Comparative Study of ASEAN Tariff Profiles by Ronald Yacat

Philippine Institute for Development Studies

Comparative Study of ASEAN Tariff Profiles Chulia J. Azarcon DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 97-20

The PIDS Discussion Paper Series constitutes studies that are preliminary and subject to further revisions. They are being circulated in a limited number of copies only for purposes of soliciting comments and suggestions for further refinements. The studies under the Series are unedited and unreviewed. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute. Not for quotation without permission from the author(s) and the Institute.

September 1997 For comments, suggestions or further inquiries please contact: The Research Information Staff, Philippine Institute for Development Studies 3rd Floor, NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, Philippines Tel Nos: 8924059 and 8935705; Fax No: 8939589; E-mail: publications@pidsnet.pids.gov.ph Or visit our website at http://www.pids.gov.ph

PTTAF-PSC, TARIFF COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES PROJECT NO. 95-04

TARIFF FRAMEWORK FOR MORE EFFICIF_NT, GLOBALLY COMPETITIVE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ASEAN TARIFF PROFILES

Chulia J. Azarcon Principal investigator CJA Consultants, Inc.

FINAL REPORT 22 September 1997

COMPARATIVEASEANTARIFFPOLICIES Table of Contents page Executive Summary I, II. 17I IV. V.

Introduction ......................................................................................................... Objectives ............................................................................................................ Reeent Changes hi TariffPolicy among ASEAN Comxtdes .................................. Methodology, Data Sources and Issues ................................................................ Asean Tariff Profiles .......................................................................................... A. Most Favored Nation (MFN) Basis .............................................................. B. Sectoral Analysis .......................................................................................... C. Progression ofTariffRateswithln Sectors .................................................... VI. Intra-ASEAN Ta_i.ffs......................................................................................... VII. Summary and Conclusion ..... ,............................................................................. VIII. PolicyImplicatiox_s for the Philippines ................................................................

1 2 3 6 12 12 17 19 23 29 30

Tables

......

TABLE 1

Summary of Uruguay Round Commitments for industrial Products-Asean Member Counu'ies ....................... 4

TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE ., TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE

2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12

Evolution of ASEAN Tariffs (1978-1996) ................ i................. 6 Use of Specific, Compound or Alternative Rates ...................... 11 Average TariffRates in ASEAN: Most Favored Nation Basis. 14 Distribution of Tari.ffLines by Rate Level .............................. .. 15 Comltry Comparisons-DegTee of Dispersion Average & Modal TadffRate by Count1T ...:,............................... ] 6 Sectoral Profile of ASEAN Tariffs (MFN) ............................... 17 Tariff Structure of Selected industries: Textile and Garments... 19 Tariff Structure of Selected Industries: Leather and Footwear.. 20 TariffStrueture of Selected Industries: Food lhocessh:g ......... 21 Tariff Structure of Selected Industries: Transpo:_t Equipment .. 22 Average MFN Tariffs of ASEAN CountriesSimple and Trade Weig,hted Averages ...................................... 23 Average Rates by HS Section/Sector: CEPT ........................... 25 Comparison ofbiFN and CEPT TariffRates ............................ 27 Average ASEAN Tariffs under a Consolidated Tariff Schedule ........................................................................ 28

TABLE 13 TABLE 14 TABLE 15

Figures FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3

Average TariffRates in ASEAN .............................................. Average MFN Tariffs by Sector ............................................... Average Intra-ASEAN Tariffs by Sector ..................................

14 18a 18b

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COMPARATIVE ASEAN TARIFF POLICIES

_llIl

exes

ANNEX A ANNEX B ANNEX C ANNEX D ANNEX E ANNEX F

Updates on Trade Policies of ASEAN Countries ...................... List of Source Documents........................................................ MYN Average Rates by Individual HS Chart (without Viet Nam).................................................................. CEPT Average Rates by Individual HS Chart ........................... Compeaisonof Merged MFN and CEPT Tariff ........................ Bibliography............................................................................

.....

_jAc_,

32 37 38 40 41 42

_o.

COMPARATIVE

TARI FF POLICIES

OF ASEAN MEMBER

COUNTRIES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Dramatic changes have taken place in ASEAN tariff policy over the last decade. Notable advances were made in reducing the general or most favored nation (MFN) tariffs through

commitments

(GATT)/World si_fificant

Trade

made under the General Agreement Organization

gains, however,

(WTO) multilateral

trade

were achieved tlu-ough unilateral

oll Taliffs

and Trade

negotiations. actions

of individual

economies in the region, moving towards more liberalized and outward looking trade re_mes.

This study forms part of a broader analysis of the impact of the Tariff Reforms of 1995 on Philippine industries, specifically the adoption of the tmifonn 5% tariffby the year 2000.

The analysis of ASEAN tariff profiles is envisioned to arm policymakers alld

industry leaders with a more hfformed basis for assessing the competitiveness of Plfilippine products in the ASEAN region and vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

This study tracks the changes in the talSff structure of ASEAN countries since the 1980s, based on the latest available customs tariff schedules of seven ASEAN member countries. The tat_ffregimes in ASEAN were compared along four dimensions: (i) average tariff levels over time; (ii) degree of dispersion, as measmed by standard deviation; ('rio simplicity and transparency, as measured by the range oftalJffs, number of rate levels, prevalence of non ad valorem based rates and (iv) notable exceptions or use of peak rates. The study also looked into the preferential rates adopted by each countuÂ˘ under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Program in comparison to the MFN rate. Sectoral profiles of the CEPT rates were likewise cousnTacted.

The study

confmns

that

average

MFN tariffs

in ASEAN

have

declined

substantially in the last decade. "/Average MFN rates in ASEAN have declined by as much as 51% since 1986. The overall average MFN tafiffin ASEAN is below 10% (9.9%), but there continues to be a wide disparity in the tariff structures of ASEAN member countries.

Singapore's tariff system is virtually duty flee, with very few exceptions.

Bnmei's average tariff is lower than 5%, with fahly limited dispersion; rate is 0%.

At the other extreme is Thailand whose tariff rates are the highest for most sectors and the most widely dispersed, its average tariff (19.2%) is double that of the regional average. It is also the one that relies most heavily on non ad valorem based rates, levying specific or alternative duties on 1,970 of its talifflines.

The philippines and hldonesia have about the same level of average tariffs of close to , 12%, but still slightly higher than the overall ASEAN average. However, tariffs are more widely dispersed in the Philippines than in Indonesia.

Malaysia has relatively low average talfffs (7.6%), although this figure does not take into account the impact of specific or compound rates which are used widely for selected subsectors: The actual averag,_ could be higher if one were to estimate the '_:i " ,,,,!_ -_ " '__'_._I"_ " :I -'_ -,.," -ad valolem'equi,'a'lc'.',t_ of the 523 t,,r;_ ._oÂ˘_,,._ b_rt,,_ _,ec,_e o_" cempou_d rates instead ofad valorem rates.

The tariff structure of Vietnam, although amended in 1992 and again in 1993, still follows the pattern of highly escalated tariffs commonly used in the 1970s. Negligible tariffs are imposed on capital equipment and raw materials while high tariffs of from 50% to 100% are applied oll selected final goods. The average MFN tariffis estimated at 12.1%.

Sectoral averages were also constructed

its modal

and compared across countries.

The

study showed that high tariff rates were applied to conatmer goods such as Footwear, ' Textiles and CrarmelatS.Fnmimre and Processed Food.

Sector by sector comparisons

revealed that rates are generally higher in Thailand, followed by Philippines and Indonesia.

Tariff'regimes adopted by each o_'_' clusters were also compared:

A:,_..:-_;._.,_a_triesfor the following industry

Food Processing; Textiles and Gal_ents;

Leather and

Footwear; Motor Vehicles and Transport Equipment. The subsectors bearing the highest CEPT rates were Textiles & Garments, Plastics & Rubber, and Leather and Leather Products.

The diversity in tariff structure and underlying policy poses a problem in the formation of the ASEAN Free Trade A:

(AF'I A).

I ne use of margins of preference

(MOP)under the ASEAN Preferential Trading An'angements (PTA) was a fhst attempt to bring ASEAN tariffs closer to a common base. The adoption of the CEPT could be the answer to the full realization of AFTA_ ,,_'l_e-iltoees_,is far from over, however, as a number of problems remain. The impact of the exclusion lists and the continued existence ofnon-tariffbaniers

such as import licensing, export quotas, and quantitative restrictions

may,also have a negative effect on future trade liberalization efforts.The steady movement towardtrade

liberalization in most cou: Mes h_ the region augurs well for the steady

progress of ASEAN economic coooperation.

Poticy implications for the Phillpt_es protectionist trend in some ASEAN countries.

are"examined in the light of the continued Closer coordination between Governmelat

and the private sector in reducing general tariffs and the drawing up of policy guidelines for CEPT concessions may go a long way in ensuring the sustainabi]ity of file country's trade reforms.

COMPARATIVE

TARIFF POLICIES OF ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES

COM:PARATIVE TARIFF POLICIES ASEAN MFM:BER COUNTRIES I.

Introduction

A number of significant events have led to dramatic changes in the ASEAN trading environment, notably the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations

and the establishment of the ASEAN

Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).

Sig-aiflcant advances have been made in reducing tal:iffs among ASEAN member states under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Program

Consensus is building

steadily within ASEAN towards the adoption of a fi'ee trade area, as envisioned under the AFTA Agreement ial 1992. Cozfi'onted with shnilar pressmes in file international trade arena, ASEAN member countries have taken unilateral actions to liberalize txade fm-ther, reacting in various degrees in revising theh respective trade regimes.

Beyond ASEAN, tlie last decade has been marked by an m_precedented number of international trade negotiations.

