k MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRES]DENT S FILE
Jahes J. Wi.kel (Interplerer), Ameri.an Embassy Tokyo Meeting with Eisaku sato, Japanese prihe Minisrer, o. Tnusday, Jmnary 6, l9?2 at t:30 p.rt. at San Cleme.re
SUBJECT;
Pdfte Minister Eisaku
Sato
Ahbassador Nob!.hiko Ushiba Ahbadsador cenichi Atraiani (Intetprerer)
xissingei, Assjsrant to tte presidenr
for National secnrLry AJtair 3 Jahes J. xricr.et, Ameri.an Emhassy Toriyo lrnre.preter)
rresidential vist to Jaran
Tle P m. Ministet, first ol
a1L, convâ‚Źyed io the president rhe sin.ere a?prc.iation of }]IM tne Emperor who was deeply impaessed rith $e varm *eLcome and unforgettable nosptatity accordcd him and tne Empress ty rhc Presidenr and Mrs. Nixon at Ancrorase.
Tne Prcsident 5aid rhat rhe wi3it was a great occasion l.r rE roo, and trd lelr a fine inpression in rre u. s., particularly be.au3e ot ihe e*.eDenr Tne Prime Minister said rlar HIM rhe Empero! haa heen parricularly pleascd at his diecnssion \rith rhe Presidenr of a possible wisit ro rhe United Siates. Howcver, he (rtre Prime Mini6rer) has been i,ptrni,s on i]1e bratesi, becalse su.h a visit vould narurally lead ro a. inwftati.n ro the President io marie a retun vist r. Jalan, vtich the Socialisis and cohmunists vould certainly oppose. Reca[i,r ihe demonerrarions in l960 shicl prewenred hi6 b.oiher (uren I,rine Mrnst velcohing Presidenr Eisent.wer ro Japan, he said thar te vished to be certain that tne Presiden! contd indâ‚Źcd matre the visit berore enendirg He did nor wa.r ft said rhar ea.h ot rLe b.orlers (Kishi a,d Sato) Iad inwited the Presidenr bnr neither had been able ro vel.ome tim
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Thc lrcsident said that he u.derslood and lert $e P acring wisely. He nored that all rhe adva inctnding the united stales and Japan, nad simitzr pr.brem3 wjnr unpleaeanr radicat he pointed ort, $e rtaj.rity of Americans hawe been deeply impreseed ty tne wisit ol HIM the Emperor, a.d hy tne Prime Minister, and are lavorably inctincd towaral Japan.
Aneramp1eoIthe1avoIab1eattitude!owaIdJapan, va8 the speedy Senatc approwal ol thc otinawa Agreement, in rie ahsence ol any ol the oppositior indicafed earlier. Thâ‚Ź Prime Midster expressed deep appieciatio! for atl the President had donc to insure rne smo.rh ap?r.var of the orilaqan Reversion asr.e ment. Noting tlat ne and the President sould discuss olinava in detail tomorfo{, le visred to linjt }imsell today to ihis exlresBion of The President said that
tl
meetirg vith se.retary connalLy in Tokyo trar rre (r]re Presidenr) wisned ro havc cmerce from this meering a rerptuL arnounceme.r of ou pos io. resardinS olinawa. Ile agreed to reserve aletailed disclssions lor fohortoR morning, and suggesteil tnat secretary Rogers and Foreig. Ministe. FnLuda micht join i. ai tnat rime. arranscmcnr w]1ich the Prime MiEisrer could an.owce at nis lres3 conlerence followinc rhe .on.1usi.n or trese ral]<s. Snmmit Talks The Prime Ministe! noied tle President s series ol meerinas vitl Presiden! Pompidou, Prime Mi.ister Heath and ctu.enor Brandi, and said that le was pteased to tale pa* in the President s lirst srmmit heeti.e tlis nev year, He larded the PleEident s cfforis io a.hiewe real communicatio. witl the readels oI the Free wor1d, at rhis rime vhen a ncv poly-potar vorLd * raking snape, and strcgesred rnar ir mignt be desirable to dewelop a more permarent arrangement lor the leader3 of tne five leadir8 narions or r]1e !.ree world (joined rrerlape by seweral otners) to continue tneir summii-leve1 contacts on a multilateral ba6is. 1l the President lad n. objection, Ie eaid, Japan would enrtorse a p!oposal for a multiLateral summit any tifte t]]e President misht sish to
Tnc President, lirst of all, nored t]1e conccrrs ex?ressed in Japan rhar vas meeting vfth rhe Prime Minister onty arter aeeri.e first vth ihe Euopean leaders. r]e a.sDred rhc prime Minisrer thar te rad no th.ugh ot.etrinc any.he ahead ot t]re others. lvhat was inwolved, he er?Lained, vas tlat he telt it was importanr ro discuss European ftancrs vith tle lrenc]1, British and Germans, and rher ro discusE pacifi. matters viih tle Prime Mirister. Oie advarrage ol rteir meetins nov, Le raid, va8 that he could rewiew lor ur Prime Minisrer tre conceprs deEloped in nis earlier meeti.ss vitn the orler rhree leaders. he
