Clear Direction or Standardized Execution A Defense of Multi-Mission in Expeditionary

Clear Direction or Standardized Execution: A Defense of Multi-Mission in Expeditionary HSC

By LCDR Rob “OG” Swain, USN

“The Jack of all Trades.” MH-60S aircrew lace this phrase with varying degrees of pride, frustration, ownership, and disillusionment. In January 2019, at the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center, I listened to the Commanding Officer of HSC-6 advocate for specialized squadrons and rouse a section of the Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor cadre who craved dedicated-mission helicopter employment. Three and a half years later, forward deployed with Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5, I read an impassioned Rotor Review contribution questioning the relevance of the Navy Tactical Tasks (NTAs) assigned to Expeditionary HSC and reflected on what shapes the author’s cynical perception of multi-mission operations.

Whether a sitting CO or a Fleet Replacement Pilot, the spectrum of professional experience yields a cohort of MH60S aircrew who wish to emulate the narrow functionality of joint service rotary-wing units. This ground swell of multimission frustration and “grass is greener” ideology is not a new sub-culture in HSC. By exposing the impracticality of specialization for modern-day shipboard naval aviation, emphasizing the necessity of our resourced maritime component rotary-wing requirements, sharing contemporary examples of HSC’s Great Power Competition application in the Indo-Pacific, and highlighting the importance of brilliance on the basics and task unit integration, I endeavor to outline the enduring responsibility for Expeditionary and CVW MH-60S Units on the LHD, LCS, ESB, and CVN to attack, assault, and rescue.

There’s no Greener Grass at Sea

VA, VF, HC, HSL, VQ. Specialized naval aircraft with singular focus and independent supply chains exist in one place – permanently resting on stilts – untenable in today’s fiscal and operational environment. While the USAF enjoys the luxury of a superior fighter with the F-22 and a superior bomber with the B-2, these joint platforms do not satisfy the Theater Joint Force Maritime Component Commander's obligation to deliver organic air-to-air and air-to-surface fires. In the early 1990s, when the A-6B Attack Squadrons and F-14D Fighter Squadrons combined, the newly generated Strike Fighter (VFA) Community shared the same internal churn experienced by consolidating HS and HC. But bomber squadrons learned basic fighter maneuvering and fighter squadrons learned to bomb. The fighter/attack squadron synthesis yielded a more lethal CVW with more flexible operational availability.

Single-capability aircraft not only limit operational scope and adaptability of the aircrew, they complicate warfare commander decision making. Modern adversaries boast complex, all-domain, anti-access/area denial capabilities with impressive force ratios and endurance at sea. To adequately meet these threats in combat, flight deck real estate on US Navy aviation and amphibious ships is at an all-time premium. The prospective loss of a specialized aircraft from the modernday flight deck would unnecessarily pressurize acceptable level of risk calculus, induce single points of failure into mission planning, and complicate the feasibility of rapidly regenerating combat power at sea. In 2012, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed these considerations: “Forces suitable for a variety of missions, if smartly positioned, maximize the chance of being prepared for a crisis.”2

Today, with the F-35C and F/A-18E/F, VFA conducts surface, search, and coordination, air to air warfare, aerial refueling, anti-surface warfare, air interdiction, close air support, electronic support, electronic attack, maritime strike, and suppression of enemy air defense. When an F/A-18E blew off the Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) flight deck during underway replenishment in July, 2022, the aircraft loss was mitigated by the overall readiness and flexibility of CVW 1. The operational impact of losing a single-mission asset would have been much more acute if not for the VFA Community’s multi-mission modernization.

The M stands for Multi-Mission

Objectively, the USA AH-64E and USMC AH-1Z provide superior attack capability, the USMC CH-53E and MV-22B provide greater lift capacity, and the USAF HH-60G and USCG MH-60T provide dedicated Search and Rescue availability...for their respective services. Joint asset proficiency, however, does not absolve the USN of its responsibility to organically source rotary-wing fires, combat logistics, and personnel recovery for the naval component of each geographic combatant command. Indeed, the “Sierra seems to provide redundant capabilities”3 and, in support of Global Force Management, “redundancies provide alternative means to accomplish an objective - which can be critical in war.”4

Funding a flight deck-efficient set of Navy rotarywing capabilities inspired the original Helicopter Master Plan of the mid1990s. Helicopter Master Plan consolidated eight distinct helicopter Type/Model/Series (H-3, H-2, H/SH60B/F/H, MH-53, CH-46, UH-1) and four communities (HS, HC, HSL, HM) into HSM, HSC, and HM. The Navy funded and resourced these new, multi-mission communities to satisfy contemporary and emerging rotary-wing-centric demands in the maritime fight.