The protracted debates which ended in the sim_ing of the

...... GAT_TiWodd,Tra,de..O_;ga_i,zat-ion Agreement in 1_.994have, c,ontrihuted to the :_roliferation and/or expansion of regional trading arrangements all over the world. A number of oilier neighboring counuies have also simfified interest in johfing the ASEAN under this more liberalized trading envh'oament.

All these developments have expectedly resulted in dramatic changes in the tariff schedules of all the individual ASEAN member states.

Caught in this environment,

Philippine pohcymakers have taken a hard look at the prevailing trade policy reghne and embarked on a detemlined path of trade liberalization, in relation to its pal_uers in ASEAN, with other member countries of APEC and with the rest of the world.

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COMPA.RATIVE

TARIFF POLICIES

]El.

OF ASEAN MEMBER

COUNTR_S

Objectives

The goal of tl_s project is to comribute to a better understanding of the outcome of trade and taliff negotiations among ASEAN countries, given the realities of conflicting pressures on the home front. It is undertaken in response to the pressing need for a basic understanding of the tariff policies underlying the conduct of trade negotiations under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.

This study fol_s part of a broader analysis of the impact of the Tariff Reforms of 1995 on Philippine industries, specifically the adoption of the unifoma 5% taaSffby the year 2000.

The analysis of ASEAN tariff profiles is envisioned to arm policymakers and

industIT leaders with a more infol_medbasis for assessing the competitiveness of Philippine products iu the ASEAN region and vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

The study also offers a baseline which could be used for an objective and systematic assessment of the progress made thus far in giving" sxl!?_ance to the goal Of closer economic cooperation under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Program (CEPT) in ASEAN. meaningfully towards

Armed with this hfformation, eventual harmoniTation

pohcymakers

of ASEAN

can work more

trade policies witkin the

framework of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

A brief historical perspective of the development of tariff policy in the ASEAN countries will be provided in Section l_II,deseribhlg the impact of tariff reforms resulting from the ratification of the GATT WTO Agreement

in 1994 and any other umlateral

measures taken in recent years. The methodology and data sources used in this study are discussed in Section IV. In Section V, current _ariff profiles in ASEAN countries are

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COMPARATIVE â&#x20AC;˘

=...

TARIFF POLICIES _

_..,,

OF ASEAN MEMBER

,_ .....

COU'NTR_rES

.,,

examined, both on a regionwide basis and on an individual country basis.

Sectoral

averages will also be compared across countries.

A parallel exercise will be undertaken in Section VI to compare average tariffs oll intra-ASEAN

imports,

The study _

discuss briefly the general coverage

of the

concessions grained by each of the cotmtries trader the CEPT and will compare the resulting average tariffs in 1996 and 2000. Tariff

profiles with MFN rates and CEPT

co_cessional rates will be compared, noting that where no concessional CEPT rates are provided, MFN rates will apply to imports from ASEAN comltries.

Finally, conclusions and policy recommendations _

be drawn in Section VII. A

brief discussion on non-tariff forms of industrial protection wlfich continue to plague the ASEAN region will also be provided to help provide a better understanding obstacles that still stand in the way of efforts at regional economic

Eli.

Recent

Changes

in Tariff

Policy

among

of the

cooperation.

ASEAN

Countries

Recent shifts iu tafiffpoficy in ASEAN have arisen from developments on ffn'ee fronts: the mukilateral trade negotiations which resulted in the GATT/WTO Agreement, the unilateral tafiffreforms undertaken by most ASEAN countries and the accelerated pace in intra-ASEAN trade liberalization under the CEPT. The resuk of all these refolms, barfing arty major policy reversal, is the narrowing of the gap between the MEN tariffs and CEPT rates at the eaadof the program, With the dismantling of trade ban-iers among them, will AFTA lose its relevance? The analysis that follows may help to shed some fight on this question.

Multilateral

trade negotiations.

The intense and protracted debates under the

GATT Uruguay Round of Negotiations helped to tbrge the ties that brought the ASEAN

COMPARATIVE

TARIFF POLICIES

OF ASEAN MEMBER

COUNTRIES

countries closer to o11eanofller. While trade negotiations were conducted on an indh,idual country basis, the ASEAN member countries were perceived to form a single negotiating bloc whose position was considered worthy of debate. The experience of participating in the WTO negotiations served the ASEAN cotmtfies in good stead as they were forced to review their individual u'ade policies in the context of overall benefits of a more open trading system for the region..

The individual ASEAN cotmtfies' response to the Ul_aguay Round can be best described as cautious and conservative. The net results on their tariff averages before and after the Uruguay Round are shown in Table 1. Note that while tadffbindings generally increased, a good number of rates were bound at rates higher than those• actually applied.

Table t. SUMMARY OF URUGUAY ROUND COMMITMENTS FOR FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES

[.iad6_6Si_a. ";.iii(

12,603

20.4

_ia

11,270

•

:..:".!_!:_i .:

:.i

!i Source:

1.0.2

9.1

10.8

9,189

23.9

22.2

32,8601

19,.4

,.,

--- ' "Zt_iii_[S!l_es _,,..i:.:i _re

36.9

4, 55

7.3

7_1

5.1

58.9

2s.0

24.

Tariff data was supplied by the'GA'F_ Secr_ariat flae World Bank, 1995.

aM d_elnier_a_tioaal Trade Policy Division of

Notes: 1/ - Impo_ls for most economies are for 1990 or the latest available data (1998 or 1989) 2/ - The base year tbr the data on tariff is 1986; based ot_ boua_d tariffs N.A,- Not available

•4

....

cj,

COMPARATIVE TARI._F POLICIES OF ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES

Regional liberalization.

Disappointed w_Lhth_ p_ogress of"the GATT-Ulxtguay

Round negotiations and the eventual outcome for developing countries, smaller trading blocs sought to find ways to improve their trade opportunities and began to discuss ways of increasing trade oll a preferential basis among themselves.

One such group was the

ASEAN Free Trade Aaea (AFTA), formally launched in 1992 before file conclusion of the Uruguay Romld. ASEAN announced the elimination of tariff and trade restrictions within seven to fifteen years ou a preferential basis among ASEAN member countries.

Itlitially,

this move was regarded with skepticism by some sectors who looked on the modest improvement fiom the general tariff as mfiil_elyto make a mealthlgftfl impact on intraASEAN trade.

These percept.ious began to change, however, with the agneement of the ASEAN Economic Ministers i111995 to: (l) acceleratethe timeframe ofAFTA fiom 15 years to 10 years; (2) dlaw up a schedule for the gradual reduction of the products excluded from the CEPT scheme; and (3) the inclusiott oftmprocessed

agricultural products (UAP) i11to

the CEPT scheme. A more detailed discussion on the effects of the .new CEPT package wil_be made in Section VI.

Unilateral

Trade Reforms.

Most of the ASEAN comltries have undertaken

major unilateral trade liberalization programs, some of which occurred only in the last two years. Annex countries.

A provides an update of recent trade policy refonus

It is noteworthy

in the ASEAN

fllat, while a number of high tariffs remain in selected

_aibsectors, the reductions iu tariffs are greater than those connait_ed under the Uruguay Round. The development ofASEA2q tariffs is showaabelow.

CJAConsultants,hie.

COMPARATIVE TARIFFPOLICIESOFASEANMEMBERCOUNTRIES

Table 2. EVOLUTION OF ASEAN TARIFFS 1978-1996

Branei -I.ndonesia

33'

. 33

4 12

Singapore Thailand

5 29

6 32

0.04 20

24.8

12 9.85

M_aysia

Vie_an ASEAN

IV. Analytical

] I

- ..,_ 25.3

Methodology,

Framework.

Data Sources

This compazative study of ASEAN tariff policies is

based on a framework of aligned tariff schedules. concordance

and Issues

The study established some degree of

among fl_e h_dividual tarff schedules of the countries which have been

participating actively in the ASEAN Preferential Tariff An'angements

and the Common

Effective Preferential Tariff Program (CEPT), namely,.Brmxei Darussalam,

Indonesia,

Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam which was officially accepted as a fifil member of ASEAN only in 1995.

Under the existing post-WTO tariff regime, Most Favored Nation (MFN) rates apply to imports from all non-ASEAN countries.

For impo_Xsamong ASEA_N member

countries, the applicable tariff rate would be the CEPT rate, for items covered by the program or, where no CEPT concessions are granted, MSFNrates.

.....

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COIVIPAP,.ATIVE TA_R_F POLICIES

OF ASEAN MEMBER

COUNTIIIES

this study, two sets of cross-country comparisons have been tmdertaken for: •

generally applied tariffrates or most favored nation (MP2q) rates; and

•

consolidated ASEAN preferential tariffs under the CEPT scheme and MFN rates

A brief analysis of the CEPT tariffs will be included in this study, but the more relevant comparison to determhae impact of tariff coneessions granted under the CEPT is between the MFN schedule and the consolidated CEPT and MFN rates.

While this study does not go into the inta-icacies of economic

and political

pressures surrounding economic policy formulation in the ASEAN countries, it identifies the sensitive and non-sensitive areas in each country compared to other cotmtries in the region through an examination of the levels and structure oftheh respective tariffregimes. Aside from comparing overall average tariffs, averages are compared for each of the major industry groups across all ASEAN member states. ,

The approach used in this study wJ_tbe similar to the ones adopted in two earlier

studies undertaken by the Tariff Commission (1979 and 1985). Three types of estimates will thus be calculated: •

Simple average of nominal tariffs

Weighted average tariffs, using individual countl-y impol_s as weights

•

Weighted average tariffs, using total ASEAN impol-ts as weights

Methods of Tariff Averaging.

