JSS_Vol2No3_Sep2009 by Randy Borum

JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC SECURITY Vol. II, No. 3 September 2009

Editor Jeremy Tamsett, M.A.

Associate Editors Gary Ackerman, M.A. Randy Borum, Ph.D. Monte Bullard, Ph.D. Denise Greaves, Ph.D. Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D. Kim Lewis, M.I.M. Vincent Pollard, Ph.D. Ed Urie, M.S.

Published Quarterly by

Henley-Putnam University Press www.henley-putnam.edu

Copyright ÂŠ 2009 by Henley-Putnam University All rights reserved. No part of this publication shall be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without written permission from the publisher. No patent liability is assumed with respect to the use of the information contained herein. Although every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this publication, the publisher and author(s) assume no responsibility for errors or omissions. Neither is any liability assumed for damages resulting from the use of the information contained herein. Paperback ISSN: 1944-0464 eBook ISSN: 1944-0472

Warning and Disclaimer Every effort has been made to make this publication as complete and as accurate as possible, but no warranty of fitness is implied. The information provided is on an "as is" basis. The authors and the publisher shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damages arising from the information contained in this publication.

Editorial Advisory Board Major General Craig Bambrough, USA (ret.) Dr. Donald Goldstein, Institute for Defense Analyses Dr. Richard J. Kilroy Jr., Virginia Military Institute Dr. William C. Green, California State University, San Bernardino Dr. Sheldon Greaves, Henley-Putnam University

Correspondence concerning essays submitted for consideration should be directed to: Editor@Henley-Putnam.edu. Guidelines for manuscript submissions can be found on the Henley-Putnam University website at www.Henley-Putnam.edu. Materials that have been previously published or are under consideration for publication elsewhere will not be accepted. Questions or correspondence concerning book reviews may be directed to Editor@Henley-Putnam.edu. Unsolicited book reviews will not be accepted. The Journal of Strategic Security is published quarterly by Henley-Putnam University Press and is an imprint of Happy About (http://happyabout.info, info@happyabout.info or 408-257-3000).

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Note from the Editor Henley-Putnam University is pleased to bring you the August/September 2009 issue of the Journal of Strategic Security: Volume 2, Number 3. In this edition, you'll find expert commentary on pressing international security issues. From the persistent threat of Somali pirates to the costs associated with providing effective port security, we have once again published the finest analysis available in the field of strategic security. As our readership base continues to expand exponentially with each new issue of the Journal, we are also receiving a record number of submissions. While the selection process is highly competitive, we are keen to receive articles from a variety of viewpoints on global challenges that impact the strategic security landscape. Be sure to look for our latest "Call for Articles" available from the HenleyPutnam University website at: www.henley-putnam.edu. Please send all correspondence, including article submissions to: editor@henley-putnam.edu.

Table of Contents Countering the Somali Pirates: Harmonizing the International Response.....................................1 The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism ..............13 START: Overcoming Remaining Challenges ....... 25 What Price Security?............................................ 33 Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks ........... 43 Keeping our Campuses and Communities Safe ... 65 Book Reviews ........................................................ 71

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Countering the Somali Pirates: Harmonizing the International Response By Richard Weitz, Ph.D.

Introduction The growing threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and neighboring regions from pirates operating off the shores of lawless Somalia has engendered an unparalleled global response. Over the past year, numerous international security organizations as well as national governments have organized many separate multilateral and single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of Africa region. Despite the unprecedented extent of this effort, this mishmash of ad hoc multinational and national initiatives has had only a limited effect. These various contingents typically have conflicting mandates and rules of engagement. They have also become fixated on responding to immediate problems rather than organizing a robust regional maritime structure, which could replace the foreign fleets when they inevitably withdraw. The current confusing mixture of overlapping and competing unilateral and multilateral initiatives needs to be reorganized and made more harmonious. The initial priority should be to improve coordination among the diverse flotillas conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. A suitable division of labor is needed to take advantage of the unique assets of each country and international organization operating in the region. Over the longer term, an enduring solution to the Somali piracy problem will require the advent of a stable government in Somalia that can enforce laws against piracy as well as revive the economy. New employment opportunities are required to diminish the appeal of piracy to impoverished Somalis. Given adequate logistical and financial support by the international community, Somali authorities might at some point form an effective coastal force to patrol the country's territorial waters. Pending the advent and consolidation of an effective government in Somalia, the international community should assist friendly groups in that country to build the capacity needed to curtail the activities of the pirates, insurgents, and other threatening groups operating in Somalia. The foreign countries concerned about piracy around Somalia should also encourage the littoral states in the western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, 1

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and Red Sea regions—which include Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania as well as Somalia itself—to form a regional maritime coastal patrol. Countries external to the area should provide funding, training, and advanced surveillance and other technologies to these local actors to strengthen their maritime security capabilities.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden Despite hopes that the arrival of more foreign warships off Somalia would curb the spread of lawlessness to the region's vital sea lanes, pirates operating from that country have resumed the disturbingly high rate of activity seen in recent years. Since 2006, the number of reported piracy attacks in the Horn of Africa region—which includes the Gulf of Aden, the western Indian Ocean, and the territorial waters of Somalia—has soared. During the first five months of 2009, the number of maritime hijacking attempts had already surpassed attempts during all of 2008. Last year, the Gulf of Aden was the scene of 111 incidents, including 42 vessels hijacked, whereas 114 attempted attacks took place through mid-May of 2009.1 The growing number and expanded range of these incidents has threatened important trade and transit routes connecting Africa, Asia, and Europe. Cargos under threat include shipments of oil from the Persian Gulf as well as other valuable commodities. Although the number of deaths directly attributable to the pirates has remained small, their activities have disrupted humanitarian relief operations within Somalia. In addition, the economic costs of piracy have included delayed deliveries, change of naval routes, damage to ships, higher insurance rates, and the detention of crews and passengers for ransom. The infamous hijacking of the Saudi-owned MV Sirius Star on November 15, 2008, demonstrates the threat to energy security from Somali piracy. At over one thousand feet long, the ship became the largest vessel ever captured by pirates. When Sirius Star was attacked, it held about $100 million worth of Saudi crude oil.2 With their highly valuable cargo and wealthy owners, energy vessels travelling through the region are under constant threat of piracy. To avoid confrontation with the pirates, several shipping companies prefer to sail around the Cape of Good Hope rather than through the Suez Canal.3 This route alteration causes delays in deliveries, cost increases for shipping companies, and a revenue decline for Egypt, whose flow of foreign currency depends heavily on traffic through the canal.4 Furthermore, 2

Countering the Somali Pirates: Harmonizing the International Response

the insurance costs for shipping companies are rising. According to the Maritime Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation, the war risk binder cost of a ship's insurance per voyage had increased by April 2009 to as much as $20,000, from $500 the previous year.5 The presence of pirates in a country with strong Islamist groups also raises the risk of an alliance between them. Thus far, there is no clear evidence of such an alliance. The media has periodically reported that some of the pirates' ransom has gone to Islamist militants.6 In addition, al-Qaeda has been urging the Somalis to attack the "crusader forces" in the Gulf.7 On the other hand, the radical Council of Islamic Courts and some other Islamist groups have denounced piracy as a violation of Islamic Sharia law.8 On balance, the pirates seem to be equal opportunity brigands, attacking targets regardless of the religion of their crew or owners, and very reluctant to part with their loot, even for the sake of supporting fellow Muslim militants. Somali pirates lack the organization, training, or skills that one might expect from a group causing so many problems for the international community. Launching either from a larger mother ship or from a Somali port, the armed pirates use small speedboats to approach and board foreign ships. Today's pirates are often people who have fought against each other since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the last time that the country had a functioning government.9 They are driven overwhelmingly by economic considerations, seeking to acquire wealth in an incredibly impoverished country.10 Since early 2008, Somali pirates have earned an estimated $200 million in ransom.11 The widespread violence, the weak economy, and the surge in illegal foreign fishing and maritime dumping of toxic and other hazardous waste by foreign companies exploiting the lack of an effective Somali authority able to police its coasts has created an environment in which pirates can easily recruit people to their cause.

International Response Over the past year, the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and various national governments have organized many separate multilateral and single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of Africa region. At present, the international response focuses on patrolling the sea lanes off Somalia's coast, escorting merchant vessels, and responding to distress calls. Understandably, these actors have remained unwilling to conduct a large-scale stabilization campaign on land; the recent experience of 3

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foreign occupiers of Somalia suggests such an operation would likely incur numerous military and civilian casualties. This patchwork of ad hoc multinational and national initiatives has achieved individual successes, defeating several pirate attacks and capturing some pirates. In some cases, they have exploited opportunities for tactical collaboration against specific pirate threats. Despite the unprecedented extent of this effort, the contributions of the approximately dozens of combat ships and thousands of military personnel have been vitiated by insufficient coordination. The various formations have employed different mandates, tactics, and rules of engagement. They have also become preoccupied with responding to immediate challenges rather than engaging in long-term local capacity building.

The United Nations The UN effort has been manifested primarily through several UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) calling for international action against pirates by member governments and regional security organizations such as the African Union. Since 2008, there have been about a dozen resolutions regarding the situation in Somalia. The initial focus was on protecting humanitarian supplies provided by the World Food Program (WFP). UNSCR 1816 (June 2008) authorizes foreign member states to conduct maritime security operations in Somalia's territorial waters with the consent of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). UNSCR 1846 (December 2008) permits UN states to provide security assistanceâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; though not weapons, which are prohibited by a UN arms embargo, without specific UNSC approvalâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;to the TFG to enable its forces to secure Somalia's coastal regions. UNSCR 1851 (December 2008) extended these authorizations to include, at the request of the TFG, operations on Somalia's land territory aimed at suppressing maritime piracy as well as military assistance, including weapons and equipment, to other UN member states and regional organizations engaged in combating piracy in Somali waters. UNSCR 1853 (December 2008) reaffirmed the UN's commitment to the security issues in the region and called upon member states to take proactive roles in the operations.

The European Union On December 8, 2008, the EU organized Operation Atalanta to supersede NATO's Operation Allied Provider. Its main task has been to protect the WFP deliveries to Somalia. In addition to representing the first EU multinational maritime security mission outside of the Mediterranean and the 4

Countering the Somali Pirates: Harmonizing the International Response

North Atlantic, Atalanta marked the first naval operation launched within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Some two dozen warships and 1,500 naval personnel have joined this one-year mission. The EU has also established an online Maritime Security Center-Horn of Africa to facilitate the sharing of information about maritime threats between EU military personnel and the merchant ships operating in the Horn of Africa region.12 The EU sees Operation Atalanta as part of its global action conducted "in the Horn of Africa to deal with the Somali crisis, which has political, security and humanitarian aspects."13 Therefore, the European attempts aim to be more comprehensive than solely providing security. The Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia for 2008–2013 proposes a budget of EUR 215.8 million under the European Commission's 10th European Development Fund, intending cooperation in three main sectors: governance, education, and rural development.14

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization From October to December 2008, NATO conducted Operation Allied Provider, primarily to defend WFP shipments from pirates and patrol the area. NATO vessels had the authority to use power where necessary. Allied Provider started as a temporary operation upon the request by the UN Secretary General in support for UNSCR 1814, 1816, and 1838. The fleet consisted of three ships from Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2), which routinely included contingents from Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. In March 2009, NATO began another mission, Operation Allied Protector. This operation now overlaps—and looks to duplicate—Operation Atalanta. NATO's current presence in the Horn of Africa region consists of five ships from Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1), a unit comprising ships on rotation from member countries such as Canada, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United States.15

Contact Group on Somalia Twenty-four UN member states and five multinational organizations joined the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS or Contact Group) established on January 14, 2009. Its main purpose was "to develop concrete and substantial responses to the concerns articulated 5

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by the UN Security Council in its resolution 1851."16 The CGPCS has the potential to address some of the problems already identified, including insufficient coordination among the existing initiatives, a lack of long-term planning, and disharmonious tactics, techniques, and procedures. But until now, the Contact Group has primarily provided additional opportunities to monitor the behavior of the other members as well as to engage in a sustained dialogue with them. The four working groups (dealing with the diplomatic, judicial, military, and public information dimensions of the problem) and other cooperative mechanisms originating from the CGPCS have yet to achieve noticeable progress regarding their six main objectives: improving operational and information support to counter-piracy operations; establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism; strengthening judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution, and detention of pirates; strengthening commercial shipping self-awareness and other capabilities; pursuing improved diplomatic and public information efforts; and tracking financial flows related to piracy.17 It is unclear how much time the CGPCS will have to accelerate its progress. The existing initiatives are all limited-duration efforts whose terms will probably end before Somalia becomes a stable state whose government can repress pirates operating from its territory. As these missions end, new extra-regional maritime operations will be needed to replace them unless the region's navies have developed the capacity to enforce maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa.

Multinational Operations Led by the United States The United States has worked to mobilize multinational forces for anti-piracy activities. The long-standing multinational Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), part of the Combined Force Maritime Command of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), has added counter-piracy to its original counter-terrorism mission.18 Since its formation after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, CTF-150 has included ships from the United States, NATO navies, and other OEF members such as Australia and New Zealand. Although CTF-150 falls under the command of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, its ships operate according to national regulations and rules of engagement.19 The task force took the lead in establishing, in August 2008, a Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden that, by concentrating merchant shipping within a narrow body of water, has facilitated naval escort operations.20 In January 2009, the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) established a new task force, CTF-151. It has the same area of operation as 6

Countering the Somali Pirates: Harmonizing the International Response

CTF-150 (the Gulf of Aden and the sections of the western Indian Ocean near Somalia) butâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;unlike CTF-150, which is responsible for patrolling the area and for supporting OEFâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the newer task force is dedicated primarily to combating pirates. CTF-151 initially consisted of three U.S. Navy ships under the command of Vice-Admiral William Gortney, Chief of the U.S. Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain.21 CTF-151 has grown rapidly to include over twenty ships from many NATO countries and other U.S. allies. The anti-piracy campaign in the Horn of Africa region marks the first widespread participation of the world's rising naval powers in an active maritime operation distant from their shores. China, India, and other ascending states have sent warships, both to combat pirates and to assert their growing importance as global security actors.22 Russia and Japan, twentieth-century naval powers whose maritime security ambitions have rebounded, also have dispatched flotillas on counter-piracy missions to the region. These fleets are primarily escorting vessels flying their flags or manned by their nationals, but their governments have expressed openness in principle to assist other ships threatened by pirates. On January 6, 2009, the Chinese destroyers Haikou and Wuhan along with the supply ship Weishanhu arrived in the Gulf of Aden and began accepting escort requests from Chinese vessels seeking protection from the pirates in the region. After escorting more than one hundred ships in the Horn of Africa region by early April, the destroyer Shenzhen and the frigate Huangshan relieved the original destroyers, while the Weishanhu remained on patrol.23 After the hijacking of the MV Sirius Star, an extraordinary session of the Arab League Council condemned the pirates and underscored the necessity of "promoting Afro-Arab Cooperation in support of efforts to combat piracy."24

Recommendations The immediate priority is to ensure the security of shipping traffic in the region, which requires harmonizing the activities of the existing naval operations being conducted by the EU, NATO, and the independent maritime commands of the other countries. The U.S. Navy's current maritime strategy, with its concept of a "Thousand-Ship Navy," envisages such a network under the rubric of the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative. Its basic premise is that pooling together the naval capabilities of many national fleets, with a suitable division of labor that reflects their distinct concerns and capabilities, can best enhance the security of the international seas against transnational threats.25 A new UNSCR could help

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define the command structure for the maritime operations and the permissible procedures for disposing of seized ships and captured pirates. Securing greater cooperation between these fleets and the private entities that dominate maritime commerce is also essential. These shipping companies and other firms, which typically function as transnational actors even when they are nominally based in one country, possess unique data, information, and intelligence that the navies operating off Somalia need to achieve effective maritime domain awareness. An enduring solution to the Somali piracy problem will require the advent of a stable government in Somalia that can enforce domestic law and order along the country's coasts as well as revive the economy. New employment opportunities are required to diminish the appeal of piracy to impoverished Somalis. Such a government is unlikely to develop soon, but when it takes shape, the United States and other countries will need to support it with foreign aid, security assistance, and diplomatic outreach, including by promoting its engagement with regional and other multinational institutions. Pending the advent and consolidation of an effective Somali government, the international community should seek to assist friendly Somali authorities build the capacity needed to curtail the activities of the pirates, insurgents, and other threatening groups operating in Somalia. Since their capabilities will remain inherently limited, extra-regional governments should also work to promote cooperation among the navies of those coastal states in the western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea regions that commit to countering local pirates and other transnational threats. Ideally, these countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;which include Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania as well as Somalia itselfâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;will pool their resources into a regional maritime security force. This force would engage in intelligence sharing, the dissemination of early warning information, and joint protection and enforcement operations. In addition to countering piracy, its missions would address other transnational maritime problems in the Horn of Africa region, including managing fishing and monitoring environmental threats. The pirates have gained some local support by claiming to defend Somalis against illegal fishing and maritime dumping by foreign fleets. Establishing an official coast guard force that included Somali participation would deprive them of this prop as well as provide an alternative source of livelihood to potential sea pirates. The weak naval assets available to the countries in the Horn of Africa region will require them to depend on external support from extra-regional governments and international organizations. These exter8

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nal actors could provide funding, training, and advanced surveillance and other technologies designed to strengthen their capabilities. Over time, the extra-regional fleets could reduce their operations as they transfer missions to the regional security force. A logical evolutionary path would see the international fleets concentrate their non-support efforts on distant offshore missions while local navies focused on coastal security.