The success of these two Navy initiatives is self-evident in today’s helicopter fleet. Rather than attempting to “stake claim in the battlespace”5 which can lead to friction, organizational misalignment, misunderstood priorities, and functional discontent, the Expeditionary HSC Required Operational Capabilities/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) defines commander’s intent for community Training and Readiness (T&R). Within T&R, this translates to a laundry list of NTAs and a requisite number of skilled crews to fight and win at our assigned missions. Informed by these governing instructions, the MH-60S is equipped and Expeditionary HSC Aircrew are armed with baseline knowledge to progress through the Optimized Fleet Response Plan and Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Program. The end state of this preparation is the ability to embark on any vessel of opportunity or forward deploy to any expeditionary base with multi-mission lethality.

The Dividends of Diversification

Skillsets acquired in training for one mission do not stovepipe to that warfare area. The multi-spectral targeting system (MTS) offers one functional example. Developing MTS proficiency during procedurally-controlled or dynamic attack (CAS/SCAR/ MARSTRK) improves an HSC pilot’s ability to effect a rapid defensive sensor posture during tactical insertion and extraction (NTA 1.1.2.4), maintain contact while collecting target information (NTA 2.2.1), or to search efficiently during rescue and recovery operations (NTA 6.2). After speaking with pilots from the 33rd and 66th Rescue Squadrons (RQS), and USCG operators from Maritime Security Response Team West, each of these “dedicated-mission” units voiced independent desire for the layered training and experiences multi-mission affords.

The versatility of HSC training improves the overall operational availability of expeditionary MH-60S detachments. In 2017, HSC-23 supported LCS-launched RGM-84D Harpoon-targeting with the MQ-8B while HSC-26 provided quick-reaction XCAS for Task Force 111 off the Arabian Peninsula. In 2018, HSC-28 stood Non-Combatant Evacuation alerts for the U.S. embassy relocation in Israel and refueled at Marine Wing Support Squadron FARPs in the Jordanian desert while HSC-21 flew overwater joint collection operations with the embarked MEU. The breadth of this operational employment speaks to the preparedness of the expeditionary detachments who earned higher headquarters trust and to the detachment officers-incharge (OIC) who nurtured multi-mission pride. Narrowing the scope of expeditionary T&R would artificially constrain MH-60S employment and limit operationally-validated “redundant capabilities” to officers in tactical command. While our adversaries have changed in capability, complexity, and capacity, our written requirements in HSC have not. The strength of our community lies in the scaled continuity of T&R across our deploying units and remains just as relevant in today’s fight.

HSC-12 "Golden Falcons" and HSM-77 "Saberhawks" conduct bi-lateral training with Republic of Korean Navy MK-99 LYNX

Attack

While a 1-Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA) LCS detachment cannot attack surface targets (NTA 3.2.1.1) with the same capacity of a 5-PAA CVW squadron, the shared SWTP exposes all HSC aircrew to the tactics, techniques, and procedures for maritime employment. The 2 and 3-PAA expeditionary detachments share this tactical task, and the distributed nature of ARG/MEU deployments do not always guarantee the availability of USMC attack aircraft to conduct air operations in support of maritime surface warfare. The Defense of the Amphibious Task Force tactical memorandum acknowledges this operational reality and outlines the MH60S as the primary asset for close-in ship defense. Great Power Competition continues to validate this HSC requirement.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) may not pose the same explosive ship threat of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy’s Fast Attack Craft/Fast Inshore Attack Craft operating in the Arabian Gulf, but that does not negate the relevance of rotary-wing fires in the Indo-Pacific. The PLAN coordinates a “forest” of People’s Armed Force Maritime Militia and other third party targeting and collection vessels. These platforms operate without the robust surfaceto-air missile/weapon engagement zones of the larger Level I and Level II combatants, but still represent critical linkages for over-the-horizon (OTH) kill chains and adversary F2T, posing credible risk to high value units. To defend both the ARG and CSG from OTH-targeting, rotary-wing platforms launching from expeditionary staging bases, LHDs, and other vessels of opportunity provide force-multiplication and appropriate weapon-to-target pairing with precision guided fires. Composite Training Unit Exercise or deployment is not the time to outline rotary-wing fires capabilities to the chain of command. Task validation happens at the speed of relevance and the relevant time to vigilantly integrate and execute is the basic and advanced phase of the OFRP.

Assault

Maritime Interdiction (not to be confused with Department of Homeland Security Airborne Use of Force or Law Enforcement Operations which are not DoD rotarywing missions) is a fundamental task of Expeditionary HSC. Surprisingly, the MEU does not serialize MIO training in its own T&R or Pre-Deployment Training Plan (PTP). This is where tactically prepared Expeditionary HSC Detachments can appropriately advocate and educate task force planners. Joint execution does not occur passively.