Estimates of the over-all average levels of tariffs

were determined for each ASEAN country and for the ASEAN region as a whole. Based oa methods used by the Secretariat of the General Agreemealt on Tariffs and Trade

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COMPARATIVE TARIFF POLICIES OF ASEAINMEMBER COUNTRIES ..... :

(GATT) 1, inter-countly comparisons of tariff structures were obtained by three basic methods: •

Simple arithmetic averages

•

Averages obtahled using the pattern of actual imports of each comltry as weights; and

•

Averages based on statutory duty rates weighted by combined ASEAN imports of that commodity or group of commodities.

In makhlg a choice of the most acceptable method of averaging tariffs, this study is cognizant of the hlherent problems in presenting averages oftafifflevels.

Being a folxn of

price index, tariff averaghlg is subject to the index number problem with respect to weighting.

Unweighted

averages, or simple averages, of all tal_ff lines (whether in each

commodity group or in the whole tariff schedule) in effect really involves weighting according to an hlelevam, fortuitious

and internationally incomparable

criterion:

the

fineness .of nomenclature subdivisions (subheadings) in the particular, tariff document. _ Tile tariff for an important item of trade, such as crude petroleum, would have the same weight as a minor item, like tennis balls. Another problem with such tmweighted tariff averages is that they are often biased upwards by the presence of a few extremely kigll tariffs of little economic signific_ce.

On the other hand, own-trade-weighted

averages generally tend to be biased

downwards since prohibitive duties are, by defttfition, excluded from the average because of minimal or non-existent imports in these tarifflines.

Tumlir, Jan and Till, Ladislav, Tariff Averaging in Inter_lational Comparisons. 2 Bell, Harry H., Tariff Profiles in Latin America, Praeger Publishers (1971).

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COMPARATIVE

This paltieular

TARIFF POLICIES

OF ASEANMEMBER

COUNTRIES

bias can be remedied in a way by introducing

standard, external to the oounu'y under study.

a more neuu'al

L_ 3:_ ;_._,:, oile could use the pattena of

total ASEAN trade ia_the coj-modity group in question.

For this pmyose, a thh'd set of

tariff averages was estimated on the basis of tariff rates per commodity group, weighted by the combined imports of ASEAN in the same group of commodities.

In addition, several measures of dispersion will also be estimated in order to assess the potential for influencing trade protection policy, noting that a more dispersed tariff structure lends itself to a more protectionist Iegim_ by ,ai_uag effective protection rates.

Data Sources. schedules of ASEAN

The p_5mary data sources for the study were the respective tax-i:[Y member countries as offioiallj,al_blished

by govennnent

sources.

The analysis was performed on the tariff schedule for 1996, with the exception of Bnmei and Viet Nam where the most recently available data on MFN tariffs are for 1992 and 1994, respectively.

The list of reference documents is shown in Annex B.

CEPT rates

have been obtained fiom official releases of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.

The

complete lists of commodities excluded fiom the CEPT consisting of Se_sitive Products and those in the Tempora_j Exclusion Lists would have been useN1 for tkis study but tmfo_tunately these were not available at the thue ot_i]fi_,_-i6port.

Data Issues.

l'he task of preparing an aligned tariff schedule for the entire

ASEAN region was complicated by a number c.f :::,, blems, including (a) the lack of hannoltization of customs tariff schedules; and (b) the continued application of speckfic, compound and akemative duties by a number of comm-ies.

Harmonization of Tariff Schedules. All the ASEAN countries had agreed to adopt the lmiversal Harmonized Commodity Description

and Coding_ System of the World

Customs Organization up to the 6-digit level of commodity description.

However,

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COMPARATIVE TARIFF POLICIESOFASEAN_'E.MBERCOUNTRIES

because of different statistical needs or the desire to promote commodities, tile total number oftarifflines

or protect

specific

continue to vary from country to country. In

addition, there is no common format for creating new subdivisions within the tariff code.

The result has been a proliferation of sub-clasxi.fications of varying complexity. This has proven to be a roadblock in efforts to conduct inter-country comparisons of tariff levels. The AFTA Council in its 7th Meeting in September 1995 reco_l;zed this need and has included the harmonization of tariff nomeaclatures at the 8th digit of the Hannonized System Code to be completed by 1997. This is particularly important in the context of the CEPT where tariff concessions at the 6-digit level may be eroded by the exclusion ot_ or imposition of higher taISffrates on, items under finer subclassilications, e.g. at the 8- or 9digit HS levels. p

Inasmuch as this target still remains to be achieved, for the purposes of this study, all tarifflines were aggregated at the 6-digit level by-taking the average of the tariff rates applicable to all lines within this common base.

A sepaxate analysis wili be done for Viet Nam because ks tariff schedule is patterned after an earlier version of the Hal_monized S3._em_ Art attempt to estimate regional and sectoral averages will be made based on latest available information.

Specific and Compound TariffDuties.

Despite a standing agreement in ASEAN to

express all tariff rates on an ad valorem basis, a number of countries have continued to admini_er specific, compound or alternative rates of tariff duties.

The total number of

tarifflines with specific, compound or alternative tate_ ul duty are shown in Table 3.

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COMPARATIVE TARII_'FPOLICIES OF ASEAd_ MElVIBER COUNTRIES

The use of specific or compound tafiffrates obscure the tIxte level of the tariffrate, the exact equivalent of which will need to be estimated from disaggregated volumes and values of imports in foreign trade data. The ideal way to deal with these rates would have been to estimate the ad valorem equivalents for such rates based on unit prices obtained from foreign trade statistics. The ad valorem equivalent may be derived by multiplying the specific rate by the volume of imports for that particular taliff line and dividing the product by the value of hnports for the same product.

Because of data limitations,

however, this study simply noted the incidence of such rates in Table 3 below and excluded them from the analysis.

Table 3. USE OF SPECII_IC, :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

COMPOUND

OR ALTERNATIVE

_ii.'_`.._.__`_::.._._?_._:_ii_ii_i_iii_iii_iiii_iiiiiiiiiii_iiiiiiiiii_

iii:,il iii: :::, _,i _i i_iii::,:ii::::i:;_, ii:_!:,i i_,i :,iii: ii::ili:_ii: _, Brunei Darus_alam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Sing_j_r e Thailand Viet Nmn TOTAL

89 .......

153 ......... 8. I.......... ........157

407

RATES

i!iiiiii!!:i::iii -

239

.......

131

523 ........

3 1.813

11 1,970

1,947

2,593

Definitions: Specific rate Compound rate Alternative rate

- tariff duty based on given value per unit of imports - tariff duty consisting of a combination of m: ad valorem duty and a specific rate of duty - tariff duty based on an ad valorem duty or a specific duty, â&#x20AC;˘ whichever is higher

-i 1

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COMPARATIVE

TARIFF

POLICIES

OF A,'i_:,._,l__.EMBER

COU_T.KIES

Products with specific, compound or alternative rates are fbtmd in the foilowh_g _bsectors:

_'_:!:i:_,'. ::,).:_:._."._ _ _:_._:: :::'. _::?_," ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::_:: *:: :::::_?i:_:i:_:i:_!:!;_:i:i:!:i:_:i:i,%_ ?.i:i:?i:::_:_.i:_:._:_:_:_:!:_ _..:.:_::::_:.'. " '....._,_i:'i_i?:_._') '::_::._:.:_::¢s._._ _._._...... ._ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ...... : '--:: ....... ._.','_::::::::::::::::::_ ............ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :_......... '::::'::'_:::::_:: ....... _::::::': ..... ' ":::::_'_ ;L_"-,_'_" ..................... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ................_........"': ....

iiiii_ _::iiiii::iii_i_?:ili::i',ii?:i::i:i:i_iii_i_i!ii?:?:i_i!iii_i_i_!ii_/_! i_.P.:i_S:::it!!i iiii!i::ii/iiiiiiiiii':iiii ii:,iiiiiii::iii:,iiiii:_iiiiii ::i::i::i_i::i:: i!ii':!::_i::!iii!i!':i::!i!i/iiii}:i

:::_! ....:.. _:._.::i:.: .::::i:..:.::._..:i_i¢:a_d-i_._i_i_._;:au_t:¢::.::_::!:.:.:... :_.:2i:_:2....:-: :"...-:_::.-.!_..:,i....

i ::!._ :::_:'_::::, :_:,i _...i_'i:i_: :.:_.i::::_:.::.:. :i.:_ __:_:_i_i_,_i_:._::,_;_:_:_ii::,_:i_:. _.:._ i:_:.i_i:,!:,-:_ ::i::!:.?:,::!:_:_./-:.. "::::_::-_:_2_: =,

iiiN_N_?_iii!iii?iiiiiii_ii!_ii_i_iiNNN_i;_i_iiii_iiiiiiiiii!_iiiiiii!!i_i!iii_ ',iti ii!iiiii',iiiiiiiiii',i}ili!.

ii!iU::::i i:/:.::,C:I Y.I:_:::._Ni_';_ _!ii_i!i_iii_iii,:::: ::::::::::::::::::::: .:.! :::.::::. _../..._:..:, _ _,.V ._:::_:/::i:i ::_:::: ::_:•: :.,.:_:_e_ls:_:_:._.;;::!ii_/:.::i ::_::'_: ::_:i _.:,,,"::.:: ..:::" ' ": :. " " '

::!_.: : .:2 :..:::. :.: ,

:._.:i_,_:h.:_ai__e;:f_t_?:_a.,10_s_.:.::.:._.:. .:::-:.... -.:.._.._. '

:.;i,.i::::_..:._._i::_ii'_i... _:f_ .::.._._.i_!_e.d_.:_d_d_._._i_i_._?_i._.:_._U_..(_._.../:/_:-.-. ..:/:.::... " !i!i:_i_:. __:i./:i_.,:_: • _::_:::" ?".. :.::i_:._ioie_:_,._.d_:_:_":::_. :_, __/..:::" : :.".... • "

::::::,::_:.:,. :..::. . .:_:_:;_a_:s_e_t:_:,_:::..,-: •'::....:,_ ,.,. ,.,",:,' :....i.: .!i!:_:..: :. .._._.:._.:_:.:_: ' i_. .:i:. . ;::._i_:_:._an:a_::a_e_,:_:_.a_:: _:'i":::__i.::_:::.::._. /!,:::::::?:,, ._::.:...:.:-:.. . .... . •i::_ ....i. :;".;.. • ..__._i_:_i.!!_i_._.__.._?_._._.._.._._._.:.__./._....:.... .. :_:i_..:! .. :/:i::.i::::: ..:::.::: :_::_::. :.. .:_!_ne_::!a_.Si::a__::_U!6:_i::il;":'::_::::":_::_::_ :!_:. .:_:_= iii:_.2 : .':"....::..:. "

V. A.

ASEAN Tariff Profiles

Most Favored Natio_ (.IVIFN)Basis Compared at a common base of 6 digits, the overaU average MFN tariffrate for

ASEAN is 9.9%. Table 4 sttmmarizes the tmweighted simple average ta_Sffrate per country. Figure 1 shows the relative levels compared to the over-all ASEAN aveaage. Note the wide disparity h_the range of country _.'vera_c_,_om 0% (Sh_gapore) to 19.8% (Thailand). At one end of the Scale would be the open and liberal trade regimes of

cj^ c._,at_t., t_¢.

