in 1992, a young Korean woman named Yoon Geum-ee, who was working at a bar near a US military base, was violently murdered by US soldier Kenneth Markle. This sparked massive protests in South Korea against the unequal ROK-USA SOFA.8 The first threat to the lives of women is the rampant spread of militarism in ROK. This has resulted in high rates of domestic or societal violence against women. Militarism is based on patriarchal ideology, and most women are excluded from the decision-making and policymaking process, especially in the fields of national security, foreign policy, and unification policy.

This militarism which stems from the patriarchy, is reinforced by: 1) The military heritage from Japanese imperial rule Park Chung-hee, the second president of ROK and who conducted the first military Coup in Korean history, graduated from a Japanese military academy which followed a male-biased hierarchical system during Japanese colonial rule. Many other generals who graduated from Japanese military academies also took on high-level officer positions after liberation in 1945.

They simply changed their allegiance from pro-Japan to pro-USA. From 1961 to 1992, Korea saw two military coups and three generals rise to the presidency. Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were the key men who controlled the massacre in Gwangju in 1980, both were found guilty and sentenced in the Korean court at the end of 1995.

2) The stationing of USFK The stationing of USFK in ROK has made women's security precarious. ROK-USFK joint military exercises take place twice a year. The exercises in March are called 'Key Resolve' and 'Foal Eagle,' and they are allegedly to help prepare against threats from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, the DPRK claims that these exercises are not only offensive, but also a threat to North Korea's independence. For over 70 years, both sides (USA and ROK on one side, and DPRK on the other) have been extensively militarizing to deal with the threat posed by the other side. Instead of mutual defense, the Koreas have been investing in mutual self-destruction.

6

For further information on ROK NAP and civil society actions in relation: http://peacewomen.org/naprepublicofkorea.

Park, Jung-tae 박정태, “jeonjaeng-gwa yeoseong, geu janhogsa” 전쟁과 여성, 그 잔혹사 [War and Women], Redian, April 24, 2013, http://www.redian.org/archive/53967.

8 Wikipedia, “Yun Geum-i murder case”, accessed August 21, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AntiAmerican_sentiment_in_Korea#Yun_Geum-i_murder_case.

7

In addition to the rampant militarization of ROK, which is related to societal and domestic violence against women, women in ROK have been threatened by the presence of USFK. From 1945 until now, the US has maintained tens of thousands of troops in ROK. This is the longest stationing of foreign forces in the entire history of Korea. This has resulted in an asymmetrical alliance between South Korea and the USA, an unfair SOFA, 200,000-300,000 USFK Comfort Women, approximately 55,000 Amerasians who are often abandoned or stigmatized,9 and over 100,000 crimes committed by US military against civilians. 10 The United States stationed nuclear weapons in ROK until late 1991, during George Bush Senior’s presidency. It also stored Agent Orange and other lethal chemical weapons that have caused tremendous environmental damage11. In 2015, the US Department of Defense reported a misdelivery of Anthrax to ROK. Yet this was not just a mistake, 12 but part of the JUPITR Program, 13 the USA’s new biological warfare and biosurveillance strategy which began in 2013 and was tested several times in US bases in ROK.14 There was no report regarding the delivery of Anthrax or related experiments made by the USA to the ROK government, a clear infringement of sovereignty.

Yongsan Garrison, the USFK Headquarters, is located in the heart of Seoul. Koreans call it “Yongsan, USA”. For 100 years, it has been the site of foreign military occupations, starting during the Japanese imperial period, and continuing to the United States military in the present day. Within the USFK is a 'Plans and Operations Nuclear Division’ stationed in South Korea, yet the US usually does not even inform the ROK military of its nuclear-related information, as in the case of the JUPITR project.

From 2002 to 2017, even though the number of US troops stationed in ROK decreased from 37,500 to 28,500 as a number, the US continued to intensify and expand its camps and facilities in the country. In 2002, the US and ROK agreed to the Land Partnership Plan which reduced the number of bases, camps, and military installations from 104 to 47. This decision was made without the Korean people's agreement, especially those living around the US military bases, and only out of consideration of the USFK's strategic goals. The Korean people were against this plan, which included the massive forced displacement of elderly rice farmers from Pyeongtaek without their consent, in order for the US to gain more expansive and flat land to accommodate the expansion of the Camp Humphries US Army Base. This led to massive nonviolent protests from 2005 to 2006.

With regard to DPRK, generally speaking, USA military policy is hostile. The Trump administration is especially pessimistic. While taking this stance, at the same time for defense “Women and the U.S. Military in East Asia”, Foreign Policy in Focus, March 1, 1999, http://fpif.org/women_and_the_us_military_in_east_asia/.

10 Figures from the National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by US Troops in Korea, www.usacrime.or.kr.

11 “Agent Orange”, Wikipedia, accessed August 21, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent_Orange#Korea; and, Kirk, Gwyn and Ahn, Christine, “Agent Orange in Korea”, Foreign Policy in Focus, July 7, 2011, http://fpif.org/agent_orange_in_korea/.

9

12

“Juhan migun ‘tanjeogyun baedalsago’, geu dwi eotteohge dwaessnyagoyo?” 주한미군 ‘탄저균 배달사고’,

그 뒤 어떻게 됐냐고요? [What Happened After the US Forces Anthrax Delivery Incident in Korea], Hankyoreh 한겨레, June 7, 2015, www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/694621.html.

13 “JUPITR program takes shape on Korean Peninsula”, ECBC Communications, March 12, 2014, https://www.army.mil//article/121633.

14 “Korea, U.S. form panel to investigate anthrax delivery”, Korean Herald, July 12, 2015, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150712000278.

purposes he is showing another contradictory face, demanding the ROK pay more for the US Forces in Korea for the businessman-like motivation of earning more money, not for peace or security reasons. Trump's unpredictable character and his “America first” and “no more freerider” policies threaten many countries, especially in the military arena.

3. Women’s Security in the Korean Peninsula The concept of women’s security is necessary for women to play a part in resolving the problems of militarism and the division of Korea. Why women's security? The traditional concept of security is framed by men. Not only does it exclude women, it fails to consider the security of women and gender inequality. “Security” (in this context) encompasses notions of militarism, nationalism, patriarchy, realism and the military hegemony of the USA (including its Missile Defense System). In this sense, women are merely treated as victims of war and second-class citizens, and are marginalized.

The gendering of “security” is important. The 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 15 examines the various needs for human security; extrapolating from this, the author finds that women’s security can be achieved through three avenues:16 1. Freedom from military violence 2. Freedom from poverty 3. Freedom from violence against women Freedom from military violence includes freedom from militarism, militaristic culture, USFK crimes against women, etc. One way to reduce militaristic and war-like cultural traits is to move from an Armistice Agreement to a Peace Treaty - as the United States, as head of the UN Command, DPRK and China promised to do 64 years ago.

The objective “freedom from poverty” recognizes the feminization of poverty caused by globalization, neo-liberalism and capitalism and, without a doubt, by massive investments in military spending, which have reduced the welfare budget assisting the most vulnerable; women, children and the elderly. Contrary to the implications of US President Trump's message that there will be "no more free riders in East Asia", ROK has been increasing its contribution to the growing concentration of USFK stationed here. In 2017, the ROK's military spending is one tenth of its total national budget (USD 34.9 billion,17 In 2017, investment in the military amounted to 57 times the sum allocated to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. The Special Measures Agreement for the USFK, a cost-sharing agreement between ROK and the USA, cost the ROK USD 808 million in 201518. From 1991 to 2015, the costs 15

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994, Oxford University Press, 1994, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.

16 Ahn Kim Jeong-ae, “Globalization and Women Security: In the case of South Korea,” as co-author in [Globalization and Women Security, Hanwool Printing, Seoul, 2005]. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/742784.html#csidx47128395f060ec093f431e1fd2d412d.

17

Kim Dae-gyu 김태규, “2017nyeon Gugbang-yesan 40jo3,347eog…Jeonnyeon bi 1,500 yeoeog jeung-ga”

2017 년 국방예산 40 조 3,347 억…전년 比 1,500 여억 증가 [2017 Defense Budget of 40.3347 trillion won ...

1,500 billion won increase from the previous year], Newsis 뉴시스, December 5, 2016, http://news.joins.com/article/20963278.

18

Park, Byung-soo 박병수, "Migun Judun Hangukman Wihaeseo?…Biyong-eun “Hanguk imi 70% budam”"

미군 주둔 한국만 위해서?…비용은 “한국 이미 70% 부담 [Only for US forces in Korea? Cost is "70% burden already on Korea"], Hankyoreh 한겨레, May 6, 2016, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/742784.html#csidx47128395f060ec093f431e1fd2d412d.

associated with stationing the USFK grew almost nine times. Contrary to Mr. Trump's assertion, ROK is not a free-riding country but rather, one that bears a heavy burden.

The freedom from violence against women refers in particular to freedom from domestic and societal abuse by South Korean men and by USFK. In 2016, a woman was killed by a man who has hatred against women. Some women think that such crimes stem from the militaristic culture, which many men learn through their education and from military experience. These men learn to think it is natural for men to control and abuse women.

4. Women's efforts for Korean Reunification 1) Calling for a stop to the war in the Korean Peninsula: Peace Walk Women in Korea want an end to the war and peaceful reunification. They call for a stop to the deployment by the USA of strategic military assets like the anti-missile defense system THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in ROK and the annual ROK-USA joint military exercises. They also want DPRK to cease their testing of nuclear weapons and missiles, and are calling for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the DPRK and the USA. In support of efforts for reunification, women from both ROK and DPRK crossed the DMZ twice, in 1991 and-199219; a group of international peace women, “Women Cross DMZ,”20 also crossed it in 2015. In 2016 and 2017 South Korean women conducted peace walks with the slogan "Life, Peace and Co-existence" as well as "No more War in Korean Peninsula". They have also participated in “Save Jeju Now,” an annual walk against the recently constructed military base in Gangjeong Village, Jeju Island.