For example, tne president.aid, he disc83ed with ur€ Europeans fte Iurure .orise ot NATO, onr alliance v h .tv.ester! Europe, .f vhich France is still a parr, md Aied.an ud European force le€13 in Enrope. The torrncoming entry ot rhe uK, and porsibty othel cortries, ilto t]1e EEC pas also a subject lor discrssion, ard, a.cordingly, so qas tle united srates relarionship r. rtris rew Europ The Presidenr nored rnar rte urjted srates relationehip vit]r Europe differed rrom its relarionstips in the pacifi.. se said tlar he made thepdd vit]1 each of rhc leadere he mer (pohpidou, Hearh and Brandt) urat vhile ve hawe a responsibitfty ro mainiain rle closest .onsutrations beiwee. the unfted srates ald rhe major European povers qe musr look ar $e vottd as a \rt.le, wnic]1 indicares a reslonsibility to also consdt closely with Japal The reason he believes rhjs importer ie rhar in viewing the Free world, tbe crear econohic povers, $e united srares, Japan, Cermany, Biftain, Fran.e, and possitty canada, closely il {e are to luild a stable and productiwe Fre viur traite and honerary 3tabiLfty. rn a geopoljrical wiew the world as rvo na1we3, rne pacifi. talr and rhc European tulf, blt must yiev it i, 31oba1 terms. Eneland, France and Germany no l.nger mai.tain a sisnificant miltary !reser.e in Asia, wtrerc Japan is tle major Free woird lati hc beliewed rtar rhe devetopment ol a t-pover c.nsnltaiiee process (addirg rtaty, perhaps, and ca.ada) world.ot only seiwe the e.onomic needs of rle enrire Free wortd, but vould also .ontlibute to rte developmenr ol ..besio! in policy ror han.Uirg all rl1e difiiculr politi.al and se.urity problems thar ari3e, The unfted srares, rhe president aaded, is in a uique pos ion, hawins separaie security heaties wit[ Japan ald rne wesrer but 3ince its poricy musr b€ gtobzl rle united stares cannoi separare rhe two. l.terestihgly erough, he reported, an rhree Euro?ear leaders expressed great interest in having closer relarions wth Japan in r]1e
areas. A bad stuarion wouLd iesrLt it rhc Europe blilr a watl from berind vhich ii conld h confu.nrarion wfth Jatan and r]le unted stares, just a5 ft s,oltd te bad for the u,ited states 1o isolate self again3t Japan and Eur.pe. Tre Pre,idenr srressed his beliet rhat we an hrsr i.evitably .ompere, whicL is good, but mrst do so o Theretore, h€ believed it important to set the Europeanr to think as ve do in ine Unfted Stares, that is, vi€wrre votld as a wl)ole! a.d ro recoSnize ttat Japan mrgr be ar important part ol the IChanceu.r Brandr, he repo.ted, explained cermany s ar.angehent tor semi_annlaL bilaieraL .onsrltarions vfth Japan at tre Foreier Minister tewel.
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In sumation, ihe President said rlrt close consultalions should conrinue Ior tle tim€ being .n a bilateral basis, but might pernaps deveLop inro mnltilateral .onsultatione amonS the 5 pove.s larer. rn any ca3e, he believes that closer consnltari.ns are indislensable in rhe mainrenance The Prihe Mirisrer said rhere werc many poinrs in rhe above vttr vtrictr ne agieed. He re.aned Japan s earrier ania.ce vttr Brftain (t9ot) and its joini.s ot ihe Tiipartite Altia,ce before rhe war, {nic! he cnaracrcrized wrile Japan in rtre past 6ay havc presenred difjerert laces to Eur.pe a.d the un ed srares, it now mur prescnr ihe same face to both with rcspecr io ,ne parh it is folt.qj.s. setring aside rne separare matter.l llory thc Iree !vo.1d mighr nLrimatety coordinate vitt rne comunisr narions, te agaeed urar il vould be mosr sigdti.ant r. de,elop close ..n3!1tarions amons ihe narions or rhe Free vor1d. Apart f..m reSuLar consulrarions berveen Forcig. Ministe.s, Le supported rne .oncept ol a 5 power sumfrit co eren.e, as sueeesred by rhe presidenr. The Pre3ident asl<ed
lim to clarify
wher]1er he meant a
5 power sumir
Prihe Minister responded rhar he did, bur witt rhe addition pertaps ol rraly and canada he did n.i leel a.y nccd ro inv.lve .ther .ourries, In viev 6f the President s brsv rchedule, cspe.iany in tnis he rn.nght jt hener to h.ld srch a 5 pover summii Late., lirsr in ure Uniied states, the reading harion ot the rrec $rorrd, and rhen sunsequentry in roiation in the othcr Eree wo.lA narions. Tne
The P.esident comented rhar the lormarion ., ure c-10 in rhe economi. area has sorked out lor ihc good of the,orld.
Minisier recalled tnat he was eeiwing as ainance Minister {1len Mr, Bta.L inwitcd Japan to join tle c 10. l0he rtonetary problem lad beer resorved, lui ne felt it Bould als. be eigniticant it t]1e Free Wolld military powers courd coordinatc ir tle interest ol porld peace and prosperi!y. He h.ped tle Presidert would keep ihis idea in mind as he mowed forvard {it]1 lis visils to Pel<ing and Morcos! perlap3 be corld annouce a lormal pr.posal at some later aate, not recessarily The Prime
Tne President said that ihie idea had eome appeal. He re.alled thinking
Dr. Kissinger. In la.t, he said that he raised this point vitn eacl of tle ihree leaders ir nis sumil meetingt, inat de could no longer ui.]( only i. terms of NATO a1 but felt it iftpo.iant to bring Ja?an, tle major po{er in the Pa.ific more fnlLy into ihe rree world comm{njty.