COMPARATIVE

TARIFF

POLICIES

OF AS_Ar_

i_:tEMBER

COUNTRIES

Singapore and Brunei and on the other end would be the high levels of tariffs in Thailand, indonesia, and the Philipph_es. Note further the higher standard deviations fi'om the average rate registered by Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. This situation suggests possible opportunities for manipulating the effective rates of protection (EPRs). Those countlies whose standard deviations are low have fairly mllformed tal_ffs across _ariffiiues and are expected to have

more neutral protection systems.

Table 4 indicates that Thailand has the highest average tariff and the most dispersed tmJaffstmcture. The Philippines and hldonesia have about the same level of average tariffs but Plfilippine taliffs are more widely dispersed. Malaysia, Brtmei and Singapore have low average tariffs and fairly limited dispersion.

With the exception of Singapore

and Bnmei, ASEAN

talfffs are generally,"

escalated, with tarift_ risiug according to the degree of processhlg.

Based on the

frequency distribution of ASEAN taliffs showa in Tal31e 5, a mtmber of significant observations can be made:

•

91.2% of total tariff rates in ASEAN are within the range of 0 to 30%.

•

Of the remaining taliffrates

(8.8% oftotai), one half cluster around the 31 to

40% range; 1.1% ofaU tariff'lines are between 90 to 100%. •

Tluee cotmtfies -- Bmnei, Malaysia, and Singapore--are large number oftafiffllnes

characterized by a

with zero duties, representing more than 50% of the

total number of ta_ifflines in their respective tariff schedules.

CJA Colttsldf._tlts_ hlc.

COMPARATIVE

Table

TARIFF POLICIES

AVERAGE Most

BRUNEI

Favored

6,183

4,730

7,248

5_i17

" I_LAYSIA

7,874 .....

4,995' '

PI-I]LIPPINES

5.741 5,777

INDONESfA_

uS]2qGAPORE

....

_NAM THAILAND

' 2'1921 5,268

OF AS_A_

MEMBER

RATES

Nation

(MFN)

COUNTRIES

IN ASEAN Basis

0.06

0_04

309

7.6

' 6.'12-

5,113

12.7

0.10

127

5,062'

0.0

0.00 ..........

5,015'

4.4 -'_

12.4

[ 12..t i ,r........... 19.8

Ii ,.=_ '0.25

.... _ _

170

. ,. :

Figure 1. AVERAGE TARIFF RATES IN ASEAN 20.0.

i_:.. ii_i/iiiiii/::ii_::i_diiiiii_:ii ............. •............................. _................................. _.....

/ ".;.c/.,-. 16.0. iii i _i11ii_i_i;!ii__?.._ ii i?.'_ii!iill ili;!i;i_;_?_i_i_!_ _ii_ii!

:.'::::'..!: '.'..:_::::::'.'.::::::::: :::::'::::

Ii!i_:

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

ii/_il

s.o-

_.o-

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

::_i_iii;i ::ii_i::ii!i!_i::ii?:!i!ii!i::ii!i!ii!ii!::i!il;i;!i::!ii/ii

2.00.0-

_:!_i_!_ _ i ............... INDONESIA MALAYSIA PHILIPPINESSINGAPORE THAILAND VIETNAM ..'.'!ii

BRUNEI

COMPARATIVE

TARIFF POLICIES

OF ASf.AN MEMBER

COUNTRIES

Indonesia, Malaysia and "lllailand continue to apply tariff rates of 100% and above on a significant number oftarifflines.

In contrast, in Singapore, 99.9% oftariffrates

are nil.

_!i_i_!![,',' i!_!_!_[ _ii_! _i_i_i/'.:"'" [:i:i:?.i:i:i:_:F _:?_?_:_:i:i:_:i:i:_:_i:i:i _:_:_:i:_:[:_:!: _:: :,):_:._.) ":"":: ::_ ::_ ':" :.',_::i::3.._'_:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::?:._:_i.[:!:?:.::_:i:_:[:[:_:1:[:!:[:?i:

i:;::::;ii:i_: VietN::_:_iiiii_i::i_!i::i!::ii:_ii:_:_i_)i_)ii:ii&!i;:_:iii::i:::;:_Z: ::: 7C:_I: ::::_iii_;;;_:i_:_i::ii:::_i;:::;i:!:::::?ii:::::i: i!:::ii:_: :_ :

Iiad61a_i::_:_ii_i::_:i!i!ilili:ii:i!::i_i_::i::i_i::i"::_i=:::::::.: :<' " : [._;_7 i.i.-.:ii:::[_:.::[: :[i[ii:(:i:[![!):.[_-::. "

The sectors with rates of 100% or more are the following:

motor velticles,

motorcycles, alcoholic beverages, and perfumery in Indonesia; and textile and gaaanents, footwear, umbrellas, and motor Vehicles in Thailand.

Table 5. DISTRIBITrION

4,259

1,400

4,144

_=6

5,770

228

0.01- 10%

958

2,670"

1,090

3,608

i0[0i-

939

1,640;

1,142

1,128

1,455"

1,342

838

67 .r "[,,: 34

26%

20.01 - 30% ....... '.

OF TARI_'F LINES _-Y RATE LEVEL

30.01

40% .,71

40.0i-

50%

.11() .,< '"1

50.01 - 60% 60.01 - 70% 70.01 - g0%

_ -;;..-

151

1 10

.,,

80.01 - 90%

?ii:":";i:: :ri.::r£o[_l:_iii_;_iii:. :. ' 6_i83 ::' ": :"'::• " ':"'::i:"Z:::ii_.:i " ..:

58 7;248

22.5%:

64.0%

13.5%

' 77_5'%

286

'5,136

1,562

5,226

.13_7%

1,336

1,448

.:3.8%

130

234

0_6%

95.6%

_26 8

744 26

2.0% 0.1%

97.6% 9%6%

324

383

1.0%

98.7%

0.0%

98.7%

. _"23..... ....

4i.5%

8.574 =

90.01 - 100% Over 100%

41.5%

247

"" 59

i5,807

91_2% c)A.0%

410

412

1.1%

99.7%

0.3%

100.0%

' ':?/i874'::::i_;_):::i:;)i5i74["/ii_: :5;7)7_ i:::5;268 ........... :_ ::.7: .:::...':_:i:_:_:7:_ :-::a,.:_.:.:.'::.:.__: 8,.0:93: ,....... _:::_-.::100,0..g,. _::.:..... :....: .::.:: -....?_:... _ ... " -::.:-::.:.:i,.. i::i_-?i:i::,_:, @,.:-:: :: :::.. .":.. ': " :[ • . • ... ....-. ...... :. .. . . .. •

The range of tariff rates (lowest and highest rate), the total number of tariff levels and the modal rate for each country are contained iu T_ble 6. Tiffs imfm_mation.reflects the complexity and the general framework of the individual country

tariff schedules.

CJAComttltaJtt-%Inc.

..-

COMPARATIVE TARIFF POLICIES OF ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES

Table 6. COUNTRY COMPARISONS: DEGREE OF DISPERSION, AVERAGE & MODAL TAR[EF RATE BY COU-NTRY3 _::::::::::::::._::::i::::::::_@;',',i:,'?,':_: f:::::::'-::::::!'.:::::.:::;:-::::::::::::::::;::::::::::::_, :::::........................................

Brunei Darussalam Indonesia

_,v,_.,..,, ... :..........

6 19

'Malaysia 3 Pl_!lippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam

23 _ 16 .... 6 29 22

...

:,, .. _,. '_ ,Jr,,

0 - 30 0 - 200

4.41 12.35

O- 100 ,,_"-0.-1Q_ ............. 0- 60 0 - 100 0 - 200

7.58 12.72 0.04 19.82 12.01

0 5 ........

0'=' 3 0 5 0 /

All these observations hi_hligl_t the wide disparity in tariff structures applied by ASEAN countries.

A wide gap exists between the vh-tually free trade reghnes in

Singapore and Bruuei madthe high levels oftariffrates

in Indonesia and Thailand.

On the other hand, tim low figures for taailand

and Malaysia do not discomat the

possibility of the existence ofkigher rates in the tariff schedule. The number of tariff lines bearing specific or compound rates is esthnated at 1,970 tariff lines in Thailand and 523 tarifflines in Malaysia.

In the case of the Philippines, wkile 97% of its tafiffrates

are in the range of 0 to

30%, 161tariff lines or the remaining 3% of total tariff lines are in the range of 35% to 100%. It will be recalled that most of these rates are the result of the "tariffication" procedm-es associated with the lifting of quantitative agreements made at the GATT/WTO Agreement.

restrictions

in the context of

They are of limited duration however

and are programmed to be reduced within a specified period ofthne.

