I Planned for this Years Ago: Making a Precautionary Emergency Landing in Haiti

I Planned for this Years Ago: Making a Precautionary Emergency Landing in Haiti

By LT Garrett Hendrickson, USCG Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater, H-60 Standardization Officer

In early 2021, I sat down with three instructor pilots at Coast Guard Air Station Elizabeth City, NC, to complete my MH-60T Aircraft Commander Board. This board aimed to test my aircraft knowledge, policy application, and – most significantly – my decision-making. My board members knew I was hoping to be transferred to Air Station Clearwater, FL, so my final scenario placed me in the Caribbean, where Clearwater crews operate year-round at a forward operating base (FOB).

What began as a routine mission near northern Haiti quickly became less routine when they introduced a tail rotor emergency. An intermediate gearbox (IGB) malfunction resulted in a “land as soon as possible” criteria, which calls for “executing a landing at the first site at which a safe landing can be made.” In my mind, that did not preclude Haiti. I discussed how I would lead my crew through the emergency, communicate our situation, coordinate support, and ensure the safety of the aircraft and crew on deck. Satisfied with my answer, one of the board members decided to spice things up. He wanted to know how, or if, I would handle things differently if it were only an intermittent indication of an IGB malfunction. So, I was faced with landing in a foreign country where I didn’t have overflight authorization or flying 60 miles over open water back to the FOB. The complication was determining if I had an actual malfunction or possibly just a faulty sensor. Our flight manual does not provide discretion to treat an intermittent IGB warning differently than a constant one, so choosing to get creative with my landing criteria may be a deviation. Necessary operational deviations to save a human life or for safety of flight are a non-issue in the Coast Guard, and our Air Operations Manual establishes that clearly on the first page. However, it does caveat the allowance by stating, “Such deviation must not be taken lightly and must be tempered by maturity and a complete understanding of the aircraft, mission, and crew.” An intermittent warning does nothing to suggest a faulty sensor or an actual issue with the aircraft, so I did not have a complete understanding of the aircraft. Again, I decided to land in Haiti in this scenario. When the alternative was to fly the aircraft over open water for 30 minutes, with the worst case being an autorotation into the ocean, it wasn’t the most difficult decision. And with that final scenario answered, my board was nearly complete.

Two years later, I found myself happily stationed in Clearwater, flying a routine mission near Haiti out of the Caribbean FOB. Just as we were turning to head back home, my co-pilot announced, “IGB Temperature Caution. Actual.” Heck. We immediately turned the aircraft toward the first site where a safe landing could be made, which was Ile de la Tortue, Haiti, just a few miles south. Shortly after the indication came on, it was out, and as soon as it went out, it came right back on. We ran through our emergency landing procedures as we approached our landing site – the westernmost part of the island on a rocky plain – and quickly communicated our situation to the station holding our radio guard and a nearby Coast Guard cutter. All this time, the IGB temperature caution flashed on and off at us. Immediate, decisive action was critical to minimize exposure to a malfunction that, as we all knew, could worst-case end with us autorotating into the water. After all, I had planned for this exact scenario years ago.

Fortunately, our landing site had plenty of space for another helicopter to land to bring us repair parts, and I believed it was isolated enough that there wouldn’t be many local inhabitants to come investigate. Immediately after landing, with the caution still flashing on and off at us, we began discussing emergency shutdown procedures. Before we got too far in that discussion, we noticed a few residents had emerged from seemingly nowhere and were approaching the aircraft. Pausing, we realized there was no need to shut the aircraft down, and doing so might actually be disadvantageous. The loud noise and rotor wash we were generating encouraged the curious islanders to keep a safe standoff distance. Moreover, staying running provided us with the drastic option of quickly relocating the aircraft should it become absolutely necessary for the safety of the crew. Although we realized that continuing to run the IGB could worsen any actual malfunction, we decided that if for some reason it was about to disintegrate, some other indications would manifest and we could take appropriate action at that time.

