Caso de polución, bahía de Gaspe, Canada - Corbeta FNV Carabobo 1945

SHIP-SOURCE OIL POLLUTION FUND

SHIP-S0URCE 0IL POLLUTION FUND

DEDICATION

In memory ofthe men and women ofCanada 's Naval Forces 1939-1945

Cover: Corvette HMCS AMHERST, in Nova Scotia waters, probably near Halifax, Augu t 1943 Corvette HMCS KAMSACK personnel, Molville, Ireland, ca. 1942

The following is reproduced from "The Ships ofCanada' Naval Force 1910-2002", Third Edition, by Ken Macpher on and Ron Barrie, courtesy the authors and Vanwell Pubti hing Limited, St. Catherine' , Ontario, I B 1-55125-072-1.

AMHERST- Commissioned at Saint John, New Brunswick on 5 August 1941, she arrived at Halifax on 22 August and after working up, joined Newfoundland Command in Octobet: She was ·teadily employed as an ocean escort for the succeeding three years, during which time she was involved in two particularly hardjought convoy baules: ON.l27 (August 1942) and SC.107 (October 1942). She had joined EG C-4 in August 1942. Her only real respite was befiVeen May and ovember 1943 when she tmdenvelll a major refit at Charlottetown, including, the extension of her fo'c's'le. After workups at Pictou, ova Scotia, she returned to the North Atlantic until September 1944 when she began another long refit, this time at Liverpool, Nova Scotia. Following workups in Bermuda in JanuGiy 1945 she joined Halifax Force, bill in March was loaned to EG C-7 for one round trip to UK. She waspaid off11 July 1945 at Sydney, and placed in reserve at Sorel. Sold in 1945, she was wrecked in the Gulf of St. Lnwrence en rowe to become the Venezuelan Navy's CARABOBO.

A!LCDR L.C. Audette, RCNVR (as he then wa) commanded AMHERST from 2019142 to 2415144. Mr. udette wa a formerAdministrator ofthe Fund.

See CARABOBO at Section 3.72, herein.

Photographs courtesy: DND I National Archive ofCanada I PA-133980

Francis Curry Collection I National Archive ofCanada/ PA-125860

KIA ON5

Dear Mr. Collenette:

It i an honour to ubmit the Annual Report for the Shjp- ource Oil Pollution Fund for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2002, in accordance with S ction 100 of the Marine Liability Act.

Your incerely

Kenneth A. Maclnnj , Q.C. Adrnini trator

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

The Honourable David Collenette, P-C., M.P. Minister of Transport Ottawa, Ontario

Abbreviations of Proper Names used in this Report

American Bureau of Shipping

Atlantic Emergency Response Team

Arctic Marine Oilspill Program

Canadian Coast Guard

Centre of Documentation, Research and Experimentation on Accidental Water Pollution

Canadian Environmental Protection Act

Civil Liability Convention

Canadian Marine Advisory Council

Comite Maritime Law International

Canadian Maritime Law Association

Compensation for Oil Pollution in European Waters

Canada Port Authority

Canada ShippingAct

Combined Sewer Outfalls

Canadian Wildlife Service

Department of Fisheries and Oceans

Det Norske Veritas

Deadweight Tonnage

European Commission

Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Regulations

Eastern Canada Response Corporation

Exclusive Economic Zone

Emergency Response

Environmental Protection Agency

European Union

Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Units

Floating Storage Units

Hazardous and Noxious Substances

International Commission on Shipping

International Chamber of Shipping

International Maritime Organization

International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund

International Safety Management Code

International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited

Limiation of Liability for Maritime Claim

Letter of Undertaking

Marine Pollution

Marine Communication Traffic Services

Marine Environment Protection Committee

Marine LiabilityAct

Memorandum of Understanding

Maritime Pollution Claims Fund

Maritime Safety Committee

Motor Tanker

Motor Vessel

National Aerial Surveillance Program

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Natural Resource Damage Assessment

Northern Transportation Company Limited

Ore/Bulk/Oil

Oil Companies International Marine Forum

Oil PollutionAct

Oil PollutionAct 1990 (US)

Oil Spill Response Ltd.

Protection and Indemnity (Marine Insurance) Association

Parts per Million

Point Tupper Marine Services Limited

Regional Environmental Emergency Team

The Italian Classification Society

Response Organization

Search and Rescue

Special Drawing Rights*

Situation Report

Societe d'lntervention Maritime, Est du Canada

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

Transport Canada

Transport Canada Marine Safety

Transportation Safety Board

United Kingdom

United States

United States Coast Guard

Vancouver Port Authority

Vancouver Port Corporation

Western Canada Marine Response Corporation

* The value of the SDR at April 1,2002, was approximately $2.00165. This actual value is reflected in Figure 1 in Appendix D. Elsewhere in the report, for convenience, calculations are based on the SDR having a nominal value of $2.

Introduction

s dmini trator of the Ship- omce Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF), I am pleased to submit this Annual Report for the rtfi cal ear 2001-2002. We welcome this opportunity for reflection - to recaJI how far we have come, to value ' hat we ha e now, to apprai e om cunent and prospective obligations and, hopefully, tooffer constructive insights for onsideration in future action

Canada ha hown con iderable fore ight over the years in fashioning a unique well-functioning domestic compen ation regime.

A Universal Problem

At the "In ight Conference" on Emergency Respon e Planning for Marine Industries held in Vancouver in January 2002, I di cu ed the de elopment ofthe Canadian regime. A few decades ago in mo t countries the legal options for eeking compen ation for marine oil pollution damage and the recovery ofcost and expenses for clean-up and monitoring were limited. In Canada in orderto e tablish the liability ofare ponsible party there was generally a requirement to pro e negligence, nui ance, etc. Even then i sue uch a judgement proofing, bankruptcy, insolvency, juri diction and one- hip companie pre ented difficult to in unnountable recovery challenge Such issues cried out for tatutory olution

A Canadian Solution

The cataly t for a made in Canada olution occun·ed in 1970 when the tanker Arrow grounded on Cerberu Rock in Chedabucto Ba , o a cotia. fter the Arrow incident, major amendment were made tothe Canada Shipping Act (CSA). The new oil pill legi lation in Part XX ofthe C A be ame pru1 ofCanadian Law on June 30, 1971. Predating the entry into force of the international 1969 Ci it Liabilit on ention by more than four yeru· , and the international 1971 IOPC Fund on ention b more than e en eru· , the new Part X wa one ofthe fir t nationaJ comprehen i e regime for oil pill liability in the we t rn world.

The principal element ofPart XX were:

•

e tabli hing the trict liability f hipowner t b re p n ible for o t and damage fora di charge ofoil; allowing the hipowner, in ertain ir um tan e , to limit hi liability to an amount linked to the hip's tonnage; creating a new fund, the Maritime Pollution laim Fund (MP F), to be a ailable for claim in exce of the hipowner' limit ofliabilit ; and, gi ing the Mini ter ofTran p011 the power to mo e or di po ofany hip and it cru·go di chru·ging or likely to di charge oil.

Thi regime wa in place between 1971 and 19 9, thu anadian authoritie w re ready when the Briti h tanker Kurdisran broke in two in the ab t trait in 1979 n route from o a cotia to Qu b c with a heated cargo of Bunker C oil. ee preci at page and 47.

In 1989 Canada decided to increa e it oil tanker pill ov r by be oming a ontracting tate in the international regime, while modifying and continuing it dome tic regime. The OP came into force on April 24, 1989, by amendment to the CSA and ucceeded the MP F.

The SOPF i intended to pay claim regarding oil pill from all cla e of hip at any place in Canada, or in Canadian water including the exclu ive economic zone. Thu , the OPF i not limited tooil tanker orto per i tent oil, a i the International Fund.

Thecurrent tatutory claim regime i found in the Marine Liability Act (MLA) .. 2001, c.6. Thi Act, which came into force on Augu t 8, 2001, continue the regime that wa previou ly found in the C A.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

The Rule of Law

The Administrator is the Canadian official who directs payment ofdome tic claim and authorizes and monitors payments ofall Canadian contribution to the International Fund from the SOPF.

The Administrator is wholly accountable to Parliament for all payments out ofthe SOPF.

The Administrator holds office during good behaviourfor a fixed term and, on the arne principle as for thejudiciary, is subject to removal by the Governor in Council for cau e.

Parliament has stipulated thattheAdministrator shall not hold any office oremployment in�on. i t�nt with his dutie as Administrator. He is a statutory authority that must be independent ofthe Crown, the h1ppmg/m urance mdustry, etc

The shipowner is deemed to be strictly liable (even without being negligent) for oil pollution damage from the hip and forcosts and expenses incuned forcertain measure taken in this regard, to the extent that both the measure taken and the costs and expenses arereasonable, by virtue ofsubsection 51(1) ofthe MlA.

The extent ofthe SOPF's potential liabilities forclaim for the matter referred to in ub ection 51(I) i et out in section 84 ofthe Act.

In addition, a person may file a claim with the Admini trator undersection 85, for lo , damage, or incurred co t and expenses referred to in subsection 51(1).

On receipt ofa claim the Administrator shall investigate and as e the claim; and make an offerofcompen ation for whatever portion ofthe claim he finds to be e tabli hed.

The Administrator shall dismiss a claim if satisfied on the evidence that the occurrence wa not cau ed by a hip.

TheAdministrator must take all reasonable measures to recoverthe amount ofthe payment from the hip wner, the International Fund, or any other person liable. Shipowner will normally repay the Admini trator only to the extent of their legal liability obligations.

Thus, particularly in the investigation, assessment and payment ofclaim , the Admini trator mu tact in a cordance with the laws governing the operation ofthe SOPF He ha no choice. He mu t not act arbitrarily or in accordance with policies contrary to Canadian Law.

A Pragmatic Approach

I continue to receive excellent assistance from per ons in both the private and public ector a well a from the International Fund's Director and members of its Secretariat. I am particularly plea ed with the c peration of Canadian shipowners, the oil industry, and the Canadian Maritime Law A o iation. I make a point of meeting and speaking with members ofthesegroups as often a possible. I would like to note in particular orne ati fying developments in the matterofCrown claims on the SOPF.

On taking up the office ofAdministrator I wa made aware that the CCG had i ued a paper di u ing the governance options for its funding ofresponse and monitoring co t pending their reco ery from the hipowner, the International Fund, and/or the SOPF (see Annual Report 1998-1999).

As invited, along with industry, I responded to the CCG discussion paper. We were mindful that the dmini trator must make an offer of compensation for oil pollution damage, when all or a portion ofthe claim i clear! e tabli hed by the evidence. To this end, while our response had to restate ornefundamental tatutory principle , we nevertheless also sought to be positive and practical. We offered way to impro e the pre entation and handlino of CCG claims. o

First we recalled that the present statutory claims regime, on the principle that the polluter pays, ha a it "four cornerstones":

1. All costs and expenses must be reasonable.

2. All clean-up measures taken must be reasonable measures.

3. All costs and expenses must have been actually incurred.

4. All claims must be investigated and assessed by an independent authority (the Adrnini trator).

\ e n t d that a fundamental principle ofthe Canaclian regime is that all claimants must be treated equally. This i a r quirement of the ct. !though the 1993 amendment to the CSA gave the Crown direct access to the SOPF for the ftr t tim , it confeiTed no pecial tatu on claim filed by the Crown a compared to claims from other claimant .

e further noted to CCG that ugge tions that the SOPF hould accept without question, as reasonable any response a tion clir ted or appro ed on- cene by the CCG or other on-scene commander or any charges made by a Certified Re pon e Organization, are incompatible with the tatutory requirement for the Administrator to independently det mline rea onablene and to deal in fairness and equality towards all claimants on the SOPF.

Fin:tlly, with a iew to proposing a practical and immediate way forward to CCG's timely recovery ofco ts and expen e . we noted to them that:

Experience shows that the investigation and as essment ofclaims is expedited when claimants provide convincing e\ idence and written explanation This includes variousjustifications by the On-Scene Commander (OSC) and proofofpayment, etc. Detailed logs and notes by the OSC and other are invaluable infacilitating the ettlement and payment ofclaims. It is essential that the measure taken and the cost and expenses incurred are demonstrably reasonable. The claim should be presented in a timely manna

At that time the ubnli ion ofCCG claim documentation to the SOPF took an average ofabout 11 months from the date ofthe incident, which in it elfnegatively impacted on any po sible ettlement within the fiscal yearin que tion.

Our letterconcluded by offering todi cu withCCGofficial fu1therpractical mea ure thatcanbetakenbytheCCG and theSOPF with a iew toimprovingthe pre entation and handJjng ofclaim in amannercon i tent with sound bu ine practice , and in accordance with the law go eming theoperationofthe SOPF.

Outreach

Immediately after my appointment, we underto k initiati e to deep n our under tanding ofth per pective of ariou takeholder in the Canadian regime. e al o met with offi ial in ariou go ernment department Because the CCG make claim on the OPF, we particularly arranged t me l with th Commi ioner and the then Deputy Cornmi ioner ofthe CCG ith a iew to e tabli hing a po iti e relation hip. l believe we all were encouraged by our di cu ion , and our mutual ommitm nt to r ol p nly.

Co-operation brings results

official The OPF' legal recovery ffi ial regarding the cau e upporting the rea onablenes

A a re ult ofjointeffort by C G and OPF, the pre ntati n fC G claim ha improved ignificantly. Thi has helped to reduce the time required forthe dmini trator to in e tigate and a e the re pective claims after their receipt by the OPF.

There are ca e where it appear that the occun·ence that ga e ri e to the damage wa not cau ed by a hip, and the SOPF would not be liable. In mo t ca e the determination ofcau e can be concluded in relatively hartorder but in ome, the inve tigation ofcau e can be very difficult and time-con uming.

Thereareoutstanding i ue . Forexample, the matterofju tifying underthe MLA, the current methodology u ed by CCG to calculate itsAdminj trative co t in claim Such co t must al obe demon trably actually incurred andrea onable.

Ship- ource Oil Pollution Fund

Overall, at this point we are greatly encouraged by the considerable progre s being made on many fronts.

I am also pleased to note the continuing and con tructive dialogue we have with the Depart?lent ofJ�stice legal team at DFO/CCG Headquarters on matters arising during the investigation ofclaim . CG Reg1ons o�licmls are . continuing to extend full co-operation during the SOPF's investigation ofclaims. In the r _ re entat1�n of G cla1ms. there is a continuing improvement in the timeliness, quality and extent ofthe documentallon subm1tted to the S PF.

A review of past years' claims indicates that on average CCG claim were received a follow : For incidents that occuned in 1997- 1 998 the average time from the incident to the ubmi sion ofthe claim to th� ?PF was 39 weeks. The subsequent investigation and assessment by the SOPFtook approximately 29 week . For 1�C1�ents that occurred in the year 2000-2001 the conesponding figures were 42 weeks and 6 week , re pect1vely. For mc1dent that occulTed in the year 2001 -2002, the figures were 32 weeks and 3 weeks, respectively. Ofparticular note wa the Ocean Venture incident (section 3.81) in Rimouski, Quebec, where the CCG claim wa ubmitted 54 day. afterthe incident and investigated and assessed by the SOPF in 19 days. The reductions in SOPF inve tigation and as.e ment times can be partly attributed to improved supporting documentation from CCG and in ome ca e . report to the Administrator by SOPF appointed surveyors and CCG officers on site during the incident re pon e.

Further, in considering the foregoing paragraph it should be appreciated that in ome ca e the Crown attempted to recover its costs directly from the shipowner before coming to the SOPF. Such action by the Crown are commendable and in accord with the principle of "polluter pay ". It hould be noted that uch action can lead to an increase in the length oftime between the incident and submission ofthe Crown claim to the OPF ee ection 4.5.

A review ofrecent incidents clearly illustrates the positive results and theout tanding effort being made by C G Regional official The following are some examples - there are other :

1. Sam WonHo (see section 3.24). The CCG ( ewfoundland Region) pre ented a claim for co t and expenses. I consider the presentation and upport documentation ofthi claim, a compiled by the official in the Region, to be exemplary. This facilitated a full a e ment, ettlement and payment ofthe claim within the fiscal year.

2. AnneJolene (see section 3.79). The CCG (Maritime Region) contracted to remove the e el a a pollution prevention measure. The completeness ofthe documentation and the manner in which the incident wa presented by the region was impressive. My on- ite urveyor received complete cooperation from G officials throughout. The openness ofthe official directly involved wa bu ine -like and helpful. Consequently, the claim could be assessed and paid within the fi cal year.

3. Mystery Oil Spill - Port-Carticr, Quebec ( ee ection 3.25). Excellent documentation was ubmitted b the CCG (Quebec Region) including log books, notes taken on ite and tho e note recorded at G Regional Headquatters. The package included variousju tification by the On-SceneCommander (0 )and proofof payment, as applicable. Thisclaim wa asse sed within three weeks ofreceipt butcouldnotbepaid, becau e a land-based spill had not yet been ruled out. The claim documentation al o facilitated the dmini trator' continuing investigation ofthe cause of this incident.

4. MilesandSea (see section 3.93). The CCG (Central and Arctic Region) contracted for the omainment and clean-up ofthe oil. Preliminary report uggestthat CCG/DFO official undertook ub equent wre k removal and/or salvage pursuant to the Fishing and Recreational Harbour Act, a oppo ed to ection 67 CSA See also Sam Won Ho (section 3.24).

5. Duke (see section 3.84) I wa immediately contacted by the CCG official in Prince Rupert and a able to ensure that �e SOPF nghts were prote�ted. The handling ofthi incident illu trate the importance oftime! comm�mcatJO� by CCG ER officials With the �dmini trator and CCG legal coun el re peering the receipt of fma�cJaJ secunty be�ore the release ofa vessel mvolved in an incident. Weare encouraged by the contmumg consultation and cooperatiOn ofCCG official in Vancouver, Victoria and Prince Rupert.

International "Optional" Third Tier (Supplementary Fund)

I am plea ed \ ith the po iti e development currently taking place on the international front in respect of the e tabli hment of an IOPC "optional" third tier (Supplementary Fund) to cover liability for major ship-source oil pollution incident The cunent Canadian position, which includes that ofthe Administrator ofthe SOPF, is upporti e ofthe initiati e to establish an "optional" Supplementary Fund under the international regime. However, we under tand that upport for the initiative does not imply a Canadian decision tojoin the Supplementary Fund hould it be e tabli hed and come into force. Any decision on Canada's interests would be made by Cabinet. We are ad i ed that any recommendation to cabinet would be preceded by full and healthy discussions involving both go ernrnent agencies and non-government stakeholders with interest in the Canadian and international ship-source oil pollution regime

The purpo e and reason for having thi "option" is nicely put in the ITOPF Review 2002:

" the International Supplementary Fund, would be availablefor ratification on an optional basis by States thatare party to the 1992 CLC and Fund Convention. This Supplementary Fund was designed to meet the concerns of those States that continue to consider that the 50% increase in the CLC and Fund limits agreed by the IMO in October 2000 (ejfecti1 e ]st ovember 2003) might still be insufficient to meet all valid claim arising out ofa major incident. It was also reasoned that this international Supplementary Fund would render unnecessmy the European COPE Fund proposed by the European Commission in December 2000. "

There may be tho e who need no convincing. For other , the need for Canada tojoin an "optional" Supplementary Fund may not be apparent. Apart from Canada· ultimate intere t , there are here arguably legitimate i ues ofvalue and co t , including potential impact on the viability of the SOPF' CUITent mode offunding by income from interest only.

For example, on the one hand, there i an increa e, both current and pro pective, in off- hore oil exploitation. On the other hand, in orthAmerica oil tanker incident app ar to ha e fall n offdramatically. The United State Coast Guard (U CG) 1999 record how that 94 percent of oil pill incident and 70 percent of volume are from ve sel other than tank hip and tank barge In anada, a ur ey of anadian oil pill incident reported by the SOPF Admini trator from 1993 to 2000 how 12 per ent w re from tanker , 62 per ent were from other ve el and 26 percent \ ere m tery pill In other word , per ent of the e anadian oil pill incident were not covered by the international lOP Fund It i aid that nforcement of hip afety r gulation and oil pollution regulations, a well a po iti e effort by hipowner , may b redited with the drop in tanker in id nt in orth America.

There i al o a recent P&I lub tudy howing that with the e eption of Erika and akhodka, all non-USA pill , 1990- 1 999, inflated to 1999 alue , would ha ben omp n ated under th in rea ed 1992 CLC and IOPC Fund limit effecti e in 2003 ( 405 million per in ident). The ame tudy indicated that the o t ofall USA tanker and oil barge pill (actual and inflated alue ) ince the enactm nt of OR 90 and up to th end of 1999 would have fallen within the exi ting 1992 LC and IOP Fund limit ( _70 million p r in ident). ee page 80.

We under tand that it i con idered de irable to en ure that anadian takeholder and government agencie are pro ided the opportunity and information to nabl them t parti ipat in m aningful on ultation on the i ue. See ection 4.6.2 within, a well a ection 4.5 and 4.6 in the 2000-200 I nnual Report. copy of the draft protocol to e tabli han "optional" international upplem ntary Fund i availabl on reque t to the OPF office.

Appropriation of IOPC Fund money for HNS matters

The granting by the 1992 IOPC Fund A embly of an appropriation f TOP Fund ontributor 'money for H S matter i reported in ection 4.4.4.

In thi ca e, a pecial appropriation for the development ofa computerized y tem to a i t the implementation of the HNS Convention wa approved by the A embly.

I am currently con idering i ue rai ed by the action ofthe A embly.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

Bunker Convention

The new Bunker Convention (see section 4.4.3) remain open for signature and ubsequent ratification. �he real difficulties that must be overcome in order to bring this Convention into force presents another opportumty to illustrate the foresight ofCanadian legislators in establishing the MPCF in 1971 and the OPF m 1989.

On March 23, 2001, the IMO adopted a new International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage to establish a liability and compensation regime for pill ofoil carried � fuel in hips' bunker�. !o come into force the Convention requires ratification by 18 State including five each w1th not le than one million gross tons ofregistered ships, once these criteria have been met the Convention will come into force 12 months later. Th1s could take some time. Fmther, to bring the Convention into force in Canada, the appropriate legi.lation would have to be introduced in Parliament with changes to Canadian law. In the meantime, in anada - unlike most other countries - the SOPF, as directed by the Administrator, can continue to be u ed to pay claim. for oil pilL from all classes ofshipsand includes oil from ships' bunker .

Environmental Damages

Compensation for environmental damage is handled differently under the MlA, the 1992 L , 1992 International IOPC Fund Convention and the US OPA 90. See ection 4. 1 .2.

For those whowish to know more about some current thinking on thi ubject ee ection 4. 1 .3. The documenL referred to are available on request to the SOPF office.

Positive Developments

There are very positive things happening in Canada with indu try and government agen ie credible results towards ensuring an effective and efficient re pon e to marine oil pill . development and programs currently established for the protection ofthe environment, a me of the trategie under di cu ed in thi report, include the following:

The DFO/CCG Aerial Surveillance Program - ection 4.2.3

The DFO/CCG Oiled Wildlife Project - ection 4.2.4

The Environment Canada Sensitivity Mapping Program - ection 5.

The Certified Response Organizations - ection 5.4

The Environment Canada Damage Fund - ection 4. 1.1

The Regional Environmental Emergency Team (REET) - ection 4.2. 1

The CCG On-Scene Commander Cour e- ection 5.6

Oil Spill Seminars - section 5.9

Legislative Developments - section 4.4

that are achie ing

These Canadian initiatives for the prevention, preparedne , re pon e and en ironmental re t ration hould be een as good news for all Canadians, as well as hipowner , in urer , and the oil indu try. eat the OPFare encouraged by these positive initiatives.

In closi�g, we are grateful for the support received, the challenge , ucce e and al o the problem e p rien ed thi year which had to be addressed. I welcome suggestion on how we can impro e OPF er ice

Thi nnual R port ofthe Ship- ource Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF) covers the fiscal year ended March 31, -002.

The report de 1ibe Canada' domestic compensation regime. Fir t there i the SOPF which covers all classes of hip a ell a per i tent and non-per istent oil and mystery spills. In addition, Canada is a Contracting State in an international compen ation regime that mutualizes the risk ofpollution (persistent oil) from sea-going tankers.

The financial tatu ofthe SOPF is reported, including claim settlements in Canada and the amount ofpayments by the SOPF to the international Fund Canadian claims totalljng approximately 134,000 before interest were settled and paid in the approximate aggregate amount of $104,000 ($11 1,000 including interest). This year the Admjnistrator paid an amount ofapproximately 2.9 million out of the SOPF to the 1992 IOPC Fund for incidents outside of Canada. As at March 31, 2002, the balance in the SOPF wa 316,491,470.73.

During the fi cal year commencing April 1, 2002, the maximum liability ofthe SOPF i $1 36,28 1,1 17.60 for all claim for one oil pill. This amount i indexed annually

During the fi cal year, the Miru ter ofTran port ha the tatutory power to impo e a levy for the SOPF of 40.87 cents per metric tonne of "contributing oil" imported into or hipped from a place in Canada in bulk as cargo on a ship. The le i indexed annually to the con umer price index.

o uch le (MPCF/SOPF) ha been impo ed ince 1976.

The OPF i liable to pay claim foroil pollution damage or anticipateddamageat any place in Canada, or in Canadian waters including the ex lu ive economic zone ofCanada, cau ed by the di charge ofoiJ from a hjp.

The cia e ofclaim for which the OPF may be liable in Jude the following:

• • •

claim for oil pollution damage; Jaim for co and expen ofoil pill Jean-up including th co t ofpre enti e mea me ; and, Jaim for oil pollution damage and I an-up co t where the identity ofthe hip that cau ed the di charge cannot be e tabli hed (m tery pill ).

There i al o an important tatutory pro i ion for a wide) defin d cia ofp r on in the anadian fi hing indu try that may claim again t the OPF for lo of in orne au ed b an oil pill from a hip.

In the ca e of my tery pill on id rable in e tigati n i metim required, be au e the OPF i not liable for non hip- ource pill . Howe er, the OPF i liable "if the au e ofthe oil pollution damage i ur1known and the Adrnini trator ha been unable to e tabli h that th curr n e that ga e ri e to the damage wa not cau ed by a hip".

Protection ofthe marine en ironm nt fr m il p llution i the central theme addre ed in the ection on I ue and Challenge

Canada' pecial purpo e account -the Environmental Damage Fund - wa e tabli hed in 1995 to manage compen ation for damage to the en ironment re ulting from pollution incident . A a cu todian of the Fund, En ironment Canada continue to actively pur ue and enhance it framework for implementing an environmental damage a e ment and re toration proce .

The third inter e ional working group of the 1992 lOPC Fund ha been di cu ing i ue ofenvironmental damage under the 1992 Convention The working group i con idering whether or not to modify the 1992 Fund' po ition in re pect ofthe adrni ibility ofclaim for the co t of rein tatement of the environment, and ofclaim for the co t of environmental impact tudie . Propo al were ubmitted to the working group by a number of State and

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

organizations. The International Tanker Owner Federation Limited drew attention to the anadian nvironmcntal Damage Fund, uggesting that it might be a model to follow.

Compensation for environmental damage is handled differently under the MLA, the J 992 L , the l 992 lOP und Convention, and the US OPA 90.

The 1992 CLC and the 1992 IOPC Fund Convention, in their definition of "pollution damage", provide '.'· :that compensation for impairment ofthe environment other than los ofprofit from such impairment shall be ltmJted to costs ofreasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken."

The MLA provides, "Where oil pollution damage from a ship results in impairment to the environment, the ov.:�er of the ship is liable forthe cost ofreasonable measures ofrein tatement actually undettaken or to be undertaken.

In the US, OPA 90 provides for payment ofnatural resource damage claim from the Oil Spill Liability Tru t Fund. The technicallyjustified reasonable cost for reinstatement/restoration mea ures, for which compen arion i available under the 1992 CLC and the 1992 IOPC FundConvention might equate to primary re toration under the ROA regulations. However, the further measure ofOPA NRDA is:

• • the diminution in value ofthose natural re ource pending re toration; plu the reasonable cost ofassessing those damages

The 1992 CLC and the 1992 IOPC Fund Convention do not, by their definition ofpollution damage, cover the latter SOli ofcompensation provided by the NRDA regulations or other theoretically ba ed a e ment ofenvironmental damage.

An update is provided on the issue ofplaces ofrefuge fordamaged hip at ea. The IMO continue to examine conditions under which littoral states should provide a safe place of refuge in heltered area for hip in immediate danger. There is a broad consensus internationally forthe need to addre the i ue of helter for hip in peril.

It is said that there is a "tradition" ofports offering refuge to endangered hip . Today, a damaged tanker loaded with oil is often con idered an unwelcome guest by the littoral state, becau e ofpotential oil pollution damage. In orne cases the coming into a place ofrefuge could reduce the threat of pollution.

TheComite Maritime International (CMI) has developed, in con ultation with the IMO ecretariat, a que tionnaire with a view to collecting as much information as po sible concerning the law applicable in the countrie ofC member associations on the access ofa distre ed ve el to a place ofrefuge where nece ary work can be undertaken to stabilize her condition and, if appropriate, to tran hip her cargo. The Canadian Maritime Law Association (CMLA) is working on a response to this questionnaire.

The international management code (IMO Code) forthe afe operation of hip addre e the re pon ibilitie ofpeople who manage and operate ships. This codeprovide an international tandard for afe hipboard operation and for pollution prevention. The ISM Code came into force on July 1, 1998, forcertain type of hip , including oil tanker , other types must comply by July 1, 2002. Every hip will then require a afety management certificate and a do ument of compliance issued by its flag state, or arecognized organization. Recent casualtie in Europe highlight concern about the effectiveness ofthe ISM Code. The secretary-general ofIMO, Mr Wtllian1 0' eil, initiated an a e ment ofthe effectiveness and impact ofthe ISM Code so far. A report was submitted to the IMO Mruitirne afety Committee in midMay, 2002.

The IMO's timetable for the accelerated phasing out ofthe single-hull oil tanker i al o noted.

On Mru·ch 23, 2001, the IMO adopted a new International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage to establish a liability and compensation regime for pills ofoil carried a fuel in hip ' bunker To come into force the Convention requires ratification by 18 States including five each with not le than one million gro tons ofregistered ships, once these criteria have been met the Convention will come into force 12 month later. Thi could take some time. Further, to bring the Convention into force in Canada, the appropriate leai lation would ha e to be introduced in Parliament with changes to Canadian law. In the meantime, fmtunately in C�nada- unlike mo t countries - the SOPF, as directed by the Administrator, can continue to be used to pay claim for oil pill from all classes ofships, including oil from ships' bunkers.

Since 1989, the inter_nati?n� funds have r�ce!�ed approxirnate!y $30. 1 million out ofthe SOPF The report note that the SOPF has potential sigmficant future liabilities formternatwnal incidents.

Th 1971 IOPC Fund Con ention cea e to be in force on May 24, 2002. Canada is now a contracting state to the 1 92 IOP Fund Con ention. e ertheies , the SOPF has contingent liabilities to the 1971 IOPC Fund but only for incident p1ior to a 29, 1999.

The rep01t note pro pecti e changes in the 1992 IOPC regime, including the increase in cwTent compensation limit due in o ember 2003, and the draft Protocol for an "optional" third tier ofcompensation (Supplementary Fund). The draft Protocol haJJ be considered at an IMO Diplomatic Conference scheduled for May 12 to 16, 2003 Canada' primary IOPC coverage alone has gone from 120 million in 1989 to $270 million in 1999. On November 1, -003, p1imary IOPC cover will increase by 50% to $405 million per incident. In Canada an additional $136 million i a ailable from the SOPF. In re ult there will be $541 million ofcover per incident for any tank ship pill in Canada - without Canada being a Contracting State to an IOPC "optional" third tier(Supplementary Fund).

The Canadian IOPC Fund delegation continue to support the development of an "optional" third tier (Supplementary Fund). However, the que tion ofwhetherCanada should become a Contracting State to any IOPC "optional ' third tier (Supplementary Fund) i for Cabinet to decide.

Some of the i sue a sociated with shipowner ' liability are addressed in the report. Debate on the issue of hipowner ' liability in the IOPC "optional" third tier (Supplementary Fund) and/or whether amendments should be made to the pro i ion in the 1992 CLC regarding hipowner ' liability took place during meeting held by the 1992 IOPC Fund third inter e ional working group. The working group ha received ubmi sion by, interalia, the International Group of P&I Club and OCIMF There remain a divergence ofopinion regarding shipowners' liability.

The Canadian interdeprutmental committee continue to review the i ue that may affect Canada in any pro pective change to the international Con ention .

The dmini trator continue hi outreach initiati e by participating in conference , eminar and work hop . During the year he met with management per onnel in federal department , government agencie , and organization ofthe marine indu try. The e activitie included:

nending meeting with enior repre entati the tlantic and Pacific R gion of Fi h rie and Ocean and Environment Canada in both

Participating with repre entation from go ernm nt agencie and the marine indu try, in an On-Scene Commander Cour eat the CCG olleg de igned for ffe ti ere pon e to a ignificant oil pill incident.

Pre enting a paperon the Ohio, p n ored b the anadian mp n ati n r gim at the fr hwater pill En ironmental Protection gen

i iting the facilitie of the E R re pon e organization in ova otia

ympo ium in Cleveland, ddre ing the opening plenary e ion of the anadian Marine d i ory ouncil Conference held in Ottawa during May.

Participating in the "In ight" nfer n eon merg n y r p n e planning for marine indu trie held in ancou er. The dmini trator pre ented a paper on anada' hip- ource Oil Pollution Fund.

trending the aritime onference held in Toronto. The e ion featured paper on the Marine Liability Act, change to the anada hipping t 200I, th hipping Confer nee Ex mption Act, and other Di cu ion were held with organizati n in the and UK including: ITOPF, OCIMF, P&I Club , and the U ationai Pollution Fund entre.

During the year the Admini trator, a head of the anadian delegation, attended and reported on the Executive Committee and the A embly e ion of the international Fund , held at IMO Headquarter in London. Extract of hi delegation report on the e proceeding are contained in ppendice B and C.

The Administrator

The . Administrator continues to receive excellent co-operation and a sistance from per ons in ?oth the public and pnvate sectors as well as from the international Fund's Director and members of 1ts Secretanat.

In 1979 (then a private lawyer) he was retained as counsel on the legal team for the CCGffCMS in the events immediately following the catastrophic break-up ofthe British registered oil tanker Kurdistan in the abot trait. Jn this major incident, the CCGffCMS and EC demonstrated their oil spill respon e readine in the alvage ofthe tern section and its cargo, the towage ofthe bow section with cargo to the edge ofthe continental shelf- where it wa sunk by naval gunftre, the clean-up of oil pollution damage in Newfoundland and ova cotia and the expedited settlement of claims from individuals. REET's advice to the on-scene commander wa critical to the ucce ofthe operation. This positive petforrnance by the Crown, including the rescue ofthe crew, prompted highly favourable editorials in the national media.

See Kurdistan at page 47.

A Dalhousie Law School graduate, he was called tothe Bar of Briti h Columbiaand ova cotia. He al o attended University College London, England - receiving a Master of Laws in merchant hipping law and international law of the sea.

In private practice he represented shipowners, insurer , alvors and government departments in ca ualtie , oil pollution damage, and salvage, as well as environmentalists and fi hing intere t . The e experience ha e proven mvaluable in performing his duties and re ponsibilitie as Admini trator.

He served in the RCNR.

1. Responsibilities and Duties of the Administrator

The dmini trator, appointed by the Governor-in-Council:

• holds office during good behaviour and, as an independent authority, mu t investigate and assess all claim filed against the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF), subject to appeal to the Federal Court ofCanada;

• prepares an annual report on the operations of the SOPF, which is laid before Parliament by the Mini ter of Tran port;

• has the power ofa Commi sioner under Part 1 of the Inquiries Act;

• may takerecour e action again t third partie to recover the amount paid out of the SOPF to a claimant and may al o take action to obtain ecurity, either prior to or after receiving a claim;

• become a party by tatute to any proceeding commenced by a claimant again t the ownerofa hip, it in urer, orthe International Oil Pollution Compen ation (IOPC) Fund , as the ca e may be;

• has the re pon ibility under the Marine Liability Act (MLA) to direct payment out ofthe SOPF for all Canadian contribution to the IOPC Fund ( uch contribution are ba ed on oil receipts in Canada reported by the Admini trator to the Director ofthe IOPC Fund ); and

• participate in the Canadian Interd partmental Committee andjoin the Canadian delegation to meeting ofthe Executi e ommittee and the embly ofthe IOPC Fund

2. The Canadian Compensation Regime

The SOPF came into force on April 24, 1989, by amendments to the CSA. The OPF ucceeded the Maritime Pollution Claims Fund (MPCF), which had existed since 1973. In 1989, the accumulated amount of $149,618,850.24 in the MPCF was transferred to the SOPF.

Effective August 8, 2001, the SOPF is governed by Part 6 ofthe Marine Liability Act (MLA) tatute of anada, 2001, chapter 6.

The SOPF is a special account established in the accounts ofCanada upon which intere t i pre ently credited monthly by the Minister ofFinance.

A levy of 15 cents per tonne was imposed from February 15, 1972, until September I, 1976 and during that period a total of$34,866,459.88 was collected and credited to the MPCF from 65 contributor Payer into the MP F included oil companies, power generating authorities, pulp and paper manufacturer , chemical plant and other heavy industries.

During the fiscal yearcommencing April 1, 2002, the Mini ter ofTran port ha the tatutory power to impo e a levy of40.87 cents per metJic tonne of"contributing oil" imported into or hipped from a place in anada in bulk a cargo on a ship. The levy is indexed annually to the con umer price index.

No levy has been imposed since 1976.

The SOPF is liable to pay claims for oil pollution damage or anticipated damage at any place in anada, or in Canadian waters including the exclusive economic zone ofCanada, cau ed by the di charge foil from a hip.

TheSOPFis intended topayclaims regarding oil spill from all cia e of hip The OPF i not limited to eagoing tankers or persistent oil, as is the 1992 IOPC Fund.

The SOPF is also intended to be available to provide additional compen ation (a third layer) in th e ent that fund under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC) and the 1992 IOPC Fund Con ention, with re peeL to pill in Canada from oil tankers, are insufficient to meet all e tablished claim forcompen ation. ( ee Figure I, ppendi D.)

During the fiscal year commencing April 1, 2002, the maximum liability ofthe OPF i 136,2 1,1 17.60 for all claims from one oil spill. This amount is indexed annually.

The classes of claims for which the SOPF may be liable include the following: claims for oil pollution damage; claims for costs and expenses of oil pill clean-up including the co t of pre enti e mea ure ; and claims for oil pollution damage and clean-up co t where the identity ofthe hip that cau ed the discharge cannot be established (my tery spill ).

A widely defined class ofpersons in the Canadian fishing industry may claim for lo of income cau ed by an oil spill from a ship.

The present statutory claims regime ofPart 6 ofthe MLA, on the principle that the polluter hould pay, has as it cornerstones:

all costs and expenses must be reasonable; all clean-up measures taken must be reasonable measures; and all costs and expenses must have actually been incurTed.

SOPF: A Fund of Last Resort

The MIA make the shipowner t:lictly liable for oil pollution damage caused by his ship, and for costs and expense incurred b the Mini ter of Fisheries and Oceans and any other person in Canadaforclean-up and preventive mea ure

A provided in the MIA, in the first instance, a claimant can take action against a shipowner. The Administrator of the SOPF i a party by statute to any litigation in the Canadian courts commenced by a claimant against the hipowner, it guarantor, or the 1992 IOPC Fund. In such event, the extent ofthe SOPF's liability as a last resort is stipulated in ection 84 MIA.

The Admini trator al o has the power and authority to participate in any settlement of such litigation, and may make payment out ofthe SOPF as may be required by the terms ofthe settlement.

Are pon e organization (RO) as deftned in the CSA has no direct claim against the SOPF, but it can assert a claim for un ati fled co t and expen e after exhau ting it right of recovery against the hipowner.

SOPF: A Fund of First Resort

The SOPF can al o be a fund offtr t re ort for claimant , including the Crown.

A pro ided in the ection 85 MLA, any per on may file aclaim with the Admini trator ofthe SOPFre pecting oil pollution lo or damage orco t and exp n e , with one ex eption. An RO, e tabli hed under the CSA, ha no direct claim again t the OPF.

The Adrnini trator, a an independent authority, ha a duty to inve tigate and a e claim filed again t the SOPF. For the e purpo e , he ha power to ummon witne and obtain document .

The Admini trator ma either make an offer ofcompen ation or decline the laim. An un ati fied claimant may appeal the dmini trator' deci ion to the Federal ourt of anada within 60 day .

When the dmini trator pay a laim, he i ubr gated t the right of the claimant and i obligated to take all rea onable mea ure to re o er the amount of mpen ation paid to claimant from the hipowner or any other per on liable. a con equence, th dmini trat r i mpowered to ommence an action in rem again t the hip (or again t the proceed of ale, if the hip ha been old) to obtain e lllity to pr t ct the OPF in the event that no other ecurity i pro ided. The dmini trator i entitled t obtain ecurity either prior to or after receiving a claim, but the action can only be continu d aft r the dmini trat r ha paid claim and ha become ubrogated to the 1ight ofthe claimant.

A indicated abo e, the dmini trator ha a duty to take rea onable mea ure to recover from the owner ofthe hip, the IOPC Fund, or any other per on, the ompen ation paid to laimant from the OPF. Thi include the right to prove a claim again t the hipowner ' Limitation Fund et up under the 1992 CLC.

3. Canadian Oil Spill Incidents

Dwing an particular year the SOPF receives many reports ofoil pollution incidents from a variet� of sources, in luding indi iduals who wish to be advised if they are entitled, under the CSA/MLA, to be considered as potential claimant as a result of oil pollution damage they have uffered. Many ofthe incidents have not yet, or will notbe, the ubject ofa claim. Such incidents are not investigated by the Administrator. The information herein is that provided to him. The Administrator is aware that many more oil pollution incidents are reported nationally. Many of tho e reported are ery minor (sheens). Other involved greater quantitie of oil but are not brought to the attention ofthe Adrni.ni tratorbecause they were atisfactorily dealt with at the local level, including acceptance offinancial re ponsibility by the polluter.

Locations of incident are indicated on map opposite.

3.1 New Zealand Caribbean (1989)

The fir t the Administrator wa aware of this oil pollution incident was when, on Augu t 21, 1990, he wa erved by the Vancou er Port Corporation (YPC) with a copy ofa Statement of Claim, pur uant to ection 713 CSA Thi document nan1ed the Admini trator a party by tatute. The Statement of Claim alleged that the Vanuatu flag 19,613 gro ton general cargo/container hip ew Zealand Caribbean had cau ed oil pollution when coming along ide a hipyard berth in orth ancou er on January 30, 19 9. It wa tated that a bollard on the quay holed a hip ide fuel oil tank. By the time that YPC had filed the claim the hip had changed name, flag, owner and operating company. It wa agreed that, unle the SOPF intere t wa at take, the OPF need not in truct coun el.

Later PC further alleged that the in UITed o t to them of the nece ary clean-up wa 76,272.26. It appeared that the hip did not pay the !aim becau e of alleged deficiencie in the de ign ofthe wharfand otber matter

During 1997, an out-of-court ettlement wa agreed between the partie . The hip made a payment f 51,000.00 and YPC agreed a di mi al order be filed naming the hip and owner , concluding the ca e again t tho e partie Coun el for the hipyard had agreed to a payment of 25,000.00 from payment due the hipyard, which wa now in bankruptcy.

The Admini trator had not been party to thi ettlement and on April 20, 1998, he wrote to VPC advi ing that he re erved all hi right in the ca e.