Excluding specific and compound rates

(_IA

Cons|dLa_lla,

hie.

COMPARATIVE TARIFF POLICIES OF ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES

Seetoral Analysis The average MFN rates for the ASEAN region, by sector are showal in Annex C

Based on this table, the average levels for each sector are ranked hi descending order to identify the relative sensitivity of sectors concemed and "shownin Table 7.

Table 7. SECTORAL

PROFILE

_c A_EAN

TARIFFS

16-24

Alcoholic Beverage, Tobacco Products and Processed Food

26.51

64-67 86-89 06-14 50-63 39-40

Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas = _ Vehic!es and Transpq_ Equipment Vegetable Products Textiles and Garments Plastics and Rubber & articles thereof

20.42 19.41 19.25 19,2i 18.52

15 ' -94-96

Animal m_d Vegetablefats Furniture

and oils ..............

01-05 47-49 68-70 72-83 41-43 93

Live animals and mfimal products Pulp, ?aper and paperproducts Ceramics and Glass Base metals Raw Hides and Leather Arms and ammunition

44-46

Wood and wood product,_ =

71 : 97298 84-85 25-27 90-92 28-38

18.19 li 85 â&#x20AC;˘

-...........

Precious metals, stones and jewelry - Works 0fan, Collector's pieces . _ M.achinery and mechajfical appliances ........... Mineral and petroleum products Optical, medical, photographic and musical instruments Chemicals and"ciiemical products

......

15.58 '...... 1.5...48" 15.17 15.02 12.90 11.53

....

" '-......â&#x20AC;˘ , -_0. ag ....

9.38 8_62 7.96 7.95

...

7.12 =

6.38

Among the more sensitive sectors are consmner goods such as footwear, textiles and garments and processed food. Many ASEAN comltries started out as major exporters of simple manufactures, such as textiles and footwear and continue to protect these sectors heavily. Accustomed to continued '%ffant industry" protection, these sectors have resisted trade liberalization moves in a _mmbc, o, _>t/Ai'4 com_tfies. Alcoholic beverages

COMPARATIVE

TARIFF

POLICIES

OF ASEAN MEMBER

COUNTRIES

are consistently levied higher rates of duties in all comatfies along with cigarettes and tobacco products.

Vehicles and transl)ort equipmem also enjoy protected status except in Brtmei. Tariff protection

for motor vehicle assembly or manufacturing

are part of couut12Â˘'s

commitment to foreim_ pampers when they made the decision to invest in a paxicular cotmtry.

It is also closely linked to progressive manu.thctmiug programs which may or

may not include the production of a national car. In Bnmei, among the few items that are dutiable are sophisticated mamffactmes such as electronics, electrical machineries, and photographic equipment.

Tariffs on agricultural products are politically sensitive issues.

Because of this, negotiations on agricultural tariffs are generally considered â&#x20AC;˘ separately from industlial tariffs, both in the GATTAVTO and in the CEPT.

Average rates of less

than 10% are hnposed on most base metals, ch_mic_ds and mineral and petroleum products. A comparison of sectoral tariff averages across ASEAN countries highlight the following obse_wations.

Based on MYN rates, average sectoral rates are consistently

higher in l'l_:_:ila:rt_t .followed .by--thePhilippines and Indonesia. On-a sector by sector, basis, the comparative level_ in all countries are shown in Annex C. The highest rates are found hi Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco (HS Chapters 16-24)- Motor Vehicles (HS Chapters 86-89); Coffee & Tea (HS Chapter 9); Fruits & i,lu_s (l-IS Chapter 8); Processed Foods (HS Chapters 16-24); Textiles and Garments (HS Chapters 50-63); and Footwear (HS Chapters 64-67).

Figures 2 and 3 compare the levels oftmfiffs on some selected, subsectors: * . , -

Live Animals and Atfimal Products Ih'ocessed Food Iron & Steel Products Textiles & Garments

(_A ConsullmtL'6 h,lc.

Figure 2. Average MFN Tariffs by Sector: Live Animals and Animal Products

(%)

40.0

BRUNEI

INDONESIA

MALAYSIA

PHILIPPINES

SINGAPORE

THAILAND

VIETNAM

Processed Food (%)

60.0

_I_._:_!_!_i_i_!_i_!_!_;_!_!_:_;_ i

,50.0

40.0 7o,o

:',i:i:_:i:i:_:_:i:_:_[!:[_!:!i!ii:iiiiii[_iii_iiiii[[i[iiiiill

_::_T:_i!i;:::::::::::::::::::::::::/i;:i :;:i!i:.ii::ii::iiii$1:/:_i i!@:@;iiiiti/i/Iiit_i::ii!!4i:41iiiS@!i!::!:'i!ii_ii!:Jiiiiiiiliiiii_:ii:: _ii!ii_i_i@iII_ii:::@_ii!i!_!@_;i_i_i_:_i_:;:;_iii_:_;_i_:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ..................... _;:::::::_:.,... ...................... _::::::::;::::: ii!iiiiii ilii ........ iiiiiiiiiii I

_iii_._i_i!!i!ii_i_!_i!i_ii_iiiiiiiii_i_i_::iiii_iii!i_ii_ii!_iiii_i_iii_ii_iii_ii_ii iiiii_ I

_oo _iiiN!ii iililllllllllltllili ii ,i,liiiiiiNiii?iii;jiii iiiiiiiN 20.0

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: '::_:::::_:_

0.0

BRUNEI

INDONI=_IA

MALAYSIA

PHILIPPINE8

SINGAPORE[

THAILAND

VIETNAM

Iron & Steel Products (%)

5o.o iiii_@,@i@_i;@B,i_iii!!,i_i,@iii@@iiiiiiiiiii@_iiii,i i

BRUNEI

INDONESIA

MALAYSIA

(%)

PHILIPPINES

SINGAPORE

THAILAND

VIETNAM

Textiles & Garments

................ ..........ii

50.0 _s;si:_:!s_:_s_s_:::_s_;i:_:i:_,i.. i_!_qi:.i:_iiiiiiliiii/::_::_q_ii_i_i_i_::_i_ 40,0 30.0

.. 1111111..'.!!i _:¢:iii_i::;::_:: (ii_::_;;:;

0,0 BRUNEI

INDONESIA

MALAYSIA

i,!;{:_:_{;_i_:_:_@!_i_i_![_;_%_:i

PHILIPPINE8

SINGAPORE

THAILAND

VIETNAM

(%) 25.0

Figure

3. Average Intra-ASEAN Tariffs By Sector Live Animals and Animal Products

•--,,,,-,,.,.,.,._,_ ',,............

20.0

_,-.,'...', ,.,.._..,_..........

_ ...... ,,,.,..,,:_. ............

_?ii_:?i?i_iii!iiiiiii[iiiiii"i:?ii==i::_!ii_ii!i_!!?i :i:i:i:?:_:_:_:_:_:i:!:i:i:i:i:!3i¢)!_Ni:i$ ili_:i:_iiiii::!_!_iii:iii::?ii=:iii/=:iil!::ii,_:_

5.0 ii_i!iIii_!i _:_ _t i::::::: :_=::::: i!:::';.:i:.'_/:_:_."..:_:i:_ ::::;_:_:_;_::_ ::!.'.: _.:=:: :

BRUNEI

_';,'::::_;!_ :_$.:_$_:'::;II_/E_IIE._I/IIII_I: :_::::::_::

_:l:'_':::::_._.,_¢: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _:_: ::::s:::;:::<:::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::

INDONESIA

I%)

_:_:_:_!!!!:i:i:i:_:;:_:!iiii!_i!:_i_!:!!_!_!!_ii

MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE

Processed

THAILAND

Food

............... ,.............. ,,......... ii i i i i i! ! iiiii !ii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!i!!',i ' 10.0 ::ii:i:g:i:i:i:!i_::::":i::::i::,::,iii::!,i::::Iili. illiiii!:,!i; _!I_iii::iiil i_i_iIIiiiiii::::::ili::iiiii::ii:#::_i_g--;,_::i??_!

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

0.0

BRUNEI

(%) •':1_ , L.. " ''

INDONESIA

MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE. THAILAND

Iron & Steel Products

i:i:_R:i::;i:::'J::i:i::'.i:i:::i:,_i,i:i:i:i_;i_

.... ,-.J-,-.-_' ','.','.:.:,: :.:-x,'-:,:,:.:,v,

6.0 ?_:._:.i:.::):.::i::i_'._)i!!_!!!_:,!:.!:,! _{i_i!ilil ! _i_iiii_i_i_i_ !:!:!:!'!'!'_'_'_':'!'!'!'_'!'_'!'!_'_'_'_'_'_'i'_' _:_::_;i!:_:i:._,::::i_::;: _..,;:_:i:i:i:::_ _-_:i_,_._,_._-_,_-_-::_:_i!:::!:;:_:! • iiiiiiiiiiiiiii 4,0 2.0 ii;;:i_!::_i_ii::_::_::_i_li_ii_iiiiiiiiiii_i_iiiill 0.0 BRUNEI INDONESIA MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE THAILAND

(%) Textiles

& Garments

_iii'.iiiiiiiii_ii_i_iiiiii/il_/iiili_ii_i::

15.0

BRUNEI

INDONESIA

MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE

18b

THAILAND

cjA con_taa_,

COMPARATIVE

TARIFF POLICIES OF ASEAN

MEMBER

CouNTRIES

Progn'ession of Tariff Rates within Sectors A more relevant analysis, however,

is the examination

of the progression

of rates

within sectors and to compare the findings across countries.

For this analysis, special

emphasis was given to selected politically sensitive industries

viz Leather and Footwear;

Textile and Garments,

Food Processing,

By and large, in all the subsectors the highest protection is demonstrated

and Transport

exazained tar_" structures

afforded to final goods.

