Book Review

The Dream Machine by Richard Whittle

Reviewed by LCDR Chip Lancaster, USN (Ret.)

Richard Whittle’s book is a historical compendium of the difficult and troubled development of an aircraft based on new aerodynamic concepts and technology. His encyclopedic work pulls no punches noting that the Osprey is a bird born from a bloodbath of accidents and a torrent of political and public criticism. He dedicates the book to the thirty Marines and civilians who gave their lives in the development of the V-22 Osprey.

Whittle is a noted military and aviation author and journalist. His meticulous investigation takes us on a fifty-plus year journey from Bell’s first tiltrotor, the XV-3 in 1951, to the V-22’s combat introduction in Iraq in 2007. The journey takes us through a process of continually pushing a new and advanced aircraft concept forward even though, at times, it was not ready. He starts with a brief history of Bell Helicopters, tracing the tiltrotor’s origins back to the Focke-Wulf FW-61 and progressing through intermediate designs to the Bell XV3, complete with aviation pioneer innovators from Gerard Herrick to Arthur Young. Into the story comes young aeronautical engineer and prime motivator of the project, Dick Spivey–it’s his dream machine. In his words, “the aircraft takes off like a helicopter, flies like an airplane.”

Spivey’s passion takes him from the drafting table into marketing with a unique ability to sell the tiltrotor, resulting in the XV-15 concept demonstrator in 1977. Several events happen over the next few years to put the Marines in the driver’s seat of V-22 development. The first is Operation Eagle Claw and the Desert One mishap in 1980. The author’s depiction of Desert One is the most in-depth and detailed account that I’ve ever read. The Tiltrotor advocates use the mishap as a selling point, in that it would not have happened with tiltrotor aircraft. The next event is the XV-15’s amazing performance at the 1981 Paris Air Show, which sells the tiltrotor concept to aviation. The next event is the Marines’ predicament. They need a replacement for the H-46, an assault support asset that will carry 24 Marines “faster and farther,” which becomes Spivey’s new motto.

The Joint Vertical Lift Experimental (JVX) Program is commissioned to find a Joint Services Vertical Lift Experimental Aircraft. The only companies to submit a final proposal are the Bell/Boeing team. The new aircraft was set to incorporate the latest, state-of-the-art components and fly-by-wire controls. The Marines set the requirements and specifications, almost killing the project at birth with the requirement to operate off amphibious assault ships. The ship requirements put size, wing-fold, and weight restrictions on the design that the companies constantly struggled to overcome. Bell and Boeing are almost complete opposites in philosophies, with locations a thousand miles apart. Despite their soap-opera drama differences, they eventually come to a 50-50 agreement where Bell will handle engines, nacelles, proprotors, and wings while Boeing does fuselage, landing gear, hydraulics, and fly-by-wire controls.

Construction is just part of the problem, with an even bigger struggle arising from funding, politics, and a host of military and civilian detractors trying to kill the project. The Army and the Air Force are even becoming less enthused. The Marines, desperate to move the project along, finally push it out to Hollywood level acclaim, complete with a fake Corps paint job in 1988 even though it won’t fly for another year.

SECDEF is an adamant opponent, determined to kill the 22, telling the Marines they can make do with Blackhawks. The Corps pushes back, knowing if they’re forced to use Blackhawks, it could kill their stand-alone-service image, making them look like a part of the Army. They need the 22 and they’re determined to get it. The first bird gets into the air in ’89, going through successful LHD ship ops in ’90. The first accident occurs at the Bell plant with ship #5 going out of control as it lifts into a hover. No one was injured but the aircraft was a complete loss, the mishap blamed on a faulty flight control system. Media coverage results in bad publicity, fueling project opposition. NAVAIR downs all the 22’s until the aircraft gets a complete makeover from fuselage design and construction to flight control software. The improved prototype is back and flying in early ’92. Tragedy strikes a second time in July as the aircraft is pushed on a nonstop flight from the Bell plant to Quantico for a promotional presentation. A chain-reaction system failure progresses from engine fire to hydraulic and flight control loss with the aircraft crashing and sinking into the Potomac River. Four Bell employees and three Marines are lost.