In 2018, HSC-28 yielded the benefits of proactive integration to facilitate NTA execution. After a year of demonstrated interoperability with HSC-28.4 on the IWO JIMA ARG, the 26th MEU Maritime Reconnaissance Force (MRF) Commander departed for Manama, Bahrain to meet with Seal Team 10 and the Crisis Response Element's 16th Special Operations Air Detachment for a JSOC sponsored MIO Exercise FPC. During the conference, the SEAL Team 10 Liaison said to the MRF CO, “We don’t think HSC needs to participate in the HVBSS. We don’t want the 160th to have to put the training wheels on for them.” The MRF CO snapped back, “Truthfully, I would rather do HVBSS with HSC-28. We have been working with them for a year and they don’t need to do 24 DLQs before we can execute.” Standardizing HSC’s role in MIO does not demand an evaluation of T&R. It requires detachment officers-in-charge willing to integrate, capable of demonstrating tactical competency, and materially ready through workups to execute with available assault units. Improving higher headquarters’ understanding of HSC’s central role in maritime special operations support advances at the speed of trust.

Rescue

A discussion of HSC’s enduring role in personnel recovery demands qualification for the conjecture, “[huge distance] presents a unique challenge that is vastly different than the plane guard and local SAR capabilities the carrier squadrons provide.” In stark contrast to this statement, the 5-PAA CVW T&R Matrix is the only readiness document defining an HSC requirement for skilled crews trained to combat search and rescue (NTA 6.2.2.2). Over the past year, every CVW Squadron in INDOPACOM has conducted distributed maritime personnel recovery.

In June of this year, a section of HSC-12 aircraft configured with dual-aux tanks landed to receive lily pad fuel off ROKS MARADO (LPH 6112) during Carrier Strike Group Exercise 2022 between the U.S. Navy and Republic of Korea Navy. The recovery vehicles then transited to receive aviation-delivered ground refuel from an MV-22B FARP placed on Okinawa, Japan en route to a simulated survivor’s location. Over the past 12 months, Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group, and Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group have each launched unescorted distributed maritime personnel recovery helicopters in support of CVW long-range maritime strike constructive kills and defensive

counter air packages in the Indo-Pacific. A reevaluation of T&R could certainly introduce combat search and rescue skill to Expeditionary HSC Detachments supporting carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group operations. But again, execution does not materialize without a written requirement. Distributed maritime personnel recovery requires Composite Warfare Sea Combat Commander or Amphibious Task Force Commander advocacy and a willingness to coordinate cruiser/ destroyer/LHD/LSD lily pad or FARP placement. Those supported commanders will only posture assets at the speed of trust in the PR unit’s ability to execute.

Helicopter Sea Combat

While I disagree with the argument that existing 3-PAA Expeditionary HSC NTAs in attack, assault, and rescue provide “no solid position for a great power conflict,” I do believe the thesis echoes a more holistic community challenge. Major General Francis Donovan, who served as Commander Task Force 51/5th Marine Expeditionary Battalion, summarizes the hurdle: “The problem with HSC is that every expeditionary detachment is different. You have HSC ARG/ MEU Detachments who are tactically prepared and integrated to execute, you have HSC ARG/MEU Detachments who are tactically prepared, but have not integrated to execute, and you have HSC Detachments who just want to fly SAR and logistics. You never know what flavor you’re going to get.” MajGen Donovan cuts to the heart of the issue. “Hanging our hat” has less to do with what our resourced capabilities are and more to do with how we demonstrate our ability to train, fight, and win. If HSC wants to employ their training and readiness in current and future conflict, it requires squadron and detachment leadership consistently poised and vigilantly prepared to advocate, integrate, educate, and demonstrate tactical brilliance on the basics in each of our assigned NTAs.

MajGen Donovan’s final thought in our correspondence was that Expeditionary HSC Detachments need APKWS, but that is a conversation for another Rotor Review article.

Footnotes

1. A spirited response framed with great respect for Jackson’s thoughtfulness. Thank you to Rotor Review for hosting a forum where professional aviators can engage in the debates which will chart the future of Navy Vertical Lift. Cotney, Jackson, LTJG, USN (2022). “Clear Direction for the Jack of All Trades: Confidently Defining a Role for the Expeditionary MH-60S Community in Future Conflict,” Rotor Review, 156, Spring 2022 2. Dempsey, Martin, GEN, USA (2012). “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020,” JCS 3. Cotney, “Clear Direction.” 4. Dempsey, “CCJO.” 5. Cotney, “Clear Direction.”

HSC-12 and HSM-77 executed daily exercise serials during the first Carrier Strike Group Exercise with Republic of Korean Navy in 5 Years including Distributed Maritime Personnel Recovery with MAG-39, HVBSS with ROKN Special Forces, and Dissimilar Aircraft (DACT) Training.