THE QUALITIES OF A WORLD-BEATING RAILWAY

IN THE FINAL ISSUE OF 2021, COLIN WHEELER LOOKS AT THE LATEST RAIL SAFETY INCIDENTS INCLUDING NOVEMBER'S COLLISION AT SALISBURY, THE DANGERS OF ABANDONED HALF TROLLIES, AND THE DERAILMENT OF A FREIGHT TRAIN AT SHEFFIELD STATION

People skills, knowledge, motivation. The use of railway engineering and operational judgement. These are the qualities I believe are needed to make the services and safety of our future railways − the Great British Railways – the best in the world. Recent reports of accidents, incidents, and near misses indicate the size of the task, but it will be worthwhile.

Unfortunately, while we await an announcement about the appointment of Simon French’s successor as Chief Inspector for the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), the organisation’s workload has been substantially increased by recent events.

Salisbury passenger trains collide

On 3 November, Anna Witherington, on behalf of the RAIB gave an update on the causes of the collision between two in-service passenger trains that occurred on 31 October. At around 18:45 that evening, the 17:20 South Western passenger train from London Waterloo to Honiton collided with the side of the 17:08 Great Western passenger service from Portsmouth Harbour to Bristol Temple Meads at Salisbury Tunnel Junction. The junction is near Salisbury in the immediate approach to Fisherton Tunnel. The South Western train was using the junction to join the Down Main from the Down Dean line as the Great Western train approached the junction from the Basingstoke direction.

Low wheel/rail adhesion

to derail. Both trains continued for some distance into Fisherton Tunnel. The RAIB’s preliminary investigation established that the South Western train driver had braked on the approach to signal SY 31 and, 12 seconds later, made an emergency brake application. A second emergency brake was applied by the Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) but the train still passed the signal and reached the junction where the collision occurred.

The On Train Data Recorder analysis showed that wheel slide occurred “almost certainly as a result of low adhesion between train wheels and the rails.” Doubtless we will learn more when the RAIB has completed its investigation.

Injuries at Grosmont

around 10:32 when a Class 20 diesel locomotive ran into the back of a passenger train. Five passengers suffered minor injuries and there was some damage to the train. Following a preliminary examination, the RAIB has decided that they will publish a Safety Digest.

Another UWC incident

On 18 September − soon after I reported on the mid-August incident at Kisby on 19 August − there was a near miss on Forestry User Worked Crossing (UWC) between Thetford and Brandon in rural Norfolk. This occurred in the early morning at about 06:05 when two cars were involved in a near miss with a passenger train. Again, following their preliminary examination the RAIB has decided to issue a Safety Digest. Local press reports have suggested that the level crossing itself may have been faulty.

WORLD-BEATING RAILWAY

Colin Wheeler.

Passenger train crashes into buffer stop

This accident at Enfield Town station involved 75 passengers though fortunately only two required treatment for minor injuries. It occurred at 08:21 on the morning of 12 October when a passenger train ran into the platform two buffer stop and ended up in a raised position, balanced on top of the buffer stop, which was also detached by the impact. On 25 October the RAIB announced that its investigation will “seek to identify the sequence of events leading to the collision,” as well as the “facts influencing the driver’s actions, the training, supervision and management of drivers by Arriva Rail London, design and configuration of the buffer stops, and the assessment and risk control of terminal platform overruns at Enfield Town Station”.

Half trolley struck at speed

At 06:10 on 21 October, a Great Western train struck a half link trolley at Challow, between Didcot and Swindon, at a speed of around 100mph. Thankfully there were no injuries, but the train was damaged and ended up with the trolley wedged beneath it. One hundred and thirty-five passengers were stranded, and the Down Main line was closed for three and a half hours. Network Rail’s Safety Advice comments that “the trolley had been left behind after the work”.

