Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
The Japan Socialist Party Introduction A characteristic inherent to most modern democracies is the existence of party competition. Parties offer different incentives to voters, and provide different policy options if one form of government is failing to deliver demands to the people. In the United States we see this play out between the Democrats and the Republicans, for example. Both parties sit close to the center, and weigh towards the left or right depending on certain issues; however, the parties maintain unified stances in their respective platforms. In doing so, they are able to capitalize on a large voter base in an attempt to cater to the demands of the overall population. This creates competition between two parties, and makes them much more attentive to voters’ needs; as they desire to stay in power. However, from 1955 through 1993 in Japan, we see something different; despite having a second, large opposition party, Japan never developed a true two party system. Idealism did not prevail in Japan after the First World War. The Second World War, however, brought tremendous destruction to Japan, inflicting wartime devastation on the country for the first time in its history.1 The United States, under the command of SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) and General Douglas MacArthur, occupied the nation from 1945 until 1952 and implemented democracy and a constitution written under their supervision by a non-Japanese committee. This constitution has never been altered, and maintains an article that set Japan off on a very unique path of political development. The article that makes this constitution unique, and sets the precedent for the political party discussed in this paper, is none other than Article 9. Article 9 essentially states that the Japanese will not commit any acts of war, and belligerency of the state will not be recognized; however, they do maintain a self1 WADA SHUICHI p. 408
Page | 1
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
defense force (SDF), which was created due to the reverse course (the USA’s need for Japan as an ally in the Pacific against the communist bloc). Article 9, as a policy, was utilized mainly by the pacifist movement that developed out of the ashes of war in Japan. When Japan stabilized after the war, it became split between those who were pro USA and those who were anti USA; those who were idealists, and those who were conservative nationalists.2 The focus of this paper is primarily on the idealists; more specifically, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The JSP served as the largest opposition party to the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) reign from 1955-1993; however, they were just that: an opposition. The JSP was never able to effectively offer a platform as an alternative to the LDP’s success during the high periods of economic growth. This paper will begin by giving an overview and background of the JSP. It will then discuss essential reasons that grapple with why the JSP failed to rise from merely an opposition party and create a true alternative to the LDP; thus, forming what could have been a two party system of competition. The paper will end by showing how the party lost and ultimately dissolved. The JSP had chances early on to gain power and become a true alternative to the LDP. One event being the Structural Reform plan advocated by Eda Saburo. However, opportunities like this were not seized. A main reason was because of the internal conflict between the JSP’s factions. Because of this, a truly unified party platform could not be determined, and the party began to lose electorally. Parties split off from the JSP, and contributed to the JSP’s pressure on both the right and left. Furthermore, the LDP had a stranglehold via its clientelistic system on Inaka (rural Japan), and was able to capitalize on the SNTV MMD (Single member nontransferable vote, multi-member district) system, and gain overwhelming success due to its large, 2 Wada Shuichi p.407
Page | 2
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
growing supply of pork during times of high economic growth. This was very hard for the JSP to contend with, since they were not in a central position of power. Lastly, after electoral form in 1993 the JSP formed a coalition with its arch rival, the LDP, in order to secure a socialist leader as the Prime Minister. This was something that had not been achieved since immediately after World War II. However, in doing so, they discarded most of the party’s platform and ideology, and subsequently dissolved and reformed. Ultimately, with the combination of external and internal pressures on the JSP, the ideal of socialism could not be maintained and could not gain enough power in the 55’ system; thus, as time went on and chances were missed to become more pragmatic, and offer a viable policy alternative to the LDP, their inevitable decline ensued.
