I ..t
,v'
June 9, l97l
Thalh yoD {or yotrr lctrer of May 13 enclosi,g a smnalion ol thc ):ecenr colloqntub .n tl1. Itrlnre ol US-J^pan relalions in tIe se'onies. ],ihc yon, I vas inPr.ssc.l by the dcpth anrl ol batance or t]i.trgl]r.s r.lr as 1l,c nrceling. agiecnerl tlat clre.ged iron 1hc'n.astrrc t also agrec vitl thc cor .nt iir tl. nrcllo_ randum io Bill Rogers ,1al inis atpror.h shoda |e consideled as anothcr trsclul mcfiod .1 3ivi4 locns lo a nDnl]]er of ourer major llrciAn policy issu.s.
(";;;,Z,,..". Honorabl. John N. Irlvi. n Thc Undcr Sc.rclary of Stare
29635
DR. XISSINCER JOHN
A- FROEBE, JV?]i
Urder Secretary Irvin's Lef.er to You on tne Re.eni Colloquire on US-Japan Retation8
Attachsd is a letter froh you io Under Se.retary rrvin (Tan A) responding to lis letter (Tal, B) folvar.line a stuatioa of &e recert colloqui]& o! the futnre uSJapan relatiors in the Beve*ies.
Tnat you sisn the letter to
Mt. Irsin at Tab A.
aâ‚Ź63S
lhank you fo! your note ot uay 6. Alea has told me that he thou8ht the colloqulm went off very veIl and served to hiehlight some iftportant considelations in the future of USJalan lelatlons. I an edclosing Bob Scalapino's sJ@!y oI Lhe discu6sion6 kiLh our .overi.A refrofandw to the secretary. {.rich tarm regards.
Itenry A. (issinser,
Assiscalt to the PresidenE, White Eouse.
ti,1Y
6
::;1
rrlrirTas 0:rrlcrtl, ra:-
a-jir:l 29 .rrC 30, at tlre r,11erl.:r4, Cori.rer.e Cen'.cr ii i::ilirq str!i.s, r er),i'.iFnia, tile D.:r:r': :.1 s!tcrsoriei :,i] c:r i.:.1: s:i:i: lrii:ln ari usejul coli.;::ul ii. 1970's. il'.â‚Źfr:.:s .inc1f.'.e.1 r:.:: :ri. r_-t, s.:trror .to.e:.:r.:ri. l. ofir.i.i. ::i si): or:i.i... ..:5:1'..xt:. ::r . t.r|.rtir: ccrc!u.10::-r .: tI.r ..11.:r::i.ni r:.i. ..i:.r,:s .a ::i'ih a .x::5.r o: :ill::r PoIj cj i:::irri, .ai:i.j :1. I:.:1 rr... :r.l :..r..r).r..x i:.;::.re: and s.!.:.1 r:.::5.rs o: c..!,rl a!3 or s.:t-.ria!, :nv I :: a Nectinq ch.ired iy tl.er Jcrn Bon. Eob Scal.!,ino lei o:i the 1att.r rceting iri rleserr ,.irg a Iuci.i sui-r.!e o::l:e ]lllcnberry rrroceeaiDqs, a co p! oi lrlich is attache:. I,le belicva tlrat this Col.loquiur - conceiv..l b! s/!c, joiDrrv p1.n).d by xa, s/rc, and I:ri, an.l f:r:-::.ed out oJ th. !rt.!.a] ilcs.a):.r !u.j!.t - ..s so succes::d1 thaL \re r)i1l iro?. to utjlr-i::e this netl.d again ir ::: fululc to l,:ing qol,crni:.rtaL ..iC non-tor.r.n.ri..1 s:-:cial:sts togeth.r to cons!c].,! inporr:ant foreiqD policy iss!:s. Amon.J thc conc:lusiors rcac\cd at tlra A11cr!ei:_a Cohfetencc, thg follo\:in! stand ort: - over the nc):r five ycars or so, rapan is r.s! lilrely to continuc its px!:srit oI "econo::isn plus," t.e. a concerr..'rlon on co:r.rcia1 !iiplorac:r, a cauLic:s :bjt!i:9 o! forciEn s.c!rit! co:::rj.tn.n:., a stcaiiy defcnJ;e_:::.irc: rililary )ruil.l-ut .t rou.lirly the pr.5.it ratcr ana :::c liiintcxalrc. oI a clo.e !cI.l:j-onslri! \.iih the !S \rjri:. $c.:rinq ro ir.rir:or.r diDlo:r.l:ic n,rd coir:.,rcial tcla'jr.rs Nitn all .ount!jos j.r tns! n.in. incl!r.]ij,g tic Cc:i::rist On
