Christopher Gandy
JSIS A 423
Professor Pyle
The Aftermath of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake: The Beginning of Modern Japanese Urban Planning in Tokyo
Introduction Urban planning: what is it and why does it matter? Through extensive personal dialogue with citizens from various countries, much of the general population seems to be unaware of what this profession truly entails. When questioned, most believe it to be similar to architecture, or engineering of some sort. Furthermore, some are not even aware of the profession’s existence. Let me pose this question: if one has no understanding of a system, how can they have an opinion on the matter; let alone, know how it will develop in the future? Democracy comes with education, understanding, and active participation from citizens. If the citizens are uneducated/unaware of a profession that is so important to our everyday lives, and are unable to actively participate in its process, it is no surprise that the practice itself will have struggles with being truly democratic. If one is familiar with Japanese history and society, it is also no surprise then that in Japan during the 1920s the movement of planning was just grabbing hold in its bureaucratic system; not in democracy itself. Believing planning could have been democratic in this context is beyond idealistic. Japan had just come out of autocratic feudal rule around 50 years before the first countrywide, modern planning system was being implemented.1 This system, known as the 1919 City Planning Law, set the precedent for Japanese urban planning until the 1960s. Furthermore, only with the substantial revisions to the City Planning Law passed in June of 2000 did local
1 Making of Urban Japan p.90
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governments finally gain the legal authority to create their own legally enforceable local ordinances to regulate the use and development of land with standards different than those specified in national law.2 Prior to the 1919 law, Japan had only experimented briefly with city planning concepts adopted from the west, and for the most part had no system at all. At the time of the Law’s implementation, the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 struck. Even more devastating were the fires that took down Yokohama and much of central Tokyo immediately following the quake. The destruction gave this law a chance to be implemented in full by the government. However, it is hard to say how the 1919 City Planning Law could have influenced Tokyo’s evolution had the earthquake and fires not happened. The most important part of this law, and change in Japanese city planning at the time, was Land Readjustment (LR); which, due to the pressing need to rebuild, was implemented in a very un-democratic manner. However, some could say that, had the disaster not occurred, Tokyo could have re-developed more slowly, incorporating democratic elements to build on the growing ideology. However, this could have not been the case, as the Japanese government did not allow for grassroots movements, essential to democratic city planning, to develop. Japan had a very centralized government, and the decisions were always top-down. The government had well-defined roles for citizens to play in the city; not in the democratization of an “unimportant” concept, as well. This is shown in the neighborhood associations at the time. Ultimately, centralized control was inherent to Japanese planning. This paper aims to address the above along with several other topics that collectively describe Japanese planning during this time period. The first will be an overview of the build-up 2 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.399
Christopher Gandy
JSIS A 423
Professor Pyle
to the 1919 City Planning Law. This requires addressing past social/planning context and the Great Kanto Earthquake. From here, the 1919 City Planning Law and what it entailed shall be discussed. Afterwards, the 1919 law’s implementation in Tokyo and subsequent rebuilding efforts will be covered, as well as planning/social movements that were taking place. Ultimately, the most important part of the rebuilding effort was the implementation of Land Readjustment found in the 1919 law. Understanding Japanese government at the time is essential to understanding why it was implemented in the manner that it was.