Background and Overview The JSP was established in 1945 soon after the end of World War II, and took part in two coalition cabinets in the early years of postwar politics (1947–1948). By 1948 the JSP had gained enough votes to lead a government for a few months in a coalition with two non-socialist parties. Despite growing in strength, at this same time, some serious weaknesses manifested. First, electoral strength was not matched by local organization (socialism), which had very shallow depth routed in Japanese society. Second, the party in 1945 was little more than a coalition of weak factions dating from the 1920’s. These ranged from democratic socialists to near-Communists.3 The JSP suffered its worst defeat in the 1949 election. In the previous election of 1947, the Socialists had received 26% of the total vote cast and obtained 143 seats (out of 466 total) in the lower house. The JSP had won plurality, which laid the basis for the two consecutive center-
3 J.A.A Stockwin p. 187
Page | 3
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
left coalition governments. The 1949 election took place after the collapse of these governments. The JSP’s vote share dropped to 13.5% and its seats to 48. The right-wing element of the JSP was especially hit hard. Both the Chairman (and former PM) Katayama and the Party Secretary Nishio lost their seats. The left-wing members who had participated in the coalition cabinet and who were thus considered “pragmatic left,” such as Kanju Kato, Masaru Nomizo, and Eiji Tomiyoshi, also lost their seats. Clearly, voters were punishing moderates within the party for making too many policy compromises in the coalition.4 According to Kohno, this was largely considered the reason why the JSP continued towards the left afterwards.5 Had the Socialists pulled together in this election they could have possibly unified sooner, and maintained their position in the Diet.
In October of 1951 the party split into a Left Socialist Party (LSP) and a Right Socialist Party (RSP), which existed until their reunification in 1955. The issue of the split was over foreign policy. In short, the Left opposed, while the Right partially supported the Allied peace settlement with Japan. The LSP subsequently developed a foreign policy of unarmed neutralism 4 Masaru Kohno p.64 5 Masaru Kohno p.65
Page | 4
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
and opposed the American presence in Japan, while the RSP committed itself neither to the American presence nor to neutralism. When the two parties reunited in 1955 the left had already overtaken the Right electorally; this was reflected in their policy of accepting neutrality.6 (Shown in Figure 1 on the previous page: Source: Masaru Kohno p.58) The two parties reunited in 1955, which was the same year the LDP was established by the merger of two conservative parties. For the next four decades, the LDP and the JSP were the two largest parties in Japan, with the LDP maintaining continuous power. This party system came to be known in Japan as “the 1955 regime.”7 Between 1955 and 1960 the JSP was led by Suzuki Mosaburo from the Left and Asanuma Inejiro from the Right. Under their leadership the party became increasingly radical. It led large street demonstrations against objectionable legislation and its foreign policy became more and more pro-Communist. For example: when Asanuma, the former Right Socialist, led a party delegation to Peking in March 1959 he made an impromptu remark, seized upon by the press, that “American imperialism is the common enemy of the peoples of Japan and China.” This was never repudiated by the JSP.8 Though, the JSP’s focus on China, mainly its factional dispute on China’s Cultural Revolution, will be discussed later on. Continuing on, despite the JSP prospering electorally until 1958, from there on out its progress dwindled. This was widely attributed to a weak organization and lack of appeal beyond industrial workers. The main trade union federation, Sokyo, had been the main backer of the JSP. The party was increasingly dependent on Sokyo, many of whose member unions were 6 J.A.A Stockwin p. 187 7 Ko Maeda p. 345 8 J.A.A Stockwin p.187-188
Page | 5
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
composed of workers in Government utilities and the public service. Faced with oppressive restrictions on their right to conventional industrial action, these unions (and others) resorted to total opposition to all government policy, using the JSP for this political purpose.9 One should make note that this trend continued, but as time went on, the JSP continued to lose support in Inaka. The JSP received support in rural areas earlier in the postwar period, but this support declined as Japan’s urban areas expanded.10 Eventually cities and their labor unions would be the JSP’s primary support and focus. This could not contend with the LDP’s clientelistic system that overtook Inaka. In regards to factions splitting, late in 1959 Nishio Suehiro, a faction leader of the right wing (discussed briefly above), seceded and formed the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Nishio argued that the “class party” advocated by the left would merely stagnate, and that the JSP should become a “people’s party” with a broader image.11 The DSP’s inception created pressure on the JSP in addition to other parties, such as the JCP (Japan Communist Party; however, the issue of political parties shall be addressed later in more detail. As the JSP began turning left in its policy, intraparty conflict merged in the Fall of this year. Left wing members criticized Nishio’s stance on foreign and security policy. Nishio described the cold war structure not as an ideological conflict between capitalism and socialism, but as a confrontation between democratic nations and totalitarian states.12 He had a pragmatic
9 J.A.A Stockwin p. 188 10 Patterson and Robbins p. 124 11 J.A.A. Stockwin p.188 12 Wada Shuichi p. 416
Page | 6
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
view on the Security Treaty, and was aiming to try and bridge the gap between the USA. However, he did support terminating it; just he believed it would take more than a decade.13 Despite having some ups and downs throughout the 70’s and 80’s, the trend overall was downwards for the JSP in terms of electoral success (Shown in Figure 2 below: Kohno p.60). Meanwhile, the LDP had been utilizing the SNTV electoral system via its own factions and clientelistic system (discussed later) in order to maintain overwhelming power in rural areas and pull seats into the Diet. In order to counter this, the JSP and other parties formed a coalition to give reform to the electoral system and temporarily oust the LDP from power; but, this coalition shortly failed, and the JSP entered another collation with the LDP, ironically. In order to achieve a “socialist” prime minister, they sacrificed the ideology that the party held to for so long.
