UN TED
STAIES ).]FORJ,,AI ON
AGENCY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Assistant to tle President lor Nalional Security Affairs Proposal lor NSC Reriev of U.S. Policy Toward JapD
I believ€ aother NSC reviev ol ourpoticy would b€ highly desirabre ar this rime.
tovald Jap
NSDM 13 ol May 23r 1969 sei lorth a pra.iicat formula tor our Jalan policy, rerying mainly on tne 6mootn execution of existi,g policies. Thar fornula ed ihe psy.hological benetits froft the Okinawa reversion decirion delused the videty aricipated "1969 crigis'in U.S. -JalaD rerations. In recent months, hov€ver, tllere hawe been indications of increaEins stEins in the relarions]1ip as the Japmese move tovard grearer independe,ce ad note $ftL corcern directions ad Deasures being urSed in the u,s. vnictr do ,ol co.ve.ge sitn th€ir oM irterests. As a re.ult, estabrished u,s. policies could dlift our ot alienftenr $i!h tne realiti€s ot
Jap 's changins situation.
In lhe economic and porifi.al areas I believe rhere are sev.ral indications of these problems, ln rne psy.hotogical area of our relationship, I note that public opinion surveys and ments of JapaD€se attitudes have iended ro co.firm or t]1ese st!ains. TheBe dev€ropeents appear to be particula!}y loused intcnse reerinas whi.h could unsetde Iroad areas of ou. retationship, some influential figlres in Japan a.e disturbed by their perception of appricarions of rhe Nixon Doctrine, and ureir leerines ale retlected in press and otner Dedia
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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Dehates are sharpening i, Japan ower the congruity o{ American and Japa,ese pori.ies tovard China.
otfi.iar Positio. ir lhe Okirawa reversion neqotiations' in which our Voi.e of Arn {igures prominently, seeme to reflect a certain eelsitivity toward Anericd CoDgressiondl ad Public Tne Japanese
AmonA t]1e quesli.ds
vlicn
a new NSC review could
exanire
make Japaese feel that close the U. S. are inhibiting their independence ir Asia?
1, Miqht increasins ndtionarish
relations vith
2.
What wiU be the psycnobgicai
efie.t of U.S. force
t]1e Ja?Mese feel insecure? Will build up lor a ]arge Japeesâ‚Ź militaiv
reductions in East Asia? W r
domesiic Japmese pressures eshbrish ent wi$ oftensive md/or nucrear capabilties? Willour lorce reductioas weaken c!â‚Źdib itv ard interest in Ar.erican pover md defense commitments?
3. Is urere a psyclologicat threshold lor e.onomic lrictions beyond vhich it vitt be ilifiicult to sustain a productiwe basi. Japanese inhibitione dd aobitions d ol remaining anti-Japanese sentimeDt in Ea6t ABia' vhat tvPe ard ilegr ee of J apane se i.wolvem ent vould mos! benefit U. S. shategic
4. In the face of mixed
irterests in the area? I believe tnat a rewiev of tle piobrems and opporrunitiet conIronting the u. S. -Japuese relatio.shiP -- which tn termed the 'rlinc]1-pinl lor Pea.e in the Pacilic -- shoula be a.corded
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
pr,.
ACTION
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
,orr [. ,,o"oooo.
,usA
Propoeal for NSC Review ol U. S. Poli.y
Di.ector Slakespeare has sert you a memora.dl]m urging an NSC rewiev oI our lo1icy to@rd Japan at ths tim€ (Ta], B). USLA
Ai
a mem.randllm lor your signarure responding io Mr. sh.kespeare in wni.h you e!:pres5 ap?leciation for his suaSestion but er?lain vhy you wuld plete! to dete! a review of ou! policy toward Japan utit taie! this yea!.
Tah A
is
RECOMMENDATION:
That you Biga the aitached medoradllm ai Tab A to Mr. Shakespeare.
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