About the Author Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. His current research includes political-military developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.S. foreign, defense, homeland security, and WMD nonproliferation policies. Dr. Weitz heads the Case Studies Working Group of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). He is a graduate of Harvard College (B.A. with Highest Honors in Government), the London School of Economics (M.Sc. in International Relations), Oxford University (M.Phil. in Politics), and Harvard University (Ph.D. in Political Science). Dr. Weitz has published in such journals as The National Interest, The Washington Quarterly, NATO Review, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Defense Concepts. His commentaries have appeared in the International Herald Tribune, Baltimore Sun, The Guardian, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal (Europe), and many Internet-based publications. He has published or edited several books and monographs, including Global Security Watch-Russia; a volume of National Security Case Studies; China-Russia Security Relations; Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia; Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis; The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis; and Revitalizing U.S.â&#x20AC;&#x201C;Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures.

References 1 International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Service, "Pirate Attacks of Somalia Already Surpass 2008 Figures," May 12, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/klsqco (www.icc-ccs.org/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirate-attacks-off-somalia-already-surpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=5).

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2 Martin Sieff, "New Pirates Terrorize Oil-Trade Routes from Middle East," UPI, November 19, 2008, available at: http://tinyurl.com/menw26 (www.upi.com/news/issueoftheday/2008/11/19/New-pirates-terrorize-oil-traderoutes-from-Middle-East/UPI-58611227110534/). 3 AFP, "Piracy Pushes Change in Route," November 23, 2008, available at: http://tinyurl.com/nsuejh (www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/World/ Story/STIStory_305847.html). 4 Louis Wasser, "Somali Piracy Cost Suez Canal Business," San Francisco Chronicle, April 29, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/ckf5kj (www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/ article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/04/28/MNOK16RIRV.DTL). 5 Patrick Burnson, "Ocean Cargo/Global Logistics: Will Piracy Add to Insurance Expenses," Logistics Management, April 13, 2009, available at: http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/CA6651242.html. 6 Kim Sengupta and Daniel Howden, "Pirates: the $80m Gulf Connection," The Independent, April 21, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/deejq7 (www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/pirates-the-80m-gulf-connection1671657.html). 7 Khaled Wassef, "Al Qaeda Urges Somalis to Attack Ships," CBS News, April 16, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/d7gnqx (www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/ 04/16/world/worldwatch/entry4949488.shtml). 8 Spiegel Staff, "Somali Pirates Form Unholy Alliance with Islamists," Spiegel Online, April 20, 2009, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,620027,00.html. 9 Scott Baldauf, "Who Are Somalia's Pirates?" Christian Science Monitor, November 21, 2008, available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1120/p25s22-woaf.html. 10 Ryan Hagen, "Pirate Economics 101: A Q&A With Invisible Hook Author Peter Leeson," The New York Times, April 20, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/cfalcn (freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/pirate-economics-101-a-qawith-invisible-hook-author-peter-leeson/). 11 Alan Taylor, "Pirates of Somalia," Boston Globe, March 16, 2009, available at: http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/03/pirates_of_somalia.html. 12 Maritime Security Center (Horn of Africa), "About the Maritime Security Center (Horn of Africa)," May 2, 2009, available at: http://www.mschoa.eu/About.aspx. 13 EU Council Secretariat, "EU Naval Operation Against Piracy," Press Release, March 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/oku5wk (ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/090325FactsheetEUNAVFOR%20Somalia-version4_EN.pdf). 14 Ibid. 15 "Operation Allied Protector," NATO, April 29, 2009, available at: http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_allied_protector.aspx. 16 Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, "Welcome Remarks," Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, February 24, 2009, available at: http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1774&doc_id=11124.

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17 "Somalia: Statement from the Contact Group on Piracy," January 16, 2009, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200901160569.html. 18 Roger Middleton, "Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars," Chatham House Briefing Paper (October 2008): 8, available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/665/. 19 Lars Bangert Struwe, For a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol (Danish Institute for Military Studies, March 2009): 11. 20 Lauren Ploch et al, Piracy off the Horn of Africa (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 21, 2009): 16. 21 Chad R. Erdmann, "Navy Ship Assists Effort to Deter Pirates," American Forces Press Service, January 27, 2009, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52821. 22 Brian Wilson and James Kraska, "Anti-Piracy Patrols Presage Rising Naval Powers," YaleGlobal, January 13, 2009, available at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=11808. 23 "Backgrounder: Brief History of China's People's Liberation Army Navy," Xinhua, April 15, 2009, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/15/content_11191772.htm. 24 "Statement By The Council of The League of Arab States at the Permanent Representatives Level at its Extraordinary Session on the Developments in Somalia," December 4, 2008, available at: http://tinyurl.com/m5ul7e (www.hiiraan.com/ news2/2008/dec/somalia_statement_by_the_council_of_arab_league.aspx). 25 John G. Morgan and Charles W. Martoglio, "The 1,000-Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 2005): 14â&#x20AC;&#x201C;17.

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The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism By Scott Cary

Introduction This article presents a strategic, operational, and tactical analysis of information currently available on the state of bio-weapons development by non-state actors, primarily Islamist jihadists. It discusses the evidence supporting a practical assessment that non-state actors have begun to acquire, and in the near-term intend to employ, bio-weapons. A pathogen and method of attack specifically designed to achieve the strategic goals of jihadists are presented as functional examples of the problem of the emerging global bio-weapons threat. Is a terrorist attack utilizing biological weapons a real threat? If so, is there a way to predict the circumstances under which it might happen or how it might be conducted? This article explores what is known and cannot be known about these questions, and will examine the threat of biological terrorism in the context of the strategic goals, operational methods, and tactical intentions of Islamist terrorists.

Strategic, Political Nature of Terrorist Groups Any strategic analysis of terrorist weapon capabilities and potential future attack should start with the understanding of who the terrorists are and how their perceived legitimacy is derived from the tenets of their radical religious beliefs. Terrorists, like nation-states, are determined to impose their will upon others. Unlike nation-states, however, terrorists resort to violence as the first and final solution.

The Basis of the Right to Rule and Asymmetric Warfare A nation's international decisions are carried out by diplomacy, enforced by a military, and directed by a political body as an expression of the interests of the people it governs. In cases of international conflict, a nation's standing military force executes international policy decisions. Such actions are openly recognized by sovereign nations as part of international norm de jure due, in large part, to the uniform practice of war throughout history. Prescribed force, within the bounds of just war, is the 13

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means by which legitimate nation-states periodically resolve their differences to, somewhat paradoxically, continue to survive in a world that requires order and the rule of law to maintain long-term peace and stability. In a less than perfect world, however, legitimacy is sometimes obtained by other means. One measure of legitimacy is the degree of support that leaders have and how they obtained that support. Legitimacy can be won by the leaders of a country who hold the confidence of its people obtained through elections. Nation-states that attempt to acquire legitimacy through blunt force are, on the other hand, rejected by the international community. We may take strong objection to the grounds upon which such authority or selfimposed "legitimacy" rests, but we ignore these leaders and nations at our peril. This is the kind of so-called legitimacy that is sought by totalitarian regimes and terrorist groups worldwide. Unlike nation-states, terrorist groups are not recognized as legitimate and independent sovereign forces; they do not represent the political will of the citizens of any country, and they do not have the ability to employ collective military might against their opponents. Nevertheless, their actions are political in nature, both because their actions are a direct manifestation of their culture, economics, and belief system, and because they are aimed at creating the same sort of changes at which legitimate military actions are aimedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;imposing their political will upon an outside group of people. They seek to attain legitimacy through the threat or act of large-scale violence, and thereby achieve the ability to impose their values upon our country and other countries.

Jihad Islamist extremists who regularly employ violence to achieve their ends describe themselves as fulfilling a religious duty to combat non-Muslims and, particularly, to combat those who do not adhere to their radical interpretation of Islam. Many Islamists are granted recognition, support, and in some cases legitimacy, even if those actors use violence in a way that non-Muslims and Muslims alike would label "terrorism." Despite the fact that the term jihad has several levels of meaning, ranging from intense concentration on self-improvement to advancement of the faith through writing, Islamist extremists invariably select its most extreme interpretationâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the conversion or death of non-believers and even moderate factions within Islam.

The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism

The first jihad began circa 622 CE, when the founder of Islam, Mohammad, first coined the term and actively engaged in it. Because Muhammad is considered by Muslims to be the perfect human example, everything he did in his life is likewise considered worthy of emulation by all Muslims for all time. Therefore, many extremist Islamists find it difficult to refute that jihad is simply a socially acceptable justification for violence. In the end, jihadist terrorist groups seek at least these two things: 1. Recognition that they are a potent, independent force 2. The ability to influence world events and impose their way of life on others

Why Jihadists Would Choose WMD It is for the above reasons that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) appeal to Islamist extremists. It is a generally accepted principle among Western analysts that terrorists are less concerned with the number of people killed in an attack and the destructive power of WMD than they are about the number of witnesses and survivors "terrorized" by the attack.1 It is for the sake of its effect on "human behavior, media coverage, and psychosocial"2 functioning of the public, as well as its effect on the leaders elected by that public, that they commit atrocities such as televised beheadings and indiscriminate marketplace bombings. The table below lists some of the prominent psychological effects that would likely surface in the aftermath of a biological terrorism incident.

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Table 1: Psychological Responses Following a Biological Terrorist Attack Horror Anger Panic Magical thinking about microbes and viruses Fear of invisible agents Fear of contagion Anger at terrorists, government, or both Attribution of arousal symptoms to infection Scapegoating Paranoia Social isolation Demoralization Loss of faith in social institutions From "The Threat of Biological weapons: Prophylaxis and Mitigation of Psychological and Social Consequences."3

Biological weapons are unequalled in their capacity to visit terror on the public at large and at overwhelming the social structures and systems in place that serve the public. Widespread research on this subject is ongoing, and several academic sources have described the probable effect of a biological attack on the general populace: An incident with these weapons will be unlike any other disaster…a biological incident poses a sudden, unanticipated, and unfamiliar threat to health that lacks sensory cues, is prolonged or recurrent, perhaps is contagious, and produces casualties that are observed by others. These are the factors that, historically, have spawned fear, panic, and contagious somatization.4 The bottom line, and most analysts will probably agree, is that terrorist groups will strike whenever they have motive, capability, and opportunity.

The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism

Accessibility of Bio-Weapons to Terrorists Because the use of biological weapons contributes to the very definition of terror, one must consider whether such weapons are available to jihadists as an attack option. Although the United States has already implemented world-class anti-proliferation efforts and expended billions in counter-terrorism and regional preparedness funding, it is difficult to detect the development of biological weapons capabilities by non-state actors, or even nation-states for that matter. There are three main components to the development of most biological weapons: scientific expertise, pathogens and growth medium, and equipment. According to biological weapons expert Dr. Reynold Salerno of Sandia National Labs, "There's no good way to track or control expertise. There are few, if any, pieces of technology used to make bio-weapons that are not also used for some other legitimate purpose. There are a lot of pathogens naturally occurring and widely available for weaponization."5 By and large, biological weapons are getting easier to develop by individuals and non-state actors, either by indigenous manufacture, or acquisition and theft from any nation-state that has developed them. There is also the possibility of collecting pathogen samples from vectors that carry the infection during a naturally occurring outbreak. In 2006 and 2007, the U.S. State Department listed five legitimate nation-states that are known to openly support terrorist groups.6 Four of themâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syriaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;have established their own biological weapons programs, in addition to the known bio-weapons programs of the U.S., China, Egypt, Israel, Taiwan, and Russia.7 There is evidence that some nation-states may be willing to assist non-state actors in their pursuit of this dangerous capability. Equipment with which to develop biological weapons is now relatively easy to acquire, and the pathogens themselves are relatively commonplace. According to one source, it costs approximately $1.6 million using equipment that is commercially available to produce a viable biological weapon.8 A facility dedicated to the development of bio-weapons does not require much space, nor does it have to be in an isolated location, surrounded by barbed wire and biohazard signs, as one might expect to find in a state-run program. The U.S. Government and other nations with an active interest in monitoring the capabilities of their neighbors collect intelligence on potential bio-weapons facilities. Even so, bio-weapons projects could be located in the center of a large civilian population, and no one 17

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would be the wiser. For example, former USSR bio-weapons facilities were often "hidden in plain sight" by using physical deception methods in order to change the visual signature of facilities.9 These methods of deception allowed the Soviets to misrepresent facilities in photos taken by spy planes and later satellites capable of taking detailed pictures of suspected sites. If large, modern state programs can be so easily camouflaged from discovery by other nations using advanced imagery technology, consider how easily a much smaller lab built in an old warehouse or processing plant could be concealed, even from civilians residing mere yards away. Relatively speaking, biological weapons are rapidly becoming more accessible and, hence, more feasible to acquire and potentially use than many other forms of WMD. According to Howitt and Pangi, "Biological weapons, cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons and more lethal than chemical weapons, are now perceived as the weapon of choice for both state and non-state actors seeking to inflict maximum damage while minimizing the risk of detection and retaliation."10 Whereas straightforward explosive attacks are relatively cheap compared to the damage and fear they produce, biological weapons are the next logical step up in attack technology. DiGionvanni stated, "…acquisition, delivery, and targeting of these weapons are within the grasp of any determined and skilled individual or group."11

Terrorist Operational Capabilities Terrorist groups do not openly advertise their capabilities in bio-weapons development. For very good reasons, even if information existed on the location and capability of a terrorist-run facility for bio-weapons, it's unlikely that the information would be available to the public. There are very few primary sources of information on the subject of terrorist capabilities with respect to bio-weapons. Nevertheless, there are subtle indicators appearing on the worldwide scene as well. It is impossible to assert that such events constitute "proof" in the absence of primary documentation or more extensive evidence. Regardless, many analysts feel that where there is smoke, there must be fire. For example, in January of 2009, the bodies of at least 40 alleged al-Qaeda operatives were discovered in a sealed cave in Algeria. All 40 victims had died of bubonic plague, which is readily communicable and kills within hours. As reported on January 19, 2009, by the Washington Times:

The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism

Authorities in the first week of January intercepted an urgent communication between the leadership of al Qaeda in the Land of the Maghreb (AQIM) and al Qaeda's leadership in the tribal region of Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan. The communication suggested that an area sealed to prevent leakage of a biological or chemical substance had been breached.12 There are not many alternative logical explanations for such a discovery, aside from the possibility that a secret bio-weapons facility had suffered a catastrophic accident. The plausibility of this scenario is even more likely when taken in context with al-Qaeda's previous interest in biological weapons. A former CIA chief and expert in terrorism has indicated that: Documents discovered from Al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Laden was pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research program…Manuals and testimony also indicate that Al Qaeda has determined how to operationalize chemical and biological warfare.13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terrorism expert Dr. Jill Bellamy-Dekker is in agreement that Islamist extremist groups have the capability to develop and carry out such an attack: "There is good reason for the Americans' fears…[al-Qaeda] had laboratories in north Afghanistan. They have scientists, chemists and nuclear physicists…People who follow such things know that al-Qaeda has laboratories..."14 A little closer to home, in a June 2009 article The Washington Times reported that: U.S. counter-terrorism officials have authenticated a video by an al Qaeda recruiter threatening to smuggle a biological weapon into the United States via tunnels under the Mexico border, the latest sign of the terrorist group's determination to stage another mass-casualty attack on the U.S. homeland.15 The successful use of a biological weapon on U.S. soil would be considered a desirable outcome by Islamist extremists in their pursuit of global jihad. The spokesperson for al-Qaeda agrees: "What a horrifying idea; 9/11 will be small change in comparison. Am I right?...It will turn into a real celebration."16