From 2008 through 2012, the “Northeast Asian Women's Peace Conference” was held. With the theme “Women's Initiative for Creating a Korean Peace Regime” the conference served as a women-led alternative to the male-dominated Six Party Talks with the aim of resolving the North Korean Nuclear issue.

From 2016 to date, women's organizations, including overseas women peace activists, have acted against THAAD deployment in ROK. THAAD is part of the US Missile Defense System targeted at China, not DPRK. It is connected to missile defense systems deployed in Japan by the USA. The USA wants a triple USA-Japan-ROK alliance in Northeast Asia. This has resulted in escalation of the arms race between, China, Japan, DPRK and ROK. 2) The mainstreaming of women in security and peace policy-making processes The index of gender equality ranks ROK the 117th lowest in the world. 21 In 2016, the percentage of women in Congress was 17%, or 51 out of 300 congresspersons22. Most women are excluded from the decision-making and policy-making process, especially in the fields of national security, foreign and unification policy. Since the foundation of ROK in 1948, there 19

Park, Kil-ja 박길자, “Hanbando-e Pyeonghwa ui Heoseutoli sseuda” 한반도에 평화의 허스토리 쓰다,

[Writing a Herstory of Peace on the Korean Peninsula], The Women’s News 여성신문, May 27, 2015, http://m.womennews.co.kr/news_detail.asp?num=83781#.WZjvcihZPY. 20 Women Cross DMZ: https://www.womencrossdmz.org.

21 The Global Gender Gap Report 2016 by World Economic Forum. www3.weforum.org/docs.GGGR16/WEFGlobal-Gender-Gap-Report-2016.pdf 22

Kim, Pil Kyu 김필규, “Hanguk Namnyeo pyeongdeung jisu 117wi…Jeongmal Choehawigug?” 한국

남녀평등 지수 117 위…정말 최하위국? [Korean Gender Equality Index 117th ... Is it really the bottom rank?], JTBC, October 29, 2014, http://news.jtbc.joins.com/article/article.aspx?news_id=NB10622031.

were no female ministers for National Defense, Foreign Affairs or Unification, until the appointment of a female Minister of Foreign Affairs this year. Women are also very rare amongst senior officials in these ministries. According to a survey conducted by Jung Gyunglan of Women Making Peace, none of 22 senior officials in the Ministry of National Defense are women; none of 22 in Foreign Affairs; three of 251 in the Ministry of Unification; and one of 21 in the National Intelligence Service, other organizations did not respond.

According to statistics regarding women's participation in government committees in 2012, 12.4% of members of government committees on National Defense were women, 30.0% in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 18.0% for the Ministry of Unification.23.

Even after the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, the level of women's participation in peace negotiation processes has been low. In the first Inter-Korean Summit of 2000, no women were present out of 94 delegates, In following summits, in 2005 there were five women of 118 delegates, in the 2007 Inter-Korean Summit six of 209, and in the intergovernmental meeting of 2010, two women of 20 delegates.24 The ROK government announced its National Action Plan for UNSCR1325 in 2014. However, there are no tangible outcomes as yet. Women’s groups demand a 50% quota for women’s representation, the legal enshrinement of the equality of women and men's human rights in the Constitution, gender balance in the cabinet as well as a 30% proportion of women committee members in governmental commissions25. Fortunately, the new president Moon Jae-in has promised a ratio of 30% of women in cabinet, and has recently appointed a woman for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kang Kyung-wha.

3) 122 USFK “Comfort Women” Lawsuit against the South Korean government In 2014, 122 women plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the ROK Government regarding its responsibility for creating and controlling US military “comfort villages” and “comfort women.”26 The first trial ended in January 2017 with a partial win for the plaintiffs. The ruling was that the ROK government has to pay USD 50,000 per person to each of the 57 plaintiffs because of its responsibility for illegal arrests and detention27. The long-term objective of this trial is to sue the US government for criminal liability. In addition, a new law is currently being made in the Korean Parliament. Titled "Truth Commission for Investigating State Violence against USFK 'Comfort Women,' it was proposed on July 14 and is currently being reviewed by the Parliament’s Gender Equality Standing Committee. This law aims to investigate the ROK government’s breaches of laws, and compensate the victims.

4) Calling for a Reduction of the Defense Budget and an Increase in the Budget for Women’s Welfare The main reason for the feminization of poverty in Korea is military spending. According to 23

Jung, Gyunglan, UNSCR1325 and Women Peace Leadership, Women Making Peace, Seoul, 2013, pp.113115.

24 Jung, Gyunglan (2013), ibid., p.116.

25 Korean Women’s Association United, Statement: “100 Points of Joint Demand Regarding Policy on Women in the 19th Presidency”, 2017.

26 Kwaak, Jeyup, S., Claims South Korea Provided Sex Slaves for U.S. Troops Go to Court, July 15, 2014, https://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/07/15/claims-south-korea-provided-sex-slaves-for-u-s-troops-go-tocourt/.

27

Hyeon, So-Eun, “Beob-won “Migun Gijichon ‘Wianbu’e guggaga baesanghaeya” 법원“미군

기지촌‘위안부’에국가가 배상해야 [The state should compensate the “camptown” “comfort women”] Hankyoreh 한겨레, January 20, 2017, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society-general/779648.html; Park, Ju-min, “Former Korean 'comfort women' for U.S. troops sue own government”, Reuters, July 11, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-military-idUSKBN0FG0VV20140711.

statistics by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending of the ROK in 2016 was 37.265 USD.28 According to this SIPRI data, ROK is ranked 10th in the world for military spending as well as arms imports. It has the lowest spending on welfare and social security in the OECD. The USA is imposing the purchase of US-made weapons on the ROK. This has resulted in internal corruption in arms dealing, including currently serving generals. 29 The women's movement is actively involved in campaigns to reduce military spending and instead invest in social needs, under the international slogan demanding "Welfare, not Warfare".

5) Dialogue and Cooperation between North and South Korean Women Under the last two conservative governments of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, all dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas ceased. Women activists tried, nevertheless, to meet annually, even in China. In December 2015, the North and South Korean Women’s Meeting for Korean Peace and Unification was held in the DPRK city of Kaesong.

Fortunately, the new Moon Jae-in government, elected in May 2017 after the Candlelight Vigil civil revolution, supports civilian dialogue between the two Koreas. On the path to peace on the Korean Peninsula, and as part of a sustainable development strategy, there is a movement to create an “Inter-Korean Peace Eco-Village” in the DMZ. As mentioned above, there were some crossings of the DMZ in 1991, 1992 and 2015. However, it hasn’t been possible to live together in the DMZ itself. For a more sincere reunification and in line with the call in UNSCR1325,30 for women’s full participation in peacebuilding, the opportunity for women from both Koreas to live together in same area could provide significant benefits. It would be beneficial to women's economic independence, self-sufficiency, food security and environmental sustainability through organic farming; one motivation being the preservation of land as GMO- and chemical fertilizer-free for future generations. Before farming, the women of both Koreas could organize something like a Kimchi Festival, as was suggested by the DPRK Delegation to a meeting convened by the international group Women Cross DMZ in Bali in February 201631. In order to foster a culture of peace as recommended in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, there are further plans to set up a peace center conducting activities which include but are not limited to meditation, dancing, conflict resolution training and yoga.

Conclusion For the reunification of Korea, and in order to stop the ongoing Korean War, dialogue and cooperation is very important. After experiencing the Candlelight Vigil civil revolution' Korean women need no longer consider themselves second-class citizens and victims, but rather peacebuilders and negotiators. Women will have to try to penetrate the security decision28

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex, accessed August 21, 2017.

29

“bangsan bili, Park Geun-hye Choi Sun sil geite uui ‘kkeutpan-wang’?” 방산 비리, 박근혜-최순실

게이트의 ‘끝판왕’? [Defense corruption, Park Geun-hye and Choi Sun sil Gate, “End of the King?”, Hankyoreh 한겨레, November 11, 2016, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/769945.html.

30 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1325 (2000) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000. S/RES/1325 (2000). Official Record. New York, 2000. https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement.

31 Women Cross DMZ, “2016 International Women’s Korea Peace Convenings February 7-14, 2016, Bali, Indonesia,” https://www.womencrossdmz.org/web/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Bali_Final_Web-Version.pdf, accessed August 21, 2017.

making process, based upon a redefinition of the concept of security from “military” to “citizen-oriented” and “women-focused”. We hope to reopen dialogue between the two Koreas without interference by the USA, by using the women's paradigm of “life, peace and cooperation,” as well as women’s security instead of the traditional security approach. Women will also work towards establishing a “Peace Regime” in place of the current “Division Regime” in Korea. Finally, women want a peace treaty to replace the armistice agreement of 1953.

The desire of women is clear: no THAAD, no nukes and no war in the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and in the world; and, in the long run, the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

The Current State-of-Play of Northeast Asian Relations: A Youth Perspective Nyamdavaa Ravdandorj1 Member, “Blue Banner” NGO, Mongolia The Current State-of-play of Northeast Asian Relations Since the end of the Cold War, the international political environment has rapidly changed.

Interstate relations and multilateral cooperation have also broadened. Most of the world’s countries are trying to solve security issues and political misunderstandings through political and diplomatic means. Such commitments by the world nations have led to the establishment of security cooperation mechanisms in many regions, with some of them having made significant advancements. For example, the regional integration processes in Europe or Southeast Asia serve as models for other regions.

However, there has not been much improvement in Northeast Asian security, peace and stability for years, regardless of the continued efforts by governments and non-governmental organizations of the region. The main reasons of this stagnation are distrust, the nuclear arms race, historical tensions and territorial disputes between regional powers.

Nuclear weapons are seriously affecting the global order, security, peace and stability. One does not have to be a security or foreign policy expert to realize the destabilizing role of nuclear weapons in global and regional security, peace and stability. Especially in Northeast Asia, nuclear weapons are seriously affecting regional stability.

For instance, in the last two years, the frequency of ballistic missile tests by North Korea has increased. Following Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, there were South Korean calls to reintroduce US tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. Some South Korean politicians are again advocating the pursuit of an independent nuclear capability. 2 This may will lead to a nuclear arms race in the region.