As we can see, the JSP was torn almost from the time it kicked off in the post-war period. It was divided, and supported an ideal that had very shallow roots in a society that had just came 13 Wada Shuichi p.417
Page | 7
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
out of what was essentially a militaristic, fascist regime. Its primary focus was on labor unions, and those who would support the socialist movement. The fragmentation continued to grow shortly after, and the party began to split further. In order to understand why, it is essential to look at the factions of the party more intricately.
Party Factions A large reason why the JSP failed externally, was due to the tension it faced internally. The party, as discussed above, was divided between two sides that reunited early on in the PostWar period. Despite reuniting to form a single socialist party, these two sides would divide further over some key issues, ultimately costing the party losses in many areas. While the JSP could not have stopped its electoral decline completely, it could have preserved more of its support if it had been able to bridge its internal ideological gaps to keep itself from fragmenting.14 A good example of this is shown in the JSP’s dealings overall with the Chinese Cultural Revolution. According to Ko Maeda, the JSP’s failure to moderate its leftist policy position is a widely accepted factor that made the LDP’s long tenure possible.15 Despite maintaining a basic internal consensus on matters such as normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with the CPR (Communist Party in China), for example, inter-factional disagreements deeply tore the party apart in the case of the Cultural Revolution.16 If a party cannot come together on key issues, how can the people truly find it a comfortable solution, or replacement, to the current
14 Patterson and Robbins p. 119 15 Maeda p. 343 16 Chae-Jin Lee p.230
Page | 8
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
government that is achieving large economic success? This was something the JSP seemed to miss. Going forward with the Cultural Revolution case, the left wing Sasaki faction and the structural reformist Eda faction of the JSP exhibited a severe rivalry in their policy discussions with China. Initially, the Sasaki faction, along with the extremist Heiwa Doshikai (Peace Comrades), responded enthusiastically to the Cultural Revolution.17 In contrast, the Eda faction refrained from either praising or condemning the Cultural Revolution during 1966, but kept a watchful eye on its development.18 Tracing back to 1965 when Sasaki assumed chairmanship, the Eda faction raised the question of Sasaki's close association with the CPR to challenge his political integrity. Whatever Sasaki might say, the Socialist Movement argued, "It is clear that the Chinese are supporting the Sasaki faction and the latter is favorably responding to that support."19 How are comments like this beneficial to the party overall? Factional ideologies were dividing the party, and the party was more committed to these ideologies, than its success as a unit; thus, not gaining power over the lower house, achieving the position of prime minister, and actually influencing policy in their favor early on. The dispute, however, does not end with just two factional sides, nor with firm opinions on those sides. Eventually the centrist Katsumata faction, which formed an anti-mainstream alliance with Eda Saburo and Kono Mitsu displayed a rather sympathetic attitude towards the Cultural Revolution. They made it clear that the Cultural Revolution, however, was a form of 17 Chae-Jin Lee p.230 18 Chae-Jin Lee p.231 19 Chae-Jin Lee p.233
Page | 9
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
thought was not directly relevant to the JSP which had its own independent revolution strategy. Despite the Eda, Kono, and Katsumata factions remaining critical of the Cultural Revolution and Mao, once chosen as Secretary-General, Eda refrained from public criticism of the CPR and the leftwing faction, in an effort to lessen tensions with Sasaki and Peking.20 No firm stances could be made, and the party could not reach agreement overall. This case points to a fundamental weakness in the JSP itself; namely the lack of a broad ideological and theoretical discipline which can transcend factional differences.21 Because of this the party became more vulnerable to intense factional divisions and rivalries which in turn generated a profound crisis in the organizational and psychological makeup of the JSP.22 As Chae-Jin Lee concludes, “The case of the Cultural Revolution suggests that the way the JSP formulated its positions on sensitive foreign issues was largely a function of inter-factional conflicts and compromises in terms of leadership contests and ideological divergence. A particular official policy adopted by the JSP may therefore represent the dominant mainstream faction or a common denominator of conflicting factional positions. As a product of factional compromise, such a policy will usually be conveniently ambivalent and unstable.�23 Ultimately, the Cultural Revolution not only worsened Peking's relations with the Eda, Kono, and Katsumata factions, but also aggravated its conflict with the JCP.24 Factional disputes were not only isolated to this issue; however, the Cultural Revolution showcases a very blatant
