RESPONSE
TO
BALANCE
IN THE AND
THE
PAPER
PAYMENTS
CRISES
]_970's:KOREA PHILIPPINES
JoHo STAFF
OF
Power
SERIES
NO.
83-05
Response to Balance of Payments .Crises in the 1970's: Korea and the Philippines
John H.
Korea and the Philippines most
heavily
burdened
of heavy borrowing How Co account and
re_pon_es Taking current reserves
their consequences
account
of
or external
fin_ced
borrowing,
debt.
the East Asian countrie_
This is a result,
account
defici=s
ar_i an analysis is the subject
crisis
to
mean
by running two period_
1974-7-I and 1979-82.
the analysis
the preceding
payments
deficit,
are among
current
for these deficits
for both countries, periods
today
with external
to finance
balance
Power*
of course,
it, the 1970's.
of the two countries'
of thi_ paper. a sharp
rise
down foreign
in
exchange
of crisis have been
While
is put in the perspective
the focu_
the
identified
is on theme
also of the trends
of
decade.
*Professor of Economics, l}niver_ity of 8awaii and llnited Nations Developmemt Programme consultant to the Philippine Institute ÂŁor l_velopw_nt Stodies. I am grateful to Dr. Dal H. Rim of the &_ian Develop_nt Bank for sti_mlatin_ dis =ussions on the subject of this paper.
Korea
1. the
_-d
Both world,
Balance o_ Payments Philippine..
Korea
and
suffered
following
the
sharp
are
also
put
and
imports. Kafea'm
increases
as
proportion_
to an average
hoverer,
understates
so
sharply
to gain a better "trade"
to about
extent
from 40 pez
In the first year
decline
in relation but
rapidly,
remarkable
it
import
of
[o trade.
acco,mt
the
rest
the
the deficit_
_vera_e
previous
ctlange,
an even
since
sharper
decline
is Korea's
flef_.c;;t
absolutely
trade
and indebtedness
helped
in 1974 anti 1975,
a t:r_nd. which
ha<]
ro grow
The reason was a Mo_t
_f
(average of
!eavin_
oDly abo_,'._
by a modest.,six per cent
by a decline
the ratios
had
and a s,_bs_an_inl
in one year.
rose 3g per cent.
of
of
continued
of trade.
Thin,
percent' in J973,
ceversa[
l_is was followed
the movement
exports
three years. the
indebtedness
as a proportion
unit values)which
This helps to explain
of
ÂŁt_te-cnat:ionalreserves_
External
year,
the
Th_.s can be
perspective _imple
of
deficits
for by the rise in tj_e trade uni.t value
in trade the following
reserves
the
30 per cent of trade, in 1974-750
showed a slight
eight per cent for real growth, growth
-_
(1974), Korea's
50 per cer_t increase
and export
much of
cex_ in 1971 to only seven
also declined
this was accounted
1970'a:
current
of 20 per cent in the
the
sharply,
with
their
that. the sharp rise represented
been rising
the
_hocks in 1974 and 1979-80.
of
defici.t jumped
in
along
in
I and 2 where
compared
dropped
Phi lippines,
the two oil price
seen in Tables
Cri.qes
in trade
unit yah,e,
to trade of the deficit,
The upshot
is_ however,
that
-
despite only and
relatively
s!.i_htly slightly
This of
the
off
with
better
off
wit.h respect
payments
that,, wh_.le crisis,
Wh_t. _._ really
xn
1977.
trade; of
account
_he
_ext
t_
two
year_
to reserves
Korea
found
,as a proport_.on
might
fit
the
i.tse!f
of. trade
to ext.er.n_l i.ndebtedne._,
(_:ee.Tabl,-
definition
of
;t L_l;_nce
of
th_
a r_Rjor one.
years_
i..qtb_
rapid
resulting
stronBl.y _ bo_h
indebtedness
r,_oovery
in _J very
absolutely
_"onti.t,;ed to grow,it
and
slight
surl)[,_s
in relation
declined,
as
to
a propo,'tio_
t fade.
'ibis picture oll
was
.,.d_ock,r_i_o._gY_ tho
be.c.._useof year_,, and
the
_[rnpressi._e, however,
in
while
of
picture
hardly
F;._serves improved
and
respect
the
i.t was
-
deficits
worse
suggests
current
large
2
it
the
represented
on
trade.
Nevertheles_,.
year
trade
s.i.X
grew
the
even
cent
we,
then,
Should beginning
in
s,ugges[s
not.,
meehinery
and
1978,
deficit
per
cen.t
again
band,
inci-eese
befere
the
_¢_.,_ n.<>t:__ sharp exports of
and
trade,
failed
rose
a yea_
slightly
grow
by
it
wi.th
les:_ than
'.inindebtedness
f._ster_ dominated
imports
StJ.l.1
t(_
a
n_
was
38 per
Second
in [¢#14_aud over
was
four
a, rever,_al
grade. i.n.proportion
30 cent
per
eemt
to
f_r
i.ncrease
the
i.n
in volume). ¢onsxder
1.978 rather
than
the in
second
!979
"I_e s,!rge in imports, _ransportequipment, _hi.eh
in
of both
mace
other
per
(31
manufactures,
growth
only
the
a_ain,
in the
reserves
l_debtedne_s,
imports
ri_e
treme_dou_
international
as
reversed
ro_e
46
per
balance
after noted
which cent.
£h_ above_
rose
69
of
paymeet,_
¢>ii shock? was per
Thesecomplemented
Other
dominated cent,
c¢[_is
arid the
;._s
evidence
by bsg_.c sharp
rise
I.
.in gross
[ixed inve._tn_.nto_ .59 per cent',in current
..accompanied the government'_ industries. seven
GDP rose
at
It seems, res,ul.t this
_
-
1978
out
O,an tripling tee.every,
of
both
however,
the
ti_ 1979 level in 198[. 19[tO ie..ael, proportion the
peak
b_#t more
21
Indebtedness
per
though trade
of
two
cent
in
rose
the decade.
to
23 per
_nd
The year 1980 deserves the later analysis
circumstances
comment
_0 three points.
1970-77.
,1978 was a
I
i,
shock.
balaoce
of
payme_ut,q
internal
1979-82.
shock. in ]979, more
time there was rio quack in
1980
and
ro.a_ined
was do_en to haIY
times
i.twas dOWn
that
'of'
1978.
above
the peak Aq a
to o:i.gbtper cent, compared
1980. not m,ch
and remained
compared
special
faster
to the
continued
tO grow,
By 1982 the ratio of reserve.- to t:o a high o{
comment, w_thout
that characterized
than trade, so
low compared
surprisingly,
rate.
could be misread
special
This
a half
Reserves,
cent.
.
quadrupled
further
to grow but
continued
.
precedin?,
decade of
an externa.l
o_
deficit
By 1982 the deficit
at a far,idly diminishing was down
year
of trade.
that the ratio rose only slightly early years
than
i
_he-f,irst
asa
account
of trade, however, of
the
_ow for the
ii
analysis
deficit
than
for
1974-77, and the second wi'l] cover
the current
as
a record
rather
periods
as a proportion
avecaRe
acco_N.ntdeficit in
boom,
pc.tied will. be taken as
the
and cbemica.l
of 4,2 per cent during
r I
_ubsequent
to faw_r heavy
than
reached
investment
in.the
In any ca_e,
to
rate
to an average
.
reason,
leaves
thrust
then, that the current
,.O,f a domestic
ÂŁrisis This
fa_,t_r
years, while _lemplovment
3.2 per cent, compared
For
a
policy
pri.ceq, _"_ch
33
per
particularly
since
some understanding that year.
First, real GNP not
only
in
cent
1977.
some o_ of
the
I will l_.mit the failed
to grow, but
_etual].y
declined
between
failure,
dominated
by
important
factor
political
tmcertaiety
The
significance
.through policy but
the
external
might
was
was
due
taken
Ouppo'lt'ted
by
to
help
stabilization
which
a substantial
expected
durin R
the
world
the
two
stand-by the
down
failure, produce
world
together reduction
with
levels
a
in
26 per
helped
with
A les_ of
President. its
effect
to _ gover,ment
_Iports
a surge effect
in
of
following less
bet_.e, als0
Gross 1978
eight energy
and
per
did
decline,
food
the
imports
latter
¢_ent rise
1980, than
1972
in parL
on
and
in the
_
to
some
help
from
GDP
curr:ent- account
terms deficit
the
real r_te
fzom
and te,'ms
of
its
peak
devalt_at ion bed
li,._it the the
Thi_
Fund
in
1982
deflsto,-.
growin B export
well
cent
tO stabilization
and
in
per
1979.
Monetary
1979
despite
si_
and
investment
cent
prices
as
in the
and
International
to maintain
tr_e,
years
hut
the
of
to about rise
the
of
of
main
cent
a_ranseme.nts.
peak
volume
sveragi_R
recession,
consultation
of
crop
year.
I0 per
than
_as
period
attributed
because
though
following
a brief
iv. GNP be
The
to more
measures
declining
shock.
output,
brought crop
cannot
reason
production.
of
decline
agricultural
the
below
was
when
i,n
Fund
well
inflati_rn
imports,
of
to
the
in rice
assassination
the
failure,
pri, nc!p_l
it_vestn_.t
balance
been
modest
compared
measures
of
was
in part
kept
crop
felt
recovery
annum,
have
to the
growth
per
face
that
to
a sherp
combined
is
response
imports
1980
this
The
drop
the
trade
than
on
following
of
1980.
cent
effect
the
GNP
was
the
per
on
less
food
a 36
and
imports
in response
in
was
1979
volu_ne growth
of in
"_e in
the
of
trade, ]982.
brought
The role og
the
of
balance
the
'current
the
import
and
in
of
of
oil
less
than
t976
end
19 per
There
is
tons)
coal
was
Onlysix
197S.
so_rces
cent.
