OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN: Why oUR sTRATEGY? Britain’s own security is at risk if we again allow Afghanistan to become a safe haven for terrorists.
The aim of the international community is to prevent Afghanistan being a terrorist sanctuary again. With our international partners the UK intends to achieve this by supporting the development of a stable country able to take its place within the international community. After the decades of conflict the country has suffered, this is a huge task. UK /International strategy Success in the mission requires three parallel strands: Afghan Security Forces capable of keeping the Taliban from regaining control; credible governance at national and local level to give the Afghan people confidence in their democratically elected government; and, economic development that gives Afghans a stake in their own future. Troop uplifts announced at the beginning of December 2009 by the US President, UK Prime Minister and over 30 contributing nations providing additional resources sought by General McChrystal in his Strategic Assessment demonstrate the collective international resolve to succeed in this campaign. There is a clear, realistic, and achievable strategy to bring about success in this mission, and a properly resourced campaign plan to deliver it. Enabling transition At the heart of the strategy is a process of transi-
tion from the international community and ISAF to the Government of Afghanistan, with the continuing engagement and support of the international community. That transition has three phases: • Gaining the initiative. To capitalise upon ISAF troop increases to seize the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum. • Consolidation. Working with the Afghan National Security Forces, to hold the gains won in the near-term, ensuring that the Taliban cannot return. • Sustained security. In the longer term, to enable the phased handover to the Afghans of security responsibility by supporting the growth and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces through closer integration and partnering; and by facilitating improvements in governance and socioeconomic development, in order to provide a sustainable, secure environment. The pace of the transition will be determined by conditions on the ground. Central to transition is building and strengthening the Afghan Army, the Afghan Police and the Afghan justice system. ISAF is addressing the threat of violent extremism and, increasingly, training and mentoring the Afghan Army and Police so that they can do this themselves. To enable transition, ISAF is working in support of the Afghan Government to implement a counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy which
incorporates the lessons of past conflicts. Its key features are: • protecting the population • providing sufficient security for Afghan governance to take hold, particularly in the provinces. That includes arrangements for delivering basic services and administering justice • building and training indigenous forces • reintegrating into society insurgents who are prepared to renounce violence. All these features aim to give the Afghan people confidence that the Taliban will not return to power and that they can plan on a better future. The role of ISAF will change as the transition proceeds; as we move from one phase to another, the balance of activity between ISAF and the Afghan security forces will alter: • Afghan forces will take on responsibility for the security of more and more of the country, on a district-bydistrict basis. They already have the lead for security in Kabul. In Helmand, we hope that the process of handing over security responsibility for the first districts to Afghan forces will begin in 2011 • ISAF will increasingly operate in support of Afghan forces, with ISAF units partnering Afghan ones • As this proceeds, we will see a gradual shift in emphasis within ISAF from combat roles to support roles (such as surveillance, logistics) – for the growing and
Security and Strategy
increasingly capable Afghan forces. The timing and sequence of transition will depend on conditions and progress. This is a process of transition, not a rigid timetable. But it is important to establish momentum and for the Afghans to take the lead for their own security. It is entirely conceivable that the conditions will be right by the second half of 2011 to allow Afghan forces increasingly to take responsibility for security across Afghanistan and for ISAF forces to begin to draw down in some areas. If progress continues at that rate, we would expect Afghan forces to take responsibility for the security of most, if not all, of Afghanistan by around 2014. We do everything we can to support our Armed Forces as they risk their lives for our country. We have increased the number of helicopters and crews so they can fly for longer and the first Merlin helicopters are operational, a month ahead of schedule. We have spent over £1bn on over 1,000 protected vehicles and the end of the year will see a doubling in the total number of Mastiff mineprotected vehicles since August. Ridgback armoured vehicle numbers will have increased by 75 per cent. Page 2