- llc (lo not c::p.c'. .., nnjor .hinE.: in rhc r:?in.sc j.t(rtrra1 to1,.r strtrc!trr., DuL clrr!9.rt in rcl.tior.l:iir
I
LIII'IED OITICI,\L
, ,,.,:,
USE
- L,:,
tith tie Us or.r e..::1ic i.sL.s are tit:.].r to icc.:a :.:a o!- -- si, _ . .. - '.: .1 . Lr. i rs -:1.1 the ijs, tlctrr er:ic:t !r.:o:ioi .::orra r:j.1r c.rtinre ro . Po.c. j;o...io: .. pori:.:_,...c .. -... rL_i.. Io- !\c Lj. .-_l
- lii th res!.c: to c!x .c.nri,:y !elnlionsripr ttere .vas a gener.I consen::us thit i h. sccd!i,:! Treai). ui11 continue to be iutuali, - Opirr:or \.a5 ei)lit o. lrjrcLnc. tl. grcatest :rise l;or; jaD:.,s d.inq i:oo r6uch or lil:tie in tho securit! fiel.t. ],oliticnI1y t)r..! sc.r..t ro b. agrcohent tha: .rape - - \rislr vo!1.1 to rlollt \rith all c1cr3ni. in tir. drrCril:tar,l bal .,, i ., i.. '.:.'o.s ..:o;s,r., :.. USSR an.l Chi.a ei11 !. linirftt b, substnnli.1 colrs:!air:rs but therc is roon rar consic.rairie governront rclations viah the lllc in t]1. IururcdaDsars rroular
LIIlfirD oir).IcrirL Ust
II}IITED O'IIC11ll US! Hore left uoiderirf, alclt tic ci:.r!a.r.r of the "n.v nationalirrr, i. -_.t:. -jrl rne r.rni., in 1.hic:r it is nosr lii:.l!
ro !. irxj;.s:ed in ii4 furrle.
\
cre.,.".., :l-", !n/J:&',i:i.;i:ac It:I.r,1.C)]:r.,.1-
i.:rrl:s oi Dr. t1o:re_L sc:IaD1.!, b-.oro ! r: r..... o. (.- - .. .. Uiir .r-:;1..:'
LIriIlaD Orliiciat-
I]sE
i-r"i;'":.li:",
RE AN{S OF DR, RORD]IT SC^:N IXO, BTEOFX COT,LOQ|rL]I Orr U.S-J^?r,ir R
LNJII.ERSIILOU4IIOII!.l]rOris
saturday, xay 1, l9?1, lC:00 a.:. Roon 110s, r{e, state luiiiling Irashington, D. c,
2
DP.
Sc;!i-r]Ii_o: I have been a3ked to tlv to
srDarize th.a tesults of i?o daYs of'rhac Aabassador l think t}lev vere. Johnsor has .aI1cd s.irit:C r.rtirds
An.l
I think th.y ere frui:ful. i hawe tried to d.vis,- vorc.s to irdicate lanses of agre.nent and disagrcerEnt. SonEtir.s I shatl say 'seeming conrensns" and son:tires I shall say "equal .tivision-" Scnctine3 I shalt iot sa! anytlinq. in enici ces. I don!t ln.lr.
Brt I an sur. that .rvery;r.rtici:Jar: vilt feel fr:G to dis aqree lrith ry conc.lti.n of thD m.etiag at th. close .f nl' t.t re begin by Eayins that I think that
everyone
presen! regarded the Japanesj-herican al.1ia:.e as orc of
great imlortance in the futrre, as in the past. Eut I think
te do indaed face it ras also tle qcieral soae very selious.robI.r. in thc perioc imediately ahcad, and that it {otrIC pav us to lake t5cse 9ro)r1eis s.riously. thes. .loble:is? I think, nost felt, 6e!e not fikely to era.ate fron drastic j oliti.a1 char.Jes in NoN.,
th. goverairg sLruclurc lriehin !5e cod.tries involved. Speakinq only about Jalan on this s.ore, I thihk it ?as tho q.n.ral vi.r/ l:hat Ja)an si11 .ortiiu.'o be gole.nee
r'
3
by th. colserwativos or nde.rat.s f.! th. n.at fr:tuf. at
13ast, tha! this ai11 c;rr-aiarl oxlera .irolqh 197s, Nith r:hc rolabili y ttrat it !i11 e:tend fur'-\er. rhere is, of cours., ah oltsid'a ?ossirf,ilitv of : snift tot:!Js the .ril of lhe s.vcnties. :-hat sbiit, in a1l rr.sabilit?, ?on1d b. .ol$e.i.C trith so'r_ lind .f .ri:is in rhe Japar.se ec.n.nv, if s).h \?erE t. occri.