20 Chae-Jin Lee 242 21 Chae-Jin Lee p. 242 22 Chae-Jin Lee p.243 23 Chae-Jin Lee p.243 24 Chae-Jin Lee p.237
Page | 10
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
example. As the paper continues, I shall discuss how factional disputes led to splits in parties and the failure of structural reform; thus, breaking unification and weakening the party further.
Opposition Parties and Party Splits As time went on through the early stages of the JSP, and the party continued to remain torn between issues on the left and right, some members eventually had enough and branched off to form entirely new parties. The first example of this was discussed earlier with the DSP in 1959. Below is an image that showcases the parties’ respective positions from 1955-1960 (Figure 3: Wada Shuichi p.415).
Page | 11
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
Increased electoral competition on its left and right flanks directly inhibited the ability of the JSP’s candidates to win legislative seats in district elections, and indirectly by leading the party to commit too many nomination errors, which, in turn, led to the loss of district seats that it otherwise would have obtained.25 Being divided ideologically, lead to serious centrifugal tendencies. Ultimately, the JSP’s right-wing elements bolted and formed new parties, which added to the JSP’s competition on its right flank. The right-flank competition was formidable enough, without the addition of these new parties.26 In addition to the right flank’s increased pressure, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) existed on the far left, and added pressure there, as well. So, the JSP sat neither on the left, right, or center, really. It was somewhere in the middle of the left; in about as firm of a position as the opinion its members collectively maintained. Furthermore, the fact that the support for the party suddenly declined when new parties emerged suggests that voters did not consider the JSP a credible and viable alternative to the LDP. Instead, the JSP functioned as a watchdog organization monitoring the LDP government.27 The JSP’s persistent adherence to its original policies had the effect of polarizing the Japanese party system, thus creating opportunities for new parties to enter the electoral competition at the center of the ideological space. The emergence of the Clean Government Party (CGP) in the late 1960s and the New Liberal Club (NLC) in the mid-1970s, in addition to the two splinters (DSP and SDF) clearly reflected this niche created by the JSP-LDP confrontation.28 25 Patterson and Robbins p.119 26 Patterson and Robbins p.123 27 Ko Maeda p (349) 28 Masaru Kohno p.59-60
Page | 12
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
Additional competition, as discussed above, appeared on both sides. The CGP began to endorse opposition candidates on the right in the 1967 election, predominantly in urban districts.29 Furthermore, the JCP caused much trouble for the JSP when their voter support increased, particularly in response to the environmental problems that plagued Japan throughout the 1960s and 1970s.30 The JCP’s vote shares were just over 2 percent in the 1958 election, but this average increased dramatically over the next several elections. Although the JCP’s vote shares reached 10.22 percent in the 1979 election, they dropped slightly over the remaining five elections, averaging 8 percent in these contests.31 However, this was still votes that could have been going to the JSP leftist factions members. More opposition parties endorsed more candidates, causing the total opposition vote to become fragmented. This fragmentation increased the potential for the opposition party candidates to “go down together” and lose seats that they otherwise might have won.32 As the opposition camp became fragmented, the chances of the JSP replacing the LDP in government diminished. Perhaps the only viable strategy left for the JSP would have been to explore a coalition with these centrist parties, but the JSP’s leftist dominance precluded this scenario. Thus, it is not surprising that the JSP was increasingly perceived as a party of perpetual opposition, rather than a party ready to participate in government.33 Though, to offer some defense to the JSP’s fragmentation, it was partially due to history; and was hard to counter the routes of its own organization in the party’s movement. The JSP had 29 Patterson and Robbins p.124 30 Patterson and Robbins p.124 31 Patterson and Robbins p.134 32 Patterson and Robbins p.135 33 Masaru Kohno p.61
Page | 13
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
not had time to mature as a party, it was inexperienced and divided between various ideological factions that originated in separate groups that had formed in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, with government functioning under constraints imposed by the Occupation – not to speak of the constraints of coexisting with its coalition partners – it had little opportunity to make much impact on problematic areas of policy.34 However, there was one chance the JSP had to make a change. Doing so would have modernized the party platform, and make a much more pragmatic attempt at dealing with the LDP and other competition. This was in the Structural Reform Plan advocated by Eda Saburo, and it shall be discussed in the following section.