The
r$se
contrast
to
almost
Japan, ooe-thlrd
_creased
at
EnerSy cent
over
overall
the
decline
rise
in
the
the
ware 1973_
de_line in
in
ener_
for intensity
by
use
over
iu
Korea end
sharp
coal per
oil
_nd
of
of
chanse
in
coneuspt_o_ cent
rate
pec
annum
of
in
8rovth
the
was
use o£
the
same
period.
to
56 per
cent
1975;
_ectors hotmv_r,
any
substituting of
Moreover,
(ratio
of
Of CDP f_rowth,
ce_t
1974
rose
cousumpt£on
the
rate
1983).
increase
oil
1974-75
8.2
times
crisis
of
in
cent
consumption
of
energy
per
I5 per
exceeded use
rise
ilports
first
despite
the
to
Finally,
than
•
ayerase.
comodity
during
cent
9.8
1971-73
the
per
_n non-i_dustrial sector.
total
otl,
of
respectively,
intensities
industrial
9.5
the
imports
1972,
GI)P (YaKer,
allo_ed
one-half
While
_nerKy
where
rate
and
consumption
matched
of
three
linit
than
cotai
that
sharp
of
1983). in
ot2
example,
to
inpacton
the
to more
period
or
Kreater
1978
an annual
prices
the
in
for
about
in
equal
cent by
1973-79
1971-73
a discussion
The. main
tlmes, of
in
through than
o_e-balg
(Ynger,
roushly
per
more
lu
mention
1970's,
course,
_a8
energy
end
dur£nK
Slight
in
conserve
the
a proportion
cent
prices;
23 per
per
es
evidence
were
of
and
per
cent
energy
(in
63
fo_t
little
coal
oil
than
this
special
in
was.
1974
_ports
to
alr_rnative
crises
Iu
eisht
datet_t_atton
deserves
balance
more
from
only
payments
price.
1975.
relative
obviously
accmmt
The value
by
oil
and
energy wre
dependance
this use than on
and
led to
to
a
GDP) ae
starched
the
imports
of
energy total
(incJ.ud_ng energy In
bur
in
1973
supply
the
second
150 per
cent
and
average
of
of
coal,
crisis, 200
1976-78.
total commodity
excluding
uranLLun)
to
cent
70
the
per
import
cent,
respectively,
The
value
of
imports
oil
compared
_rom 55 per
_n Iq79
price
per
ro_e
of
oil
in
imports
was
1980
was
to less
(Y_ger,
of
1983).
up elmo.qt
and
more
cent
1981
than
over
t.he
30 percent
than 20 per cent during
1976-78. The rapid rise in oil import: volume partly
due
to
coal.
Coal
to rise at
the
1980
imports
downturn
in
finally
GNP, but
due
subsided also
there is no evidenc_
two years.
Overall,
of energy conservation,
as energy
_nteneity
the
t_o
crises,
Korea appare.ntl:_ largely coatlnued
none
the worse
to investment As a result,
emphasis
the
ignored
export:-led growth;
and was compounded
began
ho_c_vcr,
in 1979 and I')8(.)
1983).
Comparing
posigion
of
cot_tintted
rote the following
:increased 5.3 per cent and 7.6 per cent, respectively, (Yager,
1979,
_mbstitutitrn
i_ 1979 and
and cot_sumptioa j_tmped sharply
a substantial
to
alter
_as
and it worked,
for the wear.
in heavy industry
shock
at more modest
growth
liberate
target_
leaving
short-lived.
of 1978,
its external
disaster
not be ÂŁgnored
(Republic
forces,
of Korea,
ft_r
debt
the over-commj_rm_.nt
the rate of inf1_tion, market
and opted
crisis was prolonged
and the agrlculturai
to dampen
industry,
and
of payments
The second
t_he b._lance of payment._ could
heax_
_harp
its balance
by the internal
to take measures on
fir._t
1982).
,and Korea
reduce
a_ we_l
of 19g0.
as
the to
aim
-7-
••
Turning in
the
to
first
earnings
the
crisis
o£
high
Korea
of
tn
1974
re_overed
l_
me st
end of
the
curre=t rise
the
van
because
o£
the
prices
in
1974.
sugar
as 8 percentage .. of
Philippines,
and
trade
and
1976
when,
opt
for
vhile
Despite
some
success
ho_m_,
the
strategy
the
current
Reserves
in
indebtedness
grey
in
Hence.
o11
1971-73. 8hock
4n£t:lat:ed With •in growth worsened
_rlthout
the
in
did
at
rapidly the tmVlag
to
yes
this
agriculture
and
succeed.
worsened
a low
point
in
proportion
ratio
faced
to
the the
of
).,'ia......_ improve
provide
the the
stimulus
exports,
to
:Luprov_nt in
1978.
trade
trade
that
onslaught
of
of
agrl-
exports.
again
and
prevailed. the
eec(md
payments
crisis
by the first. the
oil
of vorld further,
price
iucreases
trade.*the creepingup
in
1979-80
Philippines' from
21 per
and
the
current cent
ensuing account
of
trade
slowdown deficit
in
trade,
_-_-mem
iuprove
to to
high
s sharp
a percentage
to
balance
as
course,
a slight
it
recovered-from
of
as
1975,.but
a 8ubBtantlal
no_-tradltlo_al
1977,
Philippines
li_d
that
almost
tradttic_el
FoIloving
the
were
were
in
exceed
£n
infrastructure
for
deficit
dropped
was,
were
on export
than
the
new exports
the
deficit
mmaller
they
l_nore
demand
deficit wets
to
lagging
not
MoreOVer
and
deficits
both
effect
PhiZlppine to
rural of
favorable
trade,
government
to offset
account 1977-78
in
account
Reserves
of
chose
current
1976.
•both. absolutely
and pro_otlo_
demand
the
2.)
in which
Investment
payments,
aggregate
Table
,_ke._r^r_a.
.Sr.ovth_.
of
year,
a percentage
a year
in
The counterpart
production
balance
in
as
1973,
peak
(See
extet_aZ'£ndebtedness,
cultural
to
the
in
account,surplus. _
copper
1975.
The Phtli_l._.#_ _d
retarded
rtse
1978
to
-
23.5
p_r
of ¢lr_dP -
cent
in
from
almost
period,
_£1e
_erease
in
indicates,
198l. 34
per
me, figures
more
of
than
chat
debt
is p1_bJic or g_mranteed.
a problem
best
of
as
in
Kore_,
fully
from
the
of
cent
less
greater,
ox_r
tha_
r.he _a_.
_rade.
Bank
_{tt_tion
Debt
prc_por_o_
Tableg
2
which "is
Phil. ippi_ms
of-the'
1.a,_r'_
t[or the Ph:il,,ppino.-:, m_y _,,'c_,_.
The figures
changes,
The.
ThL_
oT the.
"
Tabl_
o_n-_uarm_eed-debt debt
a pe-r_-entage
ho_ever,_.han
World
a much great_r,
i.dex
per
a_
though
I s.spect
_ha_
._be
i_creasc
1978 is _,mder_ta_ed. In any case,
th_
offset
IoweS_ s_mce
"in 1.982 zn exper_,,_dr<_pp_d m,.;r,e
real _',r;mchcam !981-
r_han 15 per cen_ belo_ of _
been
the
28
declined
slightly
privste
a_talyzitag _ince
a rough
bp.low
only
_re
short
after
capturing
to
have
fall
at
• of
r_._erve.q
c,..'nt grew
indebtedness the
-
Tnternatio_al
indebtedness
_ince
8
C_vernment
to permit _ modest the [q60_s.
of
deficit
growth
]mpcrts
spen¢i_k_ pr,:_ided
of 2.8 per cent
[, dollars
declined
e,_o_,b
_° _ in .... N_, tb_
four p,'*.r cenr_
.%
tar short of t._e decline increase
i, v_l_ue, more
Likewise, while
the volume
the e_port
in exports.
deficit
of c,_r_d_ty
uni£ value
e×por£s
_ntet_tional
reserves
and a record
external
for _be Phili_pine_ •wa._ _ _urre, t
indebtedness
a startling
which, by
_tself, might
contrast
prices.
17 _erceat.
the valise Of
to 26 per cent of trade,
represents
the res,,|t'of an
rose a r_gdest five per cenC,
.index declined
35 per cent
almost
th_s _m
thzn offset by s decli, e _n _port
The result of this disaster account
_ut
t_rade,
_a d_cl_ne
the lowegt sluice 197I,
at 12.% per cent of trade.
to the situation
have appeared
bleak
in
in Kore_
enough.
This
in [98_
Tt
_otHd
fortune,_
of
a._'tcdch the
the
price
to _o
of
Phil.'ipp_nes
Korea,
flexibility
i_,nore
movevAents
the
way
to
Ph[l.ippines,
the
for
[or
that
the
from
index
index
he _lnfair
example,
avotd
ter_s
198Z was
of
trade can
out
and
tr._de poJ.icies, is as tm_ch to blame
bad
luck. conraent
oil in 1974-75 was r_,re of
oil
import;,_
imports,
The
w_.q 70 latter
on
its
the
than fo,=_ times per
rose
cent
greater
to 23
of
long
to
have
a built-in declin:ing dependence-on indtmtr,ia.1
te._ns of
oil.
known
The
reade
import
losses
pr{ce
as
of
that of 1971-73, ,_hile the value a proportion
as
per
have
own inward-looking
rolo
1982
_
excessive
for its
= lO0,
cent
in
of
1_}76-78
_ich
totaJ was
cc_odit_ 87 p_r
(:ellt
1971-73.
over
Then,
in ti_e.,qecond shock,
and
150 per cent
in
lqRO-_H
oil
ÂŁrapo_ts
to
30 per
to
of
]971-73
reIat-ively
continued
on the
corresponding
i_
of
trade
have. suffered
With
The
d Csaste?_
move
a' re:,'_,llt
52,
world
OF. course,
tradition,_l
#_ hr'.el
t_.rm_ of
pr/ce_.
itr_
Finally,
the
internation_i
The Philippines' exports,
of
in. the
wn._ 75,
resources
industries
rnle
Few countries
in
for
teat
the
12 per
rose cent
in
1971773
The Philippines Korea
the problem
promoting
t_ver cent
the level of
total
, 8rid then
appears of energy
alternative
i,mport price_
to
cost.