A discussion of regional security issues should concern itself with relations between countries of the region. Tensions from the Cold War era still linger in Northeast Asia. Political misunderstandings and mutual distrust still dominate inter-state relations among Northeast Asian countries.

The peace and stability of Northeast Asia is highly dependent on alliances between US-Japan and US-South Korea and strategic triangles of US-China-Russia, US-Japan-China, ChinaSouth Korea-Japan as well as US-China-South Korea.

Northeast Asia is still witnessing territorial disputes between influential countries in the region, such as Japan, China and Russia. The Senkaku/Diaoyudai Islands territorial dispute between China and Japan and the Kuril Islands dispute between Russia and Japan have still not been resolved.

While the abovementioned territorial disputes are unlikely to result in wars or massive armed conflicts, there is no assurance that they will not affect Northeast Asian relations and lead to border conflicts or further incidents between countries of the region.

In general, the main challenges for Northeast Asian security, stability and peace are inter-state historical tensions as well as the lack of political trust. Unquestionably, these tensions and distrust are stalling the development of a regional multilateral cooperation mechanism.

Nyamdavaa Ravdandorj is member of “Blue Banner” NGO. His research priorities are Northeast Asian Security and cooperation issues and Mongolia’s Nuclear Weapon Free Status.

2 Pollack, Jonathan D., “Order at Risk: Japan, Korea and the Northeast Asian Paradox” Asia Work Group Paper 5., (September 2016): 16.

1

Young people all over the world are waiting for the end of political misunderstandings, tensions and distrust among the countries of the region. In this author’s opinion, the most effective way to promote regional security, peace and stability, as well as establish a regional cooperation mechanism, is to start with removing widespread distrust and tension throughout the region.

Governments and non-governmental organizations of the region should persistently work towards the establishment of a regional multilateral cooperation mechanism. Such a Northeast Asian multilateral cooperation mechanism should commit to simultaneously promoting security, as well as economic and cultural cooperation among countries of the region.

Promoting economic and cultural cooperation would benefit the development of understanding and trust across the region.

Unfortunately, a number of events in the past years have increased distrust and misunderstanding in the region. Frequent missile tests by North Korea as well as the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in ROK are unlikely to contribute to trust and understanding in Northeast Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula.

Compared to the closest sub-regions of Southeast Asia and Central Asia, regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is very weak though the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) show some signs of success in promoting regional cooperation. ASEAN, in particular, could be a useful model for the establishment of cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. Therefore, there is great interest in initiatives based on ASEAN, such as the East Asia Summit3, ASEAN Plus Three cooperation4 or the ASEAN Regional Forum5.

Initiatives by governments and non-governmental organizations in NEA to promote security cooperation within the region also cannot be overlooked. For over last two decades, countries within and outside the region have launched initiatives for Northeast Asian cooperation. Some notable examples are the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)6, initiated by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation of the University of California, San Diego; the Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI)7 by the Republic of Korea; and the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security Issues (UBD)8, an initiative by Mongolia.

Today, new enthusiasm for regionalism in Northeast Asia suggests that despite the potential causes of conflict, the countries of this sub-region are moving closer to embracing habits of consultation and cooperation even in the security realm. Leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea regularly consult on a broad agenda of shared concerns, ranging from Korean Peninsula issues to financial reforms, to the environment. There are important indications that greater cooperation between the countries of Northeast Asia is, more than ever, the most attractive option for addressing regional concerns. Indeed, efforts to pursue regional solutions to problems seem to attract public support even among societies that are often deeply suspicious of each other.9

3

East Asia Summit has 18 member countries, including 4 Northeast Asian countries as well as the United States. East Asia Summit (EAS), http://asean.org/asean/external-relations/east-asia-summit-eas/.

4 ASEAN + Three Northeast Asian Countries of China, Japan and South Korea. ASEAN+3, http://asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/.

5 Every Northeast Asian country participates the in ASEAN Regional Forum. ASEAN Regional Forum, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/.

6 The Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue, https://igcc.ucsd.edu/research-and-programs/programs/regionalissues/northeast-asia/northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue.html.

7 Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative 2016, http://napci.net/eng/images/sub/eng_book.pdf.

8 Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations: Ulaanbaatar Dialogue. https://www.un.int/mongolia/mongolia/ulaanbaatar-dialogue.

9 Smith, Sheila A., “New Impulses for Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia”, International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Japan Studies Program (December 2009).

As mentioned in “Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia” on the occasion of the sixth trilateral summit, China, Japan and South Korea “decided to encourage a more active promotion of over 50 intergovernmental consultative mechanisms, including about 20 ministerial-level mechanisms, as well as numerous cooperative projects, and to promote the creation of new intergovernmental consultative mechanisms, including ministerial-level mechanisms.” 10 Despite current political and security frictions, the three leaders have continued to express their unwavering support for cooperation in order to build permanent peace, stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia.11 Although the abovementioned initiatives have led to some advancements in specific ways, the attempt to establish a government-level official security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia is still far from reaching its goal.

The role of youth and the importance of their participation in building peace and stability in Northeast Asia Today, the world’s youth population has reached its peak. They therefore have greater opportunities to contribute to the promotion of peace and stability on global, regional as well as national levels.

Global youth are trying to actively engage in peacebuilding processes and some governments, as well as international and national non-governmental organizations are supporting youth participation. I would like to mention few examples of the contributions that young people make towards peacebuilding around the world.

On 13 February 2016, the British Council’s Horn of Africa Leadership and Learning for Action project co-hosted a meeting on the strengthening of community cohesion and reconciliation in South Sudan. At this meeting the participants, including research fellows from Chatham House and government officials, as well as researchers from South Sudan, discussed the role of youth in the future of South Sudan and possibilities to approach youth in peacebuilding processes.

Following the meeting, a document entitled “Peacebuilding, Reconciliation and Community Cohesion in South Sudan: The Role of Youth”12 was published and the document included recommendations and action points, mostly focused on broadening youth participation in South Sudan.

Thus, we could underline civic awareness for peaceful social relations and development programmes in Nepal 13 and community entrepreneurship and livelihoods programmes in Burundi14.

Furthermore, the UN Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development Report entitled ‘Young People’s Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note’15 presents a number of policy and

10

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia" (November 2015). http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page1e_000058.html.

11 Kim, Si Hong, “NAPCI and Trilateral Cooperation: Prospects for South Korea-EU Relations,” IAI Working Papers 17/08 (February 2017).

12 Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, "Peacebuilding, Reconciliation and Community Cohesion in South Sudan: The role of Youth", Africa Programme Meeting Summary (February 2016) https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/events/130216-peacebuilding-reconciliationcommunity-cohesion-south-sudan-meeting-summary.pdf.

13 Bennett, Ryan, and Sameer Karki. "Youth and Peacebuilding in Nepal: The current context and recommendations." https://www.sfcg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/NEP_CA_Jan12_Youth-andPeacebuilding.pdf Acesso em 20, no. 04 (2012): 2016.

14 UNICEF, "Youth lead by example in Burundi," (May 2016) https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/burundi_91099.html.

15 United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development, "Young People’s Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note," (January 2016).

programme examples from different conflict affected countries that would facilitate such participation more effectively.

One significant source of support for youth was the ground-breaking United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Youth, Peace and Security. The UNSCR 2250 was unanimously adopted by Member States in December 2015. As stated in the resolution “Through the resolution, which defined youth as persons aged 18 through 29, the Security Council also urged Member States to consider setting up mechanisms that would enable young people to participate meaningfully in peace processes and dispute resolution.”16 Youth are often seen as important actors in peacebuilding. As they are the leaders and decision makers of the future, promoting trust and understanding among youth, as well as building a community of young people, could positively influence long-term peace, stability and security.

Youth already have the ability to affect peacebuilding processes around the world.

Empowering youth and enhancing their peacebuilding knowledge as well as connecting youth and government officials could help youth develop peacebuilding skills and strengthen their resolve to contribute to peacebuilding processes.

As most young people are not directly involved in politics, they could perhaps offer a different perspective of conflict management and peacebuilding. In addition, decision makers and peacebuilders could use their youthful energy and innovative abilities to reach their objectives.

Just like young people from other parts of the world, Northeast Asian youth have taken some steps to integrate and cooperate as well. In 2013, 51 young people of diverse backgrounds from China, Japan, Republic of Korea and Mongolia came together to take part in the North-East Asian Youth Conference17 at Korea University in Seoul. They discussed and exchanged ideas and opinions on various topics, including peacebuilding processes and security issues in Northeast Asia.

The young participants of the conference adopted a resolution on the future of global and regional development, entitled “The World We Want: A Northeast Asian Youth Vision”. This vision consisted of six aspects:18 1) A world with peace and security; 2) Human development; 3) A world without discrimination, stigma and inequality where everyone enjoys basic human rights and human dignity; 4) A world that respects a clean and green environment (sustainable development); 5) Good governance and accountable leaders; and, 6) Economic development and stability.

In the declaration, youth from Northeast Asia agreed on the following points in support of achieving the first aspect of the declaration; a world with peace and security:

http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Practice%20Note%20Youth%20&%20Peacebuilding%20-%20Ja nuary%202016.pdf.

16 United Nations, "Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2250 (2015), Urges Member States to Increase Representation of Youth in Decision-Making at All Levels," (December 2015) https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm.

17 United Nations Development Programme, "North-East Asian Youth Conference: 'The World We Want'," (November 2012) http://www.undp.org/content/seoul_policy_center/en/home/presscenter/articles/2012/11/27/north-east-asianyouth-conference-the-world-we-want-post-2015-.html.

18 United Nations Development Programme "North-East Asian Youth Conference: 'The World We Want' Youth Declaration" (January 2013): 3 http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/North_East_Asian_Youth_Declaration_1.pdf.