Background The Taisho Democracy period was one of enormous change for Japan. By the end of the Meiji period (1868–1912) Japan had established itself as the dominant regional power in Northeast Asia, having defeated China and Russia in war, and having gained a colony in Taiwan, extensive economic interests in Manchuria from Russia, and undisputed control over the Korean peninsula which was annexed in 1910.3 To a great extent, therefore, the main goals of the Meiji period had been achieved: Japan was an internationally recognized great power, it had achieved revision of the unequal treaties forced on it by the colonial powers in the 1850s, and had developed modern industries and a strong military.4 On the other hand, Japan was still a primarily agricultural nation at the beginning of the Taisho period, and the traditional lifestyles of the majority of the population had been little affected by modernization and the growth of the industrial economy during the previous 30 years. During the period from the end of the Russo-
3 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.386 4 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.386
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Japanese war in 1905 up to the outbreak of war in the 1930s the pace of industrialization and urbanization quickened and a much more urban society emerged.5 From 1898 to 1920 the share of Japanese population in settlements of more than 10,000 increased from 18% to 32%, and the total population of the six largest cities (Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, Kobe and Yokohama) more than doubled from 3.04 million to 7.63 million between 1897 and 1920.6 While in 1900 the population of the then City of Tokyo was 1.12 million, the number had increased to 2.17 million by 1920.7 However, more dramatic was the increase in population of the surrounding 82 towns and villages which were incorporated into Greater Tokyo in 1932 to form what is today the 23–ward area. At the turn of the century those areas were basically rural and had a population of 380,000, but by 1920 their population had increased by 369% to 1.18 million.8 Japan’s experience of rapid urbanization due to industrialization shows the beginning needs for planning to manage this high growth. Prior to the 1919 law, local governments could prepare and implement their own plans if they wished.9 While this could have led to a more democratic movement in Japan, the idea was very new still, as was advocacy for city planning. Furthermore, this authority most likely would not have lasted much longer if it had been allowed to continue, for reasons which will be described later. Moving on, if Japan did not manage this highly urbanized growth, sprawl, epidemics, and disasters related to a lack of control on the urban form would ensue. 5 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.386 6 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.387 7 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.387 8 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.387 9 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.399
Christopher Gandy
JSIS A 423
Professor Pyle
These problems were already beginning in Japan, as there was no large system of urban planning in Japan up until the 1919 City Planning Law. Rapid urbanization caused a range of social problems, including: worsening housing conditions, increasing population density in poor areas and worsening epidemics of cholera and tuberculosis.10 These were exacerbated in the Japanese case by the rapidity of the process of economic change and the very weak infrastructure base of the cities, which was inadequate even before the rapid doubling of urban populations.11 The need for a system of urban planning was evident; Tokyo was too large of a city to be managed without significant reform, and it couldn’t have struck at a better time. Thankfully, many powerful figures in Japanese society were beginning to research urban planning at the time. These included figures like Miyake Iwao, who published a book on urban policy studies in 1908.12 Furthermore, in May of 1918 Shimpei Goto established the City Planning Bureau (Toshi Keikaku Ka) within the Home Ministry, with Ikeda Hiroshi as chief. In the same month the City Planning Research Committee (Toshi Keikaku Chosakai) was established to begin drafting the new city planning law.13 That committee was composed almost entirely of central government officers, including several professors from the University of Tokyo Departments of Law, Medicine, Civil Engineering and Architecture. In twelve months from July 1918, Ikeda drafted the City Planning Law (Toshi Keikaku Ho). At the same time the Urban Buildings Law (Shigaichi Kenchikubutsu Ho) was drafted by Sano Toshikata (a professor of Architecture at the University of Tokyo), Uchida Shozo (another professor of Architecture at the University of Tokyo who later became a famous president of the university), and Kasahara 10 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.387 11 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.387 12 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.390 13 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.398