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Opportunities for Tactical Application and Targeting Certain biological agents can be applied via direct contact, and in ways in which the victim would be unaware at the time of exposure. For maximum effect, a biological weapon would be delivered in an aerosol form above a large target population. However, to avoid the added technological challenge of aerosolization, not to mention the additional problem of concealing bulky metallic spray devices, a terrorist could simply opt for a liquid solution (or "slurry") that would fit into a small glass vial. There is no unattended "suspicious package," nor any obvious sign that an attack is taking place at all. Biological weapons delivered this way are easy to transport, easy to hide, and are virtually invisible to our current detection methods. Selecting a pathogen such as variola major, also known as smallpox, would make it even easier to carry out an attack without fear of detection or retaliation. Despite suspenseful plots portrayed by the entertainment industry, smallpox spreads rather slowly. On average, each untreated case can infect approximately five other people in the two-week symptomatic phase.17 Smallpox has a two-week incubation stage during which the victim has no real symptoms, followed by a two-week active stage during which the victim has significant symptoms and is contagious, followed by either death or recovery. The normal fatality rate for smallpox is 30%.18 At the moment, variola major is only officially held in two repositories: at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States and by Russia's Vector program.19 Nonetheless, some analysts believe that at least five other countries have samples prepared, and that some of those samples have been "manipulated" in such a way as to make them more contagious, more lethal, or both.20 Due to the long incubation stage, anyone infected with the virus could hypothetically travel a great distance before becoming seriously ill, allowing for a broad dispersion to multiple victims. An appropriate tactical target for such a pathogen would be an indoor location occupied by large groups of people who are all in transit to different locations. Grand Central Station in New York City, O'Hare airport in Chicago, and L'Enfant Plaza in Washington, D.C. all come to mind. Holiday season travel would be most advantageous for terrorist planners, as there would be a greater likelihood that first-generation victims would be indoors and in close proximity to small groups of family when they begin the symptomatic and infectious stage two. 20

The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism

Complex statistical outbreak and treatment scenarios exist,21 but a quick estimate of the death toll of an attack with smallpox might look like this: Table 2: Death Toll of an Intentional Smallpox Outbreak Scenario

Infected

3 attack sites, 100 people infected at each site before 300 discovery of the first case.

Fatalities 0

300 infected people infect approximately 1500 more before CDC and medical 1800 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 90 fatalities = 1710 90 community can react. 30% of original cases are fatal. CDC isolates and successfully treats 75% of active 1710 x 0.25 = 427 cases. 30% fatality for untreated cases.

427 x 0.30 = 128

CDC locates and successfully treats remainder of cases.

299

Outbreak contained.

218

The death toll in this case would be much smaller than that of 9/11, but it would nonetheless be effective in generating terror and in compelling a government crisis response. Thousands would be indirectly affected, hospitals and medical systems would be overwhelmed with the "worried well" (those who go to the hospital thinking they are infected when, in fact, they are not), and billions of dollars would be potentially lost in containing the event, and in absorbing the surrounding political and economic fallout.

Conclusion The possibility of a terrorist attack utilizing biological weapons is an extremely relevant and valid concern. Islamist jihadist strategy demands the infliction of terror and death on non-believers. While it is difficult to provide irrefutable evidence, all signs indicate that they either have the capability or will in the near future. There is no way to reliably predict 21

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when such an attack might occur, but the conditions under which it might occur are coalescing into an increasing probability of attack. Islamist terrorist groups, like the one represented by Usama bin Ladin, clearly intend to carry out whatever form of attack has the greatest impact on the people and policies of the United States. If they succeed, they will gain additional legitimacy in the eyes of other world leaders. We may condemn the violence perpetrated by such groups on non-combatants, and we may refute their legitimacy as political bodies, but we ignore at our peril the threat they represent. Strategically speaking, we must find ways to reduce or eliminate the logical appeal of biological and other forms of terrorism as a means to an end, either by deterring, discovering, or destroying such efforts or by instituting sufficient homeland protective measures. Perhaps more importantly, we must discover what factors contribute to the global movement of Islamist jihad and find ways to minimize or eliminate those factors as significant motivators, in order to slow down and then overcome the momentum of the movement itself. The most important of these factors is undeniably the utility of violence in obtaining legitimacy-by-force. With many thanks to Jill Dekker-Bellamy for guidance and mentoring, and to Clare Lopez, Vice President of The Intelligence Summit, for remarkable insight into Islamist culture.

About the Author Scott Cary is a distance-learning student at the U.S. Naval War College, currently enrolled in two courses: Joint Maritime Operations, and Counter-Terrorism. He holds two Master's degrees: an MA in Psychology from Northwestern University, and an MBA from Johns Hopkins University. He is currently employed with the City of Washington, D.C. Mr. Cary can be reached for comment at: scott.cary@dc.gov.

References 1 David Alan Alexander and Susan Klein, "Biochemical terrorism: too awful to contemplate, too serious to ignore," British Journal of Psychiatry, 183 (2003): 491â&#x20AC;&#x201C;497. 2 "Human Behavior and WMD Crisis/Risk Communication Workshop," Co-sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command, March 2001.

The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism

3 Holloway, Norwood, Fullerton, Engel, and Ursano, "The Threat of Biological weapons: Prophylaxis and Mitigation of Psychological and Social Consequences," Journal of the American Medical Association, 278 no. 5 (August 1997): 425â&#x20AC;&#x201C;7. 4 Cleto DiGiovanni, Jr., "Domestic Terrorism With Chemical or Biological Agents: Psychiatric Aspects," American Journal of Psychiatry, 156 no. 10 (October 1999). 5 Interview with Reynold Salerno, Ph.D., International Biological Threat Reduction, Sandia National Labs, January 8, 2009. 6 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, available at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/. See also U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2007, available at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/index.htm. 7 Paul K. Kerr, "CRS Report For Congress: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends" Congressional Research Services, February 20, 2008, available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL30699.pdf. 8 GD Koblentz, "Biological Terrorism: Understanding the Threat and America's Response," in Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness, eds. Howitt and Pangi (Cambridge Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 2003). 9 James S. Jaehnig, "Why The United States Underestimated the Soviet BW Threat," (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2006), available at: http://tinyurl.com/nx2yjm (www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457274&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf). 10 Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L. Pangi, "Countering terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness," (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 2003). 11 DiGiovanni, (1999). 12 Eli Lake, "Al Qaeda bungles arms experiment," The Washington Times, January 19, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/6st4yk (www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2009/jan/19/al-qaeda-bungles-arms-experiment/). 13 Vincent M. Cannistraro, "Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction," available at: http://tinyurl.com/kjzh5k (www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/colloques/20021212/20021212-1.doc). 14 Jerry Gordon, "Al Qaeda Bio-Weapon threat to America," The Iconoclast, June 3, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/mnr9xz (www.newenglishreview.org/ blog_display.cfm/blog_id/21244#CurDomainURL#/blog.cfm). 15 Sara Carter, "Al Qaeda Eyes Bio Attack From Mexico," The Washington Times, June 3, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/pc43t3 (www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/03/al-qaeda-eyes-bio-attack-via-mexico-border/). 16 Ibid.

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17 "Dark Winter" live tabletop attack scenario produced by University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Center for Biosecurity, June 2001, available at: http://tinyurl.com/dn2hs6 (www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/events/ 2001_darkwinter/index.html). See also, Center for Infection Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) website, available at: http://tinyurl.com/mfdkk9 (www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/smallpox/ news/smallpoxtrans121701.html), and Raymond Gani and Steve Leach, "Transmission potential of smallpox in contemporary populations," Nature 414 (December 13, 2001): 748â&#x20AC;&#x201C;751, available at: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v414/n6865/abs/414748a.html. 18 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Smallpox Disease Overview," Smallpox Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp. 19 Richard Black, "Smallpox vaccine to be retained," BBC News, January 11, 2002, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1756360.stm. 20 See reference #19. 21 Martin I. Meltzer, Inger Damon, James W. LeDuc, and J. Donald Millar, "Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorist Weapon," Emerging Infectious Diseases, 7, no. 6 (2001), available at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no6/meltzer.htm.

START: Overcoming Remaining Challenges By Elizabeth Zolotukhina

Introduction During the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the governments of Russia and the United States could not agree on how to codify their balance of strategic offensive nuclear forces after the existing Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) expired on December 5, 2009.1 The United States and Russia are currently engaged in negotiations to replace START with a new treaty before the end of this year. Then U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed START on July 31, 1991, after a decade of contentious negotiations and only months before the USSR's disintegration. The accord required both countries to decrease their strategic holdings to 6,000 nuclear warheads on a maximum of 1,600 strategic delivery systems (land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles or long-range bombers) by December 5, 2001. START did not come into force until December 5, 1994, after the parties agreed that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine would serve as legal successors to the Soviet Union for the purposes of the treaty. START's initial duration was set to fifteen years, but the parties could agree to its extension for successive five-year periods. Each side also has the right to withdraw from the treaty by giving the other party six months notice. Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin negotiated a START II treaty that would have required deeper reductions, but the Russian Duma and the U.S. Congress failed to agree on mutually-acceptable terms of ratification. Strategic delivery systems for both countries include the three main components of the traditional nuclear triadâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range heavy bombers. All three systems are capable of attacking targets at great distances (over 5,000 kilometers), allowing a delivery platform based in Russia to reach the United States and vice-versa.

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The Quest for Strategic Flexibility Bush administration officials valued strategic flexibility to adjust the U.S. nuclear arsenal rapidly to meet unanticipated strategic challenges as well as to avail of technological opportunities. They considered comprehensive strategic arms control treaties largely irrelevant in a world in which threats from transnational terrorists and states of proliferation concern had become more important than fears of a confrontation between Moscow and Washington. Instead, they relied upon other measures such as export controls, interdiction, and sanctions to ensure international security. However, American officials did not entirely repudiate traditional arms control measures. Administration representatives argued that the implementation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty), signed in May 2002, would suffice to place the U.S.Russian bilateral strategic arms control relationship on a stable basis despite complications arising from the treaty's lack of verification measures and other ambiguities associated with the two-page document.

U.S. Policy to Date During the 2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Barack Obama promised to pursue negotiations to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear force levels. This policy was tested immediately following Obama's inauguration when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made his November 5th threat to target countries in northeast Europe with Iskander short-range missiles if Washington did not scrap the ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployments planned for Poland and the Czech Republic.2 Upon assuming office, President Obama directed a "reset" of bilateral relations, spearheaded by the U.S. Department of State. This comprehensive re-positioning of Washington's Russia policyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;which administration officials also expect will involve major changes in Russia's foreign and defense policiesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;is envisaged to include renewed attention to arms control issues; specifically, the negotiation of an accord to replace the START treaty. Official talks to this end began on April 24, 2009. The opening of the negotiations for START followed a very positive reception to President Barack Obama's Prague speech earlier that month reaffirming the U.S. commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons, which President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have both endorsed. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the "new momentum for disarmament"3 represented by the start of the Russia-America talks. The two governments are aiming to sign a replacement accord this Fall. This would allow legislative bodies in both countries to examine and ratify the 26

START: Overcoming Remaining Challenges

new text by December 2009. However, it is far from certain whether the parties will be able to overcome the major arms control differences separating them by the December deadline; nevertheless, Presidents Obama and Medvedev had high hopes to finalize the treaty text during a July 2009 meeting in Moscow. White House officials hailed the July 6–8, 2009 Russian-American summit as an overall success, pointing to the numerous agreements reached while conceding that it would be impossible to "solve everything in two days."4 Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed several documents at the meeting, including a joint understanding that commits the United States and Russia to reduce their strategic warheads to a range of 1500–1675 and their strategic delivery vehicles to a range of 500–1100.5 Moscow and Washington would be required to meet these limits within seven years after the new treaty enters into force. The two leaders also agreed to resume military contacts suspended after the August 2008 Georgia war, reached a deal allowing coalition forces to transport lethal equipment and troops bound for Afghanistan through Russian territory and airspace,6 and committed to jointly analyzing "ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century,"7 and to intensify their dialogue regarding the establishment of the Joint Data Exchange Center for missile launches. Many issues continue to divide the two sides and these issues may preclude, or at least hinder, the conclusion of an agreement to replace START. For example, Obama and Medvedev disagree regarding Russia's recent dismemberment of Georgia and, more broadly, Moscow's policies towards countries it considers as its "near abroad," such as Ukraine and the Central Asian states. In addition, the presidents were unable to reach consensus regarding the proposed deployment of U.S. BMD components in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although the U.S. administration has not yet made a policy decision on this issue, President Obama declined to link the BMD system with the current START negotiations—the preferred position of his Russian interlocutors.

The Russian Angle Russian negotiators are pushing for a new, formal treaty that would replace START and supersede SORT.8 The Kremlin wants the new accord to be legally binding and more detailed than SORT, which it perceives as insufficiently constraining to ensure predictability and parity in the Russian-American strategic nuclear relationship. For example, Moscow favors firm limits on the number of U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, as well as restrictions on their possible long-term deployment in 27

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foreign countries (e.g., to exclude the deployment of U.S. strategic bombers in former Soviet bloc countries near Russia). They also want to be able to increase the number of warheads aboard some Russian missiles, have fewer limitations on the movements of their existing nuclear forces (e.g., Russia's road-mobile Topol-Ms), and enjoy greater freedom to modernize their nuclear forces to ensure their ability to overcome the expanding U.S. ballistic missile defenses network.9 Russian officials are open to eliminating some of START's more burdensome implementation requirements, if only to reduce the expenses associated with meeting these provisions (especially those associated with the costly short-notice inspections).10 Russian negotiators and their American counterparts generally support retaining some of the detailed verification and data exchange provisions that have long characterized strategic arms control agreements rather than adopting the less formal transparency regime favored by the George W. Bush administration.11 In addition, Russian representatives would like to require the United States to eliminate warheads removed from its active stockpile rather than simply placing them in storage, which makes them potentially available for re-entry into the operational force. Putin and other Russian leaders have long complained about Washington's policy of placing "aside a couple of hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day."12

Ongoing Negotiations The April negotiations which took place at the residence of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom in London, although largely symbolic, resulted in the adoption of two declarations and a clarification of the two sides' initial negotiating positions. The first communiquĂŠ addressed the issue of strategic offensive weapons,13 while the second was concerned with the general framework of U.S.-Russian relations including various arms control issues and regional security.14 By adopting a bilateral arms control declaration that underscores the long-term goal of destroying nuclear weapons as a whole, Washington and Moscow pledged to engage in a gradual process aimed at achieving new and verifiable reductions of their strategic arsenals. A new legally-binding agreement will be a part of this paradigm. One of the most important issues dividing the two parties is which warheads to count. The United States still objects to the Russian proposal to count warheads that are in storage or are being refurbished. However, Russian officials have repeatedly voiced concerns that Washington could quickly "re-upload" these warheads if the occasion arises.15 Russian and 28

START: Overcoming Remaining Challenges

American diplomats must also agree on which prohibitions, restrictions, and other provisions already present in START, should be included in the new accord. Moreover, they need to establish the number of warheads that each side is permitted to retain. The new agreement will contain a bilateral ceiling of 1500â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1675 warheads, only a moderate reduction in the ceiling established by the 2002 Moscow Treaty (2200â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1700 warheads). However, once the new treaty is enacted, U.S. officials intend to open talks to cut arms more deeply.16 Russian military commanders worry that such measures could destabilize strategic parity between Moscow and Washington and add that any accord, which reduces the number of allowable warheads below 1500 would have to include provisions for restricting U.S. missile defense. Critics of Obama, who has articulated a broad nonproliferation agenda, including the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, urge the administration not to conclude a successor agreement to START until the Nuclear Posture Review, a document which establishes policies and strategies for the U.S. nuclear deterrent, has been completed and assessed by Congress. One report argues that it would be "ill advised" to consider cuts below 1700 warheads in a START follow-on agreement due to "the immense advantage the Kremlin enjoys in nonstrategic weapons and the threat they pose to the former Soviet republics and American allies on Russia's littoral."17 Nevertheless, the joint statements adopted by the American and Russian Presidents in London and Moscow clearly demonstrate that both sides would like to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons in the future.

