United States Political Parties and Israel

This movement speaks to how much a change of government can affect American Jews views’ of Israel. This is particularly notable as the elections in Israel continue to come closer and closer to together.

While majorities see both U.S. Parties as pro-Israel, they see the parties going in opposite directions

Both parties are seen by large two-thirds majorities as pro-Israel: by 71% of Republicans and by a slightly higher percentage of Democrats (69%).

Fully half (50%) of American Jews see Republicans as pro-Israel and generally supportive of Israeli policies, compared to only 13% who see Democrats that way.

While Republicans are more pro-Israel than Democrats, they are also seen as more pro-Israel than American Jewry sees itself. As noted earlier, a 65% majority of American Jews identify themselves as “pro-Israel but critical of at least some Israeli policies;” three times over the 21% of American Jews who see the Republican party that way.

American Jews see Democrats as less pro-Israel than Republicans. They see 13% of Democrats as pro-Israel and supportive of most Israeli policies, but only 19% of them see themselves that way. Still, there is a big difference in how American Jews see the trends in each party. With so many seeing the GOP as supportive and uncritical of Israeli policies, it is not surprising that 39% feel the party is becoming more pro-Israel. This is fairly consistent across demographics. Even among Democratic Jews see the GOP as becoming more pro-Israel.

Do you think the Democratic/Republican party is become more proIsrael, less pro-Israel, or not really changing its views on Israel?

But it is in the Democratic party that people see the most significant change on Israel. A 54% majority of see the Democratic party as becoming less pro-Israel, including 26% who feel it is becoming “much less” pro-Israel. Again, some of this may follow from almost all Republicans (87%) feeling that the Democrats are becoming less pro-Israel. But even among Democratic Jews, a 44% plurality feel that the party is becoming less pro-Israel.

A third of see the relationship between U.S. and Israeli Jews as weaker, although fewer think their connection has weakened

A 62% majority felt that their connection to Israel is about the same as it was two years before. One-third felt certain changes are evenly split between feeling their connection has become stronger (15%) or weaker (18%). Across age, denomination, and engagement, most feel their connection to Israel is about the same. This is at majority levels across demographics, going slightly lower for younger Jews, 46% of whom say it is the same.

Younger Jews are slightly more negative about their attitude toward Israel, with 29% saying it has gotten weaker over the past two years, compared to 18% saying their connection is

stronger. Among unengaged and non-denominational Jews, 19% and 17% say their connection has become weaker, with less than 10% saying it has become stronger.

For Orthodox, Conservative, and engaged Jews, the net change is more towards a stronger connection. For instance, among those engaged, 28% say their connection with Israel has become stronger, compared to 15% weaker; among the Orthodox Jews, it is 24% stronger and 18% weaker.

How does the personal connection you feel to Israel compare to what you felt two years ago?

But while most American Jews feel their connection to Israel is unchanged, they are a little more negative about the overall connection between all Jews in the U.S. and Israel. A third (34%) of American Jews feel the relationship between Jews in the U.S. and Israel has gotten weaker. This is almost as many as those who feel the overall relationship is about the same (39%).

How do you think the relationship between Jews in the U.S. and Israel compares to what it was two years ago?

This more pessimistic view of the overall connection is fairly consistent across demographics – although somewhat more pessimistic among the more engaged and the more observant. Among those engaged in community organizations, 40% feel the overall relationship has weakened, and 31% among the unengaged Jews. Fifty-two percent of the Orthodox Jews and 32% of the Reform and non-denominational Jews feel the overall relationship is weaker.

Reasons for feeling less connected to Israel center around the religious right and the treatment of the Palestinians, but concerns about the TrumpNetanyahu alliance still linger

In 2019, the biggest concerns about the connection with Israel were driven by politics and politician’s personalities as driving policy. A 60% majority said that “Netanyahu’s support for President Trump and his policies” was a very important reason for feeling less connected to Israel; and 39% said it was one of the most important reasons for being less connected. The only other item where a majority said it was very important was “the increasing power of right-wing or ultra-religious parties.”

“Settlement policies” (47% very important) and “treatment of the Palestinians” (45% very important) were also big factors. But clearly, the mutual support between Trump and Netanyahu struck a nerve and at least symbolized, if not embodied, deep concerns that present a risk for community institutions.

In 2021, with both Trump and Netanyahu having lost their re-election bids, the most important reasons for feeling less connected are the “right-wing or ultra-religious parties” (53% very important) followed by “settlement policies” (49%) and “treatment of the Palestinians” (46%). respectively).

Of those who said their connection to Israel had weakened over the past two years, over three quarters (78%) said that “the increasing power of the right wing or ultra-religious parties” was a very important reason.” Next were the settlement policies and treatment of the Palestinians which were cited as very important reasons for their weakening connection by over two-thirds (both at 69%).