.Through
managed
1976-78.
import_
taken
energy, sources,
and othc_rs, the Philippines
of
subsided
have
ro._e 50 per cent
to m_ch
by 26
per
a vnriety
includin_
The share 198I
more
in 1979 Of
as compared
co,nt
seriously
in
1982. than
of programs
hydro,
geo-tbermal,
coal
to limit growth oÂŁ oil consumpti.on
-
to
per
cent
over
t.ho (_ntire
imp_,rr,q co a
four
imr
ce.nr increase,
of
seven
tO
three-fourth,,; Much
of
represented 4.3
per
hild l
per
per
I 0
one
l:er
cent
th_._" mjbsti.Lut:ion 94.7
and
77.5
o_
,_ent_
cent,
cent,
o_
and has
i,a_
onl:¢ has
energy
i_tens_£y
tO
b_s
f_P
there
one-hell
7 ./4 per
of
decl'_nm3,
cent,
ST'It_ g],it_l_t"
_._i._;<s
_.5 per
,_" pav,_._rs
cyis_t_
accommodation pr-esent,!d
model,
form;_]]v
presentaf:icn
The
trade effect,
_ effec_ import Bank,
the commodity
and
eim_'j.ar to in
A_:pendxx
alay suf'f_ce
mculel
.......
of .[974-'17
nat_re ]919-82
t.o
th_s
..
,.
1973
1977
coal wa_
?.O
pet
doe,
to
e,.nt,
coal
ce,_t.
oil, Of
19S_
oi_l
providing
per
ratio and
respectively. In
and
O,7
The
Phi]ippine
_)ut the energy
ttf4e
(M_kasiar,._'J,q'}).
p:iCtUr_.
Amllysis. ancl ('.oo._eq_sencesof can
_.,e
(1980).
paper;
hence,
tile
fr_
be 4er'i_d
Bala.gs_
.
:;lowe_
_,erms of
_:rade balai_ce
the
_._avjng tLr_,u_:h The
remaining
t_i,:.e_;_
e,x_r_.?.__t_d
198].),
i.ncreases
.
balance .heek-
mO_,,l _,S
a brief,
in|Tnrma]
he_'o.
i:_ de._._gn_:_dto _ea.%ure
and
hacl
o._.i
cent,
snare
oil*s
between
that: of A
per
hydr_
diminishe4.
S;¢):' k- Ac ¢ otr_mod._ _ iOs
F,._rF.her_;_)d_._t;,tancti._'_. _,,)f' _he
annuol
s%tbst'<tutxot_ for
.%t' i)ri_'_,htrtess :in the
2.
with
the
and
recently,
geo-the_ma.1
cent
1981,
one
very
1982,
sttbStantial
t.i_eeco,no,_y has almost
of
sout:ees, By
to
represent_
occurred
energy
been
1971.-73
This
2 $_Ir Ce.._ICon_i ,m_x-,<:onventional_ Not
(World
period
respectively;
hy;|Fo
....
of
growth,
lrade
effect
the difference_
......... ]._tter.
_..eX_ernal _
shocks
0., l:ez_s int-
export
@!_
of share
,_nd :import subsL/tution measures _.n import
th,, effect
on
and
prices
export
- 12 -
FXnally Impozt substitution seaourep the diffetence beCvoeu actual i_o
and hypothetic81 Inpo_to.
to what extent eeu/d
mrze
imports
be tc_o_ted
The Sap be_tn
helo_
fez
eoeal
Yt attempts to eneumr fbe queet4en: the
tze_d
by 810_e_
shocks
level
by an smmmt beyomd that
8ro_h?
_d
tom
sdJue_cs
__
abe
4Md£tAonll ez_
fluanclng requ£rod above the trend value ef 8oak
ftzumetag,
by the trend valuee of exports ,and i_tm,,
m but,
as glv_
"ac¢_tlo_" unlike
separate
it
submtlnt£_e
_tow
the
laeue,
The actual
other
(Wo_Id Bauk,
of eouree,
but
merely
Per Annum O_ Gro_h _o_t
use_
£e_ the whole
and 1979-82,
For
the
_o price indexes for
This
in the
_sBte. _leu_st_
_erU:
9.6
5.3
Rate
,427
.30_
1.9
1.2
al'e in p_:_ee.oJ_
_ho..base
period,
1974-82,
and f:o_ the
lat_e_,
the baee pe_t_xt is 1976-78.
"invisible" _ade,
eapo_ta
tO
Is uot 4
S,9
1spot t. E_tlci_y
done
_mem;
$,g
Sba_e
va2ues
X_
of
a rotter
of the paz_teter8
values
1981),
e_maents o_ ace_B0datlo_o
per A_an Growth _te of wo_Id exports
is
ie
to the shocks, _8 are a11 of the abov_ adjustS;
the Wozld _SsaMmodel
A11 tzade
Xt
pe_iod,
19'71-73.
ewe s_b-pe_ds,
end £upo_a
Att81ysta 1974-77
S'i_ce _m have . a_e eOumodltle_ • .
-
only.
In _.ffett,
ar_i agport_ trend
cancel
the
yards
and
th_
origin,
as-wet1.
the
of
these
of
adjustments.
policy
IL
price
e£fects
cowponemtS
in
if
_hey
be
directe_
to
sosetht:a_
are
_:o those
influeuced at
the
other
from
elasticities,
fZou
of
trade
i_vis.sLb'le
are
i.mporcs
slays
the
with
the analysis
_e_s
crop
_he
at
sbocks, _tl_li
of
graph
great cats. considerable
t_vealed
thei_
t_an
paym_nt_
tre_ds.
because
o.f
the
in
--
are
sh_tres,
even _ith
over
form as
They
may
And,
even
may nnt in in
re+_pon_e mJdition constant be
must
these. L_umitat_e_ns, of payments
the pa:_t
_he contrast
the
i_
given then,
light on the bala_ce
the l_¢li_imes
wodel
may be
The res_l_s,
gewertheless,
The effects
policies
liaitatio_s
cons£nnt
Investment
pol£cy.
they
could
the
eases.
£hose
i.e.,
interns}
interpreted
some
the
from
1980
_azter.
government
These given
and
in
of
be of
1978
the
reault_
cremate can
so_e.t/mes
polic,les,
that it highlights
t_O countries.
in
nmy_be
ot_er
of
I th_k
Korea
fsiture
They
shocks
the
experience
tri_s
_hat
adj,stmute:sre
asm_ptions
particulaz
that
to
tb_
psymente
fo_
are
shoc_q.
oE Kocea and
to
above
shock,
than.the
experience
of
noced
the
proceeding
tailored
hca_nm_,
however,
balance
before
balmace
by gove_e_t
and. g_v_u
interpt_¢ed
t|W
sad
t_e co
is
internal
._ec,_d,
res_nse
_el
already
Shoc_s,
to
order,
obvious,
yea_
responses
in
that
is
of
four
inter_al
be
this
I have years
eonsidered
boom in
are
assumption
shocks.
Of
these
caution First,
exte_l
also
that
and thai
of
aoalyais.
1970'2
be
as_d
-
values, Tvo
of
It" is
13
decade.
between
crisis
To
the adjustments
-
14
-
Table_; 3 and 4 _eve_]. the results
of the calc_tl.._tionsof ._hecv:sand
ae._.o_mnod.ations for Korea and the Pbi.li_pJ.nes, reApectlvely° f'or e._•chyear end s_ammed for the _$nolt:perlod and
_ve_
5 and 6 help to
Tables
p,r_', these res_Its
tel.alive -{mportsnce of eac.h _hock toCal._, _s _tl Total Korea _ore
a_ ro trade
_hocks iu
to
for
Clte latter
Phi.li_pp_.,er,._ut
_J._ht exp_:ct e_ternal volume
¢_fwor_d
were
slightly
co_mtry
(Table
5),
t.hewhole
the p_cture
shocks
v_lnerable damag_
trade_
period
berveen
expect
the mole
of
cour_'_ _, fox
tr}22. per cent.
surprising.
On_ _id
._harpiy.
This
¢¢_t,n'try to
'isthe. _e
mo¥'_.
co_._:try,_her_we mes_ure
_[_ [_zrns out not to be true Ln ti_s c:tse,
roughi._,equal ratio
revers,_t,
co_)szed
trading
1"he ratios are muc-h more. nearly uniform
i(orea',_tr_de-.CNP
they were.J _Jch
eoun1:.rle_i_ re;.ation
differ
_o _#ttchshrieks then _he 1¢._ trading
indicati_
i.mpnrc_mt _o
e.man_tiRg from change._ in the prices
we wouJd
:iv tel.ate.on to CNP,
howeve,r,
The
is nonetheless
trade to be more u_form
&:hi_g ,s sayin_
more
to CNP is much larger
ms a proportion
to trade th_t_ co (,NP wh_.,,tr_d_-(_ _ ratio_ same
the
to their, respective
chile.,in re].atio_ to trade
;._ver'_.JF£ng _.2 per cer_c over
the
two _,_b-_eriods.
in perspective, by i_dicati_
arid adjustment
re!.atiot_ to-CNP
re,let.is the fact that trade Korea,
the
are
and GNP.
than to the Philippines, important
Results
vulnerability
is _Imo.,._t double
_,_: fac_: th,_Z:total _horEs
represe_
for
C_qP _:_tn for
.:iespitethe 17m:t that
that of the Philxppi_tes. a t_uch _,',.,xgher proport'i.ovLo 1 _
'¢.radelot the Phillppi.¢_e_ is l_rRel•Y expJ8:_ned hy the differences _he behave.or _f the two countries'
in
ter_s of _r_de, a diffete._tce a.tready
-
note_ above.