D!. KisEinq€r said that in .l nis sumdit conlerence3 he coneidered
a Big-5
irst Legar to lhink s'nmit, but on
rellecrion realized that he vould be discusting witn Japan aatters ol no concern to lhe others. sncl as okinava and(orea. For that reason the Presidenl deci<l€d to lold a series ol sumit meetines, but had indeed initiaLty giEn 3ome c.nsideration to a Big-5 summit. The Pr*iad saiil tAat ne vourd consider the idea later, and would pursue it after Mos.ow an.l pel<ing. H€ loped ihat tne Prime Mini3ter vourd also pursne it in nis meelings with ure cermans and tle Frencl.
Jaran's Position and Role The Prime Ministe! e*plaiaed iia! Japan has beer limited lo playins an e.o.omi. rore in Asia, Iolefully of some u3e, because it .annot play a Ile noteil tlat duri.g conside.atio! ol ure Ohinawa Reversion agreemeni and related legielation ii became appa.ent ihat strong a.ti war ard anti-Eecn.ity treaty teelinEs ?ersist, and even the PRC it3ell has criiicized tle rewival of Japanese milit:rism. Japm tltrs fiads it diflicult to corulce anyo.e that ii is not going militaristic, which is considcred to be inevitable in wie{ of Japan'e great economic pover. He beliewed $at Japanrs plesent positi.n is .orre.t, ihat it slonrd not se€k to become a military pover, and should seek to play a rarger economic role,itbin that contea.t.
The Prcident that he understood tne difficult !osition in which 'aid Japan finds its€lf: as $e third strongest e.onomi. p Japan mrst stiu depend on a .ommitment by an.thei cornhy, tle United states, Japan to ptay tne role it is, tha! is, an in.reasing e
lndonesia and Trailand dewerop e.on.mi.ar1y, tle m.re dirfi.ult it viU becohe to overthrov tneh by sutwe!si.n.
However, rhe Presiddqpoinred o!r, rapan ries or rhe rimrard o1 Asia, with r,o great lower neignborsi the USSR and PRC, both of vhicn are military and n! Japanrs GNp is tvice tlat oI China s and is gai.ing on the USSR, but with all tLat e.onomic povar, and beinq linked to tnc cconomi. late ol the free vorld (even if it ir increasine its trade vitn Mainldd Chira) Jalan is rahed before rhe vorrd in rerms ol fts self delense. The unted siates mclear deterr€.t not onry serwes tle United States, le said, but a1s. Japan, uder the Muhral Secaiity Treaty. He realized tnis presented a major political problcm in Ja?an, which lhe Prime Midster and his brourer, former Prime MinisrerKisni, hare handleil qilh skiu in rne ra.e of radical oplos ion, rnr it seemed to ]1im thar Japan is ra.ed w h an unacceptable choice: either Japan develops s ovn dererrenr power lowewer unpalatable wis-a,wis ts neichbols, {ro are arfted vth nn.rear weapons, .dati.r with iheh. He felt that tle Prime Milister is more acutety aware of this tna. hissell,
lortlcoming wi3it io Pekils {ould i, no vay be at the expense ol r}e commiiments tne United Stat€s has to it8 frierds and allie8 in the Pacifi., Japan, tne RoIi and Tajwan. The President rccalled the spe.ulation at rhe time his China wisii va8 a.ouced, whicn le hrev embarrassed tle Prime Minister, that tne United States vould move tovard mainland China ai the expense oI its alties, including Jape, bul he emphasized tlat he nas aesured ni3 lriends, bour pnbt.ry and privately, that thcre were absolutely no conditions atta.hed !o lis vi3it.
tle Presidertrs remarhs abont China. witl respect to nuclear veaponsi howeve!, ]1e explained &al Japan has adopted ty uanimors resolrtion ol the Di€t a poLi.y based o. the three The Prime Minister appreciated
non-nuclear prircipl€s (!on-ploduction, non-inhoduction and non pos3eesion oI nuclear veapons). Tneret.re, Ja?an mrst rery on thc United States nucrear umbrella under tne Muiual Se sucgested $at the President mislt respo,d to dy exp.ession ol lear
in Peking .f Japanese mil arism thar t]re unfted ftares vould not provide Japan any nuclear veapons, rnerefore Japan is not goins militarisric. He aLso expressed con.ern about tIe dcpth ol American criticism of Japan s T]1e
Pre.ident reslonded ftar this feeling is r.r direcred only at Japan,
blt Europe as verl, €wen t]1org]1 the Europeans have rore of a m itary .apability. Speaking pe.sonally, he emphasized rhar tle United srares has a Mutuat se.uity T.eaty wiur Japan in its own Lnteresr as Nelt as Japan s, which is rrue also of its othel trearies witt rhe RoK a.d Euro?e. unless ihe united srares .an jusrity rhese as beine in ite ovn inrcrest, tre did n.t believe the publi. sould snppori $em. As a sood pol i.ian, te knew tne Plime Minister would udersrand ihar as Jap lower g.eq and as Japan becaae more and more abl€ ro engaAe in l€a1tny coh?ciition pres3!res inevftably w.uld ari.e in rhe United Srares lor Japan to assume a greater responsibility rovard ihe derense ot ure Free Wor1d, if n.t by direct mflitary means, rtren throtrgh e..nomic Prime Mjnistd agreed drt is qute naturat ttar a lareer economi. role, hut in d€tense it has no ortr€r to &e uniied states nuclear umbrena. :ahe
with respect to econohic assista.e, rhe Prime Minisrei n.ted rhar
Japan',e aid .ow rotalled .93% ol GNP, close to rtre oECD-DAC Eoal of 1% o{ CNP, a.d sai.l that the COJ vouLd increare s assistance to hrins fl1e tura1 up to r%.
