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HSM-51 Warlord ELVA and Smokelight Approach
By LT Corey Bowes, USN, HSM-51 Warlords, Atsugi, Japan
On July 31, 2023, at approximately 1600, Warlord 04, an MH-60R part of the embarked Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) detachment, launched from USS John Finn (DDG 113) to conduct routine surface surveillance operations in the northern Sea of Japan. There were no diverts and no suitable landing sites within the fuel range of the helicopter. Myself along with LCDR Aric “Boogie” McGee, the detachment’s Officer in Charge, and AWR2 Alecsander Donlevy, the detachment’s lead Aircrewman, were the aircrew on board. While conducting surface surveillance collection (SSC) at an altitude of 5,000 feet, we maneuvered ahead of the ship approximately 75 nautical miles. At 1815 a solid layer of clouds were observed quickly developing well below the aircraft. At the current altitude it was difficult to assess the height of the layer. Our initial estimation was that the cloud tops were forming between 1,000 and 2,000 feet. We decided to descend to verify the actual altitude. Passing through 2,000 feet, the clouds were still well below us which brought some discomfort amongst the crew. At 500 feet we were still above what was now a solid cloud layer. We could no longer see the surface of the ocean below the helicopter. Our standard operating procedure (SOP) for weather minimums during shipboard operations is 500 feet and one nautical mile visibility. At this point we made the decision to abort the mission and turn back to the ship.
Upon querying the ship for a weather update we were notified the ship was also experiencing reduced visibility with deteriorating weather conditions. Ceilings were assessed to be at 200 feet AGL with diminishing visibility at that time. Pushing Warlord 04 at our buster airspeed, we started closing the ship which was now at a distance of approximately 45NM. At 1835 we were overhead the ship and they assessed ceilings at 100 feet at this point. In the aircraft we were still VFR on top and could visually see the ship’s mast peeking from the top of the cloud layer. In the time it took for our aircraft and the ship to set up for an approach, the cloud layer had risen upwards to 400 feet. We began to set up for a normal TACAN approach. This approach brings the aircraft down to 200 feet and ½ mile behind the ship but we suspected it would be unlikely that we would break out. This is our normal shipboard approach we fly everyday which would verify the bottom of the clouds from a familiar profile and glideslope. We were unable to break out and visually acquire the ship resulting in a wave off and reset. We decided to climb above the cloud layer to regain visual reference to the horizon which was now steady at approximately 400 feet and re-cage ourselves.
On climb out, we requested RADAR guided emergency low visibility approach (ELVA). This approach brings the aircraft down to 50 feet and 100 yards astern of the ship. The ELVA approach is similar to a precision approach RADAR (PAR) but less accurate due to the less precise shipboard equipment used by the Anti-Submarine Warfare Tactical Air Controller (ASTAC) to control the aircraft. Part of the predeployment ship-air training is to complete multiple practice ELVA approaches to ensure the crew and the ship are familiar with the procedure. Regularly trained to, but rarely used operationally, the request for an ELVA alerted the watchstanders onboard the ship to the severity of the situation. The ASTAC was primed and ready to execute the ELVA approach. The bridge was now reporting that they were fully engulfed in a surface layer fog with horizontal visibility of approximately 100 feet. A “pocket” of better visibility was observed by the ship’s bridge team and recommended the first ELVA be flown from the starboard rear quarter. We were unable to break out and executed yet another missed approach. Once again, we climbed out of the clouds to re-cage and set up for another approach, now knowing that the fog layer was down to the surface of the ocean.
We were growing more concerned about our ability to break out and recover with very limited options going forward. LCDR McGee requested a stern approach ELVA with the recommendation to have smoke markers standing by. Smokes are used for a follow-on emergency approach in which the aircraft comes down to 40 feet and 40 knots and flies behind the ship while smokes are deployed and communicated to the aircraft. This procedure is referred to as a “Smokelight Approach” which helps the aircrew to visually identify the ship’s wake and subsequently fly to the stern of the ship using the wake for guidance.
On the second ELVA attempt, AWR2 Donlevy used the onboard RADAR to aid in guiding the pilots to the back of the ship in combination with the ASTAC’s directions. Crew resource management (CRM) became crucial in this phase of the flight. As the pilot at controls, I was using an instrument scan making corrections based off of internal communications from AWR2 as well as the ship’s controller. LCDR McGee was using an outside/inside scan to back me up as well as coordinating with the ASTAC and Landing Safety Officer (LSO) onboard John Finn. During low visibility, the ship reduces speed for collision avoidance which prevented us from visually acquiring the wake. AWR2 Donlevy was operating the RADAR, providing position reports, recommending corrections, and announcing our distance and closure rate. On the second attempt we were still unable to break out the ship or the ship’s wake within 100 yards of the stern. We executed another missed approach and requested the ship to speed up in order to increase wake visibility.
While setting up for the third ELVA, our fourth approach, we directed the LSO to deploy the three smokes at 60 second intervals. Due to the ship’s slow speed we wanted separation between the smokes to aid in finding the wake. We were also discussing our fuel state and time of flight remaining. By now we were at approximately 1,000 total pounds of fuel, only 400 pounds above our aircraft limit of a landing with a minimum planned fuel of 600 pounds. 400 pounds of fuel provides approximately 20-25 minutes of flight time enough for one more approach. After coming on course 2 nautical miles behind the ship we began our descent back into the clouds for another ELVA, this time with a planned Smokelight Approach. We slowly descended to 40 feet and 40 knots and were at the lower edge of the current layer with visibility severely diminished. Inside the aircraft we were tense but focused, internal communications were calm but direct. The onboard detachment pilots, aircrew, and maintainers were spread throughout the various watch stations and LSO shack to oversee and coordinate the recovery.
During the approach at approximately 0.5 nautical miles from the ship we visually acquired the 1st smoke and I could barely make out the ship’s wake by looking over my left shoulder out of the door window and down at the water. There was no color to the wake as one would hope for, only slightly distorted water allowing for a loose bread crumb trail for us to see. Following the wake inbound and slowing airspeed even further for fear of losing visual contact or coming into the stern too fast causing another waveoff, we picked up on the 2nd and 3rd smoke markers. We finally broke the ship out at less than 100 yards and landed with twenty minutes of flight time left in fuel before reaching our minimum fuel state.
Although we train regularly for ELVA and Smokelight approaches, this procedure is a rare occurrence and has since created an interest in our community. Unique to naval aircraft and our operating environment is the predicament of bad weather and only one safe landing site. This shiboard recovery highlights the necessity to continue to train and practice emergency procedures as well as maintain strong crew resource management to keep us safe and allow us to make it back home when weather is marginalized.