1_e decline
15
-
in Philippines v terms of trade over the period
1.9"II-73to 1982. of 48 per cent was a].most do,ble undoubtedly
the
reflects
Philippines'
that of
greater, dependence
Korea.
'fhi._
on primary
. e_port ,. In any case., the for both
cotmtries
Mbreover, relation
ter_
over
of crmde effect
the whole
period,
as well
for both couatries, total shocks w_re to rT:aOe in the fir_-t period
diffecence
is trot:great.
The period
than
each period The pattern
tl_ picture
would
of exT_ort vohoe
m_ch greater
shares.
as in each
vo.[ut_e
slab-p_r:[od-
semewh_.t 8rearer
in
ends in 1982, however, No doubt
so that t.ii_
if we added
one yea_
be reversed. shocks
for Lh_ c_o ¢:ountr[es, be.ing derived and c.on,=tamte_port
oyez export
in the seco, d, tho,,gh the
addit.lonnl f_hock of 19S3 is not co_mted. .to
predominated
Com_rin_
is, o£ c_rse,
exactly
(rom the sa_e world
simil_r
expor.t v,_lues
the two peri.od_, _he _ffec£
i_ tl,e seco_)d, refl.ecti_8 the greater
depth
i,_
,nd lert_th of
the wo_rld _ecemsion. The pat.terns of ac<ommodations, !j.rtle similarity.
to red,,ce external p_.riod Korea's estimated
_%_le the
finmvzing
shocks
J.n contr.ast to the shocks, wete..largely accommodated
_:.lrbe].ow the assum_4__._9/_.
trade a_d growth
o.ffe_t:Sof _he shocks.
,ld_u._tmenr.s
were .tore
Over
show very hy a(idi.t.'!=o_
the wh,:_le
than double
the
For- the Philippine.f; thence adiustme.n.': _
representod
less th.,t one,-f_ur."h o_ :its shocks,
le.av.in__or#) Khan
75 per cent
" , % ' to be :m_.thV• add:,t1_.n;)_, fit_.anc-ln_ l._yond tbe ass_ed
trend.
-
16
-
Q
,o._ly ,t_t_r over
b.=,,m e_, m, _o.
r_s t_oZa t_r_-oa,
cite tin:jOt ,4jW___fm¢
/a¢_
I_s
.=port _Mtfueii
_m
,ms, uot __tY.
for 59 pe_-"et_!'ef_!_i,_.
_u==. _y ,..__ ".,¢ood__. ' __,¢_ .m=tl,_.
8m.ch_' ha_e _=s'eo=¢=_b_¢i__.s =t,e_. _Xa8
_X"-t_
,,mm,_=_,,
'"
uo_ Co a ccmpsrt_On of =he seeemmd=t:tea_tlt__,_:_'_s,
cue*_,e for _, se=_d period _.s1976-n; i__izsmtl,_ :v=zuu
for t_e se_:_,
Ip.e_'i6d,repre_c::edd£tioaa_t
' dit6¢ _b.ue c=_her, chart acc_su_ed
U_eeoU_d already
• wluu
=h_¢ cl_ PhitipptaeS
shocl_.dttd =__t_it;_mmr over 1771-73,-80"._h _
_juaced
betM
_lu_e,
_.',_:Jd_-_d_l_d
mt,=i_=o¢.op¢.iZom r=_r, =!.=to ,,,,t._¢t_.-,,mml_=
- 17 -
policies.
It
recovery trend
i8
after
cent.
ratio
--
lower
For both
the
adJuat_ute
in the
was greater
better
(Table
This
gives
and is
than
the
£n the
proportions 96 per cent, One cannot for
_rld
perforeumce
in
respectively, easily
increased
Rather,
it
period
srKue,
exp_rt had been
I had calculated base
gain
share,
(both
for
share going
hypothetical
case
on for
e_-ports
For
the whole
the
in
6). Is
final
the
period. nutrket share,
period
the
95 per cent.
of Phillpplne
exports
1972 prices).
even more outstanding.
and for
the
hc_ever,
to the
shocks
previously.
on the asmmption
projected
(Table
due to greater
growth
of Korea,
some time
but had insr_ead
is
over
by Increased
was a response
though
in
measured
the decade
in the
_econd period
to
share
yea
for
to /reports.
a ruutrkeble
trade
respect
adjustment
export
6.
continued
accQunCed
share
performance
that
the
thls
been
first;
In exports
1979-82,
F_res'8
share
increase
of Table
£ailure,
market
for
coluam
of declJ.n_ng
of _cport
export
_nd for
the
£n the
gain
per_od
in
in the
to the assumed
substitution
value
value
would have
of export
of export
cent
second
--
only
total
trend
the crop
than
import
by the
second
This
Korea's
period
of
by the
was 72 per
face
without
occurred
proportion
in the
shove
compared
_aporcanca
that
however,
proportlcm
in the
the
2) divided
¢ho_
per cent
of the Philippines'
Lndkcated,
year
below
co shocks
second
J_provement
The significance
six
was well
Nevertheless,
countries,
Philippinam
growth
at about
per
conmidar&bly
exports
chat
1980.
of 9.6
p@rfor_e
true
the past
share last that
were
92 and
four
years.
this
of the
The
drive
[970's.
If,
for
not
of a constaut
rate
exanpie.
of increase
of
-
sha;,_t (ov,_" the period.
[orate
h_ s subetmtis_ hypothetical
exports
_r2d
mxpotte.
share
retarded
81moat
mmr times
for
first
_
the _h
the _cIin_
_t
half
it
mad ch£,
pmrfm-mmce
Of
isL Eot_'8
MevQcth41eeo,
u_s,
lare,Jly
in, Che ahock-
i_,
of
in
r_
seem _o e_lleet
_ort _l_t
umsld
_s _oced
gha_
sbov_,
_lll_t
_
Co. C(m_liCC With
_i_
imlieat_d a much _o_ hmmveg_ eho_chm
hup
_
be_,
eha_
assumption
A eecood
other
cl_4-p
ptrformsa_
ch_utge from 1976-78,
shc_
ice mqual,
t_
isport
C_mi8
in 197g-82. _h_ie
the Utat
elastie_cy.
m d_ete_,
In the ev_ond
of I_tymmt8
aitu_tio_
_so_
demmnd f_ojt 1.9.
reduce,
s_d
of
in evideuca.
_aaC th_ mules
the bs/.ancqt oeriou_
_t2£ppt_s,
not
m_pO_te.
of import
1.6.
ot .trade
l_s_mc_,
the co, scant
aud t_
ml-,_._e t_dly ke_e
_or
terms
the d_c_,dm, w_leh _te
e_dof
le_s
of the
_i1_ 8hock
iucame eluticic_ to
far aL1_erlor the a_dLyeLe o_ the
in
ch_ preoffence
_shc
by _.
Korea°8
yes evtddmc
Tog _k_ Philippit_s, Ch_ better
t'emulta,
of in©tesam
share;
corrobotst_
of hypod_ieaX
b9 t_c_i_4.1_8
"
adjustment
Xor,mm_, Zeus's rc_bl_
1982.
(1971-73)
_ septic},
Ko_a
Cremd level,
svoid_
s in
period
lmtKely
p_te.
r_
in tea czl_ulatio_
.V_res
end,
" They show also
surpluses
us_m_d
the rstm
psyJmat,s s_usment
Th_ p_incipal
is
of couz_,
outs,r.4md_n8
_sm_lts-f©t peyne_ts
b_v_ reputed
results
•section.
_ct
share _j_Umnt.
1982 would
the &scads
Korea _
Co 1971-73),
_i.
1_a o_r_ll of
-
1961-63
uporr
the base
the
amcamscdsr.ion
balsam
In
_u face,
three
sr.cOu_tm
a-eaciw
18
period
indic_tot_s, The t'_g_r
thinlmtter
eh_e
-
the •_eemsl_ fiat
th_
befe_
s_e_
197z-73. _
tits .PhllipplMo
en_o__
had f_14d
hnewr,
•of _s-_dsce_"e-_fo_t ss such.
_,st"/_
is
_.cher.
_m(;r/ms, wze
to
incmt
Usaeess_
_r
/_ efforts
o,_ the ws_/_l_._y o_ t_,
ol 8z_mh ,s_d
W ss/au
_h, l_/_pLus
£C _ht
soetioa _t ths£t /n_st_nt
._ _h.
it d£d
co prouo,t_ eev escorts.
hyparJmsis
_hat be_
laSZ's_L_ $_outh Sr._rar.sSlss, lStDs_Y /4_z_,S
ps3_SntS coxidetat/mts, nat
prsd/_t.
x _d_k. e_sa _estLn8 _b8 export
r_e slWelm.
sores s_cas_
To shsd mm_s _
pre, lmt
_h8¢ each we
abroad v_m
=sks, mmmm,
Bsspi_,
its
olu_ek.
tb_..s_x.Ts_s so fsr shoreS.,lltt_
£t appesrs
ms L, _,eponse
uot su_Ud;
to recover .£x_m ths first'
to. x_lWoe4,t_, the .ba_mce of.,pSyum_s
_,LtX/mS: to borrw
1_is/mmqm,_s_/m_ Imrf_
I_14#_iShts the /aqortmce of thb
,the. secend in. explstn/aS
po_ boe_ eoeseries,
sboeb
19-
be £ns£r_t£w
ba_c,
to 1_ok ,brLefl_
and ssvln8 perfotusnce_durinS
of in the
t_
_.s_. 3. • The ratloe
Savins-I_s_snt
of I[_ss _r=mnt
Ln Tab_e_ 7 an4 8. t_Spect£vely yem_o 1971-82. &_topi_S eount_/as
Tha _at/_s
mini irroes _s_
¢o _
_ot Korea a_d th_ _hilippied_,
are s/sLtlaZ sad relatively
cQuntrLe, in 8sur_ /a the 1960's.
ku_,_. are shenm fo_ the
high c_psrsdto
and a1_o to th, ._,_.£os fo_ tlm sam
°
_e
dA_e_e_.e be_eu
=hat _
4_
cmqmsmt
-
r_e t,m t_tlee la, of cream, fere_l_ eav_,
,_e_ tae_mlu nat tremfan, ]Latter e_i_y
20
as wA1 as mt e_
foreisn of sev_8
eavini
ees m
I_.
fer beth eoI_r_. as _
_.