On January 11, 2002, at the reque t ofthe plaintiff the case wa di mi. ed, thu removing the SOPF from pos ible involvement. The Admini trator clo ed hi ftle.

3.2 Haralambos (1996)

On February 27, 1997, the Administrator received a claim from tbe Crown to recover the CCG costs and expen e , stated to amount to $73,483.00, incuned in the clean-up ofoil found on the beaches ofthe lower St. Lawrence River, south-west of Pmt Cartier, Quebec. The claim was pre ented as a mystery pill.

The oil had been found coming ashore on the beaches on December 3, 1996, by re ident ofthe small community of Riviere Pentecote, who informed the authoritie Officials arrived and confirmed the pollution. Contractor were engaged and commenced work on December 5, 1996; the ta k wa completed to the ati faction ofthe authoritie on December 9, 1996. It i reported that 103 bane] of oil and oily mate1ial were collected fordi po al.

The dmini trator inve tigated the circum tances of the oil and found that TCMS had thoroughly in e tigated two oil pill within Port Cartier Harbour that had occuned on ovember 19 and November 25, 1996, re pectively. The e pill had involved the 63,078 gro ton Cypriot flag bulk canier Haralambos. The hip had come into the harbour on ovember 18, and the next day there wa an oil pill. The hip had then gone out to anchor off Port Cartier awaiting cargo, and had come back in again on November 25, when the econd pill ofoil occuned. It wa found that one of the top ide water balla t tank had a corrosion hole through to a fuel tank, which accounted forthe lo of oil. The hipowner undertook to pay forthe cost of the clean-up within the harbour. On November 30, 1996, the Haralambos ailed for Iran.

In the cour e of hi inve tigation, the TCMS urveyor took oil ample , and al o compared the results with the analy i of the oil ubsequently found on the beaches at Riviere Pentecote. It was found that oil from the harbour matched the oil from the beaches.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

Accordingly, on December 4, 1997, the Administrator forwarded the claim to representatives ofthe hip's P&I Club in Canada for direct payment to the Crown.

On May 22, 1998, counsel forthe P&I Club replied to the Administrator denying liability ofthe M.V. Haralambos for the claim, stating that without more concrete evidence, they cannot recommend that the ship accept responsibility for this pollution.

On November 17, 1998, the Administrator authorized an interim payment to the Crown of75 per cent of its claim, amounting to $55,112.25, plus interest of $6,874.94. The Administrator continued his investigation to obtain further evidence regarding the claim.

A furtheranalysis ofoil samples was made, this time a direct comparison ofa sample taken from the beach at Riviere Pentecote with samples from the Haralambos' contaminated wing tank. Dated February 23, 1999, the analysis concluded that these samples are very similar. To further assess the probability ofthe Haralambos, while off Port Cartier, being the origin of the oil, a hindcast trajectory study was carried out on behalfof the SOPF by the Institut Maurice-Lamontagne of Mont-Joli, Quebec. Dated August 23, 1999, in summary the hindcast report found:

that if a ship off Port Cartier released oil on November 19, 1996, the oil would have passed out into the Gulf;

on the other hand, if a hip offPort Cartier released oil on November 25, 1996, the conditions were such that oil could have traveled to the general area of the beaches invol cd in the incident.

An agreement on quantum hadbeen reached with the Crown, which reduced their claim by $1,975.89. On March 28, 2000, the Administrator ananged topay the outstanding balance ofthe Crown's claim, less taxe , a further $7,396.09, plus interest of 1,61 1.41. On the question oftaxes, these had been incorrectly calculated in the Crown's original claim and theAdministrator agreed to consider this fmal outstanding amount on being presented with the correct calculation. TheCrown having submitted COITect tax calculations to the amount of $3,374.70, the Administrator on May 9, 2000directed the payment ofthis amount to the Crown plus interest of $773.05.

Representatives ofthe shipowner have raised questions regarding the most recent oil analysis and the trajectory study results. However, they did agree to an extension oftime forcommencing acourt action. Discussions continue between the Administrator, counsels for the parties, and p1incipals representing the shipowner, in the hope ofconcluding this oil pollution compensation recovery claim.

The Haralambos returned to Canada in May 2000. The Administrator obtained a Letter of Undertaking (LOU) for $125,000.00.

Subsequently, the Administrator commenc�d an acllon again t the hip in the Federal ourt:, to which a defense was filed.

In the meantime on ovember 3, 2000, it was reported that the Harala,;,bos had been purchased by hinese principal for breaking-up.

Offers and counter-offers have been made between counsels for both partie , but an out of-court ettlement has not been achieved. On December 19, 200I, the Admini trator was required to attend an Examination for Di covery by the defendant' coun el. The recovery action continues.

3.3 Rani Padmini (1997)

This ship i a 42,151 gro ton Indian flag bulk carrier which, on October9, 1997, developed a crack in a fuel tank and relea ed oil while coming along ide the public wharfat Baie Comeau, Quebec. The hip had an arrangement with an RO but refu ed to invoke it. Thi situation required the CCG to appoint contractor to contain and clean-up the oil. Approximately 12.5 tonne of#6 fuel oil, 12 tonne ofan oily water mix 15 cubic metre of oiled orbent material and 15 ;ubic metre of oiled vegetation were recovered.

Before the hip wa allowed to ail, the P&I lub provided an LOU in the amount of 375,000.00.

It i under tood that the CCG ubmitted it claim, amounting to approximately 335,000.00, for reimbur ement oftheir co t and expen e incurred to the coun el for the owner /P&I Club on January 27, 1998, and that further corre pondence en ued.

Payment by the hipowner wa not forthcoming. On May 21, 1998, the Crown pre ented a claim to the Administrator to the amount of 337,189.41, pur uant to section 710 CSA The Admini trator in e tigated and then learned that the hipowner i alleging the damage to the hull wa cau ed by a projection on the Federal public wharf in Baie Comeau.

On January 5, 2000, the hipowner commenced an action in the Federal Court ofCanada again t the Crown in the amount of US 800,000.00, for co t incuned a are ult of damage to the ve el. On January 14, 2000, the Crown withdrew it claim to the SOPF under ection 710 CSA.

The Crown filed a Statement ofDefen e and Counterclaim on August 11, 2000.Todate no documents ha e been served on the Administrator making him a party to the proceedings pursuant to section 713 CSA. On March 30, 2001, the Administrator contacted Crown coun el and asked them to advise their intentions. The Administrator has concluded that no claim will be made on the SOPF and has clo ed his file.

3.4 Koyo Maru #16 (1997)

Thi incident in olved a 409 gro s ton Japanese flao fi hing e el. Dming the evening of December 21,"' 1997, the e el bunkered 215,000 litre of diesel oil along ide a refueling dock in St. John's, ewfoundland. The refueling wa completed at 2230 local time that e ening. At 0830 the next morning, December 22. 1997, the Port police rep01ted an oil spill extending along the outh side ofthe harbom, the arne ide as the refueling facility. The CCG responded and, u ing their own per onnel and equipment, cleaned-up the oil, completing the ta k on December 24 1997.

On the morning ofthe di covery ofthe spill, TCMS conducted an in estigation and evidence ofa fuel oil spill wa found on the deck ofthe Koyo Maru #16 There was no evidence that the scuppers had been plugged. A sample from the trawler and one from a part of the harbom proved a match. TCMS laid charge for oil pollution. On June 25, 1998, the Kovo Maru #16 pleaded guilty to the charge, and wa f(ned 5,000.00.

Other oil ample taken from the harbom at the arne time a the original ample did not pro e a match to tho e taken from the fi hing ve el. Relying on thi fact, the e el refu ed to accept re pon ibility for CCG clean-up co t .

On October 18, 1999, the Admini trator recei ed a claim from the Crown for reimbur ement ofthe CCG' co t and expen e in thi incident, tated to b 7,631.82. The Adrnini t:rator inve tigated and a e ed the claim, which action rai ed a number of que tion regarding the pill it elf and the quantum of the claim. The e were re ponded to b the CG.

The Adrnini tratorwrote to the e el' agent on January 25, 2000, reque ting that the Koyo Maru #16 pay the amount claimed directly to the Crown. Coun el for the e el replied, refu ing to pa theclaim and explaining their rea oning. In e ence, coun el claimed that, wherea the e el wa along ide at Pier 24 when there wa a pill, the clean-up took place at Pier 19-21 and that the ample from that area did not match tho e from the e el.

Fo!Jowing di cu ion with the Adrnini trator, on March 2, 2000, the Crown revi ed their total claim to 6, 17 71. Following hi as e ment, on March 3, 2000, the Adrnini tratordirected the tran fer to the Crown ofthe amount he found e tabli hed, namely 4,425.31, plu intere t in the amount of 693.I0. I ue ofconcern were the charge-out rate forthe ea truck and tho e claimed for the orbent boom He in ited the Crown to provide additional evidence to upport the claimed amounts, on receipt of which he would con ider the i ue further.

The CCG advi ed on September 26, 2000, that they had accepted the above payment a final ettlement.

Coun el forthe hipowner had correctly noted that the invoice pre ented by the CCG referred only to the cleanup in the areas where ample did not prove a match (Pier 19 - 21). In fact, the re pon e and clean-up in question took place in the harbomcovering Pier 19 -24.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

The i ue ofthe clean-up area, incorrectly de cribed in the invoice, was clarified by theAdministrator in his letter to counsel forthe vessel dated November 2, 2000. His letter also claimed reimbw·sement forpayment ofthe Crown claim in the amount of$5,1 18.41, which payment included applicable intere t. Further correspondence and discussions ensued with counsel for the Koyo Maru #16. It appeared that agents for the ves el could get no direction from the Japanese shipowner.

On December 20, 2000, the Administrator filed an action in the Federal Court naming the Koyo Maru #16 and other as defendants, to recover the monies paid out to the Crown. On February 5, 2001, it was stated that the local ship's agency, Blue Peter Steamships Ltd., issuer of an LOU to CCG, is no longer in business. There is now a new company called Blue Peter Mruine Agencies Ltd. Under an LOU the guarantormakes definite undettakings in order to preclude the vessel being detained. The prospect of till LOU not being honow-ed ru·o e. This would pre ent a unique problem to the Administrator. LOU's are normally obtained from a ship's P&I Clubnot the ship's agent. It has been the SOPF's expetience that tho e who issue LOU' are prepared to immediately act in accordance with the LOU issued on their behalf. On Mru·ch 8, 2001, the Federal Court extended the time to erve the Statement ofClaim by 180 days.

The hip had left after the LOU wa provided to CCG and before the Admini t:rator became involved. In this context, it hould be noted that the Admini trator, in particular, could, by ection 677(11) CSA obtain ecurity (LOU, bank guarantee, etc.) even before recei ing a claim:

"Where rhere is an occurrence that gives rise ro liability of an owner of a ship under subsection (1), the AdminisTraTor may, eirher before or after receiving a claim pursuant to section 710, commence an action in rem againsT the ship rhat is rhe subject of rile claim, or againsT any proceeds of sale Thereof rhar have been paid into court, and in any such action the AdminisTrator is, subject to subsecTion (13), emirled ro claim security in an amowu nor less rhan rhe owner 's maximum aggregaTe liability under section 679 or 679.1."

On July 30, 200l, the Admini trator made a ettlement offer to the coun el who had repre ented the hip's agent. On Augu t 22, 2001, that counsel replied which, in brief, tated:

they had no authority to accept ervice of the SOPF' claim;

that the new agency [Blue Peter Marine Agencie Ltd.] had not been able to make contact with the owners (ofthe Koyo Mru·u #16);

that they were clo ing their file.

The Adrnini trator conducted research into the name and particulars of all ves els owned by the owners of the Koyo Maru #16. It wa found that there were a number ofve els, several ofwhich were known to come into Canadian port ounsel was appointed to act on the Admini trator's behalfand on December 5 2001, this counsel faxed to the owners in Japan, offeting

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

ettlement; the alternative being the ane t ofone ofthe company' ves el on arrival in Canada. The owner' faxed their new agent in St. John's, ewfoundland, on December 9, 2001, authmizing payment ofthe compromise ettlement.

On January 15, 2002, the Administrator received a cheque on behalfof the owner to the amount of $2,793.84, which was credited to the SOPF account. The Administrator closed his file.

3.5 Mystery Oil - Fighting Island, Ontario (1998

On May 31, 1998, a floating foul melling sub tance was found coming ashore, and drifting just offthe shore, on the northwest corner ofFighting Island, a Canadian i land in the Detroit River, downstream from Detroit. An analysi ofa portion of the substance found that it was approximately 35 per cent heavy oil and the rest a type of ewage. The CCG contracted for the clean-up. Samples ofthe oil and the other matter were taken by the USCG and the CCG, and compared to other samples taken from ships anchored in the vicinity and shoresources, without success at identifying the origin ofthe spill.

In the meantime, the SOPF has asceitained that during May 31, 1998, a heavy rainfall was repolted throughout the local area.

On June 1, 1999, the Crown presented a claim to the SOPF on behalf ofthe CCG in re pect to this incident, amounting to $1 12,504.65. The Administrator commenced an investigation. In thi proce a number offactor were revealed, including:

The Ontario Ministry of the Environment wa al o involved on the Canadian hore but their report wa unable to identify the origin of the pill. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality was also involved. An official indicated that he did not beEeve that it wa hip related.

The USCG provided a complete copy of their laboratory analysis of pollution amples, together with the laboratory covering report. Thi analy i did not positively identify the origin of the pill. Instead ofthe site samples oil content being "of a heavy type," as initially tated in a Canadian laboratory analysis for the CCG, the samples were found to contain "a severely evaporatively weathered light fuel oil mixed with...lubricating oil," in a subsequent more detailed analysis. The samples taken by the CCG and passed to a private laboratory foranalysis were sub equently destroyed by the laboratory in accordance witl1 their advised practices. Other sample , kept by the CCG, were not refrigerated. Sample taken from the Fighting Island site (only) and provided to the SOPF were retained under refrigeration and were available.

In view ofthe inconclusive results in previous analyses, in January 2000, the Administratorcontracted for a more detailed analysis ofsome ofthe samples previously held by the USCG laboratory, and those held by the SOPF.

These latter, more detailed, analyses still did not identify the ource. However, they served to support the previous ample comparisons in certain resp�cts. Throughout the morning of May 31, 1998, the wmd had been westerly, ometime very strong.

Additional information wa requested, in particular from the Cities of Detroit, Ecor e, and River Rouge, and the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. The bulk ofthis material wa received at the SOPF in mid-February, 2001. The material greatly assi ted the Administrator in hi inve ligation, but did raise orne furtherque tion , re ulting in further information being reque ted. Additional information was received toward the end ofthe financial year, in particular from the City ofRi er Rouge (Michigan) and the City ofWind or (Ontario). The factor in the spill were now better under tood. Following the receipt ofadvice on the i ue , the Admjni trator will make hi deci ion on thi complex, and unu ual, claim.

3.6 Walpole Islander (1999)

Initially thi incident was repolted as a my tery pill. On January 20, 1999, a lick ofreddi h die el was reported at the Walpole I land Cu tom Ferry Dock, in the t. Clair River, Ontario. The twoWalpole I land fenie were docked there, but it proved impo ible to how that the oil was comingfrom either e el. The CCG contracted for the containment and clean-up. The pilling ofoil continued andby January 25, 1999, approximately 270 litre ofthedie el had been recovered. Eventually, it was di covered that ice had cau ed a mall crack in a hip ide fuel tank oftheCanadian 72 gro ton ferry Walpole Islander. The owner accepted re pon ibility. One ofthe environmental concern was the exten ive wetland nearby.

The CCG reported that their claim forreco ery oftheir co ts and expen e in thi incident amounted to 80,780.53. The Admini trator advi ed the CCG that he under tood the ferry owner' in urancecontract to contain a provi ion to the effect that any claim again t the policy mu t be made within 12 month from the date of the occU.ITence. The CCG advi ed the Adrnini trator that they had ubmitted their claim directly to the ferry owner on January 10, 2000.

The CCG advi ed that they received payment (in January, 2002) ofthe negotiated ettlement. The Admini trator closed hi file.

3.7 Gordon C. Leitch (1999)

The Gordon C. Leitch is a 19,160 gro s ton Canadian Great Lake ve sel and, on March 23, 1999, he wa beithed at an iron ore faciljty in Havre-Saint-Pierre, Quebec, on the lower nolth hore ofthe St. Lawrence River. When moving the ve sel she wa caught by the strong wind and hit a dolphin, cracking the hull and

r 1 a ing an timat d 49 tonnes ofheavy fuel oil. The ovner dire ted the clean-up with contractors, under CCG guidance and making u e ofCCG material and equipment. The CCG repmted that theircosts and expense of 233,065.00 were paid by the owners. Armed " ith thi knowledge of ettlement the dmini trator's last Annual Report (2000- 2001) noted that he had closed his ca e file on the incident.

On March 22, 2002, counsel forthe Counseil des Innus de Ekuanit hit et tou les members de la Band Indienne de Ekuan it hit, filed a claim in the Federal Courtof Canada again t the owners ofthe Gordon C Leitch, and others and the IOPC Fund. The action claimed the sum of 539,558.72 for tated damages forthe local Indian Band due to the Gordon C Leitch incident.

3.8 Algontario (1999)

Thi 18,883 gros ton bulk carrier grounded in the eebi h Channel off Sault Ste. Marie on April 5, 1999. The ve el u tainedbottom damage, but there wa no pollution from the fuel tank . The hipowner activated their arrangement with the Ea tern Canada Response Corporation (ECRC), who boomed around the vessel to contain a po ible oil pill. Arrangement were also made with acontractorto remove oil fromthe hip to a lightering ve el to prepare for the refloating operation. TheCCG andTCMS were in attendance.

The hip wa ucce fully refloated with no pollution onApril 7, 1999.

TheAdmini tratorrecei ed from theCrown,onApril 4, 2000, aclaim torecoverthe tatedCCG co ts and expen e in attendingthe refloatingofthi ve el, amounting to 20,154.12 On May 2, 2000, the Admini tratorforwarded the claim totheowners, AlgomaCentral Corporation, with the ugge tion that they ettletheclaimdirectly with theCrown. tthe an1e time, the dmini tratorpointedoutto the owner that interestwas accruing.

On May 26, 2000, Algoma replied to oun I for the Crown, in e ence noting the e factor :

the C 0 ervice were not reque ted; Algoma employed the nece ary contractor and equipment at the ite; there wa no relea e of oil.

andby pro idingcommenton the individual co ting chedule pre ented.

Algoma d nied the CCG claim, and notedthat thirteen month had pa ed between the incident and the pre entation ofthe claim.

Itshould be noted that ection 677(10)(b) CSA provide that "...no action...lies [again t the ownerofa hip] unless it is commenced. where no pollution damage occurred, within six years after the occurrence. "

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

The Crown replied to the points raised by Algoma in a letterto the Administrator dated June 29, 2000. The main points made by the Crown were:

ceo actions were taken in anticipation of a discharge of oil, as provided by section 677 CSA; the ceo does not require the shipowners request to respond to an anticipated discharge of oil.

TheAdministrator investigated and assessed the claim.

The assessment was made more complicated because some ofthe CCG response costs had been bilied to the contractors, in turn paid-for by the owners, and other CCG costs claimed against the SOPF. A numberof minorerrors were found in the CCG claim and the Administratorwasunableto accept the charges forthe use ofthe CCG helicopter which was in the area at the time forotherwork.Additionally payment ofthe Crown'sAdministration overhead cost was deferred pendingjustification ofthe amount ($1,741.23).

FollowingcOJTespondence, particularly regarding the use ofthe helicopter, on January4, 2002,theAdministrator ananged totransferto theCrown $13,767.49 for established costs, plus $2,839.40 interest. On January 8, 2002,theAdministratorwrotetothe shipowner requestingpaymentofthe amount totalling $16,606.89. Paymentofthi latteramountwasreceived fromthe hipowneron February 7,2002,andpa sedthe sameday forcredit tothe SOPF.Atthe sametime the Admini tratorreopenedhis inve ligation into the useof theCCG helicopterand now awaitsreplies to hi que lion toCCG regarding ame.

3.9 Paterson (1999)

Thi i abulkcarrierof20,370gross tons, which was canyingacargoofgrain when hegrounded in Lac aint-Fran9oi , located between Montreal and Cornwall, Ontario, onApril 5, 1999. Therewasnopollutionasa re ult ofthegrounding, but the shipownergave notice to hi RO tobe in readine Arrangements werealso made to lighten the ve el of ome ofitscargo, in preparation forrefloating.Thi was uccessfullycanied out onApril 9, 1999, with no pollution occurring. TCMS and CCG were in attendance.

On April 4, 2000, the Crown pre ented a claim to the Admini trator, an1ounting to $10,350.57 to recover the CCG' tated co ts and expense in the incident. On May 2, 2000, theAdministratorwroteto the owner concerned, N.M. Pater on and Sons Ltd., suggesting that they ettle the claim directly with the Crown. A reply wa received from Paterson's, dated May 4, 2000, in e ence advi ing:

the shipowner did not request ceo assistance; the ship was aground amidships where there were no tanks containing oil; the hull was not breached in any area ofthe ship; and, that, according to TCMS, "damage was of little concern".

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

On this basis, Paterson' rejected responsibility for the claim.

The Crown replied to the points raised by Paterson in a letter to the Administrator dated June 6, 2000. The main points made by the Crown were:

CCG action were taken in anticipation of a discharge of oil, as provided by section 677 CSA; and, the CCG does not require the shipowner's request to respond to an anticipated discharge of oil.

The Administrator investigated and assessed the claim and found the amount of $3,625.50 to be established. This amount plus interest of $431.02 was offered in full and final settlement andpaidtothe Crown on orafter November 3, 2000.

On June 8, 2001, the Administrator wrote to N.M. Paterson & Sons Ltd., requesting reimbursement ofthe principal amount of $3,625.50, plus interest which had now risen to $588.50. These amounts were paid by the shipowner on or about July 30, 2001 and credited to the SOPF. The Administrator closed hi file.

3.10 Sam Won Ho (1999)

This vessel wa originally a South Korean freezer fishing trawler and had been sold to new owners and berthed in Long Harbour, Newfoundland, where she was being converted to a barge.

On April 12, 1999, the ves el sank at its berth with resulting oil pollution. The CCG responded to the spill and incurred stated costs and expenses in the amount of $99,878.55, which amount was claimed from the SOPF on December 29, 1999. On March 2,2000, the CCG advised that the claim had been revi ed to 96,856.92.

The claim was investigated by the Administrator to verify the established and non-establi hed items. An all-inclusive offer ofsettlement was made in the amount of $80,000.00, which was accepted by the CCG. Payment was directed on March 3, 2000.

TheAdministrator is consideiingwhat reasonable options exist regarding cost recovery ofthe monies paid.

It should benotedthatthis vessel was involved in a previous pollution incident at Long Harbour in July 1997, which resulted in a claim to the SOPF, repmted m the 1997-98 Annual Report under the name ofSin Wan Ho.

It appears that two individuals we�·e ass?ciated with ownershipofthe craft, togetherwith a linuted company. All three parties have denied liability. On January 5, 2001, EC had laid charges against all tlu·ee parties . involving the release ofoil pollution, connected With this incident, pursuant to section 36(3) ofthe Federal Fisheries Act.

There was further pollution from this wreck on Apnl 24, 2000, as reported at 3.24 following.

The Admini trator arranged for the OPF to have an observer at the prosecution of the three parties f�r the alleged infringement ofthe Fisheries Act. The tnal tarted on Augu t 23, 2001, and continued at various date , with a resumption date in April 2002.

The Admini trator intends to continue following the prosecution. Coun el for the SOPF filed a St�tement of Claim in the Federal Court ofCanada on Apnl 8, 2002, against the three partie claiming the recovery of $117,384.47, plu intere t. Service of the Statement of Claim upon the Defendant hall follow.

3. 11 Sunny Blossom (1999)

This ve el i an 11,598 gro ton Bahamian flag double hull chemical tanker that wa involved in at lea t four incident , which came to the Admini trator' attention. The ve el wa engaged in the cau tic oda trade, in and out ofthe Great Lake

On April 24, 1999, he grounded off King ton, Ontario, in US water The CG re ponded to the grounding. The CCG attended at the ite. The Sunny Blossom wa refloated, with no relea e ofa pollutant.

A econd incident, a grounding, wa reported in the Annual Report 1999-2000 at 3.56. The third incident wa on July 26, 1999 when the ve el truck an arre ter wire in Iroquoi Lock, Ontario. The fourth incident happened on May 1 , 2000, when the e el grounded in the eaway y tern while tran iting Lac aintFran�oi .

On April 20, 2000, the Crown pre ented a claim to the Admini trator, amounting to 9,5-6.57, to re o er the CCG' tated cot and expen e in the pril 24, 1999, incident. The claim in ol e a hip aground in U. water . The Admini trator and coun el for the OPF reviewed the circum tance ofthe claim. On September 27, 2000, coun el for the OPF wrote to Crown coun el involved rai ing the e i ue :

I. Doe the Department con ider that thi incident i subject to the tem1 of the Great Lake Water Quality Agreement and Joint [Canada- nited State ] Marine Pollution Contingency Plan?

2. If o, has the Department ought to recover the co ts outlined in its claim from the re pon ible United States authoritie ? If o, doe the Department intend to pur ue its claim with such authoritie ?

3. If not, would you provide an explanation as to why the Department does not consider that thi incident is subject to the provi ions ofboth the Agreement and Plan?

In th meantime, CG reported that they submitted a claim to the CG

The CG Claim tatu Report dated June 30, 2001, no longer mentioned ubmitting a claim to the USCG but, in tead, tated a claim hadbeen ubmitted tothe hipo ner. By letterofSeptember 26, 2001, theCrown coun el ad ised that the ceo had been successful in obtaining pa ment oftheirclaim from the hipowner.

An wer to the questions posed above were not forthcoming becau e, pre umably the needforCrown coun el to an wer question 1 was precluded by the CCG' ucces fulrecovery ofits claim from the shipowner.

The Adrnini tratorclosed his file.

3.12 Rivers Inlet (1999)

Thi wa a Canadian regi tered 24 gros ton wooden fishing e el, built in 1926, which ank at herbetth in Deep Bay, Briti h Columbia. on June 16, 1999. It wa tated that he was no longerengaged in fi hing but in tran potting wooden hake block forcutting. The owner was aware that the e el had an ingre of water and had arranged forpumping. On inking, the Rivers Inlet relea ed oil , of which an e timated 330 litre were aboard.

The local Harbour Ma ter reported the inking. The CCG re ponded. The inking wa in a SmaJI Craft Harbour. It wa reported that the e el wa interfering with operation in the harbour. Thereareclam and oy ter har e ting area in Deep Bay. On June 25, 1999, the owner igned an agreement authorizing the Crown to remove and di po e ofthe e el, indemnifying for all co t , expen e and liabilitie incurred by the Crown. On June 2 , 1999, a CCG contractor rai ed the ve el. It wa later broken-up and di po ed-of.

On March 1, 2000, the owner tated he had nomoneyto meet hi obligation regardingthe inking. The Admini trator received, on June 15, 2000, a laim from theCrown, amounting to 15,777.43 to recoverthe CCG' tatedco andexpen e in thi incident.The claim was inve tigated and as e ed.TheAdmini trator wrote tothe Crown on December 12, 2000, offering to ettle the claim for 10,819.91, plu the appr priate intere tof 1,248.38, which amounts, in hi view, tothat portion oftheclaim relating to oil pollution re pon e. On the ame date, hearrangedtotran ferthe e latter um to theCrown.

Thi ca e again rai e the matter ofoil pollution re pon e, alvage and wreckremoval, in thecontextof co t recovery by CCG. The Admini tratoradvi edthe Crown ofhi willingne to di cu the e i ue .

On October 23, 2001, the Admini trator received the hipowner' written acknowledgement ofa debt to the SOPF in the amount of$12,068.29 and agreement to

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

extend the time by which the SOPF can bring a recovery action up to December 31, 2006.

In the meantime, the Administrator shall evaluate �s recovery options. Subject to possible recovery actiOn, which does not appearpromising, theAdministrator closed his file.

3.13 Mystery Oil Spill - Patrick's Cove, Newfoundland (1999)

Patrick' Cove isasmall community on theeastsideof Placentia Bay. OnAugust 10, 1999, people swimming in the cove foundthemselvescoveredwithspotsofoil.The incident wasreported. It alsotranspiredthat oil had been seen corning a horetwodays previously. TheCCG responded andfound oil in scattered locations alongthe beachesfrom St. Btide's to GooseberryCove, adistance of ome 10 nautical miles.An overflightonAugust 11, 1999, revealed no visual signsofpollution in the area. ceo personnel responded to the clean-up required and the media repotted some 100kilograms ofoileddebtis wererecovered from thebeaches. Oiled birds and oiled chick were observed in the area.

Theceocontinued to monitor the horeline and reque tedthat furtheroverflightsbe made.

TheAdmini tratorhas clo edhisfile.

3. 14 Mystery Oil Spill - Cumberland, Ontario (1999)

local re ident ofCumberland, avillage ituatedon the Ottawa River ome 20kilometreseastofOttawa, repotted ighting an oil pill in acreek early in the morningon September2, 1999.Twoofficer from the C Gbaseat Pre cott, Ontario, re ponded the following dayandcleaned upan e timatedhalflitre ofanold oily mixture.TCMS an·ived thatsameday, September3, 1999, to inve tigate. It proved impo ible to ascettain from wherethe oil otiginatedand it wa termed a my tery pill.

TheAdmini trator ha clo ed hi file.

3. 15 Reed Point Marina (1999)

Thi marinai ituated near Pott Moody, Briti h Columbia, at the ea tern end ofVancouver Harbour. It ha many floating mooring piers, someofwhich are covered. Early morning on October 16, 1999, a fue brokeout in oneofthe covered tmctures (boathouse) at the facility and pread to ome ofthe boats. The local fire department and a VancouverPott harbourcraft re ponded and the fue wa eventually extinguished. Threemarine craftwere reponed sunk andfourothers damaged; fourboathouses hadcollapsed.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

ln urance companie covering two ofthe vessel accepted respon ibility, without prejudice, forthe cleanup and salvage ofthe unken vessel . The work commenced on October 17, 1999. FoiJowing legal advice, the insurers topped the work on October 19, 1999. The CCG then contracted with the local RO to continue the task. The RO completed the final "mop-up" ofthe boomedareaon October 25, 1999. Environment Canadacoordinated the dispo al ofapproximately 80 bags ofrecovered contaminants.

The Crown presented a claim to the Admini trator dated September 11, 2000, amounting to $39,366.81, to recover the stated CCG costs and expenses incurred in responding to this incident.

TheAdministratoremployed counsel to act on SOPF's behalf. This counsel, on October 12, 2000, sent letters to three ofthe vessel owner involved, notifying them ofthe Administrator's intention to recover any payments made in settlement ofclaims against the SOPF, and advi ing them to preserve theirinsurance cover. Wormation wa reque ted by the Admini trator from theCrown in the investigation andassessment ofthe claim.

On March 30, 2001, theAdmini trator found $36,247.58 ofthe Crown's claim tobeestablished, andarranged transferofthis sum, plu interest of$4,188.57.

Thefirewas investigated bythe Office ofthe Fire Commissioner of BC. Through the SOPF's locaiJy appointed counsel it was learned that proceeding had already been commenced in the Supreme Court ofBriti h Columbia against the owner ofone ofthe three craft burnt and sunk -the owner ofCrimePays. Later it was found that the case was dismissed/discontinued with "no money exchanging hands". The i uesarecomplicated, with three craft and the boathouse being involved.

At the end ofthefi cal year, theAdministrator was arranging with counsel forthe commencement of legal action for recovery ofthe amounts paid out from the SOPF.

3. 16 Kopu (1999)

This is a 1,531 gro s ton fi hing vessel, regi tered in Estonia and owned byan Icelandic company. TCMS reports that, on June 5, 2000, the Kopu was fmed $6,500.00 for discharging oil, which occurred in Argentia, Placentia Bay, Newfoundland on October 19, 1999. Previous reports indicate that the incident took place during refueling from a tanker truck.

No claim has been made against the SOPF. The Administrator considers that a claim on the SOPF unlikely and closed his file.

3.17 Radium Yellowknife (1999)

This235 gross tonCanadian tug depruted Hay River, N01thwestTenitories, in September 1999, with atowofnine bru-ges in threestacksofthree.ThedestinationwasThunder Bay, Ontario. Theconvoyput into Iqaluit, Nunavut, tomake

repairs. By lateOctober, freeze-up in Jqaluit wa<; Jmmmenl On October28, J999, aT MS Pollution Prevention fficer orderedtheconvoy towinterat Jqaluil.The tug and barges werebeached. Duringthefirstweekof ovember, fuel and containinatedbilgewaterwas pumped fromtheLu¥and bargestoholding facilitieson hore to reducethensk of pollution. TheCCG as i ted in the operation.

No claim ha been made again t the SOPF. The Administrator con ider that a claim on the SOPF unlikely and clo ed his file.

3.18 Mystery Oil Spill -Quebec City and Sorel (Amarantos) (1999)

On July 10, 2000, the Admini trator received a clai� from counsel acting for the hip Amarantos amountmg to $23,653.68 for two incident ofoil pill clean-up re ponse. The Amarantos i a 36,650 gro ton bulk carrier regi tered in the port ofValetta, Malta.

The claim tated that, on ovember 10, 1999, the ve el moored ahead ofthe MY Amarantos reported that they could ee trace ofoil in the waterin the vicinity ofthe Amarantos at Section 52, Quebec City. TCMS placed a temporary detention order on the Amarantos, pending inspection. The ma ter ofthe hip contracted forthe re pon e to the oil pill. It proved impractical to attempt recovery ofthe e timated 200 metre long patch ofoil along idethe hip, which patch hadfloateddown tream with the current. SIMEC attended and boom were deployed.

The detention orderwas lifted on o ember II, 1999, and the Amarantos moved upriver to orel. On November20, 1999, an EC official reported that there had been an e cape of oil from the hip at ection 21. The hip was the Amarantos. Again, the captain reque ted contractor to provide the nece ary re pon e.

In forwarding the claim for the two incident , coun el for the hip tated that the Amarantos was not the ource ofthe pill and reque ted reimbur ement to the owner for the co t and expen e incurred.

The Admini trator commenced exten i e nautical and legal inve tigation into the cir um tance ofthe pill Following a review ofthe e idence on o ember 7, 2001, he wrote to coun el for the hip rejecting the claim In hi deci ion letter he noted:

oil wa observed coming up along ide the Amarantos in Quebec City;

a small quantity of oil wa ob erved leaking from the hip' shaft in ore!; and, the urveyor for the P&l Club ugge ted the ource of the pollution may not have been a dj charge from a ship.

However, for the claim to be receivable, it must relate to "polJution damage" asdefined in the Act (i.e. damage causedby pollutant di chargefrom a ship), or measure preventing "discharge ofoil from a ship" ( ection 51

MLA), othen;i e, Part6 does not apply and the SOPF hould not concem it elfwith the claim.

Ifa ugge ted b the mveyorfrom the P&I Club, the omce ofthe pollution is not a discharge from a ship, then the SOPF i not liable. Ifhoweverthe pollution come from a ship, then one mu tconcludethat it came from the Amarantos.

There was noappeal again t theAdministrator's decision withinthestatutory60day petiod prescribed under section 87 MLA andtheAdrnini tratorclosed hi ftle.

3. 19 Cape Benat (1999)

Thi hip is a 21,165 grosston chemicaUoil tanker, flying theLiberian flagandoperatedby aCyprus based company.

On ovember24, 1999, the CCG was advi edthatthere was adiscrepancy ofapproximately 200tonne ofcanola oil betweenthat tatedtohavebeen deliveredby a hore facility and the amount loadedby the Cape Benat in Burrard Inlet, Vancouverharbom, that day.TheCCG pollution patrol aircraftoverflewtheareaon ovember 25, 1999, and ighted two large lick ofoil offPoint Atkin on andanotherlarge lickoffPointGrey.A sub equent as e ment put the an1ount pilled as 226 tonne

The hore facility announced that the had carried out a thorough in pection oftheir plant and determined that the pill did not originate from them. EC wa unable toconfirm that the pill came from the facility. The facility tood down clean-upcontractor they had forewarned. The Cape Benat, through th iragent , refu ed to accept re pon ibility for the clean-up ofthe pill and, at the time, TC wa unable toconfirm that the oil came from the hip. The CCG a umed the lead agency forthe re pon e and empl yed contractor

The area ha many ea bird and, at one tage, in the bird re cue operation it wa reported that 13 bird had died and another 204 were being rehabilitated, a a re ult ofthe pill.

On o ember 26, 200I, the Admini trator recei ed a Statement ofClaim filed on behalfofthe Crown in the Federal Court. The claim wa again t the owner , and other , intere ted in the Cape Benat, and named the SOPF a party by tatute. The Crown claim ought payment totaling 141,300.89, for oil pollution damage,recovery ofthe CCG co t and expen e in the clean-up ofthe oil, and othergeneral a ociated co t.

The receipt ofthi claim rai ed a fundamental i ue for the Admini trator: Doe the definition ofoil include tho ethatare vegetableoranimal?SOPFAdmini trator havecon idered thedefinition ofoil under CSA part XVI and MLA part 6 doe not cover uch oil Thi interpretation wa maintained mo t recently in the my tery oil pill in Bassin Lanctot, Sorel, Quebec, July

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

3, 1997, (as reported in the annual report for the years 1998-1999). In this latter case, the Crown decided not to pursue the claim, which involved a vegetable-based oil.

TheAdministratorengaged counsel and representations weremadetotheCrown toremovethe SOPFasapatty tothe instantactionbasedon the fact thatthe oil was vegetable-based. Thisposition was accepted by the Crownand, on March 6, 2002, the Crowndiscontinued itsactionagainsttheAdministrator.

The latest information is that the Crown's action against the Cape Benat and the owners continues.

TheAdministratorclosed his file.

3.20 Baltic Confidence (1999)

On February 26, 2002, national mediareported that a Halifaxcomt had, on thepreviousday, levied the highest ftneeverimposedby acomton aship polluting along the Atlantic coastofCanada. The ftne was 125,000.

The fme wa imposedon a 10,763 grosston Filipino regi tered bulkcarriertl1at, on December22, 1999, wa ob ervedby aCCG helicopterand a ptivate plane, illegallydischargingan oily substance in Canadian water oftheAtlantic.The shipwa approximately 85 nautical mile outh-ea t ofHalifax at the tin1e. The slick wase timated tobe orne 20nautical miles long,andto compri eaminimumof850litresofanoilysubstance.

TheTCMS commenced an extensive investigation which involved cooperation with the USCG, Russian, Dutch Finni h authoritie and vi its tothe ship when he came back into Canada. The strongevidentiary package pre ented by the TCMS to the court led to a guilty pleaby the shippingcompany.

TheAdmini tratornote thepotential serious con equence of uchdi charges. Forexample, at the timeoftheabovecourt hearing it was al oreportedthat biologi t wereexaminingsome ofmorethan 150oiled bird washed upon theCanadianAtlanticshore in anothermarineoil dumpingincident unrelatedtothe Baltic Confidence.

TheAdmini trator clo ed hi file.

3.21 Leonis (2000)

A local ewfoundlandCCG ER reportadvi ed the Admini tratorofthis incident. The Leonis i an Italian flag tanker and wasengagedon February 23, 2000, in loadingacargoofcrudeoilatthe Hiberniatranshipment terminal ofWhiffen Head in Come-By-Chance Bay, Newfoundland. It was reported thatatank airrelief valvebecame tuck,causingthetanktobecome overpre surized and the loading hose to rupture. Some 18 barrel ofoil were spilled but 17 ofthose werecontained on thedeckofthetanker

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

TheRe pon e Organi ation was employed to clean-up the oil in thebay and that ashore.

A subsequentTCMS rep01t advised that the ship had been prosecutedforthe pill and, on March 28, 2001, was fined $10,000.

The Administratorhas closed his file.

3.22 Miles Sea (2000)

Overnight on March 18119, 2000, the 15 metre licen ed Great Lake fish tug Miles Sea sank at her berth in Lions Head Harbour. Lions Head Harbour is situated on the eastern shoreofthe Bruce Peninsula Georgian Bay, Ontario. '

The sinkjng is the subject ofan Ontario Provincial Police investigation. Theownerstatedthatthe fishing ve sel had no insurance cover. There was some pollution, which was responded to by the CCG. The vessel was salvaged.

TheAdmirustratorhas closed his file.

It should be noted that there wasanother similar incident, but rathermore serious, involving thi ve sel the following year(as noted in 3.93). In this ca e, the name ofthis unregistered fi hing vessel was recorded a Miles and Sea.

3.23 Ronald H Brown (2000)

ATSB Occurrence Report li ted this 3,180 gros ton US flag oceanographic survey ve sel a striking Hewitt Rock, Hiekish an·ows, in one ofB1itish Columbia's northern inside coastal passages, on Aptil 23, 2000. Damage was reported a considerable and that a port side fuel tank was ruptured. The hole in the tank wa , reportedly, plugged and the remaining fuel tran feLTed. The vessel was able to proceed under herown power, escorted by a CCG cutter. It wa tated that there was mirumal pollution

The CCG advised that, as Hieki h NruTows i an area offast tidal streams and the amount ofdie el spilled was minimal, it wa impractical to mount any form of oil recovery action. The oil was allowed to dissipate naturally.

TheAdrrunistrator hasclosed his file.

3.24 Sam Won Ho (2000)

Referring to an incident listed above at 3.10, a further escape ofoil from this wreck, requiring the response of the CCG, took place onApril 24, 2000. The CCG responded and, on December 6, 2000, the Crown presented a claim to theAdministrator in orderto recovertheircosts and expenses, stated to be $45,809.19 This was the second claim involving this

wreck presented to the OPFby G. In accordance with hi responsibilities, the Administrator investigated andasse sedthe claim. The dministratorhadconcerns, mainly, on theque tion ofequipment charge-out rates and administrativecharges. On this basis, he wrote to Crown coun el on February 8, 200I, finding $36,084.47 establi hedand, at the arnetime, aiTanging topay this amount, plu theappropriate interestof$2,343.53 noting thattheCCGadministrativechargeswerenotestablished, and asking ifCCG canju tify thi claimedco t. Sub equently, in February 200I, the Admini trator agreedto meetwith CCG official toreview howCCG ruTive at admini trativeco ts in chedule 13 ofCCG claims.

On a eparate,butrelated, i ue,on July 14, 2000, the Admiru tratorreceived a letterfromthe Mayorofthe TownofLong Harbourand Mount Arlington Heights, the murucipalitycoveringthe wharfat Long Harbour, the ite ofthe wreckofthe Sam Won Ho. The Mayor' letter explainedthedifficultie the town and town -people facedduetothe wreck. In e ence, the Mayorreque ted theAdmini tratorto exarrune ifSOPF fund could be madeavailableto remove the wreck. similarletterwas receivedby theAdmiru tratoron July 18, 2000,fromthe LongHarbourDevelopment Corporation,based in Long Harbour, andathird letterwasreceivedon the arnedate fromthe HarbourAuthorityofMountArlington Heights. TheAdmini tratorreviewedthe historyofthe wreckand legislationapplicabletothe i ue. On ugust 16, 2000, theAdrruni tratorwrotetothe Mayor, with copie to the othertwoauthoritie tating- in ummary:

ection 710 CSA give the Mini ter power to remove or de troy a hip where there i a pollution threat. Jf a claim were made on the OPF for uch action , the Admini trator would con ider whether or not the measure taken and the co ts and expen e are reasonable.

wreck removal i governed by two Federal Ac , namely the avigab/e Water Protection Act and the Fishing and Recreational Harbours Act. Wreck removal and/or alvage are not concern of the SOPF. The powers given in the e two Acts may not be dependent on the que tion of whether or not there i a pollution threat, and what are the measure nece ary to counter it.