Success not Guaranteed Although it is difficult to foresee possible solutions to many outstanding technical issues, in the past, factors external to the agreement have posed serious obstacles to the conclusion of a strategic arms control accord. Some observers note that bilateral strategic arms control negotiations further U.S.-Russian relations. However, usually the causality is reversed. Positive overall ties determine the success of arms control negotiations. The history of the past several decades shows that rather than using arms control discussions as a vehicle to improve bilateral ties, oftentimes success in arms control requires good bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington. Historically, disruptive external factors included disagreement on other aspects of arms control as well as unrelated and unconnected international security issues. For example, divergent views on NATO enlarge29

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ment and the Kosovo war led the Russian Duma to postpone ratification of START II. Likewise, Russia's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan prompted the U.S. Senate to refuse to ratify SALT II. Russian and American leaders already have identified other concerns that could impede START negotiations. These issues encompass missile defense, mid-range nuclear missiles, short-range tactical nuclear missiles, conventional military force reductions, and questions regarding the strategic forces of other nuclear states. Geopolitical issues, which have the potential to derail the strategic weapons negotiations, include further NATO enlargement, Russian policy toward other former Soviet republics, especially Georgia and Ukraine, as well as differences between Washington and Moscow regarding Iran.

Policy Prerogatives Moving Forward The Obama administration has yet to conclude the policy review of U.S. missile defense. Decisions in this regard partially hinge on the progress of Iran in developing dual-use nuclear and missile technologies. President Obama's letter to his Russian counterpart underlined the link between U.S. missile defense and the Iranian threat.18 In the same missive, Obama noted that, should international efforts achieve the goal of rolling back Tehran's attempts to develop missile and nuclear weapons, in which Washington ascribes an important role to Moscow, the need for an American missile defense system would decline in tandem. In the best-case scenario, the two governments would cooperate on the Iranian issue. Initial steps in this regard were taken at the Moscow summit when Presidents Obama and Medvedev pledged to jointly evaluate the threat posed by Tehran. This approach may help to avert the near-term danger posed by Tehran developing indigenous nuclear weapons and establish the basis of a long-term partnership in other nonproliferation areas. The focus on nuclear arms control could further the "reset" of American policy towards Russia. However, history demonstrates that problems in unrelated spheres of the U.S.-Russian relationship frequently hinder progress in bilateral arms control negotiations if the former are not addressed promptly. These disagreements may increase the likelihood that misunderstandings could inadvertently lead to missed opportunities for mutually beneficial arms reductions.

START: Overcoming Remaining Challenges

About the Author Elizabeth Zolotukhina is Head Editor of the Project on National Security Reform Case Studies Working Group. Her past affiliations include the Hudson Institute and the Lexington Institute. Ms. Zolotukhina received her undergraduate degree from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research interests include nonproliferation, arms control, and Russia. Her articles have appeared in the World Politics Review and the International Affairs Forum, among others.

References 1 Wade Boese, "U.S., Russia Exploring Post-START Options," Arms Control Today, May 2007, available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_05/PostSTART.asp. 2 Elizabeth Zolotukhina, "European Ballistic Missile Defense: Competing Interests and Reluctant Partners." International Affairs Forum, April 8, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/c62uc7 (www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternalDocument.cfm?ContentID=6808). 3 Unattributed. "UN chief hails 'new momentum' with disarmament talks," Agence France Presse, May 19, 2009, available at: http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=1608588. 4 Peter Baker, "Obama Resets Ties to Russia, but Work Remains," New York Times, July 8, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/ldlzdd (www.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/world/europe/ 08prexy.html?scp=1&sq=Obama%20Resets%20Ties%20to%20Russia,%20but%2 0Work%20Remains&st=cse). 5 Unattributed, "Obama, Medvedev Agree to Nuclear Arms Reduction Goals," Global Security Newswire, July 6, 2009, available at: http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090706_5377.php. 6 Clifford J. Levy and Peter Baker, "U.S.-Russia Nuclear Agreement Is First Step in Broad Effort," New York Times, July 7, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/rdko69 (www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/world/europe/ 07prexy.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=U.S.-Russia%20Nuclear%20Agreement%20Is%20First%20Step%20in%20Broad%20Effor t&st=cse). 7 "Joint Statement by Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation and Barack Obama, President of the United States on Missile Defense Issues," July 6, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/kvhm5v (www.whitehouse.gov/ the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitry-A-Medvedev-President-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-Barack-Obama-President-of-the-United-States-of-Americaon-Missile-Defense-Issues/).

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8 Thom Shanker, "Bush Sends Putin Missile Defense Offer," International Herald Tribune, March 18, 2008, available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/18/europe/18missile.php. 9 Alexei Arbatov and Rose Gottemoeller, "New Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control," Arms Control Today (July/August 2008), available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/CoverStory.asp. 10 Boese, "U.S., Russia Exploring Post-START Options;" and Nikolai Sokov, "START I Replacement: The End of Cold War Disarmament," PONARS Policy Memo No. 418 (December 2006), available at: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0418.pdf. 11 Nikolai Sokov, "U.S. and Russia Set to Begin Talks to Replace START I Treaty, WMD Insights, September 2007, available at: http://www.wmdinsights.com/I18/I18_R2_ReplaceSTARTI.htm. 12 Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," February 10, 2007, available at: http://tinyurl.com/25oxre (www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/ 0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118135.shtml). 13 "Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arm [sic]," April 1, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/nxs4ue (www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama/). 14 "Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America," April 1, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/msymxq (www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/JointStatement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-andPresident-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America/). 15 Pavel Podvig, The Russian Nuclear Arsenal (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, 2006), p. 6, available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=15331. 16 Clifford J. Levy and Peter Baker, "U.S.-Russia Nuclear Agreement Is First Step in Broad Effort," New York Times, July 7, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/rdko69 (www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/world/europe/ 07prexy.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=U.S.-Russia%20Nuclear%20Agreement%20Is%20First%20Step%20in%20Broad%20Effo rt&st=cse). 17 The New Deterrent Working Group, "U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting it Right," July 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/qean7j (204.96.138.161/upload/wysiwyg/center%20publication%20pdfs/NDWG%20Getting%20It%20Right.pdf). 18 Peter Baker, "Obama Offered Deal to Russia in Secret Letter," New York Times, March 2, 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/washington/03prexy.html.

What Price Security? By Donald C. Masters, Ph.D.

Introduction This article presents a critique of the Copenhagen Consensus Center's (CCC) exhaustive study on transnational terrorism, published in 2008. The implications of this study are controversial, yet highly relevant in today's economic environment. The Obama administration must come to terms with fiscal realities that will challenge budget priorities and invigorate what will undoubtedly prove to be tough negotiations on Capitol Hill for homeland security dollars. It is proposed here that standard economic tools such as benefit cost analysis, cost effectiveness criteria, and simulation models can help identify areas where security can be either extended or improved using fewer resources. Greater movement towards competitive procurement practices will also result in lower costs and higher returns on security investments.

The Copenhagen Study For this study, the Copenhagen Center commissioned two academic economists, Todd Sandler and Walter Enders of the Universities of Texas and Alabama respectively, to evaluate the human costs and economic consequences of terrorism in conjunction with government expenditures on anti-terrorism efforts.1 The study's objective was to quantify the benefits of (a) lives saved and injuries avoided and (b) economic losses averted compared to the budgetary costs associated with homeland security. Their research uses standard benefit-cost methodology to calculate the estimated return on investment compared to alternative "solutions." The study deals only with "transnational" terrorism, defined as terrorist activity that crosses international borders as opposed to domestic insurgencies or resistance to foreign occupation. They observe that "terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric conflict, deployed by the weak for strategic advantage against a strong opponent." In their view, there is no permanent solution to transnational terrorism because it is a cost effective tactic. Their analysis of international trends related to terrorist incidents found that on average 420 people are killed and 1,249 are injured annually.2 Yet, guarding against terrorism can consume resources at an alarming rate without a permanent reduction in terrorist activity.

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Obviously, an international study of this complexity requires some heroic assumptions regarding the relative magnitudes of benefits and costs. By and large, the authors are explicit in stating their underlying assumptions and conducted extensive sensitivity analysis to determine the reasonableness of their estimates. Where reasonable doubt exists they took the optimistic scenario favoring higher benefits or lower costs. The data for the main variables driving benefits and costs were estimated from a number of studies or drawn from official budgets and national income accounts.

Benefit Cost Ratios Benefit cost ratios (BCR) are one method for calculating the net discounted return on investment. The BCR is a discounted ratio of benefits to costs. It is similar to the more familiar present value approach, which subtracts discounted costs from benefits to show net return. Accordingly, the present value method provides an absolute dollar value while BCR is a ratio expressed in decimal form. The investment rule (for both) is to make the investment if either is greater than one, assuming full access to capital resources. If resources are constrained (the normal situation) then either method can be used to rank order alternative investments from highest ranked investment down to the investment that exhausts available capital resources. When there is lack of certainty regarding the benefits and costs over time, then the BCR method takes on characteristics similar to a probabilistic decision model. In other words, the BCR approach estimates an order of magnitude based on a range of values for key variables driving the analysis. In the Copenhagen study, three key variables are identified as determining benefits and costs. They are: (1) fatalities and injuries sustained in terrorist attacks, (2) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) losses associated with destruction or disruption of economic activity, and (3) security costs to governments in countering terrorist threats. Although all three are calculated as "costs" either to terrorism victims or their governments, the first two are treated as benefits that would accrue if government anti-terrorist programs cause these losses to be averted. Alternatively stated, the benefit cost approach compares terrorism losses to society that would have occurred if governments did not undertake security measures to protect their citizens. In the arcane language of the economist, the benefit cost approach estimates a counterfactual of what would have occurred in the absence of investments in security measures. In this manner, net benefits and costs can be compared when appropriately discounted over a period of time. In this study, five-year capitalized values were used for both benefits and costs. Briefly, the key variables are as follows: 34

What Price Security?

Benefits Available data were assembled to show average annual casualties in terms of deaths and injuries due to terrorist acts. The fatalities were valued in terms of life expectancies at the time of death and compensation paid to families. The injuries were categorized by type and severity in order to estimate their weighted distribution and corresponding disability costs. This weighted cost formula was derived from a French study that used time series data for fatalities and injuries associated with a typical terrorist incident. Thus, the number of fatalities along with the associated (weighted distribution) injuries could be "priced" to show the dollar value of benefit of an averted terrorist attack attributable to enhanced homeland security. The variable estimated could then be adjusted to reflect higher or lower death compensation and disability values by region and average per capita income. Since terrorism destroys property and/or disrupts economic activity, an estimate of economic costs was also calculated. The authors used estimates provided in a 2004 study that calculated the economic losses in terms of forgone economic growth on a per capita basis. The estimates were then applied to countries that experienced transnational terrorism over the period 2001â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2005. The data sources for this calculation came from country national income accounts. For example, the GDP loss due to foregone growth over a five-year period, for some seventy countries, amounted to $83 billion. Of this amount, the United States had the highest GDP loss calculation at an estimated $37 billion.3

Costs The authors relied heavily on public expenditure data from the United States and Britain since they (1) represented the main country targets of transnational terrorism and (2) their budget data were the most explicit regarding security costs since 9/11. There was a high cost estimate for "proactive" anti-terrorism efforts, which included both domestic and overseas costs associated with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. These costs were converted into a percent of GDP for the base year 2005. The lower cost estimate for purely "defensive" homeland security efforts was similarly calculated. In the end, the authors used the lower "defensive" cost estimates combined with a lower proxy estimate for the 66 countries that experienced terrorist acts but were not considered main target countries.4

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Analysis Results The calculated benefit cost ratios (BCRs) ranged from a low of 0.039 to a high of 0.095 depending on alternative assumptions. This range is surprisingly low, showing a return on security investments of less than ten cents on the dollar. Nevertheless, the calculations are viewed as "robust" in light of the data sources and methodologies used.

Alternative "Solutions" Some of the solutions showing less adverse BCRs are briefly outlined below: • Greater International Cooperation–Freezing terrorists' financial assets would reduce funding available to launch attacks, while greater extradition of suspected terrorists for prosecution might also reduce their organizational capacity. Both would require greater international cooperation which, if achieved, would be a low cost option. The stepped up monitoring of financial transfers and remittances could be implemented by the International Monetary Fund, working in tandem with member country central banks and regulators. The proposed doubling of the Interpol budget from $58 million to $116 million would help improve international police coordination in apprehending and extraditing suspected terrorists. It was noted that this solution would not impact on small "routine" attacks but would make larger scale "spectacular" attacks less likely; thereby saving a considerable number of lives and property. The BCR ranged from 5.348 to 15.504, giving this approach the highest return on investment. • Augmented Defensive Measures–Better border security and hardening of critical infrastructure as well as public safety measures raise costs but might result in 25% fewer successful attacks. However, it was noted that there would likely be some transference to softer targets. Countries taking this approach might well assign a higher compensation value thereby raising calculated benefits. Accordingly, the estimated BCRs range from 0.281 to 0.304 which are still adverse and (in the opinion of the authors) not likely to change significantly with additional resources dedicated to defensive measures.

General Observations Clearly the study represents an ambitious effort. While it is possible to question some of the techniques used to derive the cost estimates, it is 36

What Price Security?

evident that costs tend to overwhelm benefits. This causes the BCRs to fall short of the investment breakeven point. At the margin, governments can and should seek lower-cost countermeasures while anticipating more lethal threats in the future. Although there was some discussion of chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear (CBRN) weapons eventually finding their way into terrorist hands, there was no attempt to model this eventuality into their benefit cost framework. Rather they suggest that there are "inhibitors" that make it unlikely that terrorists will increase their lethal capabilities in the foreseeable future.5 This may be an unrealistic assumption. A "rogue" state possessing CBRN weapons might collude with terrorists, providing them with the means of inflicting far greater casualties and economic loss. Even in the absence of such collusion between a "state actor" and a "non-state actor," a biological weapon could be developed by terrorists in the near future.6 Such a scenario would shift the benefit stream considerably upwards, yielding a significantly higher BCR. This would certainly be a "game changer" and well worth considering in greater detail. Benefit cost analysis is most usefully applied within the same organizational unit responsible for budget planning and program design. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would be, in this context, the relevant entity with independent oversight provided by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). For public goods, such as security, it is often more difficult to value benefits than measure financial costs. For this reason, it is sometimes helpful to develop measurable indicators that correlate closely with intended benefits. This requires metrics that meaningfully represent improved security, such that cost effectiveness becomes the operational measure of efficiency. For example, a security program might call for the protection of critical infrastructure with security measures designed to "harden" a facility from a possible terrorist threat. The task can be defined as selecting security systems that are most cost effective in reducing the probability of a successful attack. If a security output can be measurably defined, then we are simply looking for the least expensive combination of systems, i.e. equipment and personnel (inputs) to attain a given level of security (output). Port security would be an example. The security threat involves the smuggling of illicit or dangerous materials in intermodal shipping containers. The primary threat would be a bomb of some kind in which the port itself or some inland destination may be the intended target. The security mission is to maintain normal port operations while identifying (and disposing of, if necessary) containers that pose a serious threat. The procurement and deployment task is to do this at least cost. 37

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Layered Security Systems: Redundant Costs? The concept of layered security is to create a dense protective shield that reduces the risk of a successful terrorist attack. The layered security approach is often applied to critical infrastructure. However, without an overall measure of facility protection, security "layers" and their associated costs may be unnecessarily added over time. Conditional probability theory lends some support to this approach, but only if certain conditions are met. To illustrate, assume there are three security systems that use older technology that is only 50% effective in preventing an attack. In this example, each system probability (p) is set equal to 0.50 yielding an effectiveness rate similar to the random flipping of a coin. However, when all three systems are used in concert the resulting vulnerability declines markedly, as shown below: (0.50) x (0.50) x (0.50) = 0.125 This yields a 1:8 probability of a successful attack on the facility. This probabilistic measure of vulnerability could be further reduced if (a) additional layers and corresponding probabilities were added and/or (b) better security technologies with higher probabilities of prevention were substituted for older systems. Importantly, this approach assumes that each component system is independent or operates autonomously, such that defeating one system does not affect the others. The other condition is that none of the systems can be circumvented by the attacker. (Some well-known examples of circumvention include the Trojan Horse and, in modern times, the Maginot Line). Taking this illustration further in the context of port security, assume we have three systems (Advanced Spectroscopic Portalsâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;ASP, Automated Targeting Systemâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;ATS, and Hazmat) which together provide detection capability against an explosive device, either conventional or radiological/ nuclear. The ASP system relies on different technologies jointly deployed amounting to a two-tier scanning process.7 This newer technology costs more than five times as much as existing technology. A cost benefit analysis of the two types of scanning equipment was performed but the results were inconclusive at the time.8 Nevertheless, for the purpose of this example, assume that an optimal technical ratio or deployment configuration has been established, such that the operation of the primary scanning system, which is a polyvinyl toluene (PVT)-based gamma-ray scintillation detector, is fully coordinated with the more expensive ASP secondary scanners. The result is a 38

What Price Security?

combined effectiveness probability of, say, 90%. Similarly, we assign differing successful attack probabilities for each of the three systems, shown below. The first involves analysis of electronic manifests (ATS) and the assignment of container risk scores; second, a two-tier scanning system (ASP) and, third, a countermeasure procedure to deal with "positive" detections (Hazmat). Hence, the port security "architecture" could be summarized as follows where the numbers in parentheses represent probabilities of successful detection for each system: ATS (0.80) x ASP (0.10) x Hazmat (0.25) = 0.020 probability of success The conditional probability (P) derived from this simple equation suggests that an attack would have only a 1:50 or 2% chance of success. This implies that the port is now 98% secured from bomb threats. At this level of security, additional "layers" may not be warranted given their associated costs. However, if a rare (P = 0.020) but potentially high consequence event occurs, then mitigation strategies may be more cost effective. To determine this in economic terms, we draw on insurance theory and the concept of expected value of an outcome. This is calculated as the product of the probability and the value-at-risk of the asset. This dollar amount determines the risk premium to be paid. If the port facility suffered a billion dollar loss then the annual premium would be $20 million. Given that more than 10 million containers arrive at U.S. ports every year, a fee of $2 per container would cover this premium. Thus, an optimal port strategy might use protective and mitigation strategies together, if this translates into greater cost efficiency.