_
so
_,_
_
immem_. _st
is mtrik_U_8 in beth case= is tim =los durta8
tmestuut
z_bm
shove 30 per eat
te leusla
at _
the zg;0's md of _
t_ 24 per cemt aml 2t pe_ mint, rolp_t£mt27, Pld_ppiae8 (of_
la tie
bxse pertmi,
mhlla _he rat_
in 198t end 1982, a zeeord b_ 2o_ 197_-82 ef Ju_
a ,u,Qdy ratio lm_
)tereovs=. th_ _t_o
per _=
far
ef the tuo smocks has all
for Korea end dregped off
Tho __m08
_e_rs of the seeeed yes al_dy
die FaiAip_e_
duads,
fo_
of 35 pet cemt ta lgTg 8_L_a en
elmve 30 pet ee_t
over g_e fnt
ef the
sub-pertad
us_tained at the usa
at 28 per eest for Ir_ta
ia _,
the e.m_
f_¢
m_rled
of _
_r_oemmt 1join fez
m_d
?be _I_
per_
emmet_e _,
the Lmmsmm¢
e_ ¢1_ ,_at_e of ee_nmt fe_ I[omo
ta¢_
rote
=¢¢em¢ dd_t¢
i_q_es=
r.e trade -- 1_7_-_5 ad
rout 1975-76 and 1_79-0= for _
_.= _e,=t:
Xf one did ,tot kae_ abe,=t _
st tmmtmat eesLl_
_ludo
Sd_tly
}qJ_rO_
s._
_,
bslmce
Chat tb_ yua_ rate imms_s_t
dweln8 the peak _ear=
_dAi_es o3.1 et._
ef _mmts
of _e_e
t_stet_,
1979-_o
l_e e_de_ce a_t ,,_=pl_ e_
_¢
of ps3_euce 4_r_Le_t_Jae _ete
boom Sot out of hand.
lhtC. of Co.roe
-
we must
bring in saving
21
to complete
-
the picture
of, this side of the
story. Both
countries
also raiBed their
levels,
i.n the case of
1974-82
the same percentage
in 1971-73. rise gap than
just
Korea's
six
gap.
in government Looking Korea
was dampened growth
together
relatively
with
by the consequences
_Ith the record
Indeed,
ratios
Of the external
the peak
of
_'!,'>_
the i_ves_ment In 1979 the
_nvestment
_atÂŁo, bt_r
aver, ge for the
and again shocks
for
of
There current
five years
the average
defici:
low :i.r_ the _,_r.
ratio.
indicator
ie the other
the. _:'h_/.'.
in 1980 _._,_ i_L
-_-e.._.
slo_,-
but there _e0_a[n the
is clea_er.
remain as evidence
in
levy.
(Tab].es 7 :_,_,! _).
account
below
that in 1974-75
the picture
saving was at or _bove
high investment
rise
saving
o_ inflation;
slightly
in Korea,
relatively
the sharp
in the sav_.ng ratio during
until _e reach 1982, ]979-81)
rates
was
an avera_c
contribution
of the current
high investmet_t raci_os as clear
of a decline
but the
creating
This
Im, [980 and r_ined
[-tis r, ossible
For the Philippines
the period
ratio an prevalh:,J:
but especially
for the foreign
sharply
of GNP and higher
1974-82.
_._ find saving
ratio was very. high along
two years.
the investment
a si_alficant
peak yearn
and 1979-80),
the former dropped next
duri, ng
represented
peak values
For
maintain
that: of Lnvestment,
cent
again at the
pair of years, which ratio, yields
per
ratios over base. period
had no gap in the b_se period,
In both countries,
saving
(1974-75
saving
gap below
failed tO tmtch
under
to
by enough
The Philippines
in saving of
Korea
saving
_s no
ye;r_:_
and
Again,
sh_ek,
sh_i,<_!,,
evide_,:_c
deficit
(1975-76
1974-82.
internal
internal
the
- 22 -
Oue would need.a of the
external
very
rich model
and internal
8hocks on the
_ay here. I$ .that it eeem_ evident shocks
in both coant_lee
18 besg
to measure
colnei.din8 with
in those yesrs_
In any _ase_
it is cleer
unw_l!:LaK Co lel:
and _re
successful
"but _n
belanca
_,/ an incremental
retarded
hi_h_ relaxIvy i_ part
not
et I_88t
_
to dietorti_e
Korea_
Inves_ut
in heavy, industry
I_
in c(mtrast,
_ell. ratio
in the
In_ee_nt
O_t1',nEfor stand
in the w_y
_he,re_
Pb,ii!ppine. _ruwth w._ (ICOn,> that_ rata:[ned countrle_,
pr_.ce _te_,_e_tlon
a low ICOn, until
!at_ _gTO'S,
growth
•Korea w_,s, o£ course,
developin_
government
enjoyed
This
i_ e.x_,_n._,_i_g _tm_._poEt
'bu_ t_ moet
_nly to Kor_
co_cern_
for Korea),
caplta%-_utp_t
_ollcleS,
shocks.
a_ a _c_trn_y,_llcal _easure,
of p_ynent_
out ,_f _,_vi_.
All I can
ri_e in government
not only
effects
Int.¢rnal Investmnt
.r, hat both c.ountrle_ WeTe
_,_ tbls etrat_,
_eneratln@; _z_wth
8_P,
the external
preeumahly
(at leaat _z_tll the e=d of t_m period more
resource
that there w_re
e_qplmlned_ I thlnk_ by the 8ha_)
in b_th c_triee
the relative
th_ mcltch
_ing .. t.c_
4.
What growth
the
above
increase this
quantitative halance
external
because
Jt went
of
its
no
the
longer
in both
dropped
to below
adjustments growth m_ch was
crop
fell
strategy
It
failure away
with
0.9
eo,_pared
far
short
the
world
big
to
the
strategy
is not
the
purpose
comparison
based
on
studies
(e.L_
tha=
have
been
direction The protective
of
an
to
and
the
d:i.scol.mted becm_
paper
of
_.nd_.strini and
question,
suffered
for
its
the
trade
Korean
help
those faster
has
dis_orted
industrial
three
and
decades
trade
p_rl!or_nce to
_,:_
_'hi::_ q_e_t i_',.. p:_I_<;_-
P,lw_,r n,_,lAm:=._;i.,.:: .:"
to guide
under
p_.liciea
That
[;erfo_;m_,,-'_ _
strat_,f.<..,:and
Ba,xr.iata,
may
o].a_tic-ity
197't's.
r,o g_.ve a_ a_swer
,._u_d Kin, and
this
of
modes, +.
import
}.2).
mJs_n
Korea,
had
(its
Phi]i.ppi,es'
tb_s
_._,ti._
]argq_Iv
1981--82 when
is why
cmJrse,
it,
import
Philippines
env_.ro,lment
of
from
va/._e of
needed
_t.h
,,_ [a
a_e_.er.
Philippines and
to
the
of
Westphal
help
year._
assumed
economic
choice
the
to implem_-.n_
ÂŁnduatrv,
s_bstitution
was
question,
8ow_..%_er. a brief
directed
what
to get. away
mom_
p_tt-
willix_ K to
shocks
in heavy
While
import
were
shou]_d be
and
to the
Of
able
el_ment
eountrJe_
external
w_th
it.)
and
and
severe was
i.n 1980
share
that: both
investments
growth
The
adequate
of
Korea on
export
in
is clear.
not.
above,
slower
i_
congid_rat[ons
._hare performance
8ettlng
success
Policies.
show_
r.he face
overboard
(_e
it reflects
payments in
export
and
analysis
As noted
__ubstitutEon.
was
of
debt
strategy.
prematurely
Strategies
hiZhiy
theft pro,_.c_'d
t_4: _
stron8 the
biases
against
wauufacture
market.
of
_e
of
and
this
exports.
F_curl_nt
inflation
resulted
overvaluat.i_
policies)
s_
inter_dist,
has
bee_
to retard
to hamper
_
excessive
cycles
the
of ba_nce
Peso
_d
the'
traditional
exerts
face of
by meane
efforts
that reeo_nitio_ ¢Ou_terinK
of the prim_:y cost
of
tariff
_on-traditic-_,_..,.:!.
p_i.co
I_ _
_ystem.
of
continuing P_IUppine
_or_d
tnr.ez_.ntJ._:_"_.
