Project Report on Logistics in Military by Sanjay Gupta

Index 1. Executive Summary 2. Introduction 3. Importance of Logistics 4. Military Logistics 5. Origin-To-Date 6. Principles of Military Logistics 7. Military Logistics Functions 8. Military Logistics Planning 9. Defense Transportation System 10. Airlift support to operations 11. Sealift Support to Joint Operations 12. Land Transportation Resources 13. Military Strategy 14. Anticipatory Logistics 15. Parallel of Military and Commercial Logistics 16. Technology Military logistics 17. Logistics used in wars 18. Logistics in WORLD WAR II 19. Roman Logistics 20. 1999 Kargil Conflict 21. Failure in logistics 22. Primary Research

Executive summary NAPOLEON FAMOUSLY said an army marches on its stomach. Clearly military personnel need to eat well to perform well. But what Napoleon was really getting at with this maxim was the importance of the supply line. Logistics - getting food, clothes, and spare parts to the front - is often what makes or breaks a conflict. The truth of this was illustrated by Napoleon himself when, in June 1812, he tried (and failed) to invade Russia with a force of 500,000 men. Because the Russians removed most of the food and crops in advance, Napoleon's army couldn't live off the land as they had in previous campaigns. Despite this, his forces made it to Moscow by September, but they were too emaciated to hold their position and in October went into retreat. Napoleon failed to live up to his own dictum about supply and, as a result, his bid for continental domination was thwarted. Logistics plays a significant role in any military action, whether the action is part of a war, a military operation other than war, or even a training exercise. Whenever military units are employed, they must be deployed and sustained. In fact, logistic activities are conducted much the same way in peace as they are in war or military operations other than war. Unlike certain functions, which are conducted only in war, logistics is always â&#x20AC;&#x153;on.â&#x20AC;? Logistics is concerned with the provision and allocation of resources. The conduct of war or military operations other than war normally requires extensive resources. However, the resources available to create and sustain combat power are almost always limited. Demand

usually

exceeds

supply. Logistics helps to ensure the effective use

of limited resources. Logistics assists the commander in making best use of the available resources to accomplish the mission. Logistics by itself cannot win wars, but it has been the major contributing factor in losing many wars, particularly in the 20th century. At the strategic level, the inability of a nation to generate sufficient forces, move them to the front, and support them once engaged invariably leads to deterioration of the

forcesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; material condition, morale, and tactical capability. This deterioration can be slow, as in the European theater during World War II, or it can occur relatively quickly, as it did in Desert Storm. Both the will and the ability to fight erode, often leading to collapse and defeat.

Logistics..."embraces not merely the traditional functions of supply and transportation in the field, but also war finance, ship construction, munitions manufacture and other aspects of war economy." - Lt Col George C. Thorpe, Pure Logistics, 1917

Section 1

Introduction Logistics is concerned with getting the products and services where they are needed when they are desired. It is difficult to accomplish any marketing or manufacturing without logistical support. It involves the integration of information, transportation, inventory, warehousing, material handling, and packaging. The operating responsibility of logistics is the geographical repositioning of raw materials, work in process, and finished inventories where required at the lowest cost possible The formal definition of the word â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;logisticsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; is: - it is the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, effective flow and storage of goods, services and related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer requirements. Within the firm the challenge is to coordinate individual job expertise into an integrated competency focused on servicing customers. In most situations the desired scope of such coordination transcends the individual enterprise, reaching out to include customers as well as material and service suppliers. Ina strategic sense, the senior logistics officer leads a boundary spanning initiative to facilitate effective supply chain relationships. The excitement of contemporary logistics is found in making the combined results of internal and external integration one of the core competencies of an enterprise. Throughout the history of mankind wars have been won and lost through logistical strengths and capabilities or the lack of them. Even though the generals of the past have understood the critical role of logistics it is only in the recent past that the big organizations have realized its role in the achievement of competitive advantage. Arth Shaw in 1915 pointed out that: the relations between the activities of demand creation and physical supplyâ&#x20AC;Ś illustrate the existence of the 2 principles of interdependence and balance. Failure to co-ordinate any one of these activities with its

group-fellows and also with those in the other group, or undue emphasis or outlay put upon any one of these activities, it is certain to upset the equilibrium of forces which mean efficient distribution. The physical distribution of the goods is a problem distinct from the creation of demand. There are many ways of defining logistics but the underlying concept might be defined as follows: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Logistics is the process of strategically managing the procurement, movement and storage of materials, parts and finished inventory through the organization and its marketing channels in such a way that current and future profitability are maximized through the cost-effective fulfillment of orders.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;

Importance of logistics Logistics is the bedrock of trade and business. Without selling and or buying there can be no trade and business. Buying and or selling takes place only when goods are physically moved into and or away from the market. Take away logistical support trade and business will collapse

Integrates logistical activities In conventional management environment, various activities of logistics work in isolation under different management functions. Each pocket trying to sub optimize its objectives at the cost of overall organizational objectives. Purchasing trying to purchase at minimum price at the cost of what is needed by operations. Operations produce large quantities at minimum production cost ignoring demand leading to doom inventory. Logistics function of management brings all such functions under one umbrella pulling down inter departmental barriers.

Logistics wins or loses wars 1. British lost American war of independence due to poor logistics 2. Rommel was beaten in the desert by superior logistics of Allies

Supports critical functions like operations and marketing Strong logistics support enables a company to move towards JUST IN TIME production system for survival in a highly competitive market.

Logistical costs For individual businesses logistics expenditures are 5% to 35% of sales depending on type of business, geographical areas of operation, weight/value ratios of products and materials. This is an expensive operation. Improvement in the efficiency of logistics function yields savings as well as customer satisfaction

Reasons For LOGISTICS to exits Logistics management from this total system is the means whereby the needs of customers are satisfied through the coordination of the materials and information flows that extend from the marketplace through the firm and its operations and beyond that to supplies. For example for many years marketing and manufacturing have been seen as largely separate activities within the organization. At best they have coexisted, at worst there has been open warfare. Manufacturing priorities and objectives have typically been focused on operating efficiency, achieved through long production runs, minimized setups, changeovers and product standardization. On the other hand marketing has sought to achieve competitive advantage through variety, high service levels and frequent product changes. In todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s more turbulent environment there is no longer any possibility of manufacturing and marketing acting independently of each other. It is now generally accepted that the need to understand and meet customer requirements is a prerequisite for survival. At the same time, in the search for improved cost competitiveness, manufacturing management has been the subject of massive renaissance. The last decade has seen the rapid introduction of flexible manufacturing systems, of new approaches to inventory based on materials requirement planning (MRP) and just in time (JIT) methods, a sustained emphasis on quality. Equally there has been a growing recognition of the critical role that procurement plays in creating and sustaining competitive advantage as part of an integrated logistics process. In this scheme of things, logistics is therefore essentially an integrative concept that seeks to develop a system wide view of the firm. It is fundamentally a planning concept that

seeks to create a framework through which the needs of the manufacturing strategy and plan, which in turn links into a strategy and plan for procurement

Section 2

Military Logistics Introduction There is an old saying, "Amateurs talk strategy, and professionals talk logistics." Logistics provides the foundation of our combat power. It can be described as the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to a nation’s war fighting forces. Logistics is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. In military logistics, experts manage how and when to move resources to the places they are needed. In military science, maintaining one's supply lines while disrupting those of the enemy is a crucial—some would say the most crucial— element of military strategy, since an armed force without food, fuel and ammunition is defenseless. The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander.

The relative combat power

military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations

For e.g. The Iraq war was a dramatic example of the importance of logistics. It had become very necessary for the US and its allies to move huge amounts of men, materials and equipment over great distances. Led by Lieutenant General William Pagonis, Logistics was successfully used for this effective movement. The defeat of the British

in the American War of Independence, and the defeat of Rommel in World War II, have been largely attributed to logistical failure. The historical leaders Hannibal Barca and Alexander the Great are considered to have been logistical geniuses.

For e.g. If you are a successful manager at Wal-Mart you have a profound understanding of logistics. The tonnage that Wal-Mart moves everyday and the control, placement and usage of people to get the job done is an excellent lesson in logistics. Just like the military they have to find manufacturers to make the needed products. Arrange for the shipment of the items, (to include ocean transport) distribute to multiple locations and then get the goods into the hands of the ultimate user. There are two major differences between Wal-Mart and military logistics. Wal-Mart gets to make a profit on their distributed goods, and nobody is trying to blow up their transportation system and kill their employees.

Levels of Logistic Support There are three levels of war 1. Strategic 2. Operational 3. Tactical They apply in war and in operations other than war. The Services concentrate on strategic logistic matters. The Services and the subordinate commanders, down to their battlefield logisticians at the unit and ship level, deal with operational and tactical logistic responsibilities, including developing procedures, doctrine, and training for supplying personnel with all necessary materiel to do their jobs. All levels are interrelated, with constraints at any level limiting options of decision makers. All levels of logistics involve combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone. Thus we can say that: 12

Military logistics is the art and science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of military forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or military operations that deal with: 1. Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of material. 2. Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel. 3. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities. 4. Acquisition or furnishing of services.