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Toshiro (a Home Ministry officer and former student of Sano and Uchida). The law was crafted by a strong team of individuals who had a thorough understanding of city planning at the time. However, the possibility of a planning system that could have harnessed civil society was eliminated with this law;14 though, due to the inevitable top-down nature of the government at this time, it is hard to say whether or not civil society would have been sustained in general. As discussed above, Japan’s society throughout the Meiji, and now Taisho, was very centralized. During the Tokugawa, decentralized power was achieved only by pulling Han together in the system of alternative attendance. Decentralization led to fear that grassroots movements would most likely ensue, and could displace the central government. This is shown by the deep seeded distrust of local government by national, and why the central government deliberately kept local power in check.15 The Bakumatsu happened just 50 years earlier, so why set the parameters for another rebellion to occur during the Taisho period? Local governments could be “captured� by local actors for private ends.16 Ultimately, the Meiji government showed little tolerance for dissent, and wide-ranging suppression of opposition movements, including the banning of mass meetings, the exclusion of leaders from Tokyo, and the censorship of books and newspapers had been authorized under the Peace Regulations of 1887.17 It was not just in the case of city planning; all democratic movements were heavily regulated. Thus, limited by these measures, city planning could not be shaped by new ideas responding to the needs of individual cities. Before moving on with the City Planning Law of 1919, it is first essential to discuss the disaster of 1923. 14 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.400 15 Sorensen: Urban Planning and Civil Society in Japan p.401 16 Making of Urban Japan p.90 17 Making of Urban Japan p.94-95
Christopher Gandy
JSIS A 423
Professor Pyle
The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake Before delving into the details of the quake, I would like to give some perspective to Japan’s earthquake scene. Three of the Earth’s tectonic plates meet 300 km east of Tokyo, and a chain of active volcanoes lies just 100 km to the west. It is proposed that a 90x120km wide dislodged fragment of the Pacific plate is wedged beneath Tokyo between the Pacific, Philippine Sea, and Eurasian Plates. The fragment was probably dislodged when two seamount chains collided at the Japan Trench about 2 million years ago. It is suggested that the fragment controls much of Tokyo’s seismic behavior.18 Tokyo has been victim for a long time to earthquakes. Because of limited technology, the exact frequency of quakes in the same league as the one that occurred in 1923 is unknown. Though, it is predicted that an earthquake the size of the Kanto Earthquake of 1923 has an 8-10% chance every 30 years.19 Therefore, the quake was not as much of a surprise. The devastation was mainly from the fires that ensued. On the First of September, 1923 Tokyo experienced a magnitude 7.9 earthquake later to known as the Kanto Daishinsai, or Great Kanto Earthquake. Following the disaster, fires broke out in as many as 134 different locations in the downtown districts (see appendix 1 and 2 for burnt areas and fire prevention zone).20 The fires continued for three days and two nights and consumed almost one half of the city area of 30.5 square miles. Approximately 370,000 houses were burnt down21 and those homeless and injured by the disaster numbered 1,631,589 in Tokyo; 72% of the population of the city.22 18 Stein, Toda, Parson, Grunewald p.1966 19 Stein, Toda, Parson, Grunewalk p.1976 20 Reconstruction Work 1930 p.31 21 Reconstruction Work 1930 p.31 22 Reconstruction Work 1930 p.35
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This event transformed Tokyo from a bustling metropolis and imperial capital to a seemingly extinct city. “All that remains is twisted steel, stones, and bricks,” remarked Tawara Magoichi, the future Minister of Commerce and Industry. Concluding with, “what I saw with my eyes was more devastating than what I had heard in rumors.”23 Between the magnitude 7.9 earthquake, fires, and aftershocks, over 45 percent of the structures in Tokyo and over 90 percent in Yokohama were destroyed. Economic costs of the calamity surpassed ¥6.5 billion, a figure four times larger than Japan’s national budget for 1923.24 Food supply was a huge initial problem, but when news of the catastrophe was received in foreign countries, extensive aid was bestowed. Relief goods and messages were sent through respective embassies and legations to help with the recovery.25 Almost immediately after the disaster, a grand new vision emerged. Abe Iso, for example, saw the post-earthquake period as a unique opportunity to go far beyond what he classified as ‘makeshift improvements’ in Tokyo’s built environment. Abe argued that what Tokyo needed in 1923 was a “fundamental project for the construction of a new city,” one influenced not solely by a “materialistic point of view but also from the viewpoint of social policy.”26 Essentially, he wanted urban renewal not only of the physical, but also in the mentality. More importantly, as early as the Fourth of September, 1923, a plan to reconstruct the city of Tokyo was drafted by Home Minister, Shimpei Goto, and submitted to the council on the Sixth of September. In his statement, he stressed fukko (revival, regeneration), a drastic 23 Schencking p.302 24 Schencking p.296 25 Reconstruction Work 1930 p.37 26 Schencking p.316
Christopher Gandy
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Professor Pyle
transformation of Tokyo into a cosmopolitan city, as opposed to fukkyu (retrieval, recovery).27 However, this dream would meet the reality of the times, as quarreling between the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Finance, combined with a lack of advocacy of planning, ultimately limited Tokyo’s future vision. City planning was not the top priority of the government, which was preoccupied primarily with establishing its own legitimacy, finances, and powers of control, and with national economic growth.28 With the stage set, the 1919 City Planning Law had a chance to be implemented.
