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se.don one CrThe Question") neier sars shar fie qnestion is -- only 1nat rrwel hawe examined it and decided that no chanses of policy are needed. Despiie the special bust and confidence I repose in ihe Foreien S€rvice, a 3tud, of Japm could besin w h a .1ear statement of Us security ali€rna we should spell our norc d€ar1y, I i!inr., lhe reclr y a.d political implica tions for Japan of ou dramatically luger rclatio,s vith the eo nuclear powerc of the Far Easr, ihe soviet union and tre pRC. obwiously, the J:panese rcle 6 our 'principal ally'is soing to be quite differenr if*e vork nor€ thrcush our adwersafi€s tha ibrough our lriends to prolecl
It is jEi as clea thatve sho!1d ask ourselves ifJapaD is siill (as we thousht aJier wortd rrJar fl) ihe key inleat to rhe slabilfty and secDity ol A6ia, Ifnor, could it asain become such a threar Eay, by deyelopmenr of nuclear veapo,s a.d a hishly nationalisiic foreien policy, .r by aliAnment with lhe sovietsz Is eilher shilt lihely? Ifnot, is a.hange in policy Eneryy may b€ 1he single Dost impodanr deteminant ot Japanese loreicn poticy' (pase 11)i bur Secudly is likely io be the basis of olr foleign policy tovard Japan, sebq: y qnestions - not e.ononic queslions ad certainly not psycholoEical qnestions - sLould be giwen priDary considera,.or 'n ,ld \SSv e-cp...e. I' rhiere.pecrrhepr.onEesddeoao"rour rhF !a.r berore rhe .ors.. r ." "," p"e*Ei';-""^.. plr 'rn*.queEtjons ( securiiy a.d".athe cholosical quesEons, and liwe on securily and ,china and the sowiei union,),