Origin- to- Date 13

The word "logistics" is derived from the Greek adjective logistikos meaning "skilled in calculating." The first administrative use of the word was in Roman and Byzantine times when there was a military administrative official with the title Logista. At that time, the word apparently implied a skill in the science of mathematical computations. Research indicates that its first use in relation to an organized military administrative science was by the French writer, Antoine-Henri Jomini, who, in 1838, devised a theory of war on the trinity of strategy, ground tactics, and logistics. The French still use the words logistique and loger with the meaning "to quarter." The military activity known as logistics probably is as old as war itself. In the early history of man when the first wars were fought, each man had to find his own food, stones, and knotted clubs. Each warrior was his own logistician. Not until later, when fighters joined as groups and fighting groups became larger, was there any basis for designating certain men to specialize in providing food and weapons to the combatants. The men who provided support to the fighters constituted the first logistics organization. Logistics is not an exact science. No mathematical formula or set of tables tells precisely what supplies or services will be needed, where and when they will be needed, or the best way to provide them. Responsible officials must make judgments on these matters, using intuition and scientifically weighing alternatives as the situation requires and permits. Their judgments must be based not only upon professional knowledge of the numerous aspects of logistics itself but also upon an understanding of the interplay of closely related military considerations such as strategy, tactics, intelligence, training, personnel, and finance. In major military conflicts, logistics matters are often crucial in deciding the overall outcome of wars.

For E.g. Tonnage war - the bulk sinking of cargo ships - was a crucial factor in World War II. The failure of the German Navy to sink enough cargo in the Second Battle of the Atlantic allowed Britain to stay in the war; by contrast, the successful disruption of

Japanese maritime trade in the Pacific effectively crippled its economy and thus its military production capabilities. More generally, protecting one's own supply lines and attacking those of an enemy is a fundamental military strategy. Military logistics has pioneered a number of techniques that have since become widely deployed in the commercial world. Operations research grew out of WWII military logistics efforts.

Relationship between Military Logistics & Warfighter There is a relationship between the function of military logistics and the warfighter. What is that relationship, and is it correctly defined? In the early 1960s, there was a stated relationship between logistics and the weapons systems: military logistics "support"' the weapons system. At that time, the subject of military logistics was fairly new and, with little ongoing research, very slow in providing greater understanding about it. Therefore, during that period, this definition of relationship seemed appropriate. It was not until the late l970s that several advocates of military logistics came to the realization that logistics support of the weapons system was actually creating and sustaining warfighting capability. This warfighting capability was provided to the combat forces in the form of continuing availability of operational weapons systems (the tools of war). This new awareness set up another definition of the relationship: military logistics creates and sustains warfightin g capability. While many heard the words, few realized their implications. The level of warfighting capability that logistics provides the combat forces determines the extent to which war can be waged. This in turn limits and shapes how the war will be waged. Warfighting capability is embedded in the design of all weapon systems. Advancing technology increases speed, range, maneuverability, ceiling, and firepower, all of which provide more lethal and accurately guided munitions, stealth, and other offensive and defensive warfighting capabilities. They will be embedded into the design of future weapon systems. It is the weapon systems that contain the warfighting capability of military forces. The strength of military forces is no longer measured by the number of men under arms.

Today, military forces are measured by the number--and warfighting capabilities--of their weapon systems. It is said that armies travel on their stomachs, what is usually left unsaid is they perform on the basis of their logistics competency.

Principles of Military Logistics The following logistic principles are not a checklist but rather a guide for analytical thinking and prudent planning:

Responsiveness Responsiveness is the right support in the right place at the right time. This is the keystone of the logistic principles, for all else becomes irrelevant if the logistic system cannot support the concept of operations of the supported commander. For e.g. The average semi tractor-trailer you encounter on the highway is carrying only a few tons of goods. When you are dealing with the military, especially wartime supply requirements, you are talking in the millions of tons of supplies. If there is an ongoing battle where the food, fuel and ammunition are being consumed in mass quantities, the tonnage of needed supplies goes up dramatically. If they are not supplied at right place and at right time, the defeat is certain

Simplicity Simplicity is avoidance of complexity and often fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of national and theater logistic operations.

Flexibility Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operations. Logistics plans and operations must be flexible to achieve both responsiveness and economy.

Economy Economy is the provision of support at the least cost. This element must continually be considered. 18

For e.g. Logistics is expensive and the Department of Defense is looking to cut costs. The cost of logistics for the current Gulf War is the main reason for canceling a number of air shows. War is expensive, but protecting country is more important.

Attainability Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations.

An operation should not begin until

minimum essential levels of support are on hand.

Sustainability Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation. This focuses the supporting commanderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. For e.g. We live in a world of instant gratification. We want it now. So, when a military member is in combat and needs certain items to keep fighting, he sends an e-mail demanding next-day-air delivery. The problem is UPS and Fed Ex do not deliver to foxholes in the desert and only a fraction of supplies go by military airlift. You can send an entire shipload of supplies for very close to the cost of one cargo aircraft delivery. Unlike the world of total quality management, the wartime military cannot function on "just in time" re-supply. Combat leaders have to plan well in advance, that is why it is called logistics not Express Mail.

Survivability Survivability is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction.

Active measures must include a plan for ground defense of logistic

installations with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. Passive measures include 19

dispersion, physical protection of personnel and equipment, deception, and limiting the size and capabilities of an installation to what is essential for the mission.

Logistics comprises the means and arrangements, which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point. - General Antoine Henri Jomini, (The Art of War), 1838

Military Logistic Functions Logistic support requirements involve the following six broad functional areas:

Supply systems

It acquires, manage, receive, store, and issue the materiel required by the operating forces to equip and sustain the force from deployment through combat operations and their redeployment.

Maintenance It includes actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition, to return it to service, or to update and upgrade its capability.

Transportation It is the movement of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies from the point of origin to the final destination.

General engineering It provides the construction, damage repair, and operation and maintenance of facilities or logistic enhancements required by the combatant commander to provide shelter, warehousing, hospitals, water and sewage treatment, and water and fuel storage distribution in order to enhance provision of sustainment and services.

Health services It include evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory services, blood management, vector control, preventive medicine services, veterinary services, dental services, and the required command, control, and communications. Finally, other services are associated with non materiel support activities and consist of various functions and tasks provided by Service troops and the logistic community that are essential to the technical management and support of a force (i.e., aerial delivery, laundry, clothing exchange and bath, and graves registration.)

Logistics...as vital to military success as daily food is to daily work. -

Captain A.T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, 1912

Military Logistic Planning Logistics planning is a complex, interdependent concept that can apply leverage (plus or minus) to a combatant commanderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s combat power.

An understanding of the combatant commanderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s concept of operations and early involvement by the logistic staff will ensure that national and theater deployment and sustainment requirements are balanced with logistic capabilities. The operation plans should have logistic implications coordinated at all levels: 1. International 2. National 3. Service 4. Functional component 5. Supporting command. These plans should be adaptable and make provisions for changes to the concept of operations. The reasoning for this is that proper logistic planning will reduce the need for emergency measures and logistic improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands. Deployment planning is more deliberate and methodical than employment planning and lends itself better to automated data processing support. Detailed logistic planning for employment is equally important and should neither be neglected nor delayed until deployment plans are completed. Only by thorough and concurrent consideration of both deployment and employment facets of the campaign or operation will planners be able to construct adequate logistic plans.

Logistic Planning Considerations It is critical that planners identify key issues unique to a specific joint operation plan they must support. To anticipate priorities, planners should: 23

1. Provide instructions or guidance for redistributing assets from low- to highpriority organizations within the command 2. Obtain assets from external sources with lower priority needs 3. Control the allocation of new assets in short supply 4. Provide efficient means to retrograde, repair, and reissue damaged or unserviceable critical items. Critical supplies and materiel should be identified early in the planning process. Critical items are supplies vital to the support of operations that are in short supply or are expected to be in short supply. Logistic planners must understand the constraining factors affecting all phases of the deployment and sustainment plans. They can encounter bottlenecks that limit or degrade the ability to support a campaign or operation plan. Logistic planners must anticipate congestion and seek solutions to bottlenecks. Movement control must coordinate the employment of all means of transportation, including that provided by allies or host nations, to support the combatant commandersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; concept of operations. For e.g. 1. Commander in Chief, Transportation Command, as the single transportation manager, will provide for proper liaison with the combatant commanders for movement of personnel and materiel into the theater. 2. The geographic commanders will exercise control over movement. Whatever unique circumstances prevail in logistic plans should provide combatant commanders with the highest practicable degree of influence or control over movement.

One unique Example 24

One of the outstanding examples was Richard the Lionhearted, king of England in the laye 12th century. Richard led a large army on Crusade to the Holy Land. Previous Crusader armies had suffered greatly from a lack of logistical planning. Moving through hostile, and often barren, country, several Crusader armies had literally fallen apart from lack of food. Richard arranged for supplies to be accummulated and ships used to deliver them to his troops as they marched along the coast. He thus managed to defeat Saladin, the great Moslem general. Unfortunately, Saladin also understood logistics. When Richard finally had to march inland to besiege Jerusalem, he found that Saladin had stripped the countryside bare of food and fodder. The wells had been poisoned and Richard realized that his army would fall apart from starvation if he tried to besiege Jerusalem. The Crusaders had to settle for a treaty with Saladin that guaranteed Christian pilgrims access to the Holy Places. This was also a classic example of two able, and well matched, generals checkmating each other and then negotiating an agreement that left both able to claim a victory.

Defense Transportation System An integral part to any efforts in logistic planning is the Defense Transportation System and its role in supporting national security objectives.