With re pect to recovery action again t the hipowner, the late t information on e tabli hing owner hip ofthi ve sel i given in the re ume on the previou incident (3.10). Ju tification by the Crown ofit (CCG) adrrurustration co t (Schedule 13) in thi claim and re olution ofthi i ue in general remain out tanding.

3.25 Mystery Oil Spill - Port Cartier. Quebec (2000) '

The CCG issued a Sitrep advi ing that oil pollution wasfound in the waterbetween the Greek flag 81 120 gross ton bu� cruTier Anangel Splendour, and the' quay, alongside at Port Cartier, Quebec, on May 12, 2000, and extending orne 200 metres ahead. There were two other vessel movements within the harbour over a irrulru·period as the discovery ofthe oil spill.

Pott artier i a pri at harbom ofthe Campagne Mini're Quebec Cartier (CMQC). The port authorities tookcharge ofthe clean up, in thepresenceofthe CCG The TCMS took oil amples. The oil resembled fuel oil and the quantity spilled wa estimated at approximately 900 litre .

CMQC obtained a LOU from coun el for the Anangel Splendour to coverthe co t and expenses ofthe clean up. It wa tated thatTCMS also required a LOU from the hip to cover any possible fine. The Anangel Splendour denied that she was the otigin ofthe oil and sailed on May 15, 2000.

On January 31, 2001 the Adrllinistrator received a claim from the Crown on behalfofthe CCG to recover theirco ts and expen es, tated to amount to 4,076.08. The claim has been as e ed. However, an offerofsettlement is being withheld peniling re ults of the inve tigation into the origin ofthe spill.

In the meantime, coun el forCMQC subrrutted a claim on behalfofthat port company, an1ountingto 249,137.31, tated to have been incuJTed by them cleaning-up the oil pollution in thi incident.Theclaim wa received by the Adrruni t:ratoron April 30, 2001. On July 27, 2001, a furtherclaim wa received from coun el forCMQC amounting to an additional $10 878.08, tated to be for the recovery oftheir legal fees in connection with thi incident.

TheAdmini t:rator wrote to CMQC' coun el on ovember 28, 2001, with a Ii t ofque tion which had ari en in hi in e tigation and a e ment ofthe claim Replie to the e que tion were received on March 22, 2002, and at the arne time corrected a tated en·or in oneofthe in oice ubrnitted in theclaim, increa ing the claim by a further 1,746.63

A key i ue in thi ca e i whetheror not the oil came from a hore-ba ed operation. It wa reported that over a irnilar time frame to the incident, Environment Quebec wa in e tigating a ourceofcontamination corning from a hare in Port Cartier

It i noted that the Admini t:rator may be liable for hip- ource and marine my tery oil pill However, there i no liability where the Admini trator ha been able to e tabli h that the occurrence that gave ri e to the damage wa not cau ed by a hip.

TheAdrnini t:rator' inve tigation continue

3.26 Tahkuna (2000)

There wa a die el oil pill from thi 846 gro ton Estonian flag fi hing ve el during refueling from a road tanker while the ve el wa along ide at Harbour Grace, ewfoundland, on June 7, 2000. Weather wa poorat the time with teady rain and wind gu ting to 30 knot The hip' agent contracted with the Eastern Canada Re pon e Corporation (ECRC) and the ECRC

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

responded with labourand materials. The CCG was in attendance.Aftersounding the tanks involved, both on the vessel and the road tanker, it wasconcluded that about 1000 lit:res had been spilled.

TC advised thatcharges were laidagainstthe Tahkuna forinfractions ofthe Oil Pollution Regulations and, on April 27, 2001, the vessel was found guilty with a fine of$20,000 being imposed.

3.27 Taurus (2000)

The CCG advised thatthis 1,020grosston Estonian fishing vessel hadbeen involved in an oil spill when alongside atArgentia, Newfoundland. The incident took placeduring the morningofJune 8,2000,when refueling fromaroadtanker.Thevesseldid nothavean aJTangementforcleanupwith a responseorganization. The ship'sagentsignedaletterfortheCCG to respond.

The CCG provided labourand materials andcleaned-up the spill, whichquantity was stated tobeabout200liu·es.

TCMSadvise thatonAptil6, 2001, fines were imposed in a Newfoundland Court: Forthe spiiJ - $9,000.00 and, fornot having an an·angement with aresponse organization - 3,000.00.

3.28 Ermelina (2000)

Thi i a 39 gro s ton Canadian fish packing/u·ansfer ve sel. The TSB advised that on June 18, 2000, she reported taking on water in the engine room when off Oy ter River, on the east coast ofVancouver Island, Briti h Columbia. CCG vessels responded and tran ferred pumps to the vessel to enable the crew to control the water intake. It was reported that in the pumping proce "not more than 15 liu·es ofoil had been lost overboard".

A partofa SAR respon e,oneoftheCCG ve sel towed the Ermelina to the afety ofCampbell River harbourthe arneday.TheAdministratorclosed hi file.

3.29 Mystery Oil Spill - Vancouver Harbour, British Columbia (2000)

On September 12, 2000, the Vancouver Port Authority (VPA) wrote to the CCG requesting assistance in order to present aclaim foroil pollution clean up to the SOPF. Accordingly, on November20, 2000, the SOPF received the CCG's letterpas ing on the VPA' letter.

On ovember 24 and 30, 2000, and January 17, 2001, the Administrator wrote to the VPA requesting the submi sion ofa formal claim, and providing a list of typical information nece ary tocon idersuch a claim.

Theclaimon theSOPFfrom VPAwasreceivedbythe Administratoron January 23, 2001, and amounted to $20,375.80. The claim covered the clean up ofoil found onthe waterat SeaboardTenninal, North Vancouver, British Columbia, on June 20, 2000. It was termed a mysteryspill.

Ship- ource Oil Pollution Fund

The Admini trator in inve tigating and assessing thi claim, reque tedinformation from VPAon February 13, 2001, to which the VPA responded on March 12, 2001. On March 30, 2001, the Admiilistrator requested additional information and documentation, to which a reply was receivedfrom VPA, their letter dated July 23, 2001.

Following an investigation, the Administrator made an a sessment ofthe claim and found, principally, that some ofthe handling charge forpayment of ubcontractors' invoices were notestablished. On this basis, on October4, 2001, he made a settlement offer to VPA of$17,953.31, plus the appropriate interest of $1,883.15 This offer was accepted by VPA on October 9, 2001. A Release and Subrogation document was signed on behalfofVPA on October 23, 2001, and a cheque for the total amount of$19,836.46 was sent by the Administrator to VPA on October 25, 2001.

In spite ofadetailed investigation into the oil spill, it proved impossibletodetermine its origin. It was therefore accepted as a mystery spill. TheAdministrator closed his file.

3.30 Un-named vessel - Fanny Bay, British Columbia (2000)

The SOPF was advised by the CCO Claim Status Reportdated December 31, 2000, that a claim would be submitted by the Crown to the Administrator seeking recovery ofthe ceo co t and expen es connected with this incident.

Thevessel, apparently un-registered, un-licensedandunnamed, is awoodenplanked pleasure craft made by Ouis-Craftofapproximately nine metre in length. On July 13, 2000, the ownerofan oy terfarm in Fanny Bay (just south ofComox,eastcoastofVancouver Island) telephoned DFOin Comox andadvisedthatthecraft, tied to amooring buoy, had unk and was leaking die el. TheCCO vessel Kestrel 1 andan ER crewre ponded. On July 14, 2000,absorbentbooms and pads were deployed as an initial measure. Commercial diver were used latertoclose offfuel valves and plug leakingoil pipesandvents. Afterpatching ahole in the hull, the craft was refloated. On aretum visit by ER personnel the day followingrefloating, the craft wa found to have disappeared.

The Crown submitted aclaim, an1ounting to 2,882.15, to theAdmiillst:ratorand received by him July 9, 2001. TheAdministratorfound $2,569.59 ofthe claim establishedandoffered to pay this amount, plus interest of$226.28. The settlement was accepted and arrangements made tot:ransferthe amount of$2,795.87 onAugust23, 2001.

After consideration ofthe circumstances ofthe ownership and the craft herself, the Administrator decided that it would not be reasonable (within the meaning ofsection 87 MIA (3) (d) ) to take recovery action, unless the situation changed.

The Administrator closed his file.

3.31 Radium 604 (2000)

This incident refer to the same tug and barge train (Radium Yellowknife and tow) referred to in incident number 3.17 above.

As indicated in 3.17 above, it wa reported that the tug and bargetrain were previou ly refu ed permission by TCMS to continue tran it ofthe Arctic, because It was too late in the sea on. The barge were beached until more favorable condition could be expected.

A CCO Sitrep ofJuly 17, 2000 advi ed that on July 15, 2000 thi 320 gro ton Canadian barge beached In Iqalult, unavut, wa found to be leaking die el fuel.

It was reported that the barge leakedane timated I0 litres ofdiesel fromacrack in the under ide ofthe hull. Then it was reported that the leak increased to approximately 100 litre per hour, onto thebeach.The leak was temporarily plugged. The CCO contracted to have the remaining 46,000 litres ofdie el in the Radium 604 tran ferred to econdary torage.

The CCO emergency re pon e officer (ER) were expected on ite on July 17, 2000, to as ume the role of Federal monitoringofficer. The Iqaluit beach master was on cene forCCO until ER per onnel arrived on ite.

Theownerofthebarge i tatedtohaveaccepted respon ibilityforthe pill andsentrepresentativ tothe ite.

The Admini tratorbelieve it unlikely that aclaim will now re ulttothe OPFa a re ult ofthi incident. The Admini t:ratorha clo ed hi file.

3.32 Hiawatha (2000)

The TSB reported that, on July 26, 2000, thi 46 gro ton Canadian ferry ank at the Parliament lip, Toronto harbour, cau ing minor die el oil pollution. It wa u pected that vandali m wa the cau e.

The Admiill tratorha received no further information on the incident and ha clo ed hi file.

3.33 Skaubryn (2000)

The SOPF received a report that there wa an oil pill at Seaboard Terminal, orth Vancouver, Briti h Columbia, the pill being found late e ening ugu t 3, 2000. Two ships were berthedatthe terminal, the Skaugran and the Skaub1yn

Early on Augu t4, 2000, the VPAre ponded to the pill and tasked local contractor forclean up. Laterthat forenoon the VPAdetermined the pill was sufficient} large to transferoverallre pon ibility forthe clean-upto the CCG TCMS, CCO and EC inve ligatedthe circumstancesofthe origin ofthe pill. Samplesfromthe spill and ships in the vicinityweretaken.

The CCO Claim Statu Report dated December 31, 2001, notes that the Crown pre ented a claim totalino $87,521.98 tothe shipowneronAugust 20, 2001. o

The Administrator awaits development.

Vancouver Harbour Incidents

Following the oil found offthe Seaboard Terminal, orth ancou er,August 3, 2000, the VPApre enteda claim to the SOPF for its response. Anumberof e el in the harbour also reported oil contamination. The cause ofthese incidents and theirconnection if any, with the SeaboardTerminal incident, is unde�· inve tigation by the Administrator. These incidents are reported as 3.34 to 3.42 inclusive, following.

3.34 Vancouver Port Authority (2000)

The VPA submitted a claim to the SOPF for its respon e to the above incident onAugust 4, 2000, which was received on March 14, 2001, amounting to $13,007.72.

OnJuly20,2001,VPAcoun elwrotetotheAdministrator:

advi ing that the VPA was submitting its claim, together with that of the CCG, directly to the hipowner (Skaubryn); requesting that, in the meantime, the Administrator hold the VPA claim again t the SOPF for this incident, in abeyance.

On August 2, 2001, the Administrator replied to VPA, agreeing to hold the claim in abeyance but noting that he re erved all hi right . The Admini tratorawait development

3.35 Trophy 13K112086 (2000)

The 13K112086 i a 3 metre, open, fibergla plea ure craftofthe model name "Trophy". Acompany with the name ofOcean Fi herie ofVancouver, on October 5, 2000, wrote to the TC/CCG in Richmond, Briti h Columbia, enclo ing photograph ofthe boat oiled with oil, which oiling wa tatedto havetaken place in "July, 2000". Al o enclo ed were two original invoice datedAugu t 24 and September6, 2000, re pectively, totaling 331.22 for removal ofthe oil tain from the hull ofthecraft and forthe upplyof replacement mooring line· and fender . It wa tated that the boat i owned by an employee and moored at the company dock at Commi ioner treet, Vancouver, at the time ofthe oiling. The company advi ed that orne oftheir commercial boat were al o oiled but, being tee!, they were able to be cleaned by the company. Although not tated, the letterofOctober5, 2000, would appear to eek recompen e.

TheOcean Fi herie letterwas forwarded by the CCG to theAdmini tratorandreceivedby him on July 12, 2001. TheAdmini tratorwrotetoOcean Fi herie on July 30, 2001,reque tingthat, ifthe person whohad ufferedthe pollution damage wi hed the letterand invoice tobe a claimagainstthe SOPF,then toconfirm hi claim in writing. AtthesametimetheAdmini tratorenquired if the company hadany samplesofthe oil involved.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

No wtitten reply wasreceivedfrom Ocean Fishe1ies but, onAugust 15, 2001, theAdministratorhad atelephone conversation with thepersonresponsible forFleet Operationsofthecompany. In theconversation it was statedthatacompany employee did have a sample ofthe offending oil and that itcould be provided. The Administratorreiteratedthathe awaitedaclaim and that he would then makearrangementsregarding theoil sample.

At the end ofthe fiscal yearno furthercommunication from OceanFisheries hadbeen received. In the meantime, theAdministratorsent a reminderto Ocean Fisheries Ltd., requesting that its employee confirm whetherornot he wishes to make a claim.

3.36 17' speedboat (2000)

An individual submitted a claim to the CCG, on August 29, 2000, amounting to $500.00, forcleaning his boat ofoil. The claim was passed to the Administrator and received on November 21, 2000. The Administratorwrote to the individual on November 24, 2000, requesting confirmation that he wished to make a claim againstthe SOPF The individual replied on December4, 2000, in effect, confirming his claim against the SOPF. The Administrator commenced his investigation and asses ment ofthe claim. On March 30, 2001, the Admini tratorwroteto the ownerrequesting substantiation forthe individual amounts making up the claim.

3.37 Leedon (2000)

Thi is a private, mall, motoryacht. The yacht was moored in a mcuina on the outh ide ofVancouver Harbour, in a downtown location when, on August 9, 2000, theownercontacted the CCG with respect to the craft having been found tobe oiled. Theexacttime and date ofthe oiling wasnot stated. On October 8, 2000, the owner ubmitted a claim to the CCG for$298.65, which claim covered hauling-out, powerwashingand repaintingthe affected part ofthe hull. Theclaim was pa ed totheAdmini tratorby CCG and received by him on ovember 21, 2000. TheAdministrator wrote to the owner on November 24, 2000. He provided the ownerwithinf01mationtoassistwiththepresentationofa formalclaimtotheSOPF.Theownersubmittedaformal claim totheSOPFwith upportingdocumentationand information. ItwasreceivedonJanuary 11,2001.

The Admini trator investigated and assessed the claim. Shortly afterthe fiscal yearendtheAdministratorpaid theclaim in full, together with interest of$16.01, but continues to as ess his recovery action options.

3.38 Burrard Clean #17 (2000)

This is a447 gross ton Canadian registered barge owned and used by the local response organization Western Canada Marine Response Organization (WCMRC). On August 15, 2000,the owner submitted an invoice to the CCG for $2,542.35 to recover their

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

tated co t due to the oiling ofthe off-duty, moored, barge in Vancouver Harbour. The CCG passed the invoice to theAdmini trator, which wa received by him on November 21, 2000. TheAdministrator sent an acknowledgement to the WCMRC on November 24, 2000, and information to assist in submitting a claim to the SOPF was sent by him on November 30, 2000. The claim was received from the WCMRC on December 27, 2000, and duly inve tigated and a sessed. Further information was obtained from WCMRC and third party sources re pecting aspects ofthe claim. The Administratorfound a number ofindividual items were not established within the meaning ofthe CSA and, on February 27, 2001, he offered $1,333.93, plus the appropriate interest, in settlement. WCMRC disputed some ofthe Administrator' assessments, but on March 20, 2001 they accepted theofferand provided a duly signed release and subrogation document. On March 22, 2001, theAdministratorarranged to pay the amount of$1,333.93, plu $70.27 interest, in full and final settlement.

TheAdministratornotes that in thi case the claim undersection 710 CSA was made by WCMRC qua shipowner and not a a respon e organization (RO) underthe CSA Generally, an RO asdefined in the CSA has no direct claim against the SOPF under section 710 but it can assert a claim for unsati fied costs and expenses afterexhausting its right ofrecovery again t the shipowner, pursuant to section 709.

TheAdministratorcontinues to asse his recove1y action option

3.39 Island Provider (2000)

Anotherclaim involvingoil pollution in Vancouver Harbourwas madebytheownerofthi 35 gro ton Canadianwoodenfi hing vessel.Theowner tatedthat the vessel wasdelivering almon toacompany located in downtown Vancouverwhen, during theearly how· of August 5, 2000,the hull, mooringrope andfloats becamecoated with oil. Theownerpre entedaclain1 to the CCG forthe amountof$4,415 89, on October6, 2000, to recover its stated, costs andexpense in the incident. In tum this was passed totheAdmini tratoron November 21, 2000. TheAdministratoracknowledged the correspondence on November 24, 2000 and provided informationtothe owneron ovember30, 2000, to assist in makingaclaimon the SOPF.Telephone discussions with theowners followed. TheAdmini trator investigatedthecircumstancesoftheclaimand the allegedoiling.Todate noclaimonthe SOPF hasbeen received from theowner.

3.40 Silver Bullit (2000)

This vessel isafanlliy owned and operated7 metre aluminum workboat engaged in boom repair, watertaxi engagementsandothertasks.Theboatwasworkingby the B.C. SugarCompanydockonthe southsideof VancouverHarbouronAugust4 and 5, 2000, whenthe

hull andenginecooling system werestated tohave becomeoil contaminated. The ownerwrote the G on August I0, 2000, indicatingawi h"to register aclaim fordamage againstthedeep-seavessels"causingtheoil contamination,at that timee timatedat $8,500.00. This correspondencewaspassed bythe CG tothe Administratoron ovember21, 2000. TheAdministrator acknowledged receiving the corre pondence on November 24, 2000. TheAdmini tratorwrote again on November 30, 2000, asking theownerforwritten confirmation thathe wi hedtomake aclaimon the SOPFand, at the arne time, providing information as to how tomake uch aclaim. Theownertelephoned the Admini tratoron December6, 2000, indicating that he intendedto makeaclaim.

A follow-uptelephonecall wasmade by the OPFto the owneron February 7, 2001, but, to date, noclaim and supporting documentation ha been received by the Admini trator.

3.41 Georgie Girl (2000)

The Georgie Girl i a 8 metre fiberglas plea ure motor yacht and wa mooredat a marina on the outh ide of Vancouver Harbour, when the hull and fender became oil coated at adate and time, which i not exactly identified.Theownercontacted CCG on ugu t 9, 2000, regarding the incident. The ownerfiled a claim with the CCG on September 18, 2000, amounting to 217.86 to coverthe cleaning and replacement co t involved. The COITe pondence was pa ed to the Admini tratorby the CCG on o ember 21, 2000. The Admini trator acknowledged the corre pondence from the owneron ovember24, 2000. Information a to how to file a claim again t the OPF wa ent to the owneron ovember30, 2000. The wner ubmitted a claim to the Admini trator in the amount of 2I 7. 6, which wa received on January 9, 2001. At the fi cal year' endtheAdmini trator made arrangement to pay the claim in full, together with 12.20 intere t, thu clo ing thi claim file. Relea e and ubrogation Agreement in favourofthe dmini tratorwa executed and delivered by the owneron April 10, 2001.

TheAdmini tratorcontinue to a e hi reco ery options.

3.42 Prosperity (2000)

Thi is a 96 gro ton Canadian regi tered aluminum fi hing vessel. On September 13. 2000, the Administratorreceived a claim, amounting to $54,794.29,from the owner, tated to be the co t incuned by the vessel in dealing with the oil pollution encounteredduringthe morning ofAugust 4, 2000. At thetime ofthe incidentthe vessel wa at a dock in downtown Vancouverunloading ardines, when the hull became oil contaminated. The ownercautioned thatfurtherco t could be incurred in removincr the oil impregnated intothealuminum hull, which oil�ould not initiallybe removedby normal cleaning.

The dmini trator in e tigated and a ses ed the claim, in thepro e ofwhich he employed localcoun el. The claim rai ed a numberofconcerns with the dmini tratorincluding the charges stated to have been in uned b the hipyard, fi hing time lo t, crew wages, fuel co ts, owner charge and other, lesser, items. Anotheri ue wa the question ofthe owner's legal fee . The legal expenses claimed were rejected.

Following a number ofnegotiations with the owneron the contention item , on February 14, 2001, SOPF counsel confirmed to the ownera full and final ettlementofferby the Administratorof$27,172.88, plus 1,239.34 interest. On February 22, 2001, SOPF coun el advi edthat the ownerhad signed the release and ubrogation document. On the same day, February 22, 2001. a cheque in the amount of$26,924.22 was pas ed to the owner. On receiving the necessary evidence ofpayment to the crew, the final cheque of 1,488.00 wa made available to ownerafterthe end of the fi cal year. Thi payment completed the ettlement ofthi particularclaim and theAdrnini tratorclo ed his fileonthe claim a pect.

The hipownerhadpro ideda ample oftheoil that damagedthe e el. TheAdmini trator entthe ample foranaly i andcompari on with sample takenfromthe pill at SeaboardTerminal reportedat 3.33 above.The Admini tratorcontinue hi in e tigation intotheorigin ofthe oil, forthepurpo e ofpo ible recovery action.

3.43 Margie (2000)

The TSB reported that, on ugu t 22, 2000, thi mall Canadian gillnetter wa abandoned by her crew when in Porpoi e Harbour, off Port Edward, Prince Rupert, northem Briti h Columbia. The Margie ank and leaked die el ofwhich, it wa tated,there wa a mirumal amount aboard.

Hearing no more concerning thi incident, the Adrruni trator ha clo ed hi file.

3.44 Bivalve Harvester (2000)

Another rrunor pollution incident brought to the attention ofthe dmini tratorby theTSB, wa the inking on September 25, 2000, ofthi mall Canadian barge Bivalve Harveste1: It wa repo1ted that the barge cap ized while loading in Trevenen Bay. Thi i an area on the mainland ofthe we tcoa t ofBriti h Columbia which i reported to have many marinefarm facilitie .

It was reported that two people on the barge were able to tep a hore a it cap ized and a third fell into the water but wa quickly recovered. The barge leaked a mall amount offuel.

The Adrruni tratorha heard no more concerning thi incident and ha clo ed hi file.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

3.45 Flying Swan VI (2000)

This was a 63 gross ton wooden Canadian fishing vessel. The CCG issued a Status Report advising that the Flying Swan VI was found capsized on October 1, 2000, by two otherfishing vessels. The position was _ some 30 nautical rrules SW ofYarmouth, Nova Scotia, south ofthe entrance to the Bay ofFundy. About 1 metre ofthe hull was showing above the sea and, with the agreement ofthoseconcerned, it was decided that the best option was to sink the wreck. By October 2; 2000, the upturned vessel had drifted to a SUita _ ble s1te fordisposal and was sunk by a CCG vessel. Mmor pollution was released, there being an estimated 4,500 to 9,000 litres ofdiesel oil remairung on board at the timeofsinking.

Laterthe TSB issued a report stating that a power blockjammed while hauling a seine net aboard with a catch offish, contributing to the capsize. Six crew were re cued and one died.

3.46 Keta V (2000)

Keta V wasa 236gross ton Canadian registered tug used in supp01t ofdredging operations. Overnight October3/ 4,2000,the Keta V when on passagegroundedon rocks in Liverpool Harbour, Nova Scotia. The tug refloatedand wenttoanchor, whereshe sank All seven crew member abandonedintoa Liferaftandwererescued. Itwas stated that there wa approximately 27,000 litre ofdiesel fuel aboard. There i a large salmon fishfarmaboutone-half rrule fromthewreckpo ition.TheCCG and EC, among other ,weredispatched tothe scene. During October4, 2000, diver wereemployedtoplugthefuel tankvents andacontainmentboomwa deployed. The nearby fish farm was boomed. Effort were made torecoveroil from the wreck. Weatherconditions remained adverse and the wreck received moredamage a it pounded the bottom. The CCG ordered theowner toremove the wreck. On October23-24, 2000, alvors attemptedtorai e the wreck u ingacraneand liftbag , butwere unsuccessful. Afteradditional preparations, the contractorcould not rai e the ve el on ovember 11, 2000. By this time, the wreck wa obadly damaged thatthere werenot enough watertight compartments to assist provision of po itive buoyancy. Severe adverse weathercontinued, and it wa nece ary to revise the original plan to raise the Keta V. On January 15, 2001, to a new, agreedplan contractor commenced removing all components, which may becontaminated with oil. This removal task wa completed on January 19, 2001, and,approved by the authoritie Furtherworkceased. It wa intended that an underwater urvey ofthe remains ofthe wreck would be made in the Spring of2001 to ensure no other threat ofpollution existed.

The December 31, 2001, CCG Claims Status Report noted that the CCG costs and expenses for this incident were $29,808.89 andthatthis claim amount was ubrrutted to, and paid in full on November 30, 2001, by the shipowner. TheAdministratorclosed his file.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

3.47 Atlantic Birch (2000)

A CCG reportadvi ed thatthi 827 grosston Canadian tug pilled die el while refueling atCourtney Bay Berth o. 1 in SaintJohn, New Bmn wick,on October20, 2000. The ownersrespondedtocontain andclean-upthe pill. The TCMS reported thatthetug wasfined $10,000 on May 2, 2001, forinfractions ofthe Pollution Regulations.

It was statedthat the cause ofthe spill was the high rate offilling when a tank was almost full and deck scupper plugs, designed to prevent a pill on deck going into the water, leaked. Some 55 litres ofdiesel was reported to have been spilled.

!h� Administrator has heard no more concerning this mc1dent andconsidersthat any claims againstthe SOPFareunlikely and has closed his file.

3.48 Kent Express (2001)

Again aCCG rep01tadvisedtheAdministratorofanother spill in SaintJohnharbour.The incident involved thi 13,020gros ton Barbadosflagcontainership that, on January 13, 2001, wasstatedtohave pumped 15 litre of sludge oil overboard. TheTCMS subsequentlyadvised thatthe ship wasfined $10,000forthe offence.

TheAdministratorwas informed that anyclaim from the CCG in this incident is unlikely. He consider that any otherclaims against the SOPFare unlikely and has closed his file.

3.49 Cicero (2001)

This is a 10,919 gros ton Canadian registered, B1itish owned, ro-ro fen·y operating between Montreal, Quebec and St. John's, Newfoundland.

TheCCG reportedthat,on February 5, 2001, therewasa bunkeroil spill fromthevessel when he wasalongside at Section66, Montreal harbour. Acrack wasfound in the hull. Local contractorswereemployedon behalfof the ship toeffectthe clean-up, monitoredby theCCG.

The CCG stated that theircosts andexpen e would be billed to the operators ofthe ship.

TheAdministratorhas heard nomoreconcerningthis incidentand, ashedoesnotconsiderit likelythatclaims will beforthcomingtothe SOPF, hehasclosedhi file.

3.50 Marsha Dawn II (2001)

This isa 14gross tonCanadianfiberglass fishingvessel oftypical open aftercockpitconstruction. On February 7, 2001, the vessel wasfound sunkathermooringsin St. AndrewsHarbour,New Brunswick. Itwasstatedthata small amount ofdiesel hadbeen spilled. CCO ER personnelattendedthe sitetoascertain the pollution

ituation. Subsequently, the 0 stated thatexpen<,e<, in this connection were minimal and there would be no cost recoveryaction from that organization.

TheAdmini trator ha heard no more ofthe incident and as hecon iders it unlikely that the SOPF will receive aclaim, heha clo ed his file.

3.51 Sandy S (2001)

The issuance by the CCG ofa itrep advised the Admini tratorofthi incident and, thu , the potential fora claim against the SOPF.

On February 9, 2001, the 13 gro ton Canadian wooden fi hing ve el, built in 1947, ank along ide in Prince Rupert Harbour, Briti h Columbia. The local DFO Small Craft Harbour per onnel provided initial re pon e tothe inking. The inking re ulted in the relea e of orne ofthe approximately 900 litre of die el fuel aboard. The owner rated he would obtain help from friends to rai e the ve el. Thi did not happen, forcing the CCG to act. On February 13, 2001, the ceo sent a letter to the owneradvi ing him that,pur uant tothe CSA, they held theowner re pon ible for all co t and expen e incurred by the Canadian government in the inking ofthe Sandy S. The owner tared he had no fund available to al age the ves el. The owner igned a letter undertaking to be re pon ible forall co t and expen e incurred by the Canadian authoritie under ection 677 and 67 CSA. On February 13, 2001, undercontract to the CCG, alvor rai ed the ve el and remo ed the remaining oil aboard. The ve el wa then towed to the 0 borne Burn Site where it wa to be temporarily beached.

Thi concludedthe CCG ER' in ol ement with the Sandy S. TheAdmini tratornote from the CCG Claim Statu report dated December 31, 200I, that the Crown ha ubmitted to the owneron October26, 2001, a claim amounting to 9,677.30, toreco erthe CCO' co t andexpen e in the incident.

3.52 Cartierdoc (2001)

During the afternoon of February 27, 2001, the chief engineerofthi 18,531 gro tonCanadianGreat Lake bulk carrier advi ed the local office ofTCM that thi ve el had been involved in an oil pill. The Cartierdoc wa laid-up forthe winterat berth M2, in Montreal Harbour. TCMS, CCG, EC, the Port Authority and the rna ter, re ponded. The owner contra�ted forthe clean-up. During the winter lay-up, asroutme, �e engine room bilge were pumped on a regular ba 1 . It wa reported that a well a the biloe water, an estimated 1,100 litre ofdie el and "' !ubricating oils had been pumped overboard. The thick 1ce, fast around the vessel, and in a current free berth had held the oil. Hole were drilled in the ice and mo ' t ofthe oil wa recovered. It wa rated that an oily water separator aboard the Cartierdoc had malfunctioned.

lean-up op ration wa monitored by the CCG G laim tatu Report ofSeptember 30, 2001, not that the Crown' claim amount of$5,527.97 was ettled in full b the hipowner on September 26, 2001.

TCM laid charge again t the ship for infraction of the Oil Pollution Regulations on Aptil 4, 2002. The ca e wa ftr t heard on April 18, 2002, at which the owner ha pleaded "not guilty". The case wa adjourned until June, 2002.

TheAdministratorcon iders it unlikely that he will recei e aclaima are u1t ofthis incidentandhas clo ed hi file.

3.53 Vancouver Sunset (2001)

TheTSB reported that, on March 4, 2001, this Canadian 36GTyacht ank at the Plazaof ation moming facility, Fal e Creek, Vancouver, B1iti h Columbia. It was tatedthattherewas nopollution and thatthe ve sel was refloated, althoughwithexten ive waterdamage.

The Admini tratorha clo ed hi file.

3.54 VT No. 30 (2001)

Anotherincident, reportedtothe SOPFby theTSB was the inking ofthi barge. The VT o. 30wa reportedto ha e unk, on March 10, 2001, at the Government dock in Alert Bay, Briti h Columbia.Atthe time the 355 GT Canadian barge had acraneon deck which lid offand at erticallyon the bottom. Thebargeand thecrane were reco ered without oil pollution. The die el engine drivencranehadbeen pecially fitted with anti-theftcap on the fuelacce pipe , which pre ented leakage.

TheAdrnini tratorhas clo ed hi file.

3.55 Daviken (2001)

Thi i a 23,306 gro ton Bahamian flagore carrier. On April 1, 2001, afterexiting Ei enhower Lock, U eaway, upbound a mall quantity ofoil wa found in the lock. The hip wa informed and arrangement made for her to be in pected at the next lock, Iroquoi , in the Canadian Seaway. In the meantime the hip had taken action in removing oily waterfrom the rudder po t compartment and tightened the rudderpo t gland. On in pection byTCM in Iroquoi no oil leakage wa found and the hip wa allowed to proceed.

There wa no SOPF involvement in thi incident and theAdmini tratorha clo ed hi file.

3.56 Utviken!Provmar Terminal (2001)

A report wa received at the SOPFthatthere had been a colli ion in Hamilton harbour, Ontario, with potential for oil pollution. On inquiry it wa found that, on April l, 2001, the 17,191 gro ton Bahamian flag ore catTier

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

Utviken had struck the 982 gros ton Canadian refueling vessel Hamilton Energy and continued on hitting and holing the 4,710gross ton Canadian fuel storagebat·ge Provmar Terminal in the engine room. It was reported that the Hamilton Energy uffered damage to her rudder and propeller. The Provmar Terminal's stern sank in some 12 meters ofwater but it was reported therewasnooil pollution, as the loose oil in the unken ex-tankerhadbeen contained in the flooded engine room. The Utviken had suffered holing to herbulbousbow; it was reportedthatshe had experienced engine problems while manoeuvering. The Provmar Terminal wasraised on April 3, 2001. Pollution throughout was minorand all contained within thebooms.

Juri diction in theharbourwas underthe Hamilton Hat·bourCommission (since, Hamilton PortAuthmity). Neither the CCG nor SOPFwas directly involved.

TheAdministratorconsiders it unlikely that he will receive a claim asa resultofthis incident and has clo ed hi file.

3.57 Destiny 1 (2001)

ACCG StatusRepmtadvisedtheAdmir1istratorthaton April LO, 2001, the 196grosston Cat1adian chatter pas enger ves el Destiny 1 caught fire while mooredat Granville I land, Vancouver. The vessel was used for dinnercrui es. ACCG craft and the Vancouverfireboat re ponded. Laterthe decision was made totow the dan1aged hull toa mooring buoy at Kit ilano, Vancouver. CCG put contractor on stand-by incase ofneed. The ve el wa tatedtohave had 1,300 litre ofdiesel fuel aboardandCCG ER per onnel tooktheoppmtunityto plugthetwofuel tanks tohelprninin1izetheriskof pollution.

Laterthe followingday,April ll, 2001, the Destiny I ank at the Kit ilano mooring buoy. A representative of the in urer arrived on cene and declat·ed the vessel a total lo The CCG advi ed the ownerofhi re pon ibilitie undertheCSA, to remove the pollutant and the ve sel.

The CCG in tructed their SAR ve el crew tocheck the wreck periodically. There ha been no pollution reported. On April 12, 2001, the Destiny I was rai ed and moved ashore. Precaution were taken to ensure that no pollution wa caused during the dewatering of the hull.

The CCG advi ed that theirclaimto recovertheircosts and expenses has been submitted directly to the hipowner.

The Admini trator awaits developments.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

3.58 Scarab (2001)

ACBC TV tation in St. John's, Newfoundland, repmted that, onApiil l9, 2001, acargoship left that p01ttrailing oil. It sub equently transpiredthattheshipwasthe3,136 gro ston Cayman Island flagmulti-purposecargo hip Scarab; and, in fact, had ailed from Botwood, Newfoundland. It wasreportedthat she wascarrying paperat thetime. The oil wasspotted coming from the ship at seaabout65 nautical miles SEofSt. John's by a DFOsurveillance plane. The slick was noted tobe approximately 2 km long by 100meterswide.The Scarab wasen route toAlexand1ia, Egypt, at the time.

TheTCMS reported the occun·ence to the Egyptian authorities in accordance with agreedPortState Control procedures, with the reque t that they board the ship on her arrival.

TheAdministratorhas closed his file.

3.59 Joe's Salmon Lodge (2001)

This is an unregistered 300 gross ton accommodation barge which, on April 24, 2001, sat on a Jog at low tide and, holed, the barge sank. The barge was moored at Mitchell Island, in the orth Arm ofthe Fraser River, British Columbia, at the time.

The TSB, who reported the incident, stated that there was no pollution but that thebarge was extensively damaged.

TheAdministratorhas closed hi file.

3.60 Egret Plume II (2001)

ACCG Status Report advised the Admini tratorthat this 25 gross ton Canadian wooden craft, registereda a yacht, ank in the Small Craft Harbourat Ladysmith, British Columbia, on April 26, 2001. Lady mith i on the east coast ofVancouver I land, about 20 mile south ofNanaimo. The craft had been built in 1931.

Itwas reported thatthe Egret Plume II had recently refueled and hadanestimated660to 1,100litresof diesel aboard. Acontractordeployed booms and absorbentpads. The nextday,April 27, 2001, theCCG ER personnel anivedonsceneand assumedthe OSC role.

The owner, residing in Victoria, stated he had no money and did not take an active role in responding to the situation. Thecraftreceived adamaged bow in the sinking and was considered to have Little or no value.

On April 28, 2001, the CCG contracted to have the craftremoved from the waterand placed on a trailerin the Small Craft Harbour's property. No fmther pollution was released in this operation.

TheCCG Status Report ofDecember 31, 2001, notes "claim to be submitted to shipowner". The Administratorawaits developments.

3.61 Canadian Transfer (2001)

The TSB reported that on May 14, 2001, this I6,353 GT Canadian Great Laker, loaded with salt, struck bottom with considerable damage. The vessel was down-bound at the time andjust to the we t of Goderidge Harbour, Lake Huron, when she left the prescribed channel. o pollution wa reported

3.62 Mokami (2001)

Thi ves el is a 3,0 I5 gros ton Canadian tanker. The MCTS reported toCCG ER that, on May 17, 200I, there had been a spill ofdie el in St. Lewi harbour, Labrador, involving the Mokami while the tanker wa transferring fuel to a hore tank. It wa estimated that 200 litres had been pilled. The Mokami ailed.

The ameday, the mayorofSt. Lewi complainedto theCCGthatthe pill wa notbeingcleaned-up. The CCG explained to the mayorthat ifthe pollution wa hiprelated,then the hip wa re pon ible for the respon e, with the CCG in a monitoring role. In the afternoon the hipowner informed the CCG that they wereon ite and mounting are pon e. In calm unny condition a urveillance flight wa madeoverthe area Jaterthe ame day, May 17, 200l, and ob erved a lick ofoil 15 mile by I00 meter

The mayor ofSt. Lewi informed EC that the fuel had leaked from a pipeline to hore oil torage tank . The mayor confirmed, on May 18, 2001, that the clean-up wa progre ing ati factorily with mo t ofthe oil removed from thewater urface and thatboom with ab orbent were in place at the wharf.

CCG and EC, togetherwith provincial official , planned a follow-up to the incident to as e damage, and timeline and effectivene ofthe clean-up.

o further report on the incident havebeen recei ed by the Admini tratorand a the cau e ofthe pill doe not appearto be hip ource, he ha clo ed hi file.

3.63 Purple Rain (2001)

The TSB reported that on May 31, 2001, the 10 GT Canadian fi hing ve el ank when anivipg under escort mto Cap-aux-Meule harbour, le Ile -de-JaMadeleine, Quebec.The ve el wa declared a constructive total loss after being alvaged. There wa no report ofoil pollution.

3.64 Scotia Prince (2001)

The TSB reported that thi 5,005 GT Canadian passengerfen·y , on June 17, 2001, struck bottom while departing Yarmouth, ova Scotia, and breached a double bottom fuel tank. At the time the CCG Response Organisation in the Maritime wa not made aware ofthe incident. o oil pollution was reported.

3.65 St. Martins Wharf(2001)

t. Martin i a mall community on the north shore of the Ba of Fundy about 45 kms ea t ofSaint John. The T B r ported that, on June 19, 2001, two Canadian fi hing e els were afire at the town wharf; the 13 gro ton Tanya Jane 1 and the 14 gro s ton Miss Denette. The wharfwa also fire damaged. The CCG ER sent a repre entative to the scene to ensure any pollution was contained.

TheAdmini tratorhas heard no further information on the incident. He considers it unlikely thatthe SOPF will receive a claim and hasclosedhi file.

3.66 Joggins Wharf (2001)

Joggin i a village ofapproximately 570 inhabitants <md, again, is ituated on the Bay ofFundy but, in this ca e, is in ova Scotia, toward the ea tern head of Chignacto Bay. Joggins wa erved by a timber con tructed government wharf, five kilometers from Joggin , at a place calledTwo River but commonly know a Joggin Wharf.

On July 3, 2001, a truck on the wharfand three lobster boat at the wharfcaught ftre and were de troyed. The boat were ofthe tandard fibergla open aft cockpit de ign, approximately 13 meter in length.

The CCG ER re ponded by providing monitoringand advice on the pollution threat.

Thewreck ofthethreeboat were pulled higherupon the hore,then broken upanddi po ed-ofin a landfill ite. It was later tatedthat abarge wa being u edto replace the wharfand that the police concluded that the ftre had originated in oneofthe lo tboat Total damage weree timated tobe in exce ofhalfmillion dollar

TheAdmini trator doe not expect to re eive a claim on the SOPF for thi incident and ha clo ed hi file.

3.67 Me/lisa Desgagnes (2001)

Anotherincident, whichcametothe dmini trator' attentionfromone oftheT B Daily Occurrence Report , involved the 4,488 GTCanadian bulk carrier Messi/a Desgagnes. It was tated that,on July 14, 200I, while departing Po1t aux Basque , ewfoundland, the ve el truck bottom u tainingdamagetothe propeller. The ve el returned tothedock and diver detected a mall leakAn oil boomwasdeployed. Mo t propeller hafts areoil lubricated. The CCG ER in ewfoundland wa not made awareofthe incident at the time.

TheAdmini tratorcon ider it unlikely that he will receive a claim a are ult ofthi minoroil pollution incident and ha clo ed hi file.

3.68 Tadoussac Marina (2001)

On December 7, 2001, the Administrator received a claim from the Municipalite de Tadoussac, Tadoussac, Quebec, for $2,195,00 covering the costs ofthe local fire brigade responding to a spill ofgasolinefroma boat in a local marina on July 16, 2001.

TheAdministratorcommenced an investigation and found that the incident involved a 9 gross ton Canadian pleasure motoryacht L'Ance L'Eau. The marinafuel depot attendant, with the boat owneron site, commenced refueling into afuel filling deckfitting no longerconnected to a fuel tank. An estimated 67 litres ofgasoline went directly into the engine room ofthe yacht and some gasoline automatically pumped into the hru·bour. Pru·ks Canada requested the local fire brigade to respond to the incident because ofthe dangercaused by the spill.

Having carefully exanlined the circumstances, onAp1il 3, 2002, the Administrator wrote to the municipality, rejecting the claim. It was considered that the measures taken were not to prevent, counter, repairor limit to the minimum the damages fromcontamination resulting from the pill but, rather,takento minimize the risk of explo ion orfire resulting from the gasoline spill. The Administratorsuggested that the claim should be more correctly addressed to those who requested the service, orthose who benefited from the service.

The Administratorclosed his file.

3.69 Zodio (2001)

The TSB reported this 19,867 gros ton Malte e flag bulk cruTierbroke adriftfromher moorings in high wind and strong current condition in the Port of Churchill, Manitoba, early morningon July 27, 2001. The ve el ran aground and damaged three water ballast double bottom tank The Zodio was partially loaded with grain atthe time having topped loading forthe night a little earlier There wa no pollution.

TheTCMS cruTied out an investigation into the circum tance and, at the arne time, a Port State Control in pection.

TheCCG wa not involved in thi incident. The Admini tratordoe not expect a claim to be forthcoming and ha closed hi file.