Then, there was the question of fuel. We were toward the end of our patrol when we had to land, and there was no easy way to get fuel to the remote landing zone. We needed enough to fly 60 miles back to the FOB and still land with a safe reserve. Unsure how long it would take for the repair parts to arrive, but still not wanting to shut down for various reasons, we did our best to conserve fuel (save for securing the ECS, which was selfish but important). A common practice to conserve fuel is to start the APU and bring both engines to idle, though that is not exactly the most fuel-efficient method. With two engines at idle and the APU running, the approximate fuel burn in our MH-60T would be 530550 pounds per hour (depending on ECS setting). With one engine at fly, the other at idle, and the APU secured, the approximate fuel burn is 430-450 pounds per hour. While 100 pounds per hour is marginal savings, we considered it necessary given the circumstances. After about 20 minutes of sitting on deck, the local inhabitants lost interest and left, only to return 30 minutes later with a group of about 50 people.

Although we had no reason to believe that the residents of Tortue would be aggressive toward us, we were cognizant of some realities. In recent years, the volume of irregular maritime migration from Haiti has increased significantly. The number of Haitian migrants interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard increased 370% from FY 2021 to 2022. With the increased incidence of irregular maritime migration events comes an increase in the enforcement efforts necessary to thwart treacherous voyages that often result in significant loss of life at sea. Between 2021 and 2022, Air Station Clearwater saw a nearly 150% increase in MH-60T hours flown in support of migrant interdiction operations. So, while we often assume the white-hull effect of our helicopter harbors goodwill, we recognized we may be seen more as a foreign enforcement entity and did not abandon our caution. As the excited islanders arrived around the helicopter, they began encircling it, many of them carrying machetes, shouting toward us, and giving us the international finger of not-such-goodwill. I would like to make clear that at no point did any of the onlookers become hostile. They complied with crew hand signals to back away from the aircraft when they got too close, and their machetes were more likely than not tools of their trade rather than aggression. Nevertheless, the situation was uncomfortable and demanded a heightened state of awareness on the part of the crew.

About 90 minutes after we landed, another helicopter from our FOB arrived with the parts necessary to fix our helicopter and a federal agent to provide security during the maintenance evolution. Earlier, we were convinced that if we were to shut down, the local inhabitants would feel motivated to come closer to the aircraft and invade our preferred standoff distance for people with machetes. When I first started flying the Migrant Interdiction Operations Mission, I carried selfprotect capabilities on every mission near Haiti for this very scenario. After flying the mission for a while, comfort and complacency on my end led to me no longer require my aircrew to load weapons on the aircraft before a Haiti mission. Needless to say, this incident has motivated me to return to my old ways. Regardless, the aircrew did a phenomenal job fixing the aircraft in a field on an island in Haiti with dozens of less-than-welcoming onlookers. Just 2.5 hours after we had the malfunction, we were taking off in a healthy airplane to fly back to the FOB. Once we arrived back at the FOB, it was confirmed that the IGB Sensor was faulty. Nevertheless, I still think landing in Haiti was the most appropriate course of action.

This adventure presented many salient lessons to be learned. First, the importance of wargaming with challenging scenarios. Think about things in depth when you have the luxury of time to consider the applicable publications and policy because when it’s game time, you likely won’t have that luxury. This also demands that you know your aircraft well – you likely won’t be able to search in your flight manual if constant versus intermittent indications make a difference while you’re getting into an autorotative profile over the ocean. Second, take seriously the challenges posed to you in the pilot development process. We all know who the hammers are at the unit and probably have a distaste for some of the questions they ask. However, you never know when those questions will help prepare you for something yet unknown. Lastly, be cautious of complacency. As an instructor pilot and flight examiner now myself, I like to think I guard against complacency fairly well, but it can rear its ugly head in a lot of different ways. In this instance, it looked like me not having full self-protection capabilities as 50 curious Haitians with machetes surrounded the helicopter.

All things considered, I would say this incident was an impressive display of the coordinating mechanisms that can occur when we activate them. We had a second helicopter on scene with parts and security about 90 minutes after we landed. We were in a fixed helicopter flying home just 60 minutes later. I can’t overstate my immense pride in being part of a team that operated this well in “crisis mode.” More importantly, I can’t overstate how impressed and thankful I am to the outstanding crews that performed so well that day – whether they were my crew, in a different asset, behind the scenes, or with our partner agencies.

The Haiti scenario on my Aircraft Commander Board ended with a slightly humorous twist. One of the board members challenged me by saying that after my safe emergency landing, I was taken into custody by Haitian authorities, and he wanted to know how I would handle that situation. Fortunately, that’s the only part of the scenario that didn’t actually manifest. But if it had, I also planned for that years ago.