The 1919 City Planning Law Planning in Japan had its origins in the Meiji period, where a lot of the strengths and weaknesses inherent to the 1919 law are found. Dominance of central government, the reliance on direct government involvement for building projects rather than the development of a system for regulating private development and building activity, the consistent lack of financial resources for urban infrastructure, a rapid development of technical sophistication in plan making and a high degree of familiarity with current practices in the West were all characteristics of the Japanese planning method. 29 Prior to the 1919 City Planning Law, the Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance (TCIO) of 1888 was regarded as Japan’s first city planning law, and helped form the basis for the 1919 law.30 However, the TCIO lacked a long-term strategy for development planning, and only focused on smaller projects in selective areas of Tokyo. The Planning for Tokyo’s urban 27 Orihara and Clancey p. 110 28 Making of Urban Japan p.60 29 Making of Urban Japan p.81 30 Making of Urban Japan p.63
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expansion was not an issue because the system of alternative attendance had ended, and the departure of the daimyo had lost a great deal of population and economic base. The population in 1850 was not reached again until around 1890, yet it did not expand beyond its Edo era boundaries for another 15 years. This lack of interest in expansion was shown in the Ordinance, but later addressed in the 1919 law.31 The TCIO had been primarily concerned with the improvement of existing areas and operated mainly through specific development or redevelopment projects. Little effort had been expended to structure the growth of the city as a whole, nor were powers sufficient to regulate private landowners or builders. By introducing land zoning, building controls, and a system to plan whole city areas, the 1919 law was a major turning point, and remained in effect for close to 50 years.32
31 Making of Urban Japan p.63 32 Making of Urban Japan p.108-109
Christopher Gandy
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Professor Pyle
Under the 1919 law all plans had to be approved by the Home Minister, and each year city planning budgets had to be authorized by the Home Ministry. Although city planning authority was formally vested in local City Planning Commissions, these were composed roughly half of local prefectural and municipal assembly members and local mayors, and half of high-ranking prefectural and central government bureaucrats and technical specialists, and were chaired by prefectural governors who were Home Ministry appointees.33 Ultimately, the central government maintained control; while cities had the illusion of actually having a say. The main drafter was Ikeda Hiroshi, who was one of Japan’s leading experts on Western zoning. The City Planning Law of 1919 came into effect in January of 1920, and the City Planning Area (CPA for Tokyo, which was set at approximately the current 23-ward area, was approved in 1921 and announced in April of 1922. It would not be put in full effect until the Kanto Earthquake, however. The 1919 law had five main parts to it: land use zoning; the Urban Buildings Law; a building-line system; a system for designating public facilities; and Land Readjustment. 33 Making of Urban Japan p.111
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In regards to land zoning, Ikeda had said that the purpose of them was not primarily to enforce a strict regulatory control over land uses in different zones, but to indicate the future structure of the city in a concrete way by designing the zone uses well in advance of urbanization.34 In commercial areas large roads were encouraged, in residential areas narrow roads, and industrial areas were defined by dividing a few major arterial roads. The 1919 City Planning Law was not very restrictive in these terms. (see image 1, above left, and 2, above right Making of Urban Japan p.116 and p.117) Since there was only one standard for residential areas, one for commercial and one for industrial, there was no way of designing specialized regulations for already built up areas, partially built up areas, or areas of future development.35 Almost all commercial and office uses and a wide range of smaller factories could still be built in residential areas. Only large factories and entertainment uses such as theaters were prohibited. In industrial zones the construction of housing was still permitted, so areas of intermixed heavy industry and housing continued to spread.36 It was a catch-all system for the entire nation. This shows an essential flaw to centralized planning. This would lead to many problems due to the fact that cities are very different; having such broad, weak zones was a flaw of the 1919 law. The next part addressed is the building-line system. This system was based on three articles of the Urban Building Law. One defined roads as any public right of way, 2.7 meters wide or greater; the second designated the edges of all such roads as building lines; while the third article declared building could only take place on lots with frontage on a building line.37 34 Making of Urban Japan p.115 35 Making of Urban Japan p.118 36 Making of Urban Japan p.124 37 Making of Urban Japan p.119