3.70 Solander (2001)

The TSB reported that on Augu t I, 200I, the 37 gross ton Canadian general cargo vessel Solander sank when offOpit at, Tofino Harbour, British Columbia. All even people aboard at thetime were aved. The ve el wa carrying chemical products and general cargo. Salvage was being contemplated. There was no rep01t of oil pollution.

hip- ource Oil Pollution Fund

3.71 Twinkle (2001)

This wa a 38 gross ton Canadian wooden craft built in 1925, regi tered a afi hing ve el but, reporedly, no l?nger used in that employment. ACCG ER report ad�1sed that, on August 3, 2001, the Twinkle reported takmg on water when offCape Mudge in Discovery Pas age, on the east side ofVancouver Island. ACCG cutterresponded and the boat was esc01ted safely back to Yucata Dock, Cape Mudge.

Durin . g this rescuethe cutterhad to pump the ves el to k�ep rt afloat. In the pumping operation, oil was discharged into the water. The oil came from the ve sel's bilges and possibly some containers within the hold ofvessel.

The Twinkle was moved toCampbell Riverdock and, on August 7, 2001, he sank alongside. The ownerdid notact. With the concurrence ofthe CCG ER the Campbell River Harbour Authority respondect to the threat ofoil pollution andafterdealing with this, raised the vessel. The CCG Status Reports since September 30, 2001, have noted that the incident will be the subject ofrecovery action.

3.72 Carabobo (2001)

This is one ofthe more unusual incidents tocome to the attention oftheAdministratorduring the recent past.

ACCG Statu reportadvised theAdministratorthat during 1999 recreational diver , diving at apopular wreck ite offGros cap aux Os, in Baie de Gaspe, Quebec, noticed oil leaking from the hull. OnAugust 21, 2001, divers from Parks Canada, underdirection ofthe CCG, inspected the wreck. The diver reported that there was an unknown quantity ofoil in the wreck, thatthe wreck appeared in poorcondition and that some oil continued toleakout.

The wreck was that ofa Canadian Flowerclas corvette which had been sold to the Venezuelan navy and was en route to Venezuela when she went aground and was lost in December, 1945.

Thearea isnowconsidered environmentally sensitive and the CCG decided to remove as much oftheexisting oil in the wreck as possible. Divers wereemployed and fourtanks were identified as containing oil, which wasof the BunkerC heavy fuel type. Pumping operations were commenced and over 5,000 litres ofoil was recovered. Absorbent materials were used to remove oil which could not bepumpedout. Holes inthe Carabobo were sealed and divers, equipment and the CCG left the site.

Atthetime it wasestimatedthatthecostofthe inspection alone would be over$50,000. It is reported that DoJ advised the CCG that it was too late to submit aclaim againsttheownerofthe Carabobo, ortotheSOPF.

TheAdministrator closed his file.

3.73 Eirik Raude (2001)

In ageneral circulation by T MS ofinfonnation advising oftheirrecentprosecutions in the Maritimes, it wa notedby theAdmini tratorthat this drilling rig had been involved in an oil pill. On August 15, 2001, this Bahamas registered rig wa under repair in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, when there wa a relea e ofabout 15 J. of oil into the harbour. On December 18, 2001, the rig was found guilty ofpollution andfined$20,000.

3.74 41h Street Dock- Totino, British Columbia (2001)

Three Canadian fi hing ve el were reported afire by the TSB, at the 4th. Street Dock in Tofino, British Columbia, which fireoccurred on October I, 2001. The three ves els were: Old Spice - 15 gro s ton, Star - 31 gro s ton, and the Hayden Pass - 50 gro ton. It was tated that there was nooil pollution. TheAdmini tratorhas no fUither infonnation on the occurrence.

3.75 Lady Franklin (2001)

The Lady Franklin i a 2,125 gro ton Canadian general cargo hip. ACCG Statu Report advi ed the Administrator that, on September 3, 2001, the ve el reported that he had uffered damage to her propeller and haft eal in heavy ice conditions. The po ition of the hip at the time wa 17 nautical mile SE of Re olute, unavut. Reportedly, approximately "800 litre ofoil from the propeller and 700 litre ofoil from the tern tube" were reported lo t. The hip wa immobilized.

Two CCG icebreaker were ta ked to a i t. The crew ofone ofthe icebreaker attempteda clean-up ofthe oil u ing the hip' barge. An aerial urveillance flight revealed trace ofoil but found that the iceedge were not soiled. The two icebreaker a i ted each other in towing the Lady Franklin to ani ivik, unavut, where they arrived afely on September 5, 2001.

The remainderofthe lo t oil was deemed unrecoverable. althoughtheCCG continued to monitorthe ituation.

The CCG Claim Statu report ince September 30. 2001, notethat the agency intend to ubmit aclaim to the hipowner.

3.76 Shamrock (2001)

TheCCGadvi edtheAdministratorthatonSeptember9, 2q<:ll,anunknown(small)quantityofadieseloil/water mrxturewaspumpedfromapleasurecraftintoPortElgin harbour,Ontano. PortElgini ituatedon LakeHuron near the Bruce PeninsulaThepleasurecraftwasidentified�the Shamrr:ck It wasstated that sixotherpleasurecraft hadbeen v Wlthapproximately5litresoflubeoil mis ino· it bemgsu pectedthatthisoilhadalsobeendumpedintoth� harbour.

The CCG, poli e, ftre b1igade and Provincial En ironment agencie all ent official tothe cene.

The CCG di cu sed the question ofpayment fortheir co t and expen e with the ownerofthe Shamrock. The CCG Statu Reports ince September 30, 2001, ha e noted that the Crown intends to submit a claim to the SOPF fortlu incident.

3.77 Amerloq (2001)

A diesel oil spill originated from thi vessel during the e ening ofSeptember 12, 2001, when the ve sel was tied up in Argentia, Newfoundland. The ve sel is a 849 gro ton Russian registered trawlerowned by a Spani h company; she was in Argentiafora self-refit and was tran ferring fuel within the ve el at the time.

The initial responsewasmadebytheCCGER with ab orbentboom.Theshiphadan a.ITangement with a RO andemployedECRC forclean up, monitoredbythe CCGTCMS took an1plesandcarried outan inve tigation.

The DFO/CCG obtaineda LOU issuedonbehalfofthe P&I Clubforthe amountof 3,000. Theamountofoil spilled wasfu t- tatedtobe200litre butthi was ub equentlyamendedtobe "unknown" but "con iderable".

3.78 Linbe (2001)

The Linbe i a 12 gro ton Canadian wooden craft, regi tered a a fi hing e el. The CCG ER advi ed the Ad!1Uni trator that, on September 13, 2001, the ve el wa e!1U- ubmerged and pilling die el in Alberni Inlet, on the we t coa t ofVancouver I land. The owner aid he had no in urance but, later, called a local tug company. The harbourmaster monitored the incident and the tug company recovered the derelict u ing a barge. Thetugcompany required paymentfor the work and poke to the CCG to en ure payment would be forthcoming. The tugcompany ub equently invoiced the CCG forthe work.

The Admini tratorawait development

3.79 Anne Jolene (2001)

Oneofthedi:fficultie fortheAdmini trator, andthe cau e ofmo tdelay inre ponding to claim i obtaining the nece ary information forhim tocarryouthi required inve tigationandas e ment. Eachclaim being different and requiringdifferent information. In thi claim the Admini tratorwasparticularly impre edwiththe completene ofthedocumentation andthemannerin whichtheincidentwaspre ented. He found the cooperation andopennessofthe government official directly involved tobebu iness-like and helpful.

Thi 72 gross ton Canadian wooden fi hing scallop dragger was arrested in 1995 for illegal fishing and

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

held at federal governmentwhrufs in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. All fuelsand lube oils were removedfromthe vesselby theCCGTheCrownsold thevessel toanew owner, whotook possession and refueled/reoiledthe Anne Jolene with approximately450 litresofoils. On September28, 2001, it was rep01ted tl1at the vessel had sunk inWrightsCove, Bedford Basin, Halifax Harbour, neru·the Dartmouth YachtClub.Approximately 100 lit:res ofoil had leakedoutofthe sunken vessel andtheowner madean initial responsebyarranging with a local contractortoboom-offtheareain wayofthecraftand commenceaclean-up.Aninspectionrevealed thatthe sunkencrafthadnoapparentdamage, and was lying on herstarboru·d side, on mud, in 10metresofwater.

The CCG met with the owner and he was given until October 23, 2001, to fully respond tothe incident. On October 16, 2001, the owner indicated that he was, in fact, unable to respond tothe incident and the necessary action was taken overby the CCG Bids were received for vruious options ofdealing with the sunken hull. The SOPFappointed its own surveyor.

Contractors wereappointed by CCG andru1ivedon site on November6, 2001. Prepru·ations were madetoraise the ve el with theintentionoftakingthe hull tohaul-out area in Drutmouth, wherethe vessel would bebroken-up. umerou delays wereexpe1ienced. Eventually, on ovember 18, 2001, the Anne Jolene with a numberof buoyancy apparatus and abru·ge in placeforfloatation wa towed tothecontractor'syru·dbutgrounded offthe facility. Some oil escapedfrom the hull during thetow but, later, wa found tobedispersed.

During ovember20and 22, 2001, some upperworksof the ve el were removedto lighten the hull with a view to pulling it ashore. Fmther delay occulTed,oneofwhich involvedthe problem ofthecompo ition ofthepaint fromtheenvironmental di posalpointofview, another wa thephy icaldifficultyofhaulingthecement lined hull outofthe water. Breaking-upactivities resumed on December I, 2001, but then di:fficultie were expe1ienced in findingapproveddisposal ites in the ru·ea. This latter problem wa re olved on December4, 2001, andon December 5, 2001, EC andCCG official madea final in pection ofthedismantling ite anddeclru·ed that all the ve sel had been broken-upand removed.

On March 18, 2002, the Adnunistrator received a claim from the Crown, amounting to$77,024.26, to recover the CCG' costs and expen e in the incident. On March 25, 2002, the Admini trator found $55,899.52 oftheclaim e tablished. The Administrator had concern , principally, regmding costs fordelay , for te ting the lead content ofpaint, and fordisposal costs. There was also the extra issue ofthe need forCCG to ju tify their ad!1Unistration cost contained in Schedule 13 ofthe CCG claim. On March 26, 2002, the Crown agreed settlement ofthe amount established above and that urn wa mranged to be tran ferred, togetherwith 1,707.80 intere t, on March 27, 2002.

The Administratorclosed his file with the knowledge that the claim foradministration co ts remains out tanding.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

3.80 BCP Carrier #17 (2001)

The local CCG ER officerfu·st advised theAdmini trator ofthls _incider�t. On October 3, 2001, this 279 gross ton, Canadmn regr teredwooden barge, built in 1943, sank in Ladysmith harbour, British Columbia. The barge had orne 2,300 litres ofdiesel and some 1,100 litres of hydraulic oil in tanks and equipment aboard. The CCG officeroutlined the options available to the CCG to deal with the situation. It was stated that thebargewas in poor condition and that it may break apart iflifted.

The CCG responded, booming the site, employed diver to plug thevents,andremoved the loo e oil thathad collected in the booms. The barge, itself, was not visible from the surlace.The SOPFengagedcounselanda surveyor. The LadysmithTown council became involved. Thebarge had sunk in a BCCrownwater lease.

The reported owner stated he would fax an action plan to the CCG but in the meantime, as a precaution that agency obtained quotations to remove the pollution threat. On October 22, 2001, the owner advi ed the CCG that he was unable to handle the ituation. The CCG tasked a contractor to raise and remove the wreck. The CCG continued their monitoring ofthe site. A local beach, with minor pollution, wa cleaned-up.

Preparations for salvage began on November I, 2001, with the barge being partially floated on ovember3 and pumped dry on ovember4, 2001. Pump were u ed to keep the barge dewatered. The barge was confirmed as being in poorcondition. The salvor removed much of the pollution threat, including taking out the fuel tanks, before moving the barge to theirprerni e fordismantlin and disposal. Thebar·gewas brought to the alvors premises in Ladysmith on November 17, 2001, and dismantling was completed by November 20, 2001.

The CCG Claim Status report of December 31, 2001, notes that the incident will be the subject ofaclaim by that agency.

3.81 Ocean Venture 1 (2001)

Crown counsel forthe CCG advised theAdmini trator ofthis incident on October 24, 2001. This is a 5,955 gross ton cargo ship, registered in Panama. On October 5, 2001, a strong smell ofdiesel oil was noted in the Pmt ofRimouski, Quebec. Oil wa found on the water near to the Ocean Venture 1. Contractors were employed to clean-up the spillage and some 6,060 litres ofoily water, estimated to contain some 1,000 1irr·es ofoil, together with 16 barTels ofdebris were collected. The clean up was completed in one day, the same day as the spill was found. It was statedthat, over a similar· period, the vessel had changed ownership.

TheCrown presented the CCG's claim to the SOPFto recover theircosts and expenses in the incident, amounting to $13,237.81. The Administrator received the claim on November 28, 2001, and wrote to the registered owners in Panama on November 29, 2001,

submitting acopy ofthe claim. He requested the owners to settle directly with the rown. TheAdmini�trator advi ed the owner oftheir responsibilities under the Ml.A and noted that the debt would follow the ship, even ifsold.

Noreplywasreceived from any entity admitting owner hipofthe hip.TheAdmini trator inve tigated and asse ed the claim, finding $13,090.65 established a<; at December 17, 2001, and invited furthercomments fromCrown counsel. With winterfastapproaching, the crew left the ship on December 18, 2001. The ship's agent was unabletoobtain any money fromthestated owner and unable totake any action. The hip, without heator lighting appeared to beabandoned.Another problem wasthat the Ocean Venture 1 was loaded with baggedcoar e alt andthere was adi pute over acceptance ofthe cargo.

The SOPFappointeda urveyor. It was decided that governmentagencie had to actbecau e, among other matter , thedamagewhich could becau ed to the hip by the freezing condition TCM employed contractor to upply the hip with electricity from hore andemployed ecurityguard

Crown coun el replied to theAdrnini tratoron February 27, 2002, offeringju tification forthe CCG co not establi hed by theAdrnini trator in hi fir t review. Thi rational was accepted by theAdrnini trator, who then arTanged on March 22, 2002, to tran fer 13,195.01, plu $383.01 intere t, to DFO (CCG' ) account. The i ue of Schedule 13 admini tration fee wasagreed to remain out tanding pending further inve tigation by the Admini tratorandre olution with the Crown.

The Admini tratorawait development concerning the ve el with re pectto po ible recovery action pur uant to ection 87 Ml.A.

3.82 Rivtow Lion (2001)

Thi i a561 gro ton Canadian teel tug, built in 1940. The tug, previou lypartofthe fleet ofthe well-known We tCoasttowingcompanyi no longerowned by them. ACCG Statu report advi ed theAdmini tratorthat, on ovember6, 2001, an oily heen was ob ervedcorning from thetugas hewasmoored in an urn a.JTOW Maple Bay. Maple Bay i ituated on the SE coast of Vancouver I land, a few mile outh ofCrofton.

The owner authorized acontractor toboardthe tug to �se _ s theco t ofremedying the ituation, orremo e the i.JqUlds aboard Therewa acon iderable amount ofoil in the tug. The causeofthe oil spilling o erthe ide was becau e the tug, generally in poorcondition had a filler pipetoalubeoil tankru tedthrough, uch that rain entered the tankandthe oily watercontents,eventually, overflowed mto the vessel and al o into the sea.

The owner requested the contractor to take whatever act10 _ n was necessaryto comply with CCG reqUlrements.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

B

ovemb r 9, 2001, it appeared that the owner \l ould not take the immediate action required, in luding accepting financial re pon ibility, so the 0 " a forced to act. The CCO contracted forthe r mo aJ ofthe content from the overflowing oil tank. t the time, the Rivtow Lion was moored to an abandoned fi h farm structure, a mooring not con idered ecure. The CCO then arranged for the tug to be towed to apropermo01ing buoy in Pallicia Bay.

The dmini tratorappointed counsel and a surveyor, to actfor him. The CCO obtainedquotationsforthe removal ofthe potential forthe oil pollution and contractedwithacompany in Ladysmith, Btitish Columbia.Thecontractorthen tartedtheconsiderable taskofmakingthe tugoil-free. On February 7, 2002, the contractor advi edthatthey had succe sfullyemptied thetugofwa te products andcleanedthe hull; they stated they had removed 23,154 litre die el, 1 1,889 litres waste oil and 9,100 litresofoily water. However on March 21, 2002, the SOPFwas advised that notall oftheoil had been removedtothe atisfaction oftheCCG

On March 22, 2002, the CCO ER officer, a surveyor acting forthe CCG, and the SOPF urveyor made a i it to the tug.

At the end ofthe fi cal yearit wa tated thatoil wa still being removed from the Rivtow Lion, that there wa "no new " from the ownerand that the ceo was con idering option for di po al ofthe ve sel.

3.83 Reed Point Marina (2001)

3.15 in thi Annual Reportgi e detail ofa fire which broke out on October 16, 1999, and de troyed pleasure craft in the Reed Point Marina, ancouver harbour, Briti hColumbia. Another, irnilar, ftrebrokeout in the marinaduring the earl hour on ovember 7, 200I. In thi late t incident three boat hou e and three pleasure craft were in ol ed. Afireboat from nearby Port Moody and a frre truck re ponded, extingui hing the fire.The VPAformally handedoverthe role ofOSC to theCCO the arneday.Contractor and CCO equipmentwereu ed tocontain and recoverthe oil on the water.

The Admini trator appointed lo al coun el. It wa e timated that potential pollution wa between 2,000 and 8,000 litre ofdie el. The CCO took oil ample . The CCO Claim Statu report for December 31, 2001, note that their re pon e will be the ubject ofaclaim.

3.84 Duke (2001)

ACCOStatu report advi ed theAdmini tratorthatthi US regi tered fi hing ve el ran agroundon ovember8, 200I, in EdyePas , Hecate Strait, northern Briti h Columbia. The Duke later ank in orne4 metresof water; the crew was re cued.The wreck wasdeemeda navigational hazard, as well asa threat tothe environment. Die el andhydraulic oil werereleased from the wreck into the Pass. The owner re ponded and made arrangementsto lift the ve el.

Monitored by the CCG, on November 12, 2001, divers pluggedthe vents andthe vessel was lifted and secured alongsideabarge. Thecraftwas then taken toa shipyard in Prince Rupert, northern BritishColumbia, and reported tobe safely alongside on November 13, 2001.

The CCO made arrangements to obtain an LOU before the repaired Duke was allowed to leave Canadian waters. As a result ofbeing keptfully informed by CCO ER Prince Rupert officials, theAdministratorwas able to intervene to ensure his rights were protected. On December4, 2001, a LOU to the amount of $20,000 was signed on behalfofthe owners by, what appeared to be, underwriting agents in Seattle. Normally a LOU is signed on behalfofthe insurers or P&I Club. The Adrninisa·atorappointed local counsel, who arranged for a LOU tobe issued by another Vancouverbased counsel on December 6, 2001. Following receipt ofthis latest form ofthe LOU, the Adminisa·ator indicated he had no objection to the Duke now leavingCanada,although he emphasized he could not speak on behalfofother parties. The Adrninisa·atoralso noted that the CCO had recent positive experience ofthe shipownerpaying ceo costs and expenses promptly.

The CCO ubsequently advised that the shipownerhad paid the Crown's claim in full.

Thi incident illustrates the importanceoftimely communication byCCO ER officials with the Admini tratorand CCO legal counsel respecting the receipt offinancial secUJity before the release ofa ve set involved in an incident. The Adminisa·ator is grateful forthe prompt action by the CCO ER Prince Rupert official in this regard.

The Admini trator clo ed hi file.

3.85 Roxanne Reanne (2001)

Thi wa a 23 gro s ton Canadian woodenfishing ve el, built in 1980. ACCO Status report advised the Admini tratorthat, during a tormon November20, 2001, the ve el broke her moorings and ran aground on avy I land, nearSt. Andrews, New Brunswick. St. Andrew is on the north hore ofthe Bay ofFundy, clo e to the American border. The CCO responded and, on ovember 22, 2001, found that the ve set contained die el and lube oil ; however, to that time no pollution had occurred. The Roxanne Reanne was refloated and towed to St. Andrew public whatfwhere the CCO arTanged for the, approximately, 450 litres ofdie el and 40 litre oflube oil to be removed. The owner was located in Montreal but he stated he had no insurance and took no action.

At the reque t ofthe CCO a marine surveyorexamined the Roxanne Rea1we on November 29, 2001. The vessel was found to be in deterioratedcondition and that the hull as i , where is. could have a maximum value of$1,000.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

On December 12, 2001, the CCG moved the ve sel to Bayside, New Brunswick where, on the next day, a contractor commenced demolition. On December 14, 2001, demolition wa completed to the CCG's ati faction and the debris had been transported to an approved landfill site.

The CCG Claim Status Report of December 31, 2001, notes that their costs and expen es in thi incident will bethe subject ofrecovery action.

3.86 Seaspan 112 (2001)

T�i is anotherexample ofa well known company, in this case Seaspan International, selling a vessel to a new owner, and the new owner retaining the original name although not associated with the original owners.

The TSB advisedthat this 505 gross ton Canadian steel barge took a heavy list on November 29, 2001, while alongside at Drury Inlet, near Port Hardy, northern Vancouver Island. The barge had deck cargo including a fuel truck, the fuel truck slid intothe waterwhich the TSB stated, caused some pollution. Thebarge also ' had fuel tanks aboard.

The owners responded and re tored the listin barge to upright on November 30, 2001. By Decembe 4, 2001, through their own resourceful action, the barge owner had retrievedthe truck from the waterand put it ashore. Those on site repOited to the CCG that there had been no pollution a a result ofthis incident.

TheCCG and theAdmini tratorcon iderthe incident closed.

3.87 Pamela-Fallon 1st (2001)

The TSB reported that, on December 1, 2001, this 9 GT wooden Canadian fi hing vessel ank at the public wharfin Port aux Basque , Newfoundland. The ve el was stated to have been fully submergedandthat there was "minimal" oil pollution. The ves el was subsequently raised.

TheAdministratorcon iders it unlikely that there will be aclaim against the SOPF forthis incident and ha closed his file.

3.88 Coastal Express (2001)

This incident was one ofthe more setious casualtie reported to the Administratorforthe year. The Coastal Express was a new 3,230 gross ton Canadian barge, purposefully constructed for a pusher tug/ RoRo (roll on - roll oft) barge service between Vancouver Island and the mainland, including the caniage ofdangerous goods. It was designed so that, normally, a complete roadtractorand trailer would drive on at the loading terminaland offatthe destination.Thetug Seaspan Challenger, in the barge notch, left Nanaimo on December 14, 2001, bound forTilbury Island (Fraser

River). In the Strait ofGeorgia the vessels ran mto gale conditions, with the wind stated to be gusting to 35 knot The tug damaged her pushing connections and began totake on water. The tug came out ofthe notch and, using herbow, tried to hold the bargeoffthe land without succes Later the ame morning, the barge grounded on Carlo Island, a small rock island, to the east ofGabriola I land, off anaimo.

The owners mounted a full re pon e but for a greater partofthe time the weather continued adverse. During the lull in the weather, theowner were able to remove the various oil from thebarge, which they achieved by December 17, 2001. It wa tated that the barge had 47 trailer unit on board, 7 ofwhich contained dangerou cargo and that approximately one third ofthe unit fell intothe sea. December 16, 200 I, the CCGo er flew the grounding ite and ob erved a mall oil heen in the area, which oil wa con idered unrecoverable.

The barge wa badly damaged and declared a Con tructive Total Lo The owner obtained an ocean-dumping permit and, on January 29, 2002, the refloated barge wa towed the few mile to deep water in the Strait ofGeorgia and unk fordi po al. There wa a light oil lick relea ed on inking which, again, wa con idered non-recoverable.

Armed with the knowledge of the owner' action and the limitedre pon e nece ary by the CCG, the Admini tratorcon ider the incident fini hed from the SOPF' per pective, and ha clo ed hi file.

3.89 Sjard (2002)

Canadian are increasingly concerned at oil pill offthe Canadiancoasts,primarilybecau e oftheharmto eabird population, ome pecie ofwhich areon the vergeofextinction. It wa , therefore, ofconcern to the Admini tratorwhen he learned ofthe abandonment of the Sjard, whichcasualtyoccurred January 27, 2002.The Sjard was a 5,753 gro ton Antiguan cargo ves el en route fromLatviato St. John' , ewfoundland, tated to be loaded with wirerodand coil The e el took on waterand was abandoned in hea weathercondition in the Atlantic inpo ition 4 degree 40.6 minute orth and45 degree 01.6 minute We t, approximate) 330 nautical mile east of ewfoundland.

A Spani h trawler afely re cued the mixed nationality crew of 14. The Sjard wasnot een again and i pre umed to have unk. The Admini trator i not aware ofthe amount ofoil aboard at the time of inking.

3.90 Cala Palamos (2002)

ACCG Status Report advi ed the Admini trator ofthi incident. On February 21, 2002, it wa reported to MCTS by the pilot aboard the Ca/a Palamos that there wa oi� on the waterbetween piers 34 and 35, Halifax extendmg out into the harbour The CCG re ponded a?d employe�contractor to contain and clean up the otl. It was estlmated that some 4,300 litres of lubricating oil was involved.

Th . ala Pa/amo i a 14,366gross ton Cyptiot ontamer el and, at thetimeofthe pilot's report, she ' asdepartlng HalifaxforCuba. The TCMS aiTancred for oil amp! tobetaken from the ve sel on her ani�al in Cuba ET February 25, 2002. On March 25, 2002, cow1 el forthe hip's P&I Club provided an LOU to the Crown forthe amountof$100,000.00, which included th SOPFa anamedbeneficiary. TheAdministrator awaitstheoutcome.

3.91 Olga (2002)

Thi wa another off hare pollution incident, which cameto the attention oftheAdministratorthroucrh a meilia report. It wa stated that on February 26,l002 a CCG urveillance aircraft sighted the Olga with oil in herwake, about 80nautical milesoffthecoa tof ewfoundland.The Olga i aRus ianfi hingvessel. When Olga came intoLong Pond, ewfoundJand,on March 13, 2002 she wasboardedby inve tigatorsfrom TCMS andEC CWS. The masterand firstmatewere arre tedby EC peace officer The two ship' officer werechargedforalleged pollution offence underfederal en ironment legislation.Thetwo hip' officer were released aftertwoday andon payment of 5,000.00 bail. Accordingto meiliarep01t , it wase timatedthat ome 78 litre ofoily wasteand fuel had been discharged by the Olga in theob erved incident. The ve el was chargedbyTCforillegally di charging a pollutant in water underCanadianjuri diction,contrruyto pro i ion underthe CSA. Defen e coun el entered a not guilty pleaon behalfofthe officer and the hip' owner anda trial was chedu1ed forDecember2, 2002. An EC official indicated in mediareport that hargingthe officer ofthe e el, in addition toorin teadofthe ownersofthe e el, may be u ed a anenforcementtool in an increased marmerinfuturecase .

TheAdmini tratorawait the outcome ofthe court ca e with intere t but in the meantime ha clo ed hi file.

3.92 Lavallee II (2002)

The Lavallee II was built in 1942 a an American wooden mine weeperbut, latterly, had been employed as a herring einerand then a a herring tran porter. The ve el i 254 gro ton and would, ifoperating, require to be regi tered. At the time ofthe incident she wa on a beach, unregi tered, at Ecum Secum, ova Scotia, where heremainedforthe Ia t 18 month On March 8, 2002, it wa reported that oil wa being relea ed from the ve el into the harbour. The CCG re ponded on the arne day an ab orbent boom wa deployed. It wa found that the, engine-le , engine room wa flooded. The harbour, in ea on, hou e live lobster in cage and upport a rockweed harve t.

TheCCGemployedcontractor whoremoved the orne 10,000 litre ofdie el fromfuel tank insidethe ve el. The hullwasholed.Aprivate urveyoremployedbythe CCGconcluded thatthe ve el had no value. It i being

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

proposed that the mosteconomic solution tothe alleged continuingpotentialforoil pollution is tobreak-up the vessel on site. It appearedthat the Lavallee JJ was abandoned, although the nameofan ownerhad been provided and theCCG was attemptingtotracethis person.Thequestion ofbreaking upthevessel raisedthe issueoftoxicityofthepaintaboard,someofwhich was found toexceed Provincial limitsfordisposal in landfill sites.

TheAdministratorawaits the outcome.

3.93 Miles and Sea (2002)

Details ofthe vessel and locality will be found in 3.22. On March 15, 2002, it was reported thatthis vessel had been involved in another incident, similartothe previous one on March 18, 2001. OnMru·ch 15, 2002, the Miles and Sea wasagain rep01ted tobe sinking and spilling oil in Lions Head harbour. TI1eCCGre ponded, foundoil comingfromthesunken hullandcontactedtheowner. Theownersaidhe was unable totakeresponsibility for the re ponse.

TheCCG contractedforthe containment andclean upof theoil. It wasestimatedthatthe Miles and Sea contained 15 to 25 litre oflube oil and 3,500 litres ofdiesel fuel. Theves el hadsunk in a Small Craft Harbour, ownedby DFO, butlea edtothe local municipality.TheDFOwas concernedaboutthe ve sel remaining sunk in Crown prope1ty.

The Admini tratorawait developments.

3.94 Lake Carling (2002)

Thi 17,464 gro ton Marshall Islands bulk ca.!Tier reported on March 19, 2002, that she had experienced a large hull crackamidship on theport side. At the time the ve sel wa some 40 nautical miles northofles lie -de-Ja Madeleine, in the GulfofSt. Lawrence.The ye el wa loaded with iron ore, en route from SeptIle , Quebec, to Trinidad. The CCG developed an oil pill re pan e plan and prepared response equipment. The Lake Carling began totakeon water, which was controlled by pumping. There wa no pollution.

A tugdeprutedtoas i t the damaged vessel. In poor weathercondition the ves el anchored offles lies-deJa Madeleine. TCMS boarded the vessel for inspection and evaluation. Poorweathercontinued and after putting into Baie de Gaspe, the Lake Carling escorted by a tug and aCCG vessel sailed forQuebec City for dry-docking and repair .

The CCG con idered this to be a SAR incident, as oppo ed to a potential pollution incident. A claim again ttheSOPF is unlikely.TheAdministrator has closed his file.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

3.95 Katsheshuk (2002)

Thi wasafurther eriousca ualtyrep01tedduringthe year.Thiswasa2,674grosstonCanadiantrawler, engagedin hrimpfishing,whichcaughtfireand eventually ank.LateeveningMarch 17,2002,thevessel reportedthatshewa onftreandbeingabandonedbythe crew, ome80nauticalmile NEofBeiJeIsle,offthe nmthcoastofNewfoundland.Thevesselwasin90%ice atthetime.ThecrewwasaiJ afelyrecued.Itwa stated thattherewa approximately430,000litresofdieselfuel onboard.

OnMarch25,2002,theowner wereadvi edthat, underCEPA1999,thehulkcouldnotbe unkeither withinorwithouttheEEZwithoutaCanadianpermit. Theowner contractedwithtugownerstotowthehulk andthetug Atlantic Maple arrivedon iteonMarch 26,2002.Therewa nosignofpollution.Ledbya CCGicebreakerforassistancethroughtheice,thetow commencedthesameday.Duetoadverseweather forecastthetugandtow helteredfirtinTrinityBay andtheninConceptionBay,Newfoundland,forMarch 28and29, 2002.OnMarch30,2002,itwasreported thatthehulkhaddevelopeda30-degreeli t,whichwa steadilyincreasing.Undertowbythe Atlantic Maple thetugandtowproceededeastward .Shortly afterwardsonMarch30,2002,itwa reportedthatthe Katsheshuk hadsunkintheAtlantic ome6mile NNWofCapeSt.Franci , ewfoundland.Alargeoil slickwasoberved.Therewasconsiderableconcernby authoritiesa itwas tatedthat,po ibly,upto 10 million eabirdscouldbeintheareaoverthenext month.Therewasalsoconcernregardingtheopening ofthecrabfi herylocallyin ometwoweek timeand thepos ibleoilingofthebeache usedbycaplin.

3.96 Spring Breeze (2002)

AcopyofaLOU,madeoutinfavouroftheCCGand theAdministrator(SOPF),wa received fromcoun el forthisshiponMarch25,2002.TheLOUwasan undertakingtomeetco t andexpen esforupto 10,000involvinganallegedoil pillinthePortof QuebeconMarch24,2002.Thiswa theftrt knowledgetheAdministratorhadoftheincident.

The Spring Breeze isa 16,829grosstonbulkcarrier, registeredinMalta.ItwasallegedthatonMarch24, 2002,whilealongsideaquantityofoilywaterwas releasedfromtheship.Theshipcono·actedforthe cleanup,monitoredbytheCCG.

Inaseparateincident,theAdministratornotedthatthe Spring Breeze hadtoemploytugstobetowed alongsideonMarch7,2002,inQuebecCitywhenthe vesselwasreportedtohaverunoutoffuel.

TheAdminiso·atorawaitsdevelopments.

TheAdmini tratorawaitsdevelopment

4. Issues and Challenges

4. 1 Environmental Damages

4.1.1 Environmental Damages Fund - Environment Canada

In 1995,EnvironmentCanadaobtainedtheapprovaloftheTreasuryBoardtocreateaspecialpurpose account-theEnvironmentalDamagesFund-tomanagecompensationfordamagestotheenvironmentresulting frompollutionincidents.TheEnvironmentalDamagesFundwasestablishedtoserveasaspecialholdingortrust accounttomanagefundsreceivedascompensationforenvironmentaldamage.Thesefundsmaycomeintheform of COillt orders,awards,out-of-courtsettlements,voluntarypaymentsandotherawardsprovidedbyvarious internationalliabilityfunds.

Whenanenvironmentaloffensei prosecutedorasettlementisbeingnegotiatedoutofcourt,crownanddefense lawyerscanrecommendthatthepenaltyincludeamonetaryaward,whichisusedtorestoreenvironmentaldamage.

AnumberofcriteriahavebeendevelopedorproposedtoensurethattheFund'sobjectivesaremetefficiently, cooperativelyandresponsibly,sothatfundingallocatedforenvironmentalrestorativeprojectsisusedinthebest po ibleway. InthisregardtheTreasuryBoardauthorizedafinancialframeworktoensuretransparencyand accountability.Itdidnot,however,providespecificguidelinesonhowtheprocesswastobemanaged. Consequently,therewasarequirementforEnvironmentCanadatodevelopanimplementationplan.

InMarch 1997,EnvironmentCanadahostedaworkshopintheAtlanticRegionwithindividualsthathaveexpertise onvariousaspectsofenvironmentalretoration.Representative ofprovincialandfederalgovernmentdepartments a wella industryattendedtheworkshop.

Theobjectivesoftheworkshopwere:

•

topromotedialogueonmethodsofa e ingdamage intheAtlanticRegion toidentifyregionalprioritie andrelevantissuesofconcerntoallkeystakeholders toestabli hpartner hip intheimplementationofanEnvironmentalDamage Assessment/Restoration Proces todevelopaPlanofAction

Theframeworkforimplementinganenvironmentaldamageas es mentandrestorationproce sremainsasaworkin progre .EnvironmentCanadacontinue toactivelypurueandenhanceitsimplementationframework.Asa cu todianoftheFund,EnvironmentCanadai committedtocon ultingandbuildingonpartnershipswithother takeholder in achievingcommongoal andobjective

Atthi pointinthedevelopmentofaframeworkforthegeneralfundcriteriaandprojectrequirements,allproject propo al ubmittedtoEnvironmentCanadaforfunding houldsatifythefollowinggeneralrequirements:

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ati fyallcondition pecifiedbythecourt buildonpartnerhip with takeholder inachievingcommongoal/objectivesregardingremediationand retorationofdamage tothenaturalenvironment ati fyevaluation/technicalreviewcritetia beco teffectiveinachievinggoal ,objectivesanddeliverables recipient mu tpo e thenece aryknowledgeandskillsrequiredtoundertaketheproject havebroadcommunity upport beapprovedbytheRegional DirectorGeneral.

OnMarch25,2002,a ovaScotiacouttimpo edthecountry'shighesteverfine-$125,000-forpollutionof coatalwater thatareahaventothou and ofseabirds.

Inthi cae,thePhilippine-regiteredship Baltic Confidence waschargedfordumpingatleast850litresofoilmixedbilgewaterinDecember 1999,about 158kilometres outhwestofHalifax.

Inpleadingguiltytotheoffense,lawyer forPtimeOrientMaritimeofManilasaidthecompanyagreedtoapenaltyof $80,000andacontributionof 45,000toCanada'sEnvironmentalDamagesFund.The Baltic Confidence incidentwas theflfsttimethatashippingfirmpaidintotheEnvironmentalDamagesFund.Itisnecessary,however,forprosecutors tocontinuetoprovidejudgeswithinformationconcerningtheFundandpotentialcourtinvolvement.Thereisa

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

concernthat,at leastuntilthe Baltic Confidence cae,judicialawarenessoftheFund'srole inrestorationefforts maybeminimal

Additional information isavailablethroughEnvironmentCanadaat:

www.ec.gc.ca/ee-ue

Tel: 1-819-997-3742

4.1.2 Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration - Canada/International - USA

Compensationforenvironmentaldamageishandleddifferentlyunderthe MLA, the 1992CLC,the 1992 IOPCFundConvention,andtheUSOPA.

The1992CLCandthe1992IOPCFundConvention,intheirdefinition of"pollutiondamage",provide" that compensationforimpairmentoftheenvironmentotherthanlos ofprofitfrom uchimpairment hallbelimitedto costsofreasonablemeasuresofreinstatementactuallyundertakenortobeundertaken."

The MLA provides,"Whereoilpollutiondamagefromashipreult inimpairmenttotheenvironment,theownerof theshipi liableforthecostofreasonablemeasure ofreinstatementactuallyundertakenortobeundertaken."

IntheUS, OPA 90provide forpaymentofnaturalreourcedamageclaim fromtheOilSpillLiabilityTrutFund. Onlyde ignatedtrustee maysubmit'naturalresourcedamages.UnderUSregulation thetru teemaycon idera plantorestoreandrehabilitateoracquiretheequivalentofthedamagednaturalre ource.

Thetechnicallyjustifiedreasonablecostforrein tatementlre torationmea ure ,forwhichcompen ationi available underthe 1992CLCandthe 1992IOPCFundConventionmightequatetoprimaryretorationundertheUSNRDA regulations.However,thefurthermeaureof OPA NRDAi :

thediminutioninvalueofthoenaturalre ource pendingre toration;plu thereasonableco tofasse singthoedamage

The 1992CLCandthe 1992 IOPC FundConventiondonot,bytheirdefinitionofpollutiondamage,coverthelatter sortofcompen ationprovidedbytheNRDAregulation orothertheoreticallybaedas e ment ofenvironmental damage.

TheUSNRDAregulation provideaproce toas e injuriestonaturalreource andde ignanappropriate restorationplan.Thecosttoase injury,develop,andimplementthere torationplani thedamageamount.Thi proces isdesignedtore ultinfeaible,co t-effectivere torationofthoenaturalre ource and ervice injuredby anincident.

Thetrustee,whoi adesignatedfederal, tate,orIndiantribeofficial,conduct injurya e menttodeterminethe natw·eandextentofinjuriestonaturalreource and ervice Oncethetruteeha identifiedarangeofpo ible restorationactions,theidentifiedretorationalternative areevaluatedbaedonanumberoffactor including:

theco ttocarryoutthealternative;

theextenttowhicheachalternativeisexpectedtomeetthetru tee 'goal andobjective inreturningthe injurednaturalresource andservice tobaelineand/orcompen ationforinterimlose ;

thelikelihoodof uccessofeachalternative;

theextenttowhicheachalternativewillpreventfutureinjuryasaresultoftheincident,andavoid collateralinjuryasaresultofimplementingthealternative;

theextenttowhicheachalternativebenefit morethanonenaturalresourceand/orservice;and,

theeffectofeachalternativeonpublichealthandsafety.

Trusteesmustselectthemostcost-effectiveoftwoormoreequallypreferablealternatives.Adraftre torationplan willbemadeavailableforreviewandcommentbythepublic,includingappropriatemember ofthescientific communitywherepossible.Afterreviewingpubliccommentsonthedraftrestorationplan,trusteesmustdevelopa finalrestorationplan.Thefinalrestorationplanwillbecomethebasisofaclaimfordamage.

InFebruar 2001,aMemorandumofUnderstanding(MOU)wassignedbetweentheInternationalGroupofP&I lub andtheUS ationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdmini t:ration(NOAA).TheaimoftheMOUistopromote expeditiou andcot-effectiveretorationofinjurednaturalresourcesandservicesresultingfromship-sourceoil pill intheUS,a authorizedby OPA 90anddeterminedbytheNaturalResourceDamageAssessmentRegulations.

ThepartiestothisMOUwillmeeteverysixmonthstofacilitatearegularexchangeoftechnicalinformation,such a ITOPFand OAAtechnicalpapersandpublications.Intheeventofaship-sourceoilspillintheUS,early contactwillbeestablishedbetweentherelevantP&IClubs,ITOPF,NOAA,anditsco-trustees. ITOPF'sroleisto providetechnicalinfonnationandanalysi .

4.1.3 Environmental Damages and Environmental Studies -1992 10PC Fund

TheThirdIntersessionalWorkingGroupofthe1992IOPCFundhasbeendiscussingissuesof environmentaldamageunderthe 1992Conventions.TheWorkingGroupisconsideringwhethertomodifythe 1992Fund'spositioninrespectoftheadmissibilityofclaimsforthecostsofreinstatementoftheenvironment,and ofclaimsforthecostsofenvironmentalimpactstudies.Itwasagreedthattheissueshouldbeconsideredinthe contextofachangetoFundpolicyratherthanasanamendmenttotheConvention.

ThecwTentpositioninrepectoftheadmis ibilityofclaim relatingtodamagetothemarineenvironment,aslaid downbytheA semblies,couldbesummarizedasfollows:

1. TheIOPCFund acceptclaim thatrelateto"quantifiableelements"ofdamagetomarineenvironment,for example:

• •

reasonablecostsofreinstatementofthedamagedenvironment;and, lo ofprofit(income,revenue)resultingfromdamagetothemarineenvironmentsufferedbypersons whodependdirectlyonearningsfromcoastalorsea-relatedactivities,e.g. lossofearningssufferedby fishermenorbyhoteliersandrestaurateursatseasidereorts.

2. TheIOPCFundshaveconsistentlytakenthepositionthatclaimsrelatingtounquantifiableelementsof damagetothemarineenvironmentcannotbeadmitted.

3. The 1971 FundA emblyha rejectedclaimsforcompen ationfordamagetothemarineenvironment calculatedontheba i oftheoreticalmodel .

4. Compen ationcanbegrantedonlyifaclaimantha ufferedquantifiableeconomicloss.

5. Damage ofapunitivecharacter,calculatedonthebasi ofthedegreeofthefaultofthewrongdoerand/or theprofitearnedbythewrongdoer,arenotadmi ible.Criminalandcivilpenaltiesforoilpollutionfrom hip donotcon titutecompen ationanddonotthereforefallwithinthescopeoftheCivilLiability Convention and FundConvention .

Duringthecoureofit everalmeeting theWorkingGroupreviewedproposalsfromanumberofStates.These include:

1. A ubmi ionbyFrance,whichcontainedaconsultant' (ProfessorPiquemal)snrdyonseveralaspectsof theconceptofenvironmentaldamage.Forexan1ple,thepaperincludedthenotionofbreachofaquasipatrimonialrighta legalgroundfortherightofcompenation.Also,theproposalsuggestedmaking editorialchange totheIOPCClaim Manualinordertohighlightthespecificnatureofenvironmental damage.