Structural Reform Structural Reform (SR) was a concept advocated in order to make the JSP a more pragmatic, progressive party electorally. This owed a great deal to Eda Saburo, the energetic General Secretary of the JSP. Eda explained that the party lacked any clear policy by means of which it could positively work for the achievement of power. It had consequently been forced into a negative, defensive posture, concentrating solely on "opposition" to each new initiative of its opponents.35 The Structural Reform movement began within the JSP in 1962, and was a Marxist inspired doctrine derived from the Italian Communist Party leader, Palmiro Togliatti, but it contained within it the potential to give the JSP the kind of flexibility it needed to adapt to the changing
34 J.A.A Stockwin p.123 35 R.P. Dore p.4
Page | 14
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
needs and demands of an electorate experiencing rapid increases in its standard of living during the period of rapid economic growth.36 Eda explained the SR as follows: “By pressing our demands for policy changes, and by seeking positively to infiltrate into production relations, we can gradually accumulate partial reforms and by undermining the basis of the monopolists' control‌ we can isolate them . . . and work for a national concentration of forces opposed to monopoly capital. When the situation and the balance of forces is propitious, we can then establish, with the support of such an "antimonopoly national alliance", a government dedicated to the triple aims of preserving the constitution, establishing democracy, and pursuing a neutral foreign policy. From there we can proceed to transform such a government into a socialist regime and open the road to Socialism.â€?37 He had offered an actual plan for the party to work towards achieving its goals. However, due to the complex nature of socialism, and factors of power within the party, this would be very hard to get people to go along with. Another aspect of the SR was a renewed effort to move away from its elitist traditions, transform itself into an effective mass party with a strong national organization, and a sounder basis of electoral support. There was to be a membership drive and a new emphasis on securing representation at all levels of local government. The new drive, however, was no more successful than previous ones.38 It was very hard to get many JSP to go along with this reform, as their incumbency could have potentially been at risk. The JSP was fragmented due to these individual stances.