   

We must settle regional territorial issues, including facilitating resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue; We must pursue prosperity in North-East Asia; We need an organization to discuss historical and territorial issues; and, We must promote cooperation among the public.19

Furthermore they even called on the UN to “strengthen international cooperation among states, work closely with governments and all countries as a more neutral actor” and called on governments to “strengthen cooperation among governments, NGOs, INGOs and the private sector to ensure peace and security in the region and promote active cultural interaction.” In addition, they called on the private sector, non-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations to focus on strengthening cooperation among governments, NGOs, INGOs, the private sector and the public.

Of course, this conference and declaration did not influence regional peace, security and stability directly. The conference had some shortcomings, such as the lack of participation from all Northeast Asian countries20. However, these kinds of conferences could be an effective way to promote youth participation and unity in peacebuilding.

It is heartening to note that many regional non-governmental organizations and governments have taken specific steps to support youth participation in peacebuilding as well as empower and educate youth. In addition, many conferences and meetings on Northeast Asian security issues include youth participation as an important part of peacebuilding in the region.

Conclusion A crucial challenge for Northeast Asian peace, security and stability is the existing tension, distrust and misunderstanding among countries of the region. Most states in the region, with the exception of Mongolia, have ongoing disputes with other countries.

A concerted effort to promote trust and understanding in the region and to solve this issue, will be an important step towards the resolution of other security issues, including the nuclear arms race and territorial disputes. In addition, it would be difficult to establish an efficient cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia without trust and understanding.

Promoting youth participation and ensuring connections and cooperation among young people could be an important phase in achieving this goal. Youth is usually seen as a powerful group for positive change in the future. However, they can, even today, have influence and the ability to change the current state-of-play of the region. Therefore, empowering and educating youth as well as giving them possibilities to connect with each other and decision makers could be a practical and useful approach even today.

19

United Nations Development Programme "North-East Asian Youth Conference:' The World We Want' Youth Declaration" (January 2013): 6 http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/North_East_Asian_Youth_Declaration_1.pdf.

20 Youths from Russia and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not participate the conference.

Northeast Asian Security: What Role for Southeast Asia?

Peter van Tuijl Senior Advisor, Kemitraan, Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia / Former Executive Director Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) Introduction The risks of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula are commonly perceived from the angle of possible implications within the Northeast Asian region and considering the interests of the USA. The visual barometer of these kind of threat perceptions are maps that demonstrate how rockets from North Korea may possibly be able to reach Japan, Guam, Alaska or the US West coast. However, if North Korean ballistic missiles can reach Alaska, they can also reach Bangkok, Manila, Hanoi or Jakarta. The latter scope of the conflict remains a grossly understated element in both academic research and policy discourse on how risks related to the situation on the Korean Peninsula are evolving.

It is time to take a closer look at Southeast Asia in relation to Northeast Asian security and the conflict on the Korean Peninsula in particular. What is at stake for Southeast Asia and what might be the role of countries in the Southeast Asia region to foster a peaceful solution?

Southeast Asia is both a legitimate stakeholder in the conflict and can act as a possible bridge and mediator between different parties, provided it can focus on this role and work together.

Expanding the scope of Southeast Asia’s involvement in Northeast Asia’s security may create new opportunities for positive and stabilizing effects that will benefit the Asian region as a whole.1 Security in Northeast Asia is deteriorating More than sixty years after the end of the Korean War, there is still no peace agreement but an armistice only. The conflict on the Korean Peninsula is caught in a cold-war type stalemate between superpowers, mainly China and the USA but also involving Russia. Meanwhile North Korea has resorted to an ambitious development of nuclear weapon capabilities as its primary strategy of defense and survival. Upon completion of writing this chapter (July 2017) North Korea has already conducted eleven sets of missile tests this year, more than in any year before.

Since the Six Party talks were suspended in 2009, there have been no serious comprehensive diplomatic interactions to work on any solution. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has agreed to subject North Korea to the firmest possible regime of sanctions, because of its nuclear policy as well as its human rights record. Every North Korean missile test is followed by a condemnation of the UNSC and an addition to the list of sanctions. However, this does not appear to have had much impact in bringing a resolution to the situation. Instead, relationships between North- and South Korea, and in the Northeast Asian region more broadly, are deteriorating. We see increased inflammatory rhetoric and an alarming military and nuclear proliferation on all sides.

1

Excerpts of this Chapter were published in an op-ed in the Jakarta Post, 4 December 2016.

In response to the intensive programme of nuclear and missile tests in North Korea, South Korea has invited the USA to install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), a new missile defense system. This in turn has upset China, which sees an increased military presence of the USA in South Korea as a threat to its long-term strategic interests. Japan is also sheltering under the US security umbrella and its conservative government is increasingly stepping away from Japan’s constitutional commitment to refrain from war. The Japanese ‘Self-Defence Forces’ (SDF) are beginning to look more like a regular army with a first strike capability. This is equally upsetting for China, not least because of a territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

China takes a strident position in claiming large parts of the South China Sea. On the other side of the region, towards the North, new sea-lanes are opening up via the Artic sea, because of climate change. The question of who will control these new strategic waters emphasizes the importance of Russia and adds another contentious component in the relationships amongst the same countries. In this context, the lack of peace on the Korean Peninsula leaves Northeast Asia exposed to a potential outbreak of nuclear, chemical and/or conventional warfare that may spill over into other conflict lines. There is an urgent need to prevent a further escalation of tensions and find ways to build peaceful relationships.

Southeast Asia’s security cannot be ignored We define Southeast Asia as the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which includes: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Increasingly, Southeast Asia’s strategic interests are at stake in Northeast Asia. As pointed out, the greater scope of a potential nuclear war starting in Northeast Asia is already affecting Southeast Asia’s security. Any outbreak of nuclear, chemical or conventional warfare in Northeast Asia may very well implicate massive numbers of victims, major material damage, streams of refugees, chaos in currency and stockmarkets as well as trade- and travel disturbances. Altogether it will constitute a massive disruption that will affect not only North- but also Southeast Asia.

First, a substantial part of Southeast Asia’s primary trade and investment relationships are with countries in Northeast Asia. In 2016, Credit Suisse estimated Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the six largest economies in the ASEAN region to have reached about US$16 billion.2 South Korean investments in ASEAN are also strongly increasing.3 In 2015, countries in Northeast Asia represented well over 40% of Southeast Asia’s trade volume.4 Second, sizable communities of Southeast Asians live and work in Northeast Asia. The demand for domestic helpers in places like Hong Kong and Taiwan is met by hundreds of thousands of workers from the Philippines and Indonesia.5 Third, tourism from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia has been growing exponentially over the past years, and now accounts for almost 25% of tourist arrivals

“China embraces Southeast Asia with renewed trade, investment push as US turns inward,” South China Morning Post, December 12, 2016.

3 ASEAN/UNCTAD, “ASEAN Investment Report 2016: Foreign Direct Investment and MSME Linkages,” ((September 2016).

4 ASEAN, “Table 20: Top ten ASEAN trade partner countries/regions, 2015,” (December 2016) http://asean.org/storage/2016/11/Table20_as-of-6-dec-2016.pdf 5 Kang, John, “Study Reveals 95% of Filipino, Indonesian Helpers in Hong Kong Exploited or Forced Labor,” Forbes, March 18, 2016.

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in the region.6 All of this underscores how a destabilization of Northeast Asia may have severe economic, social and security-political implications for Southeast Asia.

Peace and Security in Northeast and Southeast Asia are connected The fundamental incentive for a more active role for Southeast Asia in promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula is that peace and security in North- and Southeast Asia are increasingly interrelated.

Recent geopolitical shifts indicate that more than ever solutions for peace and security in Asia are to be found within the Asian region. The Trump administration that came into power in the United States in January 2017 has been sending mixed signals. To the extent that we are able to identify main imperatives in the foreign policy of the new US government, they indicate a tendency to step back from extended obligations overseas and instead promote the resourcing of defense costs locally. Japan and South Korea are increasingly aware of this new reality, which is beginning to eat away at their underlying sense of security. For example, at the time of the deployment of THAAD, President Trump called for the termination of the ‘terrible’ USSouth Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) and asked South Korea to pay US$ 1 billion for THAAD, causing uproar and a refusal by South Korea.7 For a longer period of time already, a greater sense of self-confidence has been developing in Asia, supported by economic development and growth in knowledge and better-educated populations. It is the backdrop for how the lack of certainty created by the current US Government is creating a true momentum to rethink the balance of power in the region.

However, this opportunity to fundamentally realign relationships and settle the Korean dispute can only be used if a credible scenario is presented whereby the influence of China will not become too dominant for other countries in Asia. It is in nobody’s interest to replace one type of instability and insecurity with another.

A new balance of power in Northeast Asia that supports peace and prosperity in a sustainable manner has to ensure sufficient checks and balances on the power of China and Russia, notably to guarantee the security of Japan and North- and South Korea.8 This requires construing a comprehensive approach that will have a greater chance of success if it involves the legitimate interests of Southeast Asia, as it may significantly contribute to offset and even-out Chinese influence.

Taking the reverse perspective provides an additional argument. China on the one hand and Japan and South Korea on the other hand, have similar trade and investment and people to people ties with Southeast Asia, which constitutes a common interest that can help to build peace. Interestingly, the newly elected South Korean government has appointed a special envoy to ASEAN, while the suggestion has even been made for South Korea to become a member of ASEAN.9 World Tourism Organization UNWTO, “Sustained growth in international tourism despite challenges” (January 2017) http://www2.unwto.org/press-release/2017-01-17/sustained-growth-international-tourismdespite-challenges.

7 Panda, Ankit, “$1 Billion For THAAD? Trump Chips Away at the US-South Korea Alliance,” The Diplomat, April 28, 2017.

8 We do not discuss Korean unification, which will need to be addressed in a new balance of power in Asia as well, but would require an elaboration beyond this chapter.