lDt si\.3
.ra: ir noi: ,i.iely :r,:dict.a, it is ass :d nore lilell '.iat r\. .5ang.. ahat x.tri.i occur ii Ja?aa loulC be fron riiii: th. c.rrorratit:
:f,:ty it..tf,
ererlld, ds nei- .oaiitims
as h.? fa.:iora1 leadersli:i
,:fe forii:d.
;ia t\a: suc\
a
ih cerlaiD
shift, rni1. it niiil: hav. sore i.:.r.ursiof,s h.ses of iolicy 'ronld ot ro!r"s.n: lh=
.hanie that afl of
Lrs
vortd 5: ui
so.eoie like elle left so.ialists
acknorle.l9e s)o:14
cr.sen! conditior
s. the ?!obl:..s are iot eivisag:d flom the statrdpoint of a dramatic Dolitical u-lhealal ir Jalan- Rataer of eatraor.liraiy qro\7Eh on riey coFe ahout lhe part of one of t]1e n:ost intet.sliiq
anC
ilyn.liic
.ourtries ir the \;orl.di coupled !7ith onr ow!
changes
of
a
Po1ltical, economic nature.l riou, in rie.y resrects it see_â‚ŹC, I tnink, to trosl
trore co.qlex psy.ho1o"jical,
of the gro!? that thc pr.blcns easiest to aefine r'ere th. econcric piot,1.:rs nct ne.essarily easiest to solv. t!a: are certainiv goinr to ircxease ir tlleir diiersicrs :nd in their .6n:1critw. It as lid.ly bcliaved anorq our sroug that Ja9an iIl contirr. to hatr v!r! ra.ia trori:h thxoxgh the ier:t Cecade. Tle ton to trolve per.e.t nay cbncciv:bIy qo ao*n to.ight to rine p:r.ent by tie ef,c of the decade, But tl.ei. vas v:ry Iitt1. fe.linq that this grovth patt:rn ia3 :or:r to le seri.:s1y airrrt'.ed- If it i,ere, ircid.hta!1y, rta.y of tne grojeci:iois hoE otl,l iawe to b. .hars.C. rt is c.*ainl-y .lea, that ihis grc:r:i iratteri enrii.a:.es, tLoug\ it ray not reaci, a d.nbling of e,.torts,
of ,:ry rairid e\lansi.n of ovelseas inv.staerts, ro:r three billion, ap)r6iiat.1y -- the Jalai.re coletn.erl itself groje.ts tan billion b7 1975. a.d sone oi our cxlerts fel: tnat that {as lossibl7 a 10, risnre. Also tiat Ja?ar a!-iears to be ir a lositioa of :1avin., a chr..ically favorable batar.e of Ilaynenls position/ althonql: thoro ,as one larnin! t:1at th.: ,as the eay in ,\ich {e projact.d ahe h:ricar !rcb1.n s.re
5
ehelged, ai.t thattne c6hirontatior l,ii\ :1e urited stat.s
is liiiely to beco'. nole acute. since, as all of you kno{, I.think, ore-thirC .f Jr::.ar.es. trad: i.irqhty has bee. and is ?itb us, tie lroblens of sect.i dis?iacene.t, tle lrobl.rs of our linitec capa.ity fo! aajrs:nent, lea.l ix particulirr incus,:ri.s, su.h as teltil.s/ steeI, the auto indnstrL loteltiarly srroes, :o cxises thar forn in r',e politicat as :.11 a; ir thc .c.:oiic fic1i. Before pur5)ii5 t\is lcpic a:1, fxr:1.r, I nigi:: say tnat a n\rlcr of .rr p:o:le in the co.fereic. rais:a hoireful or mitis1ti..9r inctors, It aas goint:a oua/ ,.ot exanpte, lhat if the .\r,arican e.oro:ny inpfoves anri iie aqair reach son.tniag apilori-alirq full .rL!1oyfrer:, that tiis
certainly ,,ouId cilDre the iiBediate llind of crisis. Bur also if Japan xere 9re?ar.a f6r a i.re noderat. rat. of qro and partictrlalIy :n iivestrent in t]le aonsstic se.ror irvol
enviroli.rtaf faclors, that this ,ould agaii aitiqate soie of the teisiors, perhaDs. Th.re was a fcelinq, nor rotatly shared but c.rtaini:
elpr.ss.d !y our ouesiCa econonists, that lralar !,i11 h.v. to:rards a iLu.h freer, riore liberalizet trade pattern; that i.de,-n sie al.rcady has, an.l that th15 ril1 cor:i:ue --
the fe.ting t\at in five !o t.n yeals Japan nay be ore of
tlle ir:â‚Źst, most liberal .o!n:ri.,s ia tetis 6f trad. c.nditicns in :hd uorI.l. tid that a Jalan P.ound is 1ike1: ro th. r.n.cdY Tir.s.