But Trump and Netanyahu are still concerns for many. Nearly half (48%) said “the mutual support between Netanyahu and Trump when they were in office” was a very important reason for them feeling less connected to Israel. Among those whose connection had weakened, 67% said the Trump-Netanyahu was a “very important reason.”

Some of this is a reflection of the partisanship of American Jews: two-thirds (67%) of U.S. Jews identify as Democrats, compared to only 21% who identify as Republicans. Only among the Orthodox Jews there are more Republicans (57%) than Democrats (32%), but it is rather the exception than the rule. There are large Democratic majorities across age and engagement.

It should be emphasized that, in general, politics can be problematic for community institutions. In response to an open-ended question about what institutions could do to get people like you more engaged, the largest single group of responses (40%) centered on politics. Some said the institutions should stop moving so far right. Others said the organizations should stop moving left. Yet others said the organizations had become just too political. For organizations that want to be seen as institutions representing the community in a broad sense, politics carries more risks than benefits.

Conclusions and Next Steps

American Jewish communal organizations regard themselves as key players in building and sustaining a sense of identity and community, and take pride in being a central facet of the American Jewish community. They have spent decades grappling with increased threats to their sustainability and survivability. The increased vulnerability of Jewish identity in the United States, rising levels of assimilation of the younger generation, and questions of the relevance of Jewish communal organizations to contemporary Jewish life have all affected the strategies, programs, and activities of these organizations for years. The involvement in communal organizations may have the positive effect of increasing and deepening the sense of identification of those who participate, but it is not clear how well-positioned these institutions are to bring more people into the fold or even to strengthen the bond with those who are already engaged.

Although there has been considerable research on how Jews view their religious and cultural identity, not enough attention has been paid to how Jews relate to the institutions and organizations that seek to strengthen this identity and sustain a vibrant Jewish community across the U.S. The study findings presented throughout this report aimed to fill this gap, first, by providing an understanding of how American Jews perceive communal organizations and interact with them; second, by identifying the obstacles to increasing involvement; and last, by suggesting potential paths for strengthening the bond between Jewish community organizations and their members.

Several findings stood out and seem meaningful for charting a path forward for communal institutions and engaged Jews. First, it is evident that the issue of shared fate across all Jews, engaged or not, connected more or not at all. Our study provides some acknowledgment that a common bond exists despite everything. At the same time, although most Jews have some attachment to Israel, this connection is much weaker than what they feel toward fellow American Jews.

Second, our study suggests that, contrary to assumptions, Jews who belong to marginalized minority groups such as Jews with disabilities, Jews of color, and others were relatively less likely to see institutions as unwelcoming. In general, these potentially marginalized demographic groups are no more likely to feel excluded from communal institutions than the community as a whole. It is important to note, however, that the Jewish community places a premium on diversity, inclusion, and openness.

Third, the data clearly suggest that antisemitism is a major concern for U.S. Jews across the board. It is a higher concern for the more observant, older Jews, those with a higher identity index, and those who have personal experience of antisemitism. American Jews of all backgrounds share a concern over the rise in antisemitism in the U.S. Nevertheless, few are motivated by this concern to get more involved in community organizations.

Fourth, many Jews are disengaged by choice, and our findings show that even substantial intuitional changes may not be sufficient to stimulate their involvement.

Finally, when it comes to engagement, the time and resources Jews are willing to commit are decreasing. As our findings suggest, even the engaged Jews are most likely to be involved in activities that require less commitment or time, hinting at a change in patterns and types of engagement.

These findings and other details in this comprehensive report show that the main challenge for Jewish community institutions is not so much a negative perception, as just a lack of a strong positive identity. This finding indicates that there is room for improvement and a strong need for it.

In addition, our study shows that Jewish identity does not necessarily require involvement in Jewish communal institutions, potentially undermining the fundraising and programming approaches adopted by many of these institutions for the past decades, and possibly requiring the adaptation to new perceptions of Jewish identity and its measurement.

The implications of our findings are significant for those who are engaged with communal institutions but feel less connected and even marginalized. In particular, smaller donors, Reform Jews, young Jews, and Jews of color who are engaged with communal institutions could be better positioned and included in the leadership and decision-making processes of these institutions. For Jews already engaged in Jewish organizations, diversity is key for sustaining their engagement and enhancing their future participation and financial commitment. Failure to welcome diversity may affect not only these groups but also the engagement of medium-size and large donors.

A place to start the change would be a new (or renewed) commitment to diversity and inclusion. This can be achieved by reaching out to underrepresented, minority communities such as LGBTQ Jews, Jews of color, and Jews with disabilities. But this commitment can also include efforts to reach out to younger Jews, smaller donors, and others who have felt disenfranchised.

Jewish institutions must also be mindful of the risks associated with politics and policy. This is not a new issue, but the survey results show that divisive political issues had a particularly harmful effect in the last five years. There is no easy way to fix this, and it may be impossible to avoid politics altogether.