9 Velloor, Ravi, “Why South Korea eyes ASEAN,” Straits Times, June 9, 2017.

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The assumption from a Chinese point of view is that China’s economic and security interests are best served if it leads in Asia in a productive balance of power that respects the interests rather than dominates other parts of the region. In this regard, a constructive role for Southeast Asia in supporting peace in Northeast Asia has the benefit of enhancing its own relationship with China and strengthening possibilities to deal with outstanding issues in the South China Sea. One could argue that creating a bigger picture and making connections between resolving the conflict on the Korean Peninsula with resolving disputes in the South China Sea is mixing incompatible issues, overly ambitious and will make matters only more complicated. However, it might be the key to unlock peace in Asia. The main players involved are the same and they relate to each other in a configuration of often overlapping common interests in which different lines of tension and potential conflict are embedded. A comprehensive approach to peace in Asia would respond to, and could help to shape, some of the tectonic shifts in power that are beginning to emerge. With some imagination, bold leadership and support from civil society, Asia could lend a positive twist to this radical period in geopolitics.

What can Southeast Asia contribute?

Experiences from various conflict resolution processes show that an outside party with sufficient leverage can play a meaningful role and promote a focus on shared interests.

Mongolia is making efforts to play this role in the Northeast Asian region. It provides a safe space for dialogue at civil society and academic levels. These efforts could be amplified by a more active role from Southeast Asia in easing tensions and working towards a peace agreement. The Korean peninsula has been the subject of ‘strategic patience’ by the USA and ‘strategic tolerance’ by China; none of which has worked to improve the situation. Southeast Asia could help to break this deadlock by providing ‘strategic mediation’. This could start by sending a high-level representation to Pyongyang and Seoul with no conditions and an open agenda.

There are different options as to how a new initiative from a Southeast Asian perspective could take shape. The political and security community of ASEAN is not yet very developed, but has the potential to become more important. A primary goal of ASEAN’s is to promote Southeast Asia as a Zone Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This is building on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) that was concluded in 1995. The SEANWFZ mirrors the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) as declared by Mongolia since 1992 and provides a good point of departure to approach Northeast Asia, as constraining and minimizing the risk of a nuclear conflict would be a shared top priority.

ASEAN does not yet have a ‘Panel of the Wise’10 like the African Union, but could very well identify three senior, experienced officials to function as a team of mediators. The advantage of using ASEAN as a framework is that it would ensure a link to the whole Southeast Asian region and provide an ongoing structure to engage all individual Southeast Asian countries, including regularly providing feedback and accountability.

10

African Union Peace and Security, Panel of the Wise (PoW), (December 2016) http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/29-panel-of-the-wise-pow.

From among the ASEAN countries, Indonesia is particularly well positioned to convene a conversation among the different parties involved. At the level of superpowers, Indonesia has good relationships with China, the USA and Russia. Indonesia also has friendly relationships with both South- and North Korea. The latter is due to the leading role of Indonesia in the nonaligned movement, and the resulting close connections between the Sukarno family and Kim Il Sung family, which positively resonate up to this day.

In order to complement an initiative at the level of governments, a parallel process of dialogue and consultations between representatives of civil society from Northeast and Southeast Asia could be started. This process could help to build trust, generate ideas and contribute to a constituency that will support the interactions between governments. Civil society in Southeast Asia is fairly well networked and organizes an ASEAN Peoples’ Forum (APF) at every annual ASEAN meeting. It has significant experiences in supporting dialogue and mediation processes in Southeast Asia, also across borders, for example in relation to conflicts in Myanmar, between Cambodia and Thailand and in the Philippines. Civil Society in Northeast Asia is perhaps less experienced in dialogue and mediation but is growing in strength. Connections between Southeast and Northeast Asia civil society have developed in the context of the Asia-Europe meetings (ASEM) and other issue-based networks. Overall, the conditions for a NortheastSoutheast Asia civil society dialogue would be conducive.

Difficulties in achieving a more active role of Southeast Asia The approach in support of a more active role for Southeast Asia in promoting peace in Northeast Asia as outlined in this chapter is not without obstacles.

First, Southeast Asian countries tend to be inward- rather than outward looking. Driven by the need to focus on economic and social development, they struggle with the primacy of domestic politics over well-developed geo-political considerations.11 As a result, most ASEAN member states suffer from some level of ambiguity towards China, trying to find a balance between the attraction of increased trade and investment at the expense of allowing China greater influence.

In particular, the economically and politically weaker states in ASEAN such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are struggling to come to terms with China. This does not support a more unified approach of ASEAN towards Northeast Asia.

Second, there are frictions among different member states of ASEAN that tend to be perpetuated because there is a strong tradition of mutual non-interference. Human rights violations in Myanmar (related to the Rohingya) and the Philippines (drug-related killings) have raised concerns among other members of ASEAN. The 2014 military coup in Thailand has been a setback for those who believed that ASEAN could support increased participation and democracy in the region. Malaysia also appears to be drifting towards greater authoritarianism. The assertive and self-centered style of the Duterte government elected in 2016 in the Philippines is spilling over in its foreign policy, which is particularly relevant with the Philippines chairing the ASEAN in 2017. But these tensions are rarely discussed or resolved.

The underlying frictions in ASEAN do not make a consolidated approach easier.

Third, the relationship between Southeast Asia and the DPRK has recently suffered a setback.

The assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of DPRK leader Kim Jong-un, in 11

Laksmana, Evan A., "The domestic politics of Indonesia's approach to the tribunal ruling and the South China Sea." Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 38, no. 3 (2016): 382-388.

February 2017 at Kuala Lumpur Airport and the diplomatic row between the DPRK and Malaysia that followed have cast a shadow. Other Southeast Asian countries share similar concerns over such a breach of security at a major airport in the region.12 The immediate reflex is to focus on a tough response and does not help to keep in focus the larger Southeast Asian strategic interests at stake.

Concluding remarks There is an important opportunity for Southeast Asia to play a more active role in building peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, it will require prioritizing the greater interest of the region above individual differences between countries and going beyond non-interference towards a more active diplomacy. Above all, it will require strong leadership; not an abrasive type of leadership but an inclusive and engaging type. Looking at Southeast Asia, Indonesia would be the most logical choice to lead the region down this road. Civil society in Asia would be an important resource and would be ready to support such efforts.

Kurlantzick, Joshua., “Will the North Korea – Malaysia crisis cause a shift in Southeast Asian States’ relationships with Pyongyang?,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 2017.

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Making a Habit of Dialogue: Civil Society's Role in Peacebuilding in Northeast Asia Meri Joyce Regional Liaison Officer, GPPAC Northeast Asia / International Coordinator, Peace Boat Introduction Supporting the firm belief in civil society's potential to play a vital role in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, this paper will reflect upon the experience of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict Northeast Asia (GPPAC-NEA) in developing a collaborative network of civil society in the region. Reflecting upon the state of civil society in Northeast Asia, it will consider both challenges and progress, and particularly, will outline the experience of the dialogue known as the Ulaanbaatar Process, launched by GPPAC-NEA and its Ulaanbaatar Focal Point, the Mongolian NGO Blue Banner, in 2015.

The role of civil society in peacebuilding and dialogue While traditionally seen as the realm for governments, the recognition of the vital role of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding has emerged and continued to grow in recent years. It was on this very premise that the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) was founded in 2005, following the recommendation of former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his 2001 report that the role of NGOs in conflict prevention should be examined and enhanced.13 Here, the then Secretary-General recognized that “NGOs can contribute to the maintenance of peace and security by offering non-violent avenues for addressing the root causes of conflict at an early stage. Moreover, NGOs can be an important means of conducting track II diplomacy when Governments and international organizations are unable to do so.”14 In response to this call, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) - which later became the GPPAC Global Secretariat - initiated a process to convene civil society groups from around the world. Consultations began in 2003, and the network was officially launched at a worldwide conference held at the UN Headquarters in New York – the first civil societyled event to be convened in the General Assembly Hall. To quote GPPAC’s homepage, “from its origins as an ambitious idea of a few people to enhance and structure civil society's efforts to prevent violent conflict and strengthen peacebuilding efforts, GPPAC has grown into an active global network. It encompasses fifteen regions, enabling a concerted effort of many committed organisations and people working together to reflect on, improve and implement civil society strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding worldwide.”15 The network’s activities now focus on enabling collaboration, improving practice and influencing policy, encompassing work on local, regional and global levels.16 As the nature of conflicts evolved from traditional inter-state conflicts prevalent in previous 13

United Nations, General Assembly Security Council, Prevention of armed conflict: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, A/55/985–S/2001/574, (7 June 2001), available from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005902.pdf.

14 United Nations, General Assembly Security Council, Prevention of armed conflict: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, A/55/985–S/2001/574, (7 June 2001), available from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005902.pdf.

15 GPPAC History http://www.gppac.net/history.

16 GPPAC Our Work http://www.gppac.net/our-work.

centuries to complex, interconnected cross-border security challenges, it opened a space for civil society contribution - a space that had until then been difficult to enter when following a state-centered security approach. Civil society in general and GPPAC in particular have played an important role in reframing peace and security concerns, such as climate change, food and water security, migration and the refugee crisis, under the chapeau of human security, thus calling for creative, human-centered and multilateral approaches for resolution of these challenges. The nature of these new concerns are not addressable by force or military means, but require new methods of dialogue and cooperation - an area in which the approach and expertise of GPPAC have a key contribution to make.