.onl-.1
Ro:114.
a1l !o5e cextain ioder.ltiDg inflref,c::
onxhat is bounnr trf,der any circ)n:tar,c.s, I tairh
e vore
aqreei, to b. a conrinxihd problemwhat can be dox:'?
'xell, vari.us lo5sibilities ere set fort\. so;l. ?eo le 5ulg3st.a tra.l. ofi qu.ias in a bilai.ral ap!r.a.i. ini in .oiiunciion trith :iris, iairlv t.!qh L;r!.:riin, c;the s.ore ',haa tough bargainirq lor:ld not .iisnpi: onr over;rl
refations it5
anticipite.l anii evipect.d. and that e ou:iht no,r to irake JaDar lIay i:he responsible !.1: Ja_Dan/
it
oDId be
that he. e.ononi. qiantlsn ,arrants,
It \ias also rtrqgest.d ir :one quaxt.ls that ti:e Urited stat.s should aake soriously adjustErr assistanc:
aid a pattern of helDino !o reallocate thosa sectors of the ecoroity that \iera disloca:.C or a fai!1y signiticant scairr -- att:1ough ae least oie nerrs.r felt thai thi: ,oulC
be difficuit be.ause of th. resistan.e of th4 private
tir. ratner qr.at differercls i. the uai, in qhich A(erican ai.l talar bu.i.essnen, at leas! in :t s.ctor of our
econor,L)-,
I
1
!ast, have a? roached thi3 prohlen. ovarall i! ,aF assrned, I think, tha! ?e ,ou1d aova to?ar.ls spc.ialized aiproaches to s.e.ialized ecorof,ies, ir ?hich ours lrould corti.uâ‚Ź to be the hiq5.r te.hnology
and
servtce role, ,itn the Jalanes! llaviiq cther loles.
iut t ihink there vas a gen.ra1 agr.eireit that irheth.! .orr or late! tnis p16b1e:r co)1d xot b. â‚Źr.o:rpassad !n nere bifat?ratisn, the n.ltilatelat ap roacb.s :r!.srabl, .nxoirEh
i!r.
oaCD,
bri Do:sib1y o! ot:1er grounds ard
bases,
iakinq into account, for .aar!1o, the e:traoldirrrily
i)tira:: and closa r.1ario.s\ias betreli aatia.la, Jalan, tne uiite.l Stat.s and possibly Australia ..- that so'retii!? |eIohC bilateralisr rould
1r. necessary becalie
of t5. nagnitude of
thc problen af,d the nairurc of the pioblen. ird there
sas
also a hoge tnat thr.loh pu5lic as e11 as lrivate aqencies, there rrould ne a qleater .oordlnation i. the econoric
lolicies re-qar.ling tra.i. in this colntly ard a treat hopc eas erplessed for the lerfcrrance of the Peterson coarittec. (nat the stlategies oi apploaches, I think it
thi3 is Eoinq to be a touqt lroblen d? vi11 have lhe hinds of political leper.ussigns that at a nininnrn can b. ver!' tiouirlcson. an.li ae a naaiauF 1â‚Ź.:l Nas generally agreed
B
corl : Ie a r.a1 .ri:i-.