In additio., the Prime Minisrer Eored rhar a1l fiwe permanenr memlers of t1le uNsc are ,!.tear po{ers, bur ot tn.se neither France nor lte PRC hawe signed and ratiried ure NPT. He asked vnerher urc Un ed stares. UK and UssR could lersuade rhe orher tvo ro sign and rariry. He also nored urar Japan ha3 sisned ihe NpT. The Preeideni doubte.t that ve had that lind ot ilfluence with Ctina. He did no! .tiscuss this point viih presiden! pompjdou, vho in any case did nor seem ready yer to deparr trom Decanlleis policy, bur he did expecr that France vonld sign at eome tuture dare. He did not ea?e.t ctina ro do 30. He added rhar Dr. Kissinger mighr have a differenr wiew.
Dr. 1(issinser orfered hir impressi.n rtar rhe PRc
a
by fea. ol the USSR, and rhar r]1e Cnineec are retu.ianr to do aDyurine
n} \n!
b"L.-il
ro'1.USSq d b"..Fa,l
The P.ime MinLSter noied thai the discnssion *as gettins ofi the rails or its p.jn.i!a1tl.me (clina), but added that somâ&#x201A;Źday a way must be c.nsidered to sei urc PRc and France to accede ro NPT, asl.ed wlrâ&#x201A;Źnrer Jipao ha5 s,c.ed Ure NpT.
!- P.im- w:a.s,Fr
3d'd tr d- or \ -,r.r a' on .-. " rs, . ". n .. b" c teld in abeyancc unril rte ?roblem or inspection is re3olved. r a tair system of inspection .ar b thcn tlis dillicutr protlem ot ratilication vould be resorved.
The Prime Minister, runing ba.k ro crina, said rhere vas no aeed io dvell on rhe -elt-k.om s]rocki.3 impact on other courries oI r]re announ.ement ot rhe Presidenr's wisit" Ttre Japanese ewzluare hiehy tLis lotthcomirg visit ro china, bur in simpte words ne varned thar the s]1ocl of the a.noucenent on Asian .oMtliee ran mn.h deeper iha, the Prerident .ouLd ewen imagine. He realized rhar tu11 consltrarion on such an alfair vould lawe heen impossible, ald even ir inJoroeil, rnere vas rouring Le .ould hawe do.e anrlvay. Hopever, rnis ewenr poinrcd np rhe ahsence ol a .hannel ol comuication sfth a major nalion. sohe rime ago he lad agreed in ptincilte tlar a ,,hot-1ine' was necessary, bur now the iime had come tor Ja?an io consider s instanad.n positivety. T]1e Presideni agreed, ad said tlar qe could now implement rhe agreemenr ro insran a h.r-Iile, which vould be co.sisrent wfth vtat re eaid earlier abour co.sultirg vilL ile leadiDs Pacilic nalion on rhe eane ba3is as with the tlree Eu.opean povers.
wtr respecr ro china, rhe President said rhat several steps aie inw.lwed. First, the decision vas made io make t]1e visit; second, ve were consdring and info.mins our friends lrefore tle wisit resarding tli!d,vewonld.onsu1t{i1Landinl.tmouIl.iends the visit. Tneref.re, ne sished in pa.ricular to ot the ln.pose or nis wisit, to the PRc and the ussR, as he has done wth ure Elropean leaders, Follovins dre ,isit, if desired by tle Pride MiEister,
s-E
QB-E5l-Ex.prs-
wisled to mahe arrangemenrs ro inrorh him of rhc yisit, and ro present nim .eas3ura.ces resardirs our He no{ wished lo1lov up o. making arranEemenis to so inform tle Prime Minister. Ee dlso eiplained tlat Dr. Ki3singer ]ras been prcsenr at all t]re me€rin8s np ro n.w, and ir nre Prime Mini3rer tlonght ft useftL1, perhals Dr. Kissinger .onrd explain tne leasons tor rhe visft and wnar is e{pe.ted .1 it. ]re
Ey vay of ?lelace, i. a nroader context, tle President said tle Chinese agreed to Eee ur for .eado.s of tneir oen, and we agfeed 1. see them
for reasors ol our ovn, vhi.h s.metimes .oin.ided. L.oming .wer an are us ussR and PRc ussR relations, and rre fact rhat the PRc Lnevitably will be.ome a major mcrear pover wthjn allirmed 1]is o$n telief that rhe lrnired stater should atrempt at tnis time to eEtabrish .ommui.arions qth china and nor leawe the PRc isoLared in tle heart .r A3ia, checked on the vest by the USSR, its ideoLogical
enemvi on the sotrth by lndia, with elic} it carte i. conflict i, 1962! and on rhe oasr by tre lree n2 er4endins from Japan doe. $rougn Soutleast Asia. H€ pointed olt that urc ereaig!11in phitosolhy vould alvays remain between the United States and tLe PRC, as long as urey are communisis and we are non-cotumunist and lave a great dirfererce in intcrests. we shotrld, le nrged, rse our i.fluence to the exte.t that ve can to discnss and res.lve i]1e.e differences. witlout vhich t]leie vo!]d be an inedtab Tne Prcident expla,nea that shat {ou1d .ome out .I t]1e meeting i3 not normalization, lor rlere .ould be no normaLizari.n in tne c.nvenrional sense beteeen tne united states and ure PRc be.ause tne united states re.ognized ihe Roc and ra3 a derense tleaty {itn 1r, neither .t lvhich ir l{nat will come out, he hoped, is a channel of .ommui.ation ald progress i! other a.eas.