Christopher Gandy
JSIS A 423
Professor Pyle
Despite causing some difficult implementation problems, as much of rural Japan had roads that automatically qualified for building lines, these building-line plans helped prevent building on the urban fringe by giving order to where structures were allowed to be built (aka not off the beaten path).38 Preventing sprawl was definitely a benefit of this. Facilities Designation inherited its legacy from the TCIO, and relevant articles were almost directly copied from it.39 It was primarily a declaration of intent to indicate where things such as roads or parks would be built if funds should be secured in the future. Designating public facilities was essentially a matter of drawing lines on a scale map and getting it approved by the central office of the Home Ministry.40 This had a long lasting effect on the centralization of city planning in Japan. Prior to the 1919 law, local governments had considerable freedom in city planning matters because, as discussed earlier, there was no city planning law at the national level. After this, if any local government wanted to receive central government subsidies, or wanted to buy land for public facilities, they had to submit all public facilities plans to be approved by the Home Ministry’s local planning committees.41 However, given Japan’s need to organize, and the plague of problems ensuing before the 1919 plan, this almost seems inevitable. While it did transfer rights from local government over to the central, it directly countered sprawl development at this time and in this context; a problem that given Japan’s weak local governance system, was doubtful to be monitored if left alone to weak local governments. They could essentially build anywhere, without gaining permission. This was due to the powerful
38 Making of Urban Japan p.120 39 Making of Urban Japan p.121 40 Making of Urban Japan p.122 41 Making of Urban Japan p.122
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bureaucracy and the centralized trends it had already established. However, there is no doubt that this contributed to centralization. Last, and most important, is Land Readjustment (LR). This stated two things; first, that land owners must all contribute a portion of their land (usually around 30 percent) for public uses such as roads and parks, and some to be sold as urban plots at the end of the project to help pay for project design, management and construction.42 This would heavily be used during the rebuilding efforts as later shown. This policy was advocated by people like Abe Iso, who believed that even in normal conditions, “everyone needed to endure a certain degree of sacrifice for the general public.” Abe concluded that after the unprecedented destruction delivered by the earthquake, sacrifice was an essential “prerequisite” to accomplish the “great project of reconstruction” for Tokyo and the nation. Landowners in particular, Abe declared, must be willing to make the greatest sacrifice for the good of the nation. Harking back to the Meiji Restoration to remind his readers of the noble sacrifice associated with the policy of hansekihokan (when daimyo gave back their domains and personal landholdings to the new Meiji emperor), Abe suggested that the nation’s suffering was much greater in 1923 than it had been in 1868. If people would “forsake their personal interest and display a spirit of public-mindedness,” Abe concluded, Japan could “turn misfortune into a blessing.”43 The second aspect that LR contained was that in the case of association projects, which are the most common type, if at least two-thirds of the land owners on at least two-thirds of the land in the designated project agree, all landowners could be forced to participate in the project and contribute their share of land. This prevented projects from being blocked by a single 42 Making of Urban Japan p.123 43 Schencking p.317