36 J.A.A Stockwin p.123 37 R.P Dore p.4-5 38 R.P. Dore p.9-10
Page | 15
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
To be competitive against the LDP, one thing the JSP absolutely needed to do then was to increase the number of its candidates.39 However, fielding more candidates would have made the JSP incumbents worse off in terms of their reelection prospects. If two or more JSP candidates ran in a district, the votes of the party supporters would have been split between the candidates, making a reliable victory more difficult.40 These candidates, in their position of power, were in a comfortable position to not support change; despite needing it as a party overall. Individual stances and positions, and the lack of a common vision like SR, ultimately would limit the JSP as a party, and prevent it from gaining more candidates with a common goal for success. Ultimately, the SR reformist campaign came up against determined opposition from factions in the JSP that interpreted Structural Reform as a bid to dominate the leadership of the party and take it in directions already laid out by the DSP.41 This isn’t too surprising, considering the factional situation discussed above. At the 21st party congress in January 1962, there was heated debate over the SR, and a motion was adopted that prohibited the party to immediately accept the SR as the party’s principle. Later, at the 22nd party congress in November 1962, the anti-SR group intensified its attack on Eda, and a motion to censure Eda was adopted by a narrow margin. Eda then resigned from the party secretary post, and the conflict within the party subsided after this event.42 The JSP then adopted a hard-liner leftist document, “The Road to Socialism in Japan,” in 1964, which subsequently bound the party’s behavior for a long time to come. When Eda and his argument for policy moderation lost, the JSP reverted to a leftist-dominated party, and the chance 39 Ko Maeda p.349 40 Ko Maeda p.349 41 J.A.A. Stockwin p.124 42 Ko Maeda p.347
Page | 16
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
to become a competitive party might also have vanished. Kakuei Tanaka, an LDP heavyweight and prime minister in the 1970s, once said that Eda was the most formidable man in the JSP and the LDP might have been defeated if Eda had become the JSP’s leader.43 However, the SR document was defended throughout the 1970s. But ultimately, it never went through. Dismayed by the party’s inability to change, Eda and his group left the party, and created the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in 1977.44 The JSP continued, but with continued lack luster success as seen in Figure 1. By this point, the LDP was in government for a very long time, and had given Japan great levels of economic growth to pull itself out of the poverty seen after the War. Despite losing popularity, as well, the LDP was able to capitalize on the SNTV system with its own factions funded by koenkai (support groups for politicians) through a system that Ethan Scheiner calls “clientelism.”
The LDP’s Clientelistic System First, it is important to point out that this section derives directly from Ethan Scheiner’s book, “Democracy Without Competition in Japan.” All information on the clientelistic system is solely credited to him. However, before showcasing Ethan’s argument for why the LDP was able to stay in power against the opposition’s failure, I’d like to give a bit of background on the LDP. The LDP, like the JSP, had/has its own factions; though, they are quite weak today when compared with pre-electoral reform. Factions are highly personal organizations within the LDP that a member must join if he/she desires any electoral success. This is because candidates need 43 Ko Maeda p.347 44 Masaru Kohno p.58-59
Page | 17
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
to tap into the large pool of money that each faction has (led by a leader of each faction; the strongest faction leader in the LDP would receive the position of Prime Minister) in order to fund events for their koenkai. Since politicians cannot directly advertise themselves at times of election due to very strict electoral rules, they must rely on an informal support group: this is the koenkai. Koenkai members (even after reform) pledge loyalty to a politician, and in return the politician, essentially, hangs out with them and supports their interests. This came in the form of taking people to onsens (hot springs), amusement parks, BBQs, et cetera. Also, the politician must attend funerals and other events of members in his/her koenkai. These events kept LDP politicians busy for most of the year. This is essentially part of the clientistic system that Ethan speaks of. In his book he makes note that they create direct bonds with voters (via private goods) usually in the form of Pork barrel spending. This Pork would then be expended on infrastructure projects, and projects in Inaka. It was hard for voters to turn down a new rail-road stop to their small town, or new public works projects that could create revenue; so the LDP essentially locked people into voting for them, whether they liked them as a party or not. It was mainly about the individual politician that people supported, not the party. One might ask, why not vote for other parties regardless of this? To which I answer this. The smaller parties had nowhere near the amount of funding control by the central government for which local government must rely on for its financial graces. Few oppositions held local offices, as well. Over one third of Japan is rural, and the LDP capitalized on this. With the JSP only focusing on cities and labor unions, for much of the post-war period, they were not a viable option for rural voters that mainly consisted of farmers. The LDP could expend its large central funds that it had accumulated here in order to gain many seats in the Diet. This was due to how Page | 18
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
electoral boundaries were drawn under SNTV MMD (prior to 1993). The pro-clientelistic support had special privileges granted to them, as well. They could do things like send mail at no extra cost, could work in public employment, et cetra; all of which offered economic safety net. In summary, clientelism was fiscal centralization plus institutional protectionism of a clientelist’s “clienteles.” Local government was dependent on central government for success at the local level. Limited zones of geographic competition, as long as there was no drain on the economy (aka the period of high growth until the bubble burst in the late 1980’s), were taken advantage of by the LDP. In these areas, the clientelist state and productive economic sectors could work together. These factors directly contributed to the opposition’s failure. Furthermore, Japan was very financially centralized, and the power was held by elites creating linkages to a support base in society. It is amusing to see such blatant corruption in a democracy, but that’s exactly why it worked for so long. That is until 1993, when the LDP was ousted from power temporarily, and the JSP and other parties formed a coalition to reform this form of corruption of the electoral system.