Tlc Prime Minisler
said tlat Japan s viev is qnitc diifcreni, and hc asred how tne Presialeni elaluated the UN i.ntation to seat Pering by adoptine fie Albanian Resoluti.n,
The President replied tlat {e opposed t}le exprlsio .our3e are most sratetnl for the high desree of leadership Japan exercised i! tnis difficuli situation. we le1t, Le sajd, $at a had preceaent voxld be s€t by tlc cr?ulsion ol any UN member, and drd not helieve the expulsion of the ROC by the UN owel our .bjection .ould be alloved to change, .r abrogate our heaty {itl rle RoC, oi chanee our lo1icy ol contintring to re.ognize lhe RoC,
The P.ihc Mlnister agreed vt} we conld not ignore the fa.t tlat
Iim in tlat respecl, tle PRC is
but pointed
.ut rhar
The Presiden! replied thal we ac.epr rlat lacr, hecanse as a mcmber ot
Iand de Bould stick to ou uing to havâ&#x201A;Ź ierations vitn tle Roc and ol maintainins onr delense agrecment, h nis wiew,
lolicy ol
a eiear gowernment only
nation. Tne uN is one sorld, and tnere rhe PRc is rhe ol china. ol course, he added, there are other eorlds,
ns with tle Cowernment on Taiwan and are begiming discnseions yiur ire PRc. He recocljzed tnar fiis seems inc.nsistent, ttrt the w.rId {e live in }as many diwided states, East and west Germa.yr and Nort} and South Korea. He lound it irieresiing to note rhar t]1e one point on vlicl thc PRc and Roc did agree is llat there is .ne clinai tleir debate is which ol them is i! s gow.fnmenr. rife 6elicvc ilat i. tne Long Lisrorical piocess tlis shotrId be decided peacelully ty tle r,. .r fiem. Meaniime, he Eaiil, ve hawe a long higtory ol friendehip, alliance and defense arransements sath the ROC and qill .ontinue tlis relationship. At thc samc time, on the trasis le descriled alowei we *ould meet the PRC on a pragmaii. basis t. see vlether ve nad matte.E of mutlal interest, In these lerms, le did n.t reel $at recognition in tne formal sense is so important, and did not eipect t. rca.h sn.n u agreetuenr in Peki,g.
A1the President s sugcestio., Dr, Kissinger said tnai tne Presi.lent .ould naldly set out of lire since Amtassador ushiba che.l<s np on lim ewery ilree or fonr days. h eeneral, le said !6at o tle President pointed out! is $at Clina and ourselves lav. bc.n lrrongnt together, each lor rcason Had $e President ann.unced last year at this time tlar a unted states delegarion llould visit Pelains Nithin four days of bombinS Norfi viernam and votr vetcome he vonld have been ac.nsed ol a monstrotrs credib ty gap, we do not hawe to give u! our o1d lricnds to wisit the PRc, le ohserwed, but ve did need room for m at Moscov did not speah lor 1n. cntire commuisi B1o.. He gave assui ce rhat no fri.nd oI tle United States need ,ear tnat we would jeopardize thei. interest,
Tre Primâ&#x201A;Ź Minisrer relr i s suljecr at sreater lensth tecalse the.e were points dillicult Jor him io understand: tne United States did not seem io nnderstard Japurs position and Japan did not uderstand the Uhiied states position,
I The Prime Minirter rhen e:?lained Japanis yiev. Japan nad con.luded a ?eace treaty virh the Roci ar a time vnen it was no ure ROC vilr vhich r. ..nclnde a peace treaiy kith China. However, since tle uN adopted rhe Alba.ian Resolntion, Japan must wieB tle pRc as the representatiye .1 china. stilli no lrogress has been rtade in convincins Fehinc ro talk to Japan. \!itn resped ro Taiwani both chiang (ai,srek and Ma. asree fiere is onLy one china, vhicrl thererore leav€s Taiwa. as a domesric affair. Japan is anehprinS t. no.malize its relahons vitrr Peking, but docs n.r intend ro ahroeate fts tIeaty vfth
w'rh tarvd- s.'l o- r-qolv-d,r rrc p.o.-.6.r ,..-..,",.". The Prime Minister cautioned tlai a sreat lroblem woutd be caused by tvo Chinas, or an i,aependent Taivar. Anorher poinr ro .oneider, ne a.lded, is ftai rhe soviers vould probably come into Taiwan if the united siates were to vitndraw.
clina is one, rhe P.ime Minister refteiaredi blt he visned ro hear rhe united states wiev oa rhe ruture of its heary {itt rt€ Roc, or wberher tne unfted states lelt rtat Taivan represerted alt of cniDa. shoutd tte uniied states try ro push througt uris tafter yiew ne varned rhar vould 6e too big a fiction. shoutd a separate Taiwzn be creat€d, aparr froh Clina, le .aid $ar ft vould add anotner divided srare ro tbe lisr of cermany, Korea and vieriam, To recogrize Taiwa. as it ie nov w.trld sirply .reate a great problem. Therefore,
Prime Minisrer 6aid ne loud rtre urited srares ?osition as rne unfted siates hietu rind ft dilti.urr to uderstand Japd,s posftio.. n1e
ilificult to udersiand, jur
Japan, rhe Prime Mi.isrer recaLled, had no riSlt to speal< arr.ur Taiwan, nawing abandoned alt 3uctr ri8bre at $e rioe of snrrender, but Japan could say rhar Taivan is a larr of china, and tlat Japan nas a rreaty witn ure gower.ment ol vhi.L chiang Kai-shek is the
Tle P.ime Minisrer als. holed itat Dr. Kissinger *ould keep in mind lhe need to prorect the Roc seat in the rMF and world Eank and .rher international linar.ial organizarions in *hich is seated. The Presideni said urar th ale avare oI ure dilficulries of this probLem oler-aIL, eres ine w h rhem as the Japanese ao, but, he added, rrere is one norc dihension io .onside!, since Taiva. i3 part ol a defense comptex to saresuard tre securitv of frec Asiar narione. our rreary frec Asia defe.se cohplex.