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uncooperative landowner, or by free-riders who wanted to gain project benefits without contributing to project costs.44 LR projects today account for about 30 percent of the Japanese urban areas, showcasing its lasting heritage on Japanese society.45 LR would be altered to be more powerful during the rebuilding of Tokyo after the 1923 disaster. The changes being that the new act (proposed by Shimpei Goto: the Ad Hoc Town Planning Act in December of 1923) empowered the Reconstruction Board to design and carry out its own projects with no requirement to gain the consent of the landowners concerned. The use of LR in this way allowed the board to sidestep the legal requirement that all land expropriated for building roads and public facilities had to be compensated at fair market value, and only authorized compensation for decreases in lot sizes over 10 percent.46
The Reconstruction of Tokyo This will be a rather large section, as the work done was quite extensive. Much of the information comes directly from the 1930 English document put out by the Tokyo Municipal Office. To begin, taken from the first page of the document, I’d like to share the quote that the Mayor of Tokyo (Zenjiro Horikiri) said following the conclusion of reconstruction: Gentlemen: After the seven years’ untiring efforts and painstaking works on the part of the citizens and all the people concerned, encouraged and supported by the people home and abroad, the reconstruction of Tokyo, the capital of Japan, has now come to its final completion. I am most happy to
44 Making of Urban Japan p.123 45 Making of Urban Japan p.123 46 Making of Urban Japan p.126
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state that the entire work of reconstruction, unprecedented in its scope and extent in the world history of city planning has been so far accomplished with the most satisfactory records. I take this opportunity to tender our heartfelt thanks to the world nations for the overwhelming generosity and ready assistance extended to us at the time of the catastrophe, six and a half years ag. I be to submit herewith, therefore, this brief account of the reconstruction work of Tokyo accompanied by maps, charts, and diagrams, comprising what may be termed “Tokyo Reconstruction Work,� as an official report. With my best regards and compliments, I am Very sincerely yours
Shimpei Goto (who was Minister of Home Affairs, and ex-mayor of Tokyo) was in charge of bringing up several priorities for reconstruction. These were as follows: 1.
Establishment of three organs a. Special Imperial Capital Reconstruction Council to decide the highest policies b. Governmental organ to take charge of actual affairs c. Committee consisting of the government, prefectural, and city officials to consider those plans to be proposed
2.
Insurance of long term domestic and foreign loans to meet the expenditure for the Tokyo Reconstruction
3.
Governmental purchase of the devastated area in Tokyo
All proposals except number 3 were adopted in greater extent. The Capital Reconstruction as the highest advisory organ and the Capital Reconstruction board as the special
Christopher Gandy
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Professor Pyle
executive organ to deal with the actual reconstruction were created, the latter being replaced by the Reconstruction Bureau of the Department of Home Affairs.47 Broadly speaking, the reconstruction plan consisted in the laying out or extension of roads, bridges, canals, parks, and other works incidental to city planning. LR was combined with other public undertakings such as educational, sanitary, and social welfare arrangements, and also the encouragement of the construction of fire-proof buildings by conferring subsidiary aid.48 The essence of the reconstruction project was thus a very large-scale use of the LR method. Of the 3,636 hectares of destroyed area in Tokyo, 3,041 hectares were divided into 65 project areas and redesigned and rebuilt in stages.49 Contested as unconstitutional, the 10 percent land reduction portion of LR in the reconstruction project met heavy opposition. In February of 1925, the Tokyo City Assembly passed a motion opposing the forced use of LR. However, the Reconstruction Bureau offered only minor changes to the compensation, and proceeded as planned. The opposition was faced with the inability to stop the projects, and died out. This shows the failure of local bodies to influence governmental policy’s influence in Japan.50 Also, reverting back to the mentality that Abe Ito stressed, Japanese should sacrifice their private goods for the sake of the city overall. Ultimately, despite being undemocratic, this method of LR was able to achieve reconstruction within a very short amount of time. The very high visibly and prestige of the project, and its evident success in the transforming and rebuilding a vast area of central Tokyo were a tremendous boost both to the public image of city planning in Japan and to the self-image of its 47 Reconstruction Work p.42 48 Reconstruction Work p.42 49 Making of Urban Japan p.127 50 Making of Urban Japan p.128