Electoral Re-form, the End of the JSP, and Afterwards The 1993 HoR election was a huge turning point for Japanese politics. During this event, the LDP’s reign since 1955 was brought down by a coalition of LDP defectors and other parties. The goal of this was primarily electoral reform from the SNTV MMD system to a SMD/PR system.
Page | 19
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
In short in SNTV MMD, parties could run multiple candidates in every district. The LDP had stronger candidates, more candidates, more money, and was in power for a very long time. They were able to dump their members in many districts (especially Inaka ones, as discussed previously), and depending on the district size (usually 3-5 people per one, though ranging from 1-6), could obtain a majority of the seats rather easily. In the new system, electoral lines were redrawn and the system was reformed to a Mixed System (MM). This consisted of 300 SMD (single member districts) and 180 PR (originally 200 Proportional Representation) blocs. In short, now 300 districts could only elect one member to the Diet (who won the most votes), while the remainder were selected from the PR bloc.45 The PR bloc members were proportionally elected by the district size, and selected off of a party list. Members who ran for PR were typically losers in the SMD. So how did the LDP lose? On June 6th, 1993 a vote of no confidence passed in the lower house; this was backed by LDP defectors- Ozawa Ichiro (largely credited for bringing down the 55’ system), Hata, and Takemura. It was rather simple, the LDP turned against the LDP prime minister, and called an election. The LDP did not win, as a simple majority is all that is required to do this. The Diet became dissolved, and everyone except the prime minister became a candidate. During this time, a coalition formed between the JRP, JNP, JSP, CGP, DSP, Sakigake, and SDL (essentially all parties besides the JCP). They ultimately ended up winning the most seats in the HoR election, and a new prime minister, Morihiro Hosokawa of the Japan New Party (who helped form the coalition with Ozawa), was elected.46
45 Professor Robert Pekkanen lecture 4/23/2013: Politics and Government in Japan 46 Professor Robert Pekkanen Lecture 4/23/2013: Politics and Government in Japan
Page | 20
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
However, this not to last long. The JSP left the coalition in 1994 to join a coalition with the LDP, its long-time enemy. This was partially because of its poor treatment by the LDP defectors who led the coalition and partly to have its own leader, Murayama Tomiichi, named the prime minister.47 Doing so, the JSP abandoned the bulk of its position it staked its identity on in order to join with the LDP. Murayama, as Prime Minister, “declared the self-defense forces to be constitutional, the U.S-Japan security treaty to be indispensable, the national anthem Kimigayo and Hinomaru national flag to be legitimate, nuclear-energy plans in Japan to be necessary, and an increase in the consumption tax to be unavoidable.”48 In short, the JSP blew away its entire political philosophy for the sake of obtaining the prime minister. But what is the prime minister’s value if one does not support their own agenda?