Evidence

remain escalated with -

of excessively lfigh rates of EPRs

with practically duty flee entry of raw matexials and capital equipment

high than average rates on final products.

In contrast,

highlights the wide disparity in tariffreghnes

•

Equipment.

and

the fiee trade regime of Singapore

in ASEAN.

Textile and Garments

Tarifflevels

are compared fi'om raw libea m garments

structure ofprotectiml

is comparable

much higher ha Thailand.

in the Philippines,

with the findJa_g that the

Iadonesia,

and Malaysia but is

It is also interesting to note that the Philippines is the only

ASEAN country which imposes the same tariffrate

on textile yarns and _,,voven or knitted

fabrics. Table

8. Tariff

Stnmture

TEXTILES .....'".. :::_r:(i :.i_.:!.,,7:" " ,.:-

•

of Selected

lndust,'ies:

& GARMENTS

','-.%_:_:::.:._::..,>: ..i_........ ..f=--.. -:_'0= ..:

: ..,

I1:

.':.

:.,

a,o,om 5 pli4

i_N:_:} N_N_iii:i:)_!}):i:.i:i:.i!i:(i._ "3 ibm i_i}_i _ii!!}_ _!!iii_i_i:_ii,_:i::i:_::?::r:: _: i:_ i_i_;i ?:: 10 10 ii_{_g_;iiii{iii{iii:i: 10 20 }_!N_Ni)}!}i}_iiiii?}_i}}i))iiii}!}_.}:! •} 1o 20

Nil 10 20 20

Nil Nil Nil Nil

5 30 80 lOO

5 20 40 40

;ii_ _ {_{_iiii!i_ii_{_:_iii_:i_:_:_!i:{i_:_:_i_:.{ :_ !" 20 30 ....

Nil

100 ......

CJACons,dta_ts, la_c.

COMPARATIVE TAR_F POLICIES OF ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES

•

Leather and Footwear Raw hides, the basic raw material for footwear, is duty flee in other ASEAN

countries but is subject to tile mini_re_urn 3% duty in the Philippines. Leather, on the other ha_td, enjoys protectkm in the Philippines but is practically •duty fi'ee in other ASEAN countries. This is good• news for the Philippine leather industry but is a major problem to footwear manufacturers.

The implications for the Philippine footwear industry are clear:

the 20% tarttt-on leather makes the footwear iadt_s:.,-ya.:_.;_mpetitive in the region.

Table 9. Tariff Structure

of Selected Industries:

LEATHER & FOOTWEAR

ii.!_:;:.:..:,.:> ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .:-:: !.... .:L' ' ',' . .'¢,i,i'"';.

....,,:,_a.i_>_:_::. ____..•:,.;i "___.. 3 .' " .... ,'"'::;:?;:.> .....

........ ....... ............... is.... I ..... ,.... ::::_::!:_:..:::%.:._.-_:.._:i1_-;!.....i ::>,.:..._.::. " . .. ::A _wal...orem..::...:App z:ed

,,,. "

Nil

100

i;I..;eatbei:_i;:.:i_::_:.:::_( :. :!i! 20 m

:;:_oilt-_e_ii;:i: _:: •

.=.'

•

. .-

Food Processin_ Table 10 presents the tax-iffstlaacture in the m_:.:;': ?_-ocessinghldust W. The

distorted tariff structure of the food processing industl-y k_the Philipphles stems fiom the high tariff duties on com. This is one area which clearly calls for policy review. Compared to the rest of ASEAN, file Philippines is the only cotmtry that imposes heavy import duties on com. The $2.75/kilograna specific duty on corn in Thailand has no effect on domestic users of corn since Thailand is a net expmxer.

cj^ co,.,,at_t,,i,,e.

COMPARATIVE TARIFF POLICIES OF ASEAN I_EMBER COUNTRIES

Table 10. Tariff Stl_cture of Selected Industries: FOOD PROCESSING

::_:::.i:.::::_-_6b_cr/: ....Pai_:.i :ii_i:_:i:!::_m:_::'_:i::::i _':i_,::,..:_:._ :_I._L._,."s_i_ ill:.: :.:Yl-.:_.:_,::..:::.:.: ,. :. -_::.:,_,::_:: %::.:_,"::,_::11,

. : :: T_.__..:.. ,..,::. -:.::.

i::::::_.i_i:!::i!!:_.ii_i_ii:::.:i::i:i:!:!::i:.i::% â&#x20AC;˘...:.:i:_..'::.- '. , :i:[; i::_.::.i_:i:::i:::.::il _:i::i:,.i?::':":, :,:.; _?:::.:: :::..:::":://..

_!_iii,_iiiiiii_iii!i'_i':i:i,'_i:_iiiii_i,_iii_::,::.::.i_ ........ 3/8."............... 0...... _......... N::= " '"_.... Nil i Nil ,,_N _i_i':i_i_ii:,',,,i,,i,;i,,i,,i,,iiiii,i_:,;?.',_:

_fii!iii_:'i::i_::!_:ii_ii_)_i __!:.:_i_i__: :::i::il iil 45 5 ii!i!!iiii_ii_i!ii:ii:i:_iii!:_i_ii_i_i::::_.::ili:i] 30/40 _' 0 to 10 ii_i_iii:_ili_:_iiiiil!ill i!i!i_:iii_i:_i.i:i_:i!i!i:t 30/50 _' 10 i_i_i_i_=i_i_iii_iiiiiiiiii_iiii!iiii=:i=iiii!iii!:i!!:iiiii!i! !.:::!'i!il 40/65" 10

Nil Nil Nil

..... _"+....... ;_:!_:_:_::::::::

_ii_!i_t}.._O_iil _:::!ili i::ii_:.:: i_ii1 30180 20 :: :: " _:_ a/ !iti::i::l_i::_i_]!:_::_:_,,',.iii_i_::::_:_:_i::_#:::_._.:.:._:_ 30/80 20 "

N_ Nil

_i_ii_iii_i_/_iiii!i_i_!_iiiii_i_iii_!_iiii!_i_i_ 45/80 _' I5 to 20

Nil

".....

Nil Nil Nil

10 40 40 40

]0 10 .tO 40

Nil Nil

60 60

Nil

iiii!iiiii'_i',',i_ii_,i_iili,:!iii!lli',',i',i::,'_'::iiiiii',!_i::_i'_:!il _, 20 to 25 Nil to _,_i_:. :_!!_!_iiiiiiii:ii:iiii!ii:i::!:::i::i::! 30/80 Nil 60 or B50/k 60 or B50/kg

Refersto tariffson In-quotaand Out-quotaimports. .-

Motor-vehicles and other traasport e0uipment Motor vehicle assembly and manufacturing enjoys one of the highest levels of _

protection across ASEAN.

Malaysia applies the m:Jst p_o tective tariffs on motor veificles

followed by Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Added to this is the adoption of domestic car manufacturing programs in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Under this system, the EPRs hmrease to atrocious levels because of special low rates on CKD packs. Singapore hnposes no duties on motor vehicles but subjects all car sales to a 41% excise tax.

CJAConsultants,Inc.

COMI_ARATIVE

TARIFF

POLICIES

OF ASEAN MEMBER

Table 11. Tariff Structure

COUNTRIES

of Selected Illdustries:

TRA_NSPORT EQUIPMENT

'-"

ti,

. . _i_!_.i_i_i_i?i!_i_iiii]iii_iiiii_i_i_!!i_i_ii_.!_•.•_._C_i _.:i:, _,:: :: ;_,• :,,..:_ .:.. :::,-":::_:i _!:_::.! ._;_io_::'_!:._:_:_p_ii_: :•:

:_6i_i_ii iii:.;:::ii_::_:. :'ili 30 i:i:ii:!i_ _ili'.!ii':::i!':iiiii:::::_:!ii_:ii'..:il •_::i!,i:i:!i:_::-:_:::_:::::_::i:_'.i ;::::_i(_:;_:::?i::!_: '.

i_ii:::: '.i'_ _ :_ii:::::::i:i!i'_:: :_i ii:i_i!_ill ::, 40 !::iV_i_Sli'.ii'::,ii:),:ii;i::.::ii:. i

25 to 30

No duties applied 41% Ex cise tax

30 to 60

105 to 200

140 to 200

41%NoExcise duties tax app [ied % Excise tax

100 to 200

42 to 68.5

!',:_: _::_:i':i: : ............ :i:_::ii::!i!_:_i_i::_ii_?_:_i':_i::,:i_:_: _i_:_::i_:i:_!_:_:!: i_,:, ;_?,: :::i_::::_::_i Ii_::: :: ,,:_: _ _,,_:_, ,:::: ::_ ::__:: iii_!_i_iiiii_.iii _i_i

: :_: "

_-_._i:_i .artsi::::_:::_:::_:.::::._-_i._:i::.",.. 20 i:i:.:::. .i!i" _?,.::'':." _-".::--" :::::.-i.:i_!:_!%!i!i':::: ::-:.ii-:,,!:: ii::::.:.:i_:ii_:!i!i:::ii!:::'f:::::: ': 3 (::_ _ b ii_ii::_:;::':.::!il . i::,:.:i,i.::-.:.::.:.:..:.::!: ::.i'!ii:i'.!':.':::. ':" .-_2B_ff'[::7: :f, 40 :...:....::....,, .,/.........: _.Moto_. e_:i:'!' .. .: .... ,.,.._::::_:_:3::-:_., ....

:._-:,.:..:i,::_,,_ :..::.. ,,i.?,:::_:._:.,.:!_,i,.._,i__._.::_:;_,_: i:ii,_i_ii!:_:_i_i::i¢::.i_.i:_. :i, 25

35 to 150

No duties applied 12% Excise tax No duties applied 12% Excise tax :% duties applied 12% Excise tax

i:.i',,'.,', ::':::.,,: ..::. _.