Stilf, I tiii]r i: ras fott thai orr econoni. r.lationships are the
911:e
that h.1d u: toqet5er, t\a: :\et
?i11 concir!. ao b. vitally sigiificart. Dr.ba!1y \ave .ore i:iria:e
T.a:
rre
siIl
rela:tonsli-ls !jth Ja ai in
thi: fiefd thaa in an! or-her. And Lhat Ja)ar is not ]i\elr to find a qrDat su5stitnte f.r its felariolships rirh us i: this area or re ,ritn ti,.r,ce.lainl! .r:ltian i.r qoir! to seeL rariral lr:larsica ewer?],ierc, atrd larli.ular1r
i. suc! narlili:s as i5e l-aiia
/,eric;a err -.'r.Fier i.ar..t:. iritn respeca to rlre coraiuri.t nicc, I thirk it
ras felt tlLat traae \rill .xpa.i b.t n.t cra.2ti.a11y, that
tiere are naai barrici., both eco.otric and olitical, to draratic eaqansion of ',:aie :rith Chi.aj and iia! the So'/i.t relationshi! also, ,hi1e ?ronj.sirq, )as as nary olstacles rrlc tbus ,e ar. our nutlal 5encfit, an4
to.Jetl:r i. t\is fi.1c f.r it behcoves !s. I thi.k alros: !D11o,1
lhe entire qroup iclt, to trork the lroblen: out. on to t4e security issues that
,.r. Ciscxss.i, tryir! h.re agai, lo si:lplify or at ]east
,5at ,a5 a coirrli.at.t discussio! aid one thar raire.i a iide rriqe oi noi.ts. I Lirink thara lras a qeneral assur.ption that
orqani2e
nutuat .ocYity ,as ...essary ard a.sirabler
anC
tha!
rhe
tr.st Pi.j.iic continued to be an integral a!ea, at least in part, Lo the seclrit,r of :a. united sta:e5. I thi.k it ,as also vid.ly assrfred that in the Hestelr Pacific tEe se.lrity p.oblen roxld .ontinuc to be a .orplicated .^e. \ritn su.prises not ne.essarily ruled out. Tlat C:ina, ior erarple, ,ou1d .ontirue to gro, in military te:ms, iSaieve! r.r inl.rral r!.jr1ers. }nd tha: bv che nitt-
.h. aorld hare lc.Irs d.pIo?e.l, Thai the sovi;t losture also xoutd qrou. lnd that t\erc ni_dht inde.d b. 1970rs
a
sunstartial inciease in ceraain areas. Tirat th. pro6lcns of vnat are soneair.s ca11ec )o.al aggression, or vars of ix.Lugencr, sould nrobably iot fade a?ay, at leasr not rotatty, ?heiler ve lrere or \rere not involved. nof/ I tnink it {as also asslne.l that tire ,lnelican ilitary role x6n1a lroth decline in ovorall terrts and charqe in this theatar.
Thae
thi6 a.uId be Dartly as a resutr of
a
re-e\amination of thc natnle of the threat, paft1y as a patter
of bu:q.tary
and
rolitic:l
c.nstrairts, ard that in a certain
scnse
tie issue ,o:]d be not lrhetllei the xiron Doctrine
qas valu:b1e and vjlal
I bur !/het)er tr. rii:o. Do.tri.e c.rta be sustain.d aliainsr ,hat narv r,ould r.gard as Deo isolariori:: or i.olatiolist :hr.at of r n.re :ar-Ea.5id. naEure. Japanese
.lor, it ,3s i. that c.ntei:! tha! r tjrinjr !h. scene ?as a!proa.he(. Ard h:re th.ra was iisaqr:e-
ent as !o the lro5abilities vith xeslect ro There
Ja-)anese
ras : .rse ..aic out fox the ristr, tie
ielatiT.ly hiqh ,istr, tnai Jr:a. irou1li ralridly Cev.1.! : uajor military f.r.e ani quiie conc.ivably m.v. touaii: nuclear Dower, rt ,a. Doint.d out, ior orarLpl., rhat Jaia:
in the irie.liate peliod char lies aiead rould inv:sr .9 pe!..trc in :.r nilitafl, dev.lo?ftent. t5a! she co!1d, as a resull o! her econory, effor.i ruch ore ,iehou: the \ind cf t\at fruther exparsion i! t\is colntly vould inCrc:. ?hat vith the L;.ited siates cllax1y shrinkin:: in irs cotrLitnencs, and rhe pot.rtials for chinese g!or:]1r all burdexs
sign5 might indicate tnat an c.ononic oianr that irad this
..otentiat, faced a n.u and uncertain furDre, ,as tikely to ri.r! touards rilitary po{er. A.d \rhen our riro orher facrors eere added tho fâ‚Źar of hu.leax bla.knailr ,hctier lhis is
l1
legitinate o, aot, tr".