As mentioned above, the role of civil society in dialogue processes is also becoming better appreciated, particularly in situations where government-level dialogue is impossible or has reached an impasse. Such initiatives have made significant contributions over the past century, from the Cold War examples of ping-pong diplomacy, and scientists' dialogue across the Iron Curtain led by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, who “during the darkest days of the Cold War... understood the dangers of nuclear weapons [and] in their efforts to change dangerous policies became pioneers of a new kind of transnational, “track II” dialogue.” 17 This has also been seen in recent years, where sustained Track II dialogue contributed significantly to recent developments in relations between the United States and Cuba, as well as with Iran. Such experiences have demonstrated that “civil society has a particular added value in convening and facilitating dialogue processes to reach a point where derogatory images of wrongness no longer overshadow the needs of the opposing sides.”18 This approach has been at the heart of GPPAC since its foundation. A significant number of member organizations around the world are active in employing dialogue and mediation “as a means for conflict prevention, to decrease tensions during the conflict, or as a tool for reconciliation in a post-conflict context.” 19 An inter-regional working group dedicated to sharing experiences and tools for Dialogue & Mediation has been established within the GPPAC network, with members engaging in diverse initiatives including Cuba-United States academic workshops, the Istanbul Process to rebuild Georgia-Russia relations, dialogue work between Serbs and Albanians in Serbia and Kosovo, and mediation for grassroots reconciliation in Maluku, Indonesia. GPPAC-NEA has benefited greatly from the expertise of members from other regions. In fact, the launch of a GPPAC publication focusing on these case studies was held in Pyongyang in June 2015, at a seminar during which representatives of numerous DPRK people’s organisations and research institutions discussed the role of civil society in peacebuilding and dialogue together with GPPAC working group members who have direct experience of the abovementioned cases.20 The state of play in Northeast Asia Dialogue in the Northeast Asia region is urgently needed, both on the governmental and civil society levels. The region remains characterized by Cold-War-era political interactions, at times charged with fierce rhetoric amid fears of military escalation. Furthermore, it lacks regional institutional mechanisms for peace and security. The Korean Peninsula has remained 17

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, History, https://pugwash.org/history/ Zahid Movlazadeh (ed.) et al, Creating Spaces for Dialogue: A role for civil society (The Hague: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2015), p11.

19 Zahid Movlazadeh et al, Creating Spaces for Dialogue: A role for civil society (The Hague: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2015), p11.

20 GPPAC publication “Creating Spaces for Dialogue: A role for Civil Society.”

Full text and seminar information available online here: http://www.gppac.net/news/-/asset_publisher/fHv91YcOz0CI/content/new-gppac-publication-creating-spacesfor-dialogue-a-role-for-civil-society-/ 18

in an armistice system for over 60 years, without a peace treaty to end the Korean War. The absence of sustained dialogue and repeated military aggressions have heightened tensions within the Korean Peninsula and across the region.

On an official level, the Six Party Talks - launched in 2003 and involving China, the DPRK, the ROK, Russia, Japan and the US - were the closest alternative to an institutional mechanism for regional peace and security. Various rounds achieved some results, demonstrating that progress in regional engagement is possible. Yet the suspension of the Talks since 2009 and increasingly hawkish responses have left little hope for the resumption of dialogue on a governmental level. This difficult situation has been exacerbated in recent years, with provocations as seen in the continuation of the negative cycle of DPRK nuclear and missile development, joint military exercises, and the placement of strict sanctions in response.

Building cooperation and trust – the nature of and relationships between civil society in the region Amidst such a tense regional environment, cooperation between civil society in the region has developed with difficulty. Prevailing Cold War structures mean that the fractured and often tense internal relations experienced on state level are often duplicated on the level of citizens.

Furthermore, severe obstructions to communication and exchange amongst citizens within the region are in place: various countries lack diplomatic relations, such as Japan and the DPRK, and there are prohibitions for citizens of some countries from meeting with representatives from others. For example, the ROK National Security Law requires that South Korean citizens apply for prior permission from the Ministry of Unification to attend any meetings at which citizens of the DPRK are also present. There are almost no platforms within the region in which civil society from all parts of the region, including both Koreas, is regularly and actively participating. This can be said for not only areas perceived as highly sensitive such as the peace and security arena, but also for less politicized areas such as cooperation in the fields of environmental conservation, disaster mitigation, and economic development. Where regional civil society networks do exist, they tend to be centered on the trilateral partnership between the three major players of Japan, the ROK and China, without the inclusion of other members of the region.

It is precisely because of such difficulties that it is so crucial to develop more opportunities for civil society from throughout the region to interact and exchange views directly. Only through building relationships, and learning about each other’s realities and perspectives is it possible to conduct open and frank discussions which can lead to creative approaches to the challenges faced. It is for this reason that the investment of a significant proportion of time and effort on trust building is a hallmark for Track II – in contrast with official Track I processes which are by nature concerned with national interests and priorities. The necessary communication and transformations are “inextricably tied to the establishment of deep relationships of mutual trust among participants in unofficial processes. Being with the "enemy" at breakfast, in the meetings themselves, and at the bar at night, re-humanizes the conflict and helps participants recognize that they share many fears, needs, and concerns.”21 The politically diverse scope of civil society and government engagement A further complication to cooperation is that the nature of civil society is drastically different Chigas, Diana, “Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy,” August 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2_diplomacy.

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throughout the region, characterized by a diversity of systems and cultures, even within states or administrative units. GPPAC Northeast Asia's regional steering group features membership from focal points in the nine cities of Tokyo, Kyoto, Seoul, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, Ulaanbaatar and Vladivostok, as well as regular participation from Pyongyang. 22 Perusing this list gives an indication of diversity of civil society: some cities have been the scene of vibrant democratic people's movements bringing about significant political change, as seen through the “candle demonstrations” of Seoul in late 2016 to early 2017 which led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and the birth of a new progressive government led

by Moon Jae-in, while others are regularly referred to by the international media as “closed societies” or “authoritarian regimes,” such as on the other side of the Korean DMZ. Yet, even despite the presence of such active citizen-led movements, all countries of the region rend to be categorized as between “closed” to “narrowed,” according to the CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report 2017.23 The extent to which civil society is able to engage with governments, whether in constructive dialogue, policy advocacy or public appeals, differs greatly within the region, particularly when it comes to issues relating to peace and security. Even where civil society takes on a more active and prominent role within the broader society, “security” issues are often seen as out of bounds, remaining as the realm solely of governments. This tendency can be explained by various factors, including for example the heavy presence of the United States in regional security concerns. The traditional relationship between the state and citizens in the region could also be considered to play a role, with some noting that “Asian civil society's intervention was slow in the disarmament and peace keeping issues, partly because of the Confucian tradition of giving priority to the state decision-making right.”24 Let us take the field of nuclear disarmament as a point of comparison regarding civil society and government engagement. In some countries of the region, such as for example China, there are a great number of academic and research institutes which are deeply and actively involved in issues relating to nuclear disarmament, and which engage regularly and closely with government institutions on matters relating to peace and security. Yet, this is not a field in which a high number of NGOs or peace organisations are involved. In the case of Japan, regular dialogue in both structured settings and unofficial capacities takes place between members of the peace and disarmament movement, including GPPAC-NEA Regional Secretariat Peace Boat, and representatives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as parliamentarians of various political parties. An example is the regular coordination of roundtable discussions between senior ministry officials and the Japan NGO Network for Nuclear Abolition, in which Peace Boat is a central member. Yet, despite such regular channels of information exchange, it must be said that the capacity of civil society to make an impact on government policy remains extremely limited. This can be seen through the fact that although Rather than convening around “national” focal points, the deliberate decision was made by GPPAC Northeast Asia during its initiation to build its membership on the basis of cities. This allows for full participation from throughout the entire region, going beyond contentious nation-state constructs which hinder cooperation across certain boundaries within the region. Full information; GPPAC Northeast Asia Focal Points: https://www.peaceportal.org/web/gppac-northeast-asia/focal-points.

23 CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report 2017: http://www.civicus.org/index.php/state-of-civil-society-report-2017.

Each year the CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report examines the major events that involve and affect civil society around the world. Our report reviews the past year, focusing on the space for civil society - civic space and the impact of a resurgence of right-wing populist politics; the right to express dissent; protest movements; and civil society’s international-level actions. A special thematic section presents 27 guest articles from thought leaders around the world, exploring the often troublesome, yet potentially beneficial, relationships between civil society and the private sector.

24 Lee, Jung Ok, Civil Society Alliances and International Agreement for Peace Making in the Northeast Asia Region, July 18 2005, https://www.tni.org/es/node/8239 18 July 2005.

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Japan’s anti-nuclear people’s movement is one of the largest in the world, based on the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it has not been able to convince the Japanese government to support the recently adopted UN Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, due to Japan’s reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. And a final example, in which very close and positive cooperation in the field of nuclear disarmament takes place, is that of Mongolia. As a government with a strong policy to create a region free of nuclear weapons, but lacking resources and with other priorities, the Mongolian Government availed itself of the services of local NGO Blue Banner – also GPPAC Ulaanbaatar Focal Point – to promote this part of its foreign policy. Blue Banner has provided vital encouragement and support for the institutionalization of Mongolia’s single-state nuclear-weapon-free-zone status, and the complementary relationship additionally provides the foundation for stable organization of GPPAC activities in Mongolia.25 The experience of GPPAC Northeast Asia The diversity of the regional membership lies not only in the nature of the societies and political contexts from which they come, but also in the nature and makeup of the regional process itself.

The GPPAC process in Northeast Asia is a pioneering initiative, in light of its goals to forge and strengthen cross-border ties between civil society organizations, and to improve communication channels with governments that may not traditionally be responsive to civil society initiatives in the field of peace and security. The evolution of a Northeast Asian conflict prevention community – notably one that establishes a credible and coordinated regional voice on issues of peace and security, and seeks actively to engage with governments and the UN – is in itself a significant means of promoting a culture of prevention.

Reflecting the diversity of the societies from which they come, members of the GPPAC NEA Regional Steering Group also bring in a range of backgrounds. This includes representatives of grassroots civil society organizations, mass people's movements, academic institutions, women's groups and researchers. This variety of stakeholders even within membership of the network allows for a broad range of voices, as well as diverse approaches and perspectives.

From its inception, the regional network declared that “we are working beyond borders in innovative and flexible ways to build relations of trust and cooperation, and are free from the kind of restrictions created by historical and political factors that state actors are more often held captive by.”26 Regional consultation towards the launch of the GPPAC network in Northeast Asia began in 2004, and since then, a multifaceted programme of action and research, network building and advocacy has taken shape. Through joint activities, the level of regional cooperation, trust and goodwill has been gradually nurtured, and the fledgling association has transformed into a functional and effective cross-border network. Key issues of focus, as outlined in the collaboratively developed Northeast Asia Regional Action Agenda, 27 include the Korean peninsula issue; the threat of Japanese remilitarization; the Cross-Strait issue; and lack of historical reconciliation and understanding. The recognition of the need to overcome the past, including legacies of Japan's past colonization and war of aggression, as a firm base for the Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan, “Mongolia: Blue Banner cooperation with Mongolian government” in GPPAC Issue Paper 4, Joint Action for Prevention: Civil Society and Government Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, December 2007, Edited by Paul van Tongeren and Christine van Empel.