t2
Tnc Prime Minister bae.stood tlis, and assumed t was !etated Presidenfs starement tnar rre nould not abandon o1d friends. He asl(cd whefier rne Preside.r would opcn a Liaison .fiice in Felils hi3 visft rhcie, even ir ie did not esrablish an embassy,
f]]e President repLied that tnis would bc
a matter f.r discussion. but .onditions as to Bhat might develop.
Dr. Iiiseirqe.
added tnar no {orm, a3 su.n, has leen discussed, brr {elt pethaps that a. emissary mig]lt visit Pel<ins fro altlotrgh no one kncv for sue whai {ould develop,
Tne Primc Minister aslied vhetner tle U ted Siates is considerins d independent statns l.r Ta rm o, th€ Narionalisr Commnnist Colrrmon F.ont (xoktyo cassakr). He also asked wtrethcr the United States would ag from Taivar i] the PRC aEreed not to liberat The P.erident replied rhar urere are p.ssibilities rtrere. Norhing, 1lo\!ever, c.uLd le predicied tecarse these would be sul,je.ts lor discus5ion. He emlhasized that bodl sider begin vt! rhe udersranding ilat wlrt is nor negotiable is the u.ted srares treary wiih tle Roc, or its recognftion of n1e Roc. on other marters, aI re could say at rhis rime is wnat he has said ir Senerat rerms ab.ur orr postion. rn rh€ fntnre, he relt, b.tn gove menis woutd maLe adjnethenrs. He believed that ne would rtand fi.m or urar position at tlis rioe vith rhe PRC. of couse, le eaid, he strongLy opposed the resoLution ol the Tai{an situari.n bv force, To rephrase his aiews, lhe Pre3ident did not beliere rhe China ?roblem w.uld soo! be 5o1€d, As he said intiaLly, ro pni rhis in perspecriyei ore oI the principaL rea6o.s (not a se.ondary one) ine PRC is meeting ns i5 nol Taivan, vhictr vhile imporrant lanlas down the scale. onr reas.n rol heeting urem i aluroush tlis is a speciat problem. witbout l.owine more, re declined to sp..u1ate on tle m.tives of rhe FRc, but in their lies ol history he relt tlat they se€ rlemsetves sllrouded hy The udred srztes and PRc are nor ideotosi.aL friend., jr bur serves rhe inreresr of boih not ro act as enemies. we disagree with lespecr to rhe difri.trft problems of Taisan, vief,nam and Korea, but despite these, h€ said, there are otler comperring, .ve.riding reasons roi borh countries ro deverop a nev relarionsri!,
For exampte, t]]e President Baid, Dr. (issinger das lirm in hi3 disclssionB ol Korea vitn the chinese, and as an indication of fi.mness ve are addins $210 million in ruds ror tne RoK to rre hddger *rich ent te pubristed in two veeks, as a clea. sig
Dr. xissinler
3aid tnat the bldset vould also make maintain the ?resent force lewer in tle RoK t1lrougl FY 73, noi that we i.tended to r€iluce tlem afterwardi but .ur budgets are on an annual baeisr
Mi.isid said iie xoreans rear a hoop crt atter Fy 73. rn faci, Ie said, Taivu and the RoK aie bot! deepty co.cer.ed, hut ne believed tnis new budget vould le1! a11ay tlei! 1ears. The Prime
Pr:he MiniEier a13o noted thai he nad been approa.hed by ROK officialr in Tokyo, just as the usc Las been apploached by rhe RoK Ambasrador in waslington, to r€qnest tlat the Uniteit States not cut its troop level. More than that, howewer, the RoK vishes to hawe Japan€se assi8tance in buildinE its defense industry, he said, bnt Japan car.oi e.gage in joint vehtules to ploduce a.4s. He said ihat the Unitea $aks conld ]1erp in this area. Tne
russested
tlat Japar
.ou1d nelp in
otler vays.
EriEqlliglslgt acreed, and Japan is, lor example, by e:tendirg $300 millio. in e.onomic assistance ower the next couple oI years to The
help linance a new snbway in seod.