:i:i::_iii_i_':iii:ii:i:_ii_i::i:):;i::':::i!',: :. 20 i:i!i!i;:!i:! iii":i'_':i"::_i:. _!i_il iii;_!_i i i!:iii ;:ii": :.:(!':iiBi'_¢l_s.i:.:i_,;;_.:i ': 20 i?::f.i;:,.. ,...:.. _i:ii.i?i?.:. _!ii! I,,. ::i/ ?...:. ' ::",i,:i :.:.: :i:i:i.':::,'?' • i:::::i::71:.i?_.: ,:,i:i:.::_::::_.ii:_.:._:i:.,i?: :'

10 to 15

" "

, "

No duties 12%appliedExcise tax No duties

'., " _ . .:i

.....

applied 12% Excise tax .,,.

, .

,,,.

Motorcycle assembly or manufactul-ing is likeMse a protected subsector, enjoying special tariffregimes for CKD packs in the Plfilippines and Malaysia. Bicycle manufacturing no loIlger enjoys the protective levels it once enjoyed in the re_on, with the exception of Thailand which still continues to impose a 40% duty on imported bicycles.

A World Ba_tk Study (1993) suggests that the cunent trade regime in Viet Nam has substantial tariff and quantitative resU-ictions. Viet Nam's tariff structm:e, though

COMPARATIVE TA.RI_F POLICIES OF ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES

amended in 1992 and again in 1993 follows the pattern in most developing countries in the 1970s. Negligible tariffs are imposed on capital equipment and medicines while high tariff.a of S0 to 100% are applied on footwear, softchit_s, alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, and cosmetics. The MFN average tariff 0mweighted) basis, for Viet Nam is estimated at 12.1%.

Viet Nam also has considerable quantitative restrictions such as import licensing and quotas for some commodities. Comparison

of Simple and Trade-weighted

marked pattern in the different tariffaverages

Averages of ASEAN Tariffs.

]'here is no

obtained by the ttu'ee methods of computing

tariff averages. The averages are generally highest using ASEAN trade values of weights. This supports the view that using the total imports fi'om ASEAN as weights lends to a more neutral standard compared to one using own commN import Values. The latter are prone to be biased downwards especially in the case of restrictive duties.

Table 12. Average MFN Tariffs of ASEAN Countries Simple and Trade Weighted Averages _.

_,_:._,,,_.._.0.:_.:.:;:_::.:.::._:_:::.'.._':_:.,.

•.-._::.::i:: .._'.::.iBrune :_....

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

.,:_,

:_._._:::::_s_..¢..._:::_::_!_ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

.4::ff:_..:.::.[:_:.: _:"7..i : .. i: i.i

, 63

" ':: "

. :":,"... ::.:"),,::":_8;2.!::. :;.:, "' ;

,_:,_,!_.::!:!:;?.::"::;." _: , a1.:6 . -•., J::."-:_::::. :_:.", :":_!_::. ::: , . .. i:::./i:i:::.!: ::::::..:!_aSn_ia.... ,_71i::_:i,!_ii:i=)!::.i_!:::.i),_i_;i _i_.!:!: 7:::.:. !i:!!:ii:):::.:!).::!:i:/::._i_i_a_i_s..:_ ,.i:_i_.ii:!!ili::::.i:_::_:ii::!!:_i_i:::i}:)/.} .i:_: ., , 1o18: " :. ,,:,i-...".. .."-"i.; .:,:_oi_.:.:.i. :,_.:" ._"i_i

..::".. VI.

...:.:t:.: ::?. :::.

' 7:

Intra-ASEAN Tariffs

With the impressive gains made in implementh_g the goals of CEPT Program, it will be interesting to _ote h.ow these.translate

.......

into concrete tariff concessions affecting

cjx co,u_ar_U', t._.

COMPARATIVE TARIFF POLICIES OF ASEA.NMEMBER COWRIES

intra-ASEAN trade.

A paraUel analysis was conducted for tariff rates under the CEPT

Program, both for 1996 and 2000, and comparing these with current _

rates, 4

Comparisons were drawn from the official colmt13r submissions to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.

The impact of the CEPT concessions on the overall tariff average

for the ASEAN region is presented in Table 13. Note that the average tariff of all CEPT lines is 5.28% in 1996 and 2.92% in year 2000 as compared to the estimated MT2q average of 9.86 in 1996. This represents a 46.5% reduction in 1996 with rates under the . CEPT Program and an even better outlook for the year 2000 when the percentage reduction drops by a total percentage drop of 70.5%.

Based on these obsel_cations, the

highest CEPT rates are found in the following subsectors:

_..;'_.`..':_:_._:_i_:`e`.:_:.`_._.._.;.:._:........_:_.``_._.._:7.._;_;._;:`._:_`:...`.` _:_._-:_.;_ _.:; _ . : , , , ,_ -

,.:'v....

50-63

Texti]e & Garments

39-40

Plastics & Rubber

41-43

Leather & leather products (excluding footxvear)

Vegetable oils

97-9_

Works of Art

94-96

Furniture

44-46

Wood & wood products

Firearms

63-70

Ceramics & glass

72-83

Base metals

The same reservation is made regarding the limitations related to the exclusion of specific rates from the analysis.

_A Co_tauts,

Inc째

cjA c째_at_ts,

Inc.

COMPARATIVE

TARIFF POLICIES

OF ASEAN MEMBER

COUNTRIES

A question is raised however, Which countries and what sectors are likely beneficiaries of these concessions? To answer these questions, comparisons were made of MEN tariffs and CEPT tariffs for 1996 and 2000 across all ASEAN comltfies. The results are shown in Table 14. It is suggested, however, that flae more pertiuent comparison that needs to be made is not only between MFN and CEPT tariffs but the comparison of MFN rates and those contained ha a consolidated tariff schedule resulting fiom the hltegration of the MFN files ande CEPT files. To explain farther, the consolidated file will consist of the CEPT levels where these are granted, and with IVIFN rates where no CEPT concessions are granted,

This new file will more accurately reflect the prevailing tariff regime in any

particular country and in ASEAN as a whole.

Comparlson

of MFN & CEFI' Tariff rates.

The results of the analysis comparing

CEPT tariffs across hldustry groups or subsectors are summarized in Table 14,

Table 14. Comparison of lVlFNand CEPT Ta_iffRates

__. !._•:_.,.,_,_z¢*:.::._,_ _:_:_:;_: ,.,___ _:_:?:.<,q_.,.:_._ _ _::,_-_t:,:_:,;,, .,_...:.;.................. ._.,_ ;_i: _i_ __jl ';_"_";.................................... t i_!i._,_,_

_3runei Darussalam

4.4

,'.,_:_';'k _j _:................_;';';' i::i::[_ iii_!_ iiliii i':':': _i:/i!

1.81

5 8.9%

8.36I"

32_6%

_:_i_[i_::_jt i i_._, .,,_i ,_;....................... _ _j_,._i: _:_';";_.................... _::".<'::::;:

1.2 8

7 0.9%

[ndonesia '

12.4

Malaysia

7,6

3-76

50.5%

12.7

8.i7

35.7%

•6.0

Thailand

19.'9

13.95

"_o8%

7.()8

64.4%

VietNam _ ASEAN ..-

12.1 . 9.9

' 092 5.28 .,.,.

92.4% z_6.6% ,.

0.92 i.92

92.4% 70.5%

Philippines Singapore

4'16 2.21 '-

62.9% "

4.38 0

70,9% 65.5°A

-- "

COMI_ARATIVE TARIFFPOLICIESOF ASEANMEMBERCOONTRIES ......

Comparison

of MFN & CEPT rates under a Consolidated

purposes of a more realistic basis for looking introduction

of CEPT concessions

constructed.

a consolidated

rates were used) where no concessions

subsectors

Schedule.

For

at how ASEAN tariffs will change with the table of MFN and CEPT rates was

Specifically, where CEPT concessions

consolidated

were granted (at 6-digit level CEPT

were granted Mt:N rates were used.

The resulting

table more accurately reflects the situation hi ASEAN where some do not enjoy any concessions.

To use only 1VEFNrates would overstate

ASEAN tariff levels; to use only the

CEPT rates would ignore the excluded items which would be subject to IVI_N rates. Meal situation would be to work at the most disaggregated replace the CEPT rate with the MFN rates where applicable. comparison

The

level say, at 9-digit level and The results of the

are showu below.

Table 15. Average ASEAN Tariffs under a Consolidated TadffSchedule

Brunei _Damssalam II_donesia Malaysia Pl_l!ppines

.....

8.6

8_36

7.6

4.0

3.76

12.7 '

8.5

8.17

17.95

.....

6.2 ;

....

0.00

14.

9.9

",.

1.811

0.0 ....

_._

ASEAN

i 2:'4

i-9.9

vieiNan_

0.0 "'

Singapore.....

4.4

0.92 5.28

._.._,

CJACoa_l

COMPARATIVE TARIFF POLICIES OF ASP.ANMEMBER COUNTRIES

VH.

Summary

and Conclusions

The study confimas that MFN tariffs in ASEAN have declined substantially in the last decade. Compared to findings in earlier studies, ASEAN MFN tariffs have declined by as much as 51% since 1986. This is the combined effect of multilateral and unilateral actions involving trade liberation. In addition, acceleration in the pace of dismantling tariff barriers under the CEPT Program is expected to result in further reducing the ASEAN tariff average by as much as 70%. This development augurs well for the futme of trade cooperation in the ASEAN region.

â&#x20AC;˘A few problems still remain.

The intransigence

of some sectors of remaining

behind protective tm'iffs by seeking exclusion from CEPT reduction continues to chaUenge ASEAN leaders. There is also the conthming problem ofnou-tariffbaniers

including state

trading operations, the use of export taxes, arbitrary customs procedures and abuse in the application of the Rules of Origin which tin'eaten tile success of the CEPT Ihogram.