26 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict Northeast Asia Regional Action Agenda: ‘TOKYO AGENDA’ Towards Creation of a Regional Mechanism for Peace, http://peaceboat.org/oldsite/info/gppac/agenda_0222e.pdf p4.

27 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict Northeast Asia Regional Action Agenda: ‘TOKYO AGENDA’ Towards Creation of a Regional Mechanism for Peace, 2005 http://peaceboat.org/oldsite/info/gppac/agenda_0222e.pdf.

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prevention of future conflict is a fundamental common understanding of the regional network.

To this end the network has engaged in various initiatives related to historical recognition, education and reconciliation.

Concrete examples of steps made over the decade since the launch of GPPAC-NEA include support for the establishment of the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI), which since 2010 is providing annual training for peace practitioners, educators and youth from around the region in the context of Northeast Asia’s specific historical and security situation;28 organizing a series of exchanges between researchers and peace educators in Europe and Asia on the issue of joint history textbooks; 29 and coordinating regional perspectives through conferences, publications and social media to highlight the crucial role of Article 9, the peace clause of Japan’s constitution, in maintaining peace in Northeast Asia.30 Such efforts are made possible through the trust built over the years as a result of sustained communication and cooperation, in combination with the interaction with other regions around the world, as well as capacity and legitimacy provided through being part of a truly global network.

The Ulaanbaatar Process: civil society dialogue for peace and stability in Northeast Asia Building upon GPPAC's global experience in dialogue and mediation, and the trust fostered within the regional network, GPPAC NEA launched the Ulaanbaatar Process in June 2015, after several years of preparation and constituency-building. Coordinated by the GPPAC Global and Northeast Asia Regional Secretariats and Mongolian NGO Blue Banner, the Ulaanbaatar Process is currently the priority activity of the regional network. 31 With the participation of civil society representatives from all Six Party Talk member countries, as well as the host Mongolia, it promotes effective regional Track II dialogue, seeking to strengthen the role of civil society as a complement to Track I efforts.

The overall objective of the Ulaanbaatar Process is to support the creation of peace and stability throughout Northeast Asia, through the promotion of civil society dialogue, with the following specific objectives:32  To strengthen the role of civil society in the context of building peace and stability in Northeast Asia;  To complement and contribute recommendations to official processes, including the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue for Northeast Asian Security initiated by the Mongolian government;  To support the development of an institutionalized regional mechanism supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Northeast Asia;  To contribute to overall confidence-building measures within the Northeast Asian region.

Since its inception in 2015, two full rounds of dialogue have been held in Mongolia; this publication is being launched at the third Ulaanbaatar Process Dialogue, in August 2017. These meetings have seen constructive debate and knowledge-sharing on issues of concern to the entire region, including the creation of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, the replacement of the Korean War armistice with a permanent peace treaty, and the role that the women and men of civil society can continue to play in helping achieve these goals.

28

Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI), http://narpi.net.

GPPAC Northeast Asia Activities in 2008 https://www.peaceportal.org/web/gppac-northeast-asia/16 30 Global Article 9 Campaign, http://article-9.org.

31 The Ulaanbaatar Process: https://www.peaceportal.org/web/ulaanbaatar-process/home 32 From the Ulaanbaatar Process Framework Document – available: https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/131936949/0/Ulaanbaatar+Process++Framework+Document+FNL.pdf/ 29

Lessons from this dialogue While still a fledgling process, the experience of the Ulaanbaatar Process has highlighted the crucial value of creating space in the same forum for civil society perspectives from across the region, including both the DPRK and ROK. Opportunities for citizens from throughout the region to gather remain extremely limited. The regular and sustained convening of meetings, with the commitment of consistent participation, has enabled the nurturing of a culture of frank openness and listening. Participating from the DPRK, then Secretary General of the Korean National Peace Committee Mr O Ryong Il33 stated in an interview with the Mongolian Observer that “the UB Process gives us a really good opportunity to know what other countries think about the issues on the Korean Peninsula and what needs to be done to ease tensions in the region. So through these frequent exchanges I think we can come up with solutions on how to solve the many security problems that we are facing today.”34 The importance of inclusivity, ensuring space for safe participation from throughout the region based on mutual trust and respect, has been key to the continuation of the process, as well as to the sense of ownership held by participants themselves.

The Ulaanbaatar Process has also reinforced the ongoing need for historical reckoning. Given the historical roots of current tensions in the region, future-oriented work can only take place hand-in-hand with sincere efforts for reconciliation. To this end, GPPAC Northeast Asia's continuing efforts in the fields of history textbook education and youth reconciliation projects – including those by its regional secretariat Peace Boat - play an important role in guaranteeing the foundations for mutual understanding and trust-building so important to ensuring confidence in the process itself.

Conclusion and next steps The experience of the Ulaanbaatar Process and GPPAC Northeast Asia has reaffirmed the need to develop more frequent and sustained opportunities for engagement and cooperation between civil society organizations of the Northeast Asian region. At the same time, severe constraints arising from the lack of resources has highlighted the need for deep understanding and support from other stakeholders regarding the role of civil society to tackle pressing regional peace and security issues. Despite a track record of over one decade of sustained cooperation and activity, GPPAC Northeast Asia suffers from a lack of resources, both financial and human. As the space for government's constructive action for peace becomes increasingly limited, and as the role of civil society becomes more recognized, it is vital that full support is given for civil society initiatives that could contribute to the creation of an environment in which regional dialogue can once again take place. This must go hand in hand with efforts to build the capacity of the emerging civil society engaging in peace and security issues within the region. To that end, civil society participation from the whole of Northeast Asia should be institutionalized in various multilateral processes. Such steps are vital to ensure the sustainability and momentum of initiatives such as the Ulaanbaatar Process.

Despite the limited and oftentimes pessimistic situation in the region, GPPAC Northeast Asia and its partners will continue to hold regular, face-to-face meetings among members of civil society groups in the region, with the aim to change the prevailing narrative surrounding the contentious regional geopolitical relationships and to promote communication and cooperation 33

Currently Presidium Member of the same organization.

“Mutual trust is extremely important,” Interview with O Ryong Il, Korean National Peace Committee, The Mongolian Observer, July 8 & 25, 2015, Available online: https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/131936949/0/O+Ryong+Il.pdf/.

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amongst participants. Resolution of the conflict on the Korean peninsula will of course only be possible through governmental efforts, including the creation of a peace treaty to replace the current armistice regime. Yet a sustained effort by civil society is vital to create an environment conducive to progress on official levels. By establishing and maintaining a safe space for participation from all countries, and continuing to build trust both within the process as well as from other stakeholders, GPPAC hopes to demonstrate that sincere and constructive dialogue is indeed possible in Northeast Asia – and to “make a habit of dialogue,” toward the common and comprehensive vision “to create a regional mechanism for peace through concrete actions of disarmament, demilitarization, and attaining justice, democracy, non-violence and sustainability in Northeast Asia.”35

35

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict Northeast Asia Regional Action Agenda: ‘TOKYO AGENDA’ Towards Creation of a Regional Mechanism for Peace, http://peaceboat.org/oldsite/info/gppac/agenda_0222e.pdf, p4.

EPILOGUE

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Northeast Asia Kawasaki Akira Executive Committee Member, Peace Boat Introduction Northeast Asia suffers from a chain reaction of provocation and escalation of tensions over the nuclear and missile developments by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In contrast, on July 7, 2017, the United Nations witnessed the historic adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, or hereafter the Prohibition Treaty) that makes landmark progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.1 This paper examines the lessons and opportunities that Northeast Asia can draw from the Prohibition Treaty and the global process that led to its adoption.

The Prohibition Treaty Building on the past legal achievements that prohibited biological and chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons regards nuclear weapons as inhumane weapons. It unconditionally prohibits the development, possession, use, threat of use and deployment of nuclear weapons, as well as assisting, encouraging and inducing those acts. The treaty was adopted with votes of support by 122 countries - nearly two thirds of the UN Member States.

The successful establishment of the Prohibition Treaty was the fruit of an international movement focusing on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, initiated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2010 and promoted by the group of countries known as the “Humanitarian Initiative,� led by Austria and Mexico, among others.

In 2013-2014, three International Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons were held. Following deliberations at the 2015 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), effective legal measures on nuclear disarmament were explored at the UN Open-Ended Working Group in 2016. In December 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which decided to convene in 2017 the UN conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.2 Costa Rica chaired this conference from March to July 2017, navigating the negotiations which led to the adoption of the Prohibition Treaty. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) supported the whole process as a global coalition of civil society organizations.3 The Prohibition Treaty explicitly refers, in its Preamble, to the suffering and harm caused to the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Hibakusha) and those affected by nuclear tests around the world. It further states that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. The proposition that that nuclear weapons violate humanitarian rules sounds natural for people from Japan, who have been taught about what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The atomic bombs, through heat rays, blasts and radiation incomparable to other weaponry, instantly destroyed the two cities, with 1

United Nations General Assembly, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (A/CONF.229/2017/8), July 7, 2017, http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8.

2 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 23 December 2016 (A/RES/71/258), January 11, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/258.

3 http://www.icanw.org.

over 200,000 killed. Further, the survivors have been forced to suffer from long-lasting aftereffects, not only in medical terms but also social discrimination and psychological trauma.

Moreover, the International Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons dealt with the question of the potential consequences if nuclear weapons were used today.

International scientists warned that a “regional” nuclear war between India and Pakistan would cause, in addition to the devastation, deaths and radiological contamination in the region, climate change on a global scale (“nuclear winter”), and significant decreases of food products that would risk two billion people's lives around the world (“nuclear famine”).4 Further noted was the risk that nuclear weapons could be detonated not only by an authorized command by a national leader but also in unauthorized ways, including by accident, human error, miscalculation, or even cyber attacks. Therefore, the nuclear deterrence argument that nuclear weapons can remain under safe control through state-to-state balance lacks credibility.