+-he
rise 6f a ie' Jalanese nilitariaa e>c, \arv ''
Lds fo
h
lr its psrchological ke. -- t\at at1 of these lhirds rlaie tais a ptolrlen, anc a probLcn, ce!:ain beople algueCl a nuclear bedause a rilitariz.d JaDan, :f,a latiicurirlw iaDan, relresents a ne'r variable not lasilv 'oni:ro]led' nakirg lhe ovetall cxgariza:ion and cefi:ir:ior of ou! 'oIici'5 ruch rEle Ciffic:lt
and
n4c:rtain,
and Perha!5
the
g1oba1
scere nore diifi.ult.
c.ri:ainlv a |ilitari2e'i Ja:a' 'r1i 'voLe st'oaq r.a..iors, lot :.re1v froi 'rl.e ccrrLni_:' blo'/ but aI:o 1... d'' 1 . L:.a. ,r .Lo-.cdrt! ltaving said thisr I vould ral:6 oli tle case tila! at the conf:ien.e on th' o-Dposite sice Nanelvl tie ca6e t\at algued ilat char.cs of Ja:ane6e qilitarisr a''i rtr.leariza:ion are lot as or'at as co'r'ntv su?Posed Tbos' ,ho advanced this position ma'e 'Ieax tne fa't that a niril:1 risk-naYira] qain foreign policv fo! Japan has laid enoro): .lividen,ls, an.] or@ io.s not leave that lo1icv 1i9nt1Y
vras ailvanced
rlo.eover, !5. nei senetatiosof Jalaiese not onlv have ceeplv inplanttea pacifist sentiie'ts' bu! bevonc tnisr'
t5eir sanrc of th!.at is not gteat at the rorent' ald lniess
12
there are dranatic .han?es in chiresc anC/o! soviet loiicy it i5 not Iike1y to b.core qieat in ih' near future' That all of the frblic irti.ations ana nalv of the elitist indic"ti.ns are that ue Jalanese li tne past Save not had safr. serse of thr.at, fo! exanple, aq sone rielicars,
i:hP
if
anorican nerc:?tions of t\reat ar. changing a!'1 !s!ha9s corirg the'a i5 closer lo :he oriiinal Jalane.e sens':. In aiv
^o
clear indicatlon thc
Ja?anese sense
'!ent of thi'at is crrrentrv
Ther. ?as also t:'re Point aa'i. tSat eaperience
r)ith th.
develoirnen-"
of nirclear 4a)D!s
bY :l!g1and
al'i
lrance \as not been euch as tc encorragE the Ja;ian's' to
nove
in that iirectio! for anY reas.n - lrcslige o! otl:e ise' tu.] final1y, l]]at the plot.ction of nalhets, ra' naterial !eso!!..s and so fortt, is n.t verv feasible throwl ailitary po'rlr in thi. age as onr orn ev-.erience and t\at of other: has sho
n
rallrer than being .o!fr.ntc.i vitt the marital possiblc Jalanese dev.lo:in2nl,ue rig\t be confronteC vith th' problem of the i,ini.raI Ja!,anese aovel.oi frent, an.l in a re!i6d. at least in the irn.diatc ftrtn+, of tinas of va'uurs in anv balarce of pouer, nark.rd by different Dharihgs of r'rcrican
of r..ton.ibility
Hit5lraral and n,r .1" r,.i..-l,r
:'r...o
:.:.:L lrc "anE..-.:
I thilL it ras lointe.i oul a]: tlle confelence tha: the Japanese have sone right to be.ontused on:lis sc.!e/ be.ause on lbe onc hand re have tafkert str.!q1Y aqaiEst their Cer:1.r:)inq heavy niliLary p.]ex, and !articularly nxclear ponâ‚Źr, dd ylt re have ta1t.d about their assuniag qr..1ter res:orsibilities in a rathcr vagne serse. T: would ap:..ar that nost of tie confererce peolIi a: least/ seerarl to feel thal lhat Jatar s5ou1d co at this :toiat is to tal:e resgonsibilit, ii deplh for h.! orn self .leferse.
