10 minute read
A Better Way to Deal with Deadly Sea Mines
By LCDR U.H. (Jack) Rowley, USN (Ret.), SWO/EDO
A fellow retired naval officer shared an article with me that was published in the Spring 2023 Rotor Review, “Rethink Mine Countermeasures – Get Real Get Better Approach,” written by CDR Nick “TRON” Schnettler and LT Charlie “Handy Man” Thomas. It was a great forward-thinking article that addresses one of the Navy’s most vexing challenges – mine-countermeasures (MCM).
As a former naval surface warrior (22 years) who deployed with Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) detachments “back in the day,” I am mindful that while the term LAMPS is no longer in use, as the Navy now fields the highly capable MH-60R and MH-60S, the “multi-purpose” part of that term does describe the myriad of ways that these platforms contribute to the Navy’s warfighting prowess.
While CDR Schnettler and LT Thomas offer a good solution to the MCM challenge, I don’t think it is the best solution. If the MH-60R and MH-60S are engaged in the MCM mission, these aircraft are not able to do any of the wide-variety of missions that these rotary wing platforms are designed to do. Their iterative solution steps only slightly out of the box with the requirement of multiple airborne platforms to execute the MCM mission.
To put it directly – I cannot understand why we are considering an MCM solution set that involves one or two multi-million dollar helicopters and their four-person crews along with a multi-million dollar Fire Scout and its operators as a near and mid-term solution. Or worse, why we are considering the overtasked MH-60S, after expensive modifications, as a long-term MCM solution. There is a better way.
I suggest that the rotary wing community step way outside the box and consider using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment to provide an autonomous, single-sortie, detectto-engage technology to the growing MCM challenge. This is not an aspirational or hypothetical solution, but one that was successfully demonstrated during a recent Commander Pacific Fleet organized and Commander Third Fleet executed Integrated Battle Problem (IBP) held in the SOCAL OPAREA.
While CDR Schnettler and LT Thomas identify some of the challenges of the mine-countermeasures mission, it is worthwhile to provide a bit more background and granularity regarding mine warfare—a centuries-old challenge—as well as the specifics of what we accomplished during IBP with COTS MCM gear and how that is the solution to our MCM problem.
Perspective
Mine warfare is not new. Precursors to naval mines were first invented in Imperial China. Crude naval mine-like devices were designed by Chinese warlords hundreds of years before the Revolutionary War. They used ox bladders as dry bags and pig intestines as snorkels, as well as crude timed or manual cable fuses.
The first plan for a sea mine in the West was drawn up by Ralph Rabbards, who presented his design to Queen Elizabeth I of England in 1574. However, it was not until the American Revolution that the first successful use of sea mines had its beginnings when a group of break-away colonists, fighting for their independence from the British Crown, had the modern idea of a sea mine with the invention of the Bushnell Keg. Since 1776, mine warfare has been an important element of naval warfare.
The use of mines, and countermeasures to mines, have figured significantly in every major armed conflict and nearly every regional conflict in which the United States has been involved since the Revolutionary War. Mine warfare is an essential warfare capability integral to the ability of naval forces to open and maintain sea lines of communication and to dominate the littoral battlespace.
In the past several decades, rogue states have indiscriminately employed sea mines. Libya used mines to disrupt commerce in the Gulf of Suez and the Bab el Mandeb Strait. Iran laid mines to hazard military and commercial traffic in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. During Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991, the threat of mines precluded the effective use of the Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary task force off the shores of Kuwait and impeded all U.S. and coalition forces operating in the Arabian Gulf. Indeed, Operation Desert Storm highlighted the importance of mine warfare with the near catastrophic damage to USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58), USS Princeton (CG 59), and USS Tripoli (LPH 10).
The worldwide proliferation of mines compounds this challenge. The number of countries with mines, mining assets, mine manufacturing capabilities, and the intention to export mines has grown dramatically over the past several decades. Over 50 countries possess mines and mining capabilities.
While many analysts evaluate the ability of the United States to deal with peer adversaries in terms of cutting-edge technologies such as hypersonic missiles, directed energy weapons, fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other advances, they overlook the fact that all our adversaries are almost guaranteed to employ mines in any conflict with the United States.
Addressing Today's Mine Warfare Challenge Navy and Marine Corps senior leaders articulate a desire to address the mine countermeasures challenge. However, the services appear to be stuck in neutral as they seek to find an effective solution. The U.S. Navy’s mine countermeasures capabilities have changed minimally, even after decades of aspirational intentions to enhance the Navy’s MCM posture.
Naval professionals are identifying the magnitude of the problem and calling for a near-term solution. Writing for the U.S. Naval Institute Blog, Lieutenant Commander Jon Paris put the challenge this way:
"The U.S. Navy is focused on high-end warfare—engaging anti-ship cruise missiles, defeating hypersonic weapons, protecting the homeland and allies from ballistic missiles, and operating the air wing far from shore in a command-and control degraded environment. We are focused on defeating those we sometimes still call near-peer competitors. Our Fleet’s muscle will not make it to the high-end fight, though, if it fears the deceptively destructive naval mine."