This recognition of the real risk associated with nuclear weapons has underpinned the international humanitarian movement to prohibit these weapons. The often-presented cynicism that humanitarian arguments are just emotional and idealistic is not relevant in this regard.

Humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia The humanitarian movement regarding nuclear weapons has been led by a group of enthusiastic countries, particularly from Europe, Latin America and Africa. Southeast Asian countries have also joined and contributed to this movement. In contrast, Northeast Asian countries have been generally negative5, except Mongolia - the only country from the region that participated in the negotiation and voted in support of the Prohibition Treaty. How can this difference be explained?

The first and foremost explanation is that Northeast Asian countries are still deeply dependent on the Cold War-type thinking that nuclear weapons constitute the central component of their national security. Both Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are dependent on the military alliance with the United States that engages nuclear weapons. China has chosen to be a nucleararmed state since the 1960s. The DPRK has publicly pursued its nuclear armament since 2006.

The Cold War divisions remain deeply rooted in Northeast Asia.

But in addition to this, the failure to achieve reconciliation from the past history among countries in the region may well also constitute an obstacle that prevents the recognition of the humanitarian aspect of nuclear weapons from being widely shared and accepted. Rather than an academically proven case, this is a hypothesis I have come to through a number of practices of peace activism.

For years, the Tokyo-based civil society organization Peace Boat, to which I belong, has conducted a project in which Hibakusha from Hiroshima and Nagasaki travel on board our chartered passenger ship, sharing their testimonies with citizens around the world. 6 Most “Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk?”, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), November 2013, http://www.ippnw.org/nuclear-famine.html.

5 Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated at a press conference in Hiroshima, commemorating the 72 nd anniversary of the atomic bombing, August 6, 2017, that Japan would not sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/06/national/hiroshima-marks72nd-anniversary-atomic-bombing-japans-refusal-join-nuke-ban-treaty/.

6 Global Voyage for a Nuclear Free World: Peace Boat Hibakusha Project http://peaceboat.org/english/?page=view&nr=83&type=28&menu=105.

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people they meet have heard of the names of the two cities, and have seen photos of the mushroom cloud taken from above by military planes. But very few people have heard of or imagined how humans suffered under this mushroom cloud. The average age of Hibakusha now exceeds 80. The way they courageously speak of the hell on earth that they had to experience impresses and moves the audience. Their efforts have thus contributed to building the grounds for a wide recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

However, it is also the case that the messages of Hiroshima and Nagasaki do not bring about a straightforward impact, particularly for the people of Japan's neighboring countries in Asia.

The Japanese story-telling of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their “no nukes and peace” messages have often been countered by reactions such as to ask, “What about Japan's past crimes and atrocities in its colonization and aggression?” Even more critically, some see that the stories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki aim to cover up the misconduct of Japan in World War II. In responding to such typical skepticism, Japanese peace groups have explained that that the purpose of sharing the testimony of Hibakusha is not to appeal about Japan's suffering. Rather, it is for the abolition of nuclear weapons, the most dangerous weapons on earth, which are posing a threat to the very survival of humankind. The Hibakusha do not want to see anyone in the world suffer from what they went through. In fact the Hibakusha are not all Japanese: Tens of thousands of Koreans, many of whom were forced to move to and work in Japan under Japan's colonial rule, were also exposed to the bombs, along with US prisoners of war. Japanese groups are working in solidarity with those non-Japanese Hibakusha and nuclear test victims around the world, presenting the concept of “Global Hibakusha.”7 These accounts do not always, in my experience, convince audiences from countries that suffered from Japan's acts in the past. They are generally reluctant to accept Hiroshima and Nagasaki as symbols of peace. This is understandable. All the more so, now that there are clear signs of historical revisionism gaining force in Japan, as seen in the behavior and speeches of politicians and opinion leaders in the country. If Japanese peace activists want to properly communicate the messages of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to others, they have to first tackle the issues of historical recognition within their own country.

That said, the lack of understanding of and indifference to the horrific nature of nuclear weapons seen among the people of Northeast Asia other than Japan do need to be addressed.

One can observe that it is the perception that the use of nuclear weapons on Japan liberated the people of Asia (an understanding of history which I do not believe is correct) that prevents those people from paying attention to the horrific nature of nuclear weapons. Such a barrier should be removed so that people can see the real face of nuclear weapons. As Northeast Asia today is escalating into an arms race involving nuclear weapons, it is necessary to establish the common understanding that nuclear weapons are weapons that will never be accepted or permitted. Education both for the public and for policy makers is essential, and needs to be urgently implemented.

International humanitarian law has the basic premise that the right of countries to choose means of warfare is not unlimited, as stated in the Preamble of the Prohibition Treaty. Countries can claim their rights of survival and self-defense. But it is not that any weapons can be permitted 7

As an example, see Peace Boat's Pacific Peace Forum in 2016, http://peaceboat.org/english/?page=view&nr=197&type=21&menu=62.

as legitimate for the sake of their survival or self-defense. Nuclear weapons are inherently nondiscriminatory and inhumane and therefore exceed the limit that is permitted as legitimate weapons. This is the logic of prohibiting nuclear weapons. This logic needs to be applied when the international community demands the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons. The abandonment of nuclear weapons should be demanded not because the DPRK is a “bad country,� but because nuclear weapons are bad weapons.

The International Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons have repeatedly addressed the simulated detonation of nuclear weapons, using cases such as Oslo, Mexico City and a US base in Central Europe. The simulated scientific data has led to the conclusion that there would be no international capacity to adequately respond to such a catastrophe. Even humanitarian relief would not be possible. Learning from such results, the governments and non-governmental actors of Northeast Asia are encouraged to consider convening a similar conference for the region. They could thus investigate the potential humanitarian consequences in the event of detonations of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia today, and discuss what can or cannot be prepared in a realistic sense.8 It is ironic that the only region in the world that has directly suffered from the use of nuclear weapons in wartime would have to make special efforts to recall the tragic memories after over 70 years. But it is very necessary, as in Northeast Asia there are dangerous signs of dealing with nuclear weapons too easily as a tool of international games.

The Prohibition Treaty and a nuclear-weapon-free Northeast Asia Civil society actors from Japan and the ROK have long called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia.9 But today, with the global Prohibition Treaty established, if the countries of Northeast Asia were to accede to the Prohibition Treaty together, the main objectives of a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be met without actually developing a new regional treaty.

A regional policy goal could be set, that the three countries of Japan, the ROK and the DPRK accede to the Prohibition Treaty at the same time. Such a joint accession would greatly contribute to the regional security of Northeast Asia. On the part of the DPRK, it would need to decide to abandon all nuclear weapons before acceding to the Prohibition Treaty. Then the DPRK would be required, upon its accession, to dismantle all its nuclear weapons programs, in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty, under the monitoring of an international authority (or authorities) in a time-bound, verifiable and irreversible manner. This would no doubt bring about security benefits for the ROK and Japan, and more widely, internationally.

On the part of Japan and the ROK, the two countries would first be legally obligated to ensure that no nuclear weapons are stationed, installed or deployed in their territories, including within the US bases located in those countries, in accordance with Article 1 (g) of the Treaty. The DPRK has called for a verified confirmation of the non-existence of nuclear weapons on ROK

8

As a precedent, refer to Hiroshima City's Report from the Committee of Experts on Damage Scenarios Resulting from a Nuclear Weapons Attack, November 2007, http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/1269591515524/files/houkokue1.pdf.

9 For example, see the project of the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA) of Nagasaki University to Develop a Comprehensive Approach to Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/en-asia.

soil as a premise to discuss nuclear disarmament.10 The ROK's accession to the Prohibition Treaty would address this concern of the DPRK. Secondly, Japan and the ROK would also be legally obligated to undertake to never under any circumstances assist, encourage or induce the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons by the US, in accordance with Article 1 (d) and (e). In other words, the two countries could still maintain their military alliances with the US but undertake not to assist, encourage or induce the particular act of using nuclear weapons.

The proponents of the traditional security concept of the “nuclear umbrella” for those countries would criticize such an option as unrealistic. However, it is important to understand that the essence of the “nuclear umbrella” is in fact, despite the protective nuance of the words, to assist, encourage and induce the use of nuclear weapons by others on one's behalf. If the US-allied countries such as Japan and the ROK were to determine never to undertake to assist, encourage or induce the use of nuclear weapons in view of the unacceptable humanitarian consequences, this would become a significant restraint preventing military tensions in the region from escalating into a nuclear exchange.

Still, the question of how to deal with the three nuclear-armed states, namely, China, the US and Russia, remains. The US and Russia have a bilateral scheme for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. China does not have any nuclear disarmament regime internationally. Still, it should be recalled that China has a declared policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Moving a step further, China is encouraged to adopt a policy of increased transparency to convince the international community that their nuclear weapons are not placed to be used, assuring to prevent the occurrence of catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

Conclusion This paper focused on issues relating specifically to nuclear weapons, and could not examine other issues of importance for peace and security in Northeast Asia. Among these issues is Japan's possible revision of Article 9 of its Constitution.

Japan's Abe administration is currently preparing a new proposal of Constitutional revision, which would keep the words “renunciation of war” within Article 9 unchanged, but add an explicit provision regarding the Self-Defense Forces to the same article.11 Their argument for such a revision is that Japan would remain committed to never wage war again, but to provide expressly in the Constitution that the country retains the necessary minimum military capacity for its self-defense. Here the key questions are who and how to define the “necessary minimum,” and whether surrounding countries could be confident in and accept this “necessary minimum”.

Even for the self-defense of a country, there must be a red line to be kept and not exceeded.

Seeking and establishing a common standard for that is the foundation of common security of a region. Rejecting nuclear weapons under any circumstances shall be an essentially necessary, albeit not solely sufficient, element of a common security for Northeast Asia.

Moon, Chung-in, “Basis for a breakthrough in Pyongyang statement?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 14, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-what-now.

11 The Constitution of Japan, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

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