The DTS is multifaceted, resulting in a versatility, which can support the entire continuum of movement requirements ranging from peacetime cargo and passenger movement, through reinforcement and sustainment operations in general war. For e.g. The DTS is an integral part of the total US transportation system and involves procedures, resources, federal, commercial, and non-US activities that support defence transportation needs. There are several general considerations which influence transportation planning and capability. They include the following: 1. Amount and availability of forces and material to be moved 2. Availability and characteristics of movement resources, both military and civilian 3. Priorities established for the movement 4. Duration of the movement and time available for planning the movement 5. Reception and throughput capabilities of ports of embarkation 6. Strategic transportation sustainment capability 7. The threat and potential attrition 8. Requirements to convoy 9. Degree of protection provided lines of communications 10. In-transit visibility and accessibility of items in the pipeline.

Airlift support to operations Airlift supports national strategy by rapidly transporting personnel and materiel to and from the war place. It operates across the range of military operations performing six broad tasks:

Deployment For e.g. US troops were deployed in iraq with the help of aircraft.

Employment For e.g. US had employed its combatant commanders to different areas with the help of aircraft

Redeployment For e.g. When US completed capturing Baghdad it redeployed its troops in different areas to find saddam hussain

Sustainment For e.g. Aircraft was used to supply foods, shelter material to US troops in US, Iraq war.

Aeromedical evacuation For e.g. Recent war, between iraq and Lebanon is worthwhile example for people evacuation Airlift is a cornerstone of global force projection. It provides the means to rapidly deploy and redeploy forces, on short notice, to any location worldwide. Airlift employment missions can be used to transport forces directly into combat. To maintain a force’s level of effectiveness, airlift sustainment missions provide resupply of high-priority equipment, personnel, and supplies. Finally, airlift supports the movement of patients to treatment facilities and noncombatants to safe havens. Airlift’s characteristics — speed, flexibility, range, and responsiveness — complement other US mobility assets

Planning Airlift Operations

Planning airlift operations is a complicated process involving numerous interdependent functions.

These range from such things as assuring airlift facilities are capable of

supporting an operation to selecting the most appropriate airlift for that operation. Airlift planners must be thoroughly familiar with each Service componentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s unique airlift capabilities as well as those of common-user airlift. They must comprehend the nature of the threat to airlift and coordinate effective threat countermeasures. Finally, the entire airlift operation requires detailed planning, to include coordination of appropriate airspace control measures and communication procedures. The following are general considerations for airlift planners:

Airlift Facilities Planners must know the capabilities of each airlift facility in the theater.

Facility Support Forces The supported Service component is responsible for the movement of personnel and cargo to the on load site and forward after off-loading.

Air Base Defense All echelons must plan for air base defense to protect airlift aircraft, aircrews, support personnel, and base facilities. This may include protection against conventional air-tosurface munitions, as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and unconventional warfare forces.

Joint Airspace Control Airlift plans must integrate international, HN, and military airspace control procedures and regulations.

Intelligence Timely intelligence is essential to airlift mission planning. Airlift operations require considerable intelligence support to reduce their vulnerability.

Threat Airlift aircraft are very vulnerable to hostile actions. 28

Communications for Deploying Ground Forces Secure en route communication packages provide ground commanders embarked on airlift aircraft secure communications with ground force subordinate commanders while en route to an objective area.

Sealift Support to Joint Operations Successful response to regional contingencies depends upon sufficient strategic mobility assets to deploy combat forces rapidly and sustain them in a theater of operations as long as necessary to meet military objectives. The strategic mobility triad of airlift, sealift,

and prepositioning (PREPO) is the most cost effective method to provide such a response. Each element of the triad has its own unique advantages and disadvantages. In most cases, sealift accounts for the majority of the total cargo delivered to a theater of operations. To meet these requirements, sealift forces are employed in the three phases of strategic mobility, which are: 1. PREPO 2. Deployment (or surge) 3. Sustainment. For e.g. The United States is a nation with global interests and requires a military strategy that achieves national security objectives across the range of military operations. The strategy employed is based upon three main components: peacetime engagement; deterrence and conflict prevention; fight and win nations wars. This strategy cannot be executed without forward presence, power projection, and the ability to sustain forces during an operation and redeployed forces when the operation is terminated.

As the principal means for delivering equipment and

logistic support, sealift impacts the ability to conduct sustained operations and may influence the outcome of the operation being conducted. To the extent that sealift limits deployment of forces or logistic support, geographic combatant and their components are constrained in the strategic, operational, and tactical options they might choose and the forces they can employ.

Flexible, assured sealift support permits to expand the strategic, operational, and tactical options available.

Planning Sealift operations During large strategic deployment operations, sealift support is typically conducted in three phases.

Prepositioning Afloat is made up of ships from the Military Sealift Commandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF). The flexibility inherent in the APF makes this force a key element in joint operation planning; the APF is capable of supporting the plans for the entire range of military operations.

Surge It Includes ships to control fleet. Surge shipping delivers the heavy combat power and accompanying supplies to allow the deployment of predominantly based forces to anywhere in the world.

Sustainment It refers to shipping provided by the merchant fleet, mostly container ships, to deliver large quantities of resupply and ammunition to forward deployed forces augmented as necessary by the Ready Reserve force. For e.g. US had these facilities during the war against Iraq. It had deployed its ships in the seaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s near Iraq. Although all three portions of the sealift trident are distinct entities they provide a synergistic effect, and removing a segment of the trident will prove to deny the full range of sealift support options.

Land Transportation Resources The last major area of transportation is land transportation resource The Department of the Army is responsible for making land transportation available in overseas areas for the Military Departments, and coordinating all planning and requirements for the use of controlled land transportation equipment and facilities. 31

The Department of Defense owns a limited amount of resources capable of moving supplies. Some of these assets, which include railcars and containers, are used for day-today peacetime interstate transportation. The commercial transportation industry also has substantial capability available to meet transportation needs of the Department of Defense across the range of military operations. The Contingency Response Program provides, through quick-reaction procedures, the Department of Defense priority use of commercial transportation resources prior to and during contingencies, mobilizations, natural disasters, and operations other than war. They also must provide land transportation support within their installations and activities and such other land transportation service.

Military Strategy Introduction Military strategy is a collective name for planning the conduct of warfare. Derived from the Greek strategos, strategy was seen as the "art of the general".

Military strategy deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy.

Fundamentals of military strategy "Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods

be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances." â&#x20AC;&#x201C;Sun Tzu Strategy and tactics are closely related. Both deal with distance, time and force but strategy is large scale while tactics are small scale. Originally strategy was understood to govern the prelude to a battle while tactics controlled its execution. However, in the world wars of the 20th century, the distinction between manoeuvre and battle, strategy and tactics, became blurred. Tactics that were once the province of a company of cavalry would be applied to a panzer army. In its purest form, strategy dealt solely with military issues.

For E.g. In earlier societies, a king or political leader was often the same person as the military leader. If he was not, the distance of communication between the political and the military leader was small. But as the need of a professional army grew, the bounds between the politicians and the military came to be recognized. As French statesman Georges Clemenceau said, "war is too important a business to be left to soldiers." This gave rise to the concept of the grand strategy which encompasses the management of the resources of an entire nation in the conduct of warfare. In the environment of the grand strategy, the military component is largely reduced to operational strategy -- the planning and control of large military units such as corps and divisions. As the size and number of the armies grew and the technology to communicate and control improved, the difference between "military strategy" and "grand strategy" shrank. Fundamental to grand strategy is the diplomacy through which a nation might forge alliances or pressure another nation into compliance, thereby achieving victory without 33

resorting to combat. Another element of grand strategy is the management of the post-war peace. As Clausewitz stated, a successful military strategy may be a means to an end, but it is not an end in itself. Strategy (and tactics) must constantly evolve in response to technological advances. A successful strategy from one era tends to remain in favour long after new developments in military weaponry and matĂŠriel have rendered it obsolete.

For E.g. World War I, and to a great extent the American Civil War, saw Napoleonic tactics of "offense at all costs" pitted against the defensive power of the trench, machine gun and barbed wire. As a reaction to her WWI experience, France entered World War II with a purely defensive doctrine, epitomised by the "impregnable" Maginot Line, but only to be completely circumvented by the German blitzkrieg.

Principles of military strategy Many military strategists have attempted to encapsulate a successful strategy in a set of principles. Sun Tzu defined 13 principles in his The Art of War while Napoleon listed 115 maxims. American Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest required only one: "get there firstest with the mostest". The fundamental concepts common to most lists of principles are:

1. The Objective 2. Offense 3. Cooperation 4. Concentration (Mass) 5. Economy 6. Maneuver 7. Surprise 8. Security 9. Simplicity Some strategists assert that adhering to the fundamental principles guarantees victory while others claim war is unpredictable and the general must be flexible in formulating a strategy. Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke expressed strategy as a system of "ad hoc expedients" by which a general must take action while under pressure. These underlying principles of strategy have survived relatively unscathed as the technology of warfare has developed.

Examples of good strategies 1. Genghis Khan and the Mongols had all the features of above strategies. 2. Napolean had all the features in its war at water loo.

Anticipatory Logistics The Army's Supply Chain Management The Army is experimenting with the concept of anticipatory logistics for class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), class V (ammunition), and maintenance. Anticipatory logistics uses technologies, information systems, and procedures to predict and prioritize customer requirements and provide appropriate sustainment. Although this sounds simple

enough, future logisticians will use current and future technologies as tools to monitor supply levels and equipment conditions for combat units. They also will use decision support software to determine the best use of combat service support assets.