Systems Analysis and Cost Minimization Models can simulate system operations to help identify and estimate security compliance costs borne by the private sector. Several years ago, Sandia National Laboratories, drawing on Seattle-Tacoma port data, designed a simulation model to evaluate the impact of port security initiatives on container operations.9 A team representing experts and stakeholders pooled information to systematically estimate short- and long-term impacts. The resulting port "system dynamics" model estimated short-term effects of increased security on (a) shipping cost and (b) delivery time. In addition, the model estimated the port's longer term competitive prospects related to increased costs of security measures. They concluded that the implementation of security measures in a piecemeal fashion had competitive disadvantages for "early adopter" ports. The simulation took into account the high fixed costs of port operations and the limited cost recovery attainable by raising port charges. In a competi39

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tive market, individual ports cannot easily pass on security costs to carriers since this could divert shipping traffic. The related loss in container volumes creates a dynamic leading to a downward "revenue" spiral that could ultimately threaten port commercial viability. Sandia's simulation exercise suggests that security enhancements should take into account their effects on commercial operations. Even though equipment costs may be borne by the government, at least initially the localized impact on port operations may generate significant private costs. One approach for planned rollouts of new security measures would be the development of a "generic" port model. This could identify the main parameters that influence trade flows and operational costs, which could then be built-out or "customized" for specific port conditions. This might include the number of loading and stacking cranes available; container ship berths and schedules; and container storage areas linked to onward transportation facilities. The flow of containers per unit of time (or "throughput") could be estimated given infrastructure constraints and security requirements. The constrained optimization problem would be to minimize time delays and associated costs while achieving a predetermined level of port security.

Procurement Reform The search for "economies" with respect to homeland security will inevitably turn to procurement. The ability of DHS to secure favorable prices from suppliers and contractors is critical given the magnitudes involved. The value of contracts awarded by the DHS claimed one-third of budget resources in fiscal years 2006â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2008. This amounted to approximately $40 billion over a three-year period. Moreover, DHS grants to state and local institutions create cascading procurements that have substantial resource allocation implications. The Federal Acquisition Act, as amended, formally enshrines "competition" as the guiding principle for all government procurements. Following 9/11, Congress gave DHS extensive procurement authorities as well as multi-year program funding. This included "other" procurement methods (non-competitive) to expedite the nation's defenses to counter expected terrorist attacks. As a consequence, large multi-year contracts were awarded on a non-competitive basis, usually justified by the determination that only one firm had "predominant capability" in a certain technical area. As late as fiscal year 2006, roughly 39% of all federal contracts fell into the category "not competed for an allowable reason."10 In more recent years, there has been movement towards less prescribed contracting prac40

What Price Security?

tices. Nevertheless, the category "competed but only one bid was received," suggests a lack of effective competition. Combining these two categories gives a ratio of non-competitive to competitive awards of roughly two to one. Overall, 50% of all DHS procurements between fiscal years 2006â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2008 were less than fully competitive. Economists generally agree that competition provides the lowest prices, thereby mobilizing the most resources from a given budget. Thus, an indicator of procurement reform would be contract awards gradually becoming more competitive. The deployment of new advanced technologies poses the most difficulty to procurement reforms since (by definition) they do not have exact bid specifications or "off the shelf" equivalents. For this reason, grant funding is often used for applied research and development of prototypes. However, technologically sophisticated contracts have been awarded for large-scale projects. Various GAO reports suggest that the procurement methods, including contract management at the implementation stage, have proved problematic in certain cases. Well known indicators include significant project delays and related cost overruns. These projects are technology intensive and often complex, requiring exceptional management oversight. The latter cannot easily be "contracted out" as this sometimes poses conflicts of interest. On balance, DHS may have to consider a number of options that will increase internal administrative costs. One would be the development of a technical cadre to serve as program managers. Another option would be to hire and train additional procurement officers to handle the increased workload related to smaller "bite size" contracts. These would be more labor-intensive to compete but would encourage greater medium-size firm participation. Firms in this size category may prove more adept at designing and implementing less costly security systems.

Conclusion Projected U.S. Government deficits will likely create a constrained fiscal environment in the years ahead. Barring another high profile terrorist attack on American soil, homeland security may become less of a budget priority. Coming to terms with the new fiscal realities will be a major challenge for senior management. We have suggested here that standard economic tools such as benefit cost analysis, cost effectiveness criteria, and simulation models can help identify areas where security can be either extended or improved using fewer resources. Greater movement towards competitive procurement practices will also result in lower costs and higher returns on security investments.

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About the Author Donald C. Masters, Ph.D., was formerly with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1973–1975) in the Public and Private Finance Division. He subsequently joined the U.S. Foreign Service (1977– 97) where he advised governments on economic and fiscal policies. During rotations at the State Department, he served as USAID Officer-in-Charge for various countries including Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. In 1998, he became a senior consultant for the International Development Business Consultants (IDBC) and later joined the faculty at the Monterey Institute of International Studies as an Adjunct Professor of Economics (1999–2002). Currently, he is an Executive Director on the Board of the Homeland Security Innovation Association (HLSIA), a private non-profit corporation whose primary mission is to aggregate information, disseminate potential solutions, and articulate technology-related issues pertinent to homeland security. Dr. Masters can be reached for comment at: masters@hlsia.org.

References 1 "Terrorism," Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge Paper, February 2008, available at: http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Default.aspx?ID=1152. 2 Ibid, "Transnational Terrorism," Executive Summary, see Table 2. 3 Ibid, Table 12. 4 Ibid, Table 11. 5 Ibid, pp.56–57. 6 Bob Graham et al., World at Risk: Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (New York: Vintage Books, 2008). 7 For more information, see "Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS' Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors is Likely to Exceed the Cost Estimates," Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-1108R, September 22, 2008, available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1108R. 8 For details of cost benefit analysis results, see "Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS' Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment is Not Supported by its Cost Benefit Analysis," Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-581T, March 14, 2007, available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-581T. 9 Thomas Corbet et al, "Evaluating the Economic Impact of Port Security Initiatives on Container Operations," National Infrastructure Simulation & Analysis Center (Monograph, Sandia National Laboratories, 2005). 10 See http://www.usaspending.gov for federal contract award statistics.

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks By Richard Adler, Ph.D. and Jeff Fuller

Introduction: Challenges for Managing Risks from Terrorism Improved intelligence sharing is helping Homeland Security authorities identify terrorist threats more effectively. However, this progress accentuates key "downstream" problems for decision-makers: â&#x20AC;˘ Analyzing credible but imprecisely defined terrorist threats. â&#x20AC;˘ Formulating strategies to mitigate risks from terrorist threats and understanding their likely consequences and costs. â&#x20AC;˘ Revalidating and adapting strategies as the risk landscape evolves over time. Conventional decision support methods and tools lack the horsepower required to address these program-level tasks effectively. For example, spreadsheets and other simulation engines excel at manipulating numeric data, projecting quantitative trends, and the like. However, they fall short in depicting and leveraging critical knowledge about security that is largely qualitative, uncertain, and incomplete. Key examples include intelligence about terrorist objectives, resources, and behaviors; economic forces and technological trends; and the challenges of implementing complex security initiatives. Lacking robust frameworks for analyzing the dynamics of terrorism risk and risk mitigation strategies, authorities are seriously hampered in their efforts to protect the nation. This article presents a dynamic decision support methodology for counter-terrorism decision support. The initial sections introduce basic objectives and challenges of terrorism risk analysis and risk management. The remainder of the paper describes TRANSEC, a decision support framework for defining, validating, and monitoring strategies focused on managing terrorism risks to international transportation networks. The methodology and software tools underlying TRANSEC are applicable to other homeland security problems, such as critical infrastructure and border protection. 43

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Analyzing Risks from Terrorist Attacks Classic risk assessment methodologies focus on identifying relevant threats and estimating their relative likelihoods and expected impacts.1 The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has adopted the following analytic construct for assessing risks, not only from terrorist attacks but also from natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and epidemics:2 Risk = Threat x Consequence x Vulnerability. For terrorism risks, analysts evaluate threats by estimating the capability and intent of terrorists to carry out specific types of attacks against identified targets, such as driving a truck carrying a bomb into a facility in the Port of Miami or firing a shoulder-launched missile (MANPAD) at an aircraft from the perimeter of Los Angeles International Airport. Vulnerability is estimated in terms of physical accessibility and security defenses already in place to deter or prevent attacks. Finally, Consequence hinges on estimated impacts, such as loss of life and economic effects should an attack succeed. For example, within DHS, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has developed and deployed a maritime security analysis model (MSRAM).3 MSRAM analyzes the threat of terrorist attacks against 63 classes of potential targets in and around the nation's ports and waterways, including various types of passenger and cargo vessels, terminals and other port facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure. Twenty-three attack modes are proposed, such as aquatic mines or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), small aircraft, bomb-laden trucks, and hijacked vessels used as weapons. MSRAM depicts the threat for each such target-attack mode pairings via quantitative estimates of terrorist intent and capabilities to carry out these scenarios, together with confidence levels in these judgments. These data are supplied by the USCG Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC). MSRAM estimates vulnerability as a function of three factors: Attack Achievability, System Security, and Target Hardness. Attack Achievability is assessed in terms of factors such as geography, weather, and the complexity of the attack mode. System Security measures the capability of key government and commercial security authorities to interdict attacks. Finally, Target Hardness refers to the target's estimated capability to withstand particular attack modes, such as a bomb blast or release of toxic chemicals, and maintain operations. 44

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

Finally, MSRAM assesses the consequences of target-attack mode combinations in terms of estimated deaths, injuries, primary economic and environmental impacts, effects on national security, and symbolic significance. Economic impacts include property damage and immediate costs of disruption and substitution. Primary economic consequences can be mitigated by the capability of security actors to respond effectively to successful attacks; e.g., neutralizing attackers, putting out fires, providing emergency medical services, decontaminating sites, etc. MSRAM also attempts to estimate the secondary economic impacts of attacks, such as the net losses to commercial aviation from disruptions in air travel following the 9/11 attack. Mitigating factors for the component of consequence include redundancy of facilities (e.g., multiple cranes or docks) and preparedness to recover operational capabilities promptly. The USCG deploys MSRAM as a PC-based application, backed by extensive training. Captains of the Port and their staff apply MSRAM to assess risks at their (local) level on an annual basis. The USCG rolls up MSRAM data and applies it to prioritize critical maritime security investments at local, regional, and national levels.

Managing Risk from Terrorist Threats Once risks have been assessed through models such as MSRAM, the question naturally arises of reducing exposure to these risks. In other words, how do we manage risks once they are analyzed uniformly to allow ranking and other types of comparisons? In particular, what allocations of and investments in new personnel, training, systems, technologies, and other resources will improve capabilities to prevent attacks and to respond effectively should interdiction efforts fail? How and when will these strategies reduce vulnerabilities and consequences? How robust are these strategies to changes in adversaries' tactics and weapons? Finally, how can risk mitigation activities and investments be managed as a diversified portfolio to maximize reduction of risk exposure not only across geographically distributed threats and targets, but also across plausible future conditions? Managing risks from terrorist threats generally involves two types of situational interventions.4 First, exposure to risk can be addressed by reducing vulnerabilities. For example, buildings or building complexes such as ports or airports can be hardened by adding barriers around their perimeters, making them harder to attack with vehicles carrying bombs. Similarly, adding security patrols or sensor systems reduces vulnerability by 45

Journal of Strategic Security

increasing the likelihood of deterring or interdicting terrorists before they can carry out their threatened attacks. Second, assuming that attacks are successful, risk can be managed by improving response and recovery capabilities thereby minimizing or containing consequences. For example, improving communication systems and coordination capabilities of local law enforcement, other first responders, and relevant commercial or government property owners enhances response capabilities and mitigation consequences. These interventions can also reduce vulnerability by improving detect/decide/ engage/defeat functions of system security. Systems designed to analyze risk can often be extended to manage risk, at least at a basic level. First, one applies the given model to analyze risk at the present time based on inputs that describe the current security conditions (e.g., threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences). Next, one computes risk based on inputs that are altered to reflect one or more proposed security measures. Finally, comparing current risk to the risk projected for projected new security programs yields a differential analysis of risk management strategies. MSRAM, for example, provides this kind of "before-after" capability.

Additional Risk Mitigation Factors We contend that methods for assessing risk mitigation strategies must reflect four additional critical factors in order to be truly effective. These factors relate to financial and dynamic temporal aspects of risk and risk reduction. First, reducing risk (by improving security effectiveness) is not a discrete action undertaken at a single instant, but rather an extended process that is executed over time. In particular, security measures require months to years to develop, deploy, and perfect. They cannot simply be "switched on." And their success in achieving their objectives is by no means guaranteed: programs may be deficient in design or execution or they may not yield the anticipated effects. In short, managing risk involves a more granular approach than simply measuring risk exposure or reduction via "snapshot" measurements or extrapolations at discrete points in time. Second, the risk "landscape" will inevitably evolve continually over the periods it takes to implement new security strategies: socio-political and economic conditions shift, technologies advance, and so on. Equally important, terrorist groups detect and respond to changes in their envi46

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

ronment, adapting their objectives, capabilities, tactics, and strategies accordingly. This includes working to circumvent announced security measures underway and/or shifting to other targets and methods. Risk management methods must explicitly anticipate the potential impact of these exogenous factors in designing and executing risk reduction strategies. Third, from a policy standpoint, risk management strategies cannot be decoupled from their financial "footprints:" decisions to adopt new strategies must explicitly estimate the anticipated costs of competing approaches and weigh them against projected benefits. Cost-benefit tradeoffs (over time) are particularly critical to portfolio-based approaches to minimizing risk across threats and geographical locales. Finally, focusing on cost and (change over) time materially affects the structuring of risk strategies. Currently, security programs tend to be designed monolithically, to achieve a specific level of risk reduction at some target point in the future. Real options theory suggests a more fine-grained approach.5 Originally developed for designing financial derivatives, options theory is increasingly used in high-risk, high-cost decisions involving drug research and development and manufacturing capacity. The core idea is to segment programs into smaller pieces with several checkpoints in the future where go/no-go decisions can be made based on the situation and value of the investment at those points in time. For example, factories can be designed in a modular manner to provide an initial expansion short-term, with options to expand incrementally (and cost effectively) if future product demand warrants it. Security programs can be structured more flexibly through options to achieve escalating levels of protection that can be adopted to reflect risk exposure as it evolves over time. Terrorism is an economically asymmetric threat: our adversaries seek to provoke us to invest in ruinously costly national-scale countermeasures by carrying out (or merely threatening to stage) single attacks via new modes (e.g., chemical weapons, recruiting indigenous vs. foreign suicide bombers). A more adaptive approach that accommodates staging security programs to achieve deterrence before moving onto prevention is an essential enhancement in our thinking about counter-terrorism. In short, analyzing risk tends to be a static activity anchored to specific points in time. However, risk evolves continually, driven by changes in the world at large. Correspondingly, managing risk is an inherently dynamic and, ideally, adaptive process: authorities must anticipate both the evolution of risks and extended program deployment cycles in devising new 47

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security strategies, track risk reduction performance and changes in risk landscapes over time, and adjust strategies as appropriate. The remainder of this article describes TRANSEC, a decision support tool that addresses these core aspects of managing terrorism risk. TRANSEC is implemented using advanced scenario-based "what-if" dynamic simulation and analysis software called ForeTell.6 The system helps authorities evaluate risk reduction strategies by projecting the consequences of proposed security measures and comparing their capabilities (and costs) to reduce risk from terrorist threats over time and across alternate future conditions.

Backgroundâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;Terrorism Threats Involving Transportation Networks TRANSEC addresses two categories of terrorist threats against transportation systems: â&#x20AC;˘ Interdicting direct terrorist attacks against international transports such as vessels and aircraft and debarkation points such as ports and airports; â&#x20AC;˘ Interdicting attempts to transfer individual terrorists or materiel into our country for purposes of carrying out attacks later.7 Domestic homeland security efforts today focus primarily on the first category ? threats of direct attack. As noted earlier, the canonical risk analysis construct is: Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence. Numerous challenges arise in estimating these three factors uniformly and accurately, but the basic framework is relatively clear.8 The terror transfer threat consists of the movement of terrorists and materiel (including components of weapons of mass destruction) into our country via independent transport modes from multiple countries and shipping points. Once inside our borders, terrorists and materiel can be moved via domestic transport modes and assembled to perpetrate attacks elsewhere.

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

Terrorist transfer threats are open-ended in nature because they involve the staging of resources into our country prior to attacks. The standard Risk construct does not apply because specific targets and attack modes are generally not known at this stage. However, transfer threats cannot be ignored or dismissed simply because they are complex and challenging to model and analyze. On the contrary, we contend that the risks are too great not to attempt a systematic analytic approach, despite the inherent difficulties. In particular, we argue that making any progress on blocking transfer threats will reduce the scope of the "downstream" problem of interdicting terrorists as they attempt to launch direct attacks from within our borders. Hence, interdicting such piecemeal transfer threats before they penetrate our borders is a critical security priority.

TRANSEC–Decision Support for Managing Terrorism Risks in Transportation9 TRANSEC models risk assessments for both (or either) terrorist transfer and transportation system attack threats. It then models and helps refine and validate strategies for mitigating those risks. TRANSEC utilizes open source intelligence,10 expert judgments of security analysts, and inputs produced by other risk analysis tools such as MSRAM. TRANSEC employs a dynamic multi-tiered decision model that abstracts terrorist threats into a network. The nodes of this network consist of the following entity types: Terrorist Groups, Countries of Origin, Points of Embarkation, International Transport Modes, Country of Destination, and associated Points of Debarkation. Figure 1 depicts this network model from a stylized geospatial perspective. For transfer threats, TRANSEC breaks out two categories of risk—transfers of individuals and material from foreign countries to our borders. Examples of materiel include conventional and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons (or weapon components). For direct attack threats, TRANSEC focuses on two types of targets— Debarkation Points and International Transports. To minimize input requirements, the current version clusters attack modes into three categories: Emplaced, Standoff, and Hijack. Emplaced means that terrorists launch attacks aboard vessels, planes, trains, etc., while Standoff means

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that attacks are staged from Debarkation Point perimeters. Hijack mode only applies to Transports and assumes that the terrorists use the plane or vessel as a weapon.

Figure 1: TRANSEC Transfer Threat Network Model Following MSRAM's model for analyzing Risk elements, TRANSEC posits three distinct categories of actors with capabilities to detect and/or interdict terrorist personnel and materiel: national governments, local law enforcement agencies (LEAs), and owner/operators (OOs) of transport modes and supporting facilities. Each category of security actor has a distinct scope of authority, responsibilities, and operations; resources; and local presence. For example, in maritime security scenarios, OOs are assumed to be commercial or civil entities that operate passenger or cargo vessels and terminal facilities at seaports. The lead domestic national authority for maritime security is the U.S. Coast Guard. LEAs in the United States include state and city police departments and emergency management agencies. Collaboration among security players to leverage complementary detection, deterrence, and engagement capabilities is critical for effective interdiction.

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

TRANSEC defines a set of quantitative performance measures, called System Security Effectiveness (SE) metrics. SE metrics are defined for each class of security actor and represent their capabilities to interdict transfer threats at Embarkation, Transit, and Debarkation points and to interdict attack threats at Transit and Debarkation points. These metrics are assigned values from 0 to 100 and can be annotated with comments. Table 1 summarizes TRANSEC's primary performance data elements. Data elements for direct attack threats are shown in italics; all other data support transfer threat modeling. Table 1: TRANSEC Security Metrics TRANSEC Entity

Point of Embarkation

Security Metric/Datum

Metric Usage

Update Security effectiveness of Owner/ Operators, Local Law Enforcement Agencies, and National Government in Port vs. Transfer Threat of Terrorists and Materiel Probability of Interdicting Terror- Output ists and Materiel Update Security effectiveness of Owner/ Operators, and National Government in Port vs. Transfer Threat of Terrorists and Materiel

International Transport (by mode/category)

Security effectiveness vs. Standoff and Emplaced/Hijacked attack modes Probability of Interdicting Terror- Output ists and Materiel Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Risk of Attack via Standoff and Emplaced/Hijacked attack modes

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Table 1: TRANSEC Security Metrics TRANSEC Entity

Security Metric/Datum

Metric Usage

Update Security effectiveness of Owner/ Operators, Local Law Enforcement Agencies, and National Government in Port vs. Transfer Threat of Terrorists and Materiel Security effectiveness vs. Standoff and Emplaced attack modes Point of Debarkation

Probability of Interdicting TerrorOutput ists and Materiel Aggregate Transfer Threat of Terrorist and Materiel (broken out by Point of Embarkation and Intl. Transport) Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Risk of Attack via Standoff and Emplaced attack modes

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

Additional inputs include: • Estimated capability and intent of terrorist groups to initiate transfer threats of Terrorists and Materiel from specific countries11 • Estimated capability and intent of terrorist group to carry out attacks against Transport and Debarkation Point nodes in Emplaced/Hijack and Standoff modes • Factors contributing to Vulnerability and Consequence of attack modes relating to International Transport or Debarkation Point nodes (e.g., vessels, aircraft, ports) • Assumptions about social, political, and economic forces; trends; and disruptive events that might take place over the duration of the security strategy 12 Finally, TRANSEC models counter-terrorism strategies via sets of security measures. Each such measure specifies an allocation of existing resources and prospective investments to improve capabilities to interdict terrorist personnel and/or materiel prior to or upon arrival at our borders. Security measures are characterized in terms of three types of behavioral content: 1. Projected schedules to acquire or develop and deploy the given measure, depicted as start date and duration (in months); 2. Projected costs, expressed in terms of estimated capital expenditures (for start-up) and annual outlays for ongoing operations, maintenance, and support; 3. Expert assessments as to how the measures will likely impact particular SE metrics over time.13 TRANSEC's "what-if" capabilities allow analysts to explore the impacts of alternate assumptions about how benefits will occur or fail to materialize. The latter type of analysis is critical for assessing the potential impacts of delays, implementation errors, technology failures, and other types of programmatic risks on security effectiveness. Table 2 lists several example Security Measures and their anticipated impacts. Generally, individual Security Measures impact only one or several of the SE metrics tied to risk from transfer or attack threats.

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Table 2: Example Security Measures (and Strategies) Index Threat Type

Security Measure/ Strategy

Expected (Causal ) Impact

Direct Attack

Security Training Pro- Reduce vulnerability to gram for aircraft crew emplaced attack on aircraft

Direct Attack

Passenger Scanning Program for airport

Direct Attack

Procurement Program Reduce consequence to develop Emergency of attack on airport Medical Services capability

Direct Attack

Combine Measures 1, 2, and 3

Combine impacts 1,2, 3

Transfer

Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) program

Reduce transfer threat at Debarkation Points by controlling individual access

Transfer

Overseas Port Security Program to coordinate with and certify security practices of foreign ports and authorities

Reduce transfer threat at Embarkation Points by controlling individual access and materiel

Transfer

Intl Maritime Org. (IMO) Shipper Security program to coordinate with and certify security practices of owner/operators of vessels

Reduce transfer threat at Intl Transport nodes by controlling individual access and materiel

Transfer

Combine Measures 5, 6, and 7

Combine impacts 6,7,8

Reduce vulnerability to emplaced attack on airport

These inputsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;transportation network nodes, security strategies and measures, environmental assumptions and eventsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;collectively define a TRANSEC Scenario. Figure 2 depicts the taxonomy of entity types used to build TRANSEC Scenarios.14 54

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

Figure 2: Entity Taxonomy for TRANSEC The TRANSEC software system incorporates a "what-if" simulation engine that dynamically projects the likely impacts of Security Measures and environmental influences to generate the following outputs, in monthly increments: • Updates to SE metrics at all nodes in the security network. • Probabilities of interdicting terrorists and material at Embarkation, Transit, and Debarkation points. • Net transfer threat risks of personnel and materiel at specific Points of Debarkation. • These projected values are broken out by specific combinations of Terrorist Groups, Points of Embarkation and International Transport modes. For example, what is the risk of Transferring Personnel at the Port of Miami from al-Qaeda operating out of the Port of Athens via a break bulk cargo vessel? • Updated estimates of Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence and aggregate Risk for direct attacks, by mode, at International Transport and Point of Debarkation nodes. 55

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For direct attack threats, TRANSEC employs the standard Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence construct to compute Risk. For transfer threats, TRANSEC employs a probabilistic computation using SE metrics adapted from standard failure models used by system reliability engineers. TRANSEC employs various other simulation techniques to model environmental dynamics.15 TRANSEC's overall data processing architecture is summarized in Figure 3. Inputs are indicated in green, while outputs are labeled in blue. The upper half of the diagram addresses threat from direct attack, while the lower portion focuses on transfer threats. TRANSEC provides powerful analytic tools such as summary reports and graphic plots to reduce simulation data. These tools help analysts quickly compare projected outcomes to isolate the relative strengths and weaknesses of alternate strategies across diverse scenarios. Analysts can also drill down to determine how forces, trends, events, and security measures impacted risk or cost in particular months. Users can refine their security strategies to incorporate attractive features of competing approaches. The resulting strategies are robust in that they leave the country well protected despite our inherent uncertainty about the future. A strategy, no matter how robust, must be executed effectively in order to be successful. TRANSEC supports the post-decision phase of the strategic life cycle with a monitoring mode: as time passes, programs are enacted. All the while, social, political, economic, and technological conditions change and terrorist groups evolve, adapting their capabilities, objectives, and methods in response to the evolving landscape and their analysis of our defenses.

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

Figure 3: TRANSEC decision model architecture Analysts use TRANSEC to update their Scenarios periodically to reflect current intelligence and re-project the chosen security strategy.16 If the projected outcomes are uniformly positive, the strategy has been revalidated. If not, TRANSEC acts as an Early Warning System, alerting authorities promptly to changing conditions and emerging problems. Analysts can diagnose the problems, alter (or replace) the current security strategy, and implement those midcourse corrections to ensure continued success. The following figures illustrate sample outputs from TRANSEC, projecting counter-terrorism strategies described in Figure 2 above. For example, Figure 4 displays comparative time series plots projecting the reduction of risk for transferring terrorists for two strategies. As the key indicates, one set of curves assumes that a transportation worker identity credential (TWIC) program is implemented, while the other set assumes a broader program that implements security measures that impact Embarkation Points, Transport Modes, and Debarkation Points.

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Figure 4: Example TRANSEC Time Series Output Each curve depicts the risk for a transportation network path starting out from a particular Embarkation Point (e.g., Port of Athens) via one Transport Mode (e.g., a cruise ship) into one Debarkation Point (e.g., Port of Miami). In this scenario, it is assumed that in month 12, Turkey joins the European Union. The analyst postulated that the impact of this event would be to increase the baseline transfer threat out of Europe (but not Libya), under the assumption that Turkey's border security is inferior to that of European Union countries, allowing freer movement of terrorists across EU country borders. Figure 5 displays the corresponding curves for the transfer threat of materiel. The lines signify no reduction of threats from materiel transfer ascribable to the TWIC program alone (as expected), while the curves for 58

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

the composite strategy (number 4 referenced in Figure 2) reflect threat reduction benefits from strategies targeting foreign ports and vessel operators.

Figure 5: Example TRANSEC Time Series Output Finally, Figure 6 displays a spider (radar) chart comparing security effectiveness metrics for Strategies 1 (TWIC only, turquoise) and 4 (Composite strategy, red) four years into the future. Comparative analytics help decision-makers isolate relative strengths and weaknesses of security strategies and identify areas for refinement.

Journal of Strategic Security

Figure 6: Example TRANSEC Spider (Radar) Plot Output

Conclusions Managing risk from terrorism threats is a dynamic and adaptive process. Security strategies must anticipate ongoing evolution of environmental conditions and adaptive responses by terrorists in response to these changes and our defensive initiatives. The critical challenge is to devise a collection of complementary security measures that address the diverse components of terrorist threatsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;targets and transfer nodes, attack modes, vulnerability, and consequence factors. Such strategic portfolios must (1) deliver broad spectrum risk reduction in a cost effective manner and (2) anticipate changing risk landscapes and incomplete knowledge.

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

Unfortunately, no one can predict the future reliably. Equally regrettably, no closed-end (computationally tractable) equations exist to "optimize" counter-terrorism preparedness investments. TRANSEC aims for the next best thing, which is to identify and manage robust counter-terrorism strategies. A robust strategy is one that appears likely to produce superior reductions of risk across a range of plausible possible futures in comparison to competing security portfolios. TRANSEC employs scenario-based "what-if" simulations to model risk landscapes and explore and compare alternate strategies. Authorities can apply the same projective methods to monitor and adjust strategies as they are executed. TRANSEC provides a safe virtual environment for practicing counter-terrorism strategies and learning from simulated rather than real mistakes. It thereby reduces risk and improves confidence and consistency in strategic security decisions. In essence, TRANSEC allows authorities to "test drive" strategies much as consumers test drive cars before buying them to minimize costly surprises and disappointments. TRANSEC focuses on terrorism threats relating to transportation systems. However, its underlying decision support methodology and software tools are easily generalized to address other critical homeland security decisions such as critical infrastructure and border protection.

About the Authors Dr. Richard Adler is Founder and Chief Architect of DecisionPath, Inc. He designed and implemented the company's ForeTell software platform for critical decision support and currently directs development and delivery of ForeTell solutions for government, and for the life sciences and financial services markets. ForeTell systems provide modeling, "what-if" simulation, and analysis capabilities to help clients "test drive" complex decisions including preparedness strategies for countering terrorist threats and managing organizational change. Before that, Dr. Adler was a partner at Computer Science Corporation, holding positions as the Solutions Architect for the company's Internet marketplace practice and software component framework for transactional business applications. Dr. Adler was previously VP of R&D at Symbiotics, Inc., a middleware software startup, and was a key member of the technical staff at the MITRE Corporation. Dr. Adler has over two decades of experience developing advanced software technologies and innovative systems architectures in business applications, mission-critical operations support, decision sup61

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port, process control, modeling and simulation, and knowledge management. Dr. Adler has spoken and published extensively on topics including pandemic preparedness, counter-terrorism decision support, knowledge management, component software, executable specifications, intelligent systems, and software architectures for distributed control. He holds advanced degrees in Physics and Philosophy. Dr. Adler can be reached for comment at: rich@decpath.com. Jeff Fuller is the Director of Homeland Security Services at Teledyne Brown Engineering, Inc. He has supported the U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Assessment program since its inception. Mr. Fuller has extensive experience with antiterrorism and security assessments, planning, training, exercises and program management for protecting military forces and critical infrastructure, crisis management, mission analysis and planning for homeland security, special operations, WMD counter-proliferation, conventional and joint military operations, and command and control. He served as Project Manager and Senior Analyst for the U.S.S. COLE Commission Support Team, led mission area analysis for Joint Chiefs of Staff, Antiterrorism Force Protection Directorate (J-34) and managed the Pentagon Antiterrorism/Force Protection Plan Project. He served as a Department of Defense Representative to the Department of Homeland Security Interagency Incident Management Group and the DOD Coordination Element at DHS. He has supervised security assessment and planning support for the Pacific Air Force, analytic and technical support to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Enhanced Joint Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Program;, and execution and update of the JCS Web-delivered Antiterrorism Awareness Training program. Mr. Fuller was a Lt. Colonel in the U.S. Army and participated in four Special Forces assignments to include three command assignments. Mr. Fuller can be reached for comment at: jeff.fuller@tbe.com.