Returning ro the gnestion or J:pan nolmalizing relarions vith rte PRc, fie Prime Mihistel aEain eaid rnar the PRc represents cnina, but Japd has friendly relations and a tleaty vith Taivd, ard is completihg an loans to Taiwan previously negotiatei!. Jalan is even prepared, le said, to worl olt nee loa!3! -ishing ol .ourse to do so vitrotrr tr?setting Perrine. a3 p.eviously ex!1ained, ihe Prihe Minister said tlat Jalan has separated economics and por i.s in dealins yiti china up ro rovi it tas political relalions vith Taivan a.d economic relations vith botn Taiwan antl ft€ PRC. Nov, if Japars noimalization poLicy suc.eeas, it witl hawe its principal poliiical il economic relations witn Peking, and on]y eco&mic relarions Thc Prime Ministef felr rhat re 3hourd arso add tlat r]rc position of Taivan has not clanged in te!tus oi tne Muhral Security Treaty betveen Ja?an and
feLt ne must mahe two poinis. Fir.t, Japd and the are eac! sovereisn cowtries and eacl nust ftake its own Uniied States decision. Se.ond, even thoneh ve lo3t tle vote i, the UN, it vas wery mu.h noted in tlc world and very muc! ap?reciated T]1e
Pl:eidd
tlat!heUnitedstateSandJaPalstoodclosetogetheI sense
.l history Ieel that France
and Ce.hany are ..mPeting He could not cnes3 vteure
o. the
suc! race nciticr Padt n.r B.nn corld vin, only M.s.ov. \rlen lis om visit to Pekins was a.nounced urere vas,
lad been Lelt belind, lut hc cautioned uut it Japan and tle United States wer. to €neage in a .ompetition to se iis relaiions pitn Pekine qniclest, it vould .erve the interests or neitber. By tlis ]1e did not mean io say tlar ve sh.n1d ao everr4hine tose$er. Indeed, he recalled, i! 1965 and 1967 !e told Mr. xisni wly he lclt urat it vas in Japan's inte.ert to hawe trade relations Rith tne PRc. The rast tling ve wani to do, he avo*ed, i3 to norhalize oui own relationg vitl P€kin8 atthe expe!.e oJ Japan, Leaving Japan belind, hstead Be seen relations that serve the interests Japan seeks to serve, vlich serve botl .ur interests bccaure ol the seclrity lr.blem ve share in the Pacilic. we siould, }]e urged, consult closely on vnat se lvonld do. Japan
The Prime Minister aeleed empnari.ally that ve Bhould consult.
Turning to Korea, rle Prime Miniefer rep.rted that lormer RoK prime Mini3ter chug Il-Kson had r.cently visited Japan to req&st addifional Japanese econ.mic aid, and to relort on tne latest iatelrigence on \o-rh Ko."a s p anD, rl' h-o,ldbe:. vaL. "c.
lncidentally, tne Prime Minister noted that the PRC has rece.tly re{tuirea Urat all Jalanese visitors to Pe]!i.g al.o so to Py.ng-yang. Tle PRC i3 nov helping Nortn Korea greatly, and North Korea qhich once leaned tovard fie USSR is now l€anine lovard tle PRC. PRC militaiy aid is p.imarily di.ected to the army, he said, but North Korea is still dependent .n ihe USSR for aircralt and slipping, lor elamplc rcw plaeg and the shipyard bnilt at S
Tle Prime Ministcr cautioned that ROK fears are related t. okinawa reversion, but added that the Pentagon is w€Ll avarc ol this.
&99!&4! replied trut $€ point was stionary
made in the sehate drrins hearinss on the olinawa Agreement that t]1e uniled siates should maintain iis tascs in Okin just to tie Ro( bu! also Japan. we qished to be as fo.tncoming as ve corld legarding okinava, brt he emphasizea that we had no vish to be pnr in the position uut those wno supported the okinava Agreeme.t in the Senate would ieel ftat we had not mairtai.ed an a The
Ftrl<uila are nov dis.ussinB Okinava in
tn€ir meeting.
He holed to
The Preriaent 6aid urat he and the Prime Mini3ter voutd
tilie}
what
PerhaF ihe tihing is had jusi at th€ end of the b.hhing oI Norih Vietiam, noted ftai tre President lad nor said mrch today but rhe Bls4ligig!9t abotrt Indochina. If an occaeion aroee to diEcues the subject in Peking, he ,anted the President to tnov thai Japa. vould be pr€pared to co.tribute to a special rehab itation lud lor viek1am. Horever, he .autlorea, this ehould 6e establi3hed oniside the ADB, in wlicn Taiwan iE a member
Tle Pl:eident ea?re6sed appreciatio! for tnis ofier, The possibilities,
le srggested, *ould
depend on vnether an agreement conld be reached the withdrawal of for.es an.l ur retqn of all oxr POr,[s. whetLer tii6 hatte. i6 discu3sed in Pehing depende on the situation at rhat rime, he saiil, ve a1e p.e.sing torva.d on the neSotiaiing front. w€ hawe, he 3aid, made many fortncoming olfers to North viefnam vithout snccess. He explained that rhe objediwe .f the bombi.g ol rne Norrh was to prore.r our troop withdravals, redtrce our casualties and enable t]1e ARVN lorces io coniain a Nortn Vietnamese ollcnsiwe beinS praned for 3dhetiae berveen Jaluary ald Ma.c}. He r€vealed ilat Ie ?lanned to annouce another witldraqal later itliB morth. while .{r1ent i!te11ise.ce indicated an enemy oflensive in preparatioh, le exPressed confidence that the ARVN forces are stro.g enoueh to dele.d ihemselves, althougl he co.ceded they wiU lo6e a few battles and vin a fev.
Tne Presidenr explained urat our acriwties in cambodia and Laos a.e reraied to viet.am and Thailand, becanse if N.rui v He asslred the
Primc Minister that the vietnamization prosram has
su.ceeded, a,d t]re RvN now has r]1e
m tary
potenrial ro detend itseLr.
