9 minute read
Human Factors in the Cockpit: It’s All of Our Problem
By LCDR Eric “Pennies” Page, USN
SOF Truth Number 1 states: “Humans are more important than hardware.” In aviation we have adopted this same truth. We believe that changes in hardware directly facilitate the well-being of Naval Aviators and ultimately mission success.
The MH-60S Community is now over two decades old and we have come a long way from the days of Block 1 aircraft. Nearly a dozen mission system upgrades later, we fly a helicopter that has the potential to be the master of multitasking, but at what cost? This article explores some key human factors issues, specifically the placement of the Radio Control Unit (RCU) and the AAQ-45 Distributed Aperture Infrared Countermeasures System (DAIRCM) Control Indicator (CI).
Human Factors
Human Factors is defined by the International Ergonomics Association as “interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design, in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance.” In the early days of Naval Aviation, two leaders in the field were Fitts & Jones, World War II-era psychologists who conducted interviews and analysis of 460 reports of aviation errors in the cockpit, pioneering the process that current military aviation routinely uses for improvements. They rejected the idea that “accidents due to errors of pilots or supervisory personnel [were] the responsibility of those in charge of selection, training, and operations.” Fitts & Jones instead argued that “a great many accidents result directly from the manner in which equipment is designed and where it is placed in the cockpit.” This paradigm shift to the consideration of Human Factors profoundly impacted our profession, and process improvement remains critical to our safety and success.
Narrowing down this extremely broad science, we are choosing to focus specifically on preventing spatial disorientation in flight to increase safety. Multiple studies from both the Navy Safety Center and the Air Force cite spatial disorientation as a key factor in mishaps that simply has not been eliminated despite advances in airframe technology. “Spatial-D” is taught to all of us in flight school and through mandated annual refresher training, and nearly all Navy pilots can regurgitate the standard jargon; “vestibular system, proprioceptive, visual illusion, black hole effect, etc.,” on command. But what are we actually doing to fix it? I argue there are some improvements to our airframe that could be implemented at minimal cost to increase situational awareness and save lives.
We all need to remember that the following discussion of hardware use demands compatibility in full combat gear, at night using night vision systems, during the most complex missions–all which increase fatigue and decrease situational awareness on their own.
RCU
The Radio Control Unit (RCU) was originally designed as a backup control that linked directly to the radios in the event of a computer failure. In recent years, its role has changed. Today the RCU is required to be routinely used in-flight, as the sole controller for Integrated Waveform (IW) Satellite Communications (SATCOM), and for second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) Frequency-Hopping. For the audience who have been out of the cockpit for a while, these two technologies are the upgrades to Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) SATCOM and HAVE QUICK respectively. Both of these legacy systems are either no longer in use, or will be phased out in the coming years.
Nerd stuff, for sure, but the incorporation of these new technologies means that the RCU will, for a time, be required for non-emergency use in-flight. This is a big deal. SATCOM is used almost exclusively when talking to a command facility, such as a Tactical Operations Center (TOC), because of its beyond line of sight (BLOS) reach. Likewise, we often use frequency hopping on either intra-flight or when talking to external assets to prevent the effects of jamming. Until these functionalities come “under glass,” we must use the RCU to control them.
In a Fleet survey of current pilots who have used the RCU in-flight, 40 out of 41 respondents identified RCU placement (in the center console aft of both pilots) as an ergonomics issue, with 40% claiming it was a safety of flight issue. Similarly, HSC-85, Detachment 2 conducted a survey of all detachment pilots, where 100% of pilots reported difficulty with RCU use on-ground prior to engine start, on-ground with rotors engaged, and in-flight. Additionally, the RCU placement contributed to increased fatigue, extended mission interruption, and decreased situational awareness as reported by all.
As a case study, picture a section of helicopters holding at a point while working with a ground asset and relaying reports to a Tactical Operations Center (TOC). In flight, likely in an orbit at night, the non-flying pilot will have to physically turn around to re-tune the RCU, switching between a SATURN intra-flight frequency and an IW SATCOM control net (with the other radio remaining on an Air Direction net to monitor the ground party).
HSC-85 conducts training operations in El Centro, CA.
Besides being inconvenient to turn and look backwards and down, the pilot must control a panel that is now upside-down from their perspective. Additionally, the act of looking down and aft while the aircraft is in turning flight is a textbook way to induce vertigo from the Coriolis Effect. In one routine action, one pilot (typically the Aircraft Commander, in this instance) just induced spatial disorientation because of a design issue.