Itwa concludedthattheFrenchproposaltoamendtheclaim'smanualcouldnotbeaccepted,sinceitwent beyondthepreentdefinitionof"pollutiondamage".

2. TheUnitedStatessubmittedadocumentofinformationonthenaturalresourcedamageassessmentprocess intheUSunderthe Oil Pollution Act 1990.

3. Anothersignificantsubmissionwasco-sponsoredbyAustralia,Canada,France,Iceland,Netherlands,New Zealand, orway,SwedenandtheUnitedKingdom.Itcontainsproposalsfornewcriteriaandclarification fortheadmissibilityofmeauresofreinstatementofimpairedcomponentsoftheenvironment,andpostspill tudiestobeadoptedbytheAs ernbly.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

Thespon or ofthi papernotedthatfollowingaspillthatmightwarrantpo t-spillenvironmentalstudies, ormeaure ofreinstatement,theFundshouldencouragetheestablishment-withintheaffectedMember State-ofaCommjtteeorothermechanismtode ignandco-ordinateanagreed tudyprogram.

Withregardtomeasure ofreinstatement,the ponorspropoedthattobecon ideredadmissibleto meaure ofreinstatementwouldhavetofulfillallthe J992Fund'sexi tingcriteria,aswellasthe following pecificcriteria:

•

themeasuresshouldbelikelytoacceleratesignificantlythenaturalproce ofrecoveryofthe damagedarea;

themeasures hould,asfaraspossible,seektopreventfurtherinjurya are ultoftheincident; themeasureshould,asfaraspossible,notresultinthedegradationofotherhabitat orinadvere consequence forothernaturaloreconomicreources; themeasuresshouldbetechnicallyfeasible;and, thecostsofthemeasuresshouldnotbeoutofproportiontotheextentanddurationofthedamageand thebenefitslikelytobeachieved.

4. TheInternationalTankerOwner PollutionFederationLimited' propo alfocue onthetechnicalapect ofenvironmentaldamageresultingfromoil pill inthemarineenvironment.Forexample,thepaper addressesthenaturalfluctuation thatoccurinthecomposition,abundanceanddistributionofpopulation ofmarineanimalsandplants.Itcovers,al o,theabilityofmarine peciestowith tandandtoreco erfrom boththenaturaleventsandmarineoil,andman' lirrutedabilitytospeedupnaturalrecovery.

Somedelegationsexpre sedtheviewthatawiderdefinitionof"pollutiondamage" houldformpartofadifferent Convention,orshouldbecoveredbyotherfund .Inthi regard,ITOPFdrewattentiontotheCanadian EnvironmentalDamage Fund, uggestingthatthismightbeamodeltofollow. Inconclu ion,theWorkingGroup intendstoseekanamendmenttotheClaimsManualforcon iderationbytheA emblyinOctober2002.

4.2 Prevention/Response Measures in Canada

4.2.1 Prevention through Partnerships - REET

InCanadatherearevariou piece oflegi lation,internationalagreement ,inter-governmental,interdepartmentalandagencyagreement concerningtherole andre pon ibilitie ofleadagencie andre ource agencies.

EnvironmentCanadai recognizedbytheCanadianCoastGuarda thefederalauthorityforenvironmentalad ice duringapollutionincident.EnvironmentCanadanormallychair theRegionalEnvironmentalEmergencyTeam (REET),whichisresponsibleforprovidingconsolidatedenvironmentand cientificinformationduringthecoure ofresponseoperations.TheREETiscompri edofrepreentativesfromfederal,provincial,firtnation ,municipal andotheragencies,asnecessary.

ThecontingencyplansoftheREETorganizationcontainaba icframeworktoen urethatallpartner worktogether efficiently.Theseplansareintegratedwiththeemergencyplansofothergovernmentdepartment TheREET providestheCCGand/orthepolluter'sOn-SceneCommanderwithadvicerepectingweatherforecat.Information isalsomadeavailableonthephy icaloperatingenvironment,spillmovementandtrajectoryforecat.Thj assistancebytheREETorganizationtotheOn-SceneCommanderduringanincidentcanmakeamajordifference intheresponsetoanincident. Inaddition,theREETmayapprovetheu eofchemicaldisper ionandother shorelinetreatmenttechniques.

Inthepe1formanceofhisduties,theAdministratorhasauniqueperspectiveonpollutionis uesthattouch Canadians.Hecloselyfollowstheevolvinginternationalanddomeslicregimesfortheprevention,preparedne and operationalresponsefortheprotectionofthemarineenvironment.TheAdminitratorsupportsthecontinuingefforts ofCanadianoilspillresponsemanagerstobecomemoreawareofenvironmentalactivitie inothercountrie For example,thecontinuinglong-standingcooperationbetweentheCanadianandUSCoastGuard iscommendable. Thebenefitsofpartnershipdevelopmentandexchangeofinformation,forinstance,wereillustratedduringthe Adrrunistrator'sattendanceatarecentoilspillsymposiummeetingintheUnitedStates.

"MaximizingPre entionthroughPartnership "wastheprincipalthemeforthefirstplenarysessionofthe FreshwaterSpill SymposiumheldfromMarch 19to21,2002inCleveland,Ohio.Severalspeakersemphasizedthe requirementforaunifiedapproachbyalloil spillresponseprofessionals.All separateorganizationsmust collaboratetoachieveoperationalobjectivesandimplementaneffectiveactionplan.Thereareadvantagestousing onecoordinatedresponsemanagementsy tem.Asuccessfulresponsemanagementteamincludesmunicipal,state, federal,industry,environmentalists,andprivatesectorstakeholdersworkingintandem.Theguestspeakers explainedthatalsofullintegrationoftheentireresponseorganizationisanimportantstrategyfortheprevention, preparedness,andforputtinginplaceastrongresponsecapability.

A sound workingrelationshipamongthespillrespondersisalsoessentialforoverallcoordinationattheoperational level.Thi networkapproachencompassesdeployingcontainmentbooms;utilizingboats,bargesandskimmers; trackingoilsheens;obtainingoilsamples;identifyingsensitiveareasatrisk;dealingwithmysteryspillsand searchingforthepossiblesourcesofthespill.

Toillustratetheadvantagesofdifferentorganizationsworkingtogether,acasestudywasdiscussedbyMr.M. GerberoftheOhioEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA).

ItseemsthatonoraboutAugust 1,2000,Toledo,Ohio,receivedapproximatelyseveninchesofrainintwohours.A largeoilsheenappearedontheMaumeeRiver OhioEPA,USCGandthecityofToledorespondedtotheriverspill. Thesourcewasunknown.

ShortlyafterOhioEPAreceivedananonymouscallsuggestingtheycheckonoilstaininginanalleynexttoan abandonedindutrialsite.Onattendingthesiteoilstainingwasfoundonthevegetationandgravelinthealley.This land-baedresponseinvolvedthecityofToledo,OhioEPAandUSEPA.

Theinitialreactionofcityofficial wa thatanymigrationofoilfromthe itewouldhavegonetothesewer treatmentplant.Theirinitialviewwasthatthe ite pillcouldnothaveenteredtheriverthroughthecombinedsewer ystem-bypassingthesewertreatmentplant-becau ethealarmsoftheemergencycombinedseweroutlets emptyingdirectlyintotheriverhadnotbeenactivated.

Fortunately ourceoil ampleswere tillavailablefromToledoEnvironmentalServices,anagencythathad regulatedtheindustrial itewhenitwasactive ometwentyyearsearlier.Theoilintheriverandtheoldsiteoil ample werefoundtobeamatch.

Theinvetigationrevealedthatwhathadhappenedwa thatoil tillremainedinpool throughouttheabandoned buildingfloorandba ement, withtheroofofthebuildingattheformerindu trialsitehavingcollapsed.The exce iverainfallcausedfloodingattheformerindu trial iteandcreatedamigrationpathwayfortheoil inthe building .Theoilmigratedoverlandfromthebuilding tothealleyandintothe tormsewer.Itmayhavealso migratedthroughthecombined ewer tothecombined anitary/tormseweroutletsontheriver.Eitherway,United State CoatGuardfingerprintingofthe heenontheMaumeeRiver,linkedthat heentotheabandonedindu trial iteapproximatelyonemilefromtheriver.

Itwasafewday laterthatofficial determinedthepo ibilitythattheoilcouldhavefounditswaytotheriverbypassingthetreatmentplant-throughthecombined ewer y tem.Theyconcludedthatwaterlevelsintheriver weresohighthattheyhadpreventedtheendgatesontheemergencycombinedseweroutletsemptyingdirectlyinto theriverfromopeningandtriggeringtheiralarm

Afewday latera econdreleaetotheMaumeeRiveroccurredduetoanotherheavy rain torm. Duringthenext everalday federaland tateenvironmentalprotectionagencie,theUSCoatGuard,thecityofToledo,and variousprivatecontractor conductedoilclean-upattheformerindutrialsite.

Mr.Gerberattributedthe ucce softheoperationtothecooperationand haringofinformationamongthedifferent re pondergroups. Succe throughcooperationi builtoncon i tentpartnerhipactivitie ,attendingoperational meetings, haringknowledgeandtrainingandunderstandingeachother 'reponsibilitie .

TheCanadian y temforthepreventionofamruineoil pillandforresponsewhenanincidentdoesoccurlooksto cooperationbetweengovernmentandindu try.Forprotectionoftheenvironmentthecurrentregimebringstogether e entialcomponentsofindustry,municipal,provincial,teiTitorialandfederalagencies.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

4.2.2 Oil Spills from Stormwater Drains and CSOs

Theverytitle"SOPF"focu e theAdministratoron hips.Itthereforemaybea surpri eforreadersto learnthattheAdministrator ometimeshastoinvestigatetheoperationofcity ewersystems.

TheSOPFi intendedtocover inter alia ship-ourcespillsinCanadianwater ,includingtheGreatLakes,for example.However,theSOPFi alsoliableforreasonablecostsandexpen e incertainmatter inrelationtooil"if thecauseoftheoilpollutiondamageisunknownandtheAdministratorhasbeenunabletoestabli hthatthe occunencethatgaverisetothedamagewasnotcausedbya hip".Apartfrom"my tery pills",theSOPFi not liablefornon hip- ource pill

Paragraph3.5inthe ectioncoveringCanadianoil spillincident explain thebackgroundtoaparticularcaeinthis regard.OnMay31, 1998,amixtureof ewageandoilwa heduponthe horesofFightingI land,aCanadian IslandintheDetroitRiver.Thi pollutionwa cleanedupunderaCCGcontract.TheCrownpresentedaclaimtothe SOPF.

TheAdministratorcommencedaninve tigationintothecause.Thetotalamountofpollutionwa variou ly estimatedat"between900and2,300litres".Theoilwasamixtureofoilsbutthe" ludge"part, orne65%ofthe pollution,afteranalysisforthreebacterialparameter (only),found:

Samples smelled offecal waste or raw sewage.

E. coli at 900,000 cells per 100 mL is indicative ofthe significant amount offecal wastes in the sample. The levels ofE. coli results compared tofecal streptococci indicate the waste may be of human origin. The presence ofPseudomonas aeruginosa which is a pathogen bacterium strongly suggests thefecal waste is of human origin.

The concentration ofthe three bacterial parameters is consistent with a profile ofhuman waste.

With regards to the levels ofbacteria, it is highly likely that other disease-causing bacteria such as Salmonella sp., Campylobacter sp., Yersina sp., for example, as well as viruses and parasites may be present in the discharge in the river.

Water usedfor drinking and/or recreational activities will be severely compromised by this pollution occurrence.

Inthecour eofhi inve tigation,hefoundthatolderpart ofcitie havecombined tormand anitary ewer , whichincludeemergencyoverloadsy tern .Suchacombinationmean thatafterheavyrain,which aturatethe ewers,theemergencyrun-offcandischargeuntreatedintothelocalwater throughCombinedSewerOutfallCSOs.Thisrelease acombinationofrainwaterand ewageintothewatercoure,un creenedanduntreated. ome treatmentplantshave,inaddition,emergencyoverload y tern thatbypa theplantbutatleatthatpartofthe effluentcanbe creenedandchlorinatedbeforebeingdi chargedintolocalwatercoure .Ontheotherhandoilin effluentthatpas e throughthetreatmentplant canbe k.immedoff.

Thereha beencon iderableefforttoimprovethewaterqualityoftheGreat Lake andriver inCanadaandtheUS. Forexample,newercitydevelopment haveseparate tormand anitarysewer avoidingthe udden tormoverload situationatthetreatmentplant.Thi mayhelp olvetheoverflowofuntreated ewageintowatercoure .However, thiswouldnotprecludeillegaloildi chargeenteringCanadianandUSwater from torm ewer .

Thusthepotentialfornon- hip-sourceoilspill from tormwateroutfallsandCSO remain .If uchdidoccur resultinginaclaimontheSOPFthespectrearie for uch pillbeingclas itiedamytery pillforwhichtheSOPF wouldbeliable.

Preventativeactioncouldincludebettereducation,warning andenforcementofviolationsforillegaloildischarge throughseweragesystems.

Mitigatingactioncouldincludeeffortstowardsearlydetectionofoilinwatercow·e throughsurveillance,for example.Also,asillustratedinthearticleimmediatelyabove,cooperationamongvariousgovernmentauthorities cansometimesleadtoidentificationofanyland-basedcauseorsou!"ceofanoilspill.Theclean-uporproper regulationofsuchasitecouldeliminateitasafuturesourceofoilspillsintothewater.

TheAdministrator'sinvestigationintothecauseoftheFightingIslandspillcontinues.

4.2.3 Illegal Discharge of Oily Waste at Sea

Motyear theAdministratorreportsthepresenceofmysteryoilspillsfoundonexposedshorelines, principallyontheeasternseaboardofCanada.Theoilisdevastatingtowildlifeandoftenaconsiderable expen etothepublicpursefromclean-upincludingclaimspaidbytheSOPF.TheAdministratorcannotrecover paymentsmadeforcleaningupthesemysteryspills-theidentityofthepolluterisunknown.

Federalgovernmentdepartmentsandagenciesareusingavailableresourcestocombatoilpollutioncausedby pa ing hip .TheCanadianCoastGuardistheprincipalagencyresponsibleforthedirectionandcoordinationof the ationalAerialSurveillanceProgram(NASP).Currently,aerialsurveillanceisconductedthroughtheuseof threedifferentaircraft.TwooftheseareownedandoperatedbyTransportCanada'sAircraftServicesDirectorate. ThethirdisacontractedaircraftownedandoperatedbyProvincialAirlinesLimited.TheNational DefenseAurora patrolaircraftalsoprovidessurveillance.

Specializedvideoandstillcameras,computerizedreportingsoftware,remotesensingandcommunication instrumentsarefittedandutilizedinvariousmethodsofdetectiononeachoftheaircraft.Thecomputerizedimaging equipmentrecordsvesseldischarge andpollutionsightings.

ThethreeaircraftutilizedbytheCCGare:

•

ADehavillandTwinOtteraircraftislocatedinVancouver.ThisaircraftpatrolsVancouverIsland'sInner Pasage,theStraitofJuandeFucaandtheWestCoasttankerexclusionzone,aswellastheQueen CharlotteIslands;

ADehavillandDash-8aircraftislocatedinOttawa.Thi aircraftpatrolstheGreatLakes,theSt. LawrenceRiver,theGulfofSt.Lawrence,CabotStraitandthecoastofNovaScotia,includingtheBayof Fundy;

ABeechcraftKingAir200islocatedinSt.John's.Thisaircraftiscontractedforfisheriespatrolsoffthe coastof ewfoundland. Iti alsomulti-taskedorconductsdedicatedoilpollutionsurveillanceflights.

TherecentCCGrepmt(1997-2001)onthe ationalAerialSurveillanceProgramdetails tatisticsforthelastfour year ,a follow :

1. In 1997/1998,atotalof1212patrolhour wereflown,overflying7285ve elswith 149pollution sighting . Ofthoe 149pollutionsighting , 123(82%)weremysteryspillsand 11 (7%)werereportedas as ociatedwithanidentifiedve el and 15(11%)werereportedtooriginatefromland-basedandship wreck ite .

2. In 199811999.Atotalof1028patrolhourswereflown,overflying6477veselswith 135pollution ighting ,Ofthoe 135pollution ighting , 101 (75%)weremysteryspillsand 19(14%)wereshipsource pill and 15(11%)wererepo1tedtooriginatefromlandbaedand hipwrecksites.

3. In 1999/2000.Atotalof858patrolhour wereflown,overflying4670vessel with62pollutionsightings. Ofthoe62pollution ighting ,46(74%)weremystery pillsand 10(16%)were hipsourcespillsand6 (10%)werereportedtooriginatefromlandbaedandshipwrecksites.

4. In2000/2001,atotalof1053patrolhour wereflown,overflying6499ve elswith64pollutionsightings. Ofthoe64pollution ighting ,56(87.5%)weremy tery pill and8(12.5%)wereship ourcespills.

TheAdministratorgratefullyreceivedthi goodreportonanimportantCCGprogramandwa pleasedtocomment, a invited,totheCCG:

''Although the direct deterrent effect ofaerial surveillance may be difficult to measure and quantify, I suggest there is clearly a heightened awareness in the shipping industry about [Canada 's} overall national surveillance strategy to detect marine pollution and obtain evidenceforprosecutions. It is also apparent that the number ofsuccessful prosecutions during the pastfouryears is relatively low in comparison to the number ofpollution sightings. Nevertheless, an aggressive enforcement ofthe pollution regulations remains the key to environmental protection

I am interested in teaming morefrom you about the level ofco-operation ofthe CCG with municipal and provincial authorities. This interest stemsfrom the perspective that SOPF is liable to pay claims for "mystery spills" in Canadian waters. Mystery oil spills may be the result of sewer and storm drainage oveiflows during excessive rainfalls. We also note that the table on page 33 indicates there has been an annual decrease in the number ofpatrol hoursflown in the Central andArctic Region during the pastfew years, which includes significant areas of high urban and industrial activity. "

Ship- ource Oil Pollution Fund

Theproblemofillegaldi chargeofoilywasteat eaisnotuniquetoCanada.Marinepollutionisindiscriminate.By it natureiti tran -boundary.It effectshaverepercu ionsonaglobalscale.Attheinternationallevel,IMO continue totackletheisuesassociatedwiththeillegaldischargeof hip-generatedoilywastefromallclassesand izesof hip .Suchdi charge areoftenfromships'machineryspacebilge ,whichaccumulateoilywastefrom machineryspaces.

TheDirectoroftheUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyofficeofEmergencyandRemedial Re ponse characterize enforcementasthekeytotheprotection,prevention,preparedness,andrespon econtinuumfor environmental protection.

TheAdministratornotesTran portCanada'scontinuingcommitmenttoenforcementofCanada' OilPollution Regulations.

4.2.4 Oiled Wildlife Project

TheNewfoundlandRegionofDFO/CCGhastakentheinitiativetoaddres thechronicproblemofoiled seabirdsofftheprovince'ssouthcoastandtheAvalonPeninsula.A teeringcommitteewa e tablished.It truck aworkinggroupto tudyandreportontheissueoftheoilinganddeathof eabird fromoffhoreoil pill of unknown sources.

Theparticipantsrepresentthefederalandprovincialgovernments,theoffhoreoil indu try,oilrefinerie , shipowners,environmentalist andotherinterestedpartie .Theprojecti calledthe"PreventionofOiledWildlife" (P.O.W.).

Thefinding oftheworkinggroupindicatethat,baedonavailableinformationandcount ofthenumberofdead seabirdsthatd1iftashore,aminimumof60,000to 100,000arekilledeachwinter eason.The ee timate are consideredveryconservative.Wildlifestudie conductedbyEnvironmentCanada,MemorialUniver ityandthe CCGduringthewinterof2001 indicateahighermortality.Birdsexpoedtooil inthecommercialtrafficlane -up to35milesoffthecoat-couldbea highas300,000.Therei evidencethattheproblemexi t onayearround basis,butitismot everebetweenDecemberandMarchbecau eiti e timatedthattenmillionbird migratetothe areaduringthewinter.

Chemicalanalysisindicatesthatapproximately90percentoftheoilfoundonthefeather ofdeadbird originate fromshipmachineryspaces.

Mostoilspillsfoundontheexpoedshoreline ,bothdome ticallyandinternationally,areduetoillegaldi chargeof oilywastefromships intran it.(See ection4.2.3).The tudygroupargue that uch hip ourcepollutionin unshelteredwatersisnotoneofneces ity,butratherconvenienceandeconomic

Therecommendation oftheworkinggroupincludethefollowing:

Undertakeaneducationandawarenesscampaign-includingthejudiciary-forthepre entionofillegaloil discharge.

Conductadditionalaerialsurveillance

Conductresearchintotheuseof atelliteimagerytoidentifyoilspill .

Developanaerialdeployableoil- amplingdevice

ImplementalongrangeAutomaticIdentificationSystemforshipstran iting

thearea

Inits recent2002reporttotheRegionalDirectors-GeneralofDFO,ECandTCtbeSteeringCommittee recommendsthatthereareanumberofavenuesthatrequireattention,includingcorrectiveactionfocusingon monitoring,educationandawareness,surveillanceandenforcement.

4.3 Safe Ships and Environmental Protection

4.3.1 Places of Refuge for Damaged Ships - Threat of Pollution

TheimportanceofthisissueforCanadianswashighlightedinthe Eastern Power incident. Inthemorning ofDecember6,2000,thePanamaniantanker Eastern Power (126,993grosstons)developedacrackinNo 1 starboardcargooiltankbelowthewaterline.Aleakageofoilwassuspected.Whentheincidentoccurred,theship hadencounteredheavyseasenroutefromEgypttotheNorthAtlanticRefiningLtd.refineryatCome-by-Chance, ewfoundland.TheCaptainreportedtotheEasternCanadaReportingOffice(ECAREG)thathis shipwasabout 150mileseastofthe200-mileexclusiveeconomiczone.Theshipwasladenwithapproximately 1.9mmionbarrels ofBarahcrudeoil.

TransportCanadaatftrstrefusedtoallowthedamagedoiltankertoenterCanadianwaters.Permissionwasgranted howeveronDecember 11,butthenextdaytheownersdivertedthe Eastern Power toaportintheNetherlands Antilles.

TheIMOsub-committeeonSafetyofNavigation(NAY)hassincedevelopedaframeworktoaddresstheissueof placesofrefugeforshipsinneed.Theurgencytodealwiththeissueofplacesofrefugewashighlighted internationallyinthewakeofthe Erika and Castor incidents.

Afterthe Erika incident,theinternationalinvestigationbytheItalianClassificationSociety,RINA,calleduponthe EUandshippingorganizationstocampaignfortheestablishmentofacoastalstateregimethatwouldidentifyports ofrefuge.RINAchallengedFrance'sinve tigationintothecontributingfactorsforthelossoftheship.Forexample, itquestionedthedecisiontosteerthe Erika forrefugetotheRiverLoireportofDongesratherthanBrest,whichit ay the hipcouldhavereachedmorequicklywithlessstresstothehullfromwaveimpact.

ItisnotedthattheFrenchPermanentCommissionofInquiryintoAccidentsatSeacarriedoutaninvestigation.In itsreportpublishedinDecember2000,theCommissionfoundthatthespeedandcoursesfollowedbytheshipwere notdecisivefactorsinthecauseoftheincident.

Itwa the Castor incidentthatheightenedtheurgencytodealwiththeissueofplacesofrefugeforshipsinneed.In thiscae,anumberoflittoral tate intheMediten·aneanSearefusedrefuge.Theship'sflagstate,Cyprus,didoffer a istancebut itwa approximately 1000mile away.

The ituationwa thatonDecember31,2000,whileintheregionoftheStraitofGibraltar,theGreekproducttanker Castor developeda26-metercrackaero themaindeck.The hipwasloadedwithapproximately29,500tonnesof gaoline.Subsequently,theSpanish earchandrecueauthority ucce fullyrescuedallthe hip'screw.Tugsofthe 'Iavliris alvagecompanytowedthe Castor formorethanamonthacrossthewesternMediterranean.They encounteredextremeforce 12gale withwaveheight overeight meter without,reportedly,experiencingany furtherdeterioratinginthe tructuralconditionof Castor. Theconvoywasunabletoobtainpermissiontoenterport ofrefugeor eektheshelterofaheadland.Eventuallytheweatherconditionsimprovedandallowed afetransferof cargoto huttletanker inopenwater

The Castor incident parkedagreatdealofconcernamongIMOMemberStatesabouttheprovisionsofrefugefor ship indi tre s.Consequently,theSecretary-General,William0' eil,placedtheissueofofferingrefugeto diabled hipsontheIMO' MaritimeSafetyCommittee(MSC)Agenda.

TheMSCagreedatit meetingofMay30toJune8,2001,toin tructtheNAVsub-committeetobeginconsidering theis ueatit 47th Se ioninJuly2001.

Overthenexttwoyear ,theNAYsub-committeeisexpectedtoworkinco-operationwiththeSub-Committeeon RadioCommunicationsSearchandRescueandtheSub-CommitteeonShipDesignandEquipment.Togetherthey coulddevelopguidelinestohelpstate andshipmastersdealwitha ituationinwhichashipindistressseeksaplace ofrefuge.AtitssessiononJuly2to6,2001,theNAYsub-committeeagreedtodrafttermsofreferenceforfuture work.Thefurtherworkshouldincludethepreparationofguidelinestocoverthefollowingaspects:

• Actionexpectedfromcoastal tatesfortheidentification,designationandprovisionofsuchsuitableplaces togetherwithrelevantfacilities.

• Theevaluationofrisk ,includingthemethodologyinvolved,associatedwiththeprovisionofplacesof refugeandrelevantoperationsinbothageneralandacase-by-casebasis.

• Actionsmastersofshipsindistressshouldtakewhenin needof"placesofrefuge",includingactionson boardandactionsrequiredinseekingassistancefromothershipsinthevicinity,salvageoperations,flag stateandcoastalstates.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

Theintentionistohaveallthesei ue addres edinadvanceoftheneedtotakeactionandthentoemploythem 111 a non-mandatoryfahion.TheIMOguidelineswillprovideanimportantfoundationfordi cussionsbetweenthe international alvageindu tryandthevariou coastalauthorities.

Atits e siononJuly2to6,2001,theMSCnotedthattheMEPChadalreadydiscussedtheissue. Itwasagreedto a! obringthei suetotheattentionoftheLegalCommitteeforconsiderationofanymattersrelatingtointernational law,juri diction,andright ofcoatalStates,liability,insuranceandbonds.

TheMSCal onotedthat,atalaterstageandbasedoninformationbyMemberState ,theIMOmightcon ider preparinga"WorldGuideofPlacesofRefuge"fortheusebyshipmater , alvageoperator andothersincaseof hip indi tre andinneedofsuchplaces.

TheIMOcontinuestoexaminecondition underwhichlittoralstate shouldprovideasafehavenin helteredarea forshipsin eriousandimmediatedanger.Suchaction houldreducetheoverallri kofoilpollutionand,thereby, giveahigherprioritytotheprotectionofthemarineenvironment.

Thematterwasconsideredatthe 83'd sessionoftheLegalCommitteeoftheIMOheldinOctober2001.Delegate totheLegalCommitteedecidedatthe 83rd es iontogiveamandatetotheIMOSecretariat,workingin collaborationwiththeCMI,tomakea tudyofthelegali ues.

TheComiteMaritimeInternational(CMI)hasthereforedeveloped,incon ultationwiththeIMOSecretariat,a que tionnrurewithaviewtocollectinga much informationa pos ibleconcerningthelaw applicableinthe countriesofCMImembera ociationsontheacces ofadistressedve seltoaplaceofrefugewherenece ary workcanbeundertakentostabilizeherconditionand, ifappropriate,totranssruphercargo.TheCanadianMaritime LawAssociation(CMLA)ha beenaskedtorespondtothi quetionnrure.

AnewCMLACommitteewasestablihedinMarchof2002,withadeadlinefor ubmi ionofarepon etothe CMIquestionnairebytheendofJune2002.

FromtheAdministrator' view,thisi amatterofhighimportancetoCanadawithit exten ivecoatline.Theearly attentionoftheIMO,theCMIandtheCMLAtothei uei appreciated.Welookforwardtothere ult ofthi work withanticipation.

Note:Priortogoingtoprint,itwa reportedthattheGreek alvagecompany Tavliri ha lo tathirdofit 8M awardforsalvingtheCatorIatyearafteraLloyd' appealarbitratordecidedthecaedidnotwarrant pecial compen ationforpreventingenvironmentaldamage.

4.3.2 Single-hull Tanker Phase-Out

Theacceleratedphase-outofsingle-hulltanker i oneofarangeofpot-Erikamea ure adoptedbythe IMO.Therevisedregulation 13Gofannex 1 ofMARPOL,asadoptedbytheIMOMarineEnvironmental ProtectionCommittee,enter intoforceonSeptember 1,2002.

TherevisedMARPOLregulationidentifiedthreecategorie oftanker,a follow :

"Category 1 OilTanker"meansoiltankersof20,000tonsdeadweight(dwt)andabovecarrying crudeoil,fueloil,heavydieseloilorlub1icatingoila cargo,andof30,000ton dwtandabove canyingotheroils,wruchdonotcomplywiththerequirementsforprotectivelylocatedsegregated ballasttanks(commonlyknownaspre-MARPOLtankers).

"Category2OilTanker"meansoiltanker of20,000ton dwtandabovecarryingcrudeoil,fuel oil,heavydieseloilorlubricatingoila cargo,andof30,000ton dwtandabovecarryingother oils,whichdocomplywiththeprotectivelylocatedsegregatedballattankrequirements(i.e. MARPOLtankersbuiltafter 1982).

"Category3OilTankers"meansanoiltankerof5,000ton dwtandabovebutlessthanthe tonnagespecifiedforCategory 1 and2tanker .

Pre-MARPOLtankers(i.e.Category 1 OilTankers)thatwerenotrequiredtohavesegregatedballasttanksaretobe phased-outby2007.

Theamendmentstotheregulationssetaprincipalcut-offdateof2015forthewithdrawalofmostMARPOLsinglehulltankers(i.e.Category2OilTankers).

Theflag tateadministrationmayallowforsomenewersingle-hullshipsregisteredinitscountry,thatconformto certaintechnicalspecifications,tocontinuetradinguntilthe25'hanniversaryofdeliveryoruntiltheship's anni ersa.rydatein2017 However,undertheregulationsanyportstatecandenyentryofthosesingle-hulltankers thatareallowedtooperateuntiltheir25'hanniversarytoportsoroffshoreterminals.

4.3.3 ISM Code

OnJuly 1, 1998,"Phase 1"oftheInternationalSafetyManagement(ISMCode)becamemandatoryfor tankers,bulkcaniersandpassengerships.Allothertypesofshipsof500grosstonsandaboveandmobile offshoredrillingunitsmustcomplybyJuly 1,2002(i.e.-Phase2).

TheISMCodeprovidesaninternationalstandardforthesafemanagementandoperationofships,andforthe protectionofthemarineenvironmentfromoilpollution.TheadoptionoftheISMCodewasconsideredtobea watershedininternationalregulation.Theshipownerisresponsibleforensuringthatadequateresourcesandshorebasedsupportareprovidedtoenablesoundmanagementoftheship.TheCodeemploystheprincipleofcontinuous improvementthroughaudits,reviewsandcorrectiveaction.Whenthesafetymanagementsystemofashipping companyisapproved,aDocumentofComplianceforthecompanyandaSafetyManagementCertificateforthe shipareissuedundertheprovisionsofSOLASbyanorganizationrecognizedbytheflagstateadministration-for example,Lloyd'sClassificationSociety.

Asnotedinlastyear'sannualreport,theIMOSecretary-General,Mr.WilliamO'Neil,initiatedanassessmentofthe effectivenessandimpactoftheISMCodesofar.HeannouncedthattheIMOwouldcontinuetofocusoneffortsto ensureasoundapproachtothemaintenanceandenhancementofshipsafetyandmatineenvironmentalprotection. Independentflagstateswererequestedtoprovideinfmmationaboutcodedeficiencies,andthenumberofdetentions recordedforISMandnon-ISMcertifiedships.

AjointIMOandindustrymeetingwasconvenedinFebruat·y2000toaddresstheissueofmulti-inspectionswithin thecontextofrenewedeffortstorewardqualityshipping.Differentnationalinspectioncapabilitiesandthefactthat manyportstateauthmitiesarenotgearedupfortheuseofinformationtechnology,areperceivedasmajorobstacles togreatertransparencyconcerningtheISMCode'srealimpact.

AnupdatedreportwillbesubmittedtotheIMOMatitimeSafetyCommittee'ssessionthatwillbeheldfromMay 15 to24,2002.ItisoneofmanyhighpriorityagendaitemsbecauseofimminententryintoforceoftheISMCode's secondphaseonJuly 1,2002.

OnOctober18and 19,2001,theCompanyofMasterMatinersofCanadasponsoredaconferenceinHalifaxon SaferShipsandCompetentCrew .Inanopeningaddress(whichwasreadonhisbehalf)theIMOSecretaryGenerali uedatimelyreminderthat hippingcompanie needtoplanandscheduletheirimplementationactivities forISMphae2withoutdelay.

Thefollowingparagraphsareexcerpt fromMr.O'Neil'saddress:

"The Code addresse the re pon ibility of management to play full and active part in building a safety culture, and the responsibtlities of people within the overall management team to ensure that this is done. It bring management - and enior management at that - directly into the safety chain. Moreover, it ensures that, hould omething go wrong with the hip at ea, the Master and crew are not left alone to pick up the pieces.

One thing that is abundantly clear from the industry' experience in the lead-up to the first implementation date i that hipowner need to begin the certification process in good time. Too many companies trying to implement the Code at the last minute will inevitably lead to a sharp increase in applications for shipboard audits close to the deadline. The backlog of work this will create for the classification societies will mean that companies will run the risk of not being able to obtain ISM certification in time, which in tum could result in the company having to stop operations and thereby lose revenue.

For shipowners, the message is clear: if you haven't started your second-phase implementation yet, start now. There will be no extension of the deadline. So, do not leave it to the last minute and do not underestimate the size of the task.

As with all such messages, the success of the ISM Code lies in its implementation and enforcement. If, for instance, port State Control groupings share information about defaulters and are conscientious about enforcing compliance, they can systematically cut down the options for ships that do not apply the Code properly, leaving substandard ships nowhere to ply their trade.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

But my me age to hipowners is not to view ISM Code implementation as a burden, but rather a� an oppmtunity to confirm that their management practice are effective - and effective management IS good bu ine s practice. If the risk of non-compliance is a "stick", then the ISM Code also holds the promise of a "carrot". Implementing the ISM Code can create a "win-win" situation, as has been confirmed by a new tudy carried out by a leading P&I Club [The Swedish Club], which confirms that owners implementing the ISM Code can expect to achieve a reduction in hull claims of 30 per cent or better, together with a similar improvement in the incidence of P&I claims. But, to be truly succe sful, the code must be more than just a serie of file gathering dust on a helf. It mu t be the document that form the basi of a culture of afety and efficiency that becomes engrained within the fabric of every shipping company."

Dmingthe arneconferenceinHalifax,CaptainRichardDay,Director,Ship andOperation Standard (a henow is),TranportCanadaMarineSafetygaveapresentationonthe ISMCodeincludingPortStateControlfroma Canadianperspective.Capt.Day'sinterestingpaperisincludedinthi reporta AppendixI.

WithregardtotheISMSmveyconductedbyCaptainPhilAnderon,Vice-Pre identoftheLondon-baed autical Institute,afinalconclusionofhisresearchwillbepublishedasabookbythe auticalIn titutein2002.Detail will bepublishedonthe auticalInstitutesWebiteatwww.nautinst.org. Inthemeantime,aninterimreportisavailable onadedicatedWebsite: www.ismcode.net

4.3.4 Oil Spill Risks - Tankers versus Non-tank Ships

Iti apparentthatnon-tankvessel con titute ignificantrisk ofoil pill Therearemorenon-tank vessel makingmorefrequentpasage Thegrowthinnon-tankve el i projectedtoincreae.

In orthAmerica,oilspill fromtankersmakeupa mallpercentageofthetotal.For1999,intheUnited tate 94 percentofoilspillincident and70percentofvolumearefromve el otherthantankers,accordingtotheUSCG. InCanada,between 1993and2000 orne 88percentofincident reportedbytheSOPFrelatedtonon-tankve el andmystery pills.

Itisreportedthatithasbeenetimatedthat,onaglobalbasi ,asmuchas14milliontonne ofbunker arebeingcarried innon-tankersatanyonetime.Thi comparedtoapproximately30milliontonne ofoilcargoontheworld' eas. Somebulkcarriersandcontainershipsareknowntocarrymoreoila bunker thancoa taltanker doascargo.

4.4 Legislative Developments

4.4.1 From CSA to MLA

The Marine Liability Act, S.C.2001,c.6can1eintoforceonAugu t8,2001.Thi enactmentcon olidate certainrule ofCanadianmaritimelawgoverningthecivilliabilityof hipowner forlo oflife,peronal injuriesanddamagetoproperty.

Part6ofthenewActcontinuestheexi ringregimegoverningliabilityandcompen ationformaritimeoilpollution, whichwaspreviou lyfoundinPartXVIofthe Canada Shipping Acl.

Part3ofthe MLA continuesinforceinCanadaanintemationalconventiongoverningthelimitationofliabilityfor maritimeclaims.S.C. 1998,c.6andtheConventiononLimitationofMaritimeClaims 1976(LLMC),a amended bytheProtocolof1996,applyingtonon-tankers,refers.

4.4.2 Nunavut Waters Act

BillC-33receivedFirstReadingintheHouseofCommon onSeptember20,2001,providingfor, infer alia, aschemeofwildlifecompenationwhichincludestheliabilityoftheSOPF.RoyalAssentwa grantedon April20,2002.TheActmaybecitedasthe Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Su1face Rights Tribunal Act, Statute of Canada2002,c.lO

4.4.3 Bunker Convention and Current Canadian Cover

OnMarch23,2001,theIMOadoptedanewInternationalConventiononCivilLiabilityforBunkerOil PollutionDamage.ThepurposeoftheConventionistoestablishaliabilityandcompensationregimeforspills ofoilcaniedasfuelinships'bunkers.

ThecwTentinternationalConventionscoveringoilspillsdonotincludebunkeroil spillsfromshipsotherthanoil tankers.

WherethenewConventionisinforce,itwillbecompulsoryfortheregisteredownersofallshipsover 1,000gross tonnagetomaintaininsuranceorotherfinancialsecurity,tocovertheliabilityforpollutiondamageunderthe applicablenationalorinternationallimitationsregime.Claimsforcompensationforpollutiondamagemaybe broughtdirectlyagainstaninsurer.

Inourannualreport2000-2001 atpage41 wenotedtheuncertaintyremainingovertheabilityofEuropeanUnion StatestoratifytheBunkersConvention.Inthisrespect,onFebruary26,2002,theofficialjournaloftheEC publishedtheEuropeanUnion'sproposalforaCouncilDecisionauthorizingMemberStates,withtheexceptionof Denmark,tosignandratifytheBunkersConventionandinformtheIMOsecretary-generalaccordingly.

DwingtheDiplomaticConferencerespectingtheBunkersConvention,heldMarch 19to23,2001,toconsiderthe merit ofapplyingthecompulsoryinsuranceprovisionsoneissuewasthetonnagethreshold.Proposalsrangedfrom 300to5,000grosstons.Thecompulsoryinsuranceorfinancialsecuritywasfinallysetforanyshiphavingagross tonnagegreaterthan 1,000grosston

TheUnitedStatessubmittedadocumenttotheDiplomaticConferencethatcomparestheoilremovalcostrateofthe USinpollutioncase in olvingve elswithcompulsoryin uranceagainstcasesinvolvingvesselswithout compul oryinsurance.ThefollowingparagraphsareexcerptsfromtheUSdocument:

Under the law ofthe United States, the operator ofany non-tank vessel ofmore than 300 gross tons using the waters ofthe United States, or using any port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, is required to maintain compulsory insurance.

Oil spill cost recovery cases closedfrom 1997 through 1999 show that the United States was successful in recovering 98% ofcosts billed in cases involving vessels required to maintain compulsory insurance (those over 300 gross tons). In pollution incidents involving vessels not so required, the United States was successful in recovering only 27% ofremoval costs incurred. There was greater difficulryfinding the owner and idenTifying someone to bill in these cases involving vessels without compulsory insurance.

InCanadacurrently,underthe Marine Liability Act, Part6,theSOPF,asdirectedbytheAdministrator,ispotentially liableforbunkeroilspillsaswella oilcarriedin hip a cargo.Further,theAdministratorhasthepowerunder ection53ofthe MLA tocommenceanaction in rem againstalleta e ofshipsandcanobtainsecurityandarrest theshipforthatpurpo eifnece sary.Aletterofundertaking(LOU)usuallyprovidessecurityfromtheship'sP&I Clubinordertoprecludethe hip' arre tor ecureit release.Currently,themaximumliabilityoftheSOPFper incidenti 136,281,117.60.

ThenewConventionremain openfor ignature,withtheaimof ubequentratification,attheIMOheadquarters untilSeptember30,2002.TobringtheConventionintoforceinCanadaappropriatelegislationwouldhavetobe introducedin Parliament withchange toCanadianlaw.Iti understoodthatanysuchproposedchangesinthelaw wouldbeproceededbycon ultationwithinteretedperon andorganization

A aftrt tep,onMarch 19,2002,Tran portCanadawrotetothemarineindustry,enclosingthetextofthenew Convention,seekingcomment orenquiriesconcerningwhetherCanadashouldsignandlaterratifythenew Convention.

TheAdministratorinalettertoTranspo1tCanadacitingthecurrentliabilityoftheSOPFforbunkeroilspillsunder Canadianlaw (MLA) andtheprospectiveinternationalregulation(BunkerConvention)said:

"Upon comparing both regimes, one notes thefollowing:

Subject to claimsfor loss ofincome (which I shall discuss later on), the type ofdamage that can be compensated, including damage to the environment appears to be similw:

The strict liability regime is also identical, as is the limitation ofliability ofthe shipowner.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

Howeve1; the Bunker Convention contains an extended definition of "owner" which may prove wider than the extended definition of "owner" (in the case ofnon-Convention ships) that onefinds in the MLA.

One ofthe major differences is, ofcourse, the compulsory insurance orfinancial security and the direct right ofaction against the insurer or guarantor, although it does not apply to ships carrying less than 1000 tons ofbunker 01; possibly, Canadian ships trading in coastal waters only.

Another distinctivefeature ofthe Bunker Convention is the clear provision dealing withjoint liability when more than two ships are involved in an incident. This resolves the potential problem under the current regime caused by the silence ofPart 6 on this issue.

The Bunker Convention per se does not afford, however, the possibilityfor a claimant to opt out of thejudicial process and to present, instead, a claim to a Canadianfund, as is currently the case under the MLA. This obligation to prosecute a claim before the courts may prove cumbersomefor small non-governmental authorities, especially when the subject ship is one that does not carry a certificate ofcompulsory insurance. One should thus consider the possibility at the enactment stage to adopt a scheme similar to what has been set upfor the Civil Liability Convention. This would also afford additional compensation in case the claims exceed the limitation ofliability.

Finally, the absence ofspecific provisions [in the Bunker Convention} dealing with loss ofincome for those who derive their revenuefrom marine activities should constitute afurther argumentfor a careful integration ofthe Bunker Convention into Part 6 ofthe MLA.

Bearing the last two points in mind, I would support /he proposal".