How is this concept related to the supply chain management (SCM) technique that corporations use? Supply Chain Management A supply chain is made up of all the manufacturers and suppliers who provide the parts that make up a particular product. It includes production, storage, and distribution activities that procure materials, transform the materials into intermediate and finished products, and distribute the finished products to the customer. Supply chains exist in both service and manufacturing industries. However, the complexity and organization of supply chains vary immensely from industry to industry and from organization to organization. In practice, supply chains have multiple products with the potential of many shared components, facilities, and capacities. While SCM and the supply chain seem to be very similar, the most notable difference is that SCM is a process that integrates and synchronizes the supply chain to meet an organization's goals and objectives. The chart on page 4 illustrates a corporate SCM conceptual model. SCM has seven components and six essential success factors. The seven components are:

1. Suppliers. 2. Procurement. 3. Manufacturing. 4. Order management. 5. Transportation. 6. Warehousing. 36

7. Customers. The six essential success factors areâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; 1. Consumer demand. 2. Information and communication technologies. 3. Globalization. 4. Competition. 5. Government regulations. 6. Environmental concerns. The dilemma that management in industry faces is how to satisfy two diametrically opposing forces: the customers' demands for better, faster, and less costly products and services and the organization's need for growth and profitability. To meet both requirements, business organizations use SCM. Consumer expectations concerning service, speed, cost, and choice will continue to rise. The business trend is to provide consumers with what they want faster than any competitors can, at a price lower than the current market price, and in real time. SCM organizes the overall business process to enable the profitable transformation of raw materials or products into finished goods and their timely distribution to meet customer demands.

External Factors: Globalization, Government regulations, environment & Competition

External

Factors:

End-user needs, DOD regulations, environment, joint interoperability, and deployment within and outside the continental United States, mission requirements. 38

Supply chain management is similar for both corporate and military organizations. However, some significant differences are evident in these models. The first is the absence of maintenance on the corporate model. Another is that transportation, distribution, and warehousing are unidirectional in the corporate model but dual directional in the military model. The external factors differ between the two types of organizations.

Military of Supply Chain Management For military logistics operations, SCM has seven components and seven essential success factors. SCM for the Army is slightly different from SCM for corporate organizations because the Army's focus is on mission requirements rather than on quarterly earnings. The seven components of SCM for the Army are the same as for businessâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; 1. Suppliers. 2. Procurement. 3. Manufacturing. 4. Order management. 5. Transportation. 6. Warehousing. 7. Customers (soldiers). The Army's seven essential success factors areâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; 1. Customer needs. 2. Information and communication technologies. 3. Deployment within and outside the continental United States. 4. Joint interoperability. 5. Department of Defense regulations. 6. Environmental concerns (to include enemy forces). 7. Mission requirements.

The SCM conceptual models for both business and the Army are similar; however, there are some significant differences.

Differences There are the dual directional arrows on the chart for transportation and for distribution and warehousing in the Army SCM model. These illustrate that the Army may retrograde equipment and components for maintenance or retrograde personnel for medical care. Other differences are in the external factors that affect the supply chain. These factors includeâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; 1. Joint

interoperability

among

the

services'

command,

control,

communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) systems. 2. Deployment of forces. 3. Soldier and mission requirements. The supply chain reflects the Army's focus on mission accomplishment as opposed to business' focus on Profitability.

Anticipatory Logistics Like the corporate world, the Army faces two diametrically opposing forces: 1. The need to support combat maneuver forces better, more responsively at a lower cost 2. The need to reduce the logistics footprint of the Army's future forces. The Army is exploring how to better support brigade combat teams by using some underlying SCM concepts, such as information and communication technologies, order management, and transportation using current and new technologies. By using the "tactical Internet" to achieve situational awareness, future logisticians will be able to track the status of supplies for individual units and better predict the needs of combat units. Systems that provide logistics leaders enhanced situational awareness will provide instantaneous supply status, predict component failures, and even provide twoway messaging. Sensors in both combat and combat service support vehicles will monitor supply levels, unit locations, and equipment status and be able to transmit this information to logistics leaders. Knowing on-hand supply levels will help logistics leaders to better configure "pulsed" logistics resupplies, typically consisting of 3 to 7 days' worth of supplies. Leaders will use this new, enhanced level of situational awareness, provided by decision support tools such as embedded diagnostics, automated testing, and data analysis, to better support combat forces with fewer logistics assets. In an endeavor to revolutionize anticipatory logistics at the wholesale level, the Army is forming a strategic alliance with SAP to integrate and streamline the wholesale logistics process. This alliance will manage demand, supply availability, distribution, financial control, and data management better and provide more flexible and dynamic logistics at the wholesale level to meet specific customer requirements. The benefits will include a

synchronized global supply, distribution, and financial network that will increase weapon system readiness and manage mission-based requirements more responsively.

Conclusion Industry's SCM and the Army's anticipatory logistics for supporting future combat forces are similar. Whereas anticipatory logistics concentrates on the wholesale and tactical, which is a small slice of the supply chain that culminates with the customer, SCM takes a holistic approach to the entire supply chain. Both anticipatory logistics and SCM share various fundamental concepts in order to meet their respective goals and objectives. The future of logistics in the Army is evolving toward a holistic approach, much like business' SCM efforts, to improve its logistics capability while reducing its logistics footprint.

Parallel of Military and Commercial Logistics Military and commercial readiness can be defined as the optimization of available resources to operate in a possible unforeseen event. In this sense, readiness can be viewed as situational management of an event. Time, cost, and quality are still crucial to measuring situational logistics management. A thorough assessment of supplies, resources, and manpower would need to be matched with the needs of the unforeseen event under surge circumstances. Customer wait time measures the time needed to deliver an item to the customer's door, including the time a component may spend in maintenance. Door-to-door delivery times can be measured for other situational logistics scenarios. Take, for instance, the hypothetical release of a biological weapon such as Anthrax in the subways of New York City, or the crash of a busload of tourists on a congested Los Angeles freeway that results in critical injuries. These scenarios are not very different from a wartime surge scenario requiring logistics management. Whether it is for a military or commercial surge scenario, carefully planned situational logistics and effective supply chain management can get the supplies to the people in need in an emergency. Both of these hypothetical scenarios involve fundamental logistics processes, such as quickly exchanging information, identifying available supply resources, and delivering supplies. Such scenarios call for an integrated plan involving military, governmental, and commercial services.

Commercial As the national infrastructure networks and ports become stressed by capacity constraints, logistics companies are relying more on intelligent distribution methods such as the Internet. Virtual service providers allow large corporations to exchange supply information among globally situated retail locations. Since economy of scale is the driving 43

force in commercial industries, the larger the conglomerate, the better the business. When businesses are located all over the globe and information acts as another mode of transportation in logistics, technology becomes increasingly important for daily operations. Some logistics providers have become information management firms. With the adoption of the Internet for electronic commerce, customers have come to expect ready access to real-time inventory procurement, ordering, and tracking. The Information Revolution is leading the changes in supply chain distribution and fulfillment patterns. E-commerce, e-procurement, e-retailing, and virtual warehousing concepts are changing the relationships between suppliers and distributors, altering the implications for freight movement patterns, andâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;since the Internet offers accessibility from any locationâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; redefining the relative location of the workplace. Real-time access to business data on potential customers and suppliers provides managers with dynamic inventory control and immediate vehicle dispatching capabilities for freight delivery systems.

Military Each military installation can be conceived of as a decentralized retail center that can be connected to a centralized hub or a major distribution center that can distribute supplies. If end items are in need of repair parts, the technology is available to signal low stockage at location for that particular repair part so it can be reordered instead of waiting for carcasses. Transportation delivery systems are fairly reliable and are not the major bottlenecks to getting the necessary parts to the soldier in the field. Finding the manufacturer who can make component parts to order and connecting that manufacturer with the direct support operations may be the next logical step in military logistics.

Commercial In private sector logistics, direct coordination of retailers, suppliers, and transporters using technology such as the Internet has enabled retailers to fill empty shelves more quickly because such a system helps the respective parties predict each other's needs. For the military, an Internet-based system connecting installations would require that all of the

installations share information with military procurement, supply, and transportation offices.

Military Lack of spare parts is not necessarily the major hindrance to efficient military logistics. Having the spare part where it is needed is the key area for logistics improvement.

For e.g. During Operation Desert Storm, $2.7 billion worth of spare parts went unused. It is estimated that, if the Army had had an effective cargo-tracking method during the Gulf War, it could have saved about $2 billion. As a result of the Gulf War experience, automatic identification technology and intransit visibility systems have been established as mechanisms that will save the military money in the long term. For military surface distribution, the idea of having coordinated, scheduled truck deliveries at installations is not very different from the type of coordination that occurs between the retailers and the supply chain management system.

For e.g. During the Gulf War, there also was a lack of equipment needed for deployment, and the ports of embarkation and debarkation were overcrowded with supplies that had to be processed and moved to direct support locations. Although military manpower has been reduced since then, capital investments in technology have helped expedite deployment operations. Thus Military and commercial has lots of relevance but are used in different manner and different sense. Whatever the use may be both emphasis on reduction of cost, proper deployment of goods, people and proper use of transportation to say some.

Technology Military logistics In recent years Army logisticians have used technology to solve complex supply issues.

For E.g. During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, the Army sent tons of supplies to the desert. But there was a problem: Far too much time was spent opening shipping containers to discover what was inside them. Computerized electronic devices now enable logisticians to identify and track military shipments made the world over. "Things have changed significantly in military logistics [since Desert Storm] and a lot of that change is powered by the information Revolution," says Mark J. O'Konski, executive director of the U.S. Army Logistics Integration Agency. "Today the Army has total asset visibility. That means that for over 99 percent of all reportable inventory we know, in real time, where it is and what condition it is in."