1960_s s_Eched
fo= export
llberali_tion
that
1980's
of this patch_,on_ pat,,:h-_,spprcseb system, _-.e6t,_ _:h.£adopt:_.on
_his program
i_,_ee, n_ives b)' _-rt_%_al
has been ha_,er_d,
and i[s _fects
r._._fo_+in 8dj_st_enU
however,
by
on the p_'ia_s and vo]_m
_xports,
Korea also initially the early
$..ttc_apt_,
non-.
exchange
'nO_ t_,_ti!_:he early
_.he protection
_ecess_on
__,.".
have been inadeq_m[:e
of f_,re£:_
the World Bank and _u__orted
imp].e_entatl.on of
loans,
of
both
the bias _inst
incenti_$
ondarv_satio_-
of the inade_a.cy
the biases
_o counter
with
set
of
do_t.i_:
sect.or (burdened
go_ez_meut
commt_tation
eredit
growth
the
of
o_ _radiv.ica2a.ipr:i_ry
of trade l_bara_i_za£ion and fiscal
o_
for
to promote
Of a program
the
favor
of ._aymeat$ crise.o, devalustien
of fiscal
_he sUbSt_tial
:is4efemde_. by _he
to
the
in
_o carry this load, (_,aterna_=ioual Labour' $_'!fice,}.974)+
beginuin.g at the end of the 1960's_
in the
goods
decadence
from the inability
o£
production
_nd
agriculture,
and to maintain
exports,
and agricultural
consumer
result
manufacturing
by
ex_orts
adopted
en inward-lc_kin_
to export
£sdustrles
_d
promotion.
exchange
:.£r_ 1967 a,_d i973, Korea
incentives
for e_ports
s_ra_e_y_
Largely
rate polic_,
was able
b_t: in
throu_h
cheap
sided by tarif_i
to creat_ a more balanc,eJ
and i._port substitution.
Zn the s_d-1970's, industrialized
because
country
manu£actures,
goremn
uatkets
exports
for
thm nov capital-Intensive
F£_lly,
in =ha early
starker
of
aimed
inflation,
l_ad
emphasis
The prosrsm
(Korea's
first
is
use
sdjust_nt
some success
to bring
in helplng
uhJ_e
d_cl£u£ug
Prom this
_h_t
psya_nts
crises.
external
shocks
vigorously
price
of
_re
Pirst in both
pushing
The other
g_ow_
(International
overview
nOw to pollc£es
of the
sustaining
expozts
various
and
supported
loan.
countries
ahead with
_x_t_nt
aI_nt
foraisn
exch_e.
the
six
of
and otheg
since
err_nts 196|)
and by
has _ir_ady
and the
c_-rant
per cen_
£n the
had account
and policies,
i_diataly
face
o£
response
9 sb_
to
_ll_,
as already iautedia_e
I turin
_o _he balance
to boz¢ov
Table
as4
Fund).
the policy
growth,
rural
The program
at
all
and Ko_
trade
by stand-by
strategias
vas
the decade rate.
industry,
down inflation
_ora
increased
end a coucouitanC
of Fund resources
foist,
incentives
w_ assin re_rsed
to
of _P
in heavy
being
interest
Sro_h
_onetary
related
fiscal
By the end of
on heavy
of lonK-rsnga
in /abor-lntensive
_hile
preferential
in
substitution
eliminated,
at more modest
s World Bank stz_ctural
deficit,
1970's,
and more attentim
sectors.
the
to /aport
1980's .trataS_
lees
liberalizatiout
neglected
was the
protectionism competition
industries.
export8
of program
the
and fi_slly
for
zadoct/mz
vi_h
retired
rs_a/_M
adopted
sb-ltched
Over
for
that
end Srovlng
strateay
and chealcs1"£adustrlea. wre
of £ncreas/_g
o_
the _ile
noted.
polleies nouina_
va_
tl_
--_8e_.
sud real
excha_,_
rates
for
ideally
won and
should
prices
of
since ve
the
peso
be nominal
really
that
traded
goods
would
can
be
to
have
an
changes
in
the
degree
for
index
into of
of
@oods
and
The Philippines
began
floating
rate policy.
prices
1976 i_ remained
slsnificanely
roughly
no evidence
Of payments
_he Koreasa case.
not
goods
faetor_, (Thi_
important,
_'-i=h
For the vrice_ av_.rm_,eof
(or primary
factors)
6Ully inel_i_es
constan_
T%e r, al rate rose
reflecting
at about
to
depreciation
by one year
Fate
1982 di_
Not ,mill raise
during
@=_,_tic
policy
the infla_ior_.
the bsse period
bore of _n exchange
there is some evidence
in each case loll'wins
rate rose gr_sdually to
It then _el]
([975-76),
c_ises.
Significant
a,14 the adoption
oil prices on the import side and high
._nd this was not enough
I_ contrast,
_ry
pric-._.
-- the simple
off to the end of _he decade.
og _aymenta crisis years
balauo;
pr_
not for Korea.)
The nominal
on _he outpu_ side.
tO the
And,
the de,ado wi_h a devaluation
susar and
The_e is virtually
goods.
the index tha_ most
o_ high
After
relative
_d
are
;'ornon-traded
im 1974 es a reflection )pper
the
factor
protection
it being
rates
in
traded
primary
_eal
services.
1976 and then leveled
balance
changes
and non-traded
but perhaps
unit values.
the GDP deflator,
Of a managed
adjusted
1971-82.
I have ,_sed _radL_ unit values
import and export
non-traded
years,
goods
like
of traded goods
the
decomposed
was true for the Fhilippinesp
I ha,,e used
for
rates
internationally
non-traded
assumes
the
fennel,
respons_
the peso depre¢:i.:_._
the real rate,
of exch_n_
rate response
i._
took p; ace in 1975 m_d lq_0-._i,
the onset
of _he crisis.
These
_ere
not enough,
however,
rates o_domestic 1975-79 _iod
allowed
inflation.
First,
vere similar
Whyp
then,
in the t_
_d_trt_l. the
exports_
_s
Korea's
_-eaponses.
_hilippines,
but
inv_St_-nt
Zorea_e e_ who_
policie_
also
p¢1_icy rempons_ cases,
to _a_
rate over
below
the base
not
underrated
inco growth,
look nt s_rategie_
to
b_tter?
T_s
_tratsgie_
aad _olicies,
¢_t_ard~iookiag
constellation
_trkec
m_dest
_=,:<-,:!:
psW<_ o :.
_xch,_.__;:
_was bor__;o_abx'o_d, _o _:'_
apl_rently
of
the balance
,_xcep_ for gorea_s
"_fer'_nce
long-_
policies
and im_u_trial
of
nominal
fro_ this brief
'l_e name of the ga_
lles in the
differance £._ed_Jlte
can w_ d_
the iJmedlate
•ate adjustments.
over
the constant
_he real ra_e t_ fall ,i_ificantly
conclusions
pOlicies?
and
A_
owiug
level. _t
e_s
to k_.ep _he _eal. r_:e f.rom falling,
_ p_ice
¢m_y _m_red Che efficiency
ga'_
it
di_c,'_r_:ious
n__ i_!_the -
a grea_ f.ro_
g_eat
o_ treble advantage: _.ts
own
tra:..-!._..
_he gro*_th of non-.craditic_i_ o_
trm_slaCi.ng a, high
lev_:C
The outl_ok Crowth
for developing
in. the industrialized
than in _
countries
past two decades,
there i.s a_ yet no indicat_on fully _o isports
¢_ountrfes in general
particularly
fro_ developing
The other
countries°
dev_.loped _eg_t
There
is
a_d the Philippines
m_e.
are ca]l__
diversification;
_:,•[!
enterpri._e_.•
countries
(the i_:[
no reason why the gre_t:___ _hould
be rigidly
tied t,'_
i¢_ _he _nd_st'ria_.ized countries.
Both coun.trie_._ 21 th.i_k_ are fully these dira¢•tions.
_)r_
i•m_or=a•nt,both
oa that _ew dire.<:.tlc_sindicated
adj us t_.n't
to move
are aware of pa_t.
mistakes
Fiftl_ Five Year
and ether refo_s
._ _q_
Plan a_d t".._e
u'_der its _:_truc_.v__.._,
9rogra_,
How _uch _rospects
aw_.re ,_.._ _he need
in Korea'c
Phi].Ip_i_es _ trade iib_r_lization
_uccees
car_ we expect
._re reasonably
near at l_as, the gr_;_h, their Pla_. For. th_ even_
_wo strstegies
developing
Mor._:ov,:..'_
their economies
sea.la industrial
trada _ong
of wo.:ld trade),
of cou:_=ries like Kore# growth
_ore
ir_ _!:: ,:
_nd Japan.
Or_.eis to promote
t,h_:ough.._edium_•d• s_l
.isto• promote
to be slower
in Europe
that they ,_i.llopen
for in the fsce of this prospect. th_- .r_•ralsector
is expected
is nc,t very brig.:."
_a¢t_ deperJ_ Ph'i,lippi_,_.:,
be_i=_i_
in A_st,
Bood __t
_rom t:hez._e ,_._._-_ort_? For E.or_a. -",'. the}- will _:_.e able to _ch.ie":_e s,_,?'. " '.
s,.abiltzat_cr_
_nd dii.ve_._ificarior_, targetg
of ae_,rse._en the _orld 'the
picture
is trot:
1983 r_.vea.ie.d h_w
eco_,_omf_: envi-ce_.._.:•. _:•.
_o b:,:iRh_. f_agile
The
pol'i:.i'_"_'-!,..
_be, Fh_i_-_,_-
- 29 -
bL1ance
of paym_ts
ability
of th_
pollt£c_
soon,
a £avorable
is not: wssk d_m_
i_
mama l_ss ,r_)_
hss
/_duc_i
ha(
the
eco_
world
8 ._sslve
capital
_;_, how_ve_ _ill
re_ove_,
_vlr_t.
the
sppar_t
let
alone
rapidly
_
it
fii_s_
that
has
t_ke
eco_c_c
_:_,_
sev_":,_
cri_s
will
h_l_
in th_
d@al with_
thin polltlc_l ,though
tll_
lag te
fi_ht
The _nderlyr_n_
c_,_. t_
_,_
_cu_c,_'_,
o_' 1983.,
A _,_:_:_.:.,_,,<_:
that:th.._:_mol,_slr_ of the _olltlcsl cr_.ei_ml,S_-_t
com_i_m_mt t:o ths ecr.m_ctc c_tt_
_a.
to reco_Ize.
econ..
and was l_r_S however,
,It_mtloa
ev_
thin Phillppi_e
be resolved qaln,
gove_t
crisls,
d_ed
and dabt
itself.
policy re_oc_
to _hi¢_ the p'zss.,_:._:.