4.4.4 Appropriation of IOPC Fund Money For HNS Matters

ninternationalConferenceon Hazardou and oxiou Sub tance andLimitationofLiabilitywasheld rtinLondonundertheau picesofIMOfromApril 16toMay 3, 1996.TheConference,whichincludeda delegationfromCanada,pa edResolution 1 onsettinguptheHNSFund.Thereolutionreque t thatthe A semblyofthe 1992IOPCFundgiveit Directorthefollowinga ignment ,ontheba i thatallexpen e incuiTedwouldbereimbursedbytheHNSFund:

tocarryout,inadditiontothetak underthe 1992FundConvention,theadmini trativeta k nece ary for ettinguptheHNSFund,inaccordancewiththeprovi ion oftheHNSConvention,onconditionthat thisdoe notundulyprejudicetheintere tsofthePartie tothe 1992FundConvention;

togiveallnecesaryas itancefor ettinguptheHNSFund;

tomakethenece arypreparation forthefirt e sionoftheA emblyoftheHNSFund,whichi tobe convenedbytheSecretary-GeneraloftheInternationalMaritimeOrganization,inaccordancewitharticle 44 oftheHNSConvention;

toholdnegotiationswiththeInternationalMaritimeOrganizationtoenabletheHNSFundtoconclude agreementsa oona po sibleonthenece arypremi e and upport ervice .

TheDirectorpreparedadocumentfordi cussionatthe 1"Se ionofthe 1992 IOPC FundA embly,whichwa heldfromJune24to28, 1996.AcopyoftheResolutionadoptedbytheHNSConference(Re olution 1)wa presentedtotheAssemblyforit instruction totheDirector.

TheAssemblyin tructedtheDirectortocanyoutthetasksreque tedbytheHNSConference.

Atthe80'hSessionoftheIMOLegalCommitteeheldinOctober1999,aCoiTespondenceGroupwa e tabli hedto monitortheimplementationoftheHNSConvention.WithintheCorrespondenceGroup,Canadianrepre entatives tookoncertainresponsibilities.Canadawould, inter alia, initiateworkonthei ueof"complianceandverification ofStates'responsibilitiesinrespectofthereporting ystemforcontributingcargo".

AspecialmeetingoftheHNSCoiTespondenceGroupwasheldonMarch 16,2001,attendedbytheDirectorofthe 1992IOPCFund.OfficialsfromanumberofStates,includingCanada,discussedtheprogres towardsratification andimplementationoftheHNSConvention.Atthemeeting,theDirectorofthe 1992IOPCFundwa akedifthe 1992IOPC Fundcouldundertakeaprojecttodevelopasoftwareprogramtoidentifysubstancescoveredbythe HNS Convention.ThiswouldtaketheformofaWebsiteand/orCD-ROM ThesystemwouldassistStatesand potentialcontributorsintheidentificationandreportingofcontributingcargoundertheHNSConvention.

tthi March 16,2001 meetingwiththeHNSCorrespondenceGroup,itwasagreedthatproposalswouldbe pr paredonthi i sueforthe 1992IOPC FundAssemblyinOctober2001.OnMay8,2001 anoteoftheMarch 16, -001 meetingwa senttoperson ontheHNSCorrespondenceGroupdistributionlistandothers.

Ina 1992IOPCFundbriefingdocumentdatedOctober 11,2001 providedtodelegatesontheirarrivalinLondon forthe61hSes ionoftheA sembly(October16to 19,2001),theDirectornotedtheabove,March 16,2001 meeting. Headvi edthattheIOPCFundsSecretariathaddevelopedanoutlineofsuchasystem.Herequestedthatthe A semblyauthorizetheDirectortodevelopthesystemandgrantanextraappropriationof£150000forthis purpose,providedthatthecostsincwTedwouldbereimbursedtothe 1992FundbytheHNSFundwhentheHNS Conventionenteredintoforce.Itwasnotedthatthesecostswouldbepaidfromthe 1992IOPCFundGeneralFund.

TheSecretariathadidentifiedanumberofcompanieswhichmightbeinterestedincarryingoutthiswork.

TheHNSConventionwillestablisharegimeofliabilityandcompensationforincidentsarisingoutofthemaritime carriageofhazardou andnoxioussubstancesnotcoveredbythepresentconventionsonoilpollution.Itissaidthat thedevelopmentoftheproposeddatabaseisessentialfortheimplementationoftheHNSConvention.

AttheOctober2001 meetingsofthe 1992IOPCFundAssemblysomedelegationsquestionedhowthe 1992Fund couldobtainguaranteesthattheHNSFundwouldrepaytheproposed"loan".Attentionwasdrawntothepossibility thattheHNSConventionwouldnotenterintoforce.

Somedelegation questioned(1)whetherthe 1992Fundcouldlegallypaycostsforthepurposeofthe implementationoftheHNSConvention,sincetheHNSFundwouldbeatotallyseparateentityfromthe 1992Fund andcarryoutactivitiesoutsidethe copeofthe 1992FundConvention;and,(2)itwassuggestedthatinterested State shouldpaysuchcost onavoluntarybasis.

TheAdministratorasHeadoftheCanadianDelegation,whilenotingitssupportforbothanHNSFundandthe objectiveoftheproposedWebsiteorCD-ROMabove,indicatednevertheles thatdutytotheintegrityoftheIOPC Fundledhimtoexpre sconcernaboutthelegalityoftheAssemblygrantingthisappropriationofoilcontributors' money.

Anumberofdelegation expre sedtheviewthattherewerenolegalobstaclestothe 1992Fundmakingloansfor thi purpo e.

The 1992IOPCFundA emblydecidedtorenewit instructiontotheDirectortocarryouttheadministrativetasks necesaryfor ettinguptheHN FundinaccordancewiththeHNSConventionasrequestedbytheIMO 1996HNS DiplomaticConferenceandapprovedtheDirector'stwoproposal above.

4.5 The Polluter Pays

The ection51 MLA makestheshipowner trictlyliableforoilpollutiondamagecausedbyhisshipand forco t andexpensesincurredforclean-upandpreventivemeasures.

Asprovidedinthe MLA, inthefirtin tance,aclaimantcantakeactionagainstashipowner.TheAdministratorof theSOPFi apartyby tatutetoanylitigationintheCanadiancourt commencedbyaclaimantagaintthe hipowner,itsguarantor,orthe 1992IOPCFund.In uchevent,theextentoftheSOPF'sliabilityasalastresortis tipulatedin ection84 MLA

TheSOPFcanal obeafundof fu tre ortforclaimantsunder ection85 MLA.

On ettlingandpaying ucha ection85claim,theAdministratori ,totheextentofthepaymenttotheclaimant, subrogatedtotheclaimant' right ,and ubection87(3)(d)requiresthatthe"...Administratorshalltakeall reasonablemea urestorecovertheamountofpaymenttotheclaimantfromtheowneroftheship,theInternational Fundoranypersonliable...."

Inthi proce ,theAdmini tratorhasto ettletheclaimtwice,firstlywiththeclaimant,thenwiththeshipowner/ personLiableinarecoveryaction.

TheAdministratornotesthat,asnormal,inthecasesofseveralincidentstheclaimant,primarilytheCCG,has, duringthepastfiscalyear,electedtofirstclaimdirectlyagainsttheresponsibleshipowner.Sometimesthisleadsto claimantsnegotiatingandsettlingtheirclaimswiththepolluter'sdirectly,withorwithoutSOPFinterventionasmay benecesary.Othertimesthe hipowerisnotforthcomingandtheclaimantmustresorttotheSOPF.

IntheinterestofspeedingsatisfactoryclaimandrecoverysettlementstheAdministratorencouragessuchdirect claimactionbyclaimantswhereappropriate.

4.6 Prospective Changes in the 1992 /nternationa/ Regime

4.6.1 Increase in Current Compensation Limits

OnNovember J, 2003,therewillbeincreasesinthecompensationlimitationamountsofthecurrent regime,asadoptedbytheIMOlegalcommitteepursuanttoArticles 15and33ofthe 1992CLCandthe J992 FundConventionrespectively.Thi increaseofapproximately50percentto$405millionofIOPCprimary coverageis notedunderFigureI,AppendixD.Thisincreasei unrelatedtoanyamountofcompensationavailable underthe SupplementaryFund-"optional"thirdtier,referredtofollowing.

4.6.2 Supplementary Fund - "Optional" Third Tier

The J992FundAssemblydecidedtoadoptthetextofthedraftProtocola setoutinAnnex 1 ofthe RecordofDecisionofthe ixthsessionoftheAssemblyheldfromOctober 16to 19,200l.TheA embly instructedtheDirectortosubmjtthetextofthedraftProtocoltothesecretary-generaloftheIMOreque tinghimto conveneaDiplomaticConferencetoconiderthedraftProtocolattheearlie topportunity.An IMODiplomatic Conferenceis cheduledforMay 12-16,2003.

Theprotocol,asdrafted,provide fortheSupplementaryFundtobefundedbyoilreceiver only.Currently,thisi a matterofdebatebetweenOCIMFontheonehandandtheInternationalGroupofP&IClub andICSontheother.

TheOCIMF'spo itioni thatitisimportanttomaintainaproperbalancebetweentheburden impoedonthe respectiveindustrie concerned. InOCIMF' viewthepreervationofthatbalancecouldbeachievedeitherbyan increaseintheShipowner's!imjtationamountintheCLC,orbytheSrupowner 'participationinthefundingofthe thirdtierofcompen ation(SupplementaryFund).

ItisexpectedthatthisdebatewillcontinueandthattheOCIMFwill ubmjtconcretepropoal on rupowner ' liabilityforconsiderationbythethird intere ionalworkinggroupmeeting cheduledforFebruary3-7,2003.

Inanyevent,this"optional"thirdtierofcompen ationwouldbeoperativeonlyinState thatbecomepartie tothe Protocolcreatingthethirdtier,andonlyincaeswherethee tabli hedclaim exceedtheaggregateamount avaiIableunderthe 1992CLCand 1992lOPCFund.

FromtheCanadianperspectivetrusraie particularissue andchallenge .

PresumablyEUcountrieswilladoptthethirdtierbybecomingContractingState totheProtocol.

Itappear thatmostotherContractingState tothe 1992regimewillnotadoptthethirdtier.Theywillcontinuewith the1992CLCandthe 1992FundConvention,whichrecentlyhadcompenationlimit increaedbyapproximately SO percenteffective ovemberl,2003.

However,somesaythereisnodemontrableneedforcompenationlevelsbeyondtheIOPClimit alreadyavailable withthe50percentincreaeeffective2003.Nevertheles,theconceptofanIOPCoptionalthirdtieri upportedby Europeanshipowner/insuranceinterests et a/.

TheCanadianIOPCFund delegationcontinuesto upportthedevelopmentofanJOPCoptionalthirdtier.Whether theproposedoptionalthirdtiercomesoutoftheDiplomaticConferencewithorwithout hipowner 'participation remainstobeseen.

FromtheAdministrator'spointofview,anIOPCoptionalthirdtiercouldpotentiallybebothapracticalalternative -andeffectiveIMOrespone-toaEuropeanCOPEFund. SeetheAdmjnistrator'sAnnualReport2000-2001.

However,thequestionofwhetherornotCanadashouldbecomeaContractingStatetoanyIOPCoptionalthirdtier isforCabinettodecide. Ifsuchwaseverproposed,itwouldundoubtedlybeprecededbybroadconsultationswith governmentdepartmentsandagenciesand, inter alia, Canadianindu tries.

Ontheonehand,therewillbetheargumentthatCanadashouldhavethemaximumaggregatelevelofcover available.Ontheotherhand,therewillbethequestionofwhethertheexcesscoverprovidedbytheIOPCoptional thirdtierisnecessaryinlightofparticularCanadiancircumstances,includingimprovedgovernmentregulation, inspection,enforcement,andthecuiTentCanadiandomesticregimeforoilspillcompensation.Suchadditional insurancecovercomeswith"costs". Somequestionswillbeposed:Whati areasonablelevelofinsurancethat protectsCanadianinterests? Whereisthetruevalue?

Gi enthatallCanadiancontributionstoIOPCFundsarepaidfromtheSOPF,anaccountin theConsolidated Re enueFundofCanada,someconsiderationsinaddressingthatquestionmayincludetheadequacyofthecurrent le elofcoverageperincidentalreadyprovidedforatankerspill inCanada.Canada'sprimaryIOPCcoveragealone ha gonefrom$120millionin 1989to$270millionin 1999.OnNovember 1,2003,primaryIOPCcoverwill increaeby50%to$405millionperincident.InCanadaanadditional$136millionisavailablefromtheSOPF.In re ulttherewillbe 541 millionofcoverperincidentforanytankshipspillinCanada-withoutCanadabeinga ContractingStatetoanIOPCoptionalthirdtier.

It houldbenotedthatinothercountriescontributionstoIOPCFundsarepaiddirectlybypersonsreceiving contributingoilannuallyintotalquantitiesexceeding 150000tonnes-notoutoftheirnationaltreasury,asisthe caeforCanada. (SeeChapter2.TheCanadianCompensationRegime).

I theexcesscoveravailableinthepro pectiveIOPCoptionalthirdtierneededforclaimantsinCanada? Would Canadianclaimsbeashighassomeinternationalclaims? Canadahassomeexperiences.

Forexample,in 1979the BritishoiltankerMT Kurdistan brokeintwointheCabotStrait,spilling7,914tonnesof BunkerC.Fishermensufferedloss.ThecoastsofNovaScotiaandNewfoundlandwerepolluted.CCGresponded. Thesternsectionanditsoil(15,140tonnes)weresalvaged.Thebowsectionwithitsoil(7,411 tonnes)wastowedto theedgeoftheContinentalShelfwhereitwassunkbynavalgunfire.Thetotalclaim(crownandfishermen)was 7,688,893orin2000dollars-$18millionapproximately.Theclaimwassettledandpaidat$8,500,000including intere t,orin2000dollars-$23millionapproximately.

In Erika (France 1999), 14,000tonne ofheavyfueloilwerespilled.Therewereremaining 10,000tonnesinthe bow ectionand6,000tonnesinthesternsection.Theaggregateclaimsexceed$270million.

Tobecon ideredalsoinaddressingthequestionistheamountofmoneythattheAdministratormustdirectbepaid outoftheSOPFascontributionstothe 1992IOPCFund.Canadahaslittleornocontrolovertheseamounts.The level ofthesepaymentsfromtheSOPFaredeterminedbytheextentofIOPCFundpaymentsforinternational incidents,andbythelevelofoilreceipt inCanadarelativetotheaggregateamountofoilreceivedinall ContractingStates.

Thelikelylevelsoftheextracontribution requiredinanIOPCoptionalthirdtierwouldbeacriticalconcerninthe question,giventhat,uniquely,theSOPFi liabletopayallCanadiancontributionstoIOPCFunds(allpaymentsare fromtheCon olidatedRevenueFundofCanada).Unliketheprimary 1992IOPCFund,anoptionalthirdtierwould likelyhavea mallmemberhipandcontributionleviescouldbehigh.IthasbeennotedbyOCIMFthatsome contributor in omeContractingState mayfindtheco tburdentoogreattobear.

ForCanada, uchextracostsmaywellchallengetheviabilityoftheSOPF' cunentmodeoffundingexpendituresoutof intere tincomeonly. Todatealldometicclaim ontheSOPFa wella allCanadiancontributionstotheCUITentIOPC Fund havebeenpaidfromintere tearnedonthecapitalintheSOPF.Consequently,therehasbeennoneedfora CSA/ MIA levyonindutry ince 1976.

Ane entia!con iderationi thecontinuingabilityoftheSOPFtofunditsdomesticmandateinCanada.

Dome tically,theSOPFisliabletopayclaims,a directedbytheAdministrator,foroilpollutiondamageor anticipateddamageatanyplaceinCanada,orinCanadianwater includingtheexclusiveeconomiczoneof Canada,cau edbythedi chargeofoilfromany hip.

UniquelytheSOPFmaybeuedtopayclaim regardingoilspill fromallclassesof hips.TheSOPFisnotlimited to ea-goingtankersandperi tentoil,asi the 1992IOPCFund.

TheSOPFmayalsobeavailablea a ourceofadditionalcompen ation(aCanadianthirdtier)intheeventthat fundsfromthe 1992CLCandthe 1992IOPCFundConvention,withrepecttospillsinCanadafromoiltankers, areinsufficienttomeetalle tabli hedclaim forcompensation.SeeFigure 1,Appendix D.

Finally,theclasse ofclaimsforwhichtheSOPFmaybeliableincludethefollowing:

• claimsforoilpollutiondamage;

• claim forcot andexpen e ofoilspillclean-upincludingthecostofpreventativemeasures;and

• claim foroilpollutiondamageandclean-upcostswheretheidentityoftheshipthatcausedthedischarge cannotbeestablished(mysteryspills).

Importantly,the MlA providesforawidelydefinedclassofpersonsintheCanadianfishingindustrywhomay claim forlos ofincomecausedbyanoilspillfromaship.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

4.6.3 Shipowner's Limitation of Liability

Thereremainissue associatedwiththe hipowner' limitationofliability.The hipownerisnormally entitledtolimithisliabilitytoanamountthatislinkedtothetonnageofhi ship.Thesourceofcompensation moneycome frominsurance(P&IClubs).

Underthe 1969 CLC,theshipownerisdeprivedofhi righttolimithi liabilityiftheincidentoccurreda aresult oftheowner'sactualfaultorprivity.Jurisprudenceprovide reasonablepro pectsforbreakingthe hipowner's righttolimithisliabilityunderthiste t.

Underthe 1992 CLC,theshipowneri deprivedoftherighttolimithisliabilityonlyifitisprovedthatthepollution damagereultedfromtheshipowner' personalactoromi ion,committedwiththeintenttocau e uchdamage,or reckles lyandwithknowledgethatsuchdamagewouldprobablyre ult.Thisnewte tmake itpractically impossibletobreaktheshipowner'srighttolimitliability.

Debateontheissueofwhetheramendmentsshouldbemadetotheprovi ion inthe 1992 CLCregarding Shipowners'liabilitytookplaceatthethirdinteressionalworkinggroup'sfourthmeetingheldonApril 30 andMay 1, 2002, underthechairmanshipofMr A.Popp,Q.C.(Canada).Thediscussion wereheldontheba i ofthe mandategivenbytheA emblyatit October 2001 e ion.

Theworkinggroupreviewed ubmissionsbyinteraliatheInternationalGroupofP&IClub andOCIMF

A indicatedinthesectionaboveontheSupplementaryFund,thereremain adivergenceofopinionregardingthe Shipowners'liability.Theposition areillu tratedinthefollowingexcerpt fromthereportoftheworkinggroup' fourthmeetingonApril 30, May 1 and 2, 2002.

Introducing document 92FUNDIWGR.3!11/1, the observer delegation ofthe International Group ofP&I Clubs expressed the view that the issues relating to shipowners' liability should not be reopened since to do so would be detrimental to the position ofvictims ofoil pollution. It was suggested that the 1992 Conventions were intended to create an efficient compensation regime and had not been intended to ensure the quality ofshipping or to punish the guilty party. In the view ofthat delegation, any amendments to the provisions relating to shipowners' liability would give rise to serious treaty law problems. It was emphasiz_ed that it was ofparamount importance to maintain the equitable balance between the burdens imposed on the two industries im olved, i.e. those ofthe shipping and catgo imerests. In that delegation s view, an analysis ofoil spill which had occurred in the period 1990-1999 showed that the present regime had resulted in an equitable sharing ofburden between these two interests. The point was made that the proposal by the shipping industry to increase on a voluntary basis the limitation amount applicable to small ships to 20 million Special Drawing Rights (£18 million) wouldpresen1e that balance. That delegation expressed the view that the matter should be re-examined in the light ofexperience three tofive years after the entry intoforce ofthe proposed Supplemental)' Fund Protocol.

The observer delegation ofOCIMF introduced Document 92FU DIWGR.3/ll/2 and stated that the oil industry supported the proposed Supplementary• Fund Protocolfunded initially entirely by oil receivers. Howevet; that delegation emphasized the importance ofmaintaining a proper balance between the burdens imposed on the respective industries concerned, since this was a fundamental concept ofthe international compensation regime. The OCIMF delegation expressed the view that the international compensation regime should ensure that persons suffering oil pollution damage were compensated promptly but also be consistent with the general objective to improve maritime safety and reduce the number ofoil spills. It was emphasized that it was the sole responsibility ofthe shipowner to maintain a safe and seaworthy ship. It was suggested that the latter objective might be compromised by the establishment ofthe Supplementary• Fund, in sofar as it wasfunded only by oil receivers. In addition, the point was made that a Supplementary• Fund financed permanently by oil receivers would only distort the balance between the shipowners' and oil receivers' contributions to the regime. It was the view ofthat delegation that such a Supplementary Fund would also shield low quality shipownersfrom the consequences oftheir actions and would therefore not provide any incentive to improve the quality oftheir ships or the standards oftheir operations. In the view ofthat delegation, the preservation ofthat balance could be achieved either by an increase in the shipowner's limitation amount or by shipowners' participation in thefunding ofthe third tier ofcompensation.

In the conclusions ofits report the Working Group noted that the delegations were not yet ready to consider the complex issues ofshipowners' liability at a meeting which had been scheduledfor July 2002, and decided therefore to postpone its next meeting to late 2002 or early 2003.

The Working Group decided that consideration ofany issues, including those relating to hipowners' liability, fixed costs and the contribution system, should be based on written concrete proposals, preferably in theform ofdraft treaty texts.

The Working Group noted that ifit were to be decided to amend the provisions of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention in respect ofshipowners' liability, it would be appropriate to consider amendments to provisions dealing with other issues, whereas ifit were to be decided not to amend the provisions dealing with shipowners' liability, it would be necessary to consider whether the amendment ofprovisions dealing with other issuesjustified a revision ofthe Convention in view of the treaty law problems which would arise.

FromtheAdministrator'spointofviewthereremainsastrongcaseforrevisionofthelimitsofliabilityinthe 1992 CLCifthereistobeanequitablebalancebetweentheobligationsofshipownersandtheobligationofthereceivers ofoil.Fromhi viewthismayalsocontributetosafershipscanyingoil.

TheAdministratorispleasedthatthesei suesarenowbeingaddressedbyshipowners/insmers,theoilindustry (OCIMF)andthe 1992IOPCFund-towhichtheAdministratormustdirectsignificantpaymentsoutoftheSOPF.

4.6.4 Recourse Action

Claim forpollutiondamageundertheCLCcanbemadeonlyagain ttheregisteredowneroftheship concemed.ThisdoesnotprecludevictimsfromclaimingcompensationoutsidetheCLCfrompersonsother thantheowner.However,the 1969CLCprohibitsclaimsagainsttheservantsoragentsoftheowner.The 1992CLC doe thesame,butal oprohibitsclaim again tthepilot,thecharterer(includingabareboatcharterer),manageror operatorofthe hip,oranyperoncruTyingoutsalvageoperationsortakingpreventivemeasures.These "channelling"provision arecontainedinArticles ill ofthe 1969CLCandthe 1992CLC,respectively.

The 1992Conventionswillhavetobechangediftheshipownerandhisinsureraretobeliable-inreality-above the hipowner'slimitofliability,andtoachieveothermeaningfulpossibilities.

A wa notedattheMarch2001 meetingofthethirdinteressiona1WorkingGroup,ifthe 1992testforbreakingthe hipowner' liabilityi toberetainedthereisverylittleroomforrecourseaction.

FromtheAdmini trator'sview,iti importantthatthe 1992IOPCFundbeabletotakerecoureactionagainstthe person whocausepollutiondamage.

Inthi contextitha been ugge tedthatinthe"channelling"provision ofthe 1992CLC,adifferenceshouldbe madebetweentherightofvictim toclaimcompensationfromtheperonsreferredtointheprovisionsandthe 1992Fund' righttotakerecoureactionagain ttheseperson

Further,itha beensugge tedthatitmightbepossibletostrengthentheFund'spositionbyincludingaprovision givingexplicitlytheFundtherighttotakerecourseaction,probablybasedonfault.

Subjecttomeaningfulchange tothe 1992Convention ,theAdministrator harestheviewthatthe 1992IOPCFund houldtakerecoureactionwheneverappropriate.AfumpolicybytheIOPCFundonrecoureactioncouldbeused again tperon operating ub-tandard hip Thebenefit totheSOPF,othercontributors,aswellaslittoralStates, couldbesignificant.

4.7 Winding Up of the 1971 IOPC Fund

InSeptember2000,an IMOdiplomaticconferenceadoptedaProtocolunderwhichthe 197l Fund Conventionwouldceasetobeinforce.Thisactionwa considerede sential,becauseinthenearfuturemost contracting tateswillhaveaccededtothe 1992IOPCFundConvention.

Thereremainedaconcern,however,aboutapotential ituationinwhichanincidentoccursandthe 1971 IOPC Fundhasanobligationtopaycompensation,buttheremaybein ufficientmoneytocovertheclaims.Duetothis concern,theAdministrativeCouncilofthe 1971 IOPCFund,inOctober2000,authorizedthepurchaeofin urance coveringanyliabilitiesofthe 1971 IOPCFundforcompensationandindemnificationupto60mj)JionSDR($120 mmion)perincident.Thiswouldbeminustheamountactuallypaidbythe hipownerorhi insurerunderthe 1969 CivilLiabilityConvention.Itwouldcoveraswellthelegalandotherexpertfeesinrepectofallincident occurring duringtheperioduptoDecember31,2001.TheFunditselfwouldhavetocoveradeductibleofapproximately $500,000foreachincident,andthe 1971 IOPCFundwouldhavetheoptiontoextendtheinsurancecoverageupto October31,2002.

ThecovercameintoeffectonOctober25,2000.Apprehen ionforthefinancialviabilityofthe 1971 IOPCFundi reducedbythisdeci iontopurchasein urance.

BetweenOctober25,2000,andDecember31,2001,twoincidentsoccurredinvolvingthe 1971 IOPCFund,the Singapura Timur andthe Zeinab incidents,seeAppendixBandCrepectively.

Asaresultofanumberofrecentdenunciationsofthe 1971 FundConvention,thenumberofContracting tate will fallbelow25onMay24,2002.Therefore,inaccordancewiththeadoptedProtocol,theConventionwillceaetobe inforceonthatday.

TheConventionwillnotapplytoincidentsoccurringafterthatdate.However,theterminationofthe 1971 Fund Conventionwillnotresultintheliquidationofthe 1971 IOPCFund.Itwill tillhavetomeetit obligation in respectofpendingincidentsbeforeitcanbeliquidatedandterminated.The ituationinrepectofpendingincident involvingthe 1971 FundissummarizedinAppendixH.Thewindingupwillrequirea ignificantamountofwork overthenextfewyear owthatalegalcutoffdateha beene tabli hedforthe 1971 FundJiabilitie ,management canresolvetheoutstandingclaimsintheordinarycoureofbusine .Meanwhile,theIOPCSecretariatwillproceed toresolveallremainingclaimsassoonaspos ible.Any urplusaset hallbedi tributedtocontributor inan equitable manner.

Canadaisnowpastthecriticalperiodforcurrentliabilitytothe 1971 IOPCFund.OnMay29, 1999,Canadacea ed tobeamemberofthe 1971 IOPCFundandbecameaContractingStatetothe 1992IOPCFund. everthele , Canadawillcontinuetohaveobligationstothe 1971 IOPCFund,butonlyforcontributionre pectingoil pill prior toMay29, 1999.

5. Outreach Initiatives

5. 1 General

TheAdministratorcontinueswithoutreachinitiativeswithaviewtoenhancinghisunderstandingofthe perpective ofthepartiesintere tedinCanada'sship-sourceoilpollutionresponseandcompensationregime. InCanada,theseincludecitizens,RO ,DFO/CCG,TC,EC,CMAC,themarineindustry,otherfederaland provincialgovernmentagenciesanddepartments,andvariousnon-governmentalorganizations.

OntheinternationalscenediscussionswereheldwithorganizationsbothintheUnitedStatesandinEngland, includingITOPF,OCIMF,P&IClubs,USEPA,andtheUSNationalPollutionFundsCenter.

5.2 Canadian Marine Advisory Council (National)

TheAdministratorattendedtheCanadianMarineAdvisoryCouncil(CMAC)nationalmeetings,which wereheldsemi-annuallyattheGovernmentConferenceCentreinOttawa.Nearly400stakeholdersacross CanadatakepartintheseCMACmeetings.DuringtheMay2001 meetingstheAdministratoraddressedtheopening plenary ession.HeexplainedthattheenactmentofBillS-2movedtheregimeofoilpollutionliabilityfromthe Canada Shipping Act (CSA) tothe Marine Liability Act (MLA) S.C.2001,c.6.ThenewMLAconsolidatesall marineliabilityregime intoasingleAct.Compensationformaritimeoilpollution,previouslyfoundinPartXVIof the CSA, isnowinPart6ofthe MLA

TheAdmini tratorinformedtheparticipantsaboutsomeoftheuniquefeaturesoftheSOPF.Forexample,inCanadathe SOPFcanbeusedtopayclaimsregardingspillsofpersistentoilandnon-persistentoilfromallclassesofships,aswell asmysteryspills.TheIOPCFundsarelimitedto ea-goingtankersandpersistentoil.TheAdministratoremphasized severalitem ,including:

5.2.1 The High Level of IOPC Fund Claims

TheCMACmember wereremindedthatiti importanttorecognizeand upportITOPFinit effortsto giveon-siteadviceonthereasonablene ofclean-upmeaure andreponse.FromtheAdministrator'sview, ITOPF' roleanditsnon-patti anapproachareimportant,giventhehighlevelofsomeclaimsmadeagainstthe IOPCFunds.Thehigh levelofclaim resultin eriou demand oncontJibutor ,includingCanada'sSOPF.

5.2.2 Limitation of shipowner's liability

ByvirtueofS.C. 1998,c.6 inceMay29, 1999,thelimit ofliabilityforshipsotherthanoiltankersin Canadianwater haveincreaed ub tantially.Thenewlimitofliabilityforanownerofa hipunder300gross tons,includingprivatelyownedplea urecraft,i 500,000,regardles ofactualtonnage.Forexample,beforeMay 1999thelimitofliabilityofthe hipownerofplea urecraftof12.5gro ton hadbeen$3,000.Theownersofsuch hip arenowexpo edtoacon iderableperonal tr1ctliabilityintheeventofanoilpollutionincident-upto 500,000.TheAdmini tratorakedwhetheranoteorflyercouldbecirculatedinregi trationandlicensingpapers reminding mall hipandplea urecraftowner aboutthechange.

5.2.3 Canadian Claims

TheAdmini tratori cognizantoftheconcernsofshipowner whena essingclaimscoveringmonitor ingmea urestakenbytheCCGduringincidentsrepondedtobytheshipowneranditscontractedresponse organization Thei sueisgenerallyaboutwhethertheextentofthemeasurestakenbyCCGandthecostsand expen esincurredarereaonable.HesuggestedtoCMACthatthereshouldbeadialoguebetweentheshipowners andtheCCGregardingtheirrespectiverole .

TheAdministratorrespondedtoque tionsfromtheparticipantsandprovidedclarificationonsuchmattersas: the coverageofoffhoredrillingrigs,theprocedurefortheimpo itionofalevyandthelengthoftimetakentoprocess aclaim.Heemphasizedthattherearenoplanstore-impo ealevy.Nolevyhasbeenimposedsince 1976.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

5.3 Canadian Marine Advisory Council (Arctic)

InApril200l,theAdmini trator' marineconsultantattendedthe orthern anadianMarineAdvisory Council(CMAC-Northern)meetingin IqaluitonBaffinI land.Therewereapproximatelyfiftyparticipantsin attendanceforthetwo-day ofmeetings.Theyrepresentedthefederalandterritorialgovernmentsandawiderange ofoperator fromthenorthernmarineshippingindustry.

Di cussion wereco-chairedbyrepresentativesofFisheriesandOcean Canada,CCGCentral andArcticRegion, andTransportCanada' Prairieand orthernRegion.

Abreakoutfocusgroupwasformedtodiscus theCoastGuardArcticRepon eStrategy.Thepurposeofthi trategyistoensureaneffectiveresponsetoma�ineoilpollutionincident intheCanadianArctic.

N01thernTran portationLimited(NTCL)hascontractedwiththegovernmentof unavutto upplygovernmentfuelto theeasternArctic.NTCLchartersoiltankersontheinternationalmarket.Theetankersareice- trengthenedand constructedwithdoublehulls.AnnuaiJy,threeorfour18,000to20,000gro tontanker aredeployedtotheArctic port.AJa�·ger60,000gros tontankerproceedstoNuuk,Greenland,fromwherethe mallerve el tran-shipfuelto Canada. In allpo1ts,exceptChurchill,Manitoba,thefuelispumpedashoreviaafloatinghoe.Thetankerscarryablend ofpersistentoilfortheirownfuelconsumption.Allfuelpumpedashorei arcticdieelandgasoline.Anexperienced Canadianicenavigator ailstheshuttletankers.

CoastalShippingLimitedofGooeBay,Labrador,hasacontractwithPublicWork andGovernmentService Canada tosupplyfuelannuallytotheDEWLine itesonBaffmIslandandintheFoxeBasinarea.Thetankerutilizedforthee supplyvoyages,fromNewfoundlandtotheeasternArctic,i theCanadian-regitered Molwmi (3,015gro ton ).The shipisice-strengthenedwith inglehullconstruction. IntheweternArcticallfueloili deliveredby TCLtugandtank barge,ashasbeenthepracticefordecades.

5.4 Response Organizations

TherearefourcertifiedResponseOrganization (RO )inCanadatoprovidemarineoil pillre pon e services outhof60degree northlatitude.Theyareindu try-managedandfundedbyfee chargedtou er The fourROsinCanadaare:

•

WesternCanadaMarineRe pon eCorporation(WCMRC),whichingeneralcover Briti hColumbia waters;

EasternCanadaRespon eCorporation(ECRC),whichcover thewater oftheGreatLake,Quebec SIMEC)andtheAtlanticCoat(excepttwosmallarea in ewBrun wickand o a cotia);

AtlanticEmergencyResponseTeam(ALERT),whichba icallyinclude theportofSaint Johnand urroundingswaters;and

PointTupperMarine Service Limited(PTMS),whichcover theportofPortHawke buryand approache

Althougheachoftheresponseorganizationsi anindependentcorporation,theyareLinkedtogetherthroughvariou supp01tandmutualaidagreement to upplementtheresource ofeachother,ifrequireddwingamajormarineoilspill. IneasternCanada,ALERTandPTMShaveasupporta11dmutualaidagreementwithECRC. In weternCanada, WCMRChasanoperationalmanagementsupportagreementwithECRC.

OnFebruary28,2002,theAdministratormetwiththere ponsecentremanagerattheRO' centralfacilityin Dartmouth,NovaScotia.Thevisittothefacilityprovidedanopportunitytolearnmoreaboutindu try' overall functionalmanagementsystem,anditshands-ontrainingformobilizinga pillrepon eoperation.Itwa achance toseethewa�·ehouseofspecializedoilspillequipmentusedontheopen eaandfor horelineclean-up(e.g.booms, pumps,boats,bargesandskimmers).Inadditiontoobservingtheinventoryofclean-uptechnologyandit capabilities,theAdministratordiscussedthematterofcurrentcha�·geoutrate andhowtheyaredetermined.

TheAdministratorisinterestedincontinuingtheongoingco-operationandrelationshipwiththerespon e organizationsinallregionsofCanada.Hefullyappreciatesthattheirrespectiverole andre ponsibilitie regarding oilspillpollutionprevention,preparednessandresponseareessentialpartsofCanada'snationalsystemfor protectionofthemaJineenvironment.

5.5 Oil Pollution Exercise -Atlantic Region

OnMa 30and31,2001,theECRCheldatype 4 exerciseintheAtlanticRegionatitsresponsecentre locatedinSt.John's,Newfoundland.Atype4exerciseisatabletopscenariotodemonstratethatECRCcan, ac ordingtoe tablishedROplanningstandards,setupaspillmanagementteamandidentifythenecessary re ource torespondtoamarinespillupto 10,000tonnes.

Theba icexerci escenatiowasaresponsetoanoil spillafteraHiberniashuttletankerwasstruckbythedocking tugatthetrans-shipmentterminalatWhiffenHead,PlacentiaBay.Theimpactcausedanexplosioninaballasttank betweenthetwohullsandapproximately5,000tonnesofHiberniacrudeoilwerereleasedinstantaneously,butthe total olumeatriskwas 10,000tonnes.

TheROconductedtheexerci eoveraperiodof36hoursofcontinuousactivityaccordingtoareal-timeschedule. Thepatticipant werefromCanShipUglandLtd.,NorthAtlanticRefiningLimited,NewfoundlandTrans-Shipment Limited,CanadianCoastGuard,EnvironmentCanadaandvariousresponsecontractors.Advisorsandsupport per onnel helpedtoprovidearealisticresponseorientedatmosphere.Anumberoforganizationssentrepresentatives toobservetheexerciseincludingtheShip-ourceOilPollutionFund,Chevron(California),Chevron(Canada), Hu kyOil,ExxonMobil,Hibernia,Ten·aNova,ImperialOil,Petro-Canada,Ultramat·CanadaandtheRoyal ewfoundland Constabulary.

Duringtheoilpollutionexercise,theSOPFconsultanttookadvantageofanopportunitytovisittheNewfoundland Tran-ShipmentLtd TL)oilterminalfacilityatWhiffenHead.Thisfacilityhasanexceptionalworldclass infratructure.Iti designedtoreceivecrudeoilfrompetroleumproductionoffshoreNewfoundland.Thecrudeis latertran-shippedtomajorrefiningcentresontheeasternseaboardofNorthAmerica.Theterminalhastwolarge tankerberths,accommodatingtanker from60,000tol59,000dwt. It isdesignedfortheadditionofathirdberth. Whenthe iteiscompletedthefacilitywillhavesixteenholdingtanks,eachwithacapacityof500,000banelsof crudeoil.Currently,thereare6holdingtanks.TheAdmini tratornotesthatasignificantincreaseinPlacentiaBay tankertrafficcarrie thepotentialforbothanincreaeinenvironmentalriskandfinancialimpactontheSOPF.The TLmanagementha anagreementwiththeECRCforspillre ponseassistance.

TheSOPFconsultant a! oattendedattheoffice ofCanShipUglandLtd.inSt.John'swhichisthemajorship managementandmatineprojectcompany ervingtheoffshoreandmruinetransportationindustries.ItisISM/ISO9002 certified.CanShipUglandLtdmanage threepurpoe-built 127,000dwtcrudeoil huttletankersservingtheHibernia andTen-a ovafield Theetanker Mattea, Kometik and Vinland - built in SouthKorea-aresaidtobethelargest vesel regi teredinCanada.Theentirecrewi Canadian.The huttletanker aredesignedtoloadcrudeoilatthe productionplatformthrougha pecializedbow-loading ystem.TheytranportoilfromtheGrandBankoilproduction unitstothetran - hipmenttenninalatWhiffenHead.

5.6 On-Scene Commander Course

OnMarch 4, 2002,theAdmini tratorpruticipatedintheOn-SceneCommanderCourseattheCCGCollege inCapeBreton.He pokeabouttherole andreponsibilitie oftheAdmini tratoroftheSOPF Asapanel memberhedi cu edtheCanadianmarineoil pillrepon eregime.Thi ortofinteractionconttibutestoan increaedawarene aboutCanada' overall tatutory chemeformarineoilpollution,re pon eandcompensation.

Allthepreenter madecomprehen iveandin ightfulpreentation Therewereinformative peakersfromtheCCG, EnvironmentCanada,EasternCanadaRe poneCorporationandotherrelevantorganizations.Thepreentationsand casehi toriescoveringinternationaloiltankerincident wereinvaluabletrainingexpe1ience .Consultantsfromthe UnitedState andtheUnitedKingdom,includingITOPF,andlegalrepreentationfromtheDeprutmentofFishe1iesand Ocean Canadagavethetrainingameaningfulinternationalperspective.

TheOn-SceneCommanderCourei de ignedforCCGofficersandoperationalmanagersofindustry. Itis e entiallyon- itecoordinationandthedevelopmentofclean-up trategiesthatarenecessat·ytorespondeffectively toanoil pill uptotheinternationaltier3repon ecapability(i.e.maximumquantityofoilspilledat2,500tonnes). Underthetier3criteria,theequipmentandresourcesmustbedeployedtotheaffectedoperatingenvironment within 18hour afternotificationofanoil pill.

Theoil pill cenariousedfortrainingwaslocatedintheBayofFundyneartheCanadaandUnitedStates boundary. Itincludeda imulationexerciseofagroundedoilbarge.Throughoutthedayoftheexercise,the controllerscomplicatedmattersbyprovidingvariousoperationalandenvironmentalinputs.Theyinsertedahostof localcommunityconcern callingforimmediateresolution.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

TheOn- ceneCommander ourse,heldeachyearattheC GCollege,offersanopportunityforrepresentativ�sfrom govemmentagencie andthemarineindustrytomeetandworktogether.TheAdministratorverymuchappreciates CG' invitationforhimtoparticipateinthiscoure.

Itwa interestingtolearnduringthesesionthatintheUnitedState,theCentreforMarineEnvironmentalPollutionand SafetyattheMa achuett MruitimeAcademyprovide trainingrelatedtoEmergencyandSpill-Response Management Thi Centreoffer afullOPA90basedtrainingcurriculumforthoeinindustryandgovemmenthaving managementoroversightresponsibilitiesforpreparedne sorrespon eundertheAct.

WithitsOilSpillManagementSimulator-uniqueinNorthAmerica-theCentre' program are upportedbythe mostadvancetechnologyavailable.Traineesru·eprovidedwithanappropriateexerciseenvironmentinwhichto applytheiracquiredknowledgetomo trealisticoil pill cenario

Additional informationabouttheprogramisavailableat: www.MMA.MASS.edu/dce/cmeps/andwww.oil-pillinfo.com.

5.7 Canadian Coast Guard - Regional Meetings

5.7.1 Vancouver

OnJanuary29,2002,theAdministratormetinVancouverwithCCGemergencyrepon emanager andoil spillre ponders.AI oinattendancewereseniorcoun eloflegal ervice andtherevenueandclaim officer bothfromCCGHeadquarter inOttawa.

Thediscu ionfocu edonissue concerningoilspill incident andclean-upaction,including:

theque tionofreaonablenes relativetoboththeextentofthemeaure takenandthecot andexpene incurred;

thetakingofoil ample ,includingcollectionprocedure , torage,chainofcu tody,obtaininglaboratory analysi anddocumentation;and, thepresentationofclaim that houldbe ubmittedinatimelymannerandfullydocumentedinwriting.It wasemphasizedthatdetailedlog andnote bytheon- cenecommanderandotheroil pillre ponder are invaluabletofacilitatethepaymentofclaim

Themeetingwa productive,lengthy,wellattended,andreceivedgoodparticipationfromallCCGperonnel. Feedbackattheclo ingofthe e ionindicatedthatitwa apleaantchangeforregionalmanager ,andoil pill responderstodialoguedirectlywiththeAdrnini trator."We houldha ehadthi ortofmeetingalongtimeago", oneparticipantsaid.

TheAdministratorispleasedthatthemeetingwithCoatGuardperonnelwa opo itive. Heencourage CCG personnelinthefieldandelewheretocontacthi officedirectlyanddi cu practicalmeaure whendealingwith thehandlingofclaims.