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practitioners.51 Ultimately, undemocratic movement helped to advocate the power of city planning, which may have not received the attention that it did, had the Reconstruction Board not been allowed to execute such authority. However, this was myopic overall. Most of this would be short-term, as a lot of the mentality from the reconstructed vision of Tokyo would become forgotten.52 It was not a movement carried out by the people, and therefore was not a growing process in society that would constantly be reinforced. It stood as a stand-alone project, and after Tokyo was lit up in flames again by the American firebombing, would have to start over with the practices lost to a new context. However, this plan accomplished many good things for Tokyo. Continuing on with the efforts of reconstruction, prior to the Great Kanto Earthquake, most of Tokyo’s urban streets were unpaved; they were muddy when wet and dusty when dry. After the earthquake, in conjunction with land readjustment in all areas damaged by the fire, modern major urban roads were built in a grid system (see appendices 3 and 4). These roads were paved and sidewalks separated from vehicle lanes, and trees planted on the roadside. This layout of the Plan emphasized that urban roads were a city’s communal space, valuing their functions as opens spaces and disaster prevention facilities. Thus, sidewalks were wide, with plenty of space set aside for roadside greenery with open areas and flower gardens provided at main intersections and spaces near bridges. However this changed after the 1960s, where transport functions took priority.53 The inevitable change, and lack of learning from city planning as an evolving democratic process, ultimately is characteristic to top-down planning, as stressed above. In the
51 Making of Urban Japan p.131 52 The Wheel Extended p.9 53 The Wheel Extended p.9
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long run, people are not a part of the process; they merely reap the benefits of government decisions. Listed below is a direct list of the distribution of projects undertaken by the Reconstruction Work outlined in the plan:54 Item: Readjustment of land-lots Scope and Extent: Replotting and readjusting of the burnt area. ~300,000 square meters. For this the area is divided into 65 districts. Authorities to Execute: Government 15 districts – 60,000 square meters 240,000 square meters
City 50 Disctricts-
Item: Construction of Streets Scope and Extent: a. Construction of 52 trunk lines, width 22m-73m b. Construction of 122 auxilary lines, width 8m-22m length 139,146m Authorities to Execute: a. Government b. City
Item: Construction of bridges Scope and Extent: a. construction of 112 bridges on trunk lines b. construction of 135 bridges on auxiliary lines c. pavement of roads other than trunk and auxiliary lines. ~1,116,000 meters d. repair and construction of 207 bridge other than a and b. Authorities to Execute: a. Government b. City. c. City. d. City
Items: Excavation of canals Scope and Extent: Improvement of old canals- 12 New excavation 1 Reclamation 1 Total 14 Total length 14,701 meters Authorities: Government
(Shortened due to redundancy)
Item: Laying out of Park 54 Reconstruction work p.46-47
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Scope: Laying out of 3 large parks and 51 small parks Authorities: Government and City
Items: Encouragement of the Construction of Fireproof Buildings Scope: Encouragement of the construction of fire-proof buildings by granting an aid of about 50 yen per tsubo of floor space and 25 yen are added in case of jointly owned building. Authorities: Government (46)
Items: Establishment of Central Wholesale Market Scope: Erection of central Whole sale Market at Tsukiji Authorities: City
Items: Water works Scope: Restoration of damages and completion of Murayama reservoir Authorities: City
Items: Sewage works Scope: Construction of main sewers in the third district Authorities: City
Items: Educational Provisions Scope: Construction of 117 primary schools Authorities: City
Items: Sanitary Provisions Scope: Construction of 5 free hospital. Reorganization of garbage disposal. Collection station 27 Incinerators 4 Authorities: City
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Items: Social Work Provisions Scope: Labor exchange offices 12 Public and child nurseries 10 Women’s workhouses 5 Public Resturants 10 Lodging houses 10 Public pawnshops 7 Public baths 10 Authorities: City