The Controller of Site Safety (COSS) had signed out with the Engineering Supervisor by telephone and the worksite was then handed back by the Person in Charge of Possession (PICOP) as “Safe for the passage of trains”. The website item adds that “this was the second occasion in recent weeks that a trolley has been left behind after work and then missed by the “clear of line verification arrangements”. Once upon a time the PICOPs actually walked through to check for themselves!

Derailment of freight train carrying cement powder

The RAIB report on this accident that occurred on 11 November 2020 was published on 5 October this year. The RAIB’s 50-page report is titled “07/2021 Freight Train Derailment at Sheffield Station”. Its contents are both relevant and significant in railway operating, and the responsibilities and competencies needed for track engineering inspections, maintenance and renewals. It is recommended reading for those designing the future track inspection and maintenance organisation of Great British Railways.

This incident saw 16 of the freight train’s 34 wagons derailed at the north end of Sheffield Station. The train was travelling from Hope in Derbyshire to Dewsbury in West Yorkshire. The wagons were loaded with cement powder carried in PCA tank wagons, hauled by a Class 66 locomotive. PCA cement tank wagons have two axles, a wheelbase of 4.88 metres, and weigh 13 tonnes when empty and 51 tonnes when loaded.

The train had been “coasting” through the station at just 12mph when the derailment happened. A number of the wagons were damaged and there was also significant damage to the track. This resulted in the partial closure of the station.

The leading right-hand wheel of the 12th wagon had dropped between the two running rails which were too far apart due to gauge widening. The train was stopped when the signaller saw a number of equipment failures on a display screen and alerted the driver.

Track screws broken

The report says that a number of track screws had broken “several weeks or perhaps months before the derailment.” These had not been identified by Network Rail’s maintenance and inspection activities, despite being a “location with a potentially high risk of derailment”. The RAIB found that “Network Rail’s guidance for identifying such risk had not been applied”.

The report clearly states that the train driver did not contribute to the derailment. The track maintenance engineer (TME) had worked on the railway for 12 years, six of them as assistant TME at Sheffield and was appointed as acting TME just five months before the derailment. The Sheffield Infrastructure Maintenance Engineer (IME) had 29-years’ experience with six of these as TME at Sheffield. His appointment as acting IME was also made just five months before the derailment.

The derailment occurred between the crossing and switch rail of 4062 points. The lefthand wheel then climbed over the left-hand rail because the outer face of the right-hand rail was constrained as the gauge tightened approaching the switch toes of 4062 points. When the derailed wagon 12 reached the points of 4068A it did not follow the diverging right-hand route but attempted the straight route into the shunt neck siding, causing it to fall onto its side and wagon 11 etc to derail.

There were no injuries, but the north end of the station remained partially closed for five days. There was damage to both wheels and couplings on wagon 11 and wagons 13 to 26. Wagon 12’s suspension was severely damaged and largely detached. Its tank was ruptured, resulting in cement powder being spilt onto the tracks.

Causes of the derailment

The RAIB found that the derailment occurred due to: (i) multiple track screws securing the rail baseplates to the bearers had failed prior to the derailment; (ii) failed track screws had not been identified by the inspection regime; (iii) there was no additional mitigation at 4062 points as they had not been identified as a highrisk location; and (iv) the design of 4062 points did not include a check rail on the sub-200 metre radius curve between the crossing and switch heel.

Visual inspections, shuffle and gauge widening

The RAIB found that in the weeks before the derailment all “Basic Visual Inspections” had been carried out weekly and in daylight hours by track patrollers and defects had been identified, although on the last four record sheets no defects had been recorded. The record for 7 October noted “baseplate shuffle at the heel of 4062 points” and a review of earlier records found a note of shuffle back on 5 June 2019.