5.7.2 Dartmouth

OnMarch 1,2002,theAdministTatorvisitedtheCCG/DFOregionalheadquarter inDartmouth, ova Scotia.HemetwiththeRegionalDirector-GeneralDFO,theactingRegionalDirectorCCGand everaloftheir seniormanagers.Thediscussionsincluded:

preparationofclaims;recentincidents(e.g.Calapalamo incidentwhichoccurredinHalifaxHarbouron February21,2001);

DFO-CCGAdministrationCosts,whichareincludedasaseparatescheduleinCCGoilpollutionincident claims; safehavensfordamagedships;and, disposalofoilywasteandtheadequacyofportreceptionfacilitie

TheAdministratorappreciatessuchopportunitiesforfrankandopendiscussiononissuesofmutualinterest.Such cooperationcanfurtherimprovethepresentationandassessmentofclaimsinamannerconistentwithsoundbusiness practices,andinaccordancewiththelawsgovemingtheoperationoftheSOPF.

5.8 Environment Canada -Sensitivity Mapping

The Admi�strator visi . ted the regional headquarters o�Envir�nment Canada in Dartmo�th, Nova Scotia. He met With the Reg1onal D1rectorGeneral, the Reg1onal D1rector EPB, and other semor managers of En ironment Canada's Atlantic Region. The meeting focused on several departmental programs and interests including: the Environmental Damage Fund, Oil Reception Facilities, Canuslant exercises, Trajectory models, oil sampling procedures, the Regional Environmental Emergency Team (REET) andtheAtlantic Sensitivity Mapping initiative.

TheAdministrator arranged fortheEC Regional co-ordinators oftheAtlantic Sensitivity Mapping initiative tovisit the SOPFoffices in Ottawaand give a presentation on the status ofthe program. During the presentation, the co-ordinators explained that otherpartners had contributed significantly to the development and improvement ofthe existing sensitivity maps. The partners included ECRC, DFO/CCG, otherfederal and provincial organizations, andcommunity group .

The sensitivity maps are now an important element in the Department's comprehensive strategy for oil spill prevention, preparedness and response. They incorporate catalogues ofecologically sensitive areas and seasonal vulnerabilitie ofvarious physical, biological and cultural resources. The maps provide oil spill responders with an important and dynamic tool to aid them in making vital decisions for the protection ofCanada's coastal resources.

The co-ordinators are developing a complementary Web-mapping system, which will greatly expand the capability ofthe program. Currently, members ofthe REET organization, and the RO's have agreements with Environment Canada for full access ofthe sy tern.

TheAdministratorhasa keen interest inthepartnership developmentoftheSensitivity Mapping Program intheAtlantic region. He is encouragedthatthe program will be expanded toothergeographical areas ofthe country. Full access by the Administratorto the database will be invaluable during inve tigation and assessment ofclaims forcompensation resulting from oil pill incident . Furtherdiscussions will be held with the EC personnelaboutthe Web-based mapping project and the otherEC programs pertinent to an oil spill response.

5.9 US Environmental Protection Agency - Freshwater Spills Symposium

The Administrator attended the "Fourth Biennial Fre hwater Spills Symposium" in Cleveland, Ohio, spon ored by the US Environmental Protection Agency. The ymposium provided an opportunity for government agencie , industry, and international oil pill re ponder to focus on planning, prevention, and direct re pon e to oil pills in fre hwater environment Further, the ymposium provided an international forum for participant to di cu s co-operative working relation hip and encourage transfer oftechnology regarding the unique problem offre hwater clean-up operation

Fre hwater environments po e many unique variable requi.Iing con ideration during planning and response. OiJ spills in fre hwaterdiffer from coastal ormarine pill in everal ways. Thefre hwaterspills tend to be more frequent, smaller volume, and,areu uallycompo ed ofrefined products. Theyhaveahigherpotential to endangerpublic health and the environment,becau e they frequently occur within populated area The pill can immediately threaten surface water and ground water upplie , which directly impact human activitie . In addition, critical inland habitats-more diverse than coastal habitat -are more likely to be impacted. De pite the ort ofproblems that freshwaterspills pose, much of the available information on pill prevention and response i directed atcoastal areas or oil spills that occuron the urface ofthe ocean.

The Adrnini trator submitted a paper on the Canadian compensation regime. His presentation covered the principal elements ofCanada' Ship- ource Oil Pollution Fund.

He al o di cussed the role ofthe SOPF in re pect to oil spill from all classes of ships operating in Canadian waters, including the Great Lakes and other interior waterways. The pre entation addressed the current limits ofliability and compensation for oil tanker spills in Canada.

The SOPF is intended to cover inter alia ship-source spills in the Great Lakes forexample. However, ifan oil spill cannot be linked to a ship, the SOPF may still be liable for a "mystery spill". That is, theSOPF is liable for reasonable costs and expense in certain matters in relation to oil, "if the cause of the oil pollution damage is unknown and the Administrator has been unable to establi h that the occurrence that gave rise to the damage was not caused by a ship". Otherwise, the SOPF is not liable fornon ship-source spills.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

FromaSOPFper pective,theAdmini tratormentionedthe Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of1978, amendedbyProtocolin 1987,betweenCanadaandtheUS.Underthetermsoftheagreement,the oastGuard<;of bothCanadaandtheUShavedevelopedandimplementedaJointMarineProtection ontingencyPia�.�egeneral principle ofthecontingencyplanen urethatbothagencie areina trongposition tore pondtoanoilsp11l threateningtheboundarywater oftheGreatLake system.

TheAdmirtit:ratornotedthatbetweenCanadaandtheUStherearecompenationprovi ion inplacefortheGreat Lake However,no pecialfundingprovision applytowatersontheEastandWe tCoasts.Withrepecttothefunding arrangementsinforcefortheGreatLakes,the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement state:

"The costs ofoperations ofboth Parties under the Plan shall be borne by the Party in whose waters the pollution incident occurred, unless otherwise agreed. "

TheContingencyPlanreiterate thespecialarrangementforfundingand tate :

"In the Great Lakes, the provisions ofthe Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement apply, and, unless othe1wise agreed, the costs ofoperation ofboth parties under the Plan shall be borne by the party in whose waters the pollution incident occurred.

In the case ofa pollution incident arisingfrom seabed activities, the cost ofresponse operations shall be borne by the party having jurisdiction over the seabed activities involved.

In all other cases subject to this Plan each party will bear the costs ofits own response operation."

5. 10 Emergency Response Planning for Marine Industries - Vancouver

TheAdministratorparticipatedintheconferenceorganizedbyIn ight InformationCo.on"Emergency ResponsePlanningforMarineIndu trie "heldinVancouveronJanuary28and29,2002.Mr Joeph pear, Principal,SpearsandCompanychairedtheconference.

Theparticipant compri edrepre entative fromthemarineindu try,lawyer fromtheDepartmentofJu tice Canada,andprivatelawftrms;representative fromFi herie andOcean Canada,Tran portCanada, ational Defenseandcon ultants.AlsopreentwasChiefHarry F. yceSr.ofthe i ga' Li im Government.

Theconferencefocusedonthecurrentenvironmentali ue andlegi lativeupdate affectingthemarineindu try andemergencyresponsecapabilitie ,bothinCanadaandinternationally.Theprogramprovidedanopportunityfor di cus iononthelateststrategie for ucce sfulemergencyrepon eplanningin today' marineenvironment.The conferenceses ionscoveredarangeofmaterial,including:

emergencyresponseplanning; CUITentstateoftheWestCoatmarineinduso·y; impactofenvironmentalis ue andchange tolegi lation: thenew Marine Liability Act; understandingthenatureofmarineclaim andenvironmentaldamage: effectivemediacommunicationsduringanenvironmentalcri i :and, theShip-sourceOilPollutionFund.

TheAdministratorpresentedapaperonCanada'sShip-ourceOilPollutionFund.Duringhi preentationhe discussedsomeofthefundamentalproblem mostcountrie havehadtodealwithduringoil pillincident .Oil tanker ,particularlycrudeoiltanker ,carrylargevolume ofoilascargo,and hip otherthanoiltanker carrya significantamountofoilasbunkerfuel.UnderCanadianlaw, when oil pill occurredafewdecade ago, compensationforpollutiondamageandtherecoveryofcostsandexpen esforclean-upwerelimited.Inorderto takerecourseactionagainsttherespon iblepartytherewa arequirementtoprovenegligence. Issue ucha judgementproofing,bankruptcy,insolvency,juri dictionandtheone-shipcompany ituationpre enteddifficult challenges.Itwasimportanttofindastatutorysolutiontosomeoftheechallenge

TheAdministratorexplainedthatthecatalyst fortheInternationalOilSpillCompensationConvention andthe Canadianliabilityandcompensationlegislationweretwolargeoilspilldi asters.Thefirstwa the Torrey Canyon groundingontheSevenStonesRocks(England 1967).Asaresult,aninternationalregimewa createdfor compensationofpollutiondamagecausedbyoilspillsfromtar!kers.Atthetimeoftheincidenttherewereno internationalrulesdealingwiththematter,onlytheapplicablenationallaw.Undertheauspice ofIMO,twosetsof treatieswereadopted:The 1969CivilLiabilityConventionandthe 1971 FundConvention.Thisregimewas amendedin 1992bytwoProtocols:the 1992CivilLiabilityConventionandthe 1992FundConvention.

econdl ,theCanadianincidentoccunedin 1970whenthetanker Arrow groundedonCerberusRockin ChedabuctoBay, o aScotia.Afterthe Arrow incident,majoramendmentsweremadetothe Canada Shipping Act. Thenewoil pilllegislationbecamePartXXofthe CSA, whichbecamepartoftheCanadianLawonJune30, 1971. TheCanadianLawpredate theentryintoforceofthe 1969CivilLiabilityConventionbymorethanfouryearsand the 1971 FundConventionbymorethansevenyears.ThenewPartXXofthe CSA wasoneofthefirstnational comprehen iveregimesforoil spillliabilityinthewesternworld.

TheprincipalelementsofPartXXwere:

establishingtheliabilityofshipownerstoberesponsibleforcostsanddamagesforadischargeofoil; allowingtheshipowner,incettaincircumstances,tolimithisliabilitytoanamountlinkedtotheship's tonnage;

creatinganewfund,theMaritimePollutionClaimsFund,tobeavailableforclaimsinexcessofthe shipowner'slimitofljability;and, givingtheMinisterofTransportthepowertomoveordisposeofanyshipandcargodischargingorlikely todi chargeoil.

TheSOPFcameintoforceonApril24, 1989,byamendmentstothe CSA anditsucceededtheMaritimePollution Claim Fund.TheSOPFisintendedtopayclaimsregardingoilspillsfromallclassesofshipsatanyplacein Canada,orinCanadianwatersincludingtheexclusiveeconomiczoneofCanada.TheSOPFisnotlimitedtoseagoingtanker ortopersistentoil,asisthe 1992IOPCFund.

Thepreent tatutoryclaim regimeisthe Marine Liability Act (MIA) S.C.2001,c.6.The MIA cameintoforceon August8,2001.Patt6ofthenewActcontinuestheregimethatwaspreviouslyfoundinPattXVIofthe CSA.

5. 11 Maritime Conference 2002 - Toronto

TheAdmini tratorattendedtheMaritimeConferencesponsoredbyMru·shCanadaandLibettyInternational,held inTorontoonJanuary23and24,2002.The e ion featuredpaper onthe Marine Liability Act, changestothe Canada Shipping Act 2001, theSruppingConferencesExemptionAct(BillC.14)andother.Thevarious pea.kers representedregulatoryauthoritie ,themarinein uranceindu try,thelegalprofession,TransportationSafetyBoard,and theprivate ectornetworkofoil pillRe poneOrganization .

Apaneldiscu ion wa heldonCanada' AerialSurveillanceProgram.ThesupervisorypilotoftheCCGfixedwing aircraftoperation gaveaveryinformative !idepresentationonaerialoilpollution urveillance.Note:Thetypeof aircraftu edbytheCCGandthenumberofpatrol flownareindicatedonpage 37and38.

Itwa explainedthatCanadacomplie withAnnex 1ofMARPOL73/78,whichlimitstheamountofoilthatcanbe di chargedto 15part permil]jon(ppm). lnve tigationha hown,however,thatadischargeofanoily mixturewith aconcentrationof15ppmcannotbeobervedeithervisuallyorwithremote en ingequipment.Thelowest concentrationofoilpreentinthedi chargeofanoilymixturewherethefirttrace werevisuallyobervedfrom theaircraftwas50ppm.

Therei arelation hipbetweenthethkknes ofanoilfilmandthecolouroftheoil heena seenbyanobserver. Thi relation hipi validforthinfilm ofle than3mjcron andisusedtoestimatequantity.Theoptimalheight foridentifyinga licka oilfromanaircrafti 1000to 1500feetoverhead.Theviewingangleiscriticalforaetial obervation ofoil licks.Theidealpo ition i directlyabovelookingdownat90degree tothesurfacewiththe un attheob erver' back.Thepracticalimplicationoftheviewingangle,accordingtothepresenter,isthatanobserver onorclo etothe urfacei oftenunabletoseeanoil lickthatisvisibletoanaerialob erver.

Stati tic howthatduringthepastdecadeanaverageof241 incidentsperyearareobservedfromallthemethods u ebythenationalaerialsurveillanceprogram.The ource oftheoilspill are-ship8%,mysteryspill 46.5%, other -includingland-baed, hipwreck ,etc.45.5%.

5. 12 Canadian Maritime Law Association

TheAdmini tratorattendedtheannualmeetingoftheCanadianMaritimeLawAs ociationin Montreal in June2001. Hevalueshiscontact withtheCanadianMaritimeLawAsociationandcontinuestodialoguewith members.Heverymuchappreciatesthegenerouscontributionsbeingmadebymember tothecontinuing developmentofCanadianMaritimeLaw.

5.13 Eastern Admiralty Law Association

The Administrator notes the valuable work done by this organization in Halifax toward new development inMaritimeLaw.

6. SOPF's Liabilities to the International Funds

6. 1 1969 CLC and 1971 IOPC

CanadafirstbecameaContractingStatetotheinternationalConventionsonMay24, 1989.ThesetwoConventionswerethe 1969InternationalConventiononCivilLiabilityforOil PollutionDamage(1969CLC)andthe 1971 InternationalConventionontheEstablishmentofanInternationalFundforCompensationforOil Pollution Damage(1971 IOPCFundConvention).

Someofthemajorincidentsinvolvingthe 1971 IOPCFundsince 1989include Haven (Italy, 1991), Aegean Sea (Spain, 1992), Braer (UK, 1992), Sea Prince (RepublicofKorea, 1995), Sea Empress (UK, 1996), Nakhodka (Japan, 1997),and Nissos Am.orgos (Venezuela, 1997).

TheSOPFnowhascontingentliabilitiesinthe 1971 IOPCFundforoilspillincidentspriortoMay29, 1999.The SOPFwillpaytheseastheymature. Ithasnoresponsibilityforanyadministrativecostsafterthatdate.Twoincidentshaveverylargetotalclaims: Aegean Sea (Spain, 1992)and Nissos Am.orgos (Venezuela, 1997). TheSOPF's potentialmaximumaggregateliabilityisapproximately 6.5millionforthesetwoincidents.

6.2 1992 CLC and 1992 IOPC

May29, 1999,Canadaaccededtothe 1992CLCandthe 1992IOPCFundConvention.ThesetwoConventions applyonlytospillsofpersi tentoilfromsea-goingtanker

The 1992IOPCFundAssemblydecide thetotalamountthat houldbeleviedeachyeartomeetgeneraloperating expensesandanticipatedcompensationpaymentsinmajorincident .Therequiredlevypertonneiscalculatedbythe IOPCSecretariat.TheSOPFreceivesaninvoicefromthe 1992IOPCFundbasedonthecalculatedlevymultipliedby thetotalamountofCanada' "contiibutingoil."

UnderSOPFregulation thereportingofimportedandcoastalmovementsof "contributingoil"ismandatoryby person receivingmorethan 150,000tonnesduringthepreviouscalendaryear.

Report mu tbereceivedbytheSOPFnotlaterthanFebruary28oftheyearfollowingsuchreceipt.InearlyJanuaryof eachyeartheAdmini tratorwrite toeachpotentialrespondentexplainingtheprocessandprovidingthenecessary reportingform.Allthecompletedform arethenproce edtoarriveataconsolidatednationalfigurethatis, in turn, reportedtothe1992IOPCFund.Cunentlythereare 10repondent whorepOtt.Theyrepresentorganizationsintheoil (refiningandtran -hipmentoperations)andpowergenerationindu tiies.

The Erika incident(France, 1999)willprovidetheSOPFwithit firtte tofthe 1992IOPCregime,wherecompenationpayablewillprobablyreachthe 1992IOPClimits.

TheSOPF' paymenttothe1992IOPCFundforthe Erika incidentmightbeapproximately 10.5million.In2000/01 theAdmini tratordirectedpaymentof 5,933,354.58tothe 1992IOPCFundforthe Erika MajorClaim Fund.In2001/ 02,theAdmini tratorpaid$2,364,162.09forthe Erika MajorClaim Fund.

TheSOPFi at oliabletopayongoingcontributionstothe 1992IOPCFund'sGeneralFundandforother 1992 IOPCFundmajorincidentshappeningafterMay29, 1999. However,Canadawillhavenoresponsibilitytothe 1992Fundforanyincidentsoradministrativecost priortoMay29, 1999.

Since 1989,theSOPFhaspaidtheIOPCFunds$30,129,095.74,a listedinthetablebelow. Thisshowsthe"call" natureoftheIOPCFunds. ContributionsandIevie aredrivenbyclaims,andhowtheyareassessed.

1971 and 1992 IOPC Funds

7. Financial Summary

Income

Balance f01ward from March 31 I 2001

Interest credited (April 1 I 2001 - March 31 I 2002)

Recoveries of settlements - GSA and MLA sections 71 1 (3) and 87(3) respectively:

Pursuant to sections 706 and 707 of the GSA and sections 81 and 82 of the MLA the SOPF paid out at the direction or request of the Administrator the following:

Pursuant to sections 71 0 and 71 1 of the GSA and sections 85-87 of the MLA the Administrator paid Canadian claims established in the total amount of:

Pursuant to section 701 of the GSA and section 76 of the MLA the Administrator directed the following payments out of the SOPF to the 1992 IOPC Fund:

Total expenditure from the SOPF Balance in SOPF as at March 31, 2002

Appendix A: The International Compensation Regime

Canadai aContractingStateinthecuJTentinternationalregimetocompensateclaimantsforpollutiondamage cau edby pillsfromoiltankersbasedonConventionsadoptedundertheauspicesoftheIMO.

The CLC

The1969and1992CLCgoverntheliabilityofoiltankerownersforoilpollutiondamage.Theshipownerisnormally entitledtolimithisliabilitytoan amountthatislinkedtothetonnageofhisship.Thesourceofcompensationmoney come frominsurance(P&IClub).

Underthe1969CLC,theshipownerisdeprivedoftherighttolimithisliabilityiftheincidentoccuJTedasaresultof theowner' actualfaultorprivity.Jurisprudenceprovidesreasonableprospectsforbreakingtheshipowner'srightto limitliabilityunderthistest.

Underthe1992CLC,claimsforpollutiondamagecanbemadeonlyagainsttheregisteredownerofthetankerorhis insurer.The hipownerisdeprivedoftherighttolimithisliabilityonlyifitisprovedthatthepollutiondamage re ultedfromtheshipowner' per onalactoromission,committedwiththeintenttocausesuchdamage,or reckle slyandwithknowledgethat uchdamagewouldprobablyre ult.Thisnewtestmakesitpracticallyimpossible tobreakthe hipowner' righttolimitliability.Theshipowner'slimitofliabilityi higherinthe1992CLCthaninthe 1969CLC.

The IOPC Fund Conventions

UndertheIOPCFundConvention ,whichmutualizethe1iskofoilpollutionfromtankers,theIOPCpaysa supplementarylayerofcompen ariontovictim ofoilpollutiondamageinIOPCFund-ContractingStatesthat cannotobtainfullcompen ationforthedamageundertheapplicableCLC.The1971and1992IOPCFund Convention are upplementarytothe 1969CLCandthe 1992CLCrepectively.Thesourceofmoneyisthelevieson oilreceiver inContactingState ,collectedretro pectively.Canadai theexception,wheretheSOPFpaysall Canadiancontribution totheIOPCFund

Thecompen ationpayablebythe 1971 IOPCFundforanyoneincidenti limitedto60millionSpecialDrawingRights (SDR)(about 120million),includingthe umactuallypaidbythe hipownerorhi insurerunderthe1969CLC.The maximumamountpayablebythe1992IOPCFundforanyoneLncidenti 135millionSDR(about$270million), includingthe umactuallypaidbythe hipownerorhi in urerandany umpaidbythe1971 Fund

Figure1,AppendixD, how compen ationavailablefromIOPCFund.

Contracting States

ContractingState ,a ofApril15,2002,tothe1969CLCandthe1971 IOPCFundConventionandthe 1992IOPC Protocol areli tedinAppendixEandAppendix F.

Principal Changes

Inthe1992CLCandthe1992IOPCFundConvention,theunderlyingprinciplesremain.Theprincipalchanges introducedbythe 1992Protocol are howninAppendixD.

Figure1,AppendixD, how thelimit ofliability.

Appendix 8: The 1971 IOPC FundAdministrative Council and Assembly Sessions

The 5fh Administrative Council - June 25, 26 and 28, 2001

The5th e sionoftheAdmini trativeCouncil,actingonbehalfofthe8thExtraordinarySessionoftheAssemblyofthe 1971IOPCFund,washeldunderthechairmanshipofCaptainR.Malik(Malaysia).TheAdministrativeCouncildealt withthefollowing:

Winding up of the 1971 Fund

TheAdministrativeCouncilrecalledthattheIMODiplomaticConferenceofSeptember2000hadadoptedaProtocol toamendAiticle43.1 ofthe1971 FundConvention.ItwasnotedthatwhentheUnitedArabEmiratesdenunciation takeseffectonMay24,2002,thenumberofContractingStateswillfallbelow25and,aspertheamendedArticle43.1, the 1971FundConventionwillceasetobeinforce.TheConventionwillnotapplytoincidentsafterthatdate.

TheDirectorwillusetheoptiontoextendtherecentlypurchasedinsurancecoverforincidentsuptothedatewhen the 1971 FundConventionceaestoexi t.Hewillalsocontinuehisworkonthetechnicalwindingupasopposedto theConventionceasingtobeinforce.Hewillpresentadocumentonthisis ueattheAssembly'sOctober2001 ession.

Incidents involving the 1971 IOPC Fund Aegean Sea(1992)

TheGreekOBO Aegean Sea (51,801 gro ton )groundedoffthecoatofnorthwe tSpain.Theshipwasloaded withapproximately80,000tonne ofcrudeoil.Afteramajorfireonboard,theshipwasdeclaredatotal1os Extensive clean-upoperation werecarriedoutat eaandonshore.

TheAdmini trati eCouncilnotedthataprovisionalagreementhadbeenreachedamongtheSpanishGovernment, the hipowner,theUKClubandthe1971 IOPCFunda totheadmi siblequantumofclaim forcompensation.The provi ionalagreementindicatedanagreedamountof£45millionagain ttheclaimedamountof£184million.

TheDirectorwa authorizedtoconcludeand ignanagreementan1ongtheprutiesonaglobalsolutiontoall out tandingi ue ari ingoutoftheincidentandtomakecompen ationpaymentsaccordingly.

ote:Thi i theolde tout tandingclaiminthe 1971 IOPCFund.

Braer(1993)

TheLiberiantanker Braer (44,989gro ton )groundedsouthoftheShetlandIslandsandwassubsequently declaredatotallo The hipwa ladenwith84,000tonnesofNorthSeacrudeoil Boththecargoandbunkers pilledintothe ea.Therewere ub tantia1claim forcompenationrelatedtotheclosingofthefishery,damageto property,farmingandtouri mactivitie .

TheAdmini trativeCouncilin tructedtheDirectorto how omeflexibilitywhentryingto ettletheissueoflegalcosts withclaimants.Itwaspointedoutthattheeclaimantswerenotcompaniesbutwereallindividuals,someofwhomwere pen ioners.Theintentistoreachafinal ettlementofthe Braer incidentonaglobalbasis.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

KeundongNo. 5(1993)

TheKoreanbarge Keundong No. 5 (481 grosstons)collidedwithanother hipoffthecoastoftheRepublicofKorea. Anestimated 1,280tonnesofheavyfueloilwere pilied.[tre ultedin ub tantialclaim fromthefisheryand aquaculture industries.

The1971 IOPCFundappealedagain ttheftrtintanceCourt'sdeci ionsinrepectofanumberoffi heryclaim RecentlytheCourtofAppealacceptedthe 1971 IOPCFund' po itiononmatter ofprinciple-thati ,compensation i notgrantedforpainandsuffering,norforlo se inrepectofunlicen edandunregi teredfi hingactivitie

TheAppellateCourtupheldtheDi trictCourt'sdeci ion inrespectoflossofearning byclaimant duetobu ine s interruption.

Note:Thisincidentillustratesthehighlevelof omeclaims:claimedamount£8.7million;amountawardedbythe DistrictCoutt£864,000;amountawardedbytheAppellateCourt£79,000.

NissosAmorgos(1997)

TheGreektanker Nissos Amorgos (50,563gro tons),ladenwith75,000tonne ofVenezuelancrude,groundedinthe MaracaiboChannelintheGulfofVenezuela.Anestimated3,600tonne ofcrudeoilwere pilled.

Sincethe4'hsessionoftheAdministrativeCounciltherehavebeennofurtherwithdrawal ofclaimsbythe governmentoftheRepublicofVenezuela.Con equently,theAdmini trativeCouncildecidedthatthelevelof paymentsremainat40percent.

TheVenezuelandelegationstatedthattheRepublicofVenezuelahaddecidedtowithdrawoneclaimofUS 60 million.Whentheclaimi withdrawn,thelevelofpaymentwillincreaetobetween50and60percent.

Nakhodka(1997)

TheRussiantanker Nakhodka (13,159grosstons)canying 19,000tonne ofmediumfueloilbrokeintwo ection duringaseverestormintheSeaofJapan.Some6,200tonne ofoilwas piliedcau ingheavycontaminationofthe shoreline.

Adecisionwasmadetopur uedi cu ion withtheJapaneeGovernmentandthe hipownerandhi in ureron outtandingclaimsandissue Also,toexplorethepo ibilitie ofreachingaglobal ettlementofallout tanding issues.

Pontoon 300 (1998)

Thebarge Pontoon 300 (4,233grosston ) ankinheavy eaofftheUnitedArabEmirate .Iti e timatedthat .000 tonnesofintermediatefueloilwerespilled.Theoil preadover40kilometre ofcoatline,affectingfourEmirate .

TheAdministrativeCouncilnotedthatapartfromanumberofclaim ubmittedbytheMunicipalityofUrnmal Quwain,someofwhichthe1971 IOPCFundcon ider inadmi ible,forexample,environmentaldamage andaclaim bytheMinistryofAgricultureandFi heries,allotherclaim hadbeen ettled.Withregardtotheenvironmental claims,theestimationofdamageappear tobebaedontheoreticalmodel thatarenotcon ideredadmi iblebythe FundConvention.Some75percentofthesettlementamount havebeenpaid.

The 1971 IOPCFundhastakenrecourseactionagainttheownerofthetug Falcon 1, whichwa towingthebarge Pontoon 300 whentheincidentoccurred.Thebargewa notcoveredbyanyin uranceforoilpollutionliability.

Singapura Timur(2001)

ThePanama-regi teredchemicaltanker Singapura Timur (1,369grosstons)carrying1,550tonsofasphaltcollided onMa 28,2001,withtheunladentanker Rowan intheStraitofMalacca,Malaysia.Laterthesamedaythe ingapura Timur sankin47metresofwater AnunknownquantityofbunkerfuelandasphaJtcargoescaped.The cargoownerorganizedclean-upoperationsatsea.Nooilwasreportedtohavegoneashore.

TheShipowner'slimitofliabilityis£90,000approximately.

SinceasphaJtispersistentoil,thechemicaltankerwasactuallycarryingoilinbulkascargoand,therefore,fellwithin thedefinitionof"ship"underthe1969CLCand1971IOPCFundConvention.TheAdministrativeCounciI authorized theDirectorto ettleallclaimstotheextentthattheydonotinvolveanyoutstandingquestionsofprinciple.

The (;fh Administrative Council -October 15 to 19, 2001

The6thsessionoftheAdministrativeCouncil,actingonbehalfofthe24'hsessionoftheAssemblywaschairedby CaptainR.MaJik(MaJaysia).TheAdministrativeCouncilreviewedthefollowing: Incidents involving the 1971 IOPC Fund

Aegean Sea(1992)

TheAdministrativeCounciltooknoteofdevelopmentssinceitsJune2001 sessioninrespectofthe Aegean Sea incident.AformaJofferhasbeenmadetotheSpanishGovemmenttoconcludeanagreementwiththe 1971 IOPC Fund,theSpanishState,theShipownerandtheUKClub,whichisopentoacceptanceuntilNovember30,2001.

TheSpa.ni hGovernmentacceptedthecondition setoutintheAgreement.TheSpani hdelegationadvisedthe Councilthatithopedthatclaimant ,inrepectofatleast90percentoftheprincipaJoftheclaimsincourt,would acceptthequantumoftheirlose asagreedaboveandwouldwithdrawtheirclaimsincourtbytheendofNovember 2001.

Braer(1993)

TheUnitedKingdomdelegationthankedtheDirectorandtheSkuldClubforreachingafinal olutiontothe Braer cae.A are ultaJIe tabli hedclaim cannowbepaidinfull.

Iti con ideredthatthe Broer incidentwa alandmarkcase.Itha resultedinanumberofimportantprecedentson theadmi ibilityofclaim,andha reconfirmedimportantobligationsintheConventiontotreatclaimantsequally.

Sea Prince(1995)

TheCypriottanker Sea Prince (144,567gro tons)groundedneartheRepublicofKorea.A are ult5,000tonnesof Arabiancrudeoilwere pilied.

InApril2001,anagreementwa reachedbetweenthe 1971 IOPCFundandthe hipowner'sinsurerontheappropriate exchangerateandtheappropriatecurrencytobeuedforcompen ationoverpaymentsandindemnification. Anapplicationha beenmadetothecomtforthediscontinuanceofthelimitationproceedings.TheAdministrative Councilwasadvisedthatthi caseisneartoclo ing.

Sea Empress(1996)

TheLiberiantanker Sea Empress (77,356gro ton )whichwa ladenwith 130,000tonnesofcrudeoilranagroundin theapproachestoMilfordHaven,SouthwestWales.Anestimated73,000tonnesofoilwerereleaseda aresultofthe incident.

Compensationtotalling£33millionha beenpaidto800claimants.Claimstotalling£7.2millionarecurrentlyincourt. InaccordancewiththeExecutiveCommittee' decision,the197J IOPCFundispreparingforrecourseactionagainst thelocalharbourandMilfordHavenPortAuthority,respectingsafenavigationwithinMilfordHavenand approache .

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

Pontoon 300(1998)

The1971 IOPCFundha maintainedincourtthatclaim bythemunicipalityof mmalQuwainhavebecometimebarred.Themunicipalityi expectedtore pondbyOctober200I.

TheDubaiCourtrenderedajudgementinwhichitrejectedthe1971 lOP Fund' claimagainsttheownerofthetug Falcon 1. The 1971 IOPCFundappealedagain tthejudgement.

NissosAmorgos(1997)

Technicalexpertsengagedbythe 1971 IOPCFundSecretariatareexaminingthedocumentationrecentlysubmittedon theconditionoftheMaracaiboChannelfornavigation.

TheAdministrativeCouncilreiteratedthatitsdeci iontakenduringthe5'h es iononthelevelofpayment hould bemaintained-thatis,40percentincreasingupto70percentdependingonthewithdrawaloffurtherclaims.

Singapura Timur(2001)

Itwasanticipatedthatclean-upco tswouldexceedthelimitationamountapplicabletothe hipunderthe1969CLC. Claimsforcompenationforpollutiondamagearisingfromthi incidentwouldbecoveredbythein urancetakenout bythe1971 IOPCFundinOctober2000,totheextentthatthetotale tabli hedclaim exceed250,000SDR( 500,000 approximately).

Evoikos(1997)

TheCypriottanker Evoikos (80,823gros tons)collidedwiththeThaitanker Orapin Global (138,037gro ton )in theStraitofSingaporein1997.The Evoikos, cruTying130,000tonne ofheavyfueloil, piliedapproximately29,000 tonnesofoil.The Orapin Global wasinballa tanddidnot pillanyoil.

Claim havebeenpre entedinSingapore.Malay iaandlndone ia. tthetimeoftheincident ingaporewa Partyto the1969CLConly,whereasMalaysiaandIndonesiawerePartie tothe1969CLCandthe1971 IOPCFund Convention,butnottothe 1992Protocolsthereto.

Theshipownerandthe UK Clubhaveindicatedthattheymightmaintainthatclean-upoperation in ingaporewere undertaken(inpart)tominimizepollutiondamageinMalay iaorIndone ia,andthatthecot thereforequalifyfor compensationunderthe 1971 IOPCFundConvention.

TheDirectorwasnotauthorizedtomakeanypaymentofclaim forthetimebeing.

Other Incidents

TheDirectorinformedtheAdministrativeCouncilthattheSecretariatwouldworkhardtocloetheelevenother1971 IOPCFundincidentsthatremainoutstanding.The eare Vistabella, Lliad, Kriti Sea, Plate Princess, Maritz.a Sayalero, Yeo Myung, Yuil N°l, Osung N°3, Katja, Keumdong N°5 and 01 Yung lung.

Report of the Director

TheDirectorintroducedhisreportonsomeofthemaini uesrelatingtotheactivitie ofthe1971 IOPCFundduring thelast 12months.

Looking Ahead

Itwasnotedthatthe1971IOPCFundConventionwillceasetobeinforceonMay24,2002,ru1dwillnotapplyto incidentsoccurringafterthatdate.TheSecretariatwillfocusitseffort onsettlingallpendingclaim before compensation,soastomakeitpossibletowindupthe 1971 IOPCFundwithinareaonablepetiodoftime.Iti a priorityfortheSecretru·iattoencouragetheState thatare tillMembersofthe 1971IOPCFundtoaccedetothe1992 IOPCFundConvention.

Winding up of the 1971 Fund

In manceco erforthe1971IOPCFund'sliabilityforincidentshasbeenextendeduptoOctober31,2002. Whenthe semblyorAdmini trativeCouncilmeetinOctober2002,itwillbeclearwhichincidentswillinvolvethe 1971IOPCFund.Meanwhile,theCouncilagreedtomaintainajointSecretariatforthe1971IOPCFundandthe1992 IOPCFund.AI o,itdecidedtopostponefurtherconsiderationoftheappointmentof"aneminentperson"tooversee thewindingupofthe1971 IOPCFund.

Financial Statements and Auditor's Report

TheAuditor'sReportplacedanunqualifiedauditopiniononthe2000financialstatements.Theauditor'spreviously expre eduncettaintyforthefinancialviabilityofthe1971 IOPCFundhasbeenremoved,becausetheFundisnow inw-edagainstfutmeincidentswithLloyd'sofLondon.Also,theauditorapprovedthenewwebsiteandwelcomes thepotentialefficiencysavingsbyelectronicallydistributingdocumentstoFundContractingStates.

Thetotalclaimpaymentsin2002amountedto£21.2million.Cashatbanksandonhandstoodat£103.8million. Therearecontingentliabilitiesofthe1971IOPCFundestimatedat£197,019,627regarding18incidentsasat December31,2000.Alltheseclaimsmaynotnecessarilymatme.

Budget for 2002 and Assessment of Contributions to the General Fund

TheAdministrativeCounciladoptedabudgetfor2002foradministrativeexpensesforthejointSecretariat,witha totalof£2,816,603plusanadditionalamountof£250,000forwindingupthe1971IOPCFund.TheAdministrative Councilfixedalevyofcontribution fortheGeneralFundat£3.2million.Itwasdecidedtodefertheentirelevy. Workingcapitalwasmaintainedat£5million.

Assessment of Contributions to Major Claims Fund

TheAdministrativeCouncildecidedthatalevyintheformof2001 annualcontributionsshouldbemadeonlytothe NissosAmorgos MajorClaim Fundintheamountof£21million(normallydueonMarch1,2002).

ote:TheCanadian hareofthi £21 million,totheextentinvoiced, hallbepaidfromtheSOPF.

Organization of Meetings

TheAdministrativeCouncildecidedthat,exceptforre tricteddocuments,accesstodocumentsontheservershould beunretricted.Al o,thatdocument houldbeacces edviatheIOPCFund' Websiteandnot,asatpresent,viaa eparate addre .

IOPC Fund's Web Site

TheIOPCFund' Internetaddre is: www.iopcfund.org

Appendix C: The 1992 IOPC Fund - Executive Committee and Assembly Sessions

The1992IOPCFundExecutiveCommitteeheldthreesessionsduringtheyear.The13th,14thand15thsessionswereheld underthechait111anshipofMrGauteSive1tsen(Norway).

The6th e ionoftheAssemblywasheldunderthechairman hipofMr. W. Oosterveen(Netherlands).

The 1:Jih Executive Committee -June 25 and June 28, 2001

Incidents involving the 1992 IOPC Fund

Baltic Carrier(2001)

TheMarshallIslands-registeredtanker Baltic Carrier (23,235grosstons)canying30,000tonnesofheavyfueloil collidedwiththebulkcarrierTern,onMarch29,2001,intheBalticSeabetweenDenmarkandGermany.ThecoJJision reultedinthe pillageof2,500tonnesofoil,whichpollutedtheshorelineofseveralDanishislandsandthe outhwestcoastofSweden.

TheExecutiveCommitteeauthori edtheDirectortomakefinalsettlementofallclaimsforpollutiondamageinSweden andDenmarkfromthe Baltic Carrier incident,totheextentthattheclaimsdidnotgiverisetoquestionsofprinciple whichhave notpreviouslybeendecided.

A aresultofthecollision,about230tonne of Baltic Carrier oilcargoenteredthedamageforepeaktankofthe Tern.Sub equently,thereweresmalloilspill fromtheTernwhileintheportsofRostock(Germany)andVentspills (Latvia).

Withregardtotheapplicabilityofthe1992ConventionstopoiJutiondamageinRostockandVentspills,theExecutive CommitteenotedthattheTernwasabulkcarrierandwasthereforenota"ship"forthepurposeofthe1992Civilliability Convention.Further,itwasdecidedthatadeci iononthequetionofwhethertheConventionsapplytothespillsin RostockandVentspill houldbedeferredtothenext e ion.Meanwhile,theDirectorwillcaiTyoutfurtherinvestigation intothepreciechainofevent thatledtothe pill .

Zeinab(2001)

TheGeorgian-regi teredve el Zeinab, carryingabout1,500tonnesoffueloil, ankoffDubai,UnitedArabEmirates, re ultinginthelo of400tonne offueloilandthe ub equentpollutionofthecoatalarea

The Zeinab wa u pectedof mugglingoilfromIraqandhadbeenarre tedbythemulti-nationalinterceptionforces. The hip ankwhilebeinge cortedtoaholdingareaininternationalwater .

Apparently,the Zeinab wa builtin 1967a ageneralcargo hipandconvertedin 1998tocarryoilbyinstallingtanks withinthecargohold ,butmaintainedtheoutwardappearanceofageneralcargovessel. Sincethe Zeinab wa carryingoilinbulka cargo,theExecutiveCommitteeconsideredthatthe hipfellwithinthe definition of" hip".TheCommitteeal odecidedthat incetheUnitedArabEmirate isaPartytothe 1969/1971 Convention andthe 1992Convention ,both et ofConvention applytotheincidentandliabilitiesshouldbe di tributedona50:50ba i .

TheExecutiveCommitteedecidedthat,inviewofexpre sedreervationsaboutthecircumstancesurroundingthe incident,thematter houldbegivenfurthercon iderationattheCommittee' next ession.

Erika(1999)

TheMaltesetanker Erika (19,666gros ton )brokeintwointheBayofBi cay,France,onDecember12, 1999.The tankerwa carryingacargoof31,000tonnesofheavyfueloil.Approximately19,800tonne ofoilwerespilledasthe hipsank.

AsatJune20,2001,therewere4,960claimstotalling£71million.Some3,L93claimstotalling£31millionhadbeen a sessedat£19million.

hip-source Oil Pollution Fund

The anadian Delegationexpresedit upportforsellingthelevelofpaymentsat80percent. Jt�tatedthat1twa<, abletosupport80percentbecau eoftheprudentapproachtakenbytheDirectorinarrivingat£13J milliona<;bemg thee tabli hedtotalofadmi sibleclaim .Forexample,inreponsetoquestionsfromtheDelegation,theDirector advi ed that:

•

"Pureeconomiclo "isthei suewheretheFrenchcoUJt mightadoptamoreexten iveapproachintheir interpretationofthenotionof"pollutiondamage".

Thi issuewouldmainlyhaveimportanceintouri mandinthemarketingoffi h.

Con equently,theJune2001 study' e timateof£47millionfortouri mclaimsneed revision.TheDirector' e timatewouldbe£66million�ageneralextrasafetymarginofanother£18.8million.

TheDelegationnotedthattheJune2001 tudy "ha beenabletomake,forthefirttime,apracticalestimateofthe likelyleveloftourismclaims.Whereasinpreviousstudies[bythe arneMini try],theobjectivewastoe timatea theoreticalmaximumlevelofexposure,theJune2001report,withthebenefitofrealdata upplieddirectlybytouri m busines es,provideswithgreaterconfidenceapracticale timateofthelikelyvalueofthetouri mclaim ."Inthe Mini try' previou tudiestherehadremainedahighlevelofuncertaintyregardingthelevelofpo ibleJo e in certaintourism ector .

TheDirectoracknowledgedtheCanadianDelegation' a i tanceinprovidingthe 1992IOPCFundwithaMazar et Guerardreport.

The Third lntersessional Working Group (Third Meeting)

Thethirdmeetingofthethirdintere ionalWorkingGroupwa heldfromJune26toJune29,2001.TheWorking Groupcontinuedanexchangeofviewsconcerningtheneedtoreviewtheinternationalcompen ationregime.

Someoftheis ue undercon iderationbytheWorkinggroupinclude:

Uniform Application of the Conventions

TheWorkingGroupdealtwithce1tainprovi ion intheConventionthatinthepa tha enotbeenappliedina uniformmanner,ordifficultie haveari ena are ultoftherelation hipbetweentheConvention andnationalJaw, nan1elychannelingofliability,timebar,enforcementofjudgment andjuri diction.

Maximum Compensation Levels

Therewasgeneralsupportofthepropoalbyanumberofdelegation -includingCanada-toe tabli ha supplementarycompen ationfundtothepre entcompen ationregime.Thi thirdtier,a an"opt-in"mea ure,would beestabli hedbyaProtocoltothepreentConvention .TheJapaneeDelegation,thelarge tcontributing tate, questions the propo al

TheOilCompanie InternationalMarineForum(OCIMF)recognize thepo ibilityofatran itionaloptional"opt-in" thirdtierfundedbyoilreceiver,butemphaize thatiti e entialtomaintaintheprincipleofbalancing ri kbetween hipownersandcargointerest,whichi thefoundationofthecurrentregime WhileOCIMFbelieve theremaybe copeforaninterimsolution,itexpect theA emblytocommittoworkingtoward a olutionthatwouldgi e hipowner andtheirinsurersasignificantstakeinthe upplementarycompen ationfund.

TheInternationalGroupofP&IClubsprovided tati tic onoilpollutionclaim o erthelast10year toreinforce theirargumentthat"sharing"hasworkedquitewellinthepa t,andthat hipowner actuallypaymorethan50per centoftheclaims.

TheInternationalGroup,whichcoversover90percentoftheworld' tanker , upport theincreaeinthelevelsof compensationunderthe1992CLCProtocols.Thenewlevel willcomeintoeffectin ovember2003andincreasethe shipowner'sproportionby50percent.