47 Ethan Scheiner p. 42 48 Ethan Scheiner p.42
Page | 21
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
Murayama served as PM until January of 1996, and the party crumbled as a unit shortly after. How could people support something that was willing to so blatantly sacrifice everything it stood for, just to achieve the PM? Once in PM, as well, they were not in a position to carry out
any of the reforms that they had hoped for; socialism, it would seem, clashed with the test of time and realism. Despite this, it continued on in a sense. This is shown by it branching off and reforming; one party being the SDP (Social Democratic Party); however, the SDP is extremely weak electorally. In addition, other new parties were formed with future prospects; for example, the Democratic Party (DPJ). The DPJ would take the place of the JSP as the new rival to the LDP and eventually take power again from the LDP in 2009. (Figure 4 shows this: Wada Suichi p.420)
Conclusion
Page | 22
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
The Japan Socialist Party, despite being the largest opposition to the LDP for the entire 55’ system (1955-1993), lost its chance of becoming a viable alternative to the LDP very early on. Beginning in 1949, the party was already beginning to fragment, as it lost the HoR election and a bulk of its seats. After splitting off into two separate entities, then half-heartedly reuniting, the party still could not reach a consensus as a unit. The JSP was unable to pull together a collective ideological stance on socialism, and refuted pragmatic opportunities like Structural Reform, in order to maintain incumbents’ positions of power. Socialism, however, is a very broad ideological doctrine, with no well-known method on how to perfectly achieve it. In short, according to Marx, it is a natural process that follows capitalism on the road to communism. This, I can’t stress enough, must take place naturally. Forcing it onto a society ends up with individuals arguing their own interpretations of it, and not much getting done; as seen in the case of Japan. Japan had a very weak socialist background, and did not have the setting for it to flourish. They had just come out of the reigns of militarism and essentially their own version of fascism. How could one expect socialism to miraculously bloom from this without first going through capitalism’s trials and errors? Article 9 was not even created by the Japanese people themselves, and that was a large reason why the movement had any momentum to begin with. The JSP needed to adopt a more pragmatic stance if it wanted to compete with the LDP and take power. Only when it was in power could it have achieved, even minutely, the goals it desired. While the JSP’s never-ending bickering ensued, new parties were forming and adding pressure on both the right and left. The JSP’s heavy left lost votes to the JCP, while the right and moderates had to contend with an even more formidable LDP, DSP, and other parties. As time
Page | 23
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
went on, new parties made it impossible for the JSP to gain strength electorally; especially since it could not come together as a unit. Furthermore, the LDP had too much power of its own; and fighting its clientelistic system was beyond laughable. The JSP was so poorly put together, while the LDP had a very well lined out system of corruption that played on the very voting system in which the game was played. The competition was truly within the LDP itself, as its own factions fought for the position of PM. The LDP continued to offer incentives for people to support it via its large supply of pork due to fiscal centralization. It would then offer jobs, buildings, bridges, you name it, to a stable 1/3 of the nation in order to secure these votes. The JSP had no such system, and merely relied on labor unions/cities for a bulk of its votes; which diminished. As Japan gained success under the LDP, and the clientelistic machine continued, their hope faded even further. Even when the JSP finally obtained power in 1994, it was only for the sake of power; and very myopic power, at best. They discarded everything they stood for just to achieve a PM for two short years. To top it off, the PM stood for nothing, and did nothing that the party worked to achieve for so long. Is it really a surprise that they dissolved? The JSP’s success lied, and only lied, early on in their existence. They needed to moderate their platform, come together on a more pragmatic approach to socialism, and advocate it together from the start. The last real opportunity was Structural Reform, and that failed, as one would expect. I think that the lesson to be learned here is that ideals remain only ideals, if they do not gain power in their own right to influence the times.
Page | 24
Christopher Gandy
JSISA 473
Professor Anchordoguy
References Patterson, Dennis, and Joseph Robbins. "Party Competition, Nomination Errors, and the Electoral Decline of the Japan Socialist Party." Taiwan Journal of Democracy. no. 1 (2012): 119-144. Maeda, Ko. "An Irrational Party of Rational Members; The Collision of Legislators' rReelection Quest with Party Success in the Japan Socialist Party." Comparative Political Studies 2012 45. : 341-365. Stockwin, J.A.A. "The Japanese Socialist Party under New Leadership." Asian Survey. no. 4 (1966): 187200. Stockwin, J.A.A. "To oppose or to appease? Parties out of power and the need for real politics in Japan." Japan Forum. no. 1 (2006): 115-132. Lee, Chae-Jin. "Politics in the Japan Socialist Party: The Chinese Cultural Revolution Case." Asian Survey. no. 3 (1970): 230-243. Dore, R.P. "The Japanese Socialist Party and "Structural Reform"." Asian Survey. no. 8 (1961): 3-15. Shuichi, Wada. "Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and security policy: realism versus idealism in Japan since the Second World War." Japan Forum. no. 3-4 (2010): 405-431. Kohno, Masaru. "Electoral Origins of Japanese Socialists' Stagnation." Comparative Political Studies. no. 1 (1997): 55-77. Scheiner, Ethan. Democracy Without Competition in Japan Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Professor Robert Pekkanen, University of Washington, Course: Politics and Government in Japan, Date of Lecture: 4/23/2013
Page | 25