The requirement is for threemonthly supervisor’s inspections and two-yearly engineer’s inspections. During their investigation RAIB inspectors were told that there were “long standing issues with gaining access to some of the lines at Sheffield Station to perform routine inspections and maintenance.” In September 2020 the gauge at the point of derailment was 13mm wider than that measured a year earlier. A probable factor

The RAIB found that there had been no dynamic measurement of track geometry for 15 months and states that this was “a probable factor” in the derailment. Network Rail uses a single multi-purpose vehicle (MPV) to measure dynamic geometry and was scheduled to do so at Sheffield every three months. However, no recording runs had been made since November 2019. They also found that of the 19 threemonthly runs only five delivered data on the Down Through line. The RAIB report also observes that “the format of dynamic geometry data output from the MPV track recording vehicle makes it difficult for it to be analysed by maintenance staff”.

Recommendations

The RAIB recommendations relate to: (i) improved management of derailment risk at high-risk locations; (ii) improved implementation of safety critical track maintenance activities; (iii) alignment of standards and practice for the use of check rails; and (iv) improving the ability of track maintenance staff to detect changes in track geometry.

In the preface to the reports published by the RAIB they state that “it is inappropriate that RAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame or determine liability since neither the investigation nor the process has been undertaken for that purpose”.

However, Network Rail and the Office of Rail and Road, (and, in the longer term, those who will design the management organisation for Great British Railways) would do well to review their plans having studied this report by the RAIB.

The questions I am left with after studying it include: • Is it good practice to fill vacancies by stepping up a number of safety responsible engineers and inspection staff rather than promoting them to other areas to widen their experience and bring a fresh pair of eyes to bear? • Do local inspection staff have the delegated power and authority to close the railway when they have track safety concerns and if not, why not? • Where maintenance or renewal work has to be deferred or delayed, and track conditions deteriorate, do the local TME and

IME have the authority to apply speed or axle weight restrictions or close the railway for safety’s sake and without retribution? • Surely, if the standard requires inspections and dynamic measurement runs every three months, missing more than one should result in line closure?

You may gather that I consider this report to be as far reaching as any I have read. The lessons from it should be remembered when the organisation of Great British Railways is being developed. Perhaps the most important attributes for a safer railway are the commitment and team spirit aimed at always doing the best for the railway.

Whatever the organisation is, there will inevitably be potential conflict between commercial, operating and infrastructure engineering people. But, at the end of the day, local infrastructure engineering staff backed by their professional engineers must take responsibility for the safety of the line and be prepared to stop traffic when running trains becomes unsafe.

LRSSB UNDER REVIEW

THE PROGRESS OF THE LIGHT RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD (LRSSB) IS UNDER SCRUTINY AND ITS ORGANISATION, MEMBERSHIP, AND OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED.

The term Light Rail dates back to 1896. It was coined when legislation was passed by Parliament allowing local agreement to the construction and operation of rail-guided transport using lighter equipment, and operating at lower speeds than heavy rail. Tramways have a more specific definition being rail-guided but operating using a significant element of street running.

The existing Birmingham-based Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB) was set up in 2018 following publication of the (RAIB) Rail Accident Investigation Board’s report of the Sandilands Croydon Tram accident in 2016 (Report number 18/2017). Its founding was triggered by a recommendation made in that report, but there was some delay before funding was secured.

The recommendation called for “the development of a new body to enable more effective UK wide cooperation on matters relating to safety and the development of common standards and good practice guidance.” The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) adds that it must now question the degree of progress on this and the other recommendations. It has been suggested that the name of the organisation, membership, and objectives should be updated.

There is an obvious comparison to be drawn with the Rail Safety and Standards Board which has earned the respect of the heavy rail industry, but the diverse nature and number of light rail developments over the years makes the work of LRSSB more difficult.

A LIGHT TOUCH REVIEW

Responding to an invitation from the directors of LRSSB, the ORR launched a review of its operations as a part of its role as the “statutory regulator and enforcing authority for railways and tramways” and the “custodian of recommendation 1 from the RAIB report”. The review is intended to “consider what has been delivered by the LRSSB, the impact of funding on their work and whether in its current form it enables LRSSB to grow and fully commit to the terms of reference.”

On 18 October, ORR published the “Terms of Reference” for its review. ORR has said it will conduct a “light touch review” aimed at assessing the delivery of the RAIB

LRSSB UNDER REVIEW

recommendations. It has also said that “a comprehensive review could be conducted once the LRSSB has matured, and its funding has long term security”.