Another naval officer, Lieutenant John Miller, said, in his prize-winning essay in the Naval Institute’s Mine Warfare Essay Contest:
"The U.S. Navy knows that its current adversaries pose a substantial offensive mining threat. Russia, China, and Iran each possess—and too often export—an advanced, robust, and mature offensive mine capability. The U.S. Navy must consider if it has the speed and resources with which to respond to restore freedom of maneuver in the event of sustained mining."
These are just two of a growing number of articles in a wide-range of professional publications that identify this dire challenge growing more difficult as U.S. Navy MCM platforms sundown and emerging capabilities face continued delays. That is precisely why the Navy has orchestrated exercises, experiments, and demonstrations to evaluate the feasibility of fielding a near-term COTS MCM solution.
It is important to recognize that MCM is a now challenge. The danger of naval mines is especially acute in the Middle East. In October 2020, a Maltese-flagged tanker was damaged by a mine while taking on crude oil in the Yemeni port
of Bir Ali. Shortly after this event, a mine in the Red Sea, near Yemen, exploded and damaged a Greek oil tanker. In December 2020, a tanker berthed at the Saudi Arabian port city of Jeddah was damaged by a mine, with Houthi militia in Yemen linked to this attack. In January 2021, an oil tanker off the coast of Iraq discovered a mine attached to its hull.
A Growing Recognition of the Value of Unmanned Systems for the MCM Mission
The U.S. Navy is accelerating the testing and fielding of unmanned systems. Week-after-week, headlines such as, “Navy, Marines Moving Ahead with Unmanned Vessel Programs,” appear in the defense media. Concurrently, other articles, such as, “When Will the U.S. Navy be Able to Autonomously Seek and Destroy Mines?” emphasize the U.S. Navy’s strong desire to take Sailors out of the minefield.
Recalling the challenges of the Navy’s QH-50 DASH System (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter) as an example, there have been many cases where technologies were inserted as solutions to Fleet or Fleet Marine Forces’ needs only to fail. The U.S. Navy would be well-served to leverage— and combine—technologies that have been examined by commercial and other government agencies. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software along with extensive testing in Navy exercises, experiments, and demonstrations should be a priority for Navy and Marine Corps planners to field a near-term MCM capability. The United States does not have the time to wager on emerging technologies that will take years to develop, mature, and field when we are about to have a major gap in our operational capabilities.
While a complete end-to-end technical description of all the details of the solution to the Navy’s MCM challenge is beyond the scope of this article, The components of this system-of-systems is not simply an idea, but a combination of tested equipment in the operational environment, specifically during a recent IBP.
What We Demonstrated During Integrated Battle Problem
While MCM is a complex mission, it can be broken into three main phases: getting to the minefield, finding the mines, and neutralizing the mines. This is the approach we took during our Integrated Battle Problem evaluation. The leading COTS candidates for this solution were chosen for IBP based on their technical maturity, along with their current use by foreign maritime forces. Leveraging these systems will enable our MCM solution to move forward at an accelerated pace and deliver Fleet capability in the near-term. The basic elements of this solution include:
The MARTAC Devil Ray T38 (thirty-eight foot) USV which is similar in size to an eleven-meter RHIB carried by many U.S. Navy ships and thus can be easily integrated aboard most U.S. Navy warships. It is the autonomous platform for the package and hosts a communications and data transmission hub in addition to above water and underwater sensors.
The Thayer Mahan Sea Scout Subsea Imaging System which is specifically designed for missions such as mine hunting. The Sea Scout system is founded on the in-production COTS Kraken Robotics Katfish-180 tow-body mounted synthetic aperture sonar. The system is designed to search for mine-like objects (MLOs).
The Pluto Gigas MNS ROV which is an existing, standalone, third-generation mine-neutralization system with several systems deployed globally, and over 3,000 mines destroyed. The Pluto Gigas deploys an acoustically armed and detonated countermine charge. Several charges are loaded onto the T38 to enable single-sortie field clearance.
Leverage USVs to Enable the Rotary Wing Community to Focus On Other Missions
If the U.S. Navy wants to buy-down inherent technical risk and challenge the paradigm of long-cycle FAR acquisition in the deadly serious business of MCM, it is time to put a near-term solution in the hands of U.S. Navy Sailors. While complex programs of record are developing next-generation technology, we should invest in parallel-path solutions that leverage mature subsystems ready to provide “speed to capability” today. Once the Fleet sees the COTS solution that can be delivered with the system described above, we will be well on our way to providing the U.S. Navy with a way to defeat today’s deadly mine threat immediately.
To be clear, this is not a platform specific solution, but rather a concept. While evolutionary in nature, this disruptive capability delivered using emerging technologies can provide the U.S. Navy with a near-term solution to the deadly mine threat and will keep Sailors and Marines out of the minefield and enable the extraordinarily capable MH-60S to perform the other vital missions for which it is ideally suited.