References 1 P. L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1996). See also: R.A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (New York, Oxford University Press, 2004). 2 Congressional Research Service, "DHS's Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress," February 2007, available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33858.pdf. 3 B. Downs, "The Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model," The US Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council, Spring 2007, available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/.

Decision Support for Countering Terrorist Threats against Transportation Networks

4 Casualty Actuarial Society, Enterprise Risk Management Committee, "Overview of Enterprise Risk Management," May 2003. See also: Y. Sheffi, The Resilient Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 5 M.A. Brach, Real Options in Practice (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2003). See also: T. Copeland and P. Tufano, "A Real-World Way to Manage Real Options," Harvard Business Review, (March 2004): 91â&#x20AC;&#x201C;99. 6 R.M. Adler, "ForeTell: A Simulation-Based Modeling and Simulation Platform for Homeland Security Decision Support," IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security, Cambridge, MA, Spring 2003. 7 One can view this as a third logical type of intervention, targeting Threat rather than Vulnerability or Consequence. In essence, interdicting transfers impacts the Capability component of Threats. In practice, it is difficult to influence Intent directly, although reducing Vulnerability and Consequence presumably impacts Intent (i.e., targeting strategy). Capability might also be targeted at a general level by disrupting communications, funding, etc., but this is challenging because of the highly decentralized organization of most terrorist groups into small, largely self-directed cells and the small scale of most attacks to date. 8 L. Cox Jr., "Some Limitations of 'Risk + Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence' for Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks," Risk Analysis 28, no. 6, (2008). See also: "DHS Risk-Based Grant Methodology is Reasonable, But Current Version's Measure of Vulnerability is Limited," Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-852, June 27, 2008. Finally, see: T.G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure protection In Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation (Hoboken, NJ, Wiley-InterScience, 2006). 9 TRANSEC has been applied to a pilot aviation security project for the Government of Singapore's Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre. The U.S. Coast Guard is currently evaluating TRANSEC as part of its program to extend the risk management capabilities of MSRAM. 10 CIA World Fact Book, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. See also: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses (START), University of Maryland, available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/. 11 Given specific intelligence, the user can override these Country level estimates at individual Points of Embarkation. 12 An example of a force would be that a declining economy reduces the volume of flights (and purchases) of private aircraft, which lowers terrorist transfer and attack factors at airports servicing this type of aviation traffic. An example of an event would be if a country, such as Turkey, is admitted to the European Union and its borders are considered less secure than other European nations, then transfer threat values will increase for all European Countries of Origin. 13 Analyst users capture these assessments via a curve fitting process. They specify a set of points whose x coordinate represents time (in months) and y coordinate represents % change (+/-) in the SE metric anticipated by implementing the given Security measure. Different measures have different profiles and impacts on different metrics. For example, training programs can typically be initiated relatively quickly, but their benefits level off, whereas new systems may require years to

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develop, deploy in pilot mode, and tune operations, resulting in a more lengthy and graduated curve of improvements, before tailing off (i.e., equilibrating). The TRANSEC simulator coerces the data into a polynomial or piecewise linear curve and applies it via a causality (system dynamics) simulation model. 14 The underlying ForeTell modeling software allows analysts to create and save a baseline Scenario comprised of relevant nodes (relevant instances of these entity types) and their initial conditions. Analysts can then copy and adapt that Scenario by selectively changing environmental assumptions or Security Measures. This design supports rapid creation of alternate Scenarios that can be projected and compared. 15 The ForeTell software underlying TRANSEC supports system dynamics, Monte Carlo methods, complex adaptive systems (agent-based simulation), process- and event-based simulation techniques, as required. 16 This often involves abandoning Scenarios that no longer appear plausible and adding new Scenarios based on emerging trends and patterns.

Keeping our Campuses and Communities Safe By Ronald Goodman

Introduction Since the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. population has a heightened awareness that tragedies can and do strike ordinary people without warning. The same can be said for the unfortunate abundance of campus shootings, where the next "9/11" occurred in 2007 on the campus of Virginia Tech. And yet, subsequent investigations into these horrific events often reveal that clues existed that might have pointed to the eventual violent outcome. It is unquestionable that to dramatically improve the safety and security of our cities we must rely upon the millions of eyes of our fellow citizens to unearth these clues as they pursue their daily activities. But ordinary citizens on the street are often reluctant to get involved and lack the tools to overcome their reticence to report suspicious activity. In this article, we examine several indicators of campus and community violence, as well as a novel technology to facilitate communication of potential threats to safety before they become a reality.

Indicators of Campus Violence Violence on our nation's campuses is a serious problem. For example: • From July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006, there were 35 school-associated violent deaths in elementary and secondary schools in the United States. • In 2005–06, 78% of schools experienced one or more violent incidents of crime, 17% experienced one or more serious violent incidents, 46% experienced one or more thefts, and 68% experienced another type of crime. • In 2005, approximately 6% of students aged 12–18 reported that they avoided school activities or one or more places in school because they thought someone might attack or harm them.1 What seems to be painfully common about the perpetrators in many of these school shootings are expressed feelings of estrangement and rage— to call some of these youthful offenders "disturbed" is to understate the 65

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devastating psychosis of the assailants considerably. For example, Luke Woodham, who killed his mother and shot nine students at his school in Pearl, Mississippi in 1997, claims that "demons" visited him and made him commit the crimes. Paranoia, deep depression, self-perceived isolation, and hearing voices are all common symptoms reported by the various guilty parties. In almost every case there were elements of child abuse (whether physical, sexual, or emotional), as well as distinct dissociation from their parents and fellow students (where applicable)â&#x20AC;&#x201D;typically blamed on some fear or anxiety later discovered or confessed by the perpetrators, eye witnesses, or victims who survived the incidents.2 Another prime example is the case of Steven Kazmierczak, the former Northern Illinois University student who, in 2008, killed five people and left an additional 18 students wounded. We know now that he had been dismissed from the Army after it was revealed he had hidden his psychiatric history. Kazmierczak had studied the Virginia Tech and Columbine massacres. Investigators also discovered his preoccupation with cinematic monsters, particularly the sadistic killer in the "Saw" horror films.3 He had a history of suicide attempts and psychiatric difficulties. Yet, while considered strange by many, no one reported their concerns. When asked if anyone thought Kazmierczak exhibited odd behavior at NIU, Police Chief Donald Grady said nothing had ever been reported to the police department.4 Of course, sometimes, obvious predictors are missing, or at least not egregiously evident. But if a number of people individually notice questionable or odd behavior, and these same individuals report their observation to a central depository, independently of one another, a profile will emerge. What if such a profile had emerged before the tragic murder of a female student at Virginia Tech? Considering the previous shooting spree, there is probably not another campus in the nation that is as sensitive and attuned to suspicious student actions. While there are many risk factors that contribute to the likelihood that any one person presents a threat, Roger Depue, Ph.D., notes: When a cluster of indicators is present then the risk becomes more serious. Thus, a person who possesses firearms, is a loner, shows an interest in past shooting situations, writes stories about homicide and suicide, exhibits aberrant behavior, has talked about retribution against others, and has a history of mental illness and refuses counseling would obviously be considered a significant risk of becoming dangerous to himself or others.5 66

Keeping our Campuses and Communities Safe

Is it possible that some students and faculty did notice that Haiyang Zhu, a doctoral student at Virginia Tech, who decapitated a female acquaintance in a campus cafĂŠ, had previously exhibited antisocial behavior that was noted but ignored? What if sufficient numbers of students and faculty, individually, had notified a central authority like the campus safety office? Might the tragedy have been averted? We will never know, but it is imperative that all universities, cities and corporate entities utilize all available technology-enabled tools and systems to try to prevent future events. Too many studies have shown a reluctance to report crimes or other suspicious activities for fear of authorities or criminal retribution. Too many Americans are inculcated with the belief that "the authorities will attend to it" without considering that the appropriate law enforcement agency is probably unaware of the danger. While many domestic terrorist events and campus shootings are committed by those whose precedent actions, either by word or deed, were seen by those around them as odd, perverse or potentially damning, too often these observations go unreported for fear of involvement. Major news stories from our cities and universities attest to antisocial behaviors exhibited by the perpetrators that go unreported. Virginia Tech, Northern Illinois University, the Oakland city shootings and San Gabriel, California, all come to mind. The latter two are suspected gang related. In February 2009, two shooters entered a coffee shop in San Gabriel with a specific target in mind. With one dead and six seriously wounded they obviously were not concerned about collateral damage. "The preliminary investigation would lead homicide detectives to believe this is gang-related," sheriff's spokesman Steve Whitmore said. Even though the shop was crowded with at least 40 people when the attack took place, deputies had difficulty finding witnesses. Whitmore said witnesses refused to cooperate, out of fear, with the police. "We know people saw something," Whitmore said, "and we need them to come forward and help us solve this crime."6

Crime Prevention in our Communities We know evil deeds will evolve from evil or demented people; the question is how to identify and prevent them. In a recent interview, an anti-terrorism official (name withheld at his request) recently expressed his view on prevention: "The ability to gather information, sift through it to find what is useful intelligence, and then rapidly get that information to 67

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the right people, can and has made the difference between tragedy and that tragedy being averted." Given the current culture, a number of police agencies agree that anonymity is essential for encouraging citizen involvement. New technology also allows for picture/video attachments to be included. With the ubiquity of camera phones, photo identification becomes an important adjunct. Some programs are adding executive dashboard (a computer interface that displays the information) and analytical tools to help track the tips. Many of these new programs are Web-based, a boon for money strapped agencies since no software or hardware installation or maintenance is required by the adopting agency. Companies are now focusing on creating back-office solutions that adapt to and enhance consumer products already in wide distribution. By creating software programs that interface with everyday consumer tools (e.g., cell phones and laptop computers), companies are closing the loop on encouraging and supporting citizen involvement in making universities, cities and the country as a whole, safer.

Keeping our Campuses and Communities Safe

Spotlight on TipNow™—a New Mass Communication Tool to Report Suspicious Activity Obviously, the tools to fight violence in our communities must be many and varied. A new weapon in this war was recently introduced by Resiligence, a Silicon Valley, California, innovator in technology applications, to involve the citizenry in crime mitigation and prevention. Their product, TipNow™, is an anonymous text-based reporting system. It is presently being evaluated by a number of cities and universities and has already been deployed on two college campuses. The product uses SMS to anonymously report suspicious activities to the appropriate, pre-designated officials. From any cell phone a text message describing questionable or obviously illegal activities is sent to a campus or city-wide email address. With TipNow™, the company's servers assign an alphanumeric alias that allows for follow-up while maintaining the promised anonymity of the reporting party. The message is automatically encrypted by Resiligence servers and forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement agency; all in minutes and all completely anonymous. The company hopes that by allowing citizen involvement without compromising their identity more people will be encouraged to participate in the process of making us all safer. Other reporting modalities will be coming on line with new ways of identifying potential dangers before they can be realized.

About the Author Ronald Goodman is Vice President of Marketing of Resiligence Inc., a Silicon Valley-based provider of reporting solutions for campus, city, and corporate environments. Serving Fortune 500 companies for over twenty years, Ron has an extensive background in multiple disciplines. His experience spans diverse categories including wine marketing, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. Over the years he has led marketing and creative teams for industrial, hi-tech and healthcare companies. Ron has served as a board member and speaker for a number of professional organizations including Peninsula Marketing Association, Medical Marketing Association and Business Marketing Association. He is currently on the Board of the Direct Marketing Association, and is a 69

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graduate of the UCLA graduate pharmaceutical marketing program. Mr. Goodman can be reached for comment at: ronald.goodman@resiligence.com.

References 1 Rachel Dinkes et al, "Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2007," National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences, US Department of Education, and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., December 2007, available at: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2007/index.asp. 2 John Cloud, "Of Arms and the Boy," Time Magazine, June 24, 2001, available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,139492,00.html. 3 Monique Garcia et al, "Emerging Profiles of Gunman Emerge," Chicago Tribune, February 17, 2008, available at: http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/feb/17/news/chi-investfeb17. 4 "College Shooter's Deadly Rampage Baffles Friends," MSNBC, February 16, 2008, available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23171567/. 5 Roger Depue, Ph.D., "Red Flags, Warning Signs and Indicators," Appendix M, Virginia Tech Review Report, available at: http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/index.html. 6 Thomas Watkins, "Cops Seek Gunmen in Fatal CafĂŠ Shooting," Associated Press, February 6, 2009, available at: http://a.abcnews.com/US/WireStory?id=6818004&page=1.

Book Reviews The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. By David Kilcullen. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-19-536834-5. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. 346. $27.95. Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred von Schlieffen, Billy Mitchell, Hank Crumpton, David Galula, Sun Tzu and the late Air Force Colonel John Boyd focused not only on how to win engagements militarily but also by outmaneuvering an enemy mentally in order to limit the necessity for actual combat. Rarely is one able to witness the work of a distinctive practitioner and foremost authority on counterintelligence whose ideas may ultimately change the way we engage an enemy. In Accidental Guerilla, David Kilcullen examines and analyzes the nature and need for a revolutionary change in our counter-insurgency policy through his first hand experiences in the theaters of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, East Timor and Indonesia. Kilcullen emphasizes that our traditional counter-terrorism and classical counter-insurgency models are inadequate for the conflict in which we find ourselves. Thus, we find a distinction between the hard-core jihadist and the local fighter who is therefore referred to as an accidental guerillaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;fighting us because we are in his space and due to his traditional folk beliefs. In the author's own words: "This book, like its wars, is a hybrid: part field study, part personal recollection; perhaps too academic to be popular and too populist to be purely academic" (from the Acknowledgements). David Kilcullen, Ph.D. (born 1967) is a contemporary practitioner and theorist of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. A former Australian Army officer, he left that army as a lieutenant colonel in 2005 and began working as a Special Advisor for Counter-insurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. During 2007 he served in Iraq as Senior Counter-insurgency Adviser, Multinational Force-Iraq, a civilian position on the personal staff of U.S. Army General David Petraeus, responsible for planning and executing the 2007â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2008 Joint Campaign Plan, which drove the Iraq War troop surge of 2007. Kilcullen is also an advisor on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency issues to the United States, British and Australian Governments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and several private sector institutions. Most readers will enjoy the practical and understandable approach that Kilcullen takes to communicate and articulate his theories and concepts. 71

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Readers who are not actual practitioners in the field of counterintelligence will marvel at his ability to express his philosophy succinctly and in straightforward terms. His emphasis on the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars purports a unique perspective. Quintessential is Kilcullen's emphasis on changing paradigms on all fronts. Traditional notions of warfare, diplomacy, intelligence and terrorism need to be transformed in order to succeed in these modern day conflicts. "Certainly, in complex, multi-sided, hybrid conflicts like Iraq, conventional warfare has failed to produce decisive outcomes. We have instead adapted existing policing, nation building, and counterinsurgency approachesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and developed inter-agency tools 'on the fly" (p. 292). In the intelligence realms, concentrations will have to focus on less traditional approaches due in part to the simple fact that those pieces of intelligence do not tell the entire and necessary story so that proper planning can be conducted. Again, this goes to The Accidental Guerilla's primary premise, "enemy-centric approaches that focus on the enemy, assuming that killing insurgents is the key task, rarely succeed. Population-centric approaches, that center on protecting local people and gaining their support, succeed more often. The accidental guerilla phenomenon does not explain the entirety of the problem, which is so complex that it does not fit neatly into any one model" (xv). Accordingly, Kilcullen's observations in Iraq led him to conclude that the United States has not pursued the appropriate course of action to combat global terrorism. Policy at the time was to concentrate on al-Qaeda rather than giving equal attention to separate but interlocking struggles that naturally affect the broader struggle and conflict. Yet, he concludes the United States can be successful in combating this threat if it focuses on developing a new lexiconâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;changing our terminology; ensuring the grand strategy is based on a long-range view as well as a broad viewpoint; remedying the imbalance in government capability by building non-military elements of national power; identifying new strategic servicesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; re-creating the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to create balance and thoroughness; and developing a capacity for strategic information warfare whereby there is an inter-agency message being supported rather than the current fractured state. This fractured state of information plays right into the hand of the enemy who does use the propaganda machine to his benefit and is at the heart of what Kilcullen calls the takfiri objective in manipulation of the locals.