IETMs Technology is helping military logisticians in other ways too. Bulky technical manuals for military equipment, which once used masses of paper, are now contained in lightweight portable compact disks. These are known as Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals IETMs. They have many advantages over paper-based versions, including:

Information Access Printed technical manuals for complex equipment come in multiple volumes, which means it can take a technician a lot of time to find the information he or she needs. Whereas IETMs allow, internal cross-reference links and links to other material (inventory, training, etc). Many also have audio and video features.

Up-to-date Information Rapid changes to military equipment means supporting documentation must be updated along with those changes. With paper documents much of this has to be done manually, which takes time and personnel and is expensive. IETMs, on the other hand, can be updated quickly and cost-effectively. Many IETMs also have a "sticky notes" feature, which can be use as an interim solution between updates. There are many advantages to IETMs. But what might come as surprise is they lessen the need for highly skilled technicians. Tests show that inexperienced technicians, who were unable to locate a fault using paper technical manuals, were able to do so using IETMs. In cost terms this means it might be possible to shorten training programs and use less experienced personnel.

One thing is certain. Logistics have come a long way since Napoleon's day. But an army still marches on its proverbial stomach it's just the supply chain is now digital.

Logistics used in wars

Logistics in WORLD WAR II The logistic network performed prodigious feats in World War II. Millions of tons of food, weapons, and equipment, and millions of men were transported to every corner of the globe. Supplies were moved by ship to ports in the war zones and then to forward supply bases. Quartermaster units attached to the armies then moved the supplies forward to corps supply dumps. Divisional quartermaster units then, in turn, moved the supplies forward and distributed them to units. Ground transport was by railroad, truck. Ammunition supply was performed in a similar manner, except that it was the responsibility of the Ordnance Corps.

Supply of materials during WORLD WAR II

Supplies

War zone Port 1

Supply base 1

War zone Port 2

Supply base 1

Supply base 3

Units

Quarter master units

Quarter Units master units

Supply base 3

Supply base 2

Quarter master units

War zone Port 3

Supply base 3 Supply base 2

Quarter master units

Supply base 1

Quarter master units

Units Quarter master units

Quarter master units

Units Units

Units

Quarter master units

Units

Units 49

Units

In general, most types of supply were plentiful. Food, clothing and general equipment items were usually plentiful. However, gasoline (petrol), oil, and lubricants (called POL, a term inherited from the British) and ammunition tended to be in short supply at many times. POL could be difficult to get forward, container trucks and trailers worked well for unit distribution, but were inefficient for long hauls, as was the case in Europe. The solution in Europe was PLUTO (for pipeline under the ocean), a POL pipeline (actually a number of separate pipelines) laid across the English Channel and with a terminus that eventually reached to Belgium. In the Pacific, it was often a simple matter of tying up a tanker to a pier and pumping fuel directly into trucks on the dock. Ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, tended to be a much more pernicious problem. In the early stages of the Army's expansion there were plans calling for a high priority in the production of 105mm shells of all types, in as much as these were the standard, general-support divisional field piece. Ammunition for heavier guns was accorded a lower priority, under the assumption that mobile warfare would reduce the utility of large, unwieldy and relatively immobile large artillery pieces. Unfortunately, a number of factors then intervened as follows: Congressional criticism was raised over large over stocks of all types of artillery ammunition that had accumulated in Tunisia in 1943. The Army was pressured to scale back production, particularly of 105mm ammunition. The perceived need for an expansion of the heavy and medium artillery was mirrored by an expansion of the production facilities for the heavier types of shells. The expansion in heavy shell production was facilitated by converting light ammunition production to heavy. Thus, by late 1943 priorities had shifted radically. Many plants were retooling for other production, while some 105mm plants were closed completely. Events in France and Italy in mid 1944 then changed all the assumptions again. The fierce German resistance in the bocage of Normandy and in the Appenine Mountains of Italy placed a premium on all types of ammunition - just as stocks of 105mm ammunition

began to shrink. Rationing was instituted (and extended to most other types of mortar and artillery ammunition), and captured German weapons and ammunition were utilized against their former owners. By 1 January 1945 the entire ETO stock of 105mm ammunition was reduced to 2,524,000 rounds, a twenty-one-day supply according to War Department planning factors, which were widely acknowledged to be too optimistic. The poor flying weather encountered in Europe in the fall and winter exacerbated this neardisastrous situation.

Roman Logistics To understand how ill served medieval armies were in terms of logistics, consider what the Romans did and how they did it. The Romans were supremely organized in all they did. Literacy was encouraged, and in the Roman armies nearly half their troops may have been capable of reading and writing. This was important because about five percent of a Roman army consisted of technicians, clerks, and supply specialists. These troops received extra pay and/or exemption from manual labor so they could keep track of what supplies the army had on hand, how long these would last, and where new supplies were coming from. A Roman army kept records, lots of records. There were lists for everything, including how much of each soldiers' pay (and Roman troops were generally paid on time) was to be deducted for food, clothing, weapons, and burial expenses, not to mention the annual party. When any of these items were needed, the Roman army clerks had it available. The Romans built a network of roads (some still in use) throughout their empire to speed the movement of troops and supplies. All cities and many towns had military purchasing agents who received reports from the army detailing how much food, shoes (hob nailed sandals), weapons, and other supplies and were they were to be delivered. The army commanders had finance officers who arranged for suppliers to be paid promptly, thus encouraging timely and accurate fulfillment of military contracts. The Romans knew how much food (by weight and cost) their troops would consume each day. Their army clerks kept daily records of how many troops were with each unit. Army purchasing agents kept track of what supplies were available in their area, and how much of it was for sale and for how much. Paper reports were carried up and down the Roman roads to keep everyone informed of who needed what and when. The Romans usually managed to control the sea-lanes also, and would rent, buy or build the shipping they needed for each campaign. The Roman system wasn't perfect. Money problems, enemy action, or communications foul ups would sometimes leave the troops lacking key items. But 52

when compared to their opponents, the Romans were much better off. Roman opponents were either barbarians, who stole what they could find in the areas they passed through, or ill organized kings who at best made haphazard arrangements. Assured of regular supply, Roman troops could more easily survive being under siege, or reduce enemy fortifications themselves without worrying about starving. Well-supplied Roman armies could march hither and yon for months at a time while their ill-organized foes would see their troops getting hungry, and shortly there afterwards deciding to go home (with or without permission).

Roman Tactics, Strategy & battle formation Rome faced multiple, simultaneous enemies which hastened the development of its military system. The first Roman soldiers were equipped and fought as Greek Hoplites and in the close order of a Phalanx. Soldiers provided their own weapons and equipment and only the richest person could afford the "panoplia" which included: 1. A bronze corselet called Lorica 2. A spear usually three meters long 3. A large oval shield 4. Greaves The remainder of the army were equipped as Velites, light infantry skirmishers. During the reign of Servius Tullius , all Roman able-bodied, property-owning male citizens were first divided into five classes for military service based on wealth, since soldiers provided their own weapons and equipment. These classes were further organized into units of 100 called Centuries. The Equites, could afford horses and so made up the smallest, wealthiest class. The next wealthiest were the heavy infantry Triarii, below them were two classes of medium infantry the Principes and Hastati, with the poorest class serving as the Velites. The army "Legio", meaning levy in Latin, was comprised of 3,000 infantry pedites and 300 cavalry equites. Each of the three original tribes- the Titis, Ramnes and Luceres had to provide 1000 pedites and 100 equites. The army was deployed with a strong infantry center and the equites on the wings. The infantry was commanded by a tribunus militum while the cavalry by tribunus celerum. During the early Republic the Roman army changed its shape, the army abandoned the heavy and inflexible phalanx formation. Now recruitment was based on a census which took into account not only wealth but age and battle experience. The richest and the most experienced soldiers would serve as the Triarii, the middle class, somewhat less experienced and the small landowners as the principes and the remainder as the hastati and velites. The Romans developed a more flexible unit, called the Manipulus with 120 54

men in two "centuria", which despite the name were in fact composed of 60 men each and not 100. Each maniple had two centurions, with one being the senior or the prior acting as the commanding officer. The maniples would be further temporarily grouped into Cohortes of around 300 men. A typical Maniple cohort would consist of: 1. 120 hastati 2. 120 principes 3. 60 triarii. Ten cohorts would form a legion.. Each type of soldier had standard equipment which consisted ofFor Triarii:

Lorica hamata plus a bronze corselet, a large rectangular shield, called scutum, a small thrusting spear.

For principes:

Lorica hamata plus a scutum, two javelins (pila), and a gladius

For hastati:

A bronze corselet, a scutum, two pila and a gladius.

They were deployed in a checker board pattern, with the hastati first to face the enemy, the principes in the second line and the triarii in the third line at the rear. The tactical objective was simple: The hastati would wear down the enemy by throwing their pila , then in the gaps left between each maniple, the principes would charge in to rout the enemy, if the principes failed to do so, they would fall back or the triarii would advance to attack and push back the enemy. The battle signals were given by a cornicifer, which in Latin means Horn carrier, and by an Optio, who was the second in command of a centuria.