Anrl
that qould i..Ir:d: t::e kinds of ircre_
that are envisageC in the pericl irne.iialely ah:ad, !.1rticrlarIy in air loner and i. sea Ceeelotaent. Rut il:at mcni:s
it is cartainly rot realisticr to assrn: that Japan is i! ai irr..diate s!.se goinq to take rcs-!on:ibi:::t it is not ise,
arat
Tlrus. i: a certain sense this c.nfronts us :rith
tho lit-elihood that in rlortf.east asia, as in celtaiE othe! xegions, ,e slla1l be confronted lrith bilar,eral affanqeailts
t.! rrhich tl,c u.ii:ed Slatcs r-anairs th. slcke throush its or. ntrclca! detcrrence,
and
that tha! do.s laise .ertain
14
psychololiicaI ar.l pot:itical problels at
ho*,
because
of
the
weariiess of t}]e nneri.an f,eople ard a s.ns. of greater bnrden-sharing b.inq n:.essary,
all of this ,as en.as.il in the disc'rssior of c:riair e:4cif!c lrrobr.its. rcr era-pIe, hor) io.s Jald feel a5o!t l.rea/ !:aat i3 nir a:tiitr.lc toaara.: lai{a.? Ard he!e, ton, I thir! there rs a ranlje of opini.r, althotrqlr I didn't detect an! gleat ar.i vital c.ifteronces that he1d. I think thcr. nas a fe.1il( tnat itcrea at rie n.i:.: No\r,
is co..eired by nost, brt noi a1l raDan.re -- a! least bv Japan:s. in a posieio4.J atr:h.ritY -- io be.t sii-rificaa.e future :ecnritl, ard tirat Japa.,eso irvâ‚Źstren: and ilvot'eneit, etonorticallr, in xcrea is likclv tc grc\t buttre.s thi: concer.. The Tairan situatton is n.r: conplc): and I (i1l corl to that in a nonent, in Ciscrsiilg JaDan's tolo tith t\e and txus
There vras/ I think, a qen.lal feeliaq tirat \thiLe
.ieeply interested in an overall political
iili.arl
is certainly not likely at this..oint in making any niliiary coatrit ents to Souia , and that, inaeed, tilc probabifities are she
no slclr cotitn.nts
anythere iE the period ir,(eCiatelv ahead,
15
althougir !ossi.1y ti!
s.I1irE oi axns, th3 trainil:.- in vely
sgecialized forn. riglrl ererqeil.
I don't
kncT/
:irat ore can tatk
abouc
solutio:s
that wer. reached or approachei in thlse ratters.
Tncre rras,
r tninkr a broad consensu. that th.re si.orld be :he continrai.. di the c1.:est .oop:ratior i).treen rs anc i:3 jr - - - a !- D".L .1d i- ^aq, ...rt-rs. cerlain *erber. of t\e .o.ferer.! aell :hat it ?ar rise to lhase olt thF Lrnitec statesr presence liysi.alll ir fixed bai.s, in 9.-iulois areas, Iike Japaa, :oi t,6
-r ., P, -.o.o :..- ":-;.i aould o.1y assrie lesronsibililt in a broader ala mcre i:i1y .lefinell sen:e viher such $as Con.. ind :eco.dly, tlle reduction of the ilevitable political ircirtents tiat pe!. In.leed, a certain piasinq out is already goirq on.
In fact, a rather considerable Noo,
one.
this, of conrse, did raise the Okila a q:estic:.
I thirh every n
of l!. corfcre.ce felt tiat it {as absolueely crlcial that thc Okinasa issue be setiled satisfactorily atr(1 that any f.iIure, fo. etd?1e, of trEtrty -'r11r-. on .iorl- nav . rh. ro'E i r I mber
t6
in Japanese A-nerican relationsi that it ,oulri sim91v be a catastrolhic event if that treaty failed to lass the senate. that the Anericans I think there riqht becon: the niddleion in a conplicated process durinq $hich Japarese and okinatans eere qettiig reacquainted, that therc lrere all sorts of uses to $hich you .ou1d pu! niddlemen, not nany of ther verY satisfactory. But I tlinx it nas felt in general that uhat las and
tr!1y crucial ,as t. qet okirara behird us ir a satisfa.to4: fashior, anC th. px.c:ss ol :.,7orsi.r u.der ra!. I think it was senerally felt on baran.e t;at r:he probabilities lrere that Japan would .ontinue to follo, a policy of econonicisn plus -- naNcly, projectinq het very
great economic and financial influence in Asia fodaid vith
ceitain political iiputs, btt tather limited nilitary cres unless the sitration dxaatically charged. But tnete !,as, as I pointed out. anothe! qloup vithin the conterence that
felt the chances fo! nilitarization Notr k
partictrtarly
me
Jagan.se
were nuch higher.
turn very briefly to politicat relatiols relations with cther parts of Asia,
as
they },ei6 discusscd.
I think it \ras qcnerally felt that
Jagan (ould !an:
17
to \rork with all kev elanents in the so-caI1ed quadrilateral rclationshi!. That shc vrould not ti:h !o exclusivetY rove in onc direction ox anothei. That in cert'in senses she certainly eoulC seak an a.conrcdation nith th' Peo!1e's Republi. oi china, but that manv of r:ne 'arlier toiantic notions in this field Nele ),eirg di'ssipateC That noii thete h' werc more rnodest goals ara presDmalrl! ioxe nodest resnles
I thinh thae at least half of t5e corferelce felt that tne futrre for JaPai and chlna vas likelv i6 be one more of coirletitior than c6o?etati.: Tha' china trould groi nilita'rIi' ilh con!:in:ir.q e.on.na. liobl.ns cf raior maq:itude' rha! Japan eould qrov econonicallv And that vitnin ihis relaLionshiP therelEs nore tha: \ras gotentiallv of discord lhan of ham.ny -- althouEh Japan rrould Fake every effott to push fonrard trade and so(e dcalea of normallzation' provldirg it didn't nean the to!a1 sacrifice of her othe! lelt parlicularl? among ou! econonists, ihat the e.ononlc orportsunities for the together \rere peihaps Sovio! 0nion and Japan to sone{hat greate! at least in the imedjate futu'e than those I thhk
some People
Japa.. Rut the soviet union ha5 had an alrost nnexc.lled recotd of stDpiditv vith resrect to Japanes'
of china
an.t
,,'
policy, it
seefred
to nany,
and has never taken aavantage
of the kinds of openinqs lhat could be devetoled. No?, wherh.r tney uill co so in the future is a matter, of conrser for uoscon, and .ot for us, to detelmine.
Medrhile, therc certainty are potentials in slberia, as xas point.d out, if some of tne lrobl.ns Hith respect to both access aid loliticat issues can be snoothed Blt I thinlt it sas generally felt that
Japan ?ou1d
continue to feet lhat her reliance and intoraction vith the
uriLa's .L.s 1.s d r.1 ---'e'ir rj \'! o-. oa ool '; ano that of course rould Cepend upo. the credibility o! t5e United States holdlDq up.
This leads ner firal1y, and lrith these renarks I
will close, to Nhat Nas tlle cn.l dim.nsion, nct in tine, but ih genoral sequence, to our .ltsclssions, nahely, alat might be calIed the psycnoloqical Cinension of our lelationshiPs. we
are in
curious situation lrhere the treDd psychologically
seemed
It
seemc.l
to
some
of us obvious that
a
to be moving inopposite dilections. At the .nd of world Ha! TI an Ahcrica {ith high 1eve1s of se}f-conriddhce, flushed ith total victory, took on najor reslohsibilities
ara
19
vas psychotoqically niepaicd to do so. rh€ Japanese, under
the
of total def.ae, had brougnt olt froi anohg their cultural aleerhatives nany of rha feelinqs of defeatismr inferiority and subnissior. shaa.ow
Thus
in a certain
b.caus€ tne hie!a:.hica1
sense \re could
rork tosethe!,
relatiolships ,ith nhich
Japan \ras
.orma1ly acquainred i. her donestic sphefe could operate
easily i. lhe inteoarional sphele. Ahd periaps rhe suleriority iiferi.riry infcriority suleriority relaiionships
that have colsranrly chara.r.rize.i Ja.an at b -' - fd 'Lor
.
olr -.6c,
home have
also
q{- .d ,. -. -q"-ay,
true equalityr extrenely difficult ro achieve -- one of psycholoqi.al problems of today.
rhe
at leasr on the surface it sout.t appea! that .rmerica is seized {ith a goo.l deal of self-doubt, a kind of Healiness and querulousness, eith a certain lrirhdrawalt Now,
sher€es Japd dclermined
of
is
more
self-coraident,
assertive,
more
to find a broader rolo. nnd a younger geheration
Japanese does not min.t conparison
l,Jest
more
uith t5e
advanced
or with oth.r<.
Japanese
In sone respects this is leferred to as the re,J hatiooalisn. r rhink most oI us do nor equate it
Nith the nationatism of the ]930's. lhe talgets aqainst
it operates are differart, tie circunstances of its developne.t are different, there are many elenents Ni:hin
which
it that are diffefeht.
Nerertxeless, here you have the
ingredients of a cortain kind oi problen. There has beer a hi_qh Leve] dcpendence upon
lrerica.
That
of
las .ot entile1y gone,
there is qoinq !o be a A{erican rritl and credibilityi
and
sone neli
many
questioning o:
seeLs sDpeliox
of the states aloud it, or at least
lelatlorship. The psychological dinensions
betueen us/ decade
nc\?
by
this is going to take plac:
in the context o: a Japan that eith.r lelationships v;ith
Japanese psycholoqic-..1
of tne
problems
thercfole, a! be tho most Cifficult i! tne
that ries ah.:a. I,{e11,
r4i. tu$assadcr, I think thac that is the