- %0References
Balassa,
B., the
Bautis_a,
"The Newly Oil Crisis,"
Indust_llzing World Bank
Stair
De_e.iopin8 Working
Countries Paper no.
After 637, 1980.
R.M., Power, J.U, and Associates, Industrial Promotion Polic_e_ is the Ph_l_nnlua_, Philippine Institute f-_--De've_lopme_tStudie_, 1979.
International
L ..........ice,
Shar_
International
Monetary
_._ Surve1_e_., April
F_.d,
in Devel_:
A Progr_
t8,
of
1983.
_ak_siar,
G.S., "Structural Respc,a_e'to t.he Enersy Crisis_" Trade and Development _onfe_encs, M_v,.i_._, 198_,
Westphal,
L. and Kim, K..S._ "_rtdtAstrialPolicy and DeveXoVaent World Bank Staf£ Working Paper, no. 263_ 1977.
World ¥ager,
Benk, World
De2el._ o___!
_poort,
Pacific
in Kor4b_,'•'
1981o
J.A. _ "Comparison of Ene_$y Dev_..iopmeo, ts in Japan and South Korea _f_er _he 1.973._740il. Crisis," Pacific Tra_e. and _Io_e_t. Co_tferenc•e0Fi_nila, 1989,
Republic
of. Korea, A .S__!m___x _ Dr_ Soc'i.al Development Pla_..
of the Fi_th
Fix_e-_YearEcor_c
and
"51
"_
Appendix A. The Shock-Accoimodation
The resource l_sm commodity trsnsfers
pp exports
resource
prices
_J_ base
base
period
is
(X) less net earnings
period
$ balance
SaP in
raised
or
prices iu
(z)
We period
a_bgequenc
lowered
by or
the
low.red
current
prices.
R. -,_
(I + r"on)
terms of trade effect
(3>
any
raised
We can then divide
in
the
eq_uml to
cc_n_ity
from _rv_ces
impor:.#
and privat_
"o""o-_o-So
The
the
in
(S).
c_> period
(R)
ModelII
the change
and s volume
period
(n)
ch_mge in by the
equal_
_mpol:t
¢_tmge
imports prices
Ln ewpozt
in less
b_e. ex_,orr.,-:.
prices
i_,._
- Xn (t.+ Pc,a) x - Sn in R bet'ween
the two perioda
into _.
effect.
%:,%-_,,_,-_,,o_> + (_-.o> - <x-L>- (s.-so) then
define
u,
where
Rn-Rn£ as Rt is
¢he_ additional
_,he t_end
o%onthe
_m
Rem¢
--X/The i
,S is
external
resource
fi_ancing
zequi_'e4
pp_
c_-.o> * (x,,-Xo> + (_,.-So) always a_
its
_rend
value.)
rices _-
indicate exports 9.6
....
three
CNP and world
I the period, year
averages
was calculated
per cent,
for
and for
"1964 _'t _
exports "1972"
a_ >und the )wars.
to b_ _.9 Philippine
_
are
5.3
The growth
per _eent.
annual
a
_tatiol
_ ..........
per cQnc per annum, _,
the
_ate
]_or Korean
J for
vorld
CI4P,
._r_.
Koren:
InH ,,-.
I03 + 1.571 lnY-
(11.32)
1.579 lnP
F
- 150
(-.94>
72 . .974 DU-
Philippines"
lnN*
.117
lnY-
.312 lap
(8.610)
_oth £ncole
eluticities
are
(-.932)
oigni_icant
_t
the
F
1.33 - 40
72 -
.908
one per cent
,_elthez_elative prlce elasticity £_ ai_nificant.
196_-s2 Korea,
lnt_ = -.066
+ 1.646 lnT-
,$84 lnP
F
= 377
(_t.s_)
(-4.o6)
-_2..97s g_ -..72
Philipp/_ee"
lnX-
.062 + 1.091 ln¥-
.441 1rip
(10.18)
(-3.37)
F
- 1_8
_2 ...939 - 1.68
All
o_ the
coef_Ic£ent:s
are
8/Snlflcsnt
at
the
one pe_ c_.nt level.
I TaW
'..
Balance
(Millions
Year
Current Accom_ Balance
of Payments Crisis Indicators: Korea, 1,971-82 Of U.,_. dollar_ and Per Cent)
Per cent •of
Trade 1/
International Per Cen_ "Reserves- 2/
of Trade
Extern._l Indebtedness
Per
(:(e_:.: Dei;._. '..:
of TrmL:_ "
,:.i_-_ ,..i.,.:
:_,971
--847
39.8
571
26.9
2,505
117,9
_'.':.
C?72
-370
14.8
740
29, 6
3,088
123.7
!:.,:::;,
:::73
-.308
). l
1,095
25.0
3,927
89.9
: :::,
16,3
4,849
76,9
_:_
,,22,3
5,9,57
85.8
.L.
2,961
30.2
7,253
74.]
9 ,
t,, 30"1
32.7:
9,026
6_;.b
':.
i774
-2.023
31.2
1,056
'97_,!_ ..
-I,
887
27.2
1,550 '
-31.2
3.1
:'; <> _l97 ; _973
12
-
-I,085
6.1
4,937
27.6
I_..747
65.5
_c ,
?,9 ..... "."_
4,15t
].9. I
5,708
26.2.
14,304.
65 ,5
>> ,;. °_
: _780
-5,321
20. 9
6,5 72
_;. 8
.'6,705
65.6
:t:2.'_
>:-.....
-4,645
_5.,5
6,890
23, 1
20,652
6_) 2.
"_; ?
:.,,_: ,_
-2,650
8.2
6'985
23._
20;752 _-/
69.6
:_".
;_,_:,: I971-73
-508
20.6
802
27.2
3, _.73
,_.>.',:.,_;, 197/)-77
-I,052
15.4
2,468
:25.4
6,771
.._;-v._'.;.. 1979-82
-4,192
t5..9
6,539
26.6
18)103
/v_;'_, I9 74-82
-2,651
t4.6
4,552
25.3
I2,360
--l/Trad_
is
average
of e_rports
and
id..5
.
imports.
2/End of year. _/Public debt•plus guaranteed private
debt di,_tded
by e_ort._..
!/Estim__e based on cYtangein p_blic d_bt _,,)urce:&si_
P_velopmen_ Bank, _
ladic_tor_) April
_d
Oetober) 1983.
_....
7.5.8
_.0.;
67.6
i.?.;
70,9
!:.;;..;
_
Balance of Payments Crisis Indicators: Philippines, 1971-82 (Millions of U.S. dollars and Per Cent) ?ear
CuzT_t
/_
mat
_anc
Per cent of
Reserves
_2/
Per cent of
Trade
External Indebtedness
Per cent Debt: of
Trade
_._,:.
R._ti:_j_:
0.2
376
25,6
1,685
114.7
9
-
551
35.7
1,868
120.9
536
-
1,038
43.6
1,918
80.5
:_3.7
_9_ ," : 3
International
Trade _1/
-3
_/i
:,
.
6._ _._:
_'_
-176
4.7
1,504
39.8
2,_I1
61.1
_'_._
_,7',
-892
23.4
1,360
35.7
2,788
73.3
7.
25.6
1,642
40,0
3,93h
95.8
7 ,. 1
15.9
1,524
32.1
5,103
107.5
7.6
J
i_:___
-1,050
977
-752
,_7_
-1,173
21.0
1,881
33.7
6,297
112.8
13.2
_':'??
-1,576
22.0
2,4.16
33.8
7,204
100.9
]3._
) 9_:C:
-2,051
22.6
3,140
3_. 5
8,415
92.5
_'_.1
-2,293
23.5
2,707
27.7
10,148
!08.8
]_),_
_8;?
-3,3.57
34.6
2,543
26.3
12,138 -_6/
125.3
_3.2
::'._:_',_ 1971-73
181
-
-717
655
35.0
1,824
105.4
17.4
1,50"t
36.9
3) 534
81,9
_v_.
1974-77
::v_;.
1979-82
-2,319
25.7
2,701
30.6
9,476
105.6
_i',vg.
1974-82
-1,480
21.5
"2,079
33.7
6,482
95.9
7. ,_
_;.', :
7
_L째G
i
!......
,-.
1/Trade 2/End
is
4/Eetimate A_ian
of
exports
..............
and
imports.
of year.
31public
Source:
average
debts plus based
Development
on _ank,
guaranteed chan_e Key
in
_. _'
private public
Indicators,
debt divided
by exports.
debt. April
and October,
1983.
_xte-znai -_,'.c-cks and ;_uc.-,_o ..... .... _,s. : Korea, u_a ['_c. (_.i " " " U....... . .... :
_'ear
Terms
of
Trade
Export
Total
g_..o_ •-z --t
Sl o%'er
Vo!u_
Sho.t'ks
_hare
Cro_.._th
1974
1,754
38
i _792
309
!975
2,130
33'J
2,463
i ,600
i'_76
1,962
322
2,284
2 ; 700
977
I, 161
45D
t.,6ii
978
l _7_0
57'9
)79
3,909
_80.
1%.',_.-$2
Impo rt S_,bst,2tution
-_16
Tot al _
.555
.....
._-._i :
1,348
1,024
2,785
-351
1,533
3 _918
- ]. ,634
3_546
o-4!!
1,739
4,874
-3,263
2, "559
4 _2 72
-754
i, 609
5,1.27
_2,768
676
4,585
4 )029
°°355
1,866
5,540
-955
5,2 _ .......