The fix is simple. Move the RCU forward on the center console. This solution has already been fit-tested on Fleet aircraft (see Figure 1), and it was found that the internal cable length was not an issue. White papers have been generated and are working their way through PMA-299 and test community chop-chains.
Figure 1
DAIRCM
A similar problem occurs with the placement of the DAIRCM CI. This indicator screen (about the size of a half-dollar) is placed on the center console, down and left of the right-seat pilot, who is typically flying. It is now the primary indicator of non-radar surface-to-air fires, and also nearly impossible to see from the left seat. In a Surface to Air Countertactics (SACT) scenario, imagine a pilot, who is aggressively maneuvering an aircraft to stay alive, having to look down and left to see an indication. This is another vertigo-inducing movement, this time from the pilot at the controls. This fix is more extensive, but moving the CI up onto the glare-shield with the IP-1150 (what everyone calls the APR-39 Threat Warning Indicator) potentially saves the aircraft and crew.
What Do We Do About It?
The examples above are only a selection of several human factors issues with our current cockpit setup. It’s easy to be angry and point the finger at PMA-299 or the test community for these problems. There is an entire Military Specification Guide (MIL-STD-1472) that details requirements for cockpit design, which describes criteria like viewing angle requirements for emergency systems, that neither the RCU or DAIRCM CI comply with. From the MIL-STD-1472 “Emergency displays and controls shall be located where they can be seen and reached without delay. For example, warning lights should be within a 30-degree cone about the user’s normal line of sight (the median direction of gaze when viewing a display surface).” This is depicted in Figure #2.
Figure 2
Additionally, from the same standard, “Controls shall be located so that the user’s hand or arm does not obscure the associated display.” I assert that both the RCU and DAIRCM are emergency systems, as the RCU was initially designed for use in a dualcomputer failure and DAIRCM is for use in SACT.
We have all flown in Sierra cockpits that have had different center console configurations. Through the dedicated efforts of a few Commanding Officers, we have largely standardized cockpits throughout all commands. This problem is complicated by the multitude of different available configurations of the Sierra. While almost everyone is flying a Block 3b, Fixed Forward Firing Weapons Systems (FFFWS) and Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) panels pose additional challenges to maintaining a standard cockpit configuration. This is a problem in and of itself.
However, before the blame is summarily cast on the royal “they,” we as operators must ask ourselves “what are we doing about it?” These, and other human factors issues that are present in the cockpit have been around since the beginning, and we need to be more vocal about them. Not every possible fix is feasible, but our community leaders and NAVAIR need better actionable information. We all must formally report things that are degrading our ability to safely fly and present a possible solution to every problem we encounter. Wardrooms are a great venue to identify issues, but if the conversation stops there, nothing gets fixed.
We can’t wait for a program management office or the VX/HX Community to identify issues and then solve them for us. With the increased use of the new systems on our helicopter, it is incumbent on us to provide feedback and fix problems that potentially result in the loss of helicopters and crew. Change is not difficult, but it is a process that takes work. The first step in successful change is producing and delivering the data to those who can fix it. The Weapons Schools, Naval Air Warfighting Development Center (NAWDC), Wings, and individual squadron leadership are great starting points of contact.
HSC-85 conducts training operations in Republic of Korea.
Let us safeguard the processes born in the earliest days of aviation and remember that the human is more important than the hardware. Doing so allows us to better contribute to the well-being of Naval Aviators in a future of more complex systems.
Fly Safe! -Pennies
Notes
Shorrock, S. (2018). Human Factors and Ergonomics: Looking Back to Look Forward. Understanding and Improving Human Work. https://humanisticsystems.com/2018/02/25/human-factors-and-ergonomics-looking-back-to-look-forward/ Stott, J. R. R. (2013). Orientation and disorientation in aviation. Extreme Physiology & Medicine, 2(1), 2–2. https://doi. org/10.1186/2046-7648-2-2
Ledegang, W. D., & Groen, E. L. (2018). Spatial Disorientation Influences on Pilots’ Visual Scanning and Flight Performance. Aerospace Medicine and Human Performance, 89(10), 873–882. https://doi.org/10.3357/AMHP.5109.2018
Gresty, M. A., Golding, J. F., Le, H., & Nightingale, K. (2008). Cognitive Impairment by Spatial Disorientation. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 79(2), 105–111. https://doi.org/10.3357/ASEM.2143.2008
MIL-STD-1472H, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DESIGN CRITERIA STANDARD: HUMAN ENGINEERING (15SEP-2020) http://assist.dla.mil/" http://assist.dla.mil/