Book Reviews

The active counterintelligence professional may not learn anything different, yet Kilcullen addresses the necessary principles of counterinsurgency/counter-intelligence in such a fashion that subject matter experts will be propelled to heightened comprehension of the subject. Newcomers to counter-insurgency will obviously benefit from the wealth of experience and information demonstrated. However, The Accidental Guerilla is not a quick two- to three-day read. It should be enjoyed over a good two or maybe even three-week span so that one can fully digest and understand what Kilcullen is advocating. David Kilcullen's Accidental Guerilla is a book that brings the lessons of the past to life just like Ken Burns has done with his Civil War series. The primary difference is that the reader has the benefit of an actual leading expert on guerilla warfare who takes us on a live journey uncovering the face of modern warfare and demonstrating to us the elements needed to ensure a positive change in our outlook of war and what it will take to win now and into the future. J. Kelly Stewart is Principal at Newcastle Consulting, LLCâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a strategic security design and management consulting firm, and an instructor at Henley-Putnam University.

Journal of Strategic Security

Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism and Safety Concerns. By Kathleen M. Sweet. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009. ISBN 978-1-4200-8816-8 (hardcover). Diagrams. Photographs. Index. Notes. Tables. Pp xxii1, 354. $79.95. Aviation security and terrorism have been topics of intense public scrutiny over the past few years, with endless prescriptions for how to shore up the former against the latter. Into a marketplace flooded with myriad books written by self-proclaimed "experts" comes Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism and Safety Concerns, by Kathleen M. Sweet. The author is a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel with impressive credentials as an intelligence officer, an assistant air attachĂŠ to the Russian Federation, an instructor at the Air War College, a member of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) cadre, and a military/political affairs officer with a Special Operations Wing. She currently works as a consultant with various firms and as a university instructor teaching courses in intelligence, security, and terrorism. In her introduction, the author states the book "contains the necessary information with which to devise a strategy that college students, military personnel, and police counterterrorist unit [sic] alike can use to educate themselves" (p. xxiii). Unfortunately, that sentence contains a key to what is to come. I really wanted to like this book and at first blush it seemed a solid tome, written by an expert to address a vital topic. Regrettably, the more I read, the more I found that the book is laden with suppositions, sweeping generalizations, factual errors, grammatical and spelling errors, and intellectual overreach. In short, the book, while ambitious in scope, promises more than it delivers. Dissecting just the sentence quoted above, it may be useful for college students to become familiar on a superficial level with the concepts used in the book, but military personnel and police counter-terrorism units have assiduously labored ever since the catastrophic attacks of September 11, 2001, to educate themselves on aviation security and terrorism. The military and police have led the way to study these issues and have proactively engaged in very aggressive information sharing campaigns to create a common sight picture. The author does undertake a very methodical and systematic study and correctly identifies the importance of air travel and transport for our economy and way of life. However, the extraordinary depth and breadth of topics are an inch deep and a mile wide. The fifteen chapters have numerous sub-topics included that span only a page or two or three, allowing little room for the topic other than to mention it and give a paragraph or two. Every topic brought up is valid but is given short shrift, resulting in a very unsatisfying treatment. In addition, there are numerous sections copied and pasted from the Internet (appropriately sourced 74

Book Reviews

and noted), throughout the book, which lessens the book's credibility and portrays a curious lack of imagination on the part of the author. Cutting and pasting is a practice common among sluggish and less accomplished intelligence analysts and is out of place in a textbook purportedly intended for college students. The use of open source information seems to actually take the place of any real analysis or policy recommendations. The book has no real flow and is uneven, as if it were sloppily assembled with disparate elements welded together to form the final product. The chapter on terrorism unevenly tries to cram into a few pages what multi-volume studies on the topic can only allude to. The author tries to wrap in the history of the Near East (a topic in and of itself) along with the history of terrorism (another topic), terrorist group profiles (another separate topic) and then fold in case studies (a still different topic)â&#x20AC;&#x201D;all very poorly. Spelling errors throughout plague the book and factual errors undermine its credibility. A few examples follow since a complete recounting of all errors would be a larger undertaking than this review will allow. The author's spelling of al-Qa'ida or al-Qaeda is rendered as "Al'Qaeda," which is erroneous. The author attributes the June 25, 1996, terrorist attack at Khobar Towers to Usama bin Ladin, when in fact Iranian-backed terrorists carried out the act. The author's citation of seven state sponsors of terror is several years out of date (there are now four). Other data points cited regarding the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, counter-terror organizations, and the Department of Homeland Security, are outdated by a few years and placed in improper context. The author also uses citations from sources whose agendas are not clearly stated, presenting a perspective devoid of context. In spite of these glaring issues, Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism and Safety Concerns has value in that it provides a wide-based view of aviation security, and in a wide-ranging sense it is generally correct. However, the process breaks down when the author tries to provide specificity on topics other than those she copied and pasted from the Internet (and even some of those are incorrect). Perhaps the book's merits might be as a reference of topics to pursue. For those seeking counter-threat and counter-terror solutions to better protect the transportation infrastructure, this tome is useful, but not by any stretch of the imagination a definitive guidebook or manual. Mark J. Roberts is a transportation security subject matter expert. He has published strategy articles and a book with the National Defense University Press, as well as numerous book reviews in various journals. 75

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Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security: Have the Rules of the Game Changed? By David Bonner. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007. ISBN 978-0-7546-4756-0 (hardcover). Abbreviations. Footnotes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 371. $124.95. History is one of several fundamental elements in our society. It can easily help us picture what happened before, and some of us may use it to refrain from repeating the same mistakes. From the same rationale, some may have different views of the importance of case laws, but I value them from a perspective that reflects current views from various social beliefs, thoughts, and attitudes at a specific time toward certain subjects and events in our lives. Henceforth, knowing how certain decisions were arrived at will be immeasurably important for us in the future. The author presents past and present historical events in order to illustrate how the U.K. Government handled terrorism and other national security affairs, which were supported by examples in using legal mechanisms instead of using existing or newly developed criminal laws or processes. The author describes specific methods that were formulated and executed as national strategic actions: prevention, pursuit, and protection, such as internment, deportation, and restriction on movement during its colonial withdrawal in Cyprus, Kenya, and Malaya, and in dealing with the political violence in Ireland. Professor David Bonner has taught at the School of Law, University of Leicester, U.K., since 1974 and was a former student of that institute. As a lawyer, Bonner specializes in laws relating to terrorism, among other interests. He has also written a monograph on measures other than criminal prosecution to deal with terrorism and national security issues. In Chapter 1, the author uses comparisons with early U.K. history to clearly point out that the rules of "games" have not been changed for the U.K. in pursuit of protecting against further terrorist incidents. Furthermore, the author claims that methods and plans for dealing with "sleeper cells or supporters" remain the same compared to previous governmental reactive responses throughout history. Some will find this book valuable in regard to past history of how some national crises were handled via methods of internment, restriction of movement, exclusion, and deportation of selected individuals. But others may not value this book, particularly those who seek answers to comprehend sensitive current policies in handling both internal and external threats to nations. Some readers may want to skip chapters two through five and read the rest of the chapters if the readers' views and analysis on 76

Book Reviews

government actions and reactions of the September 11, 2001 attack on U.S. soil are the main points of interest. This book may be ideal for legal scholars or government officials in the U.S. to study current actions or policies on dealing with sleeper cells or supporters before and after the major attacks on both soils, but it is not clear if it will benefit professionals in intelligence, counterintelligence, and protection fields. The author's view of an effective counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency strategy centers on intelligence-led policing. The U.S. Department of Justice suggested the same approach in its 2009 report, Navigating Your Agency's Path to Intelligence-Led Policing. The author suggests that any decision on national security matters must be balanced to ensure that fundamental rights are protected, but I would add that preservation of human life should be the uppermost, indispensable, and indisputable task for anyone who is in any executive position. This book should be of interest to political scientists, historians, and lawyers, as suggested by the author, but should be only limited to those who have keen interests in executive decisions. When discussing actual events, some information was inaccurate, such as the flight number for one of the planes that crashed on September 11, 2001, and the date of the London bombing in 2005. In addition, the book's binding appears unable to handle the rigors of library use. I would expect to find this book in the law library of larger universities or reference sections in city or state libraries, but most likely not in individual homes. Jeff Ahn is a retired U.S. Army CID special agent currently working as a security manager for the Defense Logistics Agency Pacific. He is an adjunct faculty member at three universities.

Journal of Strategic Security

Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda. By Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, with Henry Robert Schlesinger. New York: Dutton, 2008. ISBN 978-0-525-94980-0 (hardcover). Sketches. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Select Bibliography. $29.95. This is an excellent book that tells both "who done it" and "how it's done." It is primarily a history focused on the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) technical support capabilities resident in the Directorate of Science and Technology. According to the jacket cover, the two primary authors are well qualified by experience and interests. Robert Wallace is a retired career CIA officer and former Director of the Office of Technical Services. H. Keith Melton is the technical tradecraft historian at the Interagency Training Center. Henry Schlesinger is an author and journalist covering intelligence technologies, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement. The foreword by George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence, 1997â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 2007, sets the stage well, with a focus on how the technical services have largely been neglected in the literature. He clearly states how important their contributions have been and how they will remain critical. When read in conjunction with The Master of Disguise by Antonio J. Mendez, one will have a more well-rounded understanding of intelligence and the interaction of the capabilities that create a valuable national asset. In the steadily increasing intelligence literature, there are several primary book types ranging from lopsidedly critical to exploitative. But then there is the rarest and most valuable type: a well-written book based on personal knowledge and experience that fills a major gap for the serious reader. This is such a book and should be part of every serious student's and practitioner's personal library, as well as public and institutional libraries. We are once again shown that Intelligence History remains a fascinating and ever-evolving subject. Educators should read and consider this book for inclusion in any intelligence history and even technology history courses. There are few books that relate technology to real-world applications better; and almost none outside of the aircraft and satellite arenas that relate technology to intelligence operations. David Kahn, of course, being the most distinguished exception. Clearly the authors intended this to be a basic early history, taking one through the real beginning of American tools and techniques to a point where both technology and operations are best left out. While the Internet 78

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is touched upon, it is useful only to point the way from traditional in-place operations to today's new, "reach out and touch almost everyone and everything remotely" world. Such a speculative discussion would have clearly been unnecessary, out of place, and a real distraction and detraction from the book's significant value. This is an informative and entertaining history, not a sensationalist "future history." Spycraft provides significant insights into one of the lesser known and appreciated critical intelligence components: successfully applying technologies supporting case officer and agent operations. While much more has been written about specific operations, rings, and individuals, precious little has been written about the "little things" that enable successful operations. Here we are carefully and often entertainingly led through the evolution of making things smaller, more reliable, more productive, and above all safer to use. The authors pull back the Hollywood hype and show where the imagination, courage, and derring-do of those not in the literature or popular media's eyes often made a profound difference. In fact, these are the ones who made many critical collection operations even possible. Perhaps this can be well illustrated by modifying a popular quote usually attributed to General Omar Bradley: "Congress makes a man a general, communications makes him a commander," to: "Case officers can recruit an agent, covert communications makes the agent a spy." A great deal of history is well laid out in several nicely organized sections. Within the sections are well written chapters on technical and operational episodes that carry one seamlessly between organization history, personalities, technologies, operations, and above all the "luck" factor. People are brought to life as select operations and technical developments are explored with an excellent interweaving of scientists, engineers, field officers, and even psychologists (considered by many to be the real "Wizards of Langley") becoming parts of an interesting and very informative history. The illustrations are well done and the equipment, tools, and document photographs are very useful. The non-technical and the technical are made clear for anyone from either camp, and most importantly for the general public.

Journal of Strategic Security

Here are just a few of many insights and knowledge to be gained, but not too many, which would spoil the fun: technical ops work at the nexus of two immutable laws; Faraday's Laws of Electrolysis and Murphy's Law; sometimes the simple is as effective as a sophisticated and complex collection device; a smart and courageous spouse can provide an elegant and very effective solution to a problem baffling an entire team; in the field there is no substitute for a smart and knowledgeable improvising techie; Luck remains the most critical factor in all Intelligence operations. Lloyd H. Hoffman is a professor at Henley-Putnam University.

Book Reviews

Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels who brought Churchill to Power and Saved England. By Lynne Olson, New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007. ISBN-10: 0-374-53133-1 (paperback). Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. pp. 436. $15.00. To those of the Cold War generation, "appeasement" was an utterly derisive epithet in discourse about international relations. Ms. Olson's book brings into focus whether "appeasement" has not become fashionable again in the guise of discourse, engagement, and diplomacy. Her book is not only a gripping account of the events leading up to the Second World War in British politics; it is another warning that those who fail to remember history are condemned to repeat it. As such, it is a worthwhile re-study of Conservative Party politics in inter-war Britain and bears comparison to the way that the leaders of both major United States parties have dealt with aggressive rogue states in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, particularly on the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. This book earns itself a valuable place as a study in international relations or as an important case study in the role of domestic politics and interpersonal dynamics in the formulation of foreign policy. Ms. Olson is a highly capable and thorough historian and journalist. She is well equipped to set the historical stage in a detailed and thoughtful manner. She is also careful to present our historical heroes in a delightfully human manner, with all their petulancies and peccadilloes. One of the most dramatic episodes recounted in her book is the moment when the troublesome Tory backbenchers, who chaffed against the avowedly appeasement policies of then Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, finally rebelled and walked away from their myopic, sinister, and self-deceitful leader after the German invasion of Poland in 1939. While Churchill was to be lionized as the great leader against appeasement, Ms. Olson shows that all too often this great man was captive of his class, his friends, and his own political ambitions. Perhaps the most shattering historical moment presented is when Arthur Greenwood, the uncharismatic Deputy Leader of the Labour Party rose to answer Chamberlain's pusillanimous response to the German attack on Britain's treaty ally, Poland, a stiff note demanding that the Nazis withdraw to their borders in September 1939. Greenwood rose and began to speak slowly and tentatively. He said, "With no opportunity to think about what I should say...I speak what is in my heart at the moment." Leo Amery, throwing decorum to the wind, shouted out, "Speak for England, Arthur." With this 81

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one phrase, Amery and Greenwood, Conservatives and Labour, were able to begin the bitter and bloody job of regaining England's honor. Thus they paved the way for the eventual elevation of Churchill as the wartime leader of Great Britain. Looking backwards, it is easy to view history's course as inevitable. Ms. Olson portrays quite a different situation. Churchill and the anti-appeasers were by no means an historical inevitability. Left to its own inertia the Tory party might indeed have acquiesced to Hitler's conquest of Poland, as it had of Czechoslovakia and Austria. The Tory back benchers were not a uniform, single minded group and dissipated much of their energies on private agendas. Sometimes it takes an outsider to congeal potentially great men into a heroic team. The relevance of Ms. Olson's book today is clear when thrown against the shadow of ineffective and weakly-pursued policies to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst rogue states. The only example of forceful intervention by the leadership of our own government has been the quixotic jostling of the former President George W. Bush against an Iraqi nuclear program that did not in fact exist and that no serious student of nuclear proliferation thought existed. Progressive red lines in the sand, drawn by both parties, have been ignored by Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. The fear of near-term consequences has overshadowed the fear of long-term consequences. Diplomatic dilatory rhetoric has replaced the use of meaningful action, whether it is military, economic, or unconventional warfare. Precious time has been lost as those who would wish us harm have grown stronger and our options have narrowed. We should ask Ms. Olsonâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;"Who shall speak for America and the generations that will undoubtedly suffer as too many voices pursued 'peace in our time'? Let us pray that we can muster the same nonpartisan courage as Amery, Greenwood, and Churchill and speak up for our values and our honor before the fate of generations to come is sealed in a nuclear doomsday. Donald J. Goldstein is a faculty member of Henley-Putnam University.