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conculs witn the consensus reaeleit by the In*rdeorrthenlal crouo to! r-s. c<ia .nd Pa.irr. Aftai!s .Ls i"sponse ro r..n l12 Lh.c exr5tjng potr.v guidein rines lemin effective fo! the attainnent of u.s. objectives in ou, letations Nith Japan. I'Je also concu, sith the croup's recomendatton that ro basic chanqes be ede in s. s. policies loward .rapan. ?ie response to rlssrl 172 could not deal at length with the ihportance to the u.s. of Japan's loIe in nultri_ Iatelai artu .ortrol, a poin! \Jni.h aCrA beiieves 6houi,i be emptrasi:ed. Of greatest imediate inlerest to the U.s. in this alea is Japan's ratification of the Nuclear Non-?roliiexation lteaty, 'rapan has a long-standing comit@lt to cohctusion of a safeguards aqreedent on nuclear naielials and lechnology rtth the lnternational nner* adencv and subseouent latitication of the ^t.mi. rr" uii"""". c.".."*""t'J position on this comitment npr, has not changed since the erllosion of a nuclear device by hdia, but the In.1ian test and sulsequent developments have atfected Japanese viess toward the Nr1' and lhe tining Tnis, in luD, may affect the of its laliticatio.. ACDA
attitudes of olhe! coxliries t.vard the IilT. Bccause of its sighificant role in tne developnent and use of nuclear naterials and its econoni. statute, Japan's adherence to the l:PT is of prim. importance fot the NPT and its non-prolif.ration reqire. ACDA believes, lherefore, that the u.s. rust aenonstrate to Japan our contiruilg strong support of .on-ploliferation. and our intexest i! a viallo also reiterate to tho.rapancse tie central inportance to non-prolifelatton 6f thair adherence, toqether vith the EtjMtoM countriâ&#x201A;Ź!, to the NPT. Japan should be ulged to nove ahea.l vith r.rlifi.ation as sooD
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as it is leasible and to take a leadership !o1e ln sorkinq ior vider adherence to the NPT by other nea!-huclea!
In ihis conrection, ACDA believes that lhe response to NSSII f72 uderstates the impac! that Japa!'s failing to ratify the NPI vould have on the Treaiy and non-proliferation in general, palticularly uhen consideied togethe! with the inlact ot ttre lndian test. rn addition to the ploblens posed for us by our obliqations uncer the NlT i! continuirg to supply Jald eith nuctea! tue1, a ,Japanese decision no! to ,atlft the NPT could cause the EURATo,^1 coun!.ies lo leconsider ratification and is likely to effectively fole.Iose the possibilitl of ratificalion by other .ea!-nuclear states.
Japan's iolerest and influence tn other nutli1atera1 ans control issues is also ol great lnportance lo us. At the Confererce of tie comittee on Disa@nent in Geneva and .iD the tNGA Japan has p1a!,€d a very active, iespo.siblel anil helpful !ole. rt has been tn tle forefront on ntclear test ba! issDes, it has takeD a .onstructive loIe oD chenical reapons by its submissio! of a draf! treaty, and It las been particularly helpful on the question of applopliate verificatioh for arns conttol agleemeDts. Its genuile anat responsible intetest in arns control @tters has been of consicelable assistan.e to the u.s. i! the ccD, the form fo! negotiation of multilateral alms control heasuEes, iapan should be encouraqed to mintain and expand
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