TheInternationalGroupisalsodevelopingaproposalforavoluntaryincreaseinthelimitofliabilityfor mall hip (i.e.lessthan5,000grosston )thatwouldapplyinthoe tateswhichoptforthepropoedthirdtierof compensation.TheClubBoardshaveyettoapproveapreci elevelofincreae.Thepropo ali eena a hortto mediumtermanangement,tohelpmaintainabalancebetween hipownerandcargointere t.Iti basedonthe assumptionthattheexistingregimeofliabilitywouldremainlargelyunchanged.

Shipowner Liability

di u ionpaperonoptionsfordevelopmentofanoptionalthirdtierlevelofcompensationco-sponsoredby Canada, ust:ralia,FranceandtheUnitedKingdomwasconsidered.Theseco-sponsorsadvocatethatthereisa trongcaefor hruingthisliabilitybetweenshipownersandoilreceivers.

Intheproce ofru·guingthattheyalreadypaytheirshareplussome,theP&IClubspresentedinterestingstatistics fromit historicaltankerspillco tdatabase,includingthefollowing: •

Over95percentofallnon-USspillsduringtheperiod1990to1999wouldhavebeenfullycompensatedby tankerownersunderthetermsofthe1992CLC.

Approximately96percentofnon-USspillswouldhavebeenfullycompensatedbytankerownersunderthe increased1992CLClimitseffectivein2003.

Thecost ofallUStankerandbargespills(actualandinflatedvalues)sincetheenactmentof OPA 90andup totheendof1999wouldhavefallenwithintheexisting1992CLCandIOPCfundlimits.

Environmental Damage

TheFrenchDelegationsubmittedasignificantpaperprepru·edbyaconsultant,ProfessorPiquemal,onseveral apect oftheconceptofenvironmentaldamage.Itwasaproposaltointroducetheconceptofcompensationfor environmentaldamageasaviolationofcollectivepropertywherebycompen ationwouldbeavailabletotheStateon thebasi ofinternationalright underotherConventionstowhichitwasaPruty,theamountofthecompensationto bebaedontheconclu ion ofenvironmentalimpactstudiesconductedinaccordancewithproceduresadoptedby the 1992Fund.TheWorkingGroupal oexaminedaproposaltochangethe1992Fund'spolicyasregardsto environmentaldamagetotheeffectthatcompensationforenvironmentaldamagewouldnolongerbelimitedtocase wheretheclaimanthad ufferedeconomiclo sandtoallowcompensationtobecalculatedthroughtheoretical model

Swedenpropo estodevelopapaperonenvironmentaldamageforcon iderationbytheAssemblyinOctober.Atthe ugge tionofFrance,ITOPFmayal opresentapaperonreasonablere-instatementmeasuresthatenhancethe recoveryofnaturalreources.

Followinguponthi tudy,theFrenchDelegationproposedcertainchangestotheIOPCFundClaimsManual highlightingthe pecificnatureofenvironmentaldamage ,andofclaim forcompensationforthistypeofdamage undertheConvention.Firt,itwa propoedtodeletetherequirementwherebyaclaimantinordertosucceedwitha claimforenvironmentaldamagemu t howthattheyhave u tainedaneconomiclossthatcanbequantifiedin monetaryterm .Secondly,itwa propoedtoremovepa age intheManualsuggestingtheassessmentof environmentaldamage houldnotbebaedon"abstractquantification calculatedinaccordancewiththeoretical models".The epropoedmodification totheclaim manualwererejectedbytheWorkingGroup.

The frh Session of the Assembly - October 16 to 19, 2001

Report of the Director

In ummary,theDirectorreportedthatthenumberof1992IOPCFundContractingState hascontinuedtoincrease. ThefailureofanumberofContractingStatesto ubmitoilreport give ri etoconcern.SincetheAssembly's e ioninOctober2000the1992IOPCFundhasbeennotifiedoftwonewoilpollutionincidents:the Baltic Carrier (Denmark)andthe Zeinab (UnitedArabEmirate ).Theinterse ionalWorkingGrouphascontinueditswork.The A emblywillbeinvitedtocon ideradraftProtocole tablishinganoptionalsupplementarycompensationfund.

The Regulation Proposed by the European Commission for the COPE Fund

OnJune14,2001,thepropoedregulationwa consideredbytheEuropeanParliament.TheParliamentproposeda numberofamendmentstotheregulation,including:

(i) TheCOPEFund houldcovernotonlyoilpollutiondamage(includingbunker)butalsodamagecausedby hazardousandnoxiou sub tances.

(il) Compen ationfordamagecau edtotheenvironmentwhenenvironmentalcostsarenotcoveredbythe internationalregime.

(ill) Higherlimit ofcompensationtobepaidbytheshipownerwherethecostofpollutiondamageexceedsthe exi tinglimitsundertheinternationalregime.

Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

(iv) tabli hmentofanadditional layerofcompen ationfundedbythecargoreceiver. ofoilorhazardousand noxioussubstances,beyondexi ting IOPCFundlimitsa upplementedbytheshipownerscontribution in (iii)above.

(v) TheEuropeanCommissiontosubmitarep01ttoParliamentbyJune2003ontheeffortstoimprovethe internationalregimeatIMOregardingliability,compen ationandenvironmentaldamage.

(vi) Theadaptationoftheregulationshouldtakeintoaccountany ub tantial improvementtotheinternational regime.

Ifthereareno ubstantialimprovementsatIMO,theEuropeanCommi ioni to ubmittotheEuropeanParliament andtheEuropeanCouncilalegislativeproposaltoestabli haEurope-widemaritimepollutionliabilityand compensationregime.

TheDirectorwasinstructedtocontinuetoprovideinformationtotheA emblyonthepropoedRegulation.Hewa al ointructedtoprovidefactualinformationtothebodie oftheEuropeanUnionontheinternationalcompen ation regime,soastoenablethosebodiestoensurethatEUmeaure wouldnotbedetrimentaltotheglobal compensation ystem.

Financial Statements and Auditor's Report and Opinion

Theinternalauditorprovidedanunqualifiedauditopiniononthefinancial tatement for2000.TheA embly approved the accounts.

In2000,theadministrativeexpenditureforrunningthejointSecretariatwa £2,424,039.Theobligation incurredwere splitbetweenthe1992IOPCFundandthe1971 IOPCFund.

Thetotalexpendituresforclaimpaymentin2000amountedtoapproximately£30million,andwerelargelyinrepect ofthe Nakhodka incident.

Note:TheSOPFisliabletopaycontributionsre pectingthe Nakhodka inthe 1971 IOPCFundonly.

Contingent Liabilities

Therewerecontingentliabilitie ofthe1992IOPCFunde timatedat£172.5millioninrepectofeightincidentsa at December31,2000.Outofthe econtingentliabilitie atotalamountof£15.9millionha beenliquidatedasatMay31, 2001,mainlytopaycompensationinthe akhodkaincident.

Note:TheSOPFwillbeliabletopaytheCanadian hareoftheremainingamountwhenandifitmature

Budget for 2002 and Assessment of Contributions to the General Fund

TheA emblyapprovedtheDirector' propoaltoincreaetheworkingcapitalofthe 1992Fund' admini trative budgetfrom£18millionto£20million.TheA emblyal odecidedtole ycontribution fortheGeneralFundat£5 million.

Note:TheCanadianshareshallbepaidbytheSOPF.

Assessment of Contributions to the Major Claims Fund

TheAssemblydecidedthatleviesintheformof2001 contribution houldbemadetothe akhodka MajorClaim Fundfor£11millionandtothe Erika MajorClaim Fundfor£46million.

TheAssemblydecidedthattheentirepropoedlevyof£11 milliontothe Nakhodka MajorClaim Fund houldbe dueforpaymentbyMarch 1,2002.Itwa alsodecidedthat£25millionofthepropoedlevytothe Erika Major ClaimsFundshouldbedueforpaymentbyMarch1,2002,butpaymentoftheremaining£21 millionshouldbe deferred.

Note:AllCanadiancontributionsforthe Erika shallbepaidoutoftheSOPF.Canadai notliableforthe Nakhodka incidentinthe1992IOPCFund.

Audit Procedures

TheAssemblyapprovedinprincipletheestablishmentofanauditbodytoadvi ethe1992IOPCFundregarding internalcontrol,riskmanagementandaudit-relatedmatters.

The dmini t:rativeCouncildidlikewiseforthe1971 Fund.Thecompo itionandmandateofthisjointAuditBody hall becon ideredatthe embly'snext ession.TheDelegationsupportedthis initiativeasanotherstepin tran parency.

Non-submission of Oil Reports

ome 33 Stateshaveoutstandingoilreportsfortheyear2000:30Statesinrespectofthe 1971 Fundand 13Statesin respectofthe 1992Fund.Somehavebeenoutstandingformanyyears.Itwasnotedthatthesituationrespectingthe 1992FundwaslikelytodeteriorateasStateswithoutstandingreportsforthe1971Fundbecame1992Fundmembers.

TheCanadianDelegationexpresseditsconcernwiththefactthatoilreportsareoutstandinginrespectofthreequartersoftheremainingContractingStatesofthe 1971 Fundandthatanumberofthe 1992FundStateshavereports out tandinginrespectofmorethanoneyear.

Working Methods and Structures of the Secretariat

TheAssemblydecided, inter alia, toapprovetheestablishmentofanetworkofpersonsinvariousregionsandsubregionsascontactpoints,andtheseparationofrolesofTechnicalAdvisorandheadofClaims.TheAssembly instructedtheDirectortoappointoneofthepresentstaffwithwideexperienceandskillinthefield,asDeputy Director.TheDelegationsupportedthesechanges.

Hazardous and Noxious Substances

ote:SeeI suesandChallenges(section4.4.4).

Report of the Third lntersessional Working Group

TheChairmanoftheWorkingGroup,Mr.AlfredPopp,Q.C.(Canada)introducedtherep01toftheWorkingGroup.

TheWorkingGrouphadmetinJuly2000,March2001andJune2001.TheAssemblyproceededtoconsidertherep01t withafocu onkeyissue :

Draft Protocol Establishing a Supplementary Compensation Fund

Withregardtobeingmoreprecieaboutthetimeandcircumstance ofpaymentsofclaimstheAssemblyconsidered twooption Fir t,the upplementaryfundwouldonlymakepayment whenitwasestablishedthatthetotal availableforcompensationunderthe 1992Conventionswasin ufficienttomeetalltheestablishedclaimsinfull. Second,the upplementaryfund hould tartitspaymentswhenthe 1992Fundhadconsideredthattherewasarisk thatthetotalamountofthee tabli hedclaim wouldexceedthemaximumamountavailableinthe1992Fund Convention

Itwa agreedthatthe econdoptionwa preferable,andthi provisionwasreflectedinthedraftProtocol.

TheA emblyadoptedthedraftProtocol,a etoutintheRecordofDecision,andinstructedtheDirectortosendit totheSecretary-GeneralofIMOreque tinghimtoconveneaDiplomaticConferencetoconiderthenewProtocolat theearlie topportunity.

Environmental Damage and Environmental Studies

TheA emblynotedthattheWorkingGrouphadexaminedwhatcouldbeachievedwithinthepresentdefinitionof "pollutiondamage",withrepecttotheadmi ibilityofclaim forcostsofre-instatementoftheenvironmentandfor claim forcot ofpo t-spillenvironmentaldamageassessment.

Aproposaltoaddressthesei ue inanAs emblyRe olutionreceivedconsiderablesupport.There wasalso upportforconsideringtheis ueofenvironmentaldamagein-depthforthelongerterm.Inthemeantime,Swedenhad preparedapaperdealingwiththemeasure ofre-instatementandpo t- pillenvironmentaldamageassessments. Somedelegationsfeltthesepropo al didnotgofarenough,whileothersexpressedreervationstothecontrary. It wa decidedthattheWorkingGroup houldgivethei suefurtherconsiderationsothattheAssemblycouldmakea deci ionatit next ession.

hip- ource Oil Pollution Fund

Resolution relating to OPRC 1990 and OPRC (HNS) 2000

TheAs.emblycon ideredadocumentsubmittedbytheUnitedKingdomDelegationregardingtheimportanceofmarine pollutioncontingencyplanningandaproposedResolutionencouragingContracting tatestothe l992 onventionsto becomepartiestotheInternationalConventiononOilPollutionPreparednes ,Responeand a-operation(OPR Convention 1990)andtheProtocolonPreparedne ,ReponseandCo-operationtoPollutionIncidentsbyHazardous andNoxiou Substances(OPRC(HNS)Protoco12000).

Itwa notedthatinthedocumenttheUnitedKingdomDelegationexpre edtheviewthatitwasimperativethat effectivemea ure wereinplacetodealwithmajorincident , incethiswa inthebe tinterest ofContracting State andtheircontributorsa wellasthe hippingandin uranceindutries.Itwaspropoedbythe nited KingdomDelegationthatonewayofencouragingthismightbeforState Partie tothe 1992Convention toratify theOPRCConvention1990andtheOPRC(I-INS)Protocol2000.

Itwa notedthattheOPRCConvention1990providedaframeworkforinternationalco-operationforcombatingmajoroil spillsandincludedrequirementsforship,port andoilhandlingfacilitie tohaveoilpollutionemergencyplan .

TheAssemblyadoptedtheResolutiononthi subject etoutinAnnexII.TheRe olutioni containedinAppendixG.

The Future of the Working Group

TheAssemblyagreedthattheWorkingGroup houldcontinuetoexchangeview onfurtherimprovementtothe 1992regime,sucha :

hipowner'sliability; environmentaldamage; alternativedi pute ettlement procedure ; non-submi ionofoilreport ; clarificationofthedefinitionof hip; applicationofthecontribution yteminrepectofentitie providing torage ervice ; uniformityofapplicationottheConvention ; variousissuesofatreatylawnature.

The 141h Executive Committee -October 15, 16 and 19, 2001 Incidents involving the 1992 IOPC Fund Kuzbass(1996)

InJune 1996,theRu iantanker Kuzbass (88,692gro ton )wa upectedofdi chargingcrudeoilthatpolluted theGermancoatlineclosetotheborderwithDenmarkandthe orthSea.

AccordingtotheGermanauthorities,analy i oftheoil ample takenfromthe Ku::.bass matchedthe ample taken fromthepollutedcoastline.Theshipownerandthein urerdeniedanyrepon ibilityforthe pill.Subequently,the Germanauthoritiescommencedlegalactionagain tthe hipowner.

Thiscaseraisesanimportantquestionofprinciple, inceunderArticle4.1 (6)ofthe 1992FundConventionclaimant hadtotakeallreasonablestepstopursuethelegalremedie availabletothembeforeobtainingcompen ationfrom the1992IOPCFund.

TheExecutiveCommitteeagreedthattheliabilityissueswillhavetobedecidedbytheGermancourt .

Nakhodka(1997)

AfurtherclaimhasbeensettledsincetheJune2001 ession Di cu sion arebeingheldastothepossibilityofa globalsolutiontoalloutstandingissuesamongtheparties,includingthoserelatingtorecourseaction.TheJapane e Delegationstressedthe needforopennessandtransparencyrespectinganyglobal olution

Note:CanadiancontributionswerepaidfromtheSOPFinthe1971IOPCFundonly.

Erika(1999)

TheExecuti eCommitteedecidedtomaintainthelevelofpayments-nowat80percentoftheassessedamount.As atOctober11,2001,approximately73percentofallclaimshadbeenassessed.Paymentsof£15millionweremadein respectof2,857claims.

TheCommitteenotedreportsbytheMaltaMmitimeAuthority(FlagStateoftheErika)andtheFrenchPermanent Commi sionofInquiryintoAccidentsatSeaontheirrespectivefindingsreferencethecauseoftheincident. Althoughthefindingsofthetwoinvestigationsdifferinsomedetails,bothbodiesconcludethatacontributing factortotheincidentwasseverecorrosionofstructuralpartsofthevessel.

InresponsetoaquerybytheCanadianDelegationitwasnotedthattheMaltaMaritimeAuthorityreportdidnot confirmtheFrenchCommission'sconclusionthatthespeedandcoursesfollowedbytheshiphadnotbeendecisive factorsinthecauseofthedisaster.

TheDirectoradvisedthatheconsidereditprematuretodrawanyconclusionsinviewofthefactthattherewereboth criminalandcivilinvestigationsbeingcmTiedoutinFranceintothecauseoftheincident.

TheDelegationjoinedtheCommitteeinexpressingitsgratitudetotheLorient,Franceclaimsofficeheadandstaff workingsometimesunderdifficultcircumstancesandnotedthatphysicalsecurityforthesepersonsisnecessary.

Baltic Carrier(2001)

TheExecutiveCommitteenotedthatthecostsfortheclean-upinRostockwereinsignificantandtheGerman authoritieswouldnotpresentanyclaimforcompensation.Therefore,thequestionofwhetherthespillofBaltic CarrieroilfromtheTerninRostockwascoveredbythe1992IOPCConventionswasacademic.

TheDirectorcontinue hisinvestigationintothespillof Baltic Carrier oilfromtheTerninVentspills.Thequestion ofapplicabilitytothe1992Conventionsinthisincidentmayalsobecomeacademic.

Zeinab(2001)

TheExecutiveCommitteewasaskedtoconsiderwhetherthecircumstancesthatledtothesinking-duringthe interceptionbythemultinationalmm·itimeinterceptionforces-shouldbeconsideredasanactofwarorhostilities.

ItwasnotedthattheFund'stechnicalexperthadbeenincontactwiththeUnitedStatesNavyMaritimeLiaisonOffice inBahrain. oinformationhadbeenprovidedregardingthesequenceofeventsleadinguptothesinkingofthe Zeinab.

TheCanadianDelegationexpresedtheviewthattheinterceptionbythemulti-nationalmm·itimeinterventionforces couldnotbecon idereda "anactofwar,hostilitie ,civilwarorinsurrection",andtheIOPCFund wouldnotbe abletoinvokethedefeneprovidedinAlticle4.2(a).TheCommittee odecided.

TheDelegationnotedthatwe tilldon'tknowwhatcau edthe"destabilization"ofZeinabthatledtoitssinking,and allthatcanbesaidnowi thatthelo occurredupontheinterceptionanddetention,butnotbecauseofsuch interceptionanddetention.TheDelegationsupportedauthorizingtheDirectortomakefinalsettlementsonbehalfof the 1992Fundofallclaim ari ingoutoftheZeinabincidenttotheextentthattheclaimsdonotgiveriseto que tion ofprinciplewhichhavenotpreviouslybeendecided.TheCommitteesodecided.

Other Incidents

TheExecutiveCommitteedealtwithfiveotherincidentsthattookplacebeforethe13'hsession,namelythe Al Jaziah 1, Natuna Sea, Slops, Mary Anne and Dolly.

The 1Sfh Executive Committee - October 19, 2001

TheExecutiveCommitteeelectedMr.G.Sivertsen(Norway)asChai1manandDr.J.Cowley(Vanuatu)asViceChairmanuntiltheendofthenextregularsessionoftheAssembly,whichwillbeheldduringtheweekofOctober14, 2002.

Appendix D: Changes Introduced by the1992 Protocols

A peciallimitofliabilityforownersofsmallvesselsandasubstantialincreaseinthelimitationamount.The limitisapproximately$6.00millionforashipnotexceeding5,000unitsofgrosstonnage,increasingona linear caletoapproximately$119.50millionforshipsof140,000unitsoftonnageorover,usingthevalueof theSDRatApril1,2002.

An increaseinthemaximumcompensationpayablebythe1992IOPCFundto$270.22million,includingthe compensationpayablebytheshipownerunderthe1992CLCuptoitslimitofliability.

AsimplifiedprocedureforincreasingthelimitationamountsinthetwoConventionsbymajoritydecision takenbytheContractingStatestotheConventions.

AnextendedgeographicalscopeofapplicationoftheConventionstoincludetheexclusiveeconomiczone orequivalentareaofaContractingState.

Pollutiondamagecausedbyspillsofbunkeroilandbycargoresiduesfromunladentankersonanyvoyage aftercarryingacargoarecovered.

ExpensesincurredforpreventativemeasuresarerecoverableevenwhennospiJIofoiloccurs,providedthat therewasagraveandimminentdangerofpoJiutiondamage.

Anewdefinitionofpollutiondamageretainingthebasicwordingofthe1969CLCand1971 IOPCFund Conventionwiththeadditionofaphrasetoclarifythat,forenvironmentaldamage,onlycostincunedfor reasonablemeasuresactuallyundertakentorestorethecontaminatedenvironmentareincludedinthe conceptofpollutiondamage.

Underthe1969CLCthe hipownercannotlimitliabilityiftheincidentoccunedasaresultoftheowner's actualfaultorprivity.Underthe1992CLC,however,the hipownerisdeptivedofthisrightonlyifitis provedthatthepollutiondamagereultedfromtheshipowner'spersonalactofomission,committedwith theintenttocaue uchdamageorreckle slyandwithknowledgethatsuchdamagewouldprobablyresult.

Claim forpollutiondamageundertheCLCcanbemadeonlyagainsttheregisteredowneroftheship concerned.Thi doe notprecludevictimsfromclaimingcompensationoutsidetheCLCfrompersonsother thantheowner However,the 1969CLCprohibit claimsagain ttheservantsoragentsoftheowner The 1992CLCdoe the arne,butalsoprohibit claimsagainstthepilot,thecharter (includingabareboat charter),manageroroperatorofthe hip,oranyperoncanyingout alvageoperationsortakingpreventive mea ure

Current Limits of Liability and Compensation for Oil Tanker Spills in Canada

Based on the value of the SDR!1l at April 1, 2002

SOPF $406.504 million

(includes amounts available under 1992 IOPC Fund and 1992 CLC)

1992 IOPC Fund $270.223 million (include amount available under the 1992 CLC)

1992 CLC $1 19.498 million Plu $840.69 for each additional ton from 5,000 to 140,000

O>The value of the SDR at April I, 2002, was approximately 2.00165. Thi acrual value i reflected in Figure 1 above and in Appendix D. Elsewhere in the report, for convenience, calculations are based on the SDR having a nominal value of $2.

Figure1showsthecurrentlimitsofliabilityandcompensationavailableunderthe1992CLC,the1992IOPCFundConvention,andtheSOPFforoilspillsfromoiltankersinCanada,includingtheterritorialseaandtheexclu iveeconomiczone. BecauseoftheSOPF,CanadahastheextracoveroverandabovethatavailableundertheinternationalConventions.

Revision

N.B.:Theaboveaggregateamountavailableunderthe1992CLCand1992IOPCFund($270.223million)shouldincreaseby approximately50%(to405.33million)effectiveNovember1,2003.TheSOPFamountofapproximately$136.28millionontop ofthat,wouldresultin$541.61millionbeingavailableforatankerspiUinCanadaafterNovember1,2003-withoutreferenceto theproposedIOPC"optional"SupplementaryFund.

Appendix E:

Contracting States to both the 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Protocol to the IOPC Fund Convention as at 15 April 2002

64 States for which Fund Protocol is in Force (and therefore Contracting States ofthe 1992 IOPC Fund)

Algeria Ge1many

Antiguaand Barbuda

Argentina

Australia

Greece

Grenada

Iceland

Bahamas India

Bahrain

Barbado

Belgium

Belize

Canada

Ireland

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Kenya

China(HongKongSpecial Latvia

Admini trativeRegion)

Comoros

Croatia

Liberia

Lithuania

Malta

Cypru Marshall Islands

Denmark Mauritiu

Oman

Panama

PapuaNewGuinea

Philippines

Poland

RepublicofKorea

Russian Federation

Seychelles

Singapore

Slovenia

Spain

SriLanka

Sweden

Tonga

TrinidadandTobago

Tunisia

Djibouti Mexico UnitedArabEmirates

DominicanRepublic

Ftii

Monaco

Morocco

Finland etherland

France ewZealand

Georgia orway

UnitedKingdom

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela

12 States that have deposited Instruments ofAccession, but for which the IOPC Fund Protocol does not enter into force until date indicated

SierraLeone

Cambodia

Turkey

Dominica

Angola

SaintVincentandtheGrenadines

Cameroon

Portugal

Colombia

Qatar

BruneiDaru salam Samoa

Contracting States to both the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 IOPC Fund Convention as at 15 April 2002

(and therefore Contracting States to the 1971 IOPC Fund)

24 Contracting States to the 1971 IOPC Fund Convention

Albania Gambia Nigeria

Benin Ghana Portugal

BruneiDarussalam

Cameroon

Colwnbia

Coted'1voire

E tonia

Gabon

Guyana

Qatar

Kuwait SaintKittsandNevis

Malaysia SierraLeone

Maldives

Mauritania

SyrianArabRepublic

Tuvalu

Mozambique Yugoslavia

2 Contracting States to the 1971 Fund Convention which have deposited InstrumentsofDenunciation which will take effect on date indicated

Appendix G: 2000 OPRC (HNS) Protocol

ANNEXll

DRAFTRESOLUTIONONTHEINTERNATIONALCONVENTIONONOll..POLLUTION PREPAREDNESS,RESPONSEANDCO-OPERATION(OPRC)1990ANDTHEPROTOCOLON PREPAREDNESS,RESPONSEANDCO-OPERATIONTOPOLLUTIONINCIDENTSBY HAZARDOUSANDNOXIOUSSUBSTANCES,2000OPRC(HNS)PROTOCOL

THEASSEMBLYOFTHEINTERNATIO ALOll..POLLUTIONCOMPENSATIONFUND1992, OTINGthattheInternationalConventiononOilPollutionPreparedness,ResponseandCo-operation 1990 ("OPRC")cameintoforcein 1995,andthat59StateshaveratifiedoraccededtotheConvention,

ALSO OTINGthattheProtocolonPreparedness,ResponseandCo-operationtoPollutionIncidentsbyHazardous and oxiousSubstances,2000OPRC(HNS)Protocolwillnotcomeintoforceuntil 12monthsafterratificationbynot le sthan 15States,

OTINGFURTHERthatnoState areyetprutytothe2000OPRC(HNS)Protocol, RECOGNIZINGtheneedfor orneStatestoidentifyexistingresourcesthatcouldformpartoftheresourcesneeded toimplementthe1990OPRCand2000OPRC(HNS)Protocol,

RECOGNIZINGFURTHERthatsomeState maynothavealltheresource neededtoeffectivelyimplementtheOPRC and2000OPRC(HNS)Protocol,

BELIEVINGitisdesirableforcoastalStatestohaveinplaceeffectivemeasuresandco-operativearrangementsto dealwithoilspillincidentswherevertheymayoccur,

FURTHERBELIEVINGthatwiderandspeedyimplementationofboththe1990OPRCandthe2000OPRC(HNS) Protocolwouldbenefitpotentialvictim ofoil pill andtheIOPCFundinhelpingtominimizetheenvironmentaland financialimpactofoil pill ,

1. URGESallContractingState tothe1992FundProtocolthathavenotyetdonesotoratify,orto accedeto,the1990OPRC;

2. E COURAGESState Partie totheOPRCtoal obecomepartytothe2000OPRC(HNS)Protocol, withtheaimofpromoting peedyimplementation;

3. FURTHERE COURAGESState notprutie tothe1990OPRCtoputinplaceeffectivecontingency plan foroilpollutionpreventionandreponsetothebe toftheirabilitie

Pending incidents involving the 1971 Fund

The ituationinrespectofpendingincidentsinvolvingthe 1971 Fundisinsummaryasfollows.

2 Thereare20incidentsinvolvingthe 1971Fundinrespectofwhichclaimsforcompensationand/orindemnificationarepending,orrecourseactionsarebeingpursuedbythe 1971 Fund.

3 Ofthe e20incidents,thefollowingsixhavealreadybeenfullyfinancedthroughcontributionsleviedtothe respectiveMajorClaimsFund :

Aegean Sea

Braer

Keumdong No5

Sea Prince

Yeo Myung

Yuil N°l

4 The eMajorClaim Fund aretogetherexpectedtoshowaconsiderablesurplusintheregionof£35million whenallclaimsandexpen eshavebeenpaid.

5 Afurther ixincidentswillprobablynotresultinanypaymentsofcompensationorindemnificationbythe 1971Fundorinonlyverylimitedpayment :

Vistabella

Iliad

Kriti Sea

Katja

Alambra

atuna Sea

6 A forthe Sea Empress incident,thebalanceontheMajorClaim Fundi ufficienttocoverthepayments ofcompen ationofpendingclaim andindemnificationoftheshipowner. Therecourseactiontakenbythe 1971 Fundagain ttheMilfordHavenP01tAuthoritywill,however,takeaconsiderabletimeandmayresult inthe 1971 Fund' incurring ignificantcost .

7 Withre pecttothe Nakhodka incident,iti difficulttoa e theremainingexposureofthe 197l Fund incethemaximumamountpayablebythatFund(60millionSDR)underthe1971 FundConvention(contrarytothe 1992FundConvention)i convertedintoJapane eyenontheba i oftherateofexchangeon thedatewhenthe hipownere tabli he thelimitationfundandthi fundhasnotyetbeenconstituted. Priorto31 December1999allcompen ationpayment weremadebythe1971Fundandthereafterall payment havebeenmadebythe 1992Fund. Ontheba i oftherateofexchangeonthatdatethe 1971 Fundwouldhavepaidoverit limit,whereasiftheconver ionweremadeontheba i oftherateofexchangeasatMarch 1 2002the1971Fundwouldhavetomakeadditionalpayments.

8 Theremainingclaim ari ingoutofthe Nissos Amorgos and Pontoon 300 incidentsare,inthe 197J Fund's view,forthemostpartinadmi sible. Theeclaimsareforsignificantamount Itisverydifficultthereforeto estimatethetotalpayment tobemadebythe 1971 Fundinre pectoftheseincidents. Thereareinany eventdeficit ontheseMajorClaim Fundsandcontribution willhavetobeleviedtotheseFunds.

9 The Evoikos incidenti unlikelytogiverisetoanypaymentsofcompensationbythe 1971 Fund. Itis posiblethattheFundwillhavetopayindemnificationoftheshipownernotexceeding£1.9million. The Fundmayalsoincursomerelatedcot .

hip- ource Oil Pollution Fund

LO AlltheincidentsrefeJTedtoinparagraph 3-9exceptthe Alambra incidentoccurredbeforetheendofthe tran itionalperiod, 15May 1998,whenthedenunciationofthe J971 Fundby24Statestookeffect Apart fromthatincidenta ufficientcontributionbasi exi tsthereforea regard theseincident ,shoulditbe necessarytolevyfurthercontribution inrespectofanyofthem.

11 Itise timatedthatthe Al Jaziah incident(24January2000)willgiveri etopaymentofcompen ationand costsbythe 1971 Fundnotexceeding£2million. Contribution mayhavetobeleviedinrepectofthat incident.

12 InOctober2000the1971Fundpurchaedin urancecoveringitsliabilitie inre pectofincidentsoccurring duringtheperiod25October2000-24May2002, ubjecttoadeductibleof250000SpecialDrawingRights (£220000)perincident. Sofartheinsurancewillbeuedinrepectofthe Zeinab and Singapura Timur incidents(14April2001and28may2001repectively)butwiJJal ocoveranyfurtherincidentsoccurringafterthe issueofthi documentupto24May2002. Themaximumamounttobebornebythe1971Fundinrepectof eachoftheeincidentsisthedeductible,i.e.£220000.

ISM AND PORT STATE CONTROL

Capt. Richard Day, ManagerSafety and Environmental Programmes Transport Canada Marine Safety, Ottawa

Good Morning, Master Mariners, distinguished speakers, ladies and gentlemen.

First,Iwouldliketothankyouforextendingtheinvitationtometomakethispresentationonthetopic"ISMand PortStateControl." Itisindeedapleasuretobeamongmypeershereathome,andIampleasedtobeableto contributetothis Conference on Safer Ships and Competent Crews. Halifaxisawonderfulcitywithalong,historic linkwithshippingandmarinematters,and,accordingtogovernmentsurveys,itscitizensarethebesteducatedin Canada. Therefore,Ithinkitisquiteappropiiatethatthisconferenceisheldhere.

Freedomoftheseashasalwaysbeenthebasisofmalitimelaw. However,weallknowthatwithfreedomalways comesresponsibility. Becauseweallwantthefreedomtoenjoyaclean,safemarineenvironment,eachcountrywith acoastalregionhasaresponsibilitytoensurethesafetyofthisresource. Canada,ofcourse,hasthelongest coastlineintheworld-some244,800km. EventheUNLawoftheSeaconventionhasrecognisedthatallstatesthat areluckyenoughtohaveacoastlinehaveabasicobligationtoprotectthemarineenvironment. TheCoastalstate hasbecomeacustodianofthemaiineenvironment.

OneofthewaysinwhichCanadaperformstheroleofcustodianisPortStateControl,orPSC. Asyouareaware,Port StateControl isashipinspectionprogran1wherebyforeignvesselsenteringasovereignstate'swatersareboarded andinspectedtoensurecompliancewithvariousmajorinternationalconventions.

Inanidealworld,PortStateControlwouldnotexist. FlagStates,owners,andoperatorswouldautomaticallyensure thattheirshipsweresafetoplytheworld'swaters. Canadahaslongexerciseditssovereignrighttoinspectships enteringitswater Formanyyears,alltankersenteringCanadahavebeeninspectedontheirfustvisitandatleast onceayearthereafter. Wehavealsoovereentheloadingofhigh-riskcargoesthroughourP01tWardenprogramme. TransportCanada' mainaimi tokeepCanada'swaterssafefrompollutionforallourresidentstoenjoy.

Youhavealreadyheardfrommyboss,BudStreeter,ontheimpactoftheCanadaShippingAct2001onshipsafetyin Canada. Thi actprimarilytarget ourCanadianvessels. OurPortStateControlin pections,however,ar·eadifferent kettleoffi h,becau etheyconcernonlyforeignvessels.

Canadaha hadalongrelationshipwithPortStateControl. Evenbeforethedisastrousshippingaccidentsinthelate 1970s,Canadahadbeenconcernedaboutthe afetyofperonsatseaandthemarineenvironment. Consequently, Canadabecameana ociatememberoftheParisMOUinApril1988,andwasacceptedasafullmemberinMay1994. Canadawa a! oadiivingforceinthecreationoftheTokyoMOUandha beenamembersinceitsinceptionin December1993.

TransportCanadaMalineSafetyisrespon ibleforallPSCactivitieswithinCanada,andforeignshipinspectionsare cardedoutatallmajorportsby hipinspectorswho,followingtheappropriatetrainingandexperience,becomePort State Controlofficer

Inall,wehave ignedmemorandawhichprovidethi1ty-fourotherPortStateControlPrutners. Althoughdifferent PSCMOUsmaybeperceivedtohavedifferentcriteria,TransportCanadahasonestandardforitsinspectionswhichi reputedtobeoneofthebestintheworld. ThemajorIMOinstrument suchasSOLAS,Mru·POL,and STCWformthebasisforourinspections. Our fu tinspectioni abasicone. Iftherear·ecleru·grounds,weconducta morethoroughinspection. Morethoroughin pectionsmayleadtodetentionsordeficienciesbeingpointedout.

Let'shavealookat orneofthestati ticsonPortStateControlinCanadaoverthelastfewyears.

Inthisgraphweseethatalthoughthenumberofinspectionsconductedduringtheyears 1995to2000hasshowna decrea e,thenumberofdeficienciesanddet ntionsremainedfairlyconstant. Youwillnoteadecreaseindetentions for2000whereasthenumberofinspectionshasremainedclosetoconstant. Bulkcarrierstendtobeourlargest troublespot,andthiscontinuestobeso. Theslideshowsthatthiscategoryofshiphasthehighestdetention statistics,andwetrytoespeciallytargetthesekindsofship. OurCanadianBulkCarrierInspectionRegimetru·gets certainbulkcardersforadetailedstructuralexamination. Duringthelastyearforty-sevenpercentofinspections wereperformedonbulkcarriers,thelargestpercentageforanyonekindofshipinspectedin2000.

hip- ource Oil Pollution Fund

Pirefightingappliance ,lifesavingappliance ,and afetyingeneralarethreeofthelargestcategoriesofdeficiencieS fortheyear2000. Ifindthi amazing,becau etheearethefewthingsI'dreallywanttomakesureworkonanyship I'm ailingon. However,theeareconsistenttrouble potsandeachyeartoomanydeficienciesarefoundinthese categorie

You'veprobablyheardoftheNewWorldOrder. No,I'mnot peakingabouteconomicglobali ationoranythinglike that. TheISMCodei hereanditi theNewWorldOrderfor hips. It implementationhasbroughtaboutachange thatcanbecomparedtoaparadigm hift. Infact,a Profe orWilliamTetleyput it,theI M odemayhavecau ed themostprofoundchange inMaritimeLawin50year . Firstofall,itha etanew tandardofresponsibilityand changedtherule bysayingthat hipowner andoperator arerepon iblefortheirmanagement,notmerelyfor defectsintheshiporforthefaultofthemasterorcrew. TheCodenowrai e the tandardofmanagement.

TheISMCodeha givencia sification ocietie andPortStateControlanew tratumofrepon ibilitywhenin pectingavessel. Iti nolonger ufficientto eethata hipi eaworthyinit cia andconcentrate olelyonit phy icalcondition-it managementmu tbeinordera well. Ingeneral,theCodewhich tartedbeingimplemented inJuly1998andwillbefullyineffectonJuly 1,2002,ha broughtaboutachangeinthinkingandinthe hiftingof blameforaccident TheISM lift thecorporateveilon ub tandard hip ,andourneighbour tothe outh(the U.S.)havecriminalindictmentsnowunderwayagaintde ignatedperonwhofailedtoen urecompliance. The followingslidesshowexample ofclearground undertheISMCode:Evidencethatcertificate arenotvalid; hip' log ordocumentationnotonboard;phy icalconditionofthe hip;crewnotabletocommunicatewitheachother; eriousdeficiencie in afety;andimproperlycertifiedperonnelonboard.

PriortoISMenforcementPhae 1,Transpo1tCanada entoutletter to hipowner andoperator toinformthemof thecomingchange totheregime. Thechangewa al ocitedbymean ofa" hipSafetyBulletin." The e tep will alsobetakenpriortotheJuly 1,2002deadline. Aquetionnairewa utiliedbyourP CO inordertodeterminea hip' andacompany' compliancewithISM. Anotherque tionnaireha beende elopedforthe econdpha e. Someofthequetion include:I ISMapplicabletothe hip? I propercertificationonboard? Doe the hiphavea maintenanceroutineandarerecord available?

Phase l wa kickedoffbyaconcentratedin pectioncampaign(CIC)whichIatedforthreemonth ,andanotheri plannedforJuly 1,2002. Thecampaigntargetedbulkcarrier andafewothercategorie forI Mimplementation. Result fromtheCanadianCIC howthatthemajornon-compliance wereinthearea ofemergencypreparedne andmaintenance. Inthethree-monthpe1iodJuly I toOctober30, 1998,atotalof212foreign e el werein pected. ThreeweredetainedforISMguideline whichwerenotmet.

DuringtheCICcampaignthePari MOUmember in pectedthreethou and ixhundredandthirty-three hip ,and detainedeighty-oneofthem. Thi repreent apercentageoffive. tthe ametimeTokyo 0 member carried outonethou andeighthundredandtwentyin pection ,with ixty-threedetention recorded. Thepercentagein thatcasewa three.

Thegraph how detention forISMdefect inCanadafor1999and2000. notedbefore,thetrendwa that emergencypreparedne wasthereaonforthemo tdetention inboth 1999and2000,followedbymaintenanceof equipmentandthen afetyandenvironmentalconcern

Asyouhavealreadyheard,Phae 1 ve el includedoiltanker ,ga carrier ,bulkcarrier ,andcargohigh peed craftoffivehundredgro ston ormorea wella pa enger hip whichcarrymorethantwel epa enger Phase 2ofISMimplementationis ettobeginonJuly I,2002,whenallve el offivehundredgro ton ormoreand certainmobileoffhoredrillingunit willal obeincluded. APSCin pectioninclude acheckonISMcompliance. SomeofthethingscheckedforunderISMregulation includethemanagementguideline ofwhattodoinan emergency,aclearchainofcommand,andofcoure,avalidDocumentofComplianceandSafetyManagement Certificate.

Theinformationwegatheri enteredintothere pectiveMOUdatabae -SIRE AC(forthePari MOU)andAPCIS (fortheTokyoMOU),whichthengoesintoEQUASIS,whichcanbeacce edpublicly

Inall,CanadahasbeeninvolvedinRegionalPortStateControlforthirteenyear . A apartofourcommitmentto eradicatingsubstandardshipping,Canadaprovide trainingforstateswhichareintheearly rage ofdeveloping theirinspectionprogramme. Inthiswayhopetopassontheexpertisewehavegainedovertheyear,andtoen ure global standardisation.

ImentionedearlierthatdifferentMOUshavedifferingstandard forinspectingship . Iwouldliketo eemore uniformitybetweenmemoranda,aswella amoreuniformapplicationofiSM.

Port tate ontroli awonderfulexampleofregionalcooperation. Togetherregionalinspectiontargetsaremetwhich \l ouldbealmotimpos ibleforanyonemember,andtheinformationgatheredandsharedwithmembersisindispensableforpre enting ub-standard hipsfromplyingourwaters. CanadaseesitsparticipationintheseMOUsasthe b standmo tefficientwayofminimisingthenumberofsubstandardshipsenteringitsports. Inmanyways,Canada act asa"bridge"betweentheAtlanticandPacificOceans. ItisomhopeinTransportCanadaMarineSafetytoform thelinkneededtomaximisethebenefitsofinspectionsintwooceans,whichwehopewillleadtotheeventual globalisationofPortStateControl.ItwasforthisveryreasonthatCanadainitiatedtheFirstJointMinisterialConferenceofthePruisandTokyoMemorandaofUnderstandingonPortStateControl,whichwasheldinVancouverin March 1998. AttheconferenceMinistersagreedonmeasurestoreducesub-standru·dshippingandtookthefirst tep towru·dshru·monisationofthesetwoMOUs. WehaverecentlysignedamemorandumwithourNAFTApartners,USAandMexico,tofurthercooperationinPortStateControlactivitiesandforeseeclosersharingandrecognitionofin pectionsin orthAmerica.

ow I wouldliketoshowyousomephotosofsomeflawswenoticedinshipsweinspected.

OurPortStateControlAnnualReportcontainsawealthofinformationandstatisticsonourPortStateControl progrrunmeinCanada. YoucanpickupthebookletatourTransportCanadaofficesaroundthecountryorjustgoto omweb iteathtt;p://www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSafety/Port State Cont:rol/index.htm.

InformationabouttheParisandTokyoMOUscanbefoundontheirwebsitesattheaddressesonthescreen.

Justasthere houldbemoreuniformitybetweenMOUs,thereisanequalneedforallthestakeholdersinshippingto workcooperativelywithPSCauthorities. Pilots,portauth01ities,classificationsocieties,andcommercialinterestsare just omeoftheindustrypartnerswhoshouldworkwithustoensuresafety.

Toconclude,Iwouldliketonotethatshippingisanindu trywherepublicandpoliticalinterestandaccountability have hat-plyincreasedoverthepastfewyears. Itiswidelyagreedthatwehavereachedapointwheremoreregulation andin pectionswillnotcontributetofurtherincreasesofsafetyatsea,butthatamoreefficientimplementation ofregimesandbettercoordinationofin pectionsservethepmposeofsafetybest. Youtooasmastermru·inerscan helpusridCanadaof ubstandardship byensuringthatthe hipsyouworkonorthecompaniesyouworkforhave alltherelevantcertificate ,andensurethattheshipsru·eadequatelymannedandru·einasafephysicalcondition.

Iwillnowtrytoan weranyque tionsyoumayhaveonPortStateControlandISMinCanada.