1,036
6°274
&,7_2.
2,247
2,134
9,173
-2,899
_81
5, t_88
i ,399
7,2!}'7
6_219
3,257
2,385
11,861
-4,574
9BZ
_,881
1,92!
6,002
6,985
4,609 "
3,392
I&,967
-8,965
34,657
34,952
@,4!4
16 ,227
59,593
-24,q36.
@,150
8,655
-58i
4,851
I2,925
-4,775
3,259
22,981
-7,I69
971_-P,2
-_.?_9t)3,
6 ;7_/._ .=
974-77
7,007
i,143
)?c_-82
7i2,580
3,232
',"": .:;::
t5,8t2
1t,721
2:'-_...":.:i_.: !.,_._., '"-_.... _ "':":" '7:.to[:'_,
; 2_;':':_.:-;:_'..F.
8,001
!61
A_ust_
Addi [iom
";:";
::":
"_ .'T--
• ' • L:
_.._.,..:.-:._ >4 _.',:.. ..-..':.-; c.:..;..:,;:...t. . ".-. ........... : .- _ _! .' :":.-.2__t!.
'.;i:_.?
c_-.:., :.."...:L_:::-,_..'_.-._,. "--'.-._/".
_'.._..:.._ --.,.-" ¢: -":.-.z_2:'..
_q,o:'_......
-3_-
_;_.i_:::,a.! Shock_
Y_
and Accc,::_nodations.:Philippines, (.miiii_:_sof U,9, doIlars)
!974-$2
T_-rm_-o_
Exgor t
Tot el..
Ex.p.o rt
Slo_e r
I'mpo_U
Total:
A_i_iena[
Tr_e-
Voium_
Shocks
$ha_e
Growth
ShSsti.turion_
Md_.ustmen_s
_ina.nainu
I-,9_-7;_' li, D08
Z37-
ii,1-%5
llJ_.%:
I_,2_i:
21_7..
I%, h-Te-
l,l:ff
_i:I0.
11113_
1.21:
I_,35-7
l_TJ;
1:,3h9 _
31_'
II, BS:_
&05:
_1:1;5".
258-
:i56
1:,,1'3[2
I_TEB
I_,5:5:.ff
61:1!
1i,9e7:
2_g'
-Iifi_
18%,
I:,.7 _-
11_7._
1:,_1:_
6_,
2-,2_/.
310'
-Y.2_
l_
)05:
2',t03,
1t_8"0,
Z, ,_."
?_I_"
3_ 5 2_
Sl 5
-250_
2:38:
%OZ_.
2, ,722:
B-9_II
3_,2_
_
_,2X_?
_8_
-l_
I._2-
3 ,,7_I=
,$
Lry, flF,1 ',
I_73:_"7_:
3_,W40'
:,
_'- _: ,...
_7;_'
4_
99
-I!29.
L,3:,
36"9:
1_:,2_9'
3:, 0_'_
_0.
-11, ,I_:5_
3:, _ :_(i;
: 1
11_.7_:-89:
_'_._CC._.
-l'Of
"
I:, :/fi_
5_, :i_:_
1_,3_'
I:,::2-I':
2 L,,_-7i;
800.
3=,5:t1_
6,.73_3_
_
.
_I"I_:,
-!!,,1,3_:
I;7.7..
.
,
1_,E-,go
4_5,
-3_:
.:.
:
_
.
. .
4_,D9_B
2_,
I_7:,,T_
6_,ASW:
::.97t,-82 .... :..x_.._-pF ._ne_
•:iO
.,50i
.7B1
219
74-.'77 :<.'_r_a t'i".a.l ipp:i.nes
,09 ]. ,076
.267 , .362
.860 .831
. t40. ,,i69
. :)7.9
,,.3_':_
.723
.277
:.9'7!_-82 F':_i.iipp
_ne.a
Total
Ad_.l_:__:'me,_:_i::._ .....
".....
'
.....
_ * ' "_"
]9 .... _o re.,.. P _li,lip p iue,_
2 136 .2'39
; >_ ofi6 3
:!4 _ -,, _ .,'¢_
'>" ': .,'_',.',._
_9 ;_4-77 _ ..... Ko r,_.,_ _'i'_d.:li :; _ ia.t: _
l ,_586 005,2
, _:_ 70 ,72.0
_,:,0;%.5 -- t, _:._:i_ 7
o?.,_.,,': :_. 723
_q79-82 E o re_ Pl_f.i.i_pi_e_
i. ,, 5 2 .302
.3zo8 ,. 8_'..5_'
...........
.!.,/Tr_ie
_s _:h_ average
o:£ e:_,.o_'_s
_id
in_p.er_:_:,
.5.] 0 _, 0?,6
R
....... ; _. o2.:..: :[
T&ble _, Ad_lsc_te:
P_r.Lod
Y_iati_e £_ortm_ce of _zade • Kocea a_d Phil£pp£_e_e 1974-82
Expo_L Shar_e " ]L_i_o_ ¢oCal [xporce Chsnse
KOruna _3__i.._._pp-£ne_
.302 ,101
K_x:_e P_,.i,_.ippineo
in
Shar_ Exports
/
S]Loue¢ Growth T'ocal: 1mporta
!report: Subs_;iCutior_ ToccL Imt_orcs
.920 ,. 718
.059 -.02"2
.114 ,032
, .31.7 .005
,867 .222
-,_ 017 -. 023
,,1,'_ .028
.106 ,099
.983 ,953
.126 .,,, 003
.03._ , O 17
i97%-82 _o_e,_. Ph _ Lippi.nea
_- Final ezport share is_export shaze_ in the final yea_p _hiCt_ _en divided _y _he change in expor_e _ho_ the _ropo_tio_ of the latter _ha_ is accoun_ed fo_ _ by _acrea_d _xpox_ _ha_e.
Souzce:
Table_ 3_
Table
Year
. Gz_aa lnvest_n
7
•
r
Saving and Tnveecment Kozea, 1971-82 (Per cant of G_P)
Ratios:
G_rosa DomeSt£c $&V_g
ForeiSn ,Saving
!971
25,4
14.6
10.8
i972
21.5
16.4
5,
1923
26.
_74
31.6
!97_
l
22.2
Goveramenc Savins 2.3
l
-1.8
3.9
l.O
19.0
12.6
0.3
29.4
_9,0
10,4
_976
25,5
23.i
2.4
1.6
i_77
26_9
26.3
0.6
21.2
t_78
30.6
27,4
3.2
2.9
;_.979
35.0
27,5
7,5
5.1
_A_O
31.1
21. ]
10.0
2.6
!9_1
28.2
20.3
7.9
2.9
_,982
26.2
21.4
4.8
O, 1
-0,2
Avg.
1971-73
24.3
17.7
6.6
0_5
;_,v_.
1974-77
28.3
21.8
6,5
1_2
Avg.. 1979-82
30,1
22.5
7._
2,,7
l_vt_,, 1974-82
29.4
22,7.
6.6
2.I
Source:
Asian Devalopman_
Bank,
Ke_ Indicator_
April
and October,
1983.
•_hilSppiues, !971-82 (Per Ce._to_ _P) •(]rOSs In_s_e_nC
Gross Doeiescic $&vi_g
C_
z_t _,aving
_!L;"_
L:2 [_3
_9__,',
20.6
18.9
-._73.
19.9
23.2
_.'.__ ,_
26,7
24.0
2.7
4.9
_'.,_ _.5
31, ),
24, Z
7,0
4.0
.}.97_
31.2
23.8
7,4
2,0
I_;'?
28._
24.2
4,4
3.2
i_7_J
27,9
22.3
5.6
3,8
1979
31,0
25, 8
5.2
5.2
;.;_
30oG
24.7
5.9
$.0
.......
29.8
23,_.
5.9
4, I
_9_2
29.5
21.,S
8.0
3.6
20,6
20.7,
,_0, I
_,3
_k_g. I97#.-,77
2_..4
2_,.0 "
_,4
3.5
• vg.
t 979--8Z
30,2
Za. (I
6. Z
4.5
Av_.
1974L82
29.6
23.8
5.8
4.0
A._g, _971-73
•
3_>._rce_ AaiaxtDeve&opmmnt B_k)
.20.0
Forei_ Savi_S
_
_._-_¢.ors_
" 1.3'
2.6
i,7
1.6
-3.3
A_r£.1_d
5.7
(_c_ober,
198_.
.able _,
_o_
sud Real!/ _xc_se
Korea _d Pl_£1ipplnaa, (W_ and paso per U.S.
1971-82 dollar)
_ces:
J
'/_:_r
gom_el
Trade
UniC Val_
_1
_om_n_
Trade Unit
Value
P_al
_-73
380
1.00
380
6,62
1,00
6,62
_?_
400
1.12
448
6.79
1.36
9.26
/_
484
.88
t25
7.25
I. 12
8. I_
_: ;_
484
.78
378
7.44
.96
7.16
_..'_ ?7
484
. 71
3A5
7.40
,90
6,65
Y'_7_
48/,
. b4
308
7.37
.91
6.70
_ __._7
484
.66
317
7.38
.95
7.04
!/_._0
60 7
.60
362
7.51
.96
7.04
1_
681
.53
362
7.90
.84
6.b_)
_97/_
746 _t
.46
345
9.17
.71
6.53
raL:ea mu_C£pl_ed
by _:rade
i--/Re_t exctumge rarm.s are no,_naL _n£_ value and d_v£ded by GI_P ¢befla_or. 2/Trade Source:
unit
Aa£an Oev_lep_mut
va].ue
exchanse
£e si_q_le average
I_ank, Kq,y l:nd_cet:ozs,
of e_t_el_t z_d :/_rt _r£1
and Ocr.ober,
ui_f.t: v._.... 1983.