RAIB RECOMMENDATIONS

One recommendation refers to the “use of technology such as automatic braking and systems to monitor driver awareness”. The second called for “a systematic review of operational risks and control measures associated with the design, maintenance and operation of tramways”. The third recommended “suitable measures to automatically reduce tram speeds if trams approach higher risk locations at speeds which could result in derailment or overturning”.

Recommendation four calls for research into systems capable of “reliably detecting driver attention state and initiating appropriate automatic responses if a low level of alertness is identified”. Number five mandates that “owners, operators and infrastructure managers should review signage, lighting and other visual information available and required by drivers on the approach to high-risk locations such as tight curves.” The sixth calls for “a review of research to identify ways of improving the passenger containment provided by tram windows and doors”.

A COMBINED ORGANISATION?

The adequacy of funding is under review. It would also be good to see more information about the development of a “Tram Accident and Incident Reporting Database” for sharing information, and how it may best assist RIDDOR reporting of accidents and the reporting of incidents as well as the implementation of appropriate research.

The parallels with the work of LRSSB’s big brother RSSB need to be taken into account as does the restricted membership of the Light Rail Group. Maybe Light Rail should be an integral part of RSSB with its own identity? This could benefit them both and clear the way for a combined organisation.

FULL STEAM AHEAD TO SUSTAINABILITY

GOING FURTHER AND FASTER ON SUSTAINABILITY IS KEY TO UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF THE RAILWAY

With world leaders having just met at COP26, we would hope no-one would argue with the statement that climate change is high on everyone’s agenda. However, there will always be different views about how sustainability improvements should be delivered. RSSB is prepared for this, with in-house expertise on sustainability topics, ready to serve members and help them with their own sustainability challenges.

RSSB is leading the development of the first industry-wide approach to sustainability, by collaborating with the rail industry and Government. Directly supporting the delivery of the Williams-Shapps Plan for Rail, the Sustainable Rail Strategy, co-created by industry sustainability experts led by RSSB, will set out options and choices to inform development of Great British Railways’ Whole Industry Strategic Plan (WISP). AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

The Sustainable Rail Strategy will provide clear goals for the rail industry, converting what the Government has set out in policy and what society expects a major industry like ours to be doing in this space. However, a strategy and goals are useless without driving action on the ground. It’s crucial that we identify what needs to be done, what we prioritise, and how much funding is needed. Driving further improvements in areas such as decarbonisation, air quality, biodiversity, and social sustainability, both efficiently and safely.

The industry is already working towards this by introducing new technology, increasing resilience to climate change, and considering the wider social benefits of connecting national and local communities. But more work is needed to ensure we are able to maintain our position ahead of other modes.

As well as investment in the right assets, we need colleagues running the railway to be better informed so they can do the right thing. That’s why our work going forward to support our members will be less about the ‘what’ and more about the ‘how’. How should procurement teams make better decisions when it comes to goods and services to deliver a more sustainable railway? Similarly, colleagues in finance teams will need to understand how they can build investment business cases that account not just for the financial, but the environmental and social capitals using the Accounting for Sustainability approach.

SHARP FOCUS 2050 may seem a long way away, but when you consider the work that needs to be done, it’s not. That’s why RSSB is taking rail sustainability so seriously. Focusing our expertise and resources to support the rail industry, as it moves at pace to better understand the barriers to improving environmental and social sustainability, and to develop safe, efficient, and innovative solutions. And our members are just as committed.

This autumn, RSSB launched a detailed air quality monitoring programme at railway sites across the network and will be shortly releasing a tool developed to help our members measure the social value of their operations. Our work on the Sustainable Rail Strategy continues.

© Bradley Caslin

If you would like to know more about RSSB’s efforts in this area, or are interested in the services we provide to members, please get in touch at: customer-portal.rssb.co.uk or visit www.rssb.co.uk/sustainability