Amcri.an for.es, he noted, a.e no lonse. engaged in groud actions. Ee also aserred the Prime Ministcr that ve are makinc eve.y effoit io n€gotiate a solntion, in.lndirg a cease lire, witldraval and retutn of POws. North viehram snouLd agree, he fe1f, beca$e it no Lonse. could expeci to tal<e over south vietnam by hilita.y forces.
tt would he difficult, the president said, for eitler t]1e PRC .. tle USSR to be lelptrl in viernah, be.ause neiiher could lail ro suptort a sisier Tne Prime Minisrer astred wterter inllunce o. Nortl Vietnam.
rte pRc anit ussR
had more
The Pr:*ident teplied that PRc infLucnce vas pred.mihant in 1964 and 1965, but as tle USSR besan to lurrish most ol rne leawy equi?ment betveen 1967 and 1969 it, inf1ne..e i.creased, and nov i3 greater becanse ii prowides more eqnirmert. Tle chinese, Ioeewer, hare influence for otlel reasonr, prin.ipany tLar t]1e PRC is a bis, neiglboring couniry.
President stated !r1ar r]1e principle we are defending has broader applicatio. thah s.uuGa.r Aeiai it mitiiary acrions wit]1 rhe strpporr of rh€ ussR and/or PRc succeed in overrnnninS anorhe! c.rntry, wfth no reaction by the non-comm!.i't povers, this \"ou1d encoulaee born to encage in srch acts. T]1e
T}e Presideni said tlat ve lace a sitlation in Sonth Asia in vnicn India, a narion of 600 mini.n ?eopLe rth a d€mocraric governheni moyed
miljtary junta. Eorewer big a.d dehocrati. rndia mighr lre, if ir swallows its neighbor qit}l ussR rrlport, tle luh.e of any small coutry is endangerei!. The Prime Minister noted tlat PRC and USSR involvement differed in ea.l czse, vieiinam, (orea and India anrl Palirtan. In particnrar, rlere is a clarins ilifference in approacn betveen the two vitl respe.r to rne hdoPakistan conflict, wli.h !e belierei! co!1d I a protlacted conflict, btrr rhe rnd.-Paki'ran var ended qlictrly in a r ce,
lvnile Japa vished to cooperate in !rowidirg hlmar re.oCnizing Bangla Desh.
TIe Prcident said tlat qe tate a forurcoaing viev witn rcspecr to huranitaria. aid, and the Conqress is opposea to aid vhich can be conErted to va.-like purpose. He asreed ihat it voutd be prematnre t. .ecosnize Bangla DesI because it had not yet estabLished a government secure enodsl to give asrurance3 ol it' slrwival. Hc Eaid tlai thc Ulited Staies would rot recognize until ihe sitnatio. .larified.
Prime Minister in.trlcted Afrhaseador Uehiba to v h Dr, Kissinger on rhis maner. T]1e
l<eep in toucn
Tle President eyprained nis position. Imp..ta.t a3 he considers lndia,t snrwiwal as a non-Cortmunist nation, ve opporea its military action against a neiglbot to ,esolwe a politicat question, not lecause of any .lillerence in philosophy ol sowernme.t, but because India,s actione set a nad precedent. Therefore, ve oppored India od the USSR at tl€ UN. Per]raps, he .o.cruded, lady chiers or srate a1e dangerols, since both India and Israel hawe been led in qar by vomen.
The Pdme Minisfer relt ii was better wlen India was completely neutral, brt vitl soviet strpp.it, a ldd frontier lndia felt itseu s!renCtlened against Pariistan. The President revieved our attenpt to vork out a settlement on a poLitical lasis, ircluding $500 hiuion for relucee rerief, and gettina Yahya Khan to aeree to a nnilateral troop viil.trawa
Dr. Kissinger reviewed a stndy vhic! disclo8ed that the Unit€a Sbtes r i e '06r. DL-:. E r\e p, o;ded -rd'd \4r - s2 hi,'ior same pc od, In.lia purchased $300 mill USSR and ?rodlced an additionaL $L?5 milljon itrelf. In effeci, !e corchded, we linanced Indiars military build-up. Durins tne same leriod, we million in aid to Pakistan, vnich received ar additional million in hilitary aid from the PRC. This ro-l incrcase in military $100 capab ity gawe rndia an enormous advurage,
prowided $50
TLe Pr€ridelt eaid this rendered ridi.ulons dy clarge that Pakistan attacked India: it linew it voutd lose. It was India that attacl<ed Pakistan, {itn sowier assisran.e.
Souureast Asia Economi. Aid The Prime Minister noied lhat Thailand in parricular depended or united statcs assistan.e, and vould be seriously tr.u61ed by a vithdraval of American for.es. He requcErcd urar assistance tor Ttailand as vell as vietnam be kept in mind by the President. T]1e President uged tlat Ja!a. not lorget Indonesia, a narion ol 140 billion leople in poseeseion ol tremendoN natural rcsonr.es,
could serve as a glear
prizc.
He noted rhar cambodia,
rlrictr
wni.t is receiving
assisiance, dilfers lrom viebam srete therc is a ciyil warj actualty cambodia is beinc invdded by a forejEn pover.
The Prime Minisre! e*plaincd rhar tte Renabil*arion Fund he di3clssed earlicr slouLd be hade available io rebuild camlodia ad La.s as ve11 ae vicinam. He agreed or rte aeed io netp rnaonesia, wrere suharro, uln(e his piedecessor, is in.Lined t.!va.d tle Free \\iotld and shonld be
!- P.'m" M n's-"r oacl mu.]1 rime ly h him.
aed
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hc
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