It is interesting to note how many say the authorities are city; but what the reconstruction plan fails to mention is that the cities were ultimately under the authority of the central government. They were not single entities deciding respectively what needed to be done. In regards to the budget of the reconstruction work, despite being successful overall, as it was Japan’s first attempt at modern urban planning (and the city reconstruction covered an area of ~3,100 ha, which was accomplished in just six years)55; the original plan was much grander, but met heavy opposition from the Ministry of Finance and members of the Diet. The Plan was scaled from an original 1.3 billion yen, to 720, then 570 million, then to 470 million by December of 1923.56 Many politicians had vested interests in the provinces and farming communities, and were opposed to large public expenditure on Tokyo and other major cities. Many politicians also lacked a long-term vision and had no knowledge or understanding of the need to improve the urban infrastructure, and since the majority also owned land in Tokyo, they argued as landowners against the violation of individual property rights.57 Going back to its success of the actual plan though, there were many features that are worth pointing out which carried over onto society in addition to the rebuilding efforts. The parks mentioned as “small parks” were created in conjunction to schools. These were also to be 55 The Wheel Extended p.2 56 The Wheel Extended p.4-5 57 The Wheel Extended p.5
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known as Japan’s famous “pocket parks.” Furthermore, the feature of large metropolitan parks and the concept of the hiroba (large open area) came into being. Not until the 1919 law did planners began to think seriously about integrating them into the urban landscape, and not until the era of reconstruction following the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 were those thoughts realized. The stand-alone hiroba remained, at least until the mid-1920s, a figment of planners’ imaginations.58 Also, as noted above, sidewalks and streets were seen as public space, and built with an emphasis on beauty via natural vegetation. Furthermore, dump facilities were improved upon; which was a pressing need for Tokyo. Lastly, the disaster and reconstruction plan advocated the need for suburbanization, as many people relocated away from the fire prone zones; and thus Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City movement was able to take route in Japanese society. These were upper middle class family communities, with Den’en Chofu still existing as a high-class residential area (despite not being the true self-sufficient community that Howard envisioned).59 Den’en Chofu was completed August of 1923, being delayed due to Great Kanto Earthquake. The Meguro-Kamata railways’ completion later that year marked the city’s actual debut, as it linked Den’en chofu to Tokyo and accelerated the influx of new residents. In 1927 Den’en chofu became part of the TokyoYokohama railway line, thereby making connections with both Tokyo’s Shibuya station and Yokohama station.60
Conclusion
58 Hoyt Long p.760 59 Making of Urban Japan p.137 60 Oshima p.146
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Professor Pyle
It is hard to say how the law could have evolved Tokyo had the earthquake and fires not happened. The most important part of this law, and change in Japanese city planning at the time, was Land Readjustment (LR); which, due to the pressing need to rebuild, was implemented in a very un-democratic manner. However, Tokyo could have re-developed more slowly, and in a more democratic fashion, if planners had time and patience. But, this could have also not been the case, as the period of Taisho Democracy was a very fragile stage in their society. Japan had a very centralized government, and the decisions were top-down. Furthermore, the Genro (elder statesman who ruled the nation in an oligarchical fashion) were dying, and militarists were gaining power. It is unlikely that city planning would have stopped these individuals from guiding the country in the direction it continued on via changes in city planning. If anything, the planning objectives with Tokyo might have not been achieved over a longer period of time, as the focus of these individuals was not on city planning. Urban planning was for an educated few academics and the Home Ministry. Given the context and the budget restrictions created by the Ministry of Finance, one could say that Tokyo, despite not achieving as grand of a scheme as individuals had hoped for, accomplished a lot for its time. It was able to implement many upgrades on the city that were of necessity. Also, despite the top-down nature of Japanese society, and lack of local governmental decisions, this is how Japan operated at this time. It always has been a hierarchical society, and it is no surprise that during this time, it continued to be so.
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Christopher Gandy
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Professor Pyle
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