A changing political environment gives the program a reprieve and a billion-plus contract for four new and improved birds. Fixing what caused the Potomac mishap along with upgraded engines, beefed up transmissions, a new wing fold mechanism, improved throttle control, and glass cockpit. We progress eight years through politics, opposition, and funding issues to ’99 as the 22 goes into Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL). NAVAIR reduces mission requirements and compresses the schedule to meet a 2001 full rate production date. Everyone is in a hurry to push OPEVAL which requires doing mission related operations carrying marines. East Coast ship evaluations run into significant supply delays, but the program pushes to the West Coast for assault evaluations at San Clemente Island and desert operations at MCAS Yuma. Tragedy strikes a third blow on a night approach to an outlying field at Marana, Arizona. A section wingman loses control on short final, flipping over and plowing inverted into the desert floor. Nineteen Marines perish. Amazingly, OPEVAL doesn’t cease. Investigation reveals that the aircraft was being flown outside of its limitations with a tail wind, and vortex ring state (VRS) of the right proprotor was suspected of causing an uncontrollable right roll. Marine Headquarters decided that they could save $50M and shorten OPEVAL if they didn’t do some of the planned tests, including those for high rates of descent.

Despite the Yuma tests finding numerous discrepancies in actuators and hydraulics, NAVAIR says the 22 passed OPEVAL and moves it to the next acceptance phase, Osprey Training Squadron operations at MCAS New River. It’s eight months later when Crossbow 8 takes off on a routine night training flight, crashing on return to the field from compound hydraulic failures aggravated by flight control computer problems. Four Marines are killed. Two fatal mishaps within eight months then leads the Commandant to have doubts and the News Show “60 Minutes” to do an investigative report. The program is completely stopped pending JAG and Mishap Board reports as well as a Blue Ribbon Commission being established. The JAG and Mishap reports fault Bell and Boeing for manufacturing discrepancies and NAVAIR for not catching them. The Commission makes 71 recommendations to fix the aircraft and production situation and resolve autorotation ability and VRS susceptibility, but finds no flaws in the tiltrotor concept.

SECDEF puts the program back on track pending resolution of the Commission’s recommendations. Additionally, SECNAV directs Bell and Boeing to move their Osprey offices to Pax River so company and NAVAIR engineers can work together. The 22 gets a second makeover with flight test results showing the aircraft less susceptible to VRS than a comparable helicopter, and autorotation is removed as a requirement. A new evaluation squadron is established to complete a second OPEVAL which wraps up in 2005 with the Osprey approved for full rate production. VMM-263 takes the 22 into combat in Iraq in 2007, successfully completing a seven month mishap-free deployment. Dick Spivey’s comments sum it up saying that the Osprey’s problems were not due to concept or engineering, but rather to the machinery of the DOD procurement process. He had no doubt that the tiltrotor would change the world. Perhaps he’s right, looking at the Leonardo AW609 and Bell V-280 Valor as examples.

My review only gives you the highlights of a 400-plus page accounting complete with detailed chapter notes, bibliography, and index. Richard Whittle’s writing style is clear and narrative-based rather than cut and dry documentation, with in-depth character development and event analysis. The mishap descriptions are in vivid detail with word for word cockpit and controller conversations, made even more impactful knowing that these are real people. Even though the V-22 has matured a lot over the past 15 years, Whittle’s investigation is a must read for those interested in the process and travails of aircraft development and procurement. The author’s words leave us with this thought: “Progress often depends on dreamers, especially in aviation. Whoever sets out to conquer the air just has to have a dream. It comes with the territory.” The Dream Machine is no light read, but it is extremely well written and thorough. I give it five stars and two thumbs up. It’s in the NHA Library; check it out. You won’t be disappointed.