Transparency in the rules of the game is essential ill tile administration of a :.:.compleY _}n.derta!dng_,_ch as the CEPT Program.

The hanlmnization

of customs .t.a_'._f[_,.

schedules along the lines of the scheme adopted by the European Community will facilitate the progress of future exchanges of concessions trader the CEPT.

Also, the use of ad

valorem tariff_ instead of the increasing incidence iu the use of specific or compound rates can make cross-country comparisons less tedious in the future.

The study has identified the sectors and stlbsectors whose rates make them likely prospects for further trade liberalization in the context of CEPT

The wide disparity in

average tariffs among certain industry groups could be useful in pinpohlthlg targets for future discussions on regional cooperation.

â&#x20AC;˘"

'i::

Q,_ Co,t_tdtmas,l_tc.

COMPARATIVE

VIII.

TARIFF

Policy

POLICEES

OF ASEA_

Implications

MEMBER

COUNTRIES

for the Philippines

Where does file Philippines find itself, given this background of the tariff policies of other ASEAN countries?

Some sectors claim that the philippines must chart its own

economic destiny, without regard to what the other ASEAN Ultimately, they

say our economic programs

must

countries are doing.

rely primarily

on the proper

management of our own resources. On the other hand, international trade is an interactive exercise and does not take place in a vacuum

Like water, imports will flow where the

tafifft's are lowest.

Some disturbing aspects in the progress of AFTA come to mind as a result of this limited attalysis:

(1) ,

Some countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia continue to pursue

protective tendencies in theh- tariffs.

Given the similarity of our production mix, what

effect will this have oll Philippine industries?

(2)_.

It is obsetwed that unrter the mfil_teral retbn_a programs m_!l_er_ake!a by ASEAN

countries, exceptions were made for certain industries.

This trend is canied over to the

area of CEPT concessions resulting in the application of higher rates or special exclusions.

The Philipphles, on the other hand, makes no exceptions, to the delight of ASEAN manufacturel-s and the consternation of Philippine producers.

The prospect of adopting a

uniform tariff of 5% within 3 years needs to be justified due to ve_3_real threats arising from alternative suppliers in ASEAN.

(3)

With the cumulative rules of origin, Singapore is the likely biggest beneficiary of

CEPT. How does the Philippine Government propose to counter this trend? What steps can it take to make the benefits more equitably distributed?

._-

....

(_IA Cotl_ttltattts,

Inc.

COMPARATIVE

TA.R_F

POLICIES

OF ASEAN M EMBER COUNTRIES

ha uThlg to evaluate the dimensions of the problem of fin-ther trade refonns in the Plfilippines, it may be useful at this stage to take a l.tard look at the competitiveness of Philippine industries vis-a-vis its neighbors in the region.

Fm-thermore, the timing of the

Philippine unilateral tariff refonns needs to be syncln'onized with those trader the CEPT program.

It is hoped that the fmdlngs of this study can contribute to the crafting of a wellcoordinated approach to the amounced targets by pinpoia_ting areas for fm-ther reform_

' 31 ....................

CJACol,s**It_lU, _e.

Annex A

Recent Changes in Trade Policies of ASEAN

:_,i.:._:_.."7 ". " 7.-

•, • i....,i_i._.7:_:_::_:...:::i: :::....._::.:.'.: .................

•,......:.:..,•,,.., ,: •

Countries

...

CjACo_,at_u, T-e.

Annex A

._dis}:ersion.ofrate_iii::!::.:?::::..i_.::::;.:::::::;.:.i_.ii::,.._;:i:;.: _;.:.::ii:.i;::;::_:.: .:;I ii,:,;!_',,:.::. :_i:i:.:;:;i;:ii ii:i.":.i_::i -i.:.._:...,:...,, ::,,i..,.,.. i. ;:.::..:_,_.: ...._.:!_ il::,,.. , ::::.,_.:.ii .iSide by side ::..::.

................ .....

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sefiO:uS...............

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............

_ .u4 .......

:::.:i:_::-:: .. _.-................. , ,.:.:........ ..... •........

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:.;:. :.::iii.ii:.::::::ii::.i :,,.i:,:_, i:.:...'":_:_:::. :.... .'.,:,! •"

............

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........... • •

':':iii_,i:iil;iii_:::_i_;:::iiiii!::__::i'. "

...._;:..•

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.. ,..,:..,.,..,:.:.;.,.: :...:. :.....

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_::iin!::Mala ....... :::::_:.:_._:::_;._::_:._::;:::::

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" ............ " ;:

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•" :i":iii:::: ii.. :.._ • .:::_.;_:_;;;_:"_:_;._-_..::'.:',,i_.:,.i .......... ..:................... _:_".:::. ...... .::.. :i :.:.:'....'.. i" :" .......: :::::": ."' commitments GA_T_O_ .... '.:_:: :- ,:',: ';%:_:i:.;_i::::,::;f..i::.::_:_:::.:: ::::::::: _........ _::::..:::';:::'.' -..:,..•.. :...;..,.:.. :, .•

..... .,;,::_ :::_:...:.. ::-_ •"?.::i:!

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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: i_::: :;:_:i::;', ;::i!i.i'_:-i: :::.:.:_.: ...,

:'.:":

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::,:::.._:.:_.:._ ::_._ :::.:.:_ .-..:._4: .i!_i,:i J.: •_'-:::::::": _:':::.ii'.;:v::i::.:::._: _:_:.::: ."'::'._:"i. ::::,'.::.:.

..:there .or::_mpound

:.;i_.i::.:i:_i::::::: ..:.:: -,,. "................

:,.:.. :.:

., ........

:::::':::::::::::::::::::::::::::;:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: '"";"::":""""__esp_t_e,this)_::_agree_O_i:.::more :': ....

i :."_:; _.. ..

i"ii.::.:; ....

• ::".....

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::_ii_::iii':: ,:..i_..:i::_:..::_ i_.:;_::.::, ,.:......:........ -.....

• ...:..

i:ii:,:;:.:.,, iii

_": ','":: i::!".ii,i",: _:i :..,:.01_: .

• -:.: .... :O_.::_e •..:.:..:._:_-:_ ....:.:..:_._::. coiit_ ,,.: . ,

. ....

ii',!i:.: ............... "":":"-.... ::,;::,.::_.::_.:.:. :":_

:::,::: .... .......... ::'"::::":'::::: ....

::ii :"":.........

,,,

. i,:,: :.. :•: :,:.• ::,'i:,':',';:. i,"i::::.i::.i ::. _:_::._:i;: ..........

..... •.. _:::

::......:..,:• ...::.:

7,.i 33

OAco,,.,,d_,,ts,_-c.

Annex A

â&#x20AC;˘

Annex A

CJAco_ltauts,

Iate.

ANNEX B

List of Som'ce Documents Bnmei Darussalam, Royal Customs and Excise Department. Bnmei Trade Classification 1992.

Ministry of Finance. 1992.

Malaysia. His Majesty's Government Gazette. Januaz'y 1996. Customs Act 1967. Customs Duties Order 1996. Republic of Indonesia, DepalXment of Finance. Directorate General of Customs and Excise. 1996./ Indonesian Customs TafiffBook. Republic of the Philippines, TariffCommlssion. of the Philippines.

October 1996. Tariffand Customs Code

Singapore, Customs and Excise Department. October 1995. Singapore Trade Classification and Customs Duties 1996. Socialist Republic ofViet Nam, Ministry of Trade. Trade Infolanation Center. 1994. Import Tariff Export Tariff(Going into effect from July 1st, 1994). Thailand Customs Depallment. 1996. Customs Taliff of Thailand with Statistical Code Numbers.

cjAcom,at_,t_,I_,.

â&#x20AC;˘ "

-.,

22 ......

CJA _ns_tlta_ts,

AN._X

l_,e.

qA Co,,_,dta_t,, me.

cJ',_co_u,lt,_,

A,NI'<IBX D

_c.

r..4

• ,

:,-,

V'_

0 C_

0 0

_ ,: :

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ANNEX E

ANNEX F BIBLIOGRAPHY ASEAN Secretariat. September 1996. "The Fifth ASEAN Summit," Volume IV. J-akarta, ASEAN Secretariat. Bell, Harry H., TariffProffles in Latin America, Praeger Publishers. Bnmei Dantssalam, Royal Customs and Excise Department. Bmuei Trade Classification 1992.

1971.

Ministry of Finance. 1992.

Malaysia. His Majesty's Government Gazette. January 1996. Customs Act 1967. Customs Duties Order 1996. Pacific Economic Coop eration Council, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat, 1995. Milestones in APEC Liberalisation: A Map of Market Opening Measures by APEC Economies. Republic of Indonesia, Department of Finance. Dh'ectorate General of Customs and Excise. 1996./ Indonesian Customs TariffBook. Republic of the Philippines, Tariff Commission. 1985. TariffProfiles in ASEAN: An Update. Republic of the Philippines, Tariff Commission. October 1996. Tariffand Customs Code of the Philippines. Singapore,. Customs and Excise Department. October 1995. SingaporeTrade Classification and Customs Duties 1996. Socialist Republic ofViet Nam, Ministry of Trade. Trade Information Center. 1994. Import Tal-iffExport Tariff(Going into effect from July 1st, 1994). Tumlir, Jan and Till, Ladislav, TariffAveragjng in International Comparisons. Thailand Customs Department. 1996. Customs Tariff of Thailand with Statistical Code Numbers. The World Bank. 1994. East Asia's Trade and Investment Regional and Global Gains from Liberalization. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Thomas, Vinod and Johu Nash. Best Practices in Trade Policy Reform_ 1991: Oxford University Press for the World Bank.

cjn consultants, Inc.

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