Formation & tactics Pre-battle maneuver The Romans generally followed the same basic methods in battle, although of course adjustments were made depending on the enemy, terrain, etc. The approach march was made in several columns, enhancing maneuver. As the opponents drew closer to each other, movement became more careful and more tentative. The Romans typically established a strong field camp, complete with palisade and ditch, providing a basis for supply storage, troop marshalling and defence. Camps were recreated each time the army moved. Several days might be spent in a location, studying the terrain and opposition, and a number of demonstrations might be undertaken to test enemy reaction as well as to build troop morale. Part of the army might be drawn up in battle array towards the enemy.

Deployment The Roman infantry typically was deployed, as the main body, facing the enemy, in three lines, with the cavalry or equites on their wings. The less experienced cohorts - usually the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th - were in the front; the more experienced cohorts - 1st, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 10th - were placed behind.

They were deployed in a Quincunx checkered pattern, in Latin triplex acies, with archers and auxiliares in the spaces between the cohorts. Before each battle, the commander exhorted his troops with a speech, and after that speech each soldier screamed his war cry and clashed his own gladius on his shield, a psychological tactic to demoralize the enemy. The Roman maneuver was a complex one, filled with the dust of thousands of men wheeling into place, and the shouting of officers moving to and fro as they attempted to maintain order. Several thousand men had to be positioned from column into line, with each unit taking its designated place, along with light troops and cavalry. It might take hours for the final deployment, but when accomplished the legion represented a formidable fighting array, arranged in three lines with a frontage as long as one mile. This is best case of networking of armies and deployment into a perfect area.

Field Combat Hand to hand The battle usually opened with light troops skirmishing with the opposition- archers, slingers, javelin-men etc. These light forces withdrew to the flanks or between the gaps in the central line as the hour of decision drew nigh. Cavalry might be launched against their opposing numbers or used to screen the central core from envelopment. As the gap between the contenders closed, the main Roman force went into action. The heavy infantry typically took the initiative, attacking on the double. The front ranks usually cast their pilum, and the following ranks hurled theirs over the heads of the front-line fighters. They then drew their swords and engaged the enemy. In the slogging match that ensued Roman discipline and training were to give them important advantages. Heavily armored,

with a large shield and aggressive swordplay, the infantry over time would wear down the opposition. Fresh troops were fed in from the rear, through the "checkboard" arrangement, to relieve the injured and exhausted further ahead. Eventually one side or another broke under the pressure and it is then that the greatest slaughter began.

Using Covering Fire Many Roman battles, especially during the late empire, were fought with the preparatory fire from Ballistas and Onagers. These war machines, a form of ancient artillery, fired arrows and large stones towards the enemy. Following this barrage, the Roman infantry advanced, in four lines, until they came within 30 meters of the enemy, then they halted, hurled their pila and charged. If the first line was repelled by the enemy, another line would rapidly resume the attack. Often this rapid sequence of deadly attacks proved the key of victory.

Ballista Another common tactic was to taunt the enemy with feigned charges and rapid arrow fire by the auxiliary cavalry, forcing the enemy into pursuing them, and then leading the enemy into an ambush where they would be counter attacked by Roman heavy infantry and cavalry

Auxiliary Cavalry

Why Romans Succeeded? 58

The film "Gladiator" (2000) presents a typical picture of Roman invincibility, complete with wild Germanic hordes that were quickly crushed. Rome suffered a number of embarrassing setbacks against such barbarians. One of Rome's greatest military defeats, (the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest) saw the liquidation of three imperial legions to Germanic warbands, and was to spark a limit on Roman expansion in the West. And it was these Germanic hordes in part (most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture) that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West. The core of the Roman Army was infantry and when they faced armies heavy with cavalry, they often encountered problems. One classic case of course is Hannibal's army, but both the horse reliant Parthians and heavy Sarmatian cavalry gave the legions more than a run for their money. Several of Rome's other military campaigns hardly show sustained invincibility or dazzling genius. Indeed Roman performance in many battles was unimpressive or disastrous. As far as ambushes for example, Roman forces seemed to have a penchant for falling into them repeatedly. Over the course of the empire, they were out-generaled by Hannibal (during the early years of the Second Punic War) and suffered a number of other severe defeats by opponents like the Parthians. And yet, over time, the Romans not only bounced back, but for the most part eventually crushed or neutralized their enemies. How then did they do it against a variety of enemies that were, at various times and places, more numerous, more skilled or better led?

Central factors in Roman success Some elements that made the Romans an effective military force, both tactically and at higher levels, were: 59

The Romans were able to copy and adapt the weapons and methods of its opponents more effectively Some weapons, such as the gladius, were adopted by romans. Especially formidable enemies units of their forces were invited to serve in the Roman army as auxiliaries after peace was made. In the naval sphere, the Romans followed some of the same methods they used with the infantry, dropping their ineffective designs and copying, adapting and improving warships, and introducing heavier marine contingents (infantry fighters) on to their ships.

Roman organization was more flexible than those of many opponents Tribal peoples for example often attacked en-masse with little coordination, using standard tactics traditional to their culture that varied relatively little. There were exceptions, notably by leaders who had previously been extensively exposed to Roman military methods, but this was the general rule. By contrast, the heavy infantry, through their training and discipline, and operating in conjunction with light foot and cavalry, could more quickly adopt a number of methods and formations depending on the situation. Against more sophiscated opponents the Romans also showed great flexibility at times, such as the brilliant adjustments Scipio made against Hannibal at Zama. These included leaving huge gaps in the ranks to trap the charging elephants, and the recall, reposition and consolidation of a single battle line that advanced to the final death struggle against the Carthaginian veterans of Italy. This is best example of logistical planning and felxibility.

Roman discipline, organization and logistical systemization sustained combat effectiveness over a longer period.

The Roman system of castra, or fortified camps, allowed the army to stay in the field on favorable ground and be rested and resupplied for battle. Well organized Roman logistics also sustained combat power, from routine resupply and storage, to the construction of military roads, to state run arsenals and weapons factories, to well organized naval convoys that helped stave off defeat by Carthage. The death of a leader generally did not cause the legions to lose heart in battle. Others stepped to the fore and carried on. In the defeat by Hannibal at the River Trebia, 10,000 Romans cut their way through the debacle to safety, maintaining unit cohesion when all around was rout, a testimony to their tactical organization and discipline.

Conclusion Few of the armies Rome faced over the centuries had efficient logistics and were thus under a lot more time pressure to reach a decision before their troops starved or, more likely, quit the field. Unless you had a logistical system comparable to the Romans, and few medieval armies did, you had to live off the land. This could have dire consequences. Each man needed at least three pounds of food a day, and each horse twenty pounds of feed. If these requirements were not met, the troops would first go hungry and then most of them would either desert or, if you were far from friendly territory, starve to death or be picked off by enemy troops.

1999 Kargil Conflict

Introduction The 1999 Kargil War took place between May 8, when Pakistani forces and Kashmiri militants were detected atop the Kargil ridges and July 14 when both sides had essentially ceased their military operations. It is believed that the planning for the operation, by Pakistan, may have occurred about as early as the autumn of 1998. The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to repel the intrusion left 524 Indian soldiers dead and 1,363 wounded, according to December 1 statistics by Defense Minister George Fernandes. Earlier Government figures stated that 696 Pakistani soldiers were killed. A senior Pakistani police official estimated that approximately 40 civilians were killed on the Pakistani side of the line of control.

By 30 June 1999 Indian forces were prepared for a major high-altitude offensive against Pakistani posts along the border in the disputed Kashmir region. Over the previous six weeks India had moved five infantry divisions, five independent brigades and 44 battalions of paramilitary troops to Kashmir. The total Indian troop strength in the region had reached 730,000. The build-up included the deployment of around 60 frontline aircraft. This is where logistics have come into force i.e. Deployment of resources. The Pakistani effort to take Kargil occurred after the February 1999 Lahore summit between then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bahari Vajpayee. This conference was believed to have de-escalated the tensions that had existed since May 1998.

Major motive The major motive behind the operation was to help in internationalising the Kashmir issue, and for which global attention had been flagging for some time. The intrusion plan was the brainchild of Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Gen Pervez Musharraf and Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff. They obtained only an 'in principle' concurrence, without any specifics, from Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani Prime Minister.

What Pakistan Exploited?

Pakistan's military aim for carrying out the intrusions was based on exploitation of the large gaps that exist in the defenses in the sector both on Indian and Pak side of the Line of Control (Loc). The terrain is extremely rugged with very few tracks leading from the main roads towards the Loc. During winters the area gets very heavy snowfall making movement almost impossible. The only mountain pass connecting the Kargil area to the Kashmir Valley, Zoji La, normally opens by the end of May or beginning of June. Thus, moving of reinforcements by surface means from Srinagar would not have been possible till then. Thus to win over India needs best logistical system to be in place because wrong deployment of resources, arms, food supplies & warehousing and transportation of food to our soldiers death and would led to loss of war.

Pakistan Army Calculations Pakistan Army calculated that even if the intrusions were discovered in early May, as they were, the Indian Army's reaction would be slow and limited, thereby allowing him to consolidate the intrusions more effectively. In the event, however, Zoji La was opened for the induction of troops in early May itself.

What Pakistan army Tried to pressurize on? 1. The intrusions, if effective, would enable Pakistani troops to secure a number of dominating heights from where the Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1A could be interdicted at a number of places. Thus trying to crub transportation system which is core to logistics. 2. The intrusions would also draw in and tie down Indian Army reserves. Thus to crub Warehousing and inventory systems of Indian Army. 3. The intrusions would, further, give Pakistan control over substantial tracts of strategic land area across the LoC, thereby, enabling Islamabad to negotiate from a position of strength. Thus giving command over logistical area where they can do networking and forward their operations.

4. The intrusions would irrevocably alter the status of the Loc.

Indian strategists believe that the Pakistani offensive had four major objectives: 1. Choke the strategic road linking Srinagar with Leh and prevent vital winter supplies reaching Ladakh. 2. Occupy Drass and Kargil and use that to open up the Loc. 3. Use the capture of heights in Chugh valley, Batalik and Turtuk regions to force India to back down in Siachen. 4. Control the Mashkoh Valley nullah near Kargil and use it as a major route for fresh infiltration. The grand design was to alter the LoC by force, bury the Simla Agreement and bring the Kashmir issue back on the international stage. Apart from keeping the plan top secret, the Pakistan Army also undertook certain steps to maintain an element of surprise and maximise deception. Any large-scale troop movement involving even two or three battalions would have drawn the attention of the Indian Army. There was no movement of reserve formations or units until after the execution of the plan and operations had begun with the Indian Army's response. No new administrative bases for the intrusions were to be created, instead they were to be catered for from those already in the existing defences. The logistic lines of communication were to be along the ridgelines well away from the tracks and positions of the Indian Army troops already in position. After it was finalised, the plan was put into action towards the end of April. The main groups were broken into a number of smaller sub groups of 30 to 40 each for carrying out multiple intrusions along the ridgelines and occupy dominating heights. This has proper deployment of troops to areas and trying to get most of the logistical areas.

The terrain of the Kargil and surrounding regions of the LOC is inhospitable in the best of times. Some of the characteristics of the region are jagged heights of up to 18,000 feet and harsh gusts of wind and temperatures plunging to about -60 degrees Celsius in the winter. The battle terrain of 'Operation Vijay' is dominated by high altitude peaks and ridgelines most of which are over 16000 ft. This region is part of the 'cold desert' region of Ladakh. Dry, and at the same time very cold, the Kargil Mountains are a formidable constituent of the Greater Himalayas. Unlike other similar high altitude areas, the Kargil Mountains lose snow cover rapidly as the summer progresses. Below the peaks and the ridgelines are loose rocks, which make climbing extremely difficult. If it is not the snow cover, then it is the rocks, which cause extreme hardships on the troops. There had existed a sort of "gentleman's agreement" between India and Pakistan that the armies of either side will not occupy posts from the 15 September to 15th April of each year. This had been the case since 1977, but in 1999 this agreement was cast aside by the Pakistani army in hopes of trying to gain the upper hand in Kashmir and plunging the Indian subcontinent in brief and limited war and raising the spectre of nuclear war. As events unfolded, Zoji La opened early on account of the unseasonal melting of snows and the Indian Army's reaction was far swifter than Pakistan had expected. Further, Pakistan also did not expect the reaction of the Indian Army to be as vigorous as has been demonstrated manifested. Indian Army Patrols detected intruders atop Kargil ridges during the period 8-15 May 1999. The pattern of infiltration clearly established the participation of trained Mujahideen and Pakistan Army regulars in these operations in areas east of Batalik and north of Dras. Pakistan resorted to artillery firing from across the border both in general areas of Kargil and Dras. Indian army launched operations, which succeeded in cutting off the infiltrators in Dras sector. Infiltrators were also pushed back in Batalik sector. Thus there was logistical strategy used of cutting down the connections of the competitor, if we say in business terms.

The Intruders on the heights were an amalgam of professional soldiers and mercenaries. They included the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 12th battalions of the Pakistan Armyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Northern Light Infantry (NLI). Among them were many Mujaheddin and members of Pakistan's the Special Services Group (SSG). It was initially estimated that there were about 500 to 1,000 intruders occupying the heights but later it is estimated that the actual strength of the intruders may have been about 5,000. The area of intrusion extended in an area of 160km. The Pakistani Army had set up a complex logistical network through which the intruders across the LOC would be well supplied from the bases in POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). The intruders were also well armed with AK 47 and 56, mortars, artillery, anti aircraft guns, and Stinger missiles.

Indian Army Operations The Indian Army detected the intrusions between May 3-12. From May 15 - 25, 1999, military operations were planned, troops moved to their attack locations, artillery and other equipment were moved in and the necessary equipment was purchased. Thus purchasing and deployment of resources becomes part of logistical system. Indian Armyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s offensive named Operation Vijay was launched on May 26, 1999. Indian troops moved towards Pakistani occupied positions with air cover provided by aircraft and helicopters. Operation Vijay in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir during the summer months of 1999 was a joint Infantry-Artillery endeavour to evict regular Pakistani soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) who had intruded across the Line of Control (Loc) into Indian Territory and had occupied un-held high-altitude mountain peaks and ridgelines. It soon became clear that only massive and sustained firepower could destroy the intruders and systematically break their will to fight through a process of attrition and, in the process, enable the gallant infantrymen to close in with and evict the intruders. Thus began a unique saga in the history of the employment of Artillery firepower in battle. 67

First Goal to achieve The first major ridgeline to fall was Tololing in the Drass sub-sector on June 13, 1999, which was captured after several weeks of bitter fighting. The attacks were preceded by sustained fire assaults from over one hundred Artillery guns, mortars and rocket launchers firing in concert. Thousands of shells, bombs and rocket warheads wrecked havoc and prevented the enemy from interfering with the assault. The 155 mm Bofors medium guns and 105 mm Indian field guns in the direct firing role destroyed all visible enemies and forced the enemy to abandon several positions. The arcs of fire trailing behind the Bofors high explosive shells and the Grad rockets provided an awesome sight and instilled fear into the minds of Pakistani soldiers. And this was only possible because of best logistics drawn by our experts in the sense of deployment of resources, food, arms and ammunitions and other means of communication.

Second Goal The capture of the Tololing complex paved the way for successive assaults to be launched on the Tiger Hill complex from several directions. Tiger Hill was re-captured on July 5, 1999 and Point 4875. Over 1,200 rounds of high explosive rained down on Tiger Hill and caused large-scale death and devastation. Once again, the Gunners of the Indian Artillery fired their guns audaciously in the direct firing role, under the very nose of Pakistani artillery observation posts (OPs), without regard for personal safety. Even 122 mm Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) were employed in the direct firing role. Hundreds of shells and rocket warheads impacted on the pinnacle of Tiger Hill in full view of TV cameras and the nation watched in rapt attention the might of the Regiment of Artillery .

Third Goal

To the west of Tiger Hill and jutting into Mashkoh Valley, was re-captured on July 7, 1999. Point 4875 has since been re-named "Gun Hill" in honour of the stupendous performance of the Gunners in the Drass and Mashkoh sub-sectors.

Simultaneous to all above goals While the nation's attention was riveted on the fighting in the Drass sector, steady progress was being made in the Batalik sector despite heavy casualties. In the Batalik sector, the terrain was much tougher and the enemy was far more strongly entrenched. The containment battle itself took almost a month. Artillery Operations were established on dominating heights and sustained Artillery fire was brought down on the enemy continuously by day and night allowing him no rest. The rule of thumb is that mountain ridges or spurs descending or linked to high Pakistani features in Batalik and Mashkoh will be difficult nuts to crack since they facilitate supplies, reinforcements and ammunition for the intruders from their PoK bases. Where there is a break, such as the Tiger Hill and Tololing area, it is possible to push forces to interpose themselves between the intruders and their supply lines. The Army plan, according to retired vice-chief of staff Lt-General K.K. Hazari, seems to be following this strategy. "We interpose our forces where we can, progressively deplete their ability to fight and then expect to roll them up in a month or two,"

Fourth Goal Point 5203 was re-captured on June 21, 1999

Fifth Goal Khalubar was re-captured on July 6, 1999. Within the next few days, further attacks were pressed home against the remaining Pakistani posts in the Batalik sub-sector and these fell quickly after being pulverised by Artillery fire. Once again, Artillery firepower played an important part in softening the defences and destroying the enemy's battalion headquarters and logistics infrastructure.

The Indian Artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately, 5,000 Artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars. Such high rates of fire over long periods had not been witnessed anywhere in the world since the Second World War.

Logistically support system to land operations in Kargil Air Operations From May 11 to May 25, ground troops supported by the Air Force tried to contain the threat, assessed the enemy dispositions and carried out various preparatory actions. Entry of the Air Force into combat action on May 26 represented a paradigm shift in the nature and prognosis of the conflict. In operation Safed Sagar, the Air Force carried out nearly 5,000 sorties of all types over 50-odd days of operations. Operations in this terrain required special training and tactics. It was soon realised that greater skills and training were needed to attack the very small/miniature targets extant, often not visible to the naked eye. The shoulder-fired missile threat was omnipresent and there were no doubts about this. An IAF Canberra recce aircraft was damaged by a Pakistani Stinger fired possibly from across the LoC. On the second and third day of the operations, still in the learning curve, the IAF lost one MiG-21 fighter and one Mig-17 helicopter to shoulder-fired missiles by the enemy. In addition, one MiG-27 was lost on the second day due to engine failure just after the pilot had carried out successful attacks on one of the enemy's main supply dumps. These events only went to reinforce the tactics of the IAF in carrying out attacks from outside the Stinger envelope and avoiding the use of helicopters for attack purposes. Attack helicopters have a certain utility in operations under relatively benign conditions but are extremely vulnerable in an intense battlefield. The fact that the enemy fired more than 100 shoulder fired against IAF aircraft indicates not only the great intensity of the enemy air defences in the area but also the success of IAF tactics, especially after the first three days of the war during which not a single aircraft received even a scratch. 70

The terrain in the Kargil area is 16,000 to 18,000 feet above sea level. The aircraft are, therefore, required to fly at about 20,000 feet. At these heights, the air density is 30% less than at sea level. This causes a reduction in weight that can be carried and also reduces the ability to manoeuvre as the radius of a turn is more than what it is at lower levels. The larger radius of turn reduces manoeuverability in the restricted width of the valley. The engineâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s performance also deteriorates as for the same forward speed there is a lesser mass of air going into the jet engine of the fighter or helicopter. The non-standard air density also affects the trajectory of weapons. The firing, hence, may not be accurate. In the mountains, the targets are relatively small, spread-out and difficult to spot visually, particularly by pilots in high-speed jets. The Indian airfields nearest to Kargil were: 1. Srinagar 2. Avantipur 3. Adampur near Jalandhar They supported air operations. Therefore, the IAF operated from these three bases. The planes used for ground attack were: 1. MiG-2ls 2. MiG- 23s 3. MiG-27s 4. Jaguars 5. Mirage- 2000.

The Mig-2l was built mainly for air interception with a secondary role of ground attack. However, it is capable of operating in restricted spaces, which was of importance in the Kargil terrain. The MiG-23s and 27s are optimized for attacking targets on the ground. They can carry a load of 4 tonnes each. This could be a mix of weapons including cannon,

rocket pods, free- fall and retarded bombs and smart weapons. It has a computerised bomb sight which enables accurate weapon delivery. These planes were, therefore, ideal for use in the mountainous terrain of Kargil.

Naval Operations While the Army and the Air Force readied themselves for the battle on the heights of Kargil, Indian Navy began to draw out its plans. Unlike the earlier wars with Pakistan, this time the bringing in of the Navy at the early stages of the conflict served to hasten the end of the conflict in India's favor. In drawing up its strategy, the Navy was clear that a reply to the Pakistani misadventure had to be two-pronged. While ensuring safety and security of Indian maritime assets from a possible surprise attack by Pakistan, the Indian imperative was that all efforts must be made to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict into a full-scale war. Thus, the Indian Navy was put on a full alert from May 20 onwards, a few days prior to the launch of the Indian retaliatory offensive. Naval and Coast Guard aircraft were put on a continuous surveillance and the units readied up for meeting any challenge at sea. Time had now come to put pressure on Pakistan, to ensure that the right message went down to the masterminds in that country. Strike elements from the Eastern Fleet were sailed from Visakhapatnam on the East Coast to take part in a major naval exercise called 'SUMMEREX' in the North Arabian Sea. This was envisaged as the largest ever amassing of naval ships in the region. The message had been driven home. Pakistan Navy, in a defensive mood, directed all its units to keep clear of Indian naval ships. As the exercise shifted closer to the Makaran Coast, Pakistan moved all its major combatants out of Karachi. It also shifted its focus to escorting its oil trade from the Gulf in anticipation of attacks by Indian ships. As the retaliation from the Indian Army and the Air Force gathered momentum and a defeat to Pakistan seemed a close possibility, an outbreak of hostilities became imminent. 72

Thus the naval focus now shifted to the Gulf of Oman. Rapid reaction missile carrying units and ships from the fleet were deployed in the North Arabian Sea for carrying out missile firing, anti-submarine and electronic warfare exercises. In the absence of the only aircraft carrier, Sea Harrier operations from merchant ships were proven. The Navy also readied itself for implementing a blockade of the Pakistani ports, should the need arise. In addition, Naval amphibious forces from the Andaman group of islands were moved to the western sea-board. In a skilful use of naval power in the form of ‘Operation Talwar’, the ‘Eastern Fleet’ joined the ‘Western Naval Fleet’ and blocked the Arabian sea routes of Pakistan. Apart from a deterrent, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief later disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel (POL) to sustain itself if a full fledged war broke out.

Indian Army Logistical Limitations 1. Ideally the army would have adopted the "encircle and squeeze" tactic to evict the intruders. But it has strict orders not to cross the LoC into PoK which means it cannot really cut off the Pakistan Army supplies to the intruders at many of the key ridges. 2. The inhospitable terrain, which is almost like Siachen with temperatures dropping to minus 15 degrees Celsius, high winds and steep escarpments, the Indian Army was initially ill prepared to take on such a large-scale intrusion. Almost half of its frontline troops were without what is known as "glacier clothing" to withstand extreme cold in the high reaches and fresh supplies took time in coming. 3. With casualties mounting, the army's strategy is to avoid costly "Charge of the Light Brigade" kind of assault and follow the textbook by attacking intruder posts from several directions, geared towards cutting off their supplies and reinforcements from Pakistan. Such a method requires numbers and time as fast as it could be.

To support this effort there was thousands of soldiers â&#x20AC;&#x201C; logistical strategy, artillery forces, reserve and specialized forces.

Logistical cost to India 1. Deployment of forces 2. Supplying food â&#x20AC;&#x201C; no army can win war without food. 3. Deployment of arms and ammunitions 4. Choking out transportation network where goods can be supplied at minimum cost and at faster rate. 5. Deployment of medical services 6. Deployment of communication system

Moreover All these have to move with the battalions moving forward.

Logistical cost It has been estimated that daily cost of war for India at Rs 15 crore. Thus daily cost of 15 crore states the importance of logistics in military operations. If a jet plane chooses wrong route for flying it can become more expensive as well as it consumed more time, in the same manner if the logistics is not planned in proper manner it can add more cost to the military operations.

Failure in logistics

Israel failure in Lebanon

Israeli military chief of staff, Lt Gen Dan Halutz, has publicly admitted to failings in the conflict with Hezbollah militants in Lebanon. Halutz has been widely criticised for not achieving Israel's war aims. In a letter to troops, he said it had exposed shortcomings in following areas: 1. Militaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s logistics 2. Operations 3. Command. The Israeli army lost 116 soldiers. Forty-three civilians were also killed by more than 4,000 Hezbollah rocket attacks. About 1,000 Lebanese were killed in the conflict, mostly civilians in Israel's vast bombardment of the county and land invasion in the south. The conflict was sparked by a cross-border raid by Hezbollah fighters in which they captured two Israeli soldiers and killed eight others.

Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Aim 1. The return of the captured Israeli soldiers 2. The removal of Hezbollah's influence from southern Lebanon. But neither of these aims has been achieved. Lebanon deaths: About 1,000 - mostly civilians, No precise data on Hezbollah dead Israeli deaths: Soldiers: 116, Civilians: 43 Lebanon displaced: 700,000 - 900,000 (UNHCR; Lebanese govt) Israeli displaced: 500,000 (Human Rights Watch)

US Army supply chain Failure in Iraq war

The failure of automated supply chain management and tracking systems in Iraq, U.S. Army combat units had to resort capturing key supplies such as lubricants and explosives from enemy stockpiles. Food supplies barely met demand, and stocks of ammunition and spare parts were nearly depleted during combat, wrote analysts at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, a military think tank that's sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and based at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. After studying the Iraq war up to the fall of Baghdad, the CALL analysts found that the performance of logistics and supply chain operations were "barely above subsistence level," in large part because of problems with software based on radio frequency identification technology (RFID) and network communications. There is no one answer to why the logistics failures occurred, said Gregory Fontenot, a retired Army colonel who was one of the three co-authors of the book. But, he added, "In my assessment, the biggest single problem was the communications issue." The Army did stress-testing on its battlefield systems before the war, but nothing could have fully prepared them to deal with fast-moving combat operations involving 150,000 troops and several million supply items. The Army is working to replace its 13 core logistics systems, which include several thousand applications, with a version of SAP AG's software tailored for defense operations.

Failure areas

1. The SAP application was not in place. If SAP's applications had been in place prior to the start of the war in Iraq, the Army simply could have installed an RFID module. Although the communications infrastructure in Iraq was poor when the war began. Probably greatest frustration was the inability to connect all computers to the network," he said. 2. The Army was unable to start deploying transmitting devices with satellite dishes and readers that can pull information from RFID tags attached to supplies until just before the U.S. launched its attack. As a result, the ability of logistics managers to track supplies plummeted after the goods reached Iraq. 3. Another problem was that the logistics systems weren't flexible enough to deal with exceptions and glitches. For example, if a combat unit unexpectedly changed its location, there was no way to reroute its supplies.

Conclusion 78

No military operation is complete with out logistics. It has become the importance of today’s business as well as for wars to implement proper logistical system. If logistical system is not in place it can make a successful strategy a failure. We have seen an example of Israel failure in Lebanon as well as US army’s supply chain failure. It have added to much cost to the war because a failure system have to be revamped and it has to be implemented against so the cost of reserve logistics makes all the difference to the country’s expenditure. A well-managed and implemented logistical system could place a weak opponent into a powerful position where as it can change the whole scenario. The use of logistics has been on a wide scale since ancient times. At every step of our life we use logistics i.e. how can we lower down cost and become more efficient. Logistics is here to stay, may be used in different areas and would be implemented in different manner but it’s a clear picture that logistics is here to stay. Those who implement it would be in a powerful position and those who do not implement it would face a severe loss. Competition is growing, cost reduction has become the main hurdle, war expenses are reaching at more high levels and moreover protecting a country and its people has become much more important. All this suggests that logistics is here to stay now it’s upon you to follow or not.

Bibliography 79

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Magazines 1. Business & Economy

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ICFAI Publication June 06 isue

3. Global educator

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Newspaper 1. Economics times 2. Business Standard

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