
5 minute read
DIVERS’ STORIES
This is one of many reports submitted for a comprehensive report by Regional Organiser, Jake Molloy which gives cause for concern around ‘medical advice’ within the diving sector.
FORT WILLIAM EVENT, LATE 2019
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I was asked to attend the sat trial of the new system at Fort William as part of the team. We arrived as a team on the pier at fort bill at 7am to start the trial. During the journey up to Fort Bill I was informed that if we could arrange the gas in time, we would be doing a gas trial instead of an Air one, which had been the plan up to that point. The job was to be a 54 msw dive for 30 mins bottom time.
On arrival I was informed that the gas was a 12% mix with spare 30% and a 50/50. I asked why we did not have a 16% or above as a spare? I was informed by both very experienced supervisors, whom I knew and respected, that this was the mix they always used at Fort Bill for their training diving. Once there, we checked the appropriate paperwork to ensure that certification etc. was all in date and I inspected the new SPHL which was attached to the system for compliance. Whilst doing this I immediately picked up a few nonconformances that were quite integral to the compliance, of which three stood out:
1 pipe work on the internal engine was not attached, fuel was very strong smelling, and nothing was clean.
2 the air for the skipper of the vessel was not in the cylinders and they were all oxygen cylinders 100%
3 you could not lock the SPHL trunk door off-of the system without someone inside the chamber blown down.
I then condemned the lifeboat but was informed that this was ok to use as it was. All checks were completed on the bell and system, and all were passed on the system, but there were a few problems inside the bell with gauges missing. The dive supervisors were both ok with this, and onboard gas checks were completed. At this point I asked whether we should reconsider doing a deep dive to 54 msw as the first manned dive, given the problems that were evident, but this was considered to be ok.
The dive got underway, which was to be two rescues and return to surface 30 min dive time. At this point I realised that the chamber was not heating to the required temp and set about exploring why. I realised this was due to a lack of thermal insulation on the pipe work, which we set about correcting.
The first diver left the bell to be rescued from the bell top and the rescue was set in motion, but before the rescue diver could leave the bell, diver 1 reported that he was on bailout. At this he was told to return to the bell, which he did, but could not get into the trunking due to his pillar valve catching on the bell trunk. It was then explained to me that this was probably due to them never having used this bell with a 37 helmet before, and this was the first attempt, which again surprised me?
We eventually got the diver into the bell and made to leave bottom. This proved impossible due to the fact the top door on the bell would not seal, letting vast quantities of gas vent out of the bottom seal. We therefore repeatedly tried to reseal the door which would not seal in any way. At about circa 140 min at depth the decision was made to enrich the mix in the bell from 12% to a richer mix to match the air for sur D 02 which they would now need for the time at depth. This was achieved by dumping 02 into the bell from adds. After many attempts to seal, the decision was made to disconnect the top door spring system to see if it would then seal, as it looked like it was off centre.
This was achieved and I took over the in water stops of the ascent from the supervisor, as he had a lot on his plate, at this time the dive B/T was circa 190mins.
All in water stops were completed correctly and I had added a stand-by diver into the chamber as a safety measure in case of the obvious 02 tox problem that was likely to occur as the Sur D 02 now required circa 15 stops. As the divers entered the chamber, I made them put on their thermal suits as the temp in the chamber was still only about 15-degrees due to the heating problems. At this point was told that Dr B [Name] had been informed, which both myself and the two dive supervisors were surprised to hear, as there was no omitted decompression so far and this was therefore not necessary.

Dr B phoned twice to change our tables, which again I did not understand as all was correct as far as we were concerned. All the Sur D 02 stops were run as the table by myself and I was watching at all times for the obvious 02 problems which did not occur up to that point.
Before we got to the last period Dr B called back for the 3rd time to tell us that once the divers had completed the last 02 stop, he wanted us to blow back down to 18msw to run a full table 6. I completely disagreed with this and told both supervisors and the ops managers I considered that this would completely overload the UPTD point and also up the chances of a Cns 02 event. I was told to do as Dr B suggested even though none of us agreed. So this I reluctantly did, watching all the time for the obvious 02 problems. At one point I took one diver off 02 as he was in a bad way.
We eventually got the divers back on surface and out by 05.30 the following morning, having all of us stayed on duty from 07.00 the day before. I informed both divers that they would both suffer chronic 02 problems within a day and that there was nothing to worry about, but that if they were unhappy to seek further medical advice.
The next day we were told to report to Aberdeen NHC for a de-brief and investigation. This took place internally and no blame was at any point apportioned to anyone, more a lessons learned and format, although the no 1 supervisor felt very unhappy about what we were made to do. On the 2nd day the divers really felt unwell with the chronic 02 chest problems and were sent to the medical centre at NHC where they were advised to go to see the specialist at Aberdeen hospital where I believe they spent the night.
Many things were highlighted at the meeting by a number of us, not least was the need to call the Doctor in the first place and why were we made to do a full table 6 at the end when there was no omitted decompression? Also, we argued that we were not really ready to do the trial and felt pressure to do so. I then returned home and was asked by [name] to